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In publishing the third  edition  of  the present  book, 
which first appeared in 1905, the author has tried to com- 
ply with the general wish to avoid as much as possible 
the mere reproduction of  the text of  the ten lectures on 
which the early editions were originally based.  Instead 
of  this, the present edition marks the partial realization of 
the idea  of  the larger work  which the author has  con- 
stantly had in mind from the very beginning 
The  author  has  tried  to  fulfil  the  expectation  and 
wishes  of  the critics  (whose suggestions are always wel- 
come) to the best of  his ability and so far as the time at 
his  disposal  permitted  The  present  edition  has  been 
completely reshaped and considerably enlarged-as  indi- 
cated in the title of  the book-although  the fundamental 
features of  the work and the particular treatment of  the 
concentration movement have been retained. 
For this purpose it became necessary in the first place 
to enlarge on the description of  German economic devel- 
opment  from  1848 to  1870, and  from  1870 up  to the 
present day, in  so  far  as this  development  exercised  a 
determining influence on the growth of  German banking. 
In the second place an attempt has been  made,  as far 
as existing material  permitted, to present  in nearly every 
chapter  the  separate  development  of  each  great  bank, 
without, however, obscuring the picture  of  the general 
development. National  Monetary  Commission  Preface 
In a separate chapter a comprehensive view is given of 
the general management and development of  the six great 
Berlin banks.  Accordingly  it also became  necessary  to 
present  a  systematic  description  of  the most  important 
debit  and  credit  transactions  of  the banks.  This  per- 
mitted the generally desired and fully justified  examina- 
tion  of  the  question  whether  and to what  extent  the 
German  great banks have actually fulfilled in the inter- 
ests of  the community the important and numerous tasks 
set forth in the introductory chapter. 
In discussing the credit and debit business of  the banks 
it became possible also to devote some space to the treat- 
ment of  questions of  technical methods and business pol- 
icy, which  had been  entirely kept out  from the earlier 
editions. 
It  will be found that the chapter (VIII) devoted to the 
analysis and criticism of  the reform proposals in the field 
of  bank deposits, which were  discussed quite fully even 
in the first edition, has been greatly enlarged, for the rea- 
son that these proposals may be said to occupy at present 
the  center  of  German  banking  discussion.  A  further 
reason was that in the meantime the views of  the various 
experts have been published, as presented before the Bank 
Inquiry Commission, of  which the author was a member. 
An analysis and appreciation of  these views seemed there- 
fore pertinent. 
Another subject which had to be passed over lightly in 
the former  editions-though  against  the wishes  of  the 
author-viz,  industrial  concentration  and the influence 
which the concentration of  banking exercises on  it, has 
now been treated in greater detail.  However, for lack of 
space this chapter even now  is limited to a study of  this 
movement  in  a  few  typical  and  specially  important 
branches of  industry. 
Suggestions as to form have also been adopted as far as 
possible.  Much  discursive matter, hitherto contained in 
the notes,  has  been  incorporated in  the text.  On  the 
other hand  large statistical tables, which  formerly were 
part  of  the text, and  thus  broke  up  the continuity of 
presentation, have been removed to the end of  the book in 
the form of  appendices. 
A series of  what I consider very important  statistical 
appendices has been substituted for those printed  in the 
earlier  editions.  For  the  preparation  and  checking  of 
these  tables  I  desire to express my  best  thanks to Dr. 
Berthold Breslauer, of  Berlin, the editor of  the statistical 
part of  the Bank Archiv.  The tables showing the amount 
of  listed securities issued by the six great Berlin banks- 
constituting  Appendices V  and VI-for  the  first  time 
provide complete material based on  official data concern- 
ing this important subject. 
Appendix VIII-treating  of  the course of  the concen- 
tration movement in the case of  the eight greatest Berlin 
banks-has  been brought down to December 3 I, 1908. 
It is hoped that the book  in its new  shape will  meet 
with the same friendly. reception which has been accorded 
to its earlier editions and that it will be found a reliable 
reference work, equally free from fulsome commendation 
and from undue depreciation of  the work of  the German 
credit banks. 
ROME,  April, 1909. TRANSLA'I'OR'S  NOTE. 
Prof. Riesser's work, Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre 
Konzentration, of  which the present volume is a transla- 
tion,  gives  the most  recent  and  fullest  account  of  the 
development,  present  organization,  and practices  of  the 
more  important  German  so-called  credit  banks,  par- 
ticularly the six largest  banks, which, with the possible 
exception of  one, may be said to have their central office 
in Berlin.  The name credit bank, which has been retained 
in the translation, in no way characterizes the actual scope 
of  activity of  these banks, but is the term used in recent 
German banking literature to differentiate the commercial 
joint-stock  and  kindred  banks  without  the  note-issue 
privilege from other  banks  having a more restricted and 
special field  of  operations, such  as the mortgage  banks, 
the mutual or cooperative banks, the savings banks, etc. 
The  book  abounds  in  technical  legal  and  banking 
terminology,  for which  no  exact equivalents in  English 
exist.  In numerous cases no translation was attempted. 
In other cases where the terms occur frequently through- 
out the volume, a choice of  an English equivalent, though 
more  or  less  arbitrary, had  to be  made.  This  applies 
particularly to the term Depositen, the definition of  which 
the  author  declares  to be  impracticable.  (See  p.  196 
et seq.)  In German bank statements different meanings 
are attached to the term by various institutions, the only 
common feature  being that  interest is allowed on these 
"  deposits. " Trafislator's Note 
An  important function  of  the German credit banks is 
the financing of  corporations and the selling to the public 
of  the  newly  created  securities  of  these  corporations. 
Throughout  the  volume  this  latter  practice  has  been 
designated  as  the issuing  activity  of  the credit  banks. 
The success of  these operations depends largely upon the 
"issue  credit"  of  the bank-i.  e., the confidence of  the 
investing public in the soundness of  the securities offered 
by  the bank.  In several  cases  a  literal  translation  of 
German technical  terms seemed entirely proper,  though 
such terms as pure and mixed  works  (p. 175)) mine fur- 
naces,  furnace  mines  (p.  369), heavy  industry,  and  the 
like, even with proper  explanations in the text, may be 
regarded by some as literary barbarisms. 
The proofs of  the translation  have been  submitted to 
the author, who made several changes in the text which 
do not appear in the German original.  The figures bearing 
upon  American banking have been revised and brought 
up  to  date.  Thankful  acknowledgment  is  due  to 
Dr.  Robert Stein, of  Washington, D. C., and Dr.  H. G. 
Friedman, of  New  York City, for valuable help rendered 
to the translator. 
MORRIS JACOBSON. 
WASHINGTON,  D. C., August, 1911. 
THE GERMAN GREAT BANKS  AND 
THEIR  CONCENTRATION. 
INTRODUCTION-THE  TASKS  OF BANKS  IN 
ECONOMIC  LIFE. 
(I)  GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
Walther  Lotz, in  his  excellent  book  on  the methods 
of  floating securities  (Die Technik des  Emissiongeschiifts, 
18go), makes the following statement (p. 60) : 
"One of  the most prominent  financiers in Berlin once 
remarked  to me that his profession was not  affected by 
the social question, which was usually regarded as the most 
important factor in economic development, and that the 
speculative banks adopted a neutral attitude toward it." 
To  my  mind  this  statement  proves  that  the  Berlin 
financier in question has strangely misconceived the posi- 
tion  and duties of  German banking within  the realm of 
"  capitalistic  economics." l  To  prove  this  in  detail  is 
neither  the least  nor  the most  unimportant  aim of  the 
present work. 
Within  the range  of  capitalistic economics there is  a 
whole  series  of  important  and  special  economic  tasks 
devolving on banks and bankers. 
To begin with, the funds are capital in the popular sense 
of  the word  (that is,  sums  of  money  constituting  com- National  Monetary  Commission 
- 
ponent  parts  of  wealth  to be devoted  to producing  in- 
come)z which accumulate in the safes of  banks and bank- 
ers.  It is the bankers' profession  and  duty not  only to 
take care of the capital, but  to turn it to good account, 
i. e., to make it productive, particularly by placing it at 
the disposal of  others for industrial and other   purpose^.^ 
Banks  have to receive  the funds placed  at their  dis- 
posal for the purpose of  investment and profitable utili- 
sation, and to direct  them into proper channels through 
the granting of  credit. 
The bank  enters into relations on  the one hand with 
the capitalist who entrusts to it his available money for 
productive investment and thus becomes its creditor, and 
on  the other  hand, with  entrepreneurs  and  others who 
receive money  for  their  ventures,  and  thus  become  its 
debtors. 
The part which  a bank plays in its relations between 
capitalists and persons engaged in various  enterprises is 
similar and as important as that of  the trader who acts as 
independent middleman between producer and consumer, 
and who participates  in the increase of  values by trans- 
porting goods with or without  intermediate manufacture 
from districts where supply is plentiful  to districts where 
demand is great. 
The so-called regular or current banking business is con- 
fined to the acceptance and granting of  such or  similar 
credit  (so-called  credit  and  debit transactions).  It in- 
cludes deposits, current accounts, bill, contango, lombard, 
and commission business. 
The tasks involve, as far as is practicable within such 
limits, the direct furtherance of  the power of production of 
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a11  industries, including (after what has been said above) 
c~mmerce,~  and  indirectly  the  furtherance  of  the pur- 
chasing  power  of  all  classes  of  the comm~nity.~  They 
necessitate endeavors for the investment of  surplus capital 
in  a  suitable  and economic  manner,  and  its utilisation 
for credit transactions. 
In the next place, banks and bankers have to provide 
for a sound and constant regulation of  the circulation of 
money  and the adjustment  of  money  settlements  in  so 
far as these functions do not fall within the province of 
special public  banks.  They also have to provide  for  a 
banking organisation of  the whole commercial system of 
payment, and above all for an increase of  those forms of 
settlement which tend to take the place of  cash:  in par- 
ticular  the  employment  of  checks, transfers  (giro), and 
bank  clearing."inally,  they have to establish organic 
relations  between  the systems  of  credit  and payment, 
by using their credit to convert the claims of  their cus- 
tomers in the shape of  bills, checks, money orders, etc., 
into current paper, and thus into ready money, using this 
latter for  the purpose of  meeting payment on matured 
obligations.7 
The historical  development  of  German banking, how- 
ever, has considerably enlarged the scope of  these duties. 
The  transformation  effected  since  the middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century  in the whole  system of  communica- 
tions through the use of  steam for ships and railways (see 
P. 34), and the revolution  in many industrial  branches, 
caused by the appearance  of  the steam engine,  in con- 
jullction with the creation of  a large and unified German 
economic territory through the customs union of  the Ger- National  Monetary  Commission 
man States (Zollverein, 1833)~  paved the way for the ex- 
pansion and world-wide aspirations of  German industry, 
and thus  gave the impulse to large-scale production  in 
many branches of  industry. 
Thus it became necessary that capital as well  as credit 
should be devoted to the building of  piants and works in 
sums and for periods hitherto seldom required, if produc- 
tion on a large scale was to be maintained and extended. 
This could only be made possible by the issue of  shares or 
debentures. 
The joint stock company proving the most reliable ally 
of  trade  and  industry, conducted  on  a  large  scale, it 
became necessary to  transform private concerns into joint 
stock companies and to establish  new industrial  enter- 
prises in the shape of  stock companies, whenever it was 
desired to increase the credit of  existing private concerns, 
to enlarge or diversify production, or to enable  domestic 
industry to enter into competition with foreign producers. 
The  general  public  in  Germany, whose  funds were 
meager compared  to those of  England, was  neither able 
nor willing at this juncture to participate directly or per- 
manently  in  such  ventures  as  mentioned  above.  The 
private individual  fought shy of  investing his capital in 
enterprises,  and, content with  smaller  interest,  bought 
government  securitie~.~ 
Adequate  assistance for the demands  of  capital  and 
credit could not be expected from  the existing note-issuing 
bankslg  whose increase had  long  been advocated in the 
interest of  increased facilities' of  payment, as the extent 
of  their  activity was  naturally  limited  by their  special 
functions.  In the same manner private bankers, who at 
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that time were very powerful, at least  in several centers 
(see below, p.  39), could supply only  modest  means for 
such  purposes-means  which  could  neither  suffice, nor 
be tied up for any length of  time.  In addition to this, the 
organisation of  the banking  business at that period was 
in general neither prepared for, nor adapted to operations 
of  such a comprehensive and difficult nature (see below, 
P. 40). 
For  these  reasons  such  new  and  enormous  demands 
could  be  met  only  by  the creation  of  special  organs, 
namely joint  stock banks, which were  called into exist- 
ence to satisfy these very requirements.  In the natural 
course  of  things  the banks  gradually  became  the  pro- 
fessional and expert intermediaries  in meeting  the new 
financial wants.  This they were able to do only through 
continuous  and systematic study of  the money  market, 
as well as of the markets for the newly created securities, 
especially among their own  customers.  Moreover, both 
the continuity of  their existence and regard for their own 
issue credit (~missio&kredif),  i. e., the permanent ability 
of  maintaining among the German  public a  market  for 
new securities issued under their auspices, insured a per- 
manent interest on the part of  these  banks in the newly 
created  undertakings  as well  as  in the securities which 
they were instrumental in placing on the market. 
It is, therefore,  too  narrow a view, and consequently 
incorrect, to assume that (l0) "  the assistance of  the numer- 
ous  private bankers, equally conspicuous for intelligence 
and wealth, would  have amply sufficed for all the tasks 
described above," and that the German credit banks grew 
up solely, or almost exclusively, because the general public National  Monetary  Commission 
'rushed  madly  after  the most  speculative of  securities,' 
and because of  the endeavours made  to cater  as far as 
possible  to this  speculative  craze  for  railway,  mining, 
and foundry shares."  It must, however, be acknowledged 
that these reasons did play a certain part in the matter, 
especially  the  desire  of  the smaller  capitalists  to par- 
ticipate indirectly in the industries promoted by the new 
banks  by  the speculative  acquisition of  shares in these 
banks (" speculating on  speculation"). 
It  has  been  said  concerning  Saxony,  that  although 
the number of  private banks  was  large for the time in 
question, yet  "their  powers were  inadequate to  satisfy 
the credit requirements." l'  There is ample testimony to 
prove  that this was not solely  a  local symptom, and a 
mere glance at the security issues made during that first 
period leaves the same impression.  Moreover it is stated 
that it was just among private bankers of  that period that 
"the necessity for concentration of  capital was felt the most, 
and that a remedy was  being  looked for."12  We know 
that the committees which in almost all German  States 
were  petitioning  for concessions (in Prussia long  in vain, 
as is well  known) for the establishment  of  note  issuing 
and  credit  banks, were composed  for  the most  part  of 
private bankers.13 
Schaffle l4 goes even further in the following statement 
published in a monograph about  I 856 : 
"When  industrial development has reached  the stage 
at  which great industries are forced to acquire their capital 
largely through  the gathering  of  small capitals, special 
economic  organisations  must  develop  on  which  special 
functions regarding  the initiative  in  stock  transactions 
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devolve.  Banks  for  the promotion  of  such  enterprises 
meet this need. 
"  As long as these premises for the economic justification 
of  speculative banks have not been scientifically refuted 
scientists should not allow themselves to be terrified by 
the mere catchword  'cr4dit mobilier', like children by a 
bogy." 
In  this manner then, according to historical development, 
the stock issuing, promotion, and conversion business in 
Germany  became  a  regular  banking  business,  i.  e.,  a 
branch of  the regular business of  credit banks, which at 
the same time carried on the so-called current business. 
On the other hand, in view of  the relatively small amount 
of  the available  funds for bank  investment  proper,  no 
attempts were  made to establish  special  deposit banks, 
as  under  the circumstances  but  little  profit  could  be 
expected from them. 
Even those persons who on principle are opposed to the 
whole capitalistic and industrial development as it mani- 
fested itself in Germany during the last decades, and who 
have no sympathy for this expansion of  the regular busi- 
ness  of  the German banks, but rather  deplore and find 
fault with it, will not be able to alter this course as long as 
the reasons exist which have led up to this development. 
I am convinced that these reasons will continue to exist 
for  some  time  to  come,  owing  to  Germany's  rapidly 
increasing population,  her  moderate wealth  (at least  in 
comparison to other  countries), also because of  her inter- 
national position in trade and industry, a position attained 
with difficulty, but which it will be even harder to main- 
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It  will  be  seen  by  the  description  of  the  historical 
development  of  the  sphere  of  activity  of  the German 
banks,  that a  proper  and  socially sound administration 
and organisation of  the different departments of  banking 
(especially of  the last-mentioned branches), is one of  the 
most important social problems.  Moreover  as there are 
as many  social problems  as there  are spheres  of  social 
activity, and the various branches of  banking are of  the 
utmost importance in the economic life of  the nation, the 
banking problem is closely interwoven with the majority 
of  the other social problems, a fact which is in absolute 
contradiction with the statement of  the eminent financier 
quoted by Lotz. 
2-SPECIAL  CONSIDERATIONS. 
(a)  TEE TASKS OF BANKS DIJRING  NORMAL  TIMES. 
The  proposition  last  enunciated  must  be  proved  in 
detail by a discussioi~  of  the main directions of  banking 
activity. 
It certainly does not lie within the power of  the indi- 
vidual or the legislator, or even of  the administration of 
the largest bank, to arrange  matters in  such  a  manner 
that only the best sides of  the capitalistic system may pre- 
vail in economic life.  It is, however, the most urgent and 
eminent duty of  banks and bankers to endeavor, at least 
within  the scope of  their  activity, and as far as is within 
their powers, to effect this as far as practicable, and to see 
that the profit and loss account of  capitalistic economics 
is closed with a balance in favour of  economic progress. 
Above all, they must promote all the economic interests 
of  the nation, i. e., the interests of  all producing  classes 
without  distinction,  in  so  far  as  the  services  and  the 
credit required by them come within the sphere of  bank- 
ing activity, and do not conflict with the necessary pre- 
mises of  sound banking policy.  These latter conditions 
are  determinative  of  the  kind  and  extent  of  support 
which  the so-called "credit banks"  are in a position  to 
grant to agriculture. 
In the  next  place  they have to keep  the amount  of 
credit to  be granted within reasonable bounds, and to offer, 
as far as is within their power, the utmost opposition to an 
unsound  demand for  credit.  The banks must therefore 
endeavor to obtain at  all times a comprehensive and accu- 
rate insight  into the general conditions  of  the branches 
of  industry and trade chiefly dependent on them for sup- 
port, in order to  be able to discriminate between necessary 
requirements  and false hankerings  after  expansion  and 
aggrandizement.  They should  also be able to intervene, 
or at least  restrain and check, in cases where the form 
and extent of  the credit received cause the fear of  unsound 
development. 
Their duties toward the investment-seeking  public are 
those of  the honest  broker, who, by reason of  his expe- 
rience and expert knowledge, is  able to draw attention 
to the advantages and dangers of  investments, and par- 
ticularly  to explain  in  a  purely  objective  manner  the 
dangers connected with securities yielding excessive inter- 
est or dividends. 
As regards acceptances, they ought to place their serv- 
ices  at their  customers'  disposal  only  for  economically 
sound  purposes.  They  should keep  the brokerage, the 
contango and deposit business within normal limits, and, National  Monetary  Commission  The Germafi Great  Bads 
as far as it is possible to divine the purposes aimed at, 
to operate in such a manner that these transactions may 
not become a cloak for reckless and unsound speculation. 
In the issue business they should  take particular  care 
not to burden the market by an overproduction of  securi- 
ties or by the promotion of  shaky ventures, for thereby they 
might not only cause heavy loss to the purchasers of  such 
securities,  but  also  inflict  lasting  and  severe injury  on 
their own issue credit. 
More especially they should transform only such under- 
takings into joint stock companies as are naturally suited 
to that particular form of  commercial organisation.  Be- 
fore deciding to promote or transform such undertakings, 
they should make very cautious  estimates regarding  the 
possible profits of  these undertakings.  In addition to this, 
they should investigate the financial position of  the whole 
branch of  industry, or business concerned, and, as far as 
possible, form an opinion  as to its future prospects and 
risks.  Finally,  they  should pursue  not  only  a sound 
dividend policy, but also a proper economic policy;  resist- 
ing  the temptation  of  momentary  profits, they  should 
abstain from business that does not appear economically 
sound, or  might  be  detrimental to the business interests 
of  the nation. 
The problems which the German banks have to solve 
during ordinary times have become, step by step, more 
comprehensive,  more  difficult,  and  more  important. 
The number  of  these tasks and the sphere of  activity of 
the German banks  have  grown with the increasing size, 
consolidation, and  power  of  the  country.  The  banks, 
particularly the "  great banks, " were  called upon to lend 
intelligent support to the Reichsbank (founded in 1875-76) 
in its currency and discount policies, and in its endeavors 
to introduce  and  promote  "giro,"  clearing,  and  check 
transactions, though this support was not always forth- 
coming to the full extent.  Another  task  which  fell  to 
their lot-and  of  which they can neither be said to have 
acquitted themselves quite satisfactorily-was  to support 
the land policy of  the government  and municipalities by 
means of  the mortgage banks and real-estate companies 
which they had established against purely speculative and 
other  undertakings which made no  allowance for public 
interests.  In countless ways, especially by an active par- 
ticipation  in  the  organisation  of  state  and  municipal 
credit, they were called upon to make possible the accom- 
plishment of  important state and administrative tasks, as 
well as to promote the growth of  German towns and the 
development  of  German  ports, railroads, and highways. 
They were called upon to organise German inland naviga- 
tion,  as  well  as  to provide  for  the development of  the 
German railway system, and for the industrial utilisation 
of  electric light and electric power.  They had to assist by 
counsel and deed  the business  man crossing the seas as 
pioneer of  German  trade.  It became their function to 
support the industrial  export policy  of  the nation when 
it came to be considered in Germany an economic neces- 
sity, and to promote the economic development  of  the 
colonies, as well as of  German cable communications by a 
series of  undertakings not promising immediate returns. 
They  had  to strengthen  our  financial, and with  it our 
political,  influence  abroad; nor was  this  done  without 
many a bitter experience.  For in this field they met the National  Monetary  Commission 
competition  of  the majority  of  the great powers in  the 
underwriting  of  foreign  loans, the promoting  of  foreign 
undertakings, and the opening of  international  business 
relations, with the  disadvantage  that  their  rivals  had 
entered the field long before them.  By assisting German 
navigation, and establishing German  banks abroad, they 
imparted to the German name  a renown previously un- 
dreamed of, thus extending by their activity the sphere of 
German  business  and political  influence.  Finally, by  a 
cautious financial policy, they prepared our financial read- 
iness for war, and for the carrying on of  war. 
How and to what extent German banks acquitted them- 
selves of  all these tasks will  be set forth in the following 
pages. 
Difficult and numerous as are the problems of  external 
policy, those of internal policy  are no easier.  Success in 
the latter field became conditioned upon the recognition 
of  two  principles  as the basis  of  all business  activity. 
Furthermore these principles had to be observed under all 
vicissitudes, in  the  hurry  of  everyday life, in  the  pur- 
suit  of  business, and in the finding of  ways  and means 
for the carrying out of  new and urgent tasks as they con- 
tinually crop up. 
These two principles are: The principle of  the distribu- 
tion  of  risks,  on  the one hand, and the principle of  the 
liquidity of assets on the other. 
Nearly all the mistakes made in German banking, and 
the reproaches leveled against it, can be traced back to the 
violation,  or  misconception, of  these  fundamental  prin- 
ciples underlying every sound banking policy.  The prin- 
ciple of the distribution of risks must be observed in almost 
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all branches of  banking activity; not only in the granting of 
short or  long  credit, but also in the promotion, conver- 
sion, emission, and syndicate business.  It implies, among 
other matters, that no single branch of  current business 
shall be exclusively fostered in an excessive and unsound 
manner  at  the  expense  of  others;  that  the  entire 
amount of  blank  credit,  granted after the most  careful 
scrutiny, shall  not  bear  an  unsound  proportion  to the 
total of secured credit; further, that credit granted to a 
single  undertaking,  or  branch  of  industry, shall  not be 
too high; that  in case  of  underwriting  and share issues 
provision shall be made  for a fitting distribution of  par- 
ticipation~;  for there is  always the possibility of  a sud- 
den change in political and economic conditions, as well 
as of  changes in the market which may affect particular 
cases.  It therefore  becomes  necessary  to bear  in  mind 
constantly the need of the diminution of  risk, even in the 
most  promising ventures  and  during the most  favored 
state of  the market. 
The securing and maintaining of  the liquidity of  the 
assets  is  another  most  essential  task  incumbent  on  a 
banker.  Indeed, in view of  the variety of  claims made on 
the resources of  bankers and  banks,  and of  the multi- 
plicity  of  aims pursued  by them, it is  one of  the most 
difficult  problems  of  banking policy.  It is all the more 
difficult, since the establishment of  the right  proportion 
of  the so-called quick assets to the liabilities, especially to 
the obligations  falling due at any time, or within a cer- 
tain period, does not always depend solely on the will and 
discernment of  the Bank.  Possibilities have  constantly 
to be reckoned with; for instance, that the issue of  new National  Monetary  Commission 
shares required  to restore  the necessary liquidity of  the 
bank's resources  after a great increase of  business is  im- 
possible  during bad  or  critical  times; that consequently 
its assets would be tied up just at the very moment when 
it might be called upon to relieve  general embarrassment 
by proper intervention. 
It  is, therefore, a matter of  necessity to constantly con- 
trol the liquidity of  the  resources  by  frequent  general 
inventories  (Genera1dispositionen)-as  is done, for instance, 
with the greatest care, and at short intervals by the Ger- 
man "great  banks "-in  addition to the daily cash inven- 
tories  (Kassendisposition)  ,l5  further,  to  increase  the 
amount of  the quick  assets by a proper  composition of 
the security and bill  holdings;  to strengthen  both  the 
visible and invisible reserves; and to regulate  with  the 
greatest vigilance the extent of  the obligations, as well as 
their proportion to the liquid resources. 
It may well be sa: 1 that, on the whole, the German 
banks, or  at least  the  greater  part  of  them, and more 
especially the "  great banks " have accomplished and are 
accomplishing a god deal in this respect.  In this way 
the objections which  are continually urged  against  the 
inclusion of  the deposit business in our hanks' spheres of 
activity are most effectively refuted, or reduced to narrow 
limits.  For there can hardly be  any question  of  'dan- 
ger" when the deposits, and +he  other obligations due at 
short notice are balanced by more than ample security in 
the shape of  the quickest assets, and if, in addition, special 
caution is exercised in the selection of  the securities owned 
by the bank, as was  the case with  the  Deutsche  Bank, 
which  on  the last  day of  its  fiscal  year (December 31, 
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~go&j  held  among  its assets  some 4o,goo,ooo  marks of 
securities, acceptable for investment in trust funds. 
We shall have to go into this question later on in a more 
detailed manner.16 
(b)  THE  TASKS  OF  BANKS  DURING  CRITICAL  TIMES. 
If  the sphere of  activity of  the banks, of  which  natu- 
rally only the most important features have been barely 
outlined,  is  exceedingly extensive  even  during  normal 
times, necessitating great discernment, caution, knowledge, 
and experience, it follows that the extent and difficulty of 
such  tasks  becomes  considerably  augmented  during and 
after those economic crises which all countries experience 
periodically. 
There will  probably never  be a permanent cessation of 
crises, any more than there will e-ver be permanent peace. 
However, just  as it is the duty of  diplomats and states- 
men constantly to reduce the possibility and probability 
of  wars by  the prudent removal, prevention, or mitiga- 
tion of  all disturbances of  the political equilibrium, so it 
is the duty of  the directors of  the great banks to prevent 
in  an  ever-increasing degree the breaking  out of  crises, 
to guard against  a disturbance of  the economic equilib- 
rium  as  much  as can  be  done  by  external  influence, 
and by a cautious and preventive business policy in  all 
the above-mentioned spheres of  activity. 
This  implies  to  a  continuously  increasing  degree  an 
accurate knowledge of  the internal conditions of  indus- 
try, commerce and the exchanges, also  of  the  financial 
and commodity  markets,  and the  general  international 
situation. National  Monetary  Commissiolz 
This duty entails above all a keen perception of  those 
symptoms  which,  like  storm-petrels  flying  before  the 
storm, act as signals to the experienced observer. 
Science, in modern times, with the aid of  particularly 
delicate instruments, has been able to  record earthquakes, 
and with accurate knowledge of  the factors determinative 
of  a  change of  weather  (as contained  in the reports  of 
meteorological stations) to predict storms and give timely 
warning to those concerned. 
Similarly, undeterred  by  the course of  contemporary 
events, experienced observers, with the help  of  modern 
scientific  resources, and  knowledge  gained  from  former 
crises, ought to be able to read  disturbances of  equilib- 
rium as from an economic seismograph, and thus predict 
the approach of  crises. 
The study of  the history of  crises l7 shows in the most 
striking  manner  that, provided  the same  causes  exist, 
the effects are  as  similar  as  if  one  crisis had "copied" 
its  predecessor,  as  a  schoolboy  copies  his  neighbor's 
essay, or as a legislator frequently copies the draft of  his 
fellow-legislator's bill.  Crises may be defined as lengthy 
and serious disturbances of  the bases of  either the pro- 
duction, supply, or market systems, of the payment and 
credit systems, or of  the mutual relations of  these systems. 
From the history of  crises,18 the knowledge of  which I 
regard as indispensable to every director of  a bank, it can 
be established with certainty that almost without excep- 
tion every crisis (stock exchange, credit, commercial, pro- 
duction  crisis, etc.) is preceded by a more or  less  rapid 
rise of  the rates for short-time credit, i. e., of  the discount 
rates. 
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It will also be noticed that the cause of  such a rise in 
the discount rate is almost invariably an increase in the 
demand for credit, a demand far exceeding the available 
resources,  which,  wherever  a  central  state  note  bank 
exists, finds expression in a great increase in the demands 
made on its funds. 
The banks, by virtue of  their  accurate knowledge  of 
stock  exchange  conditions,  of  market  quotations,  of 
"reports " and  "deports,"  and  of  the  rates  for  daily 
and ultimo money, are best qualified to answer the ques- 
tion  whether  such an increase in the demand  for credit 
is  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  stock- 
exchange speculation.  They are also able to draw fairly 
accurate  conclusions,  from the extent  and  kind  of  bill, 
acceptance and current account credit required by their 
customers,  as well  as  from  the volume  of  their  report 
and collateral  accounts, as to the existence, or  the ap- 
proach, of  such excessive speculation as is likely to cause 
the outbreak  of  a  crisis  on  the exchange.  The greater 
their clientele the more reliable are such conclusions. 
The approach of  an industrial  or  a commercial crisis 
can be perceived  or inferred not only from general eco- 
nomic  conditions, but also  from a  series of  phenomena 
which take place in the field of bank transactions.  The 
imminence of  such crises can be  inferred from the rapid 
growth of  the claims made on the credit of  the central 
note  bank, and in view of  the growing intimacy between 
industry and the banking  world, from a series of  occur- 
rences  that become reflected in the internal  bank  man- 
agement,  as  well  as  in  the  impaired  liquidity  of  the 
bank's assets and the decrease of available cash resources. National  Monetary  Commission 
These  symptoms need  not  manifest  themselves in  their 
entirety nor simultaneously.  Some of  these occurrences 
are: The increased credit demands, growing by leaps and 
bounds and becoming more striking each day, and the ex- 
cessive, and finally complete withdrawals of  existing cash 
deposits.  Further, the displacement of  short-term credit 
by long-term credit; the rapid rise in the number of  bills 
due that have to be extended; the constantly increasing 
offer of securities of  an inferior and unsound nature from 
a banking  standpoint.  Other signs (though they are at 
first not easily recognised as such) are the demand by man- 
ufacturers  of  bank credit, especially of  acceptance credit, 
not intended for current operating expenses but for pay- 
ing dividends, or for considerably augmenting fixed capi- 
tal, i. e., extension of  plant, new machines, premises, etc.Ig 
Next,  the continual demand  for  advances  without  any 
stated  reasons,  or  for  veiled  purposes;  the  constantly 
growing delay in the receipt of  payments due, and of  the 
so-called "specifications" in industry (which only gradually 
become known  to the bankers,  and seldom to their  full 
extent) ; the great and rapid changes, especially the sud- 
den  rise  of  prices  of  raw  materials  and  manufactures; 
finally, a superabundance of  promotions, conversions, and 
flotations, and the wholesale establishment of  subsidiary, 
affiliated, and trust companies. 
Although HelfferichZ0 has proved (I venture to say with 
mathematical  exactness), that in  most  cases  (especially 
as regards the last German crisis) the amount of  the gold 
production, gold  imports and exports, never had the im- 
portance which Sombart ascribed to them; still, like the 
fluctuations of  the rates of  exchange and discount (bank 
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and private discount), these factors should also be  care- 
fully watched. 
Finally, important aids have recently been made avail- 
able which in a characteristic manner-though  with some 
limitations-help  to diagnose the approach of  industrial or 
commercial crises.  I have in mind the valuable reports 
first published in Germany by J. Jastrow,  the editor  of 
the  Arbeitsmarkt  and  later  continued  in  the  Official 
Labor  Gazette  ( Reichsarbeitsblatt ) .  These  reports  give 
data regarding  the labor  market, especially the demand 
and supply at the public labor exchanges and the extent 
of  unemployment.  It was  these  reports  I had  in  mind 
when I referred above to modern scientific auxiliarie~.~~ 
Laxity  in  the  observation  and  appreciation  of  such 
causes,  especially  if  produced  by  ignorance  of  former 
crises at home and abroad, is one of  the gravest and most 
fatal mistakes of  which bankers can be guilty.  It is the 
less excusable the larger the power and the capita1 of  the 
bank, the wider the field of economic observation and the 
greater  the influence which may be exercised by  means 
of  a prudent business policy. 
A  deficiency in this respect prevents the bank manage- 
ment from taking measures at the proper time, i. e., before 
the outbreak of  the crisis, and thus if  not  preventing a 
crisis, at least mitigating its severity.  The extent, nature, 
and opportuneness of  such measures above all serve as a 
reliable gauge of  the efficiency,  prudence, and foresight of 
a bank management. 
For, during a crisis, it is difficult, often impossible, to 
pursue a restrictive business policy, to collect outstanding 
debts, to call in credits,  to decline to discount  bills and National  Monetary  Commission 
acceptances; indeed such  a  policy  is  generally a  serious 
mistake,  likely  to cause  an increase of  the extent and 
intensity of  the crisis, for it may give rise to the disastrous 
notion that money and credit are not merely dear, but are 
not to be had at  What is required is a preventive 
policy, a cautious intervention before the outbreak of  the 
crisis.  To do this it is necessary to give opportune warn- 
ings against  drawing  bills, increasing  engagements,  and 
credit; to  make  seasonable  reference  to  the  above- 
mentioned indications of  the probable approach of  a crisis, 
while making  provision  at the same time for a slow and 
prudent  though  consistent  increase  in  the  liquidity  of 
the  bank's  resources.  Provided  this  is  done, the  bank 
can not  only await quietly all  dangers, but is  also  able 
to offer  support and aid in the form of  discreet  help, or 
energetic  and  conspicuous  intervention  in  order  to 
prevent  or  at least lessen  and  mitigate  the  collapse  of 
otherwise sound undertakings, temporary embarrassments 
of  clients, and serious disturbances of  the market. 
In this manner, the suddenness of  the outbreak, as well 
as the extent,  duration, and seriousness of  a  crisis are 
reduced.  A  further  effect  of  such  a  policy  is  that the 
crisis is not followed by a period of  lingering and latent 
depression, which is frequently worse than the crisis itself, 
and which renders recovery, i. e., return to normal condi- 
tions, much more difficult.  It must be acknowledged, how- 
ever, that for persons standing in the midst of  business and 
practical life, and who are frequently confronted by occur- 
rences of  a contradictory nature, or difficult to fathom, it 
is far more difficult to perceive the approach of a crisis, 
than for critics, who  ex  post, or after the outbreak, can 
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easily review circumstances and symptoms that have then 
become clear and connected. 
As  a  general rule, however, threatening signs such as 
are described above (p. I 7) as almost regular harbingers of 
a crisis, ought to be  correctly diagnosed whenever they 
occur not  singly, but as connected or  mutually comple- 
mentary  symptoms  of  a  serious  affection of  the  body 
economic. 
It is a nobile oficium, especially of  the great banks, to 
intervene after the outbreak of  a crisis, not  only where 
their own clients or interests are concerned, to lend their 
support, attempt reconstruction  and  thus to prevent or 
at least remedy a  serious disturbance of  the market by 
conspicuous and therefore especially efficacious action. 
It will always redound to the credit of  the great Berlin 
banks and bankers that through their intervention imme- 
diately after the collapse of  the Preussische Hypotheken- 
ilktienbank,  of  the  Deutsche  Grundschuldbank  and  of 
the Pommersche Hypotheken-Aktienbank, they prevented 
(with almost immediate and favorable effect) the absolute 
demoralization of the entire mortgage bond  market, and 
that through the reorganization  of  these concerns  23  they 
reduced to a  minimum the losses  sustained  in wide cir- 
cles on account of  the securities issued by these establish- 
ments. 24  The same applies  to their  intervention  during 
the catastrophe in Saxony. 
(C)  THE  TASKS  OF  THE  BANKS  IN TIME  OF  WAR  AND  IN 
PREPARING  FOR  WAR  (FINANCIAL  READINESS  FOR  WAR 
AND  FINANCIAL  CONDUCT  OF   WAR).^^ 
Banks have also to make timely provision  (as far as 
possible)  in  times  of  peace  for  the eventuality  of  war. National  Monetary  Commission 
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The  marshaling  of  financial forces  must  correspond  to 
that of  military forces, and just  as military mobilisation 
is made possible by careful plans made in times of  peace, 
so too the marshalling of  financial forces should be facili- 
tated  by  schemes  likewise  devised  in  times  of  peace. 
Weaknesses and gaps in the financial mobilisation may 
be paid for as dearly as mistakes in the tactical deploying 
of  forces, for to both applies what I have said elsewhere, 
"that it is  impossible  without severe losses to evolve a 
battle formation in the face of  the enemy.'' 
The most important preparation for financial mobilisa- 
tion consists in fashioning the credit system in such an 
elastic manner that in case of  war it can cope with the 
agitated and suddenly increasing calls for credit. 
To meet this contingency, reserves must be created in 
time of  peace: reserves of  considerable extent which can be 
realised rapidly, i. e., mobilised.  These must include on 
the one  hand  a  considerable amount  of  domestic  first- 
class  securities,  especially  government  and  municipal 
bonds, which in war times can be pledged, if  necessary or 
desired, at the "  war  lombard  offices " (Kriegs-Lombard- 
Kassen)  .26  On the other hand, they must include foreign 
Goldvaluten, i. e., bills and other claims receivable abroad 
in gold, and prime  foreign  gold  securities negotiable  on 
various foreign bourses, consequently possessing an inter- 
national  Through the realisation of  these gold 
equivalents, and  by calling  in  outstanding  debts  from 
abroad, i.  e., by  utilising  these  reserves  (the value of 
which in such cases will  be  comprehended  by the veriest 
layman), a panic will usually be averted. 
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The  enemy,  however,  may endeavor  to aggravate  a 
panic of  this description  by the sudden collection of  out- 
standing claims, by an unlimited sale of  our home securi- 
ties, and by other attempts to deprive Germany of  gold. 
Attempts may also be made to dislocate our capital, bill, 
and security markets, and to menace the basis of our sys- 
tem of  credit and payments.  Such a panic might easily 
occur  during the first  few  days after  the declaration  of 
war  if  the impetuous demand  for  ready  cash  and cash 
reserves  (Angstreserven)  is  not  amply  and  imme- 
diately satisfied.  The latter demand often leads to pre- 
cipitate withdrawals of  giro and current account balances 
and of  deposits, to the recall of  credit, and to the precipi- 
tate sales of  merchandise and securities. 
Accordingly,  the banks  must  endeavor  to terminate 
such conditions as rapidly as possible, as well as to stem 
the  feverish  demand  for,  and  the  collection  of  ready 
money from all depositories, and  places of  hoarding and 
storing, so that normal conditions are reestablished, under 
which all the expedients and substitutes obviating the use 
of  cash will once more assume their normal importance for 
circulating purposes. 
Above all, the business policy  described above  (p. 20) 
as indispensable during a crisis, must be pursued in times 
of  tension  and agitation, which generally precede a war 
long before its outbreak.  Among others, restrictive meas- 
ures, such as the withdrawal of credit, the refusal to accept 
bills, or to discount customers' bills, must be avoided.  In 
the next place, interventions should be made in the mar- 
ket, and all means used for the gradual restoring of  public 
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credit systems.  It  is such confidence which underlies not 
only the acceptance of all cash substitutes (Geldsurrogate), 
which abound  to a far greater degree than ready money, 
but also the determination to fulfil all pending engage- 
ments, or at least to terminate them slowly and cautiously, 
as well as the resolution not to withdraw deposits, nor to 
flood the market with securities at extremely low rates, &c. 
The "great banks" should cooperate in all these direc- 
tions, not only by word or through influencing their clients, 
but by  their  own  example, especially by  exercising  the 
greatest reserve in withdrawing their credit balances from 
the Reichsbank, and in presenting bills for re-discounting. 
Besides  this, they  should aid those "financial  precau- 
tionary  measures"  which  come  within  their  sphere  of 
activity-i.  e., those  measures which may be undertaken 
after the declaration  of  war  in order to ease the market 
and credit  demand  and to maintain  our  gold  standard, 
and the circulation of our bank notes.2@ 
In  Germany, as I have endeavoured to prove elsewhere? 
these tasks would be facilitated to some extent during the 
critical weeks immediately following a declaration of  war 
by the amount of  bullion likely to be at  our disposal, which 
includes the "war treasure"  of  120,000,000 marks in the 
Julius  tower 31 at Spandau  (this latter, however, would 
not go far) ; and by the further fact that the expenses of 
mobilisati0n,3~  as far as can be judged  to-day, could be 
covered by  the issue of  bank notes.33  Another  gratify- 
ing consequence would  be  that during this particularly 
critical time the Government would not have to apply to 
the Reichsbank  with  extensive  demands  for  cash; and 
further, that in so far as the State did not prefer to meet 
its requirements  by  additional taxes,34  it could  await  a 
calmer and more favorable condition of  the money market 
for contracting loans to defray the cost of  war.35 
The most important consequence of  this fact is, that in 
negotiating such loans,36  the cooperation and good offices 
of  the "  great banks " and great banking establishments can 
be counted on to a far greater degree, and with much more 
certainty than if  the negotiations  took place during  the 
days immediately following the declaration of  war, when 
the resources of  the banks would be taxed to an extraordi- 
nary extent. 
It is  impossible  for  the  Reichsbank  in  Germany  to 
execute smoothly and successfully its numerous and diffi- 
cult tasks in war time without the assistance of  the great 
banks which form such an important factor in the whole 
economic organisation of  the country.  The latter, how- 
ever, must prepare  in times  of  peace in the manner de- 
scribed above, if  they are to  render effective support during 
war time.  On  the other hand, it would be preposterous 
to demand of  them complete "  readiness for war,"  such as 
would exclude or paralyse the banks' capacities for doing 
their customary business.37 
During the stages of deliberation by the administration 
of  the imperial treasury and the Reichsbank  concerning 
the  adoption  of  the  sometimes  extremely  complicated 
financial  measures for  the maintenance of  the German 
currency and credit systems, as well as for affording relief 
to the market, and facilitating money and credit transac- 
tions during war times,38  the directors of  the great banks 
and banking  houses  by reason  of  their  practical  experi- 
ence, their intimate acquaintance with the situation and 
the receptive capacity of  the money market, particularly National  Monetary  Commission 
by reason of  their exact  knowledge of  the requirements 
and capabilities of  their clientele, should be amongst the 
first called upon to serve as a "  financial general-staff " to 
the imperial treasury and the Reichsbank. 
The above presents a broad outline at least of  the most 
essential of  the many and gradually increasing duties per- 
formed with untiring perseverance by the German banks.3g 
In order  to appreciate their achievements,  it should be 
borne in  mind  that during the first  period  (1848-1870) 
their work and progress was greatly hampered  by crises 
and European wars, by German  political  impotence and 
lack  of  unity, by our lack  of  capital, and the medley of 
German monetary and coinage conditions of  those years. 
I  shall  now  proceed  to outline  the growth  of  these 
duties during the two epochs of  general economic devel- 
opment, and the development of  the German banks (with 
particular  reference  to  the  great  banks).  These  two 
clearly marked  epochs extend  from  the middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century to  1870, and from that year  to the 
present day. 
As  far as is possible without effacing or obscuring the 
picture of  the general course of  development of  the Ger- 
man great banks, I shall endeavor to do what  I  omitted 
in former editions of  this book, namely, to show in what 
manner, and with what success each individual great bank 
participated in the common work.  Indeed, a  thorough 
and proper appreciation of  the course of  development of 
each great bank will become possible only after detailed 
monograph  studies  of  each  of  these  shall  have  been 
published.*O 
The most important works of  reference used in this book 
will be found in the appendix. 
THE FIRST PERIOD (FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE 
XIX CENTURY TO THE YEAR  1870). 
CHAPTER  I.-SKETCH  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS  IN 
GERMANY  AT  THE  TIME  OF  THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF 
THE OLDEST  EXISTING  CKEDIT  BANKS. 
In 1848-the  beginning of  the period about to be dis- 
cussed-about  200 years had passed since the end of  the 
Thirty Years' War (161  8-1 648). 
Even then, however, Germany,  which in consequence 
of  her geographical position from remote ages presented a 
favorite battlefield for the whole of  Europe, had not yet 
completely recovered  from the thorough  spoliation and 
devastation she had undergone. 
A re-establishment of  her completely ruined trade and 
of  her  shattered  fortunes  was  impossible  during  the 
period from 1648 to 1815, owing to a series of  European 
wars.  These were in particular  the campaigns of Louis 
XIV, the Spanish War  of  Succession, the Seven Years' 
War, and the struggles against Napoleon.  Those wars and 
campaigns were once more fought on German soil by pow- 
erful enemies, who like Louis XIV seized parts of  the coun- 
try (for instance, Strassburg, 1681), and devastated anew 
other parts,  such  as  the Palatinate  and  other  Rhenish 
countries.  During the latter years of  that period (18~6- 
1815), the wars carried on with changing fortune against 
Napoleon I,  which terminated with his dethronement and NationaZ  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
banishment,  prevented  the  beginning  of  recovery.  It 
was only during the three decades of  undisturbed peace 
(I  8  I 5-1 848), which  preceded  the economic epoch about 
to be described (1848-1870), that the German nation had 
time to recuperate and to engage in the first attempts to 
rehabilitate trade, industry, and agriculture.' 
Evidently, it is only possible to outline here the main 
points  in  the economic conditions  of  Germany  brought 
about by this lengthy period of  peace, and only in as far 
as they bear  on the development  and tasks of  German 
banking. 
The population  of  Germany  numbered  at that  t~me 
about 35,000,000, and was not more than that of  France 
(34,500,ooo).  Of  capital  there  was  but  little; it  was 
estimated that in Prussia there were 720 marks per head 
of  the population, whereas the amount for England was 
2,860  marks,  according  to  an  estimate  made  almost 
simultaneously  (1845)  .2  At  that  period  England  had 
almost completed her transition to a great industrial and 
manufacturing  country, supplying  more than half  of  the 
world's requirements.  Her annual coal production at the 
beginning of  the 19th century was about ~o,ooo,ooo  tons, 
while  that of  Germany  toward  the end  of  the century 
was  little more than 120,000,000 tons. 
In accordance with French example, serfdom, as well as 
the hereditary subjection of  the peasants had ceased in the 
country during the first half  of  the I 9th century, although 
its abolition was slow, especially in the east of  Germany, 
where it had been firmly rooted for centuries.  The aboli- 
tion of  hereditary subjection did away not only with the 
obligation to furnish hand and team for the benefit of  the 
landlords, but-what  proved of  even greater and increas- 
ing  importance-with  the obligation  on the part  of  the 
peasant to remain on the estate, or in the village belonging 
to the same.  In  German industry, despite modest attempts 
at reform undertaken by the legislation of  the individual 
states, the system of  guilds (Zunftwesen) was predominant. 
Only a few German States, e. g., Prussia  (by the laws of 
1810 and 181  I) and Nassau, had abolished the obligation 
of  craftsmen to join  guilds, and to obtain certificates of 
ability  (Befahigungsnachweis), and  had  introduced,  on 
principle,  freedom of  trade,  an action  against  which  a 
vigorous protest was launched by  the craftsmen's "par- 
liament " sitting at Frankfort-on-the-Main from July  15 
to  August  18,  1848.  Fairs  continued  to  enjoy  great 
importance in some towns even after 1850, at least for a 
number of  special wares.Yrade was confined mostly to 
local markets and fairs.  Delivery trade by sample had, 
however,  started on  a  small scale.  But the conditions 
for economic reform in most  of  the German States had 
already been created by the establishment in 1834 of  the 
German  Zollverein.  It may  be  justly  said,  that  this 
great  Prussian  innovation,  which  transformed  the par- 
ticipant  German  States  into  a  unified  economic  area, 
dealt the deat6 blow  to the mediaval economic system 
in Germany.  It was only then that a uniform economic 
policy  became  possible  in  the  participating  States,  a 
policy which soon asserted itself by its urgent demands 
for protection of  new and growing industries against the 
overwhelming economic superiority of  England. 
The  average  annual  value  of  the  imports  into  the 
territory included in the Zollverein for the period  1842- National  Monetary  Commission 
1846 has been  calculated by K. H.  Rau (Grundsatze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, 8 ed., part  2, p. 3  I 8) at 2 10,303,000 
thalers,  or  about  630,000,000 marks,  while  the exports 
have  been  valued  at  I jo,o8g,ooo  thalers,  or  about 
51o,ooo,ooo marks, which  amounts should be used  only 
with reservation.  During the last decade of  that period 
the exports rose  quite considerably.  Industry was  still 
mainly  of  the so-called  domestic  type, and  principally 
carried on in the country.  This applies particularly  to 
the manufacture of textiles (spinning and weaving) .'  In 
the  country  it was  still  customary  to manufacture  at 
home nearly all the personal requirements in the shape of 
clothing, linen, and other textile goods.  Almost the whole 
of  the  German industry seemed to center at  that time in the 
textile and mining industries, both of  which were chiefly 
carried  on  in the country.  The number of  workmen 
employed in these  industries exceeded  by far the com- 
bined number of  workmen employed in all other industries. 
The total number of  workmen employed in the mining 
and smelting industries within the limits of  the Zollverein 
(created  on January  I, 1834)  about the middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century was  60,800.'  In Prussia  there were 
48,659 workmen employed in the same industries (average 
of the years 1848-185 j), as compared with IOI ,908 accord- 
ing to the trade census of  1895.  In 1840 the number of 
steam-engines employed in the industrial area comprised 
in the German  Zollverein  was  not  quite  500, whereas 
there were over 5,000 steam-engines at work in England 
about I 8 10.  According to  the Prussian Statistical Annual 
(Preussisches Statistisches Jahrbuch)  there were  in  1852 
only 2, I 24  steam-engines, developing 43,05  I  horse-power , 
employed in the entire industry of  Prussia, of  which almost 
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half (according to nulnber and power) belonged to mines 
and  foundries;  machine  factories  occupied  only  the 
fourth place in the list. 
In the Kingdom  of  Saxony  the number  of  steam- 
engines  used  for  industrial  and  agricultural  purposes 
amounted in 1846 to 197 only, with 2,446 horse-power.  At 
the end of  this period  (1866), however, there were already 
about 92,000 motors (~oo,ooo  H. P.) in use in Germany, 
whereas in 1895 the total horse-power of  all engines in use 
was  3,~oo,ooo,  of  which  2,ooo,ooo horse-power  was  em- 
ployed  in  industry.  In  1840 the whole German freight 
traffic  (with  the  exception  of  ocean,  town,  and  rural 
traffic)  was  calculated  at about  2,000,000,000 ton-kilo- 
meters, whereas in 1900 it was estimated at 40,000,000,000 
ton-kilometers, or almost twentyfold.'O 
In  1860  the  whole  of  Germany's  industrial  output 
equalled only about half  that of  France; whereas  to-day 
she ranks second to England in Europe, and takes third 
place in the world, only the United States and England 
outranking her. 
About the middle  of  the nineteenth century the pro- 
portion  to the total population of  industrial  workmen 'l 
(including those engaged in flour mills and all home indus- 
tries) amounted in Prussia to only 2.98 per cent. 
The enormous industrial growth that manifested  itself 
shortly after the establishment of  the Zollverein and its 
economic measures was due not entirely to that organi- 
sation, but  primarily  to  the  construction  of  (private) 
railways, begun in 1835 with the line between Nuremberg 
and Fiirth.  This led at the outset to an almost feverish 
activity  in  the mining,  smelting, machine,  and kindred 
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As  early as the middle  of  the last century there was 
quite  a  considerable  demand  for  pig  iron,  chiefly  by 
reason of  the above-mentioned  construction of  railways. 
According to  Oechelha~ser~~  over I 7,500,000  quintals (Zent- 
ner)  of  pig  iron were used  in railway construction from 
1836 up to  the beginning of  our period (1850).  The home 
consumption, however, was not met by the home produc- 
tion.  England had obtained a great start in the manu- 
facture  of  that  material,13 coke  blast  furnaces  having 
been used  as early as the eighteenth century in place of 
the expensive charcoal  fuel almost universally  in vogue 
in Germany during the middle of  the nineteenth century. 
In the Siegerland not a single coke blast furnace existed 
at  the beginning of  the forties; the first coke blast furnace 
in the Ruhr district was erected  in  1847; moreover, the 
existing blast furnaces were not very efficient.14  In 1847 
the consumption of  iron in the  region comprised within 
the Zollverein amounted to 28 Zollpfund (= 14 kilograms) 
per  head  of  the mid-year  population  (Sering, loc.  cit., 
p. 51), as compared  with 309.8 pounds in 1899. 
The production of  pig iron in 1850 was less than that of 
France, and even of  Belgium; it amounted to 208,00o,o~ 
kilograms (I  875, 2,029,000,000 kilograms). 
The output of  coal amounted in 1850 to 5,800,000 tons, 
as against 109,220,000  tons in I 9oo.15 
In the district of  Siegen 38,880 tons of  iron ore, valued 
at 124,974 thalers, were brought  to the surface in  1850, 
as  compared  with  997,680  tons,  valued  at I I ,857,779 
marks, in 19oo.l' 
In 1858 (according to Sering, loc. cit., p. 82) of the total 
number  of  blast  furnaces  in  Prussia,  56.9  per cent 
(I  ,328,429  Zentners)  used  charcoal,  3 7.2  per  cent 
(I  ,527,989 Zentners) coke, 5.9 per cent (243,s  16 Zentners) 
coke and charcoal.  Mineral fuel (coal) was not  used be- 
fore 1844 except in Silesia, and even there only in small 
quantities. 
As a result the iron imports from Great Britain reached 
52  and 55  per cent of  the total German consumption up 
to the middle of  the last century.  This state of  affairs 
underwent a change  only with  the rapid  growth  of  the 
use of  coal in Germany, and when the Zollverein  aban- 
doned its free-trade policy by the imposition in 1844 of a 
duty  on  iron, which  till  then  had  entered  free.  It is 
due to the energetic support of  the German credit banks 
that before long the following prophecy, contained in the 
business  report  of  1856  of  the  A.  Schaaffhausen'scher 
Bankverein (p. 53), was fulfilled to the letter: 
"The  iron  and  coal  output  of  Westphalia,  and  the 
Rhineland, in the course of a few years, will not fall short 
of  that of Belgium; in the more distant future it will com- 
pete  successfully in  the international market  with  that 
of  England, provided  one of  the most  important  condi- 
tions for such competition-namely,  the construction of 
cheap  means  of  communication-receives  proper  atten- 
tion." 
The following figures, giving the proportion of  persons 
engaged  in  industrial  pursuits,  as  compared  with  the 
entire population, apply to Prussia for the middle of  last 
century (I  843) :  l7 
Per cent. 
Agricultural population. .............................  60.84 to 61.34 
Industrial population. ....................................... 23.37 
Persons employed in commerce. ............................... 0.97 National  Monetary  Commission 
In 1846 there was only I person employed in trade and 
industry to every 12.2 inhabitants, though in 1850 the fig- 
ures were already I to every 8.5 inhabitants.  In 1849 only 
28  per cent of  the entire populationls of  Prussia lived in 
towns,  and  the  population  of  Berlin  did  not exceed 
331,894  l9 (exclusive of  soldiers)  in  1840, and not  quite 
500,000  in  1858,  and  gave  employment  to only  3,000 
workmen  in  1840,  a  number  which  rose,  however,  to 
10,242 in  18.56.~~  In  1849 there were  only  15 towns in 
Prussia the population of  which  exceeded 30,ooo.~~  Ex- 
cluding Berlin,  the  following now  important  industrial 
towns had the greatest number of  inhabitants: 
Aix-la-Chapelle  (about). .................................... 46,000 
...........................................  Elberfeld(about)  35,000 
.............................................  Crefeld(about)  30,000 
........................  Chemnitz and Diisseldorf each (about)  26, om 
.......  Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, and Solingen each (about) 22.  7,000 
With the aid of  foreign (English) capital, gas lighting 
was gradually adopted 23 after 1826 by the larger German 
towns (first of  all by Hanover and Berlin); it was only 
after  1859 that petroleum  became  popular  for lighting, 
especially among the middle classes. 
The  construction  of  railways  may  be  said  to have 
started on a large scale only about the middle of  the nine- 
teenth century.  From 1835 to 1842 only railways of  short 
length  and  of  merely  local  significance  (between  large 
towns)  to a  total length of  87  German  miles  had been 
constructed.  These  were  the Nuremberg-Furth railway 
in  I 835 ;  the  Berlin-Potsdam,  and  the  Braunschweig- 
Wolfenbuttel railways in I 838 ; the Leipzig-Dresden line in 
1839; the Leipzig-Magdeburg, the Munich-Augsburg, the 
Mannheim-Heidelberg, and the Frankfort-Mainz lines in 
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1840; and  in  1841 the  Berlin-Anhalt,  the  Diisseldorf- 
Elberfeld, and the Cologne-Elberfeld railways.  Up to I 855, 
the date when the credit banks appeared on the scene, only 
7,800 kilorneters of  railways had been built, which, spread 
over the twenty years from 1835, meant only 390 kilometers 
of new line annually.  On the other hand, in 1865,  ten years 
later, almost double the amount of  railway mileage (13,900 
kilometers) was finished, or 610 kilometers of  new line per 
year, a performance in which the credit banks had taken 
an active share.  In 1875,  or ten years later, there were no 
less than 27,981 kilometers of  railways in operation, again 
a twofold increase. 
This corresponds to the enormous increase of  capital 
invested  in  German  railway  construction  during  that 
period.  At the beginning of  the fifties the amount of  this 
capital was stated as  140,000,000 thalers, in addition to 
206,000,000 thalers  preference shares, or a  total of  346,- 
ooo,ooo thalers  (1,038,000,ooo marks); somewhat  over 
a billion  marks.24 At the end of  that period  (1870) the 
invested  capital  amounted,  according to Engel,  to over 
~,oooloOO,ooo  marks (4,072,167,62  I marks), in which sum 
the preference shares are included. 
As  far as the means of transit in Germany were  con- 
cerned,  so-called  "  Chausseegeld,"  or  road  toll,  had  in 
many cases to be paid to the end of the sixties, as a con- 
tribution toward highway construction and maintenance. 
In Frankfort-on-the-Main, for instance, this toll was only 
abolished on May  18, 1866.  The highways in Germany 
had in 1857 a length of only 30,000 kilometers as against 
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The inland toll-gates in the majority of  German States, 
however, had already been  abolished in  1834-35  by the 
foundation of  the Zollverein.  This proved a great boon 
in the economic field. 
Equally beneficial in the legal field proved the adoption 
in the fifties  and sixties  by  the various  German  States 
of  uniform  commercial  legislation  in  the shape  cd  the 
A llgemeine  Deutsche  Wechselordnung and the A llgemeines 
Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch. 
As  far as means of  transport  were  concerned, steam- 
navigation made a modest beginning on the Weser in I 8  I 7 
and on the lower  Rhine and Elbe in  1818.  During the 
middle of  the nineteenth  century, however, steam-navi- 
gation made more rapid progress. 
At the end of  the fifties Germany had no less than I 7 
different independent postal  administrations in  addition 
to the Prussian-Austrian Post~erein.~Vn  1867 the  Thurn 
and Taxis postal monopoly  came to an end by transfer 
to Prussia. 
Up to 1844 fees for forwarding ordinary letters within 
the confines of  Prussia went as high as 19 silbergroschen 
(I silbergroschen =  & thaler, or about 2% cents).  And it 
was  considered  great  progress  when  an  agreement was 
made in 1850 with Austria, whereby the cost of  forward- 
ing  letters weighing  less  than  I  lot  (lot =about half  an 
ounce) to the farthest of  the three zones, or over 20 Ger- 
man miles  (I German mile = 7,420 metres), was fixed at 
3 silbergroschen, or g kreuzer.  It was only as a result 
of  this agreement that, at the beginning of  1850, stamps 
were introduced in Prussia.  Up to that time the fee for 
conveying letters had to be paid  in ready money at the 
p~st-office. Even during the forties the post-offices were 
only opened on certain days in the week.  There were no 
postmen,  not  even  in the towns,  to say nothing of  the 
country; so that letters had to be called for at the post- 
office.  Letter-boxes were introduced for general use only 
after 1850. 
The slow development of  postal facilities is best illus- 
trated by a statement of  Karl Lamprecht (loc. cit., p. 143) 
that in Saxony, the "land of  the Leipsic fair," the postal 
regulations remained unchanged  between I 7 13 and 1859. 
In Great Britain, on the other hand, uniform penny- 
postage  had  been  introduced  in  1840; uniform  postage 
was  introduced  in  Austria  in  1861, and in  the  North 
German Federation only in I 868. 
The receipt of  a letter, even as late as the middle of  the 
last century, must have been regarded as quite an event, 
except by large mercantile firms, for there were only 1.5 
letters per  head  of  population  in  Prussia  during  1842, 
and even in 185  I, the beginning of  the period under con- 
sideration, only about 3 letters annually. 
The telegraph systemz6  was first opened for public use 
in  Prussia  (Aix-la-Chapelle)  in  1843, in  Bavaria  and 
Saxony  in  1850, in Wurttemberg  and  Baden  in  1851, 
in  Hanover  in  1852,  and  in  Mecklenburg  in  1854. 
"  The charges of  telegraphing were high and ill-arranged. 
According to the zone tariff of  1858, which on the face of 
it had already been reduced, it cost 2 gulden 6 kreuzers to 
send 20 words from Frankfort-on-the-Main to Nuremberg, 
or almost as much as to Amsterdam or Como (2 gulden 48 
breuzers) ; the shortest telegram to Bochum cost 4 gulden 
12  kreuzers,  almost as  much  as to Tilsit  or Orsova  (4 National  Monetary  Commission 
gulden  54  kreuzers.)""  In 1850 only 35,000 telegrams 
were sent in Prussia, as against 1,500,ooo in 1865. 
Only 102 joint-stock companies of all kinds, with a total 
capital of  638,000,ooo marks, or an annual average of  less 
than 27,000,000 marks, were formed in Prussia between 
the years 1826 and 1850, that is in twenty-four years.28 
On the other hand, during the following nineteen years, 
the period from 1851 to the first half  of  the year  1870, 
295 j oint-stock companies, or almost three times as many, 
with  a  total  capital  of  about  2,~05,00o,ooo marks,Z8 
were formed in Prussia, making an annual average capi- 
tal of  over 124,000,000  marks, or more than four times as 
much as in the preceding period. 
Among the German exchanges at the beginning of  this 
period, the one at Frankfort-on-the-Main  was  the most 
influential for state loans and similar securities, whereas 
the Berlin exchange took the lead in railway securities, 
the  amount  of  which,  however,  was  not  yet  great.30 
Sixty-three securities were  quoted  on  the  Berlin  Stock 
Exchange in  1850 as against  309  in  1870, and  I ,872 in 
1900.  At Frankfort-on-the-Main the first special organs 
dealing with financial and commercial questions were pub- 
lished, viz : The A ktionar, on January I, I 854; the Frank- 
furter Geschiiftsbericht, on July  2 I, I 856 (which,  on August 
27,  1856, became the Frankfurter  Zeitung und Handels- 
blatt).  In the meantime, however (before the publication 
of  the Frankfurter Geschaftsbericht) ,  the Berliner Boersen- 
zeitung, with the  Thursday supplement, the  Berliner  Boersen- 
Courier, was published on July  I, 1855, in Berlin. 
As far as the systems of  coinage, money, and banks are 
concerned, the following details may be of  interest: 
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During the whole of the period under consideration, and 
to the final adoption of the common German coinage sys- 
tem in  1870, no  less than 7  different  kinds  of  coinage 
existed in the various German States, which, with the ex- 
ception of  that of  Bremen, were  all based  on  the silver 
standard.  Between  the South  German  gulden  and the 
North German  thaler  standards  a fixed ratio had been 
established  at the  general  coinage  conference  in  1838 
(Dresdner Convention), but solely for purposes of  calcula- 
ti~n,~l  i.  e.,  no  State belonging  to the convention was 
obliged  to  admit  the circulation  of  the  coins  of  any 
other State belonging to the convention. 
The variety  of  the systems of  coinage and standards 
at home and abroad was doubtless one of  the main rea- 
sons why  bankers,  who  were  called  money  changers at 
that time,  in  the centers  of  trade and  traffic  at least, 
formed  a prosperous and well-filled  profession.  At the 
center of  money changing for middle and south Germany, 
namely,  the  free  town  of  Frankfort-on-the-Main,  there 
were 109 private bankers in 1855, among a total of  1,131 
firms; and toward the end of  the period under discussion 
(1868-69),  192  private  bankers  out  of  a  tetal of  1,829 
firm~.~-hese  private  bankers,  who  in numerous cases 
carried  on  simultaneously commission  business  or  com- 
mission and forwarding business, formed a very respected 
class,  especially  at Frankfort-on-the-Main,  a  long  time 
before the period in question, having identified themselves 
with the general existing commercial interests.  A most 
striking proof  of  this is an occurrence which took place 
in  1810: "  By the order of  Napoleon  (at the time of  the 
Continental  System)  two  French  officials in  Frankfort National  Monetary  Commission 
confiscated 185 chests containing English goods, the prop- 
erty of  Frankfort merchants, and burnt them in front of 
the gates of the town.  Upon this the Frankfort bankers 
refused to continue the discounting of  French bills, and 
caused thereby  numerous failures in  Strassburg, Nancy, 
Rheims, and other places." 33  Thereupon the Continental 
System was soon repealed in Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
What was  true of  Frankfort-on-the-Main, however, is 
not applicable to other towns and districts.  In Stuttgart, 
for instance, there  were in  1855 only  14 firms (including 
the Royal Court  Bank)  which claimed to belong to the 
banking and discounting profession, and only one each in 
Heilbronn and Ulm.  "These were, however, partly carried 
on in connection with other occupations, especially with 
the forwarding business."  The modest  position held by 
these firms appears best  from the fact that in the indus- 
trial census taken in 1855 (no changes of  importance took 
place between  I 852  and  I 855) 25  banking firms are men- 
tioned employing only a total number of  68  assistant^.^^ 
In the  whole  Kingdom  of  Prussia  (in  the territory 
before  1866)  the  number  of  persons  employed  in  the 
money and credit business during 1858 (after several years 
of  economic prosperity), including principals  and assist- 
ants, amounted only to about  1,800  (1,774), and  these 
were  distributed  among  602  enterprises,  so  that there 
were  602  principals  and  I ,172 assistants,  or  about  two 
assistants to each business. 
Of  these  1,800 persons,  384  were  employed in  Berlin 
At  the  beginning  of  the  period  under  consideration 
modern methods of  payment and credit had not yet devel- 
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oped, and  the  giro  and  current-account  business  was 
"almost  unknown,"  with  the  exception  of  places  like 
Hamburg,  where  special  conditions prevailed.  Even in 
a large commercial center such as Frankfort-on-the-Main, 
at the beginning of  the fifties, numerous porters with small 
trucks laden with sacks and barrels of silver money could 
be seen  moving  about the streets "at any hour  in  the 
forenoon." 38  The discounting of  hills was "  seldom prac- 
ticed"  in Germany, except  in  chief  trade centers  and 
exchange towns, and a systematic fostering of  the deposit 
business was  still  less  in  evidence, either  at the credit 
banks (p. 73) or at the note-issuing banks existing at the 
beginning of  the period.  The amount of  deposits at the 
Prussian Bank, for instance, totaled only about 22,740,000 
thalers (equal to 68,220,000 marks) 38  in 1850, in spite of 
the inflow of  capital which had taken place in consequence 
of  the discovery of  gold mines in California (1848) and in 
Australia  (1851), and the simultaneous discovery of  new 
quicksilver mines in Mexico.  In other hanks of  issue the 
deposits were for the most part much smaller.39 
At the same time, however, powerful factors (mentioned 
above on p. 28)  were making for progress. 
Above all, the era of  peace that had prevailed in Ger- 
many  for an unprecedented  length  of  time  (1815-18~8) 
had  caused  a  relatively  large  accumulation  of  capital, 
which was seeking profitable investment. 
As  early  as  1844 the first industrial exhibition in  the 
Zollverein  area  stimulated  industry in numerous direc- 
tions.  The international  exhibition  in  London in  1851, 
at which  the  latest  industrial  progress  and  inventions 
were shown, exerted a powerful influence on Germany.  A National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
few years later (1856) a great revolution took place in the 
iron industry through the application of  Bessemer's prin- 
ciple of  turning  pig  iron  into  steel 40 without the aid of 
human power  by inclosing the pig in pear-shaped cham- 
bers (converters) and by conducting heated air through it 
from  powerful  blast  apparatuses-a  process  adapted in 
1865 by Martin to ore containing small amounts of  phos- 
phorus and, in 1879, by Thomas and Gilchrist to ore rich 
in phosphorus. 
In the years  1834-1854  aniline colors were  invented, 
and in 1868 alizarine colors. 
In I 840, Liebig published his manual on chemistry and 
its use in agriculture, which laid the foundation of  modern 
agriculture.  From  1831-1840  to  1871-1880  constant 
progress,  with  few  interruptions,  was  experienced  in 
agriculture.  In the old  Prussian  provinces  during  this 
period, the price of  rye rose 69 per cent, that of  wheat 60 
per  cent, and of  barley  90  per  cent; the selling price of 
land not  less  than  200-300  per  cent;  the rents  of  the 
Prussian domains increased from 4,500,000 marks, or 13.9 
marks per hectare  (I hectare=  2.471  acres), in  1849, to 
10,200,000  marks,  or  35.6  marks  per  hectare,  or  an 
increase of  156 per cent.  These rises were frequently out 
of proportion  with the increases in the prices of  agricul- 
tural products and in the productiveness of  the area used 
for agricultural purposes.41 
As  stated  before,  various  industries,  such  as  cotton 
spinning, at  the beginning of this period introduced manu- 
facturing on a large scale (production on a large scale had 
commenced in the mining industry many  years before). 
The large industries were,  however, unable  to attain  a 
- 
dominant  part in the whole  of  industry, in which  home 
production still played a leading part.  In the last decade 
of  this  period  we  can  also  perceive a  tendency  toward 
increasing  the exports  of  industrial  products  the rapid 
development  of  which  in  the  second  period  gradually 
caused a complete transformation in the character of  the 
whole German economic organization. 
Hand  in  hand  with  the large increase  of  population, 
a  serious  transformation  deeply  affecting the whole  of 
agriculture  (which at this  period  was  at the height  of 
prosperity) had been gradually developing, which led to a 
considerable portion of  the country's agricultural require- 
ments  being  met  by  foreign  imports;  whereas  at the 
beginning of  this period,  the exports of  important  Ger- 
man  agricultural  products,  with  the  exception  of  rye, 
considerably exceeded the imports.42  (As early as  1860, 
the imports of  rye exceeded the exports by 259,000 t0ns.~3) 
Industry, particularly the mining, machine construction, 
and metal industries, etc., received large orders owing to 
the rapid increase of  railway construction, and was pro- 
tected and strengthened, to some extent at least, through 
the  measures  taken  by  the  Zollverein  against  foreign 
importations.  The expansion of  industry, however, and 
with  it  the  growing  transition  to  large-scale  industry 
(Grossbetrieb), became an absolute necessity for the sup- 
port and employment of  the population, which showed its 
greatest  increase  at the  beginning  of  this  period,  and 
continued to grow in later years. 
Between I 8  I 6-1 845 the population had increased from 
24,800,000 to 34,400,000 (by about 9,600,000 or 38.7 per 
cent), whereas between  1845-1875  it had increased only National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
by  8,300,000, or  24.1 per  cent, and between  1865-1895 
only 31.8 per cent. 
This growth, noticed in most of  the German States up 
to the middle of the last century, was almost entirely in 
favor  of  the rural population, though we  must not lose 
sight of  the fact that a great many of  the industrial con- 
cerns  (as  has  been  already  mentioned),  (p. 30)  were 
situated  in  the country.  Loud  complaints  were  heard 
almost  everywhere  at that  time  that "there were too 
many people in the country," and it  was frequently stated 
with the greatest emphasis that the country was unable 
to support a  population  of  that number, and ways and 
means should be devised to meet the new  condition^.^^ 
As  a matter of  fact the population  of  the agricultural 
districts (especially those east of  the river Elbe) increased 
in the period  I 8  16 to 1877 nearly 91 per cent, while that 
of  the industrial western and southern parts of  Germany 
increased only somewhat  over  23  per  cent, whereas  be- 
tween  1871 and  1900 the proportions  were  exactly  the 
reverse (26 and 79 per cent).45 
It was under  such economic conditions that the first 
German credit banks were established. 
CHAPTER 11.-THE  GERMAN  BANKS  DURINC  THE  FIRST 
PERIOD  (I  848-1 870). 
It is easy to realize at present the exceptionally strong 
influence exercised at the beginning of  this period (about 
the fifties) by the very great and rapid development of  the 
German  railway  system,  above  all  on  the mining  and 
machine industries.  In order to appreciate it, we  need 
only recall the startling growth of  the mining and machine 
industries, occasioned by  the rapid  development  of  the 
electrical  industry  during  the  second  period,  although 
quite different financial and banking conditions exist to- 
day.  In  both  cases,  however,  the  immediate  conse- 
quences were  serious crises  (1857 and ~goo),  which were 
brought on, however, in part by other causes. 
The mining and  smelting  industries  were  the first  to 
undergo  this  transformation  of  which  we  have  been 
amazed  witnesses.46 It  is  these  industries  which  are 
mainly responsible for the spread of  capitalism and the 
development  of  large-scale  production,  as  well  as  the 
gradual and radical change in the general economic con- 
ditions of  the country.47 
The enormous demands of  the newly constructed rail- 
ways for iron, coal, sleepers, locomotives, cars, etc., could 
not be met even approximately by the means at the dis- 
posal of  the industry of  those days.  New undertakings of 
all descriptions, and the enlargement of  existing ones, were 
necessary.  Figures and requirements, however, were cal- 
culated at ten times the right amounts, as is the wont of 
reckless  persons in  agitated times,  in  whose  minds  the 
prospective  profits  are sure to assume gigantic  propor- 
tions.  Thus, at  the beginning of  our epoch, following the 
new railway enterprises, there arose in rapid succession, 
and in strange medley, a large number of other new joint- 
stock companies, especially in the fields of  mining, smelt- 
ing-machine construction, and banking. 
The list of  German credit banks founded during the first 
eight  years  of  this period  (1848-1856), and which  were 
mostly provided with share capital ample at least for the 
period  in  question, will  be found in Appendix I1 at the National  Monetary  Commission  The Germalz Great  Banks 
end of this book.  Among them the following were promi- 
nent at  that time, according to the amount of  their capital : 
(I)  I 848 : The A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  at 
Cologne, formed as the result of  the reorganisation of  the 
old banking firm of  Abraham  SchaafThausen (which had 
been  seriously affected by the troubles  in 1848), with a 
capital  of  5,  I 87,000  thalers,  or,  in  round  numbers, 
5,200,ooo  thalers= 15,600,ooo  marks,  of  which  about 
3  ,ooo,ooo (3  ,199,800) thalers was immediately issued. 
(2)  185  I :  The  Disconto-Gesellschaft in  Berlin,  which 
started however as a mere "  credit partnership " (Kredit- 
gesellschaft).  In 1856 it was transformed  into its present 
shape,  namely,  a  joint  stock  company  en  commandite 
under the name of  the Direction der  Disconto Gesellschaft, 
with  a  capital of  10,000,000 thalers =  30,000,000 marks, 
which was issued  in two instalments of  ~,OOO,O~  thalers 
each. 
(3)  1853: The Bank  fur Handel und  Industvie, which 
took up its headquarters  at Darmstadt because no con- 
cession could be obtained at that time for a joint-stock 
banking company, either in the free town of  Frankfort-on- 
the-Main or in Prussia.  The nominal capital amounted to 
25,000,000 florins= 42,750,000 marks, of  which, however, 
only  ro,ooo,ooo florins = I 7,  ~oo,ooo  marks was  issued  at 
first;  it was  only in  the year  1856, when  the  Disconto 
Gesellschaft was transformed, that the Darmstadter Bank 
assumed the size first contemplated. 
(4)  1856 : The Mitteldeutsche Creditbank  at Meiningen, 
with a capital  of  8,000,000 thalers  (24,000,m marks), 
of  which, however, 3,000,000 thalers  (g,m,ooo marks) 
remained in the portfolio of  the bank;  in  reality, there- 
fore, the capital was made  up of  5,000,000 thalers only, 
divided  into 50,000 shares of  IOO  thalers each; moreover, 
of  this amount ~,ooo,ooo  thalers were redeemed in  1859. 
(5)  I 856 : The Berliner Handelsgesellschafl with a share 
capital of  I g ,ooo,ooo thalers (45  ,ooo,ooo marks), of  which 
only a small part was paid  in  at first, namely, 3,740,150 
thalers; of  this latter sum 800,ooo thalers (4,000 shares of 
200 thalers each) remained in possession of  the company. 
In the four years  (1853-1857)  the paid-up share capi- 
tals of the railway companies newly formed in the various 
German States, which were almost exclusively in private 
hands (see p. 35), amounted to over 140,000,000 thalers, 
and  that  of  the  joint-stock  banks  (Bankaktiengesell- 
schaften) to over 200,000,000 thalers (6oo,ooo,ooo marks). 
Of  259  mining, foundry, steamship, machine-construc- 
tion, sugar, and spinning companies, etc., existing during 
this period, with a total capital of  over 260,000,ooo  thalers 
(780,000,om marks), more than half  were founded during 
the four years mentioned above (I  853-185 7) .48 
During the one year,  1856, new joint-stock  companies 
with a nominal capital of  about 15o,ooo,ooo thalers were 
chartered in Prussia alone. 
In order,  however, to comprehend  properly  the rush 
that took place just  then, it must be  remembered  that 
during this whole period (about twenty years), from 1851 
to the first half  of  1870, only 295 joint-stock  companies, 
with a total capital of about 2,405,000,000 (2,404,760,000) 
marks (see p. 38), were chartered. 
Of  this total almost half, namely  1,020,000,000 marks 
(340,000,ooo thalers), represented the capital of  the rail- 
way and joint-stock  bank companies founded in Prussia National  Monetary  Commissios 
during these four years (I  853-1 857).  Of  the total capital 
of  2,404,760,000 marks invested in Prussia in joint-stock 
companies during  I 85 1-1  8  70  (first period), 2 2 5o,g6o,ooo 
marks were invested as follows: 
Marks. 
......................  Mines, foundries, and salt works.  275,410, ooo 
.............................................  Banks  94,650,000  ...............................  Insurance companies..  158,460, ooo 
...........................................  Rallways  1,722,440,000 
so  that these  four  classes  of  industrial  and commercial 
undertakings absorbed 92.7 per cent of  the capital of  all 
joint-stock  companies  founded  in  Prussia  during  the 
period in q~estion.'~ 
During this great process of  transformation, which took 
place in the same manner in all the other German States 
up to 1856, scarcely any other aid could be called in than 
that of  the Bank fiir Handel und  Industrie, founded in 
1853, which we  shall style in the future, after its head- 
quarters  and  conforming to  public  custom, the Darm- 
stadter  Bank.  For  the  Disconto  Gesellschaft,  founded 
in  I 85 1, emerged from the narrow confines of  a "  mutual 
credit partnership " (auf Gegenseitigkeit beruhende Kredit- 
gesellschaft) only  after  1856, while the attention of  the 
A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein was necessarily occu- 
pied  during  those  years  with  strengthening  the  inner 
affairs of  the firm of  Abraham ~chaaffhausen  which it had 
taken over. 
The Darmstadter Bank, founded at  the beginning of  this 
process of  transformation, purposely assumed the title of 
"  Bank fiir Handel und Industrie. " 
"  It is in no way the task of  the bank," it was stated in 
the first business report for  1853, "to pave the way  for 
stock-jobbing operations, and to stimulate capitalists to 
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unproductive gambling on 'change.  On the contrary, the 
bank is expected to promote sound and extensive under- 
takings by  its own  participations, and by investing out- 
siders' funds intrusted to its care.  By means of  its em- 
inent position and clear insight into the whole situation 
of  German  industry  it is  fitted  to assist  to the fullest 
extent of  its powers in directing capital and the spirit of 
enterprise into the channels corresponding to the require- 
ments of  the moment.  Its offices at home and abroad are 
intended  to facilitate export and the thousand  and one 
other relations between German industry and the money 
market.  It is the right and the business of  the bank to 
receive  the funds which  some manufacturers  may  have 
available for the time  being  and supply them  to other 
manufacturers ,who  may require them.  Through such a 
constant  exchange  it  hopes  to  stimulate and  promote 
industrial activity.  Aside from the bank's  participation 
in  great industrial undertakings, it is likewise authorized 
to participate  in the great creations  and financial trans- 
actions of  the governments, and to  act as  intermediary 
in the placing of  securities of  foreign governments." 
There is no doubt that part of  this program, including 
the statutory reg~lations,~'  was influenced by the organi- 
zation and aims of  the Crddit Mobilier (Socidtd gdnCrale 
de Cr6dit mobilier) founded in  November,  1852, with  a 
capital of  60,000,ooo francs.  This is particularly true of 
the debentures idea,51  and the fixing of the amount of  the 
capital.  As  a matter of  fact among the founders of  the 
CrCdit Mobilier was Abraham Oppenheim, of  Cologne, one 
of  the co-founders of  the Darmstadter Bank, while one of National  Monetary  Commission 
the higher officials of  the Credit Mobilier (Hess), was one 
of  the first directors of the Darmstadter Bank. 
It may be of  interest to note that the French estab- 
lishment alluded to, which was intended to put the Saint 
Simon  ideas  into  practice  under  the  direction  of  the 
PQeires,  was heartily welcomed by  the Government, as 
well  as by the general public, as an institution likely to 
form a  counterpoise to the excessive  power  of  the pri- 
vate  bankers,  and  more  especially  of  the  house  of 
Rothschild. 
"The founding of  the Contango Bank, or  Credit Mo- 
bilier,"  says an article 52  published in Germany  in  1856, 
was  based  on  a  genuine  and  true  principle  belonging 
entirely  to  our  age.  Enormous  capitals  had  accumu- 
lated in the hands of  several banking hoyses in different 
towns in Europe.  They dominated all business through 
the enormous proportions of  their capital.  *  *  *  They 
made their own conditions as though they held a monop- 
oly.  *  *  *  No limits can be discovered to these tend- 
encies.  This monopoly can be broken only by opposing 
large capital with a still larger one, and this can be done 
only by the association of  many small capitals.  Thus on 
November  12, 1852, the Credit  Mobilier  Company  was 
founded with  a  capital of  60,000,ooo francs, in  120,000 
shares of  200 francs each. 
The  French  Government  desired  simultaneously  to 
weaken  the Bourbonist  and Orleanist aspirations, which 
were  supposed to be represented  by the house of  Roth- 
schild, through the concession of  a Bnnque Gouvernernentale 
which among other things was to influence the quotations 
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of  government  stock-of  course in an upward  direction 
only ! 
Accordingly the Rothschilds  (after co-operating in the 
beginning) formed a very powerful  syndicate of  private 
bankers as early as 1855 to fight the Credit Mobilier. 
It is principally  the Credit  Mobilier,  its organisation, 
its  unparalleled  growth  and  decline  within  the  short 
period  of  fifteen years,  that has  influenced  the public 
mind to such an extent that German banks almost with- 
out  distinction,  and  even  up  to the present  day,"  are 
designated as Cridit Mobilier banks.  The formation and 
activity of  that establishment form to a  great extent54 
the subject  of  one of  the most  brilliant  French  novels, 
namely, "  L'Argent," by Emile Zola. 
This result was largely the work of  contemporary writ- 
ers, who, impressed by the failure of  the Credit Mobilier, 
naturally gave vent only to very adverse criticism.55  A 
prominent place in this field belongs  to the voluminous 
work by Ay~ard,~~  published during the year of  the failure 
of  the CrCdit Mobilier (1867).  This book, containing 595 
pages, which unfortunately was used and is still used con- 
stantly as an authority, is from beginning to end (and in 
this particular I quite agree with PlengeS7)  nothing but a 
pamphlet.  It is a clumsy work, overflowing with repeti- 
tions and exaggerations, which had its origin in the spite 
and jealousy of  a small banker, whose small power of dis- 
cernment prevented him from perceiving side by side with 
the undeniable mistakes and faults of  the Credit Mobilier 
the incontestable services which that institution had ren- 
dered to the economic progress of his country. National  Monetary  Commission 
The Credit Mobilier, which, according to the amount of 
its capital and the program  outlined  in its reports  and 
in  the statements of  its managing  directors,  was never 
intended to be solely a flotation bank (Effektenbank),  at  the 
very outset fixed its aims far too high, until they became 
almost  fantastic.  For  this  program  (although it  may 
have been the result  of  much forethought), was not one 
that could be  carried  out with  the ordinary means  of  a 
bank, as it purposed  an  economic transformation  on  a 
grand  scale of  the entire railway,  industrial, and credit 
systems. 
Further, the Credit Mobilier injured its own interests 
to  a  great  exterit  (as  was  recognised  when  too  late), 
through  the  distribution  of  excessive  dividends  (1855 
over 40 per cent),  as well as by persistent adherence to its 
scheme  of  the issue  of  debentures,  a  matter  generally 
impracticable within the compass of  any bank, and espe- 
cially of  one  that  had  so  many  aims  in  view.  That 
scheme, rightly enough, was never executed owing to the 
opposition  of  the Government.  Thus  it was  debarred 
above all from gradually increasing its share capitalb8 in 
accordance with its growing business, and from strength- 
ening  its  reserves  in  order  to  attain  the  liquidity of 
resources which is the sole justification  and qualification 
for the pursuit of  constantly increasing tasks. 
It is also  true that through its precipitate procedure, 
and through the attempt to carry out simultaneously all 
parts of  its program, which in turn necessitated constant 
and increased support of  the Bourse, as well as through 
the flotation  of  a superabundance of  new  securities and 
companieslbo  the Crddit  Mobilier  paved  the way  in  no 
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inconsiderable measure for stock gambling, agiotage, and 
share swindling pure  and  simple.  The  last-mentioned 
effect was largely due to the business reports, which were 
true paradigms of  inadmissible concealments and puffing 
advertisements (justly denounced, at least in most cases, 
by Aycard, although  he  does  so in  endless  repetition), 
which in turn caused the shares of  the Credit Mobilier- 
not without the influence of  the institution itself-at  the 
very outset to become  gambling stock  of  the very  first 
rank.E0 
The Credit Mobilier did not foster the regular customer 
business  to  any  extent  worth  mentioning.  The  large 
amount of deposits (up to ~qg,ooo,ooo  francs), however, 
that were intrusted to its care by the large railway com- 
panies which it formed, were  invested to a considerable 
extent in other  railway  shares,  and industrial securities 
of  all descriptions, as well  as in its numerous subsidiary 
companie~.~~ 
This  circumstance,  coupled  with  the  enormous  and 
permanent advances made to these subsidiary companies 
(especially  to  the  Sociite'  Immobilzke  which  it  had 
founded), led to the complete immobilization of  its share 
capital, and thereby to the downfall of  the bank, which 
actually took place in 1867. 
Moreover, strong speculation on the part of  the bank 
itself, in the closest relation to the enormous amounts of the 
tied-up securities, took place, which resulted occasionally 
in considerable gains, but frequently and probably in the 
majority of  cases, in great losses. 
On the other hand, however, it must not be forgotten 
that it was due above all to the boldness and tenacious National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
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energy  of  the Pkreires that the enormous extension  of 
French  railways,  and  partly  also  of  foreign  lines, was 
brought  aboute3  in  the  period  from  1850  to  1860,~~ 
when  the  PQeires  were  acting  independently.  This 
opened  up  new  fields  of  activity  to  French  industry, 
and  gave  it  an  undreamed  of  power,  extension,  and 
organisation. 
In addition it must be admitted in praise of  the CrCdit 
Mobilier that,  as Aycard himself  is obliged to recognise, it 
continued to protect the enterprises it had  founded and 
the securities it had issued, and that it was just  the per- 
sistent exaggeration of  this principle, which in itself is not 
reprehensible, that constituted the main though not sole 
cause of  its downfall. 
This downfall, however, was not prevented by the con- 
trol on  the  part of  the shareholders, a  remedy  recom- 
mended as most efficient in many quarters, and facilitated 
by the by-laws of  the Credit Mobilier, according to which 
any 10 members at a general meeting by a written appli- 
cation could place any subject on the order of  the day. 
Purther (and this is not less  important), the downfall 
was neither prevented nor foreseen by the existing  sub- 
stantial  governmental  control.  No  less  important  an 
authority  than  Adolf  Wagnerls5 while  under  the  first 
impression of  the crisis of  1900, thought it necessary to 
propose for all German Banks a "State Control Bureau," 
an institution which  in the case of  the Crddit  Mobilier 
had  existed  from  the very  beginning  in  a  form  which 
partly met, and partly even exceeded the wishes of  Adolf 
Wagner.  The charter, dated November 20,1852, contains 
the following regulations regarding the government  con- 
trol which was by no means "  an empty form:"66 
"ART.  3. La societd sera tenue de remettre, tous les six 
mois, un extrait de son Ctat de situation au Ministkre de 
1'1ntCrieur, de 1'Agriculture et du Commerce, au prefet du 
Departement de la Seine, au prefet de police, B la chambre 
de Commerce et au greffe du Tribunal  de commerce de 
Paris. 
"ART. 4.  En outre, la Socidte devra fournir au Ministre 
des Finances sur sa dernande, ou & des epoques pQiodiques 
par lui ddterminkes, les memes dtats prdsentant la situa- 
tion  de ses comptes  et de son portefeuille,  ainsi que le 
mouvement  de ses ophations. 
"Les opQations  et la comptabilit6 de la Sociktg seront 
soumises  B  la verification  des  d6lkgu6s  du Ministre des 
Finances, toutes les fois que celui-ci le jugera convenable. 
I1 sera donnd communication  B ces deleguks du registre 
des  ddliberations, ainsi  que  de tous  les  livres, souches, 
comptes,  documents  et piPces  appartenant  la  societe. 
Les valeurs  de caisse et de portefeuille lui seront  Cgale- 
ment reprdsentdes." 
[ART. 3. The Company shall transmit every six months 
abstracts of  its condition to the Minister of  the Interior, 
Agriculture and Cotnmerce; to the prefect  of  the police, 
to the Chamber of  Commerce and to the file office  (greffe) 
of the Commerce Court in Paris. 
ART. 4.  The Company shall furthermore furnish to the 
Minister  of  I'inance, either  upon demand or  at intervals 
prescribed  by  him,  statements  of  the  condition  of  its 
accounts and portfolio, also of the movement of  its opera- 
tions. National  Monetary  Commission 
The operations and the books of  the Company shall be 
subject  to  examination  by  the  representatives  of  the 
Minister  of  Finance  at any  time  he  may  deem  proper. 
These representatives shall have access to the minutes of 
the  deliberations,  also  to  the  books,  stubs  (souches), 
accounts,  documents and other papers  belonging to the 
Company.  They shall also have power  to ascertain  the 
value of  the cash and of  the portfolio of  the Company.3 
I trust that I  have  given above, though only in brief 
form, everything essential to form  an opinion as to the 
growth  and downfall, the faults and excellencies of  the 
Credit Mobilier, without  having omitted any of  the im- 
portant points which  formed the bases of  Sattler'se7  and 
Max Wirth's6Qriticisms.  I  shall now take up the ques- 
tion whether and  in how far it is correct to designate the 
German banks  (especially those of  the first  period)  un- 
reservedly as "  Credit Mobilier" banks.6Q 
In  the first place, as far as the by-laws are concerned on 
which the Darmstadter Bank  (Bank fiir Handel und In- 
dustrie) was founded, it may be asserted, that taken as a 
whole, i. e.,  as regards the large majority of  its regulations, 
they  are copied, not  from those  of  the Credit Mobilier 
(which was founded the year before), but consciously, and 
in some cases literally, from the statutes of  the A. Schaaff- 
hausen'scher  Bankverein,  established  in  1848.  Conse- 
quently, they rest  essentially on  a  German, and not  on 
a  French foundation, and were  the product  of  German 
business customs and views. 
This applies especially-I  can only refer to a few  in- 
stances  here-to  the most  important  part  of  the pro- 
gram, namely  to Chapter 111,  in which the "sphere  of 
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activity and the powers of  the bank" (sec. 10)  are gone 
into minutely, and which is almost an exact copy of  the 
corresponding  paragraph  in  the  Schaaffhausen  by-laws 
(sec. 20).  This is preceded, in the by-laws of  both banks, 
by the following fundamental principle of  sound banking 
policy  (sec.  10, par. I of  the by-laws of  the Darmstadter 
Bank and sec. 20 of  the Schaaffhausen Bank by-laws) : 
"The bank is authorised to carry on all kinds of  bank- 
ing  business-that  is, such business  from which  it can 
easily withdraw its money in case of  need." 
The additional regulations of  Chapter I11 of  the by-laws 
of  the  Darmstadter  Bank  are  interesting.  They  were 
evidently made with regard to the needs of  the timesT1 I 
have pointed out above that they were partly a reproduc- 
tion of  the corresponding clauses in the Credit Mobilier's 
program.72  They  were  lackingT3  in  the  Schaaffhausen 
Bank by-laws, which had been prepared five years earlier, 
and under  different economic conditions.  According to 
these regulations the bank was authorised: 
(i) To undertake all  loans, or enterprises  of  a  public 
nature on its own account, or partly on its own account, 
to assign or transfer them, to realise them, or to partici- 
pate in underwriting them, as well as to put in circulation 
bonds payable to names or bearer to the limit of  its under- 
taking or participation. 
(h) To arrange for and effect  the union, or consolidation 
of  various anonymous companies, as well as the transfor- 
mation of  industrial undertakings into anonymous com- 
panies.T4 
The programs of  both of these two large banks belong- 
ing to the period under con~ideration7~  (the by-laws of the National  Monetary  Commission 
Disconto Company were,  in  accordance with  its origin 
as a credit partnership, if  anything more restricted)  were 
consequently  neither  fantastic, nor  calculated  to effect 
revolutionary changes. 
Naturally  these  pregnant  differences  in  the by-laws 
and programs could hardly be noticed, far less appreciated, 
during the fifties.  For the situation of  general economic 
conditions was almost  identical  at that time in  France 
and Germany, in so far as similar causes (described above) 
produced  similar results  in both countries.  In France, 
as well  as  in  Germany, an  impetuous  rushing  forward 
manifested itself from 1852-53  in all branches of  industry, 
especially  in  the mining  and  machine  industry, caused 
by the great haste with which railways were being con- 
structed.  In both  countries  a  vast  number  of  promo- 
tions,  transformations,  and  flotations  came  to the fore 
during a very short period; these, naturally, required the 
aid of the newly founded banks which perceived in such 
undertakings a rich source of  gain.  Added to this  (and 
again  as  a  result  of  the same  causes, accompanied by 
the  ever  present  and  apparently  irrepressible  spirit  of 
speculation  in  both  countries),  discount  rates went up 
strongly in consequence of  the excessive demand for cap- 
ital.  The rate of  discount of  the Bank of  France, which 
together with that of  the Bank of  England, was above all 
determinative for Germany  at that time, stood  at 3 per 
cent as late as  1852 (beginning with March), and that of 
the Bank  of  England  at only  2  per  cent during April- 
December, 1852." 
During the year  1853 the discount rate of  the Bank of 
England gradually  rose to 5 per  cent between the 29th 
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September  and  the  21st  December.  In 1855, between 
autumn and the end of  December, it went up to 5% per 
cent and 7 per  cent, after some fluctuations  again  to  7 
per cent at the end of  1856, next to 8 per cent beginning 
with October 19, 1857, to 9 per cent on November 5, and 
to 10 per  cent on  November 9,  1857, a sufficiently sure 
sign of  an  approaching storm.  Similar  conditions  pre- 
vailed  in  the Bank  of  France,  while  the  highest  rate 
recorded by the Hamburger  Bank in  1857 was as much 
as 12 per cent.I7 
A  commercial  and  bourse  crisis  which  was  greatly 
intensified by  severe commercial  crises  in  England  and 
the United States, broke  out in  1857 simultaneously in 
England, France, and Germany. 
The  situation  in  the  two  last-named  countries  was 
bound to develop into a bourse crisis, even without the 
simultaneous commercial crises in the United States and 
England,  in  consequence of  the  excessive  number  of 
company promotions, transformations, and new issues, as 
well  as through  the collapse of  the normal  organisation 
of the credit and money market produced thereby.Ts 
The course of  events on the Bourse was that which has 
been  constantly  recurring.  First  of  all,  professional 
speculators, upon learning at the Bourse of the universal 
improvement  in the economic situation, found that the 
improvement was not sufficiently reflected in the bourse 
quotations,  and  by  heavy  and  continued  purchases, 
endeavored to bring about  a  lasting  rise.  It was only 
then, as is  generally the case, that the general  public, 
for the most part guided and influenced by the quotation 
list, took up the matter.  Its opinion, however, is based National  Monetary  Commission 
on slight practical knowledge.  During times of  a visible 
rise of  the market its credulity is exceeded  only by its 
hopes; it accepts the existing exchange quotations, how- 
ever high, as the basis for calculating the intrinsic value 
of  securities,  while  these  calculations  grow  more  and 
more fantastic from day to day. 
As  the economic developm'ent  and  the course on  the 
bourses of  both countries at that time proved nearly the 
same, and as the participation of  the banks of  both coun- 
tries in excessive and irrational promotions, issues, and 
flotations,  above  all  in  mining  enterprises  and railway 
building  (which first  gave  rise  to the crisis,)  was  only 
too obvious, the natural inference was drawn, that these 
banks were identical in character and kind. 
This conclusion, however, overstepped the mark.  It is 
true that the banks dating from this period, endeavored 
from  the very  commencement to vindicate their right, 
and even duty, to promote commerce and industry in the 
most  effective way, by  participation  in flotations, foun- 
dations, and transformations.  The Darmstadter Bank in 
particular  had  contemplated  from  the very  outset  the 
creation  of  special "  organs  at home and abroad "  for 
this purpose. 
This  bank  accordingly  began, during the first years 
of  its existence, to create such "organs"  on a large scale. 
But it is equally true that attempts to found branches in 
the various German States were  unsuccessful, chiefly be- 
cause of  the opposition of  the different governments, which 
gave home banks the preference over the branch  estab- 
lishments of  outside  institution^.^^  Thus only an agency 
could  be  established in Frankfort-on-the-Main in  1854, 
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which  existed  until  1864, when  it  was  replaced  by  a 
branch.  Only at Mainz, in the Grand  Duchy of  Hesse, 
where the headquarters of  the bank were situated, did the 
bank succeed in opening a branch establishment as early 
as  1854, while  in  the  same  year  a  silent  partnership 
(Kommandite) had  been  formed  in  New  York  (G. von 
Baur & Co.), which, in 1856 and  1857, was  followed  by 
the founding of  further commandite connections in Berlin, 
Heilbronn,  Mannheim, Breslau, and Leipsic,  and in  the 
sixties also in Hamburg, Stuttgart, and Vienna.82 
Accordingly the account "  commandites, branches and 
agencies  l'  stood in the books of  the bank at 8,433,701.43 
florins as early as 1856. 
The promotion of  industry, however, was not the only 
aim that the banks had  in view at that period.  It had 
been emphasized at the very beginning that participation 
"in  the great creations and financial transactions of  the 
Governments"  also  formed  an essential  part  of  their 
program.  This constituted a sphere of  business activity 
which  the Credit  Mobilier  had  constantly  neglected  in 
favor of  railway and industrial transactions, except in  so 
far as the exigencies of  its position as a "  banque gouverne- 
mentale," a position which  it aimed at and which it was 
intended  to  fill, necessitated  a  different  attitude.  In 
contrast  to  this  all  German  banks,  (especially  those 
founded  during  the  period  under  consideration,)  fos- 
tered  from the very outset  this special  branch, namely, 
public  loan  credit  (state,  provincial,  and  municipal), 
and have attended to this branch of  business effectively 
and successfully ever since. National  Molzetary  Commission 
In the following list the principal loan transactions of  - 
the Damstadter Bank and the Disconto Gesellschaft, (the 
two most prominent banks of  the period,) are given: 83 
DARMSTADTER  BANK. 
1854: Baden state loan. 
Bavarian state loan. 
1858  : Bremen state loan. 
Swedish state loan. 
1860: Swedish state loan. 
1861  : Swedish mortgage loan. 
(Lottery) loan of  the Canton Fribourg. 
1862 : Worms municipal loan. 
1864: Austrian state lottery (Rothschild syndicate). 
1866: Bavarian state loan. 
Saxon state loan. 
Wiirttemberg state loan. 
1868: Hessian state loan. 
Brunswick (railway) loan. 
Prussian 4 per cent state loan. 
Hamburg 4%  per cent state loan. 
1859: Prussian  (mobilisation)  loan of  30,000,0o0 thalers, effected jointly 
with the leading Berlin banks and firms under the management of 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft, which was the origin of  the so-called 
"Prussian Consortium (syndicate) " constituted during subsequent 
years. 
1866: Four per cent Baden Loan (30,000,ooo  thalers), effected jointly  with 
the Seehandlung, and the banking  firm of  W.  H.  Ladenburg  & 
Sons, at Mannheim. 
Four per  cent  Bavarian issue of  premium  loan bonds  (35,000,ooo 
florins), jointly  with  the Royal Bavarian Bank and the banking 
houcle von Erlanger & Sons, Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
Brunswick loan (2,000,000 thalers). 
I 867 : Four per cent Baden  premium loan bonds (12,ooo,ooo thalers). 
1868: Four  and one-half  per  cent  Mannheim  municipal  loan  (3,200,ooo 
thalers) for the construction of  the Mannheim-Karlsruhe Railway, 
effected jointly  with the banking  firms of  W.  H. Ladenburg  & 
Sons and M.  A. v. Rothschild & Sons in Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
Prussian  state loan  of  40,000,000  thalers  and  5,000,ooo  thalers 
(Prussian syndicate under management of  the Seehandlung). 
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1869: Danzig municipal loan. 
Prussian loans (agreement with Frankfort-on-the-Main) of 4,450,000 
thalers and 550,000 thalers. 
The  German  banks,  following  the  example  of  the 
Credit Mobilier, also founded industrial companies as early 
as this period.  Thus the Darmstadter  Bank  undertook 
the promotion  of  the Wollmanufaktur Mannheim (paid- 
up share capital 400,000 florins), of  the Wurttembergische 
Kattunmanufaktur  (paid-up share capital 500,000 florins), 
of  the Oldenburgische Ostindische Reederei  (paid-up share 
capital  250,000  florins),  the  Kammgarnspirsnerei  und 
Weberei, Marklissa (paid-up share capital 300,000 florins), 
the Ludwigshutte, near Biedenkopf  (paid-up share capital 
360,000  thalers, jointly  with  the Mitteldeutsche Kredit- 
bank),  and  participated  in  the  transformation  of  the 
Maschinenfabrik  und Eisengiesserei Darmstadt into a joint 
stock company  (paid-up capital 2001000 florins), as well 
as in that of  the Heilbronner  Maschinenbaugesellsch  aft. 
The example of  the Cr6dit Mobilier in creating subsid- 
iary companies was also followed; thus the Darmstadter 
Bank on November  5, 1855, founded the Hessian Note- 
Issuing Bank, known as the Bank fur Suddeutschland, with 
a capital of  20,000,000 florins.  Finally the Darmstadter 
Bank, like the Credit Mobilier, made  it a  business prin- 
ciple from the very outset to remain permanently inter- 
ested  in  the  companies  which  it  promoted,  not  only 
through permanent representation of its own directors on 
the board df  managers, but also by the holding of  a large 
number of shares, through which, however, severe losses 
were frequently sustained. National  Monetary  Commission 
Thus it participated in the seven industrial and com- 
mercial  companies  which  it promoted  or  transformed 
during 1856 (with a total capital of  I ,580,000 florins) with 
about one-third of  the combined share capital of these con- 
cerns (8 13,  I 57 florins).  In contrast, however, to the Credit 
Mobilier, the  German  banks never consented  to tie up 
their capital during the period in question by unlimited 
advances to such subsidiary or  affiliated companie~.~~ 
Furthermore,  during  those  first  years  of  impetuous 
growth, some of  them, like the Cr6dit Mobilier, became  - 
interested too extensively and too rapidly in railway and 
industrial securities and enterprises, though thereby they 
doubtless rendered great and permanent service  to  the 
nation.  The  list  below  is  intended  to  give  a  detailed 
idea of  the most important railway transactions in which 
the  Darmstadter  Bank  and  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft 
participated at that time. 
DARMSTADTER  BANK. 
1854: Austrian State Railway (taking over of  shares). 
'  1855: Extension of  the Rhine Railway from Nymwegen to Bingen. 
Theiss Railway (taking over of  shares). 
1856: Financing the Bingen-Aschaffenburg Railway  (via Mainz) and pro- 
moting the Elizabeth Railway (taking over of  shares). 
1859: Four and one-half per cent bonds of  the Rhine-Nahe Railway (guar- 
anteed  by  State)  4,500,om  thalers,  jointly  with  the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft. 
1861. Preference  shares of  the Cologne-Minden Railway. 
Private sale of shares and bonds of  the Hessian Ludwig Railway. 
1862: Placing of  bonds of  the Livorno Railway. 
Conversion of the 4% per cent Thuringian Railway preference shares 
Issue of  1,200,000 florin  preference  shares of  the Hessian Ludwig 
Railway. 
1863: Preference silver shares  of the Galician Carl-Ludwig Railway, exempt 
from taxation (Rothschild syndicate), of  6,000,000 florins. 
Five per cent preference shares of  the Moscow-Riazbn Railway of 
5,000,mo rubles, guaranteed by State. 
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Four per cent preference shares of the Hessian  Ludwig Railway of 
about 3,000,000 florins. 
Silver preference  shares of  the Galician  Carl-Ludwig  Railway  of 
5,000,000 florins (Rothschild syndicate). 
1866: Shares of the Hessian Ludw ig Railway. 
Shares of the Magdeburg-Leipzig Railway Lit. B. 
Shares of  the Altona-Kiel Railway. 
Preference shares of the Upper Silesian  and South-North German 
Junction Railway (Reichenberg-Pardubitz). 
1867: Common and preference  shares of  the Fiinfkirchen-Bares Railway 
and construction of  the line, as well  as of  the Siebenburgen and 
Franz Joseph Railway (Rothschild syndicate). 
First preference shares of  the Magdeburg-Halberstadt Railway. 
Bonds of  the Russian Kozlov-Woronezh and Poti-Tiflis Railway. 
1868: Shares of the Hessian Ludwig Railway (~,ooo,ooo  thalers). 
Five per cent bonds of the Hessian Ludwig Railway (guaranteed by 
State, 4,000,000 thalers). 
Five per cent preference shares of the Hessian Ludwig Railway. 
Organization of  the Alfold Railway (Rothschild syndicate). 
Construction of  the Arad-Temesvar line (Rothschild syndicate). 
Shares and bonds of  the Austrian North-West  Railway. 
Shares of the Rhine Railway Lit. B. (5,ow,ooo thalers). 
1869: Five per  cent  preference  shares of  the Berlin-Potsdam-Magdeburg 
Railway of  7,000,000 thalers. 
Five per  cent  preference shares of  the Upper Silesian Railway  of 
I 3,305,000 thalers. 
Four and one-half per  cent  guaranteed  shares  of  the Thuringian 
Railway Lit. C of  4,000,000 thalers. 
Shares of  the Cologne-Minden Railway of  9,068,200 thalers. 
1869-70:  Purchase of  the entire Brunswick railway system from the Bruns- 
wick government on behalf of  a syndicate for I I ,ooo,ooo thalers, 
and an annual payment of 875,000 thalers for sixty-four years, 
and transfer of its management  and of  the further extension 
of  lines  to  a  special company. 
DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT. 
1853: Five per cent bonds, guaranteed by the State, of  the Moscow-Riazbn 
Railway of  5,375,000 thalers;  jointly with the Darmstadter Bank, 
the banking firm of  Sal. Oppenheim jr.,  & Co., and a St. Peters- 
burg house. 
1856: Three and one-half per  cent bonds of the Upper Silesian Railway 
Company. 
1857: Four and one-half  per  cent  bonds of  the Cosel-Oderberg Railway 
(r,goo,ooo thalers). National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
1859: Four and one-half per  cent State guaranteed  bonds of  the Rhine 
Nahe Railway of 4,500,000 thalers (jointly with the Darmstadter 
Bank). 
1866-1868:  Shares and bonds of  the Bergisch-Markische Railway. 
1867: First preference shares of  the Nordhausen-Erfurt  Railway. 
1868: Shares of  the Alsenz Railway. 
Five  per  cent  bonds  of  the  Charkoff-KrementshGg  Railway  of 
£1,716,000 (jointly with J. H. Schroder & Co., London). 
In considering this great activity displayed by the banks 
of that time in the underwriting and issuing of  securities, 
we must not forget that (as a glance at the list will show) 
these operations were almost exclusively confined to first- 
class securities, the introduction of  which has proved of 
great benefit to the German investment market.  It must 
also be borne in mind that the whole task of  carrying out 
the great development of  the German railway system at 
that period was performed by means of  German private 
capital (which was very small), and by the aid of  banks, 
with a total share capital extremely limited in comparison 
to the magnitude of  the undertakings. 
The German banks at  that time (almost without excep- 
tion)  when  heavily  engaged,  took  immediate  steps to 
restore the liquidity of  their resources and the equilibrium 
between  their  assets  and  liabilities, whereas the Cr4dit 
Mobilier, greatly to its detriment, postponed such attempts 
till the year preceding its collapse. 
Thus the Darmstadter Bank, the capital of  which had 
been paid up in full in the first series (IO,OOO,OOO  florins 
in 1855) raised its capital to 25,000,000 florins, though the 
attempt made in  1857 to bring it up to the amount of 
50,000,ooo florins (provided for in section 4 of  its charter) 
failed almost entirely by reason of  the crisis of  that year.85 
Consequently the bank, up to 1864, pursued the course 
(justifiable  from  the  economic  point  of  view,  though 
hardly from a business standpoint) of  reducing the loans 
on current account from 4,500,000 florins (1857) to about 
360,000  florins  (end of  1859), and of  reducing  also the 
"Lombard  and  covered  credits"  and  the  "loan  and 
mortgage " accounts.  The same course was bllowed with 
regard to the item "illiquid claims,"  always specified in 
the reports up to 1864  although the administration was 
doubtless  perfectly  aware  of  the  serious  objections  to 
such reductions from a business point of  view. 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft likewise resolved, as early as 
1856, or  about a year  after  its transformation  into its 
present  form,  to  raise  its  comrnandite  capital  from 
IO,OOO,~O  thalers to 20,000,000 thalers.  Owing  to the 
crisis  of  1857, however,  this  resolution  could  only  be 
partly carried out, and was cancelled later on.87 
Like the Credit Mobilier, the German banks in the early 
years of  their existence (1855 and 1856), mainly under the 
influence of  the highly inflated quotations of  their shares, 
made the great mistake of  distributing excessive dividends, 
instead of  holding them down  and using the surplus to 
strengthen  their inner position  and reserves.  Thus the 
Darmstadter Bank paid  dividends  of  10.66 per  cent in 
1855 and 15 per cent in 1856, and the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
13% per cent in 1856 (10 per cent for nine months).  This 
course naturally  had to be atoned for, especially by ex- 
treme fluctuations of  dividends during the next few years, 
and by large decreases during bad years.  The dividends 
of  the  Darmstadter  Bank  and  those  of  the  Disconto- National  Monetary  Commissiola 
Gesellschaft during this period (up to, and including 1869) 
are shown in the following table? 
Pear.  DarmstLdter  Disconto.  (  Bank  /  Cewllrhaft. 
a  For nine months. 
The average  dividend  rate of  the Darrnstadter  Bank 
was: during the  first decade of  its existence (I  853-1 862),  6  % 
per cent; during the second decade of  its existence 1863- 
1872), 8.7  per  cent;  sg  that of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
during the first ten years (1856-1865)  of  its existence as 
a  limited  joint  stock  company  (Kommanditalztiengesell- 
schaft)-6.55  per cent; during the second decade  (1866- 
1875), 13.1  5 per  cent.g0 It should be said  though, that 
neither bank neglected to increase its surplus, which, for 
instance,  rose  in  the case  of  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft 
from 16,600 marks in  1852 to 2,640,495 marks  in  1860, 
and of  the Darmstadter  Bank  from  39,109.8  florins in 
1854 to 1,553,363.18 florins in 1868. 
In contrast  to the  Credit  Mobilier,  current  account 
business was fostered during the period under discussion 
The German Great  Banks 
by both banks with the greatest care and success, although, 
in the case of  the Darmstadter  bank,  not  to the same 
extent as the promotion and issue busine~s.~' 
The development of  the current account business in the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft and the Darmstadter  Bank during 
the period is shown in the tables below (pp. 70 and 7  I). 
The  tables  show  that the deposits of  the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft amounted on December 31, I 869, to 2,274,228 
marks, and those of  the Darmstadter Bank in 1869 (the 
end of  thislperiod) to 10,800,268.34 florins.  It should be 
said, though, that this large amount was due to exceptional 
and temporary circumstances, discussed on pp. 73 and 74. 
The other banks  to be considered in this connection, 
the activity  of  which  during  this  period  has  remained 
almost  unnoticed  in  literat~re,~~  likewise  show  on  the 
whole  a  satisfactory development. National  Monetary  Commission 
-- 
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11. Darmstadter Bank, 18531869. 
Year.  Credits in cur- 
rent account. 
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The  A.  Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein,  founded  in 
1848 with a business capital of  5,187,000  thalers (see p. 46) 
(of  which,  however,  only  3,199,800 thalers  had  been 
issued  at the  start), during  the first years of  its exist- 
ence  O5  under  the cautious  and experienced management 
of  W. L. Deichmann, Gustav Mevissen, and Victor Wen- 
delstadt succeeded in starting important industrial under- 
takings,  as  well  as  in  establishing numerous  industrial 
connections, especially in Rhenish Westphalia.  Thus, for 
the  purpose  of  mobilizing  the industrial  participations 
of  the firm  of  A.  Schaaffhausen, it took  a  considerable 
part  as  early  as  1851 in  the founding of  the Hoerder 
Bergwerks- und  Huttenverein, at Col~gne,~~  in 1852 in the 
Colner Bergwerk~erein,~~  as well as in the establishment of 
the Colnische Baumwollspinnerei und  Weberei;  the  Col- 
nische  Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft, the  Coln-Miisener National  Monetary  Commission 
Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft,  and the  Colnische  Riickveu- 
sicherungs-Gesellschaf  t. 
"The board of  directors," says the business report for 
1852  (p. 3), "acted  on the  principle that the  function 
of  a  great  banking  institution  is  not so  much to start 
new  branches  of  industry  through  extensive  participa- 
tion~,  as to induce  the capitalists  of  the country,  by 
recommendations  based  on exhaustive investigations,  to 
turn idle capital toward  such enterprises, which,  when 
properly  launched, in response to existing requirements, 
and offering the guarantee of  expert management, bid fair 
to yield reasonable profits." 
As  early as I 85 I,  the item "  Participations in Industrial 
Enterprises"  amounted to 434,706 thalers.  Up to 1858 
the following  promotions  were  added  to those  already 
mentioned : 
The Concordia, Colnische Lebensversicherungsgesellschaft; 
the  Agrippina, Colnische Transportversicherungsgesellschaft, 
and the Colnische Hagelversicherungsgesellschaft. 
The A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein took part also 
in the foundation of  the Bank fur Handel und Industrie 
(Darmstadter  Bank),  the  Bank  fur Suddeutschland  in 
Darmstadt  as  well  as  of  the  Colnische  Privatbank  at 
Cologne.  Further, it assisted at that time in the amalga- 
mation  of  the  Rhenish,  the  Bonn-Cologne,  and  the 
Cologne-Crefeld railway companies into one unified system 
of railways, with a union railway station at Cologne. 
The development of  the current account connections, 
mostly drawn from the industrial and commercial circles 
of the Rhineland and Westphalia, is shown in the following 
table : 
The Germart Great Banks 
I  Debits in current account. I Credits in current account. 
Year.  1 umber  1  a~~~~  I Number  1 Total amount. 
As to deposits (it is important to establish  this fact as 
the result of  a deliberate business policy), no appreciable 
increase during the period  under contemplation could be 
expected,  owing  to  the  principles  adopted  by the  A. 
Schaaffliausen'scher  Bankverein as well as by most of  the 
other credit banks. 
"  According to the principles  adopted after discussion 
with the Board of  Managers,"  says the business report of 
the Bankverein for 1850 (Appendix  2  to the minutes of 
the general  meeting,  September  14, 1850)  deposits  are 
received  only  on  condition  that three,  six,  and  twelve 
months'  notice  be given  before withdrawal.  It is  only 
because of  these principles  and the low  rate of  interest 
that the amount in hand is insignificant when compared 
with former years.  In the interest  of  the perfect safety National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
of our institution we do not deem It advisable to endeavor 
to obtain an increase in the deposits through more attrac- 
tive terms; we much prefer to carry on the business with 
our own means, to the extent that such action is  at all 
possiblein the banking  business  and  is  in  the interests 
of  our correspondents." 
The deposits at  the Bankverein at  the end of this period 
(I  869) amounted to 883,6  I 6.80 thalers. 
The dividends paid on stock Lit. B (according to  section 
10 of  the statutes, the capital and fixed dividends of  4% 
per cent on stock Lit. A were  guaranteed by the State) 
during this period amounted to: 
Per cent. 
1848-1851 .................................................. 4 
.......................................................  1852  @l5 
1853 .......................................................  6% 
1854 ....................................................... 6% 
.......................................................  1855  9 
1856 .....................................................  9%lW 
.......................................................  1857  9 
.......................................................  1858  6 
.......................................................  1859  6 
1860 -_-~-..~..~7--.----....~----..--.--.......  6 
1861 ....................................................... 6% 
.......................................................  1862  7 
.......................................................  1863  7 
1864 ....................................................... 7% 
1865 .................................................  7% 
1866 ....................................................... 7% 
1867 .......................................................  7% 
1868 .......................................................  7% 
.......................................................  1869  8 
1870 ..................................................  8% 
The profits  of  the business  were  thus quite  satisfac- 
tory,lol  and the surplus funds amounted, as early as Decem- 
ber 31, 1857, to 320,388.63 thalers. 
The extension of  the business by the establishment  of 
branches,  agencies, and commandites had  been  contem- 
plated as early as  1853 (business report for  1853, p.  3), 
and at the general meeting of  September 29, 1855, a reso- 
lution was passed to add a paragraph (par. 82) to the by- 
laws, which read as follows: "  The company is authorised 
to establish a  branch  in  Berlin, as well  as agencies and 
commandites abroad."  This resolution, however, was not 
carried  into effect, owing to the refusal of  the Prussian 
Ministry of  Finance and Trade to ratify the change of  the 
by-laws. 
The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, founded In  1856, de- 
voted itself successfully, from the very outset, to the fur- 
therance of  the issue business (in accordance with section 
2  of  its  by-laws,  see  note  73).  Its  nominal  capital 
was  I g,ooo,ooo thalers, of  which, however, only 3,740,  I 50 
thalers were paid up (1859,3,786,200 thalers) ; of  the lat- 
ter, again, 800,ooo thalers (4,000 shares nominally at 200 
thalers) remained in the portfeuille of  the company. 
In 1856 it participated in the Carinthia Railway (merged 
in  1858 with the Lombard  Railway), and in  1862 in the 
conversion of  the 4%  per  cent  preference bonds  of  the 
Hamburg-Berlin-Potsdam-Magdeburg and Thuringia Rail- 
way; during  1867, in the flotation of  the Baden 4%  per 
cent state loan and 4 per cent premium loan, of  the Magde- 
burg and Halberstadt original preference shares, and of  the 
Thuringia  Railway  shares.  Further,  it  negotiated  the 
issue of  the 5 per  cent  Kozlov-Voronezh and the 5 per 
cent East Prussian Southern Railway preference bonds. 
In  1868,  when  the  commandite  capital,  which  had 
been  reduced  meanwhile  to 7,500,000 thalers  (of  which 
at that time 3,786,200 thalers had been issued), was paid 
up to the amount of  5,625,000 thalers, it participated in National  Monetary  Commission 
the issue of  the 4%  per  cent Upper  Silesian preference 
bonds,  the  Russian  Land-credit  mortgage  bonds,  the 
Yeletz-Ore1 preference bonds, the 4%  per cent Prussian 
state loan of  1867 Lit.  D. to the amount of  24,000,000 
thalers, part of  which was issued in 1868, and in addition 
arranged  successfully  for  the  public  subscription  and 
placing of  the 5 per cent  (state-guaranteed)  preference 
bonds of  theshuya-IvAnovo, Kursk-Charkov, and  Charkov- 
Azov  Railway;  of  the 4%  per cent preference bonds of 
the Breslau-Schweidnitz-Freiburg Railway; of  the 736'  per 
cent Roumanian Railway bonds, and of  part of  the first 
preference bonds of  the Halle-Sorau-Gubener Railway. 
Finally, in 1869, it took a nominal part in the issue of 
the 5  per cent bonds of  the Moscow-Smolensk Railway; 
of  the 5 per cent preference bonds  of  the East-Prussian 
Southern Railway; of  the 4%  per cent preference bonds 
of  the Magdeburg-Cothen-Halle-Leipzig Railway;  of  the 
shares of  the Breslau-Schweidnitz-Freiburg  Railway, and 
of  the Gotha premium mortgage debentures; it also had a 
secondary participation (unterbetezlzgt) in the taking over 
of  the original and preference shares of  the Schleszsche 
Zznkhutten, of  the preference shares of  the St. Petersburg- 
Baltishport  Railway,  and  of  the loans  of  the  Italian 
Government raised on the church estates. 
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All  arrangements  had  been  made,  according  to  the 
business  report  of  1857, for  the establishment  of  com- 
mandites  in  other  towns,  but  the  realization  of  these 
plans had to be postponed owing to the crisis. 
Only the banking firm of  Messrs.  Breest & Gelpcke in 
Berlin  carried  on  business  on  account  of  the Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft since January, 1857.  This firm, how- 
ever, sustained large losses in 1863 through the failure of 
a large export firm at Danzig. 
The Mztteldeutsche Kredttbank lo3 was founded in  I 856 
with  a  capital of  8,000,000 thalers,  of  which  3,000,000 
remained  in  the portefeuille of  the bank,  while  of  the 
remaining capital of  5,000,ooo thalers,  I ,ooo,ooo thalers 
were redeemed in 1859 (see p. 47.)  This bank, as stated National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
before, should properly not concern us in this connection, 
as during the period in question it was a note-issuing bank. 
Its note issue amounted to 1,688,660 thalers in 1857 and 
to q,ooo,ooo thalers in  I 868.  At Frankfort-on-the-Main 
an "agency" (August Siebert) was  established  in  1856, 
which was transformed into a branch office in 1872. 
The Bank took an active part shortly after its founda- 
tion in a series of  industrial, state, and railway transac- 
tions, which, however, were not always successful. 
Thus in 1856 it participated to the extent of  one-third 
in  the purchase  of  the  Ludwigshufte, near  Biedenkopf, 
which  was  transformed  in  1858  (under  the  name  of 
Oberschlesischer Hiittenverein) into a joint-stock company 
with a capital of  600,000 florins.  This operation  caused 
serious losses  to both  partners  (the Darmstadter  Bank 
participated to the extent of  two-thirds). 
The participation  during  1856 in  a  cigar  factory at 
Wassungen in the Duchy of  Meiningen  also terminated 
badly. 
On  the other  hand,  it attained satisfactory results in 
its simultaneous participation in the Hochheim enterprise 
of  sparkling wines (Burgeff & Co.), which was transformed 
into a  joint-stock  company  in  1857; also in negotiating 
a 4% per cent Swedish loan (jointly with the Darmstadter 
Bank), and in a  100-florin lottery certificate loan, guar- 
anteed by the Austrian Government, as well as in taking 
over a preference loan of  the Werra Railway (~,ooo,ooo 
thalers), and in its participation in the establishment  of 
the insurance  society  "  Providentia,"  at  Frankfort-on- 
the-Main. 
It was interested in the development of  the brown coal 
industry in the Nieder-Lausitz district from the very com- 
mencement of  this industry; particularly in the Eintracht, 
Braunkohlenzierke  und  Brikettfabriken,  and  the  Ilse, 
Bergbau-A ktiengesellscha  ft. 
In 1858 it participated  in taking over the balance  of 
the m'erra preference shares of  250,000 thalers; a 4% per 
cent  loan of  the city of  Bremen; and the 4%  per  cent 
preference shares of  the Frankfort-Hanau Railway. 
In 1862 it took a leading part in the founding of  the 
Deutsche Hypotheken-Bank at Meiningen. 
During the greater part of the period  under considera- 
tion, it devoted  itself  to the regular  (current) business. 
Its turnover amounted to- 
Year. 
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Thalers. 
84,818,800.50 
The commissions amounted te- 
Thalers. 
1857-----------------~~~------------------------  58,067.39 
1858--___---.____.------------------------------------ 23,660.02 National  Monetary  Commission 
Thalers. 







The  current  account  business  showed  the  following 
results 
l  Credits.  I  Debits. 
Year. 
Numberof  tz,",zt:,f  Amount.  I accounts.  /  / 









































I.  588.034.88 
1,947.910.74 
The deposits increased from 490,599.54  thalers in 1858 
to 756,465 thalers in 1869. 
The silent partnership  (commandite) account stood, as 
early as 1858,  at  I ,103,1  I I thalers, without thecommandites 
being  named.  It is  only  in the report for 1860 that a 
Berlin commandi  te  is mentioned, namely, Messrs. A. Wolff- 
sohn & Co., whose place was taken by Messrs. G. Miiller & 
Co. in  1866.  This commandite, simultaneously with the 
Frankfort Agency,  was  changed  into a  branch  office  in 
1873- 
During 1869, 1870, and 1871 the original capital of  the 
bank, which had been reduced to 4,000,000  thalers, was 
increased  again  to  8,000,ooo  thalers,  and  in  1872  to 
16,300,ooo thalers, equal to 48,900,000 marks.lo4 
The liquidity of  the bank's resources was nearly always 
maintained, although energetic intervention was occasion- 
ally necessary.  Thus, at the end of 1859 the bank owned 
securities to the value of I 79,8  I 3.32 thalers; and succeeded 
in reducing the same during one year (I  860) to I 32,2  10.32 
thalers, or by 47,603 thalers. 
The attitude of  the banks during the crisis of  1857 was, 
generally  speaking,  economically  correct.  The  Darm- 
stadter Bank, for instance, could point out in its report for 
1857 that during that year it was able to ease and mitigate 
the economic situation by retarding industrial promotions 
and by opportune  interventions  on the stock exchange; 
through which course, however, its holdings of  securities 
rose from 8,500,000 to 10,500,ooo florins in 1858, and to 
I 2,500,ooo florins in I 859, causing considerable loss later 
on.  During that year (1857) it was able to advance con- 
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4,658.450.31 National  Monetal-y  Commission 
several banks, thus proving  that it had  seasonably and 
successfully strengthened the liquidity of its resources. 
The A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  also  empha- 
sized in its business report for 1857 (p. I) that "  its large 
available means had  enabled it at the time of  the crisis 
to continue to grant credit to its old solid clients, as well 
as  to increase  the same suitably  wherever  it appeared 
advisable." 
Similarly, the  Berliner  Ilandelsgesellschaft  report  for 
1857 (p. 2) states: "  During the crisis we  have helped to 
smooth over difficulties by opportune assistance in numer- 
ous cases where a  proper assurance  was  given  that  the 
assistance granted would be repaid." 
In all  issue business  and flotation  activity, however, 
the banks at that time were not slow to perceive clearly 
the importance and necessity of  the fundamental principle 
underlying  all prudent banking  policy, namely, the dis- 
tribution  of  risk; a  principle which  was  adhered  to by 
several banks in their issue transactions to an extent that 
often proved disadvantageous to their profits. 
In 1859 the Darmstadter  Bank  (probably for the first 
time)  formed  a  "bank  syndicate "  lo5 for  the purpose  of 
taking over several engagements which had to be settled 
in  1860  (especially the  Rhein-Nahe  Railway  bonds), a 
proceeding emphasized in the business report of  1860 in 
the following words: "This form has its decided advan- 
tages, as it reduces risk and facilitates operations." lo6 
It  must be admitted that the business reports lo7  of  that 
period left much to be desired as far as lucidity and con- 
ciseness are concerned  (this was owing to the fact that a 
proper  form  had  yet  to  be  found)  thus  complaints, 
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both  justifiable  and  unjustifiable,  were  not  lacking. 
 everth he less, it must be emphasized that hardly any one of 
them  contained self-advertising commendation, and that 
frequently they  contained  warnings,los  and  that, for  in- 
stance,  Model  (op.  cit.,  p.  36)  was  able  without  any 
difficulty  to compile the profit and loss of  the Darmstadter 
Bank from 1853 to 1856, although a specified profit and 
loss account was  attached to the reports only beginning 
with the year 1859. 
The  business  reports  of  the  A.  Schaaffl~ausen'scher 
Bankverein  can  also  be  described  as  thorough  and 
exhaustive. 
On the whole, it may be said of  the banks whose activity 
falls within the period under consideration that they made 
satisfactory progress in the organization and extension of 
business  connections  (Kunde~zgeschaft)  , and  that  they 
undertook, with  growing  success,  state,  financial,  and 
railway transactions on a large scale, and to a far greater 
extent than industrial transactions. 
The words used  by a  specially competent expert,log  in 
reviewing  the activity of  the Darmstiidter  Bank  during 
the first period, apply equally to all the banks, at least to 
the  most  prominent  of  the  period;  namely,  that  they 
"  rendered special service in the development of  European 
state credit and in the execution of  great railway construc- 
tions. " 
After reviewing the great work performed by the Ger- 
man credit banks during this first period-a  work executed 
gradually and gropingly, not without many faults and mis- 
takes, but neither without great and permanent  success, 
although  in  the  face  of  serious  interruptions  through National  Monetary  Commission 
European wars 11'  and grave crises "l-it  wi:l  be difficult to 
accept  the view  of  A.  Weber  that German  joint-stock 
banking  may  be  said  to have become  a  common  form 
only in the beginning of  the seventies (op. cit., p. 47). 
Neither can we  adopt the extremely  subjective  view- 
point  of  Max  Wirth, the  South  German  contemporary 
critic, concerning the activity of  the German banks during 
this period,  In his book on commercial crises (p. 271) he 
places the fact that the Darmstadter Bank participated in 
1857 in the promotion of  the North German Lloyd, under 
the heading  "The requirement  of  industry  and  trade," 
following it up with an exclamation mark, and manifests 
indignation at the bank's  promotion  of  the "  Concordia 
Spinning and Weaving Works " (formerly S. Woller) ,  still 
flourishing in Bunzlau und Marklissa, by referring to it as 
the " Promotion  of  worsted spinning works  in  far-away 
North Germany. " 
THE  SECOND  PERIOD  (FROM  1870 TO  THE 
PRESENT DAY). 
(I) TABLE OF EVENTS DURING THE SECOND  PERIOD IVHICH 
INFLUENCED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN  BANK- 
ING S'irSTEM. 
187 1-72. .  . . .Termination of the Franco-German war; sudden influx of  the 
war indemnity of ~,ooo,ooo,ooo  francs; irregular expansion 
of  the  German  system  of  private  railways, impetuous 
growth of  production, rise of  workmen's wages, of  almost 
all  prices,  especially  prices  of  raw  material  and  mining 
products; strong speculative movement in all branches of 
commerce and industry; beginning of  the industrial cartel 
movement. 
Establishment of  provincial  discount companies in Her- 
lin, Hanover,  Aix-la-Chapelle, Dernburg, Elberfcld, I-Iatn- 
burg, Duisburg  Ludwigshafen. 
1871. . . . . . .  .Foundation of  tile  Deutsche  Bank, xuarking the cornlnence- 
ment  of  a  systematic development  of  the  deposit  busi- 
ness, of tlie industrial export policy of the credit banks, and 
of  the concentration  of  German banking. 
1873. . . . . . .  Boursc and industrial crisis. 
1874-1878.  . .  Econornic depression. 
1875. . . . . . . .Poundation of the "Reichsbank"  (began business January I, 
1876). 
1876. . . . . . . .Bank discount rate falls to 3%  per cent in Berlin. 
1877-1878.  Russo-Turkish war. 
1879-1882.  . .Economic revival; formation  of foreign railway  companies, 
and the issue of  foreign loans. 
1879  . . . . . . .Bank discount falls to 3 per cent in Berlin. 
1879. . . .  . . . .The commcncement of  the conversion of German state rail- 
way  and niunicipal  bonds; reorganization of  the Gernian 
bank and coinage systern, adoption of  the gold standard; 
beginning of  the state purchase of the German private rail- 
ways; treaty of  alliance with Austria. 
1883-1887.  . .I)epression in all fields; continuation of  the issue of foreign 
securities. National  Monetary  Commission 
1887. . . .  . . .  .Alliance with Italy. 
1888-1890..  .Boom, large number of  promotions,  transformations, issues, 
bourse  speculation,  difficulties  in meeting  payments  on 
the state loans of  Argentina,  Portugal, Greece, etc. 
1891-1894.  .Depression and stagnation in all directions. 
1891. . . . . . .  .Failure of  several Berlin banking concerns. 
1893. . . . . .  . .Foundation of  tlie  Kheznisch-IVestfalisches  Kohlcn-Syndzkat. 
1893. . . . .  . . .Meeting of  the bank inquiry commission. 
1895. .  . . . . .Co~nmencement  of  an upward tendency; quotations of  tlle 3 
per cent In~perial  consols rise to 1oo.30 and of  the 3 per 
cent  Prussian  consols to 100.40; beginning of  a systematic 
industrial  policy  of  the banks;  foundations,  transforma- 
tions, issues; most of  the great banks raise their capital. 
1896-97. . .  . .The upward movement intensified; brilliant  development of 
the  electro-technical  industry;  further  extension  of  the 
German  (state) railway  system; increase  of  the Imperial 
Navy. 
1897. .  . . . . .  .Formation  of  the Rheinisck-bVestfalisches  Roheisensyndzkat; 
fusion  of  interests  (Interessengemcinschaft)  between  the 
Deutsche Bank on the one hand, and the Bergisch-Mar- 
kische Bank at  Elberfeld, and the Schlesischer Bankverein 
at  Breslau on the other, in order to promote an industrial 
banking policy (denoting the commencement of  close rela- 
t.ons between  the great banks and industry) which  gave 
an impetus to concentration of  banking. 
1898-1900. .  .Market at  its highest; rise of  the average bank discount rate 
in Berlin to 5.33 per cent and of  the private discount rate 
to 4 41 per  cent (1900).  Growth of  money requirements 
through tlie predominance of  cash transactions in bourse 
speculation  instead of  time  bargains,  as a result of  the 
bourse law of  January I, 1897. 
1898. . . .  .  . . .Outbreak of  the Spanish-American war. 
1899. .  . . . .  .Transformations,  new  promotions,  and  issues  show a  new 
record. 
Outbreak of  the Boer war. 
1900  . .  . . .  Quotation of  the 3 per cent German Imperial consols falls to 
86.74 (as compared with quotations of  99.63 of  the  z$i 
per  cent British  consols, and of  100.60 of  the 3  per  cent 
French rente).  The Deutsche Bank takes over zoo,om,ooo 
marks of  Gernlan Imperial and Prussian consols. 
~gw-01.  . Crisis, fall in quotation of  mining securities (end of  March to 
beginning  of July); failure of  the Porneranian  Mortgage 
Bank,  of  the  Mecklenburg-Strelitz  Mortgage  Bank, 
of  the  Prussian  Joint -Stock  Mortgage  Bank,  of  the 
Deutsche  Gru.rcdschuldbank, the Dwsdner Bank fur  Handel 
und  Gewerbe, the Leifizzger  Bank, and of  many industrial 
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undertakings  especially  in  the  electro-technical  branch. 
Energetic intervention of  the great banks,  strengthening 
of  the concentration  movement; disposal to an American 
syndicate of  8o,ooo,om marks 4  per  cent state treasury 
bills repayable in 1904 ancl 1905, maintenance  of  the low 
bank discount  rate  (3;':  per  cent)  until the end  of  Sep- 
tember. 
1901-1992..  .Continued large needs of  nioney on the part of  the Empire, 
the individual states, and mu~iicipalities,  outbreak of  the 
Chinese troubles,  foundation of  the  United  States Steel 
Corporation (1901). 
1902-1906..  .Recovery, bank discount rate falls to 3 per cent (February, 
1902), then increases to 4 per cent (October, 1902).  Feb- 
ruary  9,  1904,  outbreak  of  the  Russian-Japanese  war. 
1904:  Foundation of the Stahlwerksz~rband  at  Dusseldorf; 
impetuous movement  of  concentration.  1905:  Founda- 
tion of  the Oberschbsischcr Stahlwerks-~erband. 
1907. .  .  .  .  .  .  .American  crisis; considerable rise of  discount rates up to 7;4' 
per cent (average, 6.03 per  cent). 
1908.. .  .  .  .  .  .Termination of  acute crisis in America; recovery; money be- 
coming available, fall of  the bank rate from 7%  per cent in 
January to 4 per cent in December; average 4.76 per cent. 
1909.. .  .  .  .  .  .Money  circulates  more  freely, political  troubles  owing  to 
conflict  between  Austria  and  Servia;  bank-law  amend- 
ment, in  the  last  months  of  tlie  year  beginning  of an 
improvement  in some branches of  industry, especially in 
the mining industry. 
(2) SKETCH OF THE ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  OF GERMANY 
FROM  1870  UNTIL  THE  PRESENT. 
The result of  the victory in the great Franco-German 
war was  the creation of the German Empire in 1871. 
Unity was established gradually also in economic life. 
Weights  and measures,  the coinage  and monetary  sys- 
tems,'  the  constitution  of  law-courts,  procedure,  and 
law,2 were  unified by degrees, and the army and navy 
linked  firmly  together  for  the protection  of  the gains 
attained.  A  central  note  bank  (the Reichsbank)4  was 
founded for the purpose of regulating the money circula- 
tion and facilitating payments.  IJurthermorc, a supreme 
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The right of  free migration and free competition  (rec- 
ognized as early as the sixties in the independent indus- 
trial legislation of  the various German States) was intro- 
duced everywhere, at first through confederate and then 
through Imperial legislation. 
The epoch commencing in this manner  represents one 
of  the greatest economic revolutions  that has probably 
ever taken place in any modern civilized state. 
It does not lie within tlie scope of  this work to attempt 
to describe these changes exhaustively.  The extent and 
the developrrient of  the problems, however, which had to 
be solved by the German banks during the period  under 
consideration,  could hardly be comprehended without  a 
brief  description  of  at least  those  chief  factors  of  the 
economic development which had particular influence on 
the growth of  German banking.  It is only within such 
limits that I have attempted to sketch them in the fol- 
lowing outline. 
I will  attempt to summarize the numerous important 
factors in this development under the following two heads : 
This development is characterized on the one hand by 
an enormous expansion in almost all directions of  public 
and private  activity, coupled withR  a  further shifting of 
the center of gravity of  the whole economic fabric from 
agriculture to industry; and on the other hand, by the 
most  intense  concentration  of  forces, undertakings, and 
capital.  The following will give a detailed illustration: 
The  feverish  rapidity  of  the  economic  development 
during the period  in question must be attributed above 
all to the rapid growth of the population, for which sus- 
tenance and employment had to be found. 
The population in 18  16 amounted to about 25,000,000; 
at  the beginning of  this period  (1870), to over 40,000,000; 
and in  1907  to  62,100,000 souls.  During  the last  few 
years  it has increased  on  an average by about 855,000 
souls  annually,  as  co~ilpared  with  an  annual  increase 
during recent years of  about 373,000 in England and of 
only about 58,000 souls in France. 
It should be emphasized  however that this enormous 
increase in  the population of  Germany is not due to an 
increase of births, which have decreased  in proportion to 
the  population during the last three decades.  The increase 
is  due principally  to the very  considerable  decrease  in 
mortality, i. e., owing to  the  fact that  as a result of  improved 
hygienic conditions  the number  of  deaths in proportion 
to the population has decreased far more rapidly than the 
number  of  births7  Should  this  proportion  change,  an 
eventuality  bound  to take  place  sooner  or  later,  and 
should  the birth  figures  remain  stationary  or  decrease 
to a considerable extent, a  continuation  of  the increase 
in population hitherto recorded is out of  question.  Added 
to this, the excess of  immigration, which occurred for the 
first time in the years 1895 to 1900,~  (and which still con- 
tinues) may change  again  into an excess of  emigration 
which, from 1871 to 1895, amounted to about  2,500,ooo 
souls.  Finally,  the increase in population may cease or 
the rate  of  increase  may  decline,  if  there  should  be  a 
decline in the productivity of  our national industry which 
has been both a result as well as a cause of  the increase of 
population. 
At the beginning of  this period (I  87 I) about 64 per cent 
of  the inhabitants of  Germany lived in the country, and National  Alonetary  Commission  The German Great  Bank's 
about 36 per cent (as compared with only 28.04 per cent in 
Prussia  in  1849) in  the towns.  In 1893, however,  the 
percentage of  country and town population  was  almost 
equal, and in  1905 the percentage of  people living in the 
country  amounted  to 42.58  per  cent otily,  whereas  the 
percentage of  those living in towns had risen to 57.42 per 
cent of  the total pop~lation.~ 
According to the census of professions, trades, and occu- 
pations taken June 14, 1895, 26,000,000, or 42.7 per cent 
of  the population,  were  engaged  in various professions, 
trades, and occupations l0 (either as a main or subsidiary 
means of  gaining a livelihood)  (erwerbstatig im Hauptund 
Nebenberuf.)  They were divided as follows: 
Of  the  total number, 20,770,875,  or 40.12 per cent of  the 
entire population,  were  engaged  in  various  professions, 
trades, and occupations as a main source of  livelihood (er- 
werbstutig im  Haufitberuf)  , as compared with  I 7,632,008, 
or 38.99 per cent of  the entire population, in 1882. 
According to the occupation census taken on the 12th 
of  June, 1907, the main  results of  which were  published 
in the "  Reichsanzeiger " of  Pebruary 10, 1909, No. 35, the 
number of  persons thus engaged was 26,827,362, or 43.46 
per cent df  the entire population.  These figures show an 
increase of  6,056,487, or 29.16 per cent, as compared with 
I 895, whereas the increase in I 895, as compared with I 882, 
amounted only to I 7.80 per cent. 
The  population  of  the chief  industrial  towns l1  had 
increased to an extraordinary extent up to the end of  1905, 
iri  comparison with  the years  1843 or  1849.  Thus, for 
instance: Aix-la-Chapelle to about 144,000, as conlpared 
u~itll  about 46,000; Chemnitz to about 241,000, as com- 
pared with about 26,000; Dortmund to about 175,000, as 
compared with about 7,600; Essen to about 229,000, as 
compared with about 7,000; Diisseldorf to about 253,000, 
as compared with about 26,000.'~ 
At the beginning of  the period under consideration there 
were  8 towns,  in  1905 as many as 41 towns,  with  over 
~oo,ooo  inhabitants.  Berlin, which  about the middle of 
the nineteenth century numbered less than 500,ooo inhabi- 
tants, in 1870, 774,000, in 1880 not quite 1,250,000, and in 
1890 about  1,5oo,ooo,~~  has  passed  beyond  the second 
million since December, 1904. 
As stated by Ad. Wagner,14  it seems at  the present tirne 
as difficult to make a scientifically incontestable estimate 
of  German national wealth, as it is to estimate the amount 
of  income  of  the German  nation or its annual savings. 
A brief consideration of  the facts will make this clear. 
According to the most recent calculation made (1908) on 
the basis of  what is relatively the most accurate method, 
taking as basis  the Prussian  supplementary  tax (i. e., a 
direct  property tax),  the wealth of  Prussia amounted to 
I 30 billion marks.  Taking into account '"he  proportion 
of  population  (315)  the German  national  wealth  (given 
by  Mulhall  in  1895 in his  "Dictionary  of  Statistics" as 
£~,~oo,ooo,ooo  = I 50 billion marks) is estimated at  216 bil- 
lion marks, or to avoid exaggeration at 200 billion marks.10 
Two years earlier (1906) the German national wealth was 
estimated by Evert17 at 200 billion marks, by Ballod18 in 
1908 at 251 to 266 billions, by Steinmann-Bucher (1908)'~ 
at even 314 billions;  and in a recent essay  ("350  Milli- 
arden deutsches Volkvermogen," Berlin 1909) at 350 to 360 
billion marks.  Thus there is a difference of  no less than National  Monetary  Commission 
160 billion marks 20 between the highest and lowest (200 
billion to 360 billion marks) estimates recently made, al- 
though most of them were based upon careful and con- 
servative calculations. 
Again,  the result  of  the Prussian  income  tax assess- 
ment for  1907, chosen as a basis  for  estimating the Ger- 
man national income, gives a total income for the Prussian 
population (1907) of  I 7,99o,ooo,ooo  marks (I  I ,747,000,ooo 
marks  for  taxpayers; 6,243,000,ooo marks  for  nontax- 
payers).  Calculated on the proportion of  the population 
this would result in a German national income of  25  to 30 
billion  marks,  and an annual income of  484  marks per 
head  of  the population.  These figures, however, should 
be used with great reserve.21 
As  a matter of  fact Steinmann-Bucher calculates  the 
present German  national  income (in his book "j'50 Mil- 
liarden deutsches  Volksuerl;zogen," p. 102)  as being much 
higher, namely,  35 billion marks, though the grounds on 
which he bases his estimate seem inadequate. 
The same remarks apply to any estimate of  the annual 
German savings, i. e., the aniounts by which the German 
national wealth  is  annually increased from the Gerrnan 
national  income.  This  amount  Schrnoller  has placed 
at 2%  to 3 billion marks, and it has been calculated by the 
author of  the Grenzboten article already mentioned (p. 91) 
at 3.7 billion  marks on  the basis  of  an average  annual 
increase oi I ,700,000,000  23 marks in the value of  property 
subject to the Prussian supplementary tax. 
It is plain  that the same objections, or other no  less 
serious, may  be  urged  against  all  estimates for  foreign 
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countries which have been made according to any of  the 
above methods.24 
If, however, it be desired to give merely a general idea 
of  the development  of  national  prosperity  in Germany 
during this second period, it may be pointed out among 
other  things  that the total  income  during  1907  of  all 
physical  persons in  Prussia  (including an allowance for 
non-taxpayers)  amounted  in round  figures to 16 billion 
marks for a population  of  38,42  I ,000, while in  I 896 the 
total income of  these persons amounted to slightly over 
10 billion  marks,  for  a  total  population  of  32,379,000. 
The increase of  income was thus 56 per cent, while popu- 
lation increased during the same period only 17 per cent. 
The amount of  property assessed for propelty taxes in 
1905 amounted  to about 82,50o,ooo,000 marks, showing 
an increase of  17 per cent, as compared with  1899, when 
it amounted  to  70,000,000,000 marks.  The figures  for 
the  other  German  Federated  States  show  a  similar 
development  .25 
If  an attempt be  made  to ascertain  the amount  of 
German  national  wealth  invested  in  Bourse  securities 
(which would  be  especially  appropriate  in  the present 
volume),  equally  great  difficulties  will  be  experienced, 
despite the material collected in regard to this subject on 
the occasion of  the German finance reform bills of  1908.~~ 
If  the  table  compiled  in  the report  of  the Aeltesten 
der Kaujrnannsclzajt  voqz  Berlin 27  be  adopted, in  which 
(according to the market  report  of  June  30,  1906) the 
nominal and market values of  the securities dealt in on 
the Berlin Bourse were estimated at about 92% and 94% 
billion  marks,  respectively,  it  is  evident  that for our National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
purpose  the figures are too  high in  one regard  and too 
low in  another.  Too high, because in the table the total 
of  securities bearing fixed interest  includes the amounts 
withdrawn  from the market  during  1906 by  repayment; 
further, because it does not contain the total amount of 
foreign securities in German hands, but only the amount 
of foreign securities listed  at the Berlin Bourse.  By far 
the larger portion of  these securities, however, were never 
in German hands, as, for instance, Russian and Argentine 
government bonds, as well as Russian and American rail- 
way securities.  28  Another  part  of  these securities, such 
as the Italian, Austrian, and Hungarian state securities, 
had  passed  or  returned  by  the  30th  June, 1906, from 
German  to foreign hands (especially to the countries  of 
their origin) in consequence of  conversions or of  foreign 
demand. 
On  the other hand, the results obtained by accepting 
the table as a basis, are in part far too low, as many of 
the securities are not  quoted on  the Berlin  Bourse, but 
on other German exchanges.  Other securities, such as the 
debentures  of  small  industrial  undertakings,  are  not 
quoted on any German bourse. 
The  Deutscher  Oekonomist 2\ndeavors  therefore  to 
solve  the  problem  in  a  different  manner.  It starts 
with  the supposition  that, according to the income-tax 
statistics in  Prussia, the Prussian  income  derived  from 
' 
capital  property has been  valued  (though  far too  low) 
at 1,61o,ooo,ooo  marks, which, capitalized at 4 per cent, 
corresponds  to  40,000,000,000  marks  for  Prussia, 
and  assumes  that  of  these  40,000,000,000  about 
20,000,000,000 are invested  in  mortgages,  thus  leaving 
a  balance  of  20,000,000,000 for  securities  invested  in 
Prussia,  and  accordingly  about  30,000,000,000 for  the 
whole of  Germany. 
This method of calculation does not yield indisputable 
results, the more so, because no statistics exist regarding 
the total mortgages outstanding in Germany, the amount 
of  which for Prussia is estimated at 2o,ooo,ooo,ooo marks. 
Thus every  estimate  must  be  more  or  less  inaccurate. 
Moreover, every purely schematic application of  Prussian 
to German general conditions is improper. 
As  a  matter of  fact  it is  assumed in  the above-men- 
tioned supplementary volumes to the German finance re- 
form bill of  1908  30 that in  1907 the German public held 
German  public  and  quasi-public  securities,  as  well  as 
mortgage and municipal bonds of  private mortgage banks, 
to the amount of  about 35,  joo,ooo,ooo marks ; industrial 
bonds to the amount of  2,j00,000,000 marks, and shares 
of  an actual value of 6,750,000,ooo marks, making a total 
of  44,750,000,ooo marks of  securities in German  hands, 
or 14,750,000,ooo marks more than the above-mentioned 
estimate of  the whole  amount of  securities  in German 
hands. 
As  statistical details are lacking (especially the yield of 
illc  stamp  duties), it is  impossible to obtain a  reliable 
estimate 31 of  German investments  held  in  the shape of 
securities of  all kinds.  On  the whole,  we  may  assume 
(on the strength of  a number of data) that at least one- 
third of  the national  wealth  is  invested  in  securities.32 
According to the different estimates of  the German na- 
tional  wealth  (2oo,ooo,ooo to  360,000,ooo  marks:  see 
above, pp.  91  and  92)  it  may  be  concluded  that  the National  Monetary .Commission 
amount  is  between  66,ooo,ooo,ooo and  12o,ooo,ooo,ooo 
marks, figures which present  a  wide margin, indeed.  A 
similar conclusion  may be based  on the issue statistics, 
which, though somewhat incomplete, tend to prove that 
~,~oo,ooo,ooo  marks,  or  about  one-third  of  the annual 
savings of  the nation, is invested  annually in securities. 
Grave misgivings have  been  expressed, especially by 
Ad. Wagner, regarding  the tendencies  shown by the de- 
velopment  of  German incomes  during the period under 
consideration.  Wagner  finds  that  it  is  in  the main  a 
development  along  plutocratic  lines  and  favoring  the 
interests of  the money aristocracy, and he seems to think 
that the entire  economic  development  of  Germany  is 
seriously menaced by "  this constantly growing concentra- 
tion  of  income, evidenced not only in the case of  some 
particularly rich  persons, but also by a constant growth 
in numbers  of  the classes occupying a high and even the 
highest place in the economic scale." 33 
In a  study, breathing  a high spirit of  patri0tism,3~  he 
has lately pointed out that about the middle of  the nine- 
teenth century there were only about roo persons with in- 
comes exceeding ~oo,ooo  marks in the  territory correspond- 
ing to the confines of  present-day Prussia, whereas in 189 I 
there were I ,400 to I ,500, in 1902, 2,800, in 1905, 2,900, 
and in  1907, 3,600 such  persons.  In another  place he 
states that the national wealth and national income have 
increased out of  all proportion in favor of  the upper and 
of  the highest classes, and not inconsiderably in favor of 
the lower classes (especially the working classes), whereas 
the large middle class maintains its position with great 
difficulty in the list of  taxpayers, and (as far as its share 
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of  the national income is concerned) is falling into a less 
favorable position from day to day.35 
A  consideration  of  the facts  will  show  that none  of 
these misgivings can be deemed justified in all or even in 
their main points. 
In my opinion  (see p.  I 13) the increase h1  the number 
of  persons  with  incoliles  exceeding  ~ou,ooo  marks  in 
Prussia (of  present extent), fro~n  roo in the middle of  the 
last century to 3,600 in I 907, is certainly a gratifying proof 
of  our  economic development.  But  if  we  consider  the 
enormous  growth  of  population  in  these  57  years,  the 
increase of  such incomes does not seem very considerable, 
but rather  (relztively speaking) inconsiderable. 
As a matter of fact, a  smaller growth  in  the incomes 
exceeding  ~oo,ooo  111arks  might  have suggested serious 
misgivings regarding  the developn~ent  of  national pros- 
perity, in view  of  the fact that during these sixty years 
the  entire  standard  of  living,  the  entire  consumption, 
and thus the household budget of  the individual, has doubt- 
less increased to a very great extent. 
After all, we  can see but little significance in the fact 
that it is  just  the uppermost  grade  of  taxpayers  (men- 
tioned  by  Wagner)  which  has  considerably  increased 
colnpared with the other classes, since those of  its mem- 
bers who  become  wealthier must  of  necessity remain  in 
that  grade, there being no higher grade to which  they 
could be transferred. 
Finally, it may be pointed  out that during the period 
under discussiorl  the number of those persons who have 
been moving upward from a lovier to a higher tax grade 
has been constantly increasing; further, that the relative National  Monetary  Commission 
number  (in  proportion  to  the  population)  of  non-tax- 
payers  (i. e., persons  in Prusiia with incomes below 900 
marks) who have been moving upward into the taxpaying 
class during this period has also been constantly on the in- 
crease.37  'I'liis  can be  proved  in  detail.  According  to 
S~hmoller,3~  in old Prussia the number of  persons paying 
taxes on incomes exceeding 3,000 marks was as follows: 
Persons 
111  Prussia of  to-day: 
This shows, certainly, an absolute increase in the number 
of  taxpayers in Prussia (present-day area)3o  with incomes 
above 3,000 marks whose total taxable income (after legal 
deductions)  has  risen  from 2,792,345,342 marks in 1892 
to 5,156,245,432 marks in 1907. 
On the other hand, the income  of  persons  subject  to 
the income tax in Prussia  (present area) belonging to the 
lowest  grade  (incomes  between  goo  marks  and  3,000 
marks) has  risen  from  Z,~I  I ,981,421 marks in  1892 to 
6,591,553,725 marks in 1907.~~ 
Between the years  1907 and 1908 the group paying no 
income tax (incomes below  900 marks) decreased in the 
proportion of  5,555 to  5,242 ; the number  of  taxpayers 
in Prussia (with incomes exceeding goo marks)  increased 
19.5  per  cent  between  1892-93  and  1898-99,  whereas 
the population increased during the same period only 8.2 
per cent.41 
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Purtl~erinore,  the returns of the  Saxon income tax, under 
which until 1894 all persons receiving a minimum income 
of  360 marks were liable to taxation, give the following 
figirres for every roo persons assessed: 
Per cent 
5  6 
65  3 
31  I 
2  8 
8 
Less than goo marks-..  - -  --  --- ---- 
300 to 800 marks  -  __  ---  -_  ____  ___  _  __ 
800 to 3.300 marks-  -  -  -  ---- - 
3,300 to 9,600 marks  . -.--  _-  -  -  ---- ----- -  -- - 
Over 9,600 marks. -  ----.-------------  --  -  - 
That is to say, the number of  taxpayers in the lowest 
grades decreased, and the number belonging to the other 
groups  increased  considerably.  Moreover,  the  largest 
increase during the period  mentioned took place in the 
middle group of  taxpayers (800 to 3,300 marks), supposed 
by Ad.  Wagner to be particularly  endangered.  Finally, 
the total taxable income  of  physical  persons  in  Prussia 
has increased from 10,147,578,035  marks in 1896  to 15,873,- 
774,007 in 1907. 
Per cent 
7  I 
76  3 
20  9 
2  3 
5 
In the memorial  of  thc Admiralty,  dated  December, 
I 905,  erltitled "  Dze Entwzchlung der deutschen Seeznteres- 
sen zln  letzten Jah~zehnt,"  proof  is furnished  of  the enor- 
mous upward movement of incomes in Prussia, in which 
not only the wealthy classes but also those with smaller 
incomes participated  (900 to 3,000 marks)  almost to the 
same extent.  The increase of the national income by far 
exceeds the increase of  population. National  Monetary  Commission 
The fact that the classes with  small incomes,  which, 
by the way, are not solely conlposed of  ~vorkingmcn,  had 
a  large  share in  this  upward  inove~nent,  can also 42  be 
proved by the savings bank statistics. 
Of  the 9,000,ooo savings bank books43  in  existence in 
Prussia  at the end of  1901, almost one-quarter were for 
amounts not exceeding 60 marks, about one-seventh for 
amounts  from  60  to  80  marks,  about  one-eighth  for 
amounts from  150 to 300  marks, and only one-fhirtietll 
for amounts above 3,000 marks  (at this stage depositors 
begin CO  invest their savings in securities.). 
The number of  savings bank books grew as follows:  44 
The 
Location 
Wurttemberg- - - - - - - -.  -  - -.  - -.  - - - - - .  - -.  .  -.  . 
prussla---------------------------------.. 
This iiumber had doubled in  Prussia  during the time 
from I 882 to 1897 and trebled up to the end of  1906. 
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These deposits had  almost trebled in Prussia  between 
1882 and 1906, and were more than five-fold at the end of 
1907.  In  1882 every  eighth inhabitant  of  Prussia pos- 
sessed a savings bank book, and at the end of  1901 every 
fourth inhabitant.  The amount of  deposits increased in 
the German  Empire from about  1,869,ooo,ooo marks in 
1875 to 13,889,000,ooo  marks in  1907, which denotes an 
increase during these thirty-three years of  643.05 per cent. 
From  1883 to 1907, or in twenty-five years, the deposits 
have increased from 3,  I 87,000,ooo marks to I 3,889,000,ooo 
marks, or four and a quarter times. 
Between  1883 and  1908, the deposits  in the German 
credit banks  have also increased  considerably; in credit 
banks particularly, with a minimum capital of  ~,ooo,ooo 
marks each (which are of  greater importance for the de- 
posit business "1,  they rose from about 498,000,ooo marks 
at the end of  1883 to about 2,746,000,ooo marks at the 
end of  1908, an increase during these twenty-six years of 
more than four and a half  times. 
It may be  assumed that the greater portion  of  these 
bank  deposits,  about  two-thirds,  consists  of  working 
reserves of  manufacttlrers and traders (doubtless includ- 
ing also the smaller ones), and of funds of capitalists de- 
posited temporarily, but destined for investment in secu- 
rities,  mortgages,  etc.,  and  that only  the smaller  part 
(about one-third) represents savings deposits proper. 
The annual increase of  the savings deposited with the 
16,092 German cooperative credit societies (on January  I, 
1908)  was  estimated  at 225,000,000 marks.46 The ma- 
jority  of  the members belong most probably to the clas: 
of  the smaller and smallest tradesmen. 
pp 
Per certi. 
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German foreign trade (i. e., special imports and exports) 
according to the memorial of  the admiralty dated Decem- 
ber, 1905, entitled  Die Entwicklung  der  deutschefi Seein- 
teressen  irn  letzten  Jalzrzehnt,  rose  from  ~,~OO,OOO,OOO 
marks to 12,200,000,000 marks in the decade from 1894 
to 1904; the increase in weight was  60 per cent, and in 
value 66 per cent. 
During  this  period  the special  trade  of  England  in- 
creased  38  per  cent, that of  the United  States 59  per 
cent, that of  France 28  per cent, and that of  Russia  23 
per cent.  Within the last twenty-five years German trade 
has exactly doubled.47 
The total number of  establishments in trade and indus- 
try amounted, according to the census taken in 1895, to 
over  3  ,ooo,ooo, in which  about  10~22  5  ,000 persons were 
at  work. 
Of  these  3,000,000  establishments,  nine-tenths-with 
about 4,750,000 persons only-were  small establishments, 
as against only 19,000 large establishments, with over 50 
persons each; the latter, however, gave occupation to about 
3,000,000 persons, or almost to 30 per cent of  all persons 
engaged  in trade and industry.  As  compared  with the 
census of  i882, the proportion of  large establishments to 
middle-sized  and  small  establishments  in  1895,~'  had 
increased  28.3  per  cent  in  tlie mining  and  foundry  in- 
dustries, 3.6 per cent in the chemical industries, and 2.2 
per cent in the industry of illuminants. 
By far the majority of the 19,000 large establishments 
with about 3,000,000 persons belonged to industry proper. 
The  average  number  of  workmen,  clerks,  and  other 
employees belonging to the trade insurance associations 
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(BeruJsgenossenschaJten) in  commerce and industry was, 
in round figures, as follows: 
There were 124,074 steam engines (not including those 
used  in  agriculture  and forestry)  with  7,587,650 horse- 
power 49  at work in the German  Empire in  1907, which, 
if  the effective horsepower of a machine during a normal 
working  day is  computed  as equivalent  to the  labor- 
power of  10 men, replaced the work of 7~,ooo,ooo  men. 
Of  these  124,074 (7,587,650 W) steam engines,  27,921 
(3,065,223  El?)  belonged  to  the  mining  and  foundry 
industries;  the textile  industry  employed  11,039 steam 
engines  (934,763  FP)  and  the  machine  industry  8,066 
(89 I ,088 FP)  stea~n  engines. 
The population of  the Empire engaged  in  agriculture 
According to the occupation census of  1895 the whole 
population of  Germany was  divided  as follows: Agricul- 
ture, 35.74 per cent; industry and mining, 39.1 per cent; 
trade and transportation, I I .5 per cent.  For Prussia alone 
tlie following comparative data may be given:50 
and forestry, which still numbered  19,250,000 persons in 
............................  Agriculture. 
..................  Industry and mining 
...............  Trade'and  transportation. 
1882 (19,225,455 souls, or 42.5 per cent of the population), 
decreased  in  the thirteen years  following (1882-18~~),  to 
18,~oo,ooo  (18,501,307 souls, Or  35.8 per cent), the whole 
- - 
1843. 
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Per cent. 
as.  59 
42.  76 
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population  increasing during the same period  14.48 per 
cent; that is to say, the decrease in agricultural popula- 
tion amounted to about 700,000 persons, or 3.77 per cent 
of  the total population.  Although the number of  farms 
(la?zdzvirtschaftliche  Betriebe) and the area utilised for agri- 
culture increased constantly during the thirteen years in 
question, the number of  agricultural laborers  diminished 
by over 254,000 persons. 
During  the  same  period  (1882-1895),  the  industrial 
population  increased 26. I 2  per cent, and the commercial 
population as much as 31.62 per cent. 
Thus  even  the census  of  1882  had  made it evident 
that a reversal had taken place; the industrial  minority 
of  former times had become a majority, and the former 
agricultural  majority  had  been  turned into  a  minority. 
According to the census taken on Junc I 2, 1907 (" Reichs- 
anzeiger"  of  February  10, 1909, No.  35), this condition 
has become very much more pronounced. 
The total number  of  persons  engaged  in  agriculture 
(those making agriculture their main occupation, includ- 
ing house servants, and members of  the family) has de- 
creased  still further, the number being  I 7,68  I,  I 76 souls. 
Of  the entire population of  the German I3111pire in 1882, 
1895, and  1907 the distribution  of  the total  population 
by occupations showed the following percentages: 
The German Great Banks 
Agriculture  (including gardening,  stock breeding, 
forestry, and fisheries) ..................... 
Industry (including mining and the building trades). 
Trade and traffic (including innlreepiug and tavern 
keeping) .................................... 
The distribution by occupations of  the population  en- 
gaged  in gainful  occupations  in  the German C  p'  m  ire in 
E'er  cent. 
4 2.  S 
33.  5 
'0.0 





keeping) ....................................  1  8.31  IO.Z/  11.5 
Agricnlturc  (including gardening, stock  breeding. 
......................  forestry, and fishcrics). 
Industry (including the mining and building trades). 





Thus on the basis of  the statistics of  occupations it may 




tions to be set forth presently), that of  the German popu- 
lation  more  than two-thirds are no longer  employed in 
agriculture."  It  would, however,  be entirely  one-sided 
Per cent. 
36.  2 
36.  I 
and incorrect  (as has been  pointed  out by  Oldenburg, 
I'cr  cent. 
32 7 
37.2 
Ballod,  and especially  by Traugott  Miiller, in  a  highly 
instructive article  to infer from  these facts that Ger- 
man agriculture  is on the decline, and  that Germany's 
sole  salvation  lies  in  industry, especially  in the export 
industry 
It has already been mentioned 53 that both the number 
of farms (landwirtschaftliche  Betriebe) and the area devoted 
to agricult~re,~~  have increased  dming this period;  and 
the same applies on the whole to stock raising,"  as well 
as to almost all agricultural productions, especially those of 
fodder and potatoes.  This increase was due chiefly to the 
steady improvement in the systems of  culture and meth- 
ods of  work, as well as to the constantly growing employ- 
ment of  machinery  driven by steam and electric power. 
Between 1882 and 1895,  for example, the number of steam 
plows in use increased from 836 to 1,696, and the number National  Monetdry  eornmiss;oti 
of  steam thrashing-machines from 75,690 to 259,364.  On 
the other hand, the number of  large distilleries increased 
fivefold  since  1870  in  the  districts  east  of  the  Elbe 
(according  to  K. Lamprecht, op. cit., p.  187), in  conse- 
quence of  the introduction of  the high-pressure boiler for 
steaming potatoes. 
The intensity of  agricultural cultivation has also grown 
considerably,  and likewise almost without exception  the 
average crop yields.  Thus, if  the period from 1879-1888 
be compared with the year 1899, an increase will be found 
to have taken place in the case of  rye from 980 to I ,490 
kilograms  per  hectare, in the case of  oats from  I ,140 to 
I ,720, and of  potatoes from 8,100 to 12,290 kilograms. 
According to Ballod's essay on the economic develop- 
ment of  Germany since 1870, the home production of  all 
sorts of  grains increased within the last two decades about 
36 per cent, whereas the population increased only about 
I 8 per cent. 
The net proceeds, however-that  is to say, the profit- 
ableness  of  agricultural  undertakings,  fell  considerably 
in  many parts of  Germany mainly  because  of  the great 
increase in the domestic cost of  production, and of  foreign 
competition  having the advantage of  lower  cost of  pro- 
duction, and cheap transportation  by land and sea.  An 
irriprovement  in this regard  has been  noted  only during 
the last few years, due  in part to the greatly increased 
duties on agricultural products put in force by the latest 
commercial treaties.  Until then, much to the detriment 
of  the general economic interests in  large parts of  Ger- 
many, the condition of  agriculture, affected as it was by 
a heavy fall in the prices of  its chief  products,56  and the 
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growing encumbrances on landed propertyli7  had become 
quite precarious.  This condition, naturally, influenced the 
amount of  agricultural production  and, considering the 
great influence of  agriculturists on the politics and legis- 
lation of  Germany, brought about-in  some cases unnec- 
essarily-results  detrimental  to  other  classes,  without 
simultaneous advantages desired for and by agriculture. 
Finally, certain iinprovemerlts in the agricultural credit 
system were introduced, partly by state aid, as in Prussia 
by the foundation of  the Prussian Zentral-Genossenschafts- 
kasse (Central Bank for Cooperative Societies) (1895) and 
partly  through  the establishment  of  "  Raiffeisen"  loan 
societies, and the Schultze-Delitzsch han  and credit socie- 
ties.  In this direction, i. e., of  cooperative effort, much 
remains to be clone.  The granting of  credir: by the Reichs- 
bank, which  in  view of  its own  short-term  obligations 
may grant short credit  only, can  be depended  on  by 
agriculturists  only  in  exceptional  cases  in view  of  the 
greater  length of  time occupied by the  process of  agri- 
cultural  production.  Agriculture  requires  a  system  of 
credit adapted to its peculiar conditions of  production.  A 
permanent  organisation  for this  purpose  would  benefit 
agriculture as much as the community at large, since the 
colnmon good requires  that not only the interests of  the 
collsumer  but also those of  the producer be guarded. 
In other directions, too, the injudicious use of  the above 
data (see pp.  104 to 106) may lead to false conclusions. 
In the first place, we must not lose sight of  the fact that 
a considerable  amount  of  economic  activity  which  in 
our  statistics is  classed  under  the head  of  industry  is 
either largely of  an agricultural nature, for instance, the National  Monetary  Commission 
manufacture of  beet sugar and starch, distilling, brewing, 
milling, etc., or  else  closely connected with  agriculture, 
such as baking, butchering, the manufacture of  food and 
drinks, brickmaking, etc."  It mmu stlso be borne in mind 
that our statistics do not take into account those persons 
who, in  addition to their  main occupation were engaged 
in  agriculture  as a secondary occupation. 'According  to 
Troeltsch  (loc. cit.  p.  I~I),  the number  of  such persons 
in 1905 amounted to 3,700,ooo. 
Further, it must be remembered that although between 
1882 and  1895 the number of  independent  producers  in 
agriculture increased by 2.9 per I ,000, the number of  de- 
pendent workers  (abhangige Arbeiter)  decreased  16.1 per 
1,000 during the same period, the agricultural labourers 
having  turned  to other  occupations,  mostly  industrial, 
without returning and without being rep1aced.O0 
Finally, the period  under  consideration  witnessed the 
completion of  a movement which set in during tlie earlier 
economic period  (I  848-1 870), namely, the gradual devel- 
opment into independent branches of  ind~~stry  of  a whole 
series of  occupations, such as spinning and weaving, origi- 
nally carried on as homework in the country, and there- 
fore  classified under  the  heading  of  agriculture.  These 
occupations no longer center in the country. 
In this  manner  the  number  of  persons  occupied  in 
agriculture decreased statistically, without an actual de- 
cline of  agriculture  as  such, and  without  a  decrease of 
the number of  persons actually employed in agricultural 
Care should therefore be taken not to overstretch the 
col~clusions  drawn  from  the  figures  showing  the  per 
The German Great Banks 
centage (see pages 104 and 105) of  persons in Germany fol- 
lowing agricultura!,  inclustrial, and trade pursuits,  nor  to 
pit  against each  other too  sharply  the  two  expressions 
"  agrarian state " and "  industrial  state,"  which  as  the 
result of  indiscriminate use are assuming  more and niore 
the character of  dangerous catchwords, suggesting that the 
two economic stages thus designated are essentially antago- 
nistic.  It is only by avoiding these errors that a proper 
appreciation can be gained of  tlie share of  German agri- 
culture in the national wealth  and production, in fact in 
the entire economic life of  Germany. 
All  these  considerations,  however,  do  not  impair  the 
correctness of  the above statement (p. 88), namely, that 
the center of  German economic life has been shifted more 
and more from agriculture to industry.62  The causes of 
this fact are of  very varied nature. 
The larger  the growth and the rate of  growth  of  the 
German population, the less German agriculture was able 
to employ and sustain it. 
It is true that, until the beginning of  the period under 
consideration,  German  agriculturists  exported  consider- 
ably more  of  their  products  (especially grain, with  the 
exception of rye), mainly  to England, France, Holland, 
and Switzerland, than was  imported  from foreign coun- 
tries.63  It is also an established fact that during the period 
in question the necessity of  exchanging Gernlan manufac- 
tured  products 64  for foreign products of  the  soil  (more 
especially wheat and vegetal raw materials) became more 
and more pronounced.  Furthermore, agriculture, despite 
great efforts and successes, was not able to increase in the 
same proportion and with the same rapidity as the popu- National  Monetary  Comnzission 
lation.  The deficit in  agricultural  production  thus  en- 
tailed, which despite all protective duties amounted as far 
back as I 898 to over 2 ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks per annum, had 
consequently to be met by importation from abroad. 
Similarly, German manufacturers were quite unable to 
satisfy their requirements  at home, especially of  raw ma- 
terials, as the required raw products are not to be had at 
all in Germany, or, if  the colonies be taken into account, 
only  in  insignificant  quantities.  Consequently  a  large 
portion, in some cases the largest portion of  the require- 
ments of  German industry, has to be procured by imports 
from abroad.  The rnost  striking instance of  this is fur-. 
~iished  by  the textile industry occupying the first  place 
in  Germany's  export  trade,  which  has to obtain from 
abroad  about  nine-tenths  of  its raw  materials (cotton, 
jute, silk)  .65 
The annual import  requirenlents  of  foods and delica- 
cies, cattle as well  as  raw materials, and half-manufac- 
tured goods necessary in German agriculture and industry 
for further manufacture, or for direct use,  could not be 
paid  out  of  German national capital (Nation~L~ermo~en) 
unless  the nation was to be gradually impoverished; pay- 
ment had to be made in another way. 
An  inconsiderable  part  of  this  payment  is  made to 
foreign countries in such German home-grown raw mate- 
rials as are not needed for home use.  The greater part of 
the payment,  however,  is  made in manufactured goods 
supplied to foreign countries which import into Germany 
food and raw materials, or, in other words, in exporting 
the results  of  German home  labor in  return for foreign 
products of  the soil.6"hese  manufactured goods consist 
The German Great  Banks 
principally  of  woollen  and  cotton  manufactures, sugar, 
machines, silk goods, coarse iron manufactures, chemical 
products, etc. 
In 1908 by  far the larger part of  our  special exports 
consisted  of  manufactured  goods, namely,  65  per cent. 
Raw  material  exported  amounted  to only  25  per  cent, 
foods and delicacies to 10 per cent. 
The "  industrialisation " thus characterized  caused  in 
the first  instance by  an increased  population  that had 
to be  fed  and employed, in  its turn became the cause 
of a further increase of  the population.  It  was intensified 
by the circumstance  that simultaneously  the industrial 
demand for means of  production was constantly growing 
through "  the displacement of  organic by inorganic  mat- 
ter,"  as  Sombart  has  pregnantly  characterized  this 
recent technical development. 
The tree of  the forest  has  to make  room  for the iron 
girder for building purposes, and is  replaced  by coal for 
purposes of  fuel.  Animal  manure and animal labor are 
being  displaced by  chemical fertilizers  (ground Thomas 
slag, potash, Chile saltpeter, etc.), by  steam engines, and 
electric  motors;  through  the discovery of  aniline  dyes 
fields sown in madder becarne free for other cultures. 
At the end of  1907 the special exports from the German 
Customs  Union  amounted  to  nearly  6.4 billion  marks 
(6,389,860,000),  and the special imports to about 8 billion 
marks  (7,664,ooo,ooo)", whereas  exports  from the Ger- 
man Customs Union between I 842-1 846 averaged, accord- 
ing to K. H. Rau, about ~~o,ooo,ooo  marks and imports 
about 630,000,ooo 111arks.~~ National  Monetary  Commission 
Tile exccss of imports for home consumption into Ger- 
many at the end of 1907  (more than llalf  of which came 
frorn Great Britain, the United States, iZustria-Hungary, 
and Russia)  over German domestic exports  (alniost half 
of which  were  sent to the above-mentioned countries), 
or  our  adverse  trade  balance  (WarenverKelzrsbilnnz), 
amounted  thus  to  aln~ost  I ,300,000,000 marks  (I  895 : 
800,000,000). 
It will  be found, however,"!' on comparing  the import 
and export figures of  1907 with those of  I 882, that on the 
whole the imports of  I go7 have increased proportionately 
much  more  than the exports.70 Of  raw  materials  and 
half-manufactured goods the imports increased  2oo.1 per 
cent; arld the exports only 77.5  per  cent.  Of  manufac- 
tured goods the imports increased 222. I  per cent; and the 
exports only  183 per  cent.  The opposite tendency may 
be noted for the period  before 1882, when  the growth of 
imports was  on  the whole  smaller  than the  growth  of 
exports. 
Further, commencing with  1882, it will be found that, 
on  the  whole,  the  quantities  of  manufactured  goods 
exported have formed  a constantly decreasing  portion of 
the total Gcrman industrial production. 
Finally, it will  be  found that the increase in German 
industrial  production  (in the most  important  branches) 
was greater after  1882 than the increase in the average 
number of  persons employed;  that since 1885 the increase 
in the number  of  gainfully  employed  persons  has been 
greater than the increase of  the general population, and 
on the whole  greater than the increase  of  production 
and of  the quantity and value of  the exports. 
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All  these  factors  warrant  the  conclusion  that  since 
about the beginning of  the eighties the consuming power 
of  the German nation, i. e., the home market, developed 
more speedily and vigorously than the foreign  markets.Y2 
It can scarcely  be doubted  that this was  due to the 
greater accumulation of  capital during the same period- 
that is to say, to the growing development  of  national 
prosperity. 
This growth raised the productive power of  the indus- 
trial  population  on  the one  hand,  and  the purchasing 
power  of  the nation on the other, allowing at the same 
time a portion of  the added available means to be utilized 
for the improvement of the German balance of  payments. 
This improvement of  the German balance of  payments 
has been  caused during the last twenty-five years, espe- 
cially through the acquisition  of  foreign securities, which 
rendered foreign countries "  tributary " to Germany in so 
far as they had to pay her interest.  Additional improve- 
ments have been brought about by the granting of  long 
and short term credit to foreign countries, by the consid- 
erable growth of Germany's shipping, and by her partici- 
pation  in  foreign  undertakings.  The necessity  and the 
benefit  of  these  improvements,  especially  of  the  last 
named, will  form the subject of  a  special  chapter  (Sec. 
V11 of  this part). 
There can be no doubt, however,  that an unfavorable 
trade  balance  (Passivitat  der  Wirtschaftsbilanz) of  a 
country is the less dangerous  the more favorable its bal- 
ance of  payments, for it can then more easily afford to let 
other countries "work  for  it" and  supply it with  raw 
material and food. National  Monetary  Commission 
During the last few  years there have been noticed cer- 
tain though not absolutely indisputable indications that 
the German balance of  payments, while not unfavorable 
throughout, yet evinces a certain tendency in that direc- 
tion.73  This should serve as a warning to utilize the in- 
creasing accumulation of  capital primarily, and to  a greater 
degree than hitherto, for the strengthening of  the home 
market ;  or,  in other words, to increase home production and 
purchasing power, particularly the agricultural production 
of foodstuffs and our colonial production of  raw materials, 
and  to employ  our  surplus  funds  only  secondarily  in 
the service of  so-called "  export capitalism. "  74 
Industrial, commercial, and banking  circles must  not 
forget that the strengthening of  agriculture and its ca- 
pacity for absorbing industrial products forms one of  the 
most  indispensable  means  of  strengthening  the  entire 
home market; on the other hand, the agricultural inter- 
ests should not overlook the fact that the most  careful 
fostering of  the export industry, within the limits essential 
for the  strengthening  of  the home  market,  is  in  turn 
demanded in the interests of  national economy. 
In my  opinion  the inferences to be  drawn  from  the 
above for  the German  credit  banks  are clear.  As  re- 
gards  the past, they have  rendered  effective service in 
promoting  the  development  of  the  national  economic 
forces by participating  to a  considerable extent in the 
strengthening  of  the  home  market, by  increasing  the 
productiveness  and  purchasing  power  of  the  nation, 
and by sharing in the above-described (p. I 13)  improve- 
ments of  the German balance of payments.  The favor- 
able effects of  the activity of the credit banks should be 
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admitted even by those persons who, in a spirit of  exag- 
geration, hold  the German  credit  banks  responsible for 
everything unfavorable that has happened  in the indus- 
trial and commercial development of  Germany. 
On the other hand, as regards  the future, the German 
credit bank? must aim at restraining "  export capitalism" 
still further than has been the case hitherto, particularly 
during the last few years, more  especially at times when 
the home  market according to all  indications  stands  in 
need  of  available home capital. 
Furthermore, as far as it  is practicable and in conformity 
with  Germany's  international  economic  and  financial 
relations,  they  will  have  to shape  the forms  in  which 
export capitalism  is to operate, especially by fixing the 
dates  of  issue  of  foreign  securities  and  the  rates  of 
interest  with  due  regard  to  the  interests  of  national 
economy, and of the domestic money and capital market. 
We shall resume now  our review of  the economic con- 
ditions of the period under consideration. 
As  far as the formation  of  joint stock companies was 
concerned  (vide,  p.  38)  only  102  companies,  with  a 
total capital of  about  638,000,ooo marks  were  founded 
during the twenfy-four years between  1826-1850 as com- 
pared  with  295  companies, with a total capital of  about 
2,404,760,000 marks, founded between 1851 and the first 
six months of  1870.  At the end of 1908 the total number 
of  companies founded in the German Empire since 1871 
(including undertakings that had  been  transformed  into 
joint  stock companies) amounted to 6,249, with a share 
capital  of  9,439,530,000 marks  (vide, p. I ~g),  or  about 
9% billion marks.  These figures do not include the large National  Monetary  Commission 
number  of  limited  liability  partnerships  that had  been 
established  during  the  same  period.  During  the years 
1867-1873  no fewer than 1,005 German stock companies 
were  licensed,  and  682  were  newly  formed.  From  the 
second half  of  1870 to 1874 there were founded 857 com- 
panies with a joint  stock capital of  3,306,810,000 marks. 
The sudden influx of  the 5 billion francs of  French war 
indemnity caused a great abundance of  money which let 
loose a veritable rage of  speculation and enterprise.  This 
overproduction  of  new undertakings, just as in 1857, was 
one of  the main causes of  the crisis of  1873.  By Sep- 
tember, 1874, out of  the above 857  companies, no  fewer 
than  123 were  in  process  of  liquidation and 37  in  the 
hands of   receiver^.^^ 
As  compared with the capital stock of  the companies 
founded between 1851 and 1870, the amount of  capital of 
the stock companies founded in the principal trades and 
industries  between  1870 and  1874 shows  the following 
increases : 
Building  trades,  about  twenty - seven - fold  (from 
I 7,420,000 marks to 486,640,000) ;  brewing, about twenty- 
four-fold; stones and earths, about nineteenfold; banking, 
about  ninefold  (from  94,650,000 marks  to  838,270,000 
marks) ;  metal working and  machine construction, about 
sevenfold;  agriculture,  about  fivefold;  chemicals,  fuel 
materials  and  illuminants,  about  fourfold,  and  sugar 
manufacturing, about twofold. 
In the mining industry, not mentioned in the above list, 
the number of  companies founded between I 870 and I 874 
was also quite considerable.  In fact, as regards the abso- 
lute amount of  capital newly invested during these years, 
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394,950,000  marks,  this  industry  takes  front  rank.77 
But inasmuch as the share capital newly invested in this 
industry between the years of  1851 and 1870 reached the 
large total of  275,310,ooo marks, the increase during the 
following period does not appear so striking. 
As  the German railway system had already been con- 
structed to a  considerable extent by the end of  the for- 
mer period (1851-1870)~  the capital of  newly created rail- 
way  companies  was  considerably  smaller in  I 870-1 874 
(778,~o,ooo  marks)  than in  1851 to 1870 (I  ,722,000,ooo 
marks). 
In  1883,  I ,31  I  joint-stock  companies published  their 
balance-sheets, showing a capital of  about 3,9  I 8,000,ooo 
marks.  Among these, I 28  companies (or about one-tenth 
of  the total number) with a capital of  571,250,ooo marks 
(or about one-seventh of  the total capital)  belonged  to 
the mining ind~stry.7~ 
During the subsequent period, the years 1889 and 1890, 
which were years of  great industrial prosperity, are most 
notable for the large number of  company flotations. 
In 1896 there were 3,712 joint-stock companies with a 
paid-up capital of  6,845,760,000  79 marks. 
Their  distributions0 was  as  follows:  235  mining and 
foundry companies with a capital of  1,022,330,000 marks 
(or, including  loans and  reserves, I ,38  I ,860,000 marks) ; 
235 machine-building companieslsl  with a total capital of 
3  24,720,000 marks;  259  textile-industry companies, with 
a capital of  41 4,9 10,000 marks ;  378 brewing  companies, 
with a capital of  367,200,ooo marks;  164 building com- 
panies, with a capital of  172,760,00o marks; 98  banking 
companies, each with  a capital  of  more  than  ~,ooo,ooo National  Monetary  Commission  - 
marks, and  a  total capital  of  1,240,300,000 marks; 108 
companies  in  the chemical  industry, with  a capital  of 
332,870,000 marks; 39 compames in the electrical industry 
with a capital of  195,610,000  marks 
From 1897 to the year 1900, when the crisis broke out, 
there was again a flood of  flotations.  In these four years 
no fewer than 1,208 joint-stock companies were floated 83 
with a capital of  I ,730,000,ooo  marks, among them  53 
banks with a total capital of  124,776,000 marks. 
In 1900 the total  number  of  all  German  joint-stock 
companies amounted to about 5,400.  It was ascertained 
that in  the case of  about 4,600 companies there was  a 
paid-up capital of  6,800,00o,000 marks, and together with 
loans and reserves, about 7,800,000,000 marks 84 
We have already  proved in  detail by  thc list  of  new 
companies founded between 1897 and 1900 what a super- 
abundance of  flotations preceded the crisis of  1900, just 
as was the case before the crisis of  1873.  Of  the 4,000 
joint-stock companies the year of  whose flotation we  are 
able to ascertain, more than I ,600 are found to have been 
founded in the years 1890-1900. 
Nearly nine-tenths of  all joint-stock companies belong 
to industry; the rest to the banking  business, with  the 
exception of  I 50  insurance  companies, which, however, 
claim nearly a  third of  the share and debenture capital. 
The  table s5  given  below  shows  for  each  year  the 
number and combined capital of  the joint-stock companies 
floated since  1871.  Their number  amounted  at the end 
of 1908 to 6,249 with a joint-stock capital of 9,439,530,000 
marks, which, compared with 1900, represents an increase 
in joint-stock capltal alone of  nearly 2%  billlon  marks. 
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Table of  ~mnt-stock  company flotatzons,  1871-1908 







758  760  ooo 
I  477  730  000 
544  180  000 
105  920  000 
45  560  000 
18  180  ooo 
43  520  000 
I3  250  000 
57  I40  000 
gr  590  ooo 
I99  240  000 
56  100  ooo 
176  030 ooo 
I11  240  000 
53  470  000 
103  340  ooo 
128 410  ooo 
193  680  ooo 
402  540  000 
270  g90  ooo 
90 240  000 
79  820  ooo 
77  260  ooo 
88.260  000 
250  680  ooo 
268  580  ooo 
380  470  ooo 
463  620  ooo 
544  390  000 
340  460  000 
158  250  ooo 
118  430  000 
300  040  ooo 
140  650  000 
386  ooo  ooo 
474.510  000 
253,790  000 
162  500  000 
a Transformation Into a stock company of the Krupp firm 
I, Hohenlohe Works Company (Limited) 40,ooo  ooo marks 
1  Marks 
3  650  ooo 
3  850 ooo 
z  250  000 
I  180  ooo 
830  ooo 
430  000 
ggo  000 
320  000 
1 270  000 
940  000 
I  800 ooo 
600  ooo 
920  000 
720  ooo 
760  ooo 
g20  000 
760  ooo 
I  020 000 
I  120  000 
I  160  ooo 
560  ooo 
630  ooo 
810  000 
960  ooo  I  I  560  000 
(  I  480  ooo 
I  500  000 
I  400  000 
I  490  000 
1 300  000 
I  020  000 
I  360  ooo 
a3 570  000 
1 350 000 
I  b  2  020 000 
1 220 000 
I  260  000 
I  080  ooo National  Monetary  Commissiort 
The average dividend income  for the years 1870-1900 
of  shareholders in  companies whose  shares were  quoted 
on the Berlin exchange  may  be seen  from the following 
The above explains why during the periods under consid- 
eration  (especially during  the years of  great  industrial 
development,  1886 to 1889 and  1895 to 1899) there has 
always been such a great demand for shares in industrial 
companies.  This of  course increased the over-production 
of  enterprises, especially as large amounts of  inert capital 
continued to be stirred since 1879 by the  nationalization of 
the railways and the great conversions of  state loans. 
As  far as that branch of  industry is  concerned which 
played such an important part in the whole development 
of  the first period, viz, the mining and smelting industry, 
the following details are noteworthy: 
The German output of  pig-iron  in  1870 amounted  to 
only 23  per cent of  the English output, the English iron 
industry having occupied the first place in the world up to 
1890, since when  the American  iron  industry took  the 
table : 
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lead.  In 1880 the German  output  rose  to an  amount 
equivalent to 35  per cent of  the English output, in 1890 
to 59 per  cent, and in  l900 to 93 per  cent; the English 
production  in the same year (1900) only equalled 63 per 
cent  of  the American  After  the expiration  of 
the fifties the German output of  pig-iron  exceeded the 
Belgian, and in 1880 the French output.  (See p. 32.) 
From the beginning of  the period under consideration 
to the end of  1907 the production of  pig-iron in the Ger- 
man Empire (including Luxemburg) rose from  I ,346,000 
tons (1870) to 12,875,000 tons (1907).  In 1907 the total 
output  of  France  amounted  to 3,589,000 tons,  that of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  to  10,083,000 tons,  whereas 
that  of  the  United  States  amounted  to  no  less  than 
26,194,000 tons.g2 
The importance of  the last item can be gauged by the 
fact that  in  1875 Germany and  the United  States pro- 
duced about the same amount of  pig-iron (in round num- 
bers, each 2,000,000 tons), whereas at the end of  1907 the 
production  of  pig-iron  in  the United  States was  more 
than  double  that  of  Germany  (including  Luxemburg); 
and, further, that between  July  1903 and July  1907 the 
pig-iron output of the United States increased by no less 
than 140,000 tons per week, or 7,000,000 tons annually.Q3 
Despite  the  very  considerable  growth  in  Germany's 
output of  pig-iron during the period under consideration, 
she was not able in the long run to meet her home con- 
sumption.  Imports,  especially  from  England,  had  to 
be relied on to an increasing extent, and in  1907  they 
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The pig-iron consumption in the German iron industry 
increased considerably during,  the last  few  years  of  the 
period  in  question  (considering  also  the  imports  and 
exports of pig-iron and the pig-iron contents of  machinery 
and iron  manufactures  imported  and exported), namely, 
from  over  6,500,ooo tons  (or  I I I .50 kilograms per head 
of  the population  in 1904) to  9,250,000 tons, or  147.60 
kilograms per head of  the population.g4 
As  far  as  the proportion  of  exports  and  imports  is 
concerned, the same remarks apply as those made above 
(pp. I I 2 and I I 3) regarding the development of  industry 
in general.  In consequence of  the great increase in home 
consumption, the  iron  exports  despite  the  greatly  in- 
creased output, could not grow permanently, falling from 
the high level of  480,575 tons attained in 1906 to 275,170 
tons in 1907. 
The output of  coal 8Gncreased in Germany during the 
second period from 26,398,000 tons in 1870 to 143,185,000 
tons in 1907 (valued at I ,394,27  I ,000 marks) ; the output 
in France amounted in 1907 to 36,168,000  tons; in Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  (including lignite)  to  2 7  2,  I I 4,000 
tons, while that of  the United States  amounted to not less 
than 425,156,000 tons. 
In 1907 the output of German coal amounted thus to 
one-half the  English  output and to about one-third the 
output of  the United States. 
The  total  value  of  all  German  mining  products 
grew  from 3  14,000,000  marks in  1871 to about one and 
three-q~~arters  billion  marks  (I  ,844,9z0,000  marks)  in 
1907.~' 
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The total production  of  the German  electro-technical 
industry, the enormous growth of  which, beginning with 
the middle of the nineties, exercised such a strong influence 
on the other  industries, causing in the main  the general 
over-production and the crisis of  1900, amounted as early 
as 1898 to 228,700,ooo  marks.  Of  this sum 21 I ,~oo,ooo 
marks,  or  92.3  per  cent, was  represented  by  the value 
of  articles belonging to the strong-current branch (which 
was  hardly  developed  twenty  years  before),  and  only 
17,600,000 marks  by  the value  of  articles belonging to 
the weak-current branch. 
In 1883 Emil Rathenau, being convinced at the Paris 
Exposition of  188  I  of  the far-reaching importance of  the 
new  invention, formed together  with Siemens & Halske 
the  first  joint-stock  company in  the  electric industry, 
under  the name of  the  Deutsche  Edisongesellschaft  fur 
angewandte  Elektrizitat.  This  company  became  inde- 
pendent  of  Messrs.  Siemens & Halske in  1884, and  de- 
veloped  in  1887 into  the existing  concern  of  the All- 
gemeine  Elelztrizitats-Gesellschaft.  This  firm  was  suc- 
cessful in improving the three-phased current to such a 
degree that in 1891 300 horsepower was transmitted, with 
very  little loss of  power, over a line of  175 kilometres to 
the exhibition at Frankfort-on-the-Main, a feat that made 
a great and permanent impression. 
In 1896, as has been pointed out (p. I IS), as many as 
39  electrical joint-stock  companies existed,  with  a  total 
capital  of  I 95,610,ooo  marks,  whereas  in  1900 there 
were  quoted on  the German exchanges the shares of  34 
joint-stock  companies  in  the  electrical  industry,  with National  Monetary  Commission 
436,000,000  marks  capital  (22  in  Berlin  alone,  with 
396,700,000 marks capital). 
The  rate  of  dividend  income  of  the shareholders  of 
these 34 companies amounted, between 1883 and 1900, to 
8.38 per cent. 
During the nineties, up to the crisis of  1900, feverish 
activity,  coupled  with  an  almost  chaotic and  incalcu- 
lable number of  enterprises and forms of  financing pre- 
vailed  in the electrical industry, which  in  a very  short 
time had gained, at home as well as abroad, a position of 
the highest importance.  Eberstadt  97  quite truly remarks 
that at that time  the great electrical  companies "were 
simultaneously machine-construction factories, suppliers 
of  energy,  and  financing  institutions,"  and  there  was 
scarcely a form of  management or financing which was not 
utilised in the nineties  by  the electrical industry.  There 
were  syndicates,  subsidiary  companies  (Tochtergesell- 
schaften), and  trust  companies,  98  the  latter  especially 
intended to relieve the banks of  part of  their  enormous 
financial and other tasks connected with electrical under- 
taking~,~~  operating companies proper,'OO  and manufactur- 
ing companies, as well as financing institutions, increases 
and reductions of  capital, silent participations, comman- 
dites, issues and sales in the open market, fusions, pooling 
of  profits  (Gewinngerneinschaften)  , buying  of  shares, 
separations  and  combinations, independent  and  syndi- 
cated  enterprises  abroad,  conventions,  syndicates  and 
cartels at home and abroad.  In short, a medley of  under- 
takings  which  might  well  have  led  outside  observers 
during those years to imagine that far more paper  was 
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produced  in the electric branch  of  industry than power 
and light. 
To-day, when a condition of  relative quietness has set 
in and the early movement may be said in a sense to have 
terminated, it will  be seen that the sphere of  activity of 
the electro-technical industry, although only  comprising 
a  relatively small number  of  prominent  companies  (see 
Part V, sub. 11, ~a),  has extended very largely. 
Trade and industry headed by the mining industry, as 
well  as a considerable number of  secondary electric rail- 
ways, and more recently agriculture, absorb a constantly 
increasing  amount  of  light  and  power.  The  change of 
standard railways from steam to electric railways, which 
is  only  a matter of  time, will  create new and profitable 
employment for the electro-technical industry. 
In  1907 the German exports of  products  of  the elec- 
trical industry amounted to about I 53 ,ooo,ooo marks and 
the imports  to  about  8,000,ooo marks.lol  In  1907 the 
electrical industry gave employment to 100,966 workmen, 
as compared with 54,417 in 1898. 
According to a circular inquiry made by  the German 
home office in 1899, the total value of  the products of  the 
German electrical industry amounted to 228,700,000  marks, 
as  compared with  45,000,000 marks  in  1891, a fivefold 
increase in eight years. 
As regards the chemical industry,loa  according to Hiib- 
ner  ('l Jahrb. f. Volksw.  U.  Statistik," Vol. LIX, p.  146), 
g German chemical joint-stock  companies, with a capital 
of 7,300,ooo marks, existed during the period 1854 to 1859; 
in  the seventies, however,  their  shares  were  no  longer 
quoted on the stock exchange. National  Monetary  Commission 
The enormous growth of the chemical industry and its 
dominant position in the world market date really from 
the beginning of the seventies.  Beginning with the sum- 
mer of 1870 to the end of  1874, no less than 42 companies, 
with 42 ,ooo,ooo marks capital, were formed. 
In 1883, according to the Deutscher Oekonomist (1885, 
p. 7.9, no less than 51 companies, with  a total capital of 
127,220,000  marks, published their balance sheets. 
In  1896 there were  in  existence  108 joint-stock  com- 
panies, with a  total capital of  332,890,000 marks,  their 
number having thus doubled since I 883. 
The number of  establishments in which more than  IOO 
persons were employed, increased, between I 888 and I 898, 
from 156 to 247, or about 60 per cent in ten years. 
In 1902 there were 7,539  establishments in this indus- 
try employing 160,841 workmen with a total wage list of 
about 164,000,ooo marks, as against 5,758 establishments 
with I 10,348  workmen and a total wage list of  98,621,506 
marks in I 894, and 4,464 establishments with 85,143  work- 
men  and a total wage  list  of  67,300,000  marks in 1888. 
From  1882 to 1895, or in thirteen years, the number  of 
workmen employed in the chemical industry increased 61 
per cent.  At the end of  1898 a total of  216,580 workmen 
and other employees in the German chemical industry were 
contributing to the obligatory insurance funds.  The total 
wages and salaries of  all workmen and employees, accord- 
ing to the Bericht  uber die  Verwabung der Berufsgenossen- 
schafin der chemischen Industrie for I 908, page 3, amounted 
to 248,731,687 marks.  The number of insured establish- 
ments was 8,699. 
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According to the census of  June  14, 1895, there were 
then in the chemical industry: 
- 
Number. 
Small establishments (I to S persons) --.-_---.-.--------  8.228 
Middle-sized establishments (6 to 50 persons)  ------------  I.  781 
Large establishments (5  I  persons or more). - - - - -.  .  - - -.  - -  376 
Employees. 
The results of  the latest census have not yet been pub- 
lished.  Large establishments, while forming only a very 
small  part  of  the total  number,  gave  employment  to 
almost  two-thirds of  all  the workmen  employed in  the 
chemical industry. 
In I 907, 8,8  I 6 factories employing 207,704 hands figured 
in the lists of  the state insurance authorities, i. e.,  belonged 
to the trade association of the chemical industry.lo4 
The total amount of  wages and salaries paid to workmen 
and officials in the chemical industry amounted in 1907 to 
230,223,733 marks. 
The imports  into Germany of  raw materials for use  in 
the chemical  industry and  partly and wholly manufac- 
tured chemical products amounted  in 1907 to 43,586,417 
metric  quintals  of  IOO  kilograms  each,  valued  at 
552,414,000 marks, and the exports to 31,539,353 metric 
quintals, valued at 640,418,000 marks.lo5 
In 1907 the import trade decreased somewhat while the 
exports fell off  considerably; the only large increase being 
shown in the exports of  artificial indigo.106 
A change in  the English  patent  law  directed  against 
the predominance of  the German chemical industry, and 
introduced on the 1st January,  1908, provides that every National  Monetary  Commission 
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holder  of  a  patent  must  manufacture  his  patented 
invention in England after four years' time from the date 
when the patent was taken out in that country.  As this 
law  was  given retroactive  force, and became  applicable 
twelve  months  after it had  been  passed, many German 
chemical factories had to erect branch factories in England. 
This naturally increases total expenses, but on the other 
hand allows the goods manufactured in English branches 
of  German chemical factories to enjoy preferential duties 
granted by some English colonies to the mother country.'07 
It may, however, become necessary to make a  corre- 
sponding change in the German patent law, so far as Great 
Britain  is concerned.  The ultimate result  of  the latest 
unpleasant move on the part of  our English competitors 
may thus cause more harm than good to British industry, 
as was the case with the act which provided for the corn- 
pulsory marking "  Made in Germany " of  imported articles 
branch in German  industry  is very  evident from these 
of  German manufacture. 
Further details regarding the concentration movement 
in the chemical industry are given below  (Part V, sub. 
11, 1b). 
The census of  June 24,  1895, gives the following data 
regarding the number of  establishments and average num- 
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figures, as according to  the census of  I 895 the total number 
of  German establishments of  all descriptions amounted to 
3,144,977, employing on an average 10,299,269 
Of  the 450,000  to 490,000  home workers,  counted in 
1895, almost  one-half belonged  to the textile branch  of 
industry, although the number  of  textile home workers 
had decreased by 90,000 persons between the years 1882 
and 1895, and in various branches of  the textile branch 
by  one-fifth  to  three-fourths  of  the original  number. 
Since, however, despite this great decrease of  hand-loom 
industry  in  the  textile  branch  (due principally to the 
growth of large-scale machine industry), there was in 1895 
a  falling off of  only  18,000 persons  employed in  home 
work in German industry as a whole, as compared with 
the number in 1882, it is evident that home work has not 
declined in many German industries, but rather increased. 
Ludwig P~hle'~~  is quite right in calling special attention 
to this very interesting fact and to the above figures. 
The fact should also be emphasized that the number of 
home workers increased in the large towns from 3 I ,000 to 
71,000  between  1882 and  1895, having thus more than 
doubled during these thirteen years.l1° 
In the 3,144,977 establishments  mentioned  above  as 
existing in the German  Empire in  1895, the 10,269,269 
employees were distributed as follows: ll1 
Average  /  Number.  I  number 
employees. 
Small establishments (I to 5  persons) .----.  - ----  -------- 
Middle-sized establishments (6 to 50 persons)----  -------- 
Large establishments (over 50 persons)  - - - - ---  - --  -----  -- 
Total-----..------_--------------------------- 
2,934,723 
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The number of  large establishments is relatively small, 
although  between  the  years  1882,  when  they  totaled 
9,974, and  1895, their number had increased no less than 
90  per  cent.  In view  of  this, the fact  is  particularly 
striking that almost one-third of  all persons occupied in 
industry were  employed in these large industrial  estab- 
lishments. 
If  we  turn our attention to the enormous development 
of  the means of  communication during this period, taking 
the railways first, it will be seen (p. 35)  that the network 
of  German railways comprised 2 7  ,g8  I  kilometers as long 
ago as 1875.  As  far as main lines are concerned, the Ger- 
man railway system was completed in the main during the 
eighties.  In the second period  (the one under considera- 
tion) the private German railways were acquired by the 
State, and the network of  main and branch lines (standard 
gauge) in Germany 'l2  at the end of  1907 totaled 56,196 
kilometers, including 5  I ,87 I kilometers of  railways owned 
by the Government or managed on Government  account, 
and  4,320 kilometers  of  private  railways.113  Of  53,822 
kilometers  in  1904, 33,734 kilometers  belonged  to the 
Prussian-Hessian Railway Union.ll* 
The capital invested in these standard-gauge main and 
branch  lines amounted at the end of  1902, in round fig- 
ures, to I 3  % billion marks, and at the end of  r 907 t'o about 
I 5% billions, or at the end of  I go2  to 258,000 marks per 
kilometer, and at the end  of  1907 to 277,100 marks per 
kilometer of  railway line. 
At  the  end  of  1906,  1,284,676,000  persons  and 
~08,2~010m  tons  of  goods  were  conveyed  by  these 
railways.  An  average number of  20 railway journeys is 
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thus shown for every inhabitant of  Germany during tlie 
year. 
The total traffic receipts of  the standard gauge railways 
amounted in 1907 to 2,~~~,ooo,ooo  marks, and the total 
expenses of  operation to I ,894,000,000 marks.  The sur- 
plus of  traffic receipts over expenses of  operation was thus 
8~1,ooo,ooo  marks; the rate of  profit  on the capital in- 
vested amounted to 5.60 per cent, and the percentage of 
expenses  of  operation  to traffic receipts  (coefficient of 
operation) amounted in 1907 to about 69 per cent. 
The  home  requirements  of  the German  railways  for 
rolling  stock  alone  amounted  in  1907  to  288,ooo,ooo 
marks.  The  requirements  for  operating  material  and 
superstructure of  the German  railways  during  the last 
fifty years, which were principally met by German mining, 
metallurgical, and machine construction  industries, have 
been  estimated at about 5 billion marks.110 
In addition  to the standard-gauge  main  and branch 
lines, on  April  I, 1907, there were  in  operation 3,719.2 
kilometers of  public  street  railways  (Kleinbahnen) and 
8,99  I .g kilometers of secondary railways (nebenbahnahnliche 
Kleinbahnen).'17  To  these  must  be  added  the narrow- 
gauge state and private railways (end of  1907, 2,100 kilo- 
meters)  ,lls besides sidings, mining, agricultural, and forest 
railways not used by the general public. 
As  far as the postal service is concerned, it has  been 
pointed out (p. 37) that in Prussia during I 85 I only about 
three letters were received per head of population; in 1906, 
over  5%  billion  letters and  post  cards  (5,393,300,000) 
were dispatched in the German Empire (including Bavaria 
and  Wurttemberg),  averaging  86  letters  per  head  of National  Monetary  Commission 
population.  Printed matter (newspapers), samples as well 
as parcels and articles of  value  are not included in  the 
above total.119  In 1904 the number of  mail matter dis- 
patched  averaged  I 15 per  head  of  population,  and in 
the  same  year  there  was  one  post-office  to  every  14 
square kilometers of  area and every  1,458 inhabitants. 
At the end of  1907 there were 40,083 post-offices in Ger- 
many; at the end  of  1906  there was  one post-office  to 
every  1,530 inhabitants and  13.60 square kilometers. 
In 1882 one telegraph  office  did duty for every  133.7 
square kilometers;  in  1904 there was  one for  every  18 
square kilometers,  with a total of  35,1oo,ooo  telegrams, or 
an average of  0.65 telegram per head of  population.  At 
the  end  of  1907  the  number  of  telegrams  dispatched 
amounted to nearly ~~,ooo,ooo,  and the number received 
to ~6,ooo,ooo. At the end of  1907 there was an average 
of  0.71 telegram sent per  head  of  the population, and a 
like  number  received.  On  the  same  date  there  were 
37,309 telegraph offices in Germany.lz0 
As  to telephones,lZ1  which  were  adopted  during  the 
period  under  discussion, there were in Germany, at the 
end  of  1907, 30,901  towns  and villages, etc., provided 
with  long-distance telephone  offices  (I  899,  I 3,  I 75).  At 
the end of  1907 87,521 (1899, 1,964) places could com- 
municate with each other by telephone.  Over 927,ooo,ooo 
telephone  conversations  took  place  in  1903,  and 
I ,466,000,ooo  in I 907.  In I 907 there were I 8.2 telephonic 
messages per  head  of  the population.  In Berlin  alone 
there were in 1898 over 40,000 telephone call  places, with 
68,000 kilometers of  line, over which 38,000 conversations 
were carried on daily.  In 1904 there was one telephone 
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office  to every  23.5 square kilometers  and  2,448  inhab- 
itants. 
The  total  value  of  all  German  merchant  vessels 
amounted at  the end of  1897 to about 300,000,000 marks, 
at the end of  1899 to about ~oo,~~o,ooo,~~~  and at the end 
of  1905 to about 81o,ooo,ooo marks  (as compared  with 
290,000,000  marks in I 895 and 426,000,000  marks in I 898). 
On  the 1st of  January,  1908, Germany  possessed 4,571 
seagoing vessels (merchantmen), with a carrying capacity 
of  2,790,435 net registered tons, and a total crew of  7  I ,853 
men. 
These  4,57  I  merchant  vessels  included  2,345  sailing 
vessels of  433,749 net registered tons, 304 tugs of  99,903 
tons,  and  1,922  steamships of  2,256,783 net  tons regis- 
ter.lZ3 
The net  registered  tonnage  of  the German  merchant 
marine  (steam vessels)  has  increased from 375,000 tons 
in  1884, to 2,257,000 tons (in round numbers)  in 1908.'~~ 
According to the memorial of  the admiralty, dated De- 
cember,  1905, entitled  "Die Entwickelung  der  deutschen 
Seeinteressen im  letzten Jahrzehnt " (Introduction, p. VI) , 
the shipping at German ports increased between 1893 and 
1903 by over 52  per cent, or from 27,500,000 to almost 
42,000,ooo net registered tons.  In 1907 it amounted to 
56,  I 29,ooo net registered tons.  In the same memorial it is 
stated that Germany has been progressing about four times 
more rapidly  in international sea traffic than in popula- 
tion, while the increase of  trans-marine traffic in German 
ports has been almost six times as great. 
As  far as sea-going steamships are concerned, the Ger- 
man  merchant  marine  occupied  in  1874  fourth  place, National  Monetary  Commission  The Germa.n Great  Banks 
whereas  the  British,  American, and  French  mercantile 
fleets took the first three places in the order named. 
In 1884, however, Germany caught up with the United 
States (the ocean fleet of  which had decreased considerably 
by that time), and in 1889 France was outdistanced.  In 
1908  Germany, with  a  net  tonnage  of  2,323,000 tons, 
occupied the second position on the list, although possessing 
only I I .2 per cent of  the steamships of  the world's mercan- 
tile marine.  On the other hand, England, whose progress 
naturally was relatively smaller during that period, pos- 
sessed in  1908 no less than  10,350,000 net tons, or  50.2 
per  cent  of  the world's  mercantile  fleet  of  steamships, 
which latter amounted to 20,633,000 net registered tons.lZ5 
As regards her sailing fleet, Germany between 1880 and 
1901 occupied fourth place among the nations, owning in 
1880 957,000 tons out of  the world's  sailing tonnage  of 
6,994,000 tons.  In  1908 it occupied  only  sixth  place, 
with  45g,ooo  net  tons  register.  The following  are the 
figures for the other countries:126 
Tons. 
England ................................................  1,591,ooo 
United States. ..........................................  I,419,ooo 
Nomay ................................................  667,000 
Russia .................................................  569,000 
.................................................  France  510,ooo 
The officers  and  crews  of  the German  seagoing ships 
(sailing vessels, tugs, and steamships) numbered on Jan- 
uary  I, 1909, 72,450 persons, distributed as follows: Sea- 
men, 34,308 ; engineers, 23,201 ; and various,  I 4,941  .lZ1 
It is pleasing to note that subsidies were granted by 
Germany  solely  for the maintenance  of  regular  lines of 
mail steamers of  the North-German Lloyd and the Ger- 
man East Africa Line (the Hamburg-American Line does 
not  receive  any  subsidy)  to  eastern  Asia,  Australia, 
Africa,  and New  Guinea beginning  with the year  1894. 
The amount paid in  1909 did not exceed the very mod- 
erate total of  7,440,000 marks, equal to  I .85 marks  per 
registered  ton.lZ8 These amounts include also  the pay- 
ments for carrying the mails. 
As  against  this small amount Great  Britain has been 
paying since 1902 to the Cunard Line alone a yearly sub- 
sidy  of  £ 15o,ooo, besides  granting  to  that company  a 
loan  of  £2,600,000, bearing  only  2%  per  cent interest. 
The  total  subsidies granted  by  that country  were  not 
less  than  34,000,000 marks  (1.95  marks  per  registered 
ton).  France  spends  53,000,000  marks  in  subsidies 
(28.00  marks  per  registered  ton),  Austria-Hungary, 
26,000,ooo  marks  (26.70  marks  per registered ton), and 
Japan,  28,500,000  marks  (24.70  marks  per  registered 
ton) .  lZ9 
The most  prominent  of  the German  shipping compa- 
nies are the following: 
I. The Hamburg-American  Packet  Joint  Stock Com- 
pany, at Hamburg, founded May 27,  1847, with a capital 
of  300,000 marks  (Hamburg currency), which has under- 
gone not less than sixteen increases from 1853 to the present 
day.130  This company began operations  in  1848 with 3 
sailing vessels, steamers between Hamburg and New York 
being introduced  only in  I 856. 
At the end of  1908 the company's share  capital amomted 
to 125,000,000 marks, and its surplus amounted, on Jan- 
uary I, 1909, to 16,800,000 marks. National  Monetary  Commission 
The amount of bonds issued was originally 55% million 
marks.  At  the  end  of  1908  the  outstanding  bonds 
amounted to 76.4 million marks. 
The number of  the company's ocean steamers amounted 
at the end of  1908 to 162,  with a book value of  185,953,076 
marks. 
2.  The Norddeutscher Lloyd, at Bremen, was  founded 
in 1857, or ten years after the Hamburg Company, banks 
and banking firms participating to a considerable extent. 
Its original  share capital amounted to 9,513,772 marks 
(28,643 shares, at IOO  former Bremen gold thalers).  In 
1859  the company started a regular fortnightly service 
with four steamers between Bremen and New  York. 
The company's share capital totaled I 25,000,000 marks 
at the end  of  1908, while  its surplus funds  have been 
used up by losses. 
Its bonded  indebtedness  originally  amounted  to  70 
million marks.  At the end of  1908 the bonds outstand- 
ing amounted to 76,034,700 marks. 
The company's ocean-going fleet numbered at the end 
of  1908 I 27  vessels  (besides  2 schoolships), with a book 
value of  I 89,  I I 4,000 marks. 
Between  1902 and  I 903  these two companies 13'  made 
essentially identical agreements  with the International 
Mercantile  Marine  Company, which  was  founded  Jan- 
uary I, I 903, by American bankers and shipowners, with 
a  capital  of  $12o,m,ooo  (of  which  $60,000,000  were 
common and $6o,m,m  preference  shares), and which 
comprised  nine  American  and  English  steamship  lines. 
This company, which is named the "  Morgan trust," after 
the originator  of  the association, is  authorised to issue 
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bonds to the extent of $75,ooo,ooo, of  which $~O,O~,OOO 
were issued at once.  The contracts with the two German 
companies,  which  are  almost  identical  in  tenor,  have 
been concluded for a term of  twenty years, and contain 
a  stipulation  that either  party  has  the  right  after the 
expiration of  ten years to demand their revision; should 
a revision not be agreed to, a year's notice may be given 
for the termination of  the agreement. 
These international  agreements  contain the following 
points : 
I. A  demarcation  of  fields  of  operation: the right  of 
traffic to and from all German ports is  reserved to the 
German companies; the trust's  ships may enter German 
ports  only  by  their  consent,  whereas  German  ships, 
coming from New  York, may enter English ports for the 
purpose  of  embarking  passengers  (each  company  75 
times yearly in any direction).  The German companies' 
ships bound  for South America, Mexico,  and the West 
Indies,  as well  as those  bound  for such countries  with 
which the trust maintains no service, may also touch at 
English ports. 
On  the  other  hand, the  German  companies abandon 
in  the  main  all  claims  to  the  Anglo-American  freight 
business. 
Belgian ports  (at which German ships had  not called 
before) are not to be touched by the German companies' 
ships  on  their  way  to  North  America; the status quo 
forms the basis of  the arrangement for calls by German 
or  trust steamships at French ports.  The German com- 
panies, however, are at liberty to increase their sailings 
from French ports at their own discretion.  In case such National  Monetary  Commission 
an increase takes place, the trust is entitled to an equal 
increase. 
Should any of  the contracting parties  desire to found 
a new  line  (permanent reservation is made expressly in 
favour  of  the  newly  instituted  lines of  the  Hamburg- 
American  Company between  New  York  and  the  West 
Indies and between New  York and eastern Asia), notice 
of  the intention must be submitted  to the common com- 
mittee of  supervision.  This committee  does not possess 
the  right  of  veto, but the other  contracting  party  has 
the right, in such a case, of  participating to the extent of 
one-third in the proposed line (coasting lines excluded). 
An  agreement has been arrived at whereby the return 
tickets of  cabin passengers on North Atlantic lines of  the 
various companies are valid for all lines belonging to the 
combination.  Negotiations were  likewise  pending for a 
common time-table for first-class steamships with  alter- 
nating departures during the quiet  season.  These nego- 
tiations however, it seems, were not successful. 
The agreements contain- 
2.  A  reciprocal  participation  in  profits  whereby  the 
German  companies  allow  the trust  annually  a  quarter 
of the amount  of  the dividends paid in excess  of  6  per 
cent, whereas the trust pays to the German companies a 
quarter of  the amount which they may lack in order to 
pay a dividend of  6 per cent. 
3. An arrangement for mutual accommodation in cer- 
tain cases; i. e., each party before applying to outside com- 
panies must charter ships from the other party in the event 
its own  tonnage  is  found  insufficient;  also  a  provision 
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to the effect that both parties  under  certain conditions 
are to support each other against outside competition. 
Both contracting parties bind themselves not to acquire, 
directly  or  indirectly,  shares  in  each  other's  concerns. 
The evasion of  this prohibition has been made more diffi- 
cult by the German companies in 1902 (after the conclusion 
of  the agreement) by alterations in their by-laws to the 
effect  that in  certain  questions of  national  importance 
resolutions may be passed only by  a majority of  three- 
fourths  (in the  Hamburg-American Company  by  four- 
fifths), and at two consecutive general meetings, and that 
the members of the executive and supervisory boards must 
be Germans domiciled in Germany. 
The supervision of  the proper  execution of  the agree- 
ment is placed in the hands of  a committee consisting of 
an Englishman and an American belonging to the trust 
management and the directors-general of  the two German 
companies. 
The agreements become null and void  in case of  war 
between Germany and Great Britain or the United States, 
or in case of  war between Great Britain and the United 
States. 
In 1908 an agreement was arrived at between the Ham- 
burg American Steam-packet Company (Hapag)  and the 
Woermann  Line  on  one  side,  and  the  North  German 
Lloyd  and the Hamburg Bremen Africa Line on the other 
side.  (At first only till the end of 191  2.)  The agreement 
creates  a  limited  community  of  interest  between  the 
companies  involved  and  regulates  the  traffic  to  West 
Africa by excluding any independent action in connection 
with the West African traffic by any of the parties to the 
agreement. National  Monetary  Commission 
Shipbuilding, which was promoted by German banks to 
a  great  extent,133  became  prosperous  again  only  in  the 
eighties.  It was  only  about that time that the British 
practice of  substituting iron for wood as the main mate- 
rial  in  shipbuilding, which  began  about  1860, was first 
followed by German shipyards.  The "  Vulkan" at  Stettin, 
the shipbuilding  yards  of  Fr.  Schichau  at Elbing  and 
Danzig, of  Blohm & Voss at  Hamburg, and of  the "  Weser " 
Joint  Stock Company  at Bremen  stand at the head  of 
German  shipbuilding.  In this  industry  the joint-stock 
companies  showed  in  1907  a  total  share  capital  of 
54,000,mo  marks  and  a  debenture  capital  of  about 
2 5  ,ooo,ooo marks. 
According  to  the  occupation  census  of  I 895,  22,73 I 
persons were employed in German shipbuildirig, a number 
which must have considerably increased during the last 
fourteen years. 
According  to  the  data  of  the  Germanischer  Lloyd  a 
total of  368,440 gross registered tons of  shipping (seagoing 
.  steamships and  sailing ships,  river  boats, other  vessels, 
and war ships) were built during 1907,  the figures for 1908 
being  279,137 gross registered tons; a large part of  Ger- 
man sea-going merchant vessels  (up to 1905 about one- 
third) is still being built abroad. 
Germany's share in the shipbuilding of  the world (mer- 
chant vessels exceeding IOO tons) as compared with Great 
Britain's  has been as follows: 
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American shipbuilding (iron and steel vessels) in 1907-8 
increased about sixfold as compared with 1892-1897. 
If  we turn from sea navigation, with its enormous di- 
mensions, to inland navigation, which has developed con- 
siderably since the forties of  the last century, it will be 
found that 14 new joint-stock companies were founded in 
this field during the eighties and six additional companies 
in the nineties.134  The economic value of  the German 
waterways was  estimated  in  1895 at over  1,5oo,ooo,ooo 
marks. 
On December 31, 1907, there were 26,235 vessels, with 
a carrying capacity of  5  ,g I 4,020 tons, occupied in inland 
navigation, including 22,923 without power of  their own 
and 3,3  I 2 ships with power of  their own  (steamships and 
motor boats)  The total length of  navigable waterways 
was I 3,748.6 kilometers.13~ 
In 1895, 22 per cent of the total traflic fell to the share 
of  waterways and 78 per cent to that of  the railways.  The 
amount of traffic carried on each kilometer of  waterway 
was 750,000 tons, and on each kilometer of  railway ~go,ooo 
tons. 
I take it for  granted  that the large  increase  of  the 
German  navy  during  the period  in  question, which  in 
its turn resulted in important orders to and great activity 
of  various  branches  of  German  industry,  is  generally 
kn0wn.1~7 
We  shall  now  take up the subject of  currency  (Zah- 
lungsverkehr) . 
Before  the foundation  of  the  Gernian  Empire there 
existed  in Germany  31  banks  authorised  to issue bank 
notes; to-day  there  are only  4  private  note  banks  (in 
- 
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Bavaria, Saxony, Wiirttemberg, and Baden) in addition to 
the Reichsbank inaugurated on January I, 1876, in accord- 
ance with the law passed on March I 4, I 8  7 5. 
The  Reich~bank,~~~  which  took  the place  of  the  old 
Preussische  Banlz,  is  a  bank  under  the supervision and 
management  of  the  Empire,  established  with  private 
means  and  constituting  a  corporate  body  (juristische 
Person)  though  not  a  joint-stock  company.  According 
to section 12 of  the bank law it is allotted the task "of 
regulating the money circulation of  the whole Empire, of 
facilitating payments, and of  utilising available capital. " 
The original capital, divided into shares (each bearing 
the name of the owner), amounted  at the time of  founda- 
tion to I 20,000,000  marks, and since the supplementary law 
of  June  7, 1899, has reached the amount of  18o,ooo,ooo 
marks;  the surplus funds amount to 64,814,000 marks. 
The management of  the Reichsbank rests in the hands 
of  the Imperial chancellor, and, subject to his authority, 
in those of  the president and of  the Reichsbank directors, 
who are appointed for life; supervision is carried on by a 
board  of  bank  curators  (curatorium), consisting  of  the 
Imperial chancellor as chairman and four members. 
The cooperation in the management by the share owners 
(chiefly in an advisory capacity) is exercised through the 
general  meeting,  and  through  the  central  committee 
elected from its midst, which consists of  15 members and 
15 alternates.  The committee, which meets at least once 
a month, under the chairmanship of the president of  the 
board of directors, receives monthly reports of the general 
business situation as well  as proposals for measures that 
may be deemed necessary.  (Sec. 32  .)  Its  expert opinion is 
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also to be heard on a number of questions, such as the dis- 
count rates and the maximum amount to which the funds 
of  the bank are to be applied to loans on collateral (see sec. 
32  a-f) ;  it elects 3 deputies, whose duty it is to exercise 
supervision over the management of  the Reichsbank, and 
who are authorized to inspect the books of  the bank, and 
to participate in the meetings of  the board  of  directors 
(with advisory powers).  No  business with  the Empire, 
or the German Federated States for which unusual terms 
are to be made, is to be transacted unless approved by a 
majority of  the central committee. 
At the chief branches of the Reichsbank, established in 
large  towns  outside  Berlin  (Reichsbankhau+tstellen) , dis- 
trict committees are formed from among the shareholders, 
invested with the same functions as the central committee. 
The local committees in turn elect 3 deputies for the con- 
stant control  of  the business  management  of  the local 
office.  Over 500 various branches are in existence at the 
present day. 
The Reichsbank has the right to issue bank notes with- 
out direct limitation according to the requirements of its 
business.138 Its right is only limited indirectly by section 
17  of  the bank  law, which  enacts  that the bank  must 
possess in bullion and Imperial treasury notes a minimum 
of  one-third  of  the amount for which  notes  are issued, 
and for the remainder-discounted  bills fulfilling the re- 
quirements of  the Bank Act (bankmassige Wechsel) ; fur- 
thermore, that a tax of  5 per  cent must be paid on the 
notes issued  in  excess of the cash reserve, i. e., bullion, 
treasury  notes,  and  notes  of  other  banks,  and  of  its 
so-called  tax-free  contingent.  (Sec.  g.)  The  latter National  Monetary  Commission 
- 
amounted,  according to the  Bank  Act,  to  250,000,000 
marks, and since the liquidation of  various private note 
issuing banks to 472,829,000 marks. ' The bank is bound 
to redeem its notes at  all times "  in German gold coin,''140  at 
the main office in Berlin on presentation, and at its branch 
offices in so far as the available cash and money require- 
ments permit."  (Sec. 18.) 
In view  of  its power of  issuing notes, i. e., obligations 
that may  fall  due  at any  moment, the  Reichsbank  is 
allowed to engage only in certain classes of  transactions. 
It is confined to transactions in precious metals; to the 
discounting  of  bills  running  for  not  more  than  three 
months and for which 3 or at least 2  persons of  known 
solvency are liable; the purchase and sale of  imperial gqv- 
ernment bonds, of  the bonds of  Federated States, or  of 
domestic  municipal  corporations  payable  at their  face 
value  at the  latest  in  three  months;  the  granting  of 
interest-bearing loans on collateral for a period not exceed- 
ing three months on movable pledges exactly defined by 
law (sec. I 3, clause 3 a-c) ; the purchase and sale of  Ger- 
man debentures, exactly defined by the Bank Act (sec. 13, 
clause 4 and 3b) (even if  not due after three months) ; the 
collection of  commercial bills,  the purchase  and sale of 
precious metals or of  securities of  all kinds on account of 
third parties  (security being given in  advance) ; the re- 
ceiving  of  interest-and  noninterest-bearing  moneys on 
deposit aid on giro account, with  the  proviso that the 
amount of  the interest-bearing deposits must not exceed 
the limits of  the combined capital and the surplus funds 
of  the bank;  finally,  the custody  and  management  of 
articles of  value. 
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The Reichsbank  is required  to publish  from  time  to 
time the rate at which it discounts or advances money on 
collateral  (sec. 15); like all other note banks  (sec. 8), it 
must publish the state of  its assets and liabilities under 
date of  the 7th, 15th~  and 23d, and the last day of  every 
month (at the latest five days after the above-mentioned 
dates).  It must  also publish within  three months after 
the end of  the financial year an exact balance sheet of  its 
assets and liabilities, as well  as a statement of  its profit 
and  loss  for  the  year.  All  these  statements  must  be 
published in the "  Reichsanzeiger." 
From its foundation to the present day the Reichsbank 
has fulfilled all the tasks devolving on it under section 12 
of  the bank  law  in an almost exemplary manner.  The 
details are well known and can only be summarized here. 
The  Reichsbank  has  rendered  service in  the first  in- 
stance in facilitating payments through the introduction 
on April 10, 1876, of  "giro" transactions, the principle of 
which  is  that in  lieu  of  payment  in  cash  between  the 
"giro"  customers of  the banks,  book  transfers may  be 
made  by  writing  off  the amount  to be  paid  from  the 
account of  the payor  and transferring  it to that of  the 
payee.  "  Giro " transactions form the most simple method 
of  settling claims and counterclaims at one and the same 
bank, namely, by transfer from one account to another. 
Since  I 883 so-called compulsory clearance  ( "  Verrech- 
nungs-Zwang ")  has been introduced for "  giro " customers, 
according to which all claims of a "  giro " cust.omer arising 
out of  bill or collateral credit granted by the Reichsbank 
are not paid in cash, but placed to the credit of  his "giro " 
account. National  Monetary  --  Commission 
Since  1896 most  of the imperial  treasuries,  as well as 
the state treasuries  of  Prussia  and Baden, have  opened 
"  giro " accounts with the Reichsbank. 
The nmnber of  "giro " accounts increased from 3,245 
in  1876 to  24,821 in  1908; aside from the governmental 
treasuries  these  accounts stand mostly  in  the name  of 
large commercial and industrial c~ncerns,l~~  so that up to 
the present  the  "giro"  transactions  of  the Reichsbank 
have  partaken  of  a  somewhat  plutocratic  character. 
Therefore, in the interest of  the more economical use of 
cash as means of  payment, the introduction of  the postal 
transfer and check  system on  January  I, 1909, must be 
welcomed, as largely extending the circle of  firms and per- 
sons who settle their claims and counterclaims by means 
of  transfer.  As the Reichsbank has also joined this postal 
transfer and check system, transfers can be made by firms 
possessing  postal-check  accounts  to Reichsbank  "  giro " 
accounts  of  other  firms  by means  of  the  Reichsbank 
postal-check account.  In the same manner the possessor 
of  a  postal-check  account,  who  likewise  has  a  "giro" 
account at the Reichsbank, may have the amounts stand- 
ing  to his  credit  in his postal-check account transferred 
to his "giro"  account at the Reichsbank. 
Through this interlocking of  postal check and Reichs- 
bank "giro" systems (which latter might be considerably 
extended), and through a still greater fostering of  the use 
of  checks, whose  ultimate liquidation,  however,  should 
l~e  effected by transfer and clearance, rather than by cash 
payment, the present antiquated and unsatisfactory met h- 
ods of  payment in Germany will be consider2 .Ay improved. 
The German Great  Banks 
A great and necessary improvement would be brought 
about by suitable agreements with foreign postal savings 
banks, central note banks, and credit banks, whereby their 
transfer  systems  might  be  made  to cooperate with  the 
transfer systems of  the German post-office and Reichsbank. 
A first step in this direction is the arrangement of  Feb- 
ruary I, 1910, for the clearing of  postal checks and trans- 
fers between the German  postal administration  and the 
postal savings bank administrations in Vienna and Buda- 
pest  as well as the Swiss postal-check bureau. 
The "giro " transactions of  the Reichsbank with private 
persons, private firms, and public treasuries in 1907 were 
as follows: 
Marks. 
Average amount of  each account------.-  ..._-__-_...__.  24, I16 
Average volume of  transactions per account _-___.  ___-_.  .-  10,876,564 
whereas the total volume of  "giro"  transactions  during 
1907 amounted to 260,656,851,081 marks.lha 
The number of  postal-check accounts amounted at the 
end of  November, 1909, to 23,847, with  a  total balance 
of  70,955,349 marks to the credit  of  persons  and  firms 
having such accounts. 
The means at the disposal of  the "giro"  department 
strengthen  the operating resources  of  the Reichsbank  or 
its power to serve the whole economic community by way 
of  bill and loan transactions, and enable it to make the 
most  rational  use  of  its bank-note issue.  At  the same 
time the currency  set free through  the "giro"  method of 
payments can be utilised for credit business. 
The "giro"  business of  the Reichsbank,  which  is  re- 
stricted to its customers, should be supplemented by the National  Monetary  Commission 
clearance system, which  aims at discharging claims and 
debts  (especially checks, bills, etc.)  among  a number  of 
institutions  and  their  clientele by  means  of  balancing 
their accounts-i.  e., with the least possible use of  cash. 
A  clearance  system  [Slzontrationsverkehr]  of  this  de- 
scription, which has long been organised on a much larger 
scale abroad  in  the  form of  clearing houses,  (especially 
in England and the United States), was instituted in Ger- 
many  as late as  1883,  in  which  year  the  Reichsbank 
founded clearing  branches  [Abrechnungsstellen].  At  the 
close of  1908, when there was a total of  I 7 clearing houses 
with  198 members, the amount  of  paper  presented  for 
clearing had  increased to  10,531,271 from  I ,979,012 in 
1884,  and  the  total  sum  cleared  from  12,130,196,000 
marks in 1884 to 45,960,854,400 marks in 1908. 
In the three foreign financial centers, the total value of 
clearances was as follows: 
Marks. 
~1.289.  aro, oeo 
France (Chambre de  Compensation des 
Banquiers de Paris) --------.------- 
England  (London  Bankers'  Clearlng 
house comprising City. Country, and 
Metropolltan  Clearing .--------.--  .- 
Un~ted  States  (Associated  New  Pork 
Clearing-house banks) 
260,081,929,  ooo 
Marks. 
3.355.475.000 
118,464,479,  ooo 
143,186,557.  ooo 
The  small  amount  cleared  at  the  German  clearing 
houses at the present  time as compared with the clear- 
ing houses of  the two last-mentioned countries is due on 
the one hand to the gratifying  circumstance that large 
payments  in Germany are effected with outside places by 
means of  '' giro " accounts, or  transfers on  the books of 
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the  Reichsbank  or  post-office, and  on  the  other  hand 
to the less  gratifying fact that  payments  in  Germany 
are much less effected by means of  checks which in turn 
would pass through the clearing houses. 
It should  be  stated, though,  that  the  check  law  of 
March  11,  1908, passed  after protracted  opposition, has 
removed a series of  obstacles that have hitherto stood in 
the way  of  the  development  of  the  check  system in 
Germany. 
The total turnover of the Reichsbank 144  amounted in 
1908 to 305,244,504,000 marks, or, in round figures, 305% 
billion marks, as compared with about 47% billion marks 
in  1877 and about  142 billion marks  in  1867; in  these 
total turnovers, cash payments are superseded by "  giro " 
transfers  to  a  constantly  growing  extent.  Thus  the 
volume  of  giro  transactions  increased  from  41  billion 
marks in 1886 to 188 billons in 1905, and it is due mainly 
to this circumstance that the Reichsbank has been able 
to operate with a relatively small amount of  bank notes 
even in periods of  increased business activity. 
The doubling of German bank-note circulation in 1907, 
as  compared  with  the  average  for  r 88 I-1885-despite 
the great increase in  gold coinage and  in  the extent of 
the giro transactions, is  a  clear  proof  of  the enormous 
growth of  the requirements for means of  payment on the 
part of  the greatly increased population during the period 
under consideration. National  Monetary  Commission  - 
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The reserves of  the Reichsbank for the issue of  bank 
notes amounted to- 
I 
Aver- ' High-  Low-  Aver-  High-  Low-  1 Aver- I High-  Lon -  1  a.  est.  I  e.t.  ~  age.  1  is*.  1  est.  i  age.  1  est.  1  est. 
As  compared with this, the note issue reserves held by 
the banks of  France and England were as follows: 
1876-1880 
1896-1900 ..---  . 
1908 ----..-.------ 
.  I  Bank of France.  1 Bank of England. 







1876-1888  ..... -.--..-..  ...._-....--....__ 
1886-1900..  ..  ---- ---.  -  --- -----. 













/  Gold. 
The proportion of  reserves of  the Reichsbank to bank 
Per 
cent. 
66.  I 
51  9 
49 9 
Metal. 
notes and other moneys falling due daily (the giro assets 
in the first instance) was: 
- 
Per cent. PE~.  cent 
- - - - -  - .  99.0 
52.0  129.9 
56 a  120 5 


















jz  6 
Per  1  Per 
cent.  cenf. 
34.0  54.4 
39.0 
52.4 
44 2  , 51  5 
71.7 
65.6 National  Monetary  Commission 
This proportion in the case of  the other two banks was 
as follows : 
The average amount of  gold in hand at the Reichsbank 
Bank  of  France. 
-  - 
(current gold-coin of  the Empire, bars, foreign coin, etc.) 
Bank of England. 
during the period in question was 





1876-1880 ............................................  I  231.5g3.000 
1881-1885  .............................................  a~~.ogz,ooo 
.....................................  1886-18g0  1  513,574,000 
..........................................  1891-1895  611,296.000 
...................................  1896-1900..  .l  584,091,  ooo 
.........................................  1901-1905.  .l  693,561,000 






'  The amount of  Reichsbank  notes  in circulation  unse- 
cured 14j  by  cash 146  or  metal 147  is  rightly  regarded  as 
the real  "elastic"  part  of  the whole  note  issue,  as  it 
adapts  itself  very  closely  to the varying  state  of  the 
market, and the requirements of  the business community, 
the varying amounts forming a very reliable gauge of the 
state  of  and fluctuations in  the demand  for  means of 
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payment. 
The following tables may serve as illustration. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
In  1907  the  greatest  amount  of  gold  in  hand  was 
759,181,ooo marks (on May  23), and the lowest amount 
47 I ,848,000 marks (on November 30). 
The average metallic reserve was: 
Marks. 
1876- ..............  .......................  SIC, 593,000 
1880  ..............................................  562,091, ooo 
1881  ................................................  556, 749,000 
1885  .................................................  586, 131,  ooo 
1586-  .................................................  693, 105,ooo 
I 890- .................................................  801,019, ooo 
1895  -.-....--.....----....---....--..-............  1,011,763,000 
1896- .--...-.--...-.----.-.......----...............  891,988, ooo 
1900 ...............................................  817, 137,000 
1901 ...--..--.....-------........-----.-...........  gr1,411,ooo 
1905  ...................................................  972,959,000 
I 908- ..............................................  I,  019,065, ooo 
The differences (Spannung)  between the official  rate of 
discount and the private rate (market discount) averaged 
by four-year periods as follows: 
Berlin. 
Per  cent. 
I.  1g 
0.  98 
Paris. 





0.  og 
0.60 
0.  go 
0.  28 
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The average rates of  discount of the central Banks in 
Germany. France. and England  since the  institution of 
the Reichsbank was as follows- 
Bank of  Bank of 
France .  England . 
Per cent .  Per cent .  Per cent 
4261  3.40  261 
In 1906 the rate of  the Bank of  France was 3.00, and 
that of the Bank of  England 4.27; the rate in 1907 of  the 
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was 4.93; and in 1908 the rate of  the Bank of  France was 
3.04,  and the rate of  the Bank of  England was  3.01 per 
cent  . 
The private rate of  discount (market discount) averaged 
as follows : 
i  Berlin .  1  Pvlr  1  London . 
Bank of  France was 3.46, and that of the Bank of  England 
........................................  1876 
I  ......................................... 
1878 ........................................ 
1879 ........................................ 












Per cent .  Per cent .  / 
3  04  j  2  25 
317  175 
3  07  2  00 
2  60  2  15 
304  250 




1  :::  230 
2  II  275 
2  6  i  2  65 
378  264 
3  02  258 






























2  66 
4  05 
453 
2 .  31 
1 
1892 .......................................  I  SO  1  1  83 












2  10 
2  72 
340 
1894 .......................................  174 
....................................  1895  1201 
1896 ........................................  1304 
1897 .......................................  1  309 
1898 ..................................  (355 
l  52 l 
25 
1899 ........................................ 
.......................................  1900. 
1901 ....................................... 
.......................................  1902 
1903 ........................................ 
1904. ....................................... 
........................................  1g05 










1907  512 
1908 ....................................... National  Monetary  Commission 
The  average  bill  investments  of  the  Reichsbank 
amounted to- 
Marks 







1, 104,537,  r3oo 
967,729,000 
Since a central note bank always has to be in a position 
to redeem its notes (covered according to law in a special 
manner)  on  presentation,  and  to meet  its  other  daily 
obligations  (for which  the mode  of  covering is not pre- 
scribed by law), the general principle ought to be observed 
that, in so far as the law does not permit exceptions, its 
credit business  must be strictly in keeping with its debit 
business, a  principle which need not. be so strictly main- 
tained by the credit banks. 
Accordingly  a  central  note  bank  should  grant  short- 
time  credit  only, either  by discounting  short-term bills 
or by making short-time loans on collateral 
The discounting of  short-term bills ought to occupy the 
first  place  in  the credit business  of  the Reichsbank, as 
the latter is bound under section  17 of  the bank law to 
secure, by short-term bills, two-thirds of  the notes it issues. 
The Reichsbank  in  the course  of  time  has  acquired  a 
constantly growing  percentage  of  the entire number  of 
outstanding bills.  It is thus able to extend its note cir- 
culation,  as the short-term  bills  falling  due  provide  it 
continually with the means  of  redeeming  its bank notes. 
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Collateral credit business at  the Reichsbank is relegated 
to a secondary position, since collateral claims, for obvious 
can not be used as reserve for notes.  Never- 
theless, collateral credit (which is likewise granted for three 
months  only)  is  normally  less  expensive to the debtor, 
although since I 896 the rate of interest on collateral loans 
has been  I  per  cent higher than bank discount, for the 
reason  that interest on  loans on collateral  is computed 
only for the actual duration of  such loans, and that the 
debtor may repay at any time part or the whole of  the 
loan.  Lending money on merchandise has been discarded 
more and more in  favor of  lending money on securities. 
Thus at the end of  1908 only 5,390,100 marks were loans 
on  merchandise,  wheieas  r 70,533,650 marks were  loans 
on  securities.  The amount  of  loans on collateral, as a 
whole, rose almost constantly, as follows 
1904  I  I  957 411  820 1  74 180  ooo 
1905  1  2 093 427 625 (  72 073 000 
1906  2  773 191 475  1  83 631  000 
1907 -  /  3 293 301 200  98 I40 PO0 
1908  (decrease of  the total and of  the annual average)-  ,  2 812 171 450  91  397 oco 
Amount of loans 
on collateral 
made 
l  Mark3 





involves greater risk for the bank to grant credit on collat- 
eral than bill credit, as the nature of the credit required 
cannot be recognised so easily as in the case of  bills. 
In granting  short-term  credit it is incumbent  on the 
Reichsbank administration to aini at regulating, through 
the interest or  discount  rate, the domestic  demand  for National  Monetary  Commission 
short-term credit which concentrates at the Reichsbank 
and which is expressed to a great extent in its bill invest- 
ments. 
When credit is rendered more expensive by a high dis- 
count rate, which latter naturally influences immediately 
the  rate  on  loans on  collateral  and, gradually, general 
interest rates throughout the country, excessive demands 
for credit at home, as well  as excessive speculation, over- 
production,  and  overvaluation  of  goods  and  securities 
are  restricted  to  a  certain  extent.  Provided  that the 
private  rate of  discount  is  high,  and  that exceptional 
circumstances (similar to those in 1907) do not intervene, 
a high  Reichsbank  rate of  discount can  also  check,  di- 
minish, or  retard  the outflow  of  gold  to foreign coun- 
tries.149 As  a rule, however, it will  not  cause gold  to be 
imported from abroad, unless domestic discount rates are 
raised far higher than those  abroad, and private rates of 
discount  are raised  correspondingly and kept at a corre- 
sponding  height.  In all  other  cases  "screwing  up the 
discount rate "  will not cause gold to flow in from abroad, 
but  merely prevent  temporarily a further increase in the 
foreign exchange rate, thus preventing or postponing  the 
advent  of  the moment  when  the export  of  gold  might 
become profitable.150 
Complaints have been made against the Reichsbank for 
having raised the bank rate (especially in  1907) without 
necessity,  at all events  for  having  maintained  it at an 
exorbitant height, thus severely injuring the interests of 
trade, industry, and agriculture. 
It  was also stated that the Reichsbank was too obliging 
as  far as  credit  demands  were  concerned,  particularly 
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toward the credit banks, and the average amount of  its 
bill investments in 1907 (I  ,104,537,ooo  marks) and of  its 
investments  in  collateral 151  (98,  I 40,000  marks)  were 
pointed to as a proof  of  the complaint.  In particular at 
the so-called "  heavy terms " (schwere Termine)  (the first 
day of  the quarters;  also  the fortnights  from  Septem- 
ber  15 to  30  and  December  15 to  30)  it was said  to 
have  weakened  its  position  unnecessarily  by  granting 
bill and collateral credit of  too  comprehensive a nature, 
and  that  it discounted  n  great  number  of  financial, 
credit,  and  nominal bills  (Leerwechse1)-i.  e., such  bills 
as  were  not  based  upon  real,  bona  fide  commercial 
transactions. 
Finally it was urged that, because of  its limited holdings 
of  foreign  bills, the Reichsbank  was unable  to exercise 
any appreciable, even  if  only temporary, pressure  upon 
the rate of  exchange, whenever this rate had gone beyond 
the "  upper gold point," or tended in that direction; that 
it was therefore not in a position to pursue an independent 
foreign bill  policy  (Devisenpolitik) , which was  demanded 
by the circumstances, or at least to support and supple- 
ment  its discount  policy  by  means  of  a  corresponding 
foreign  bill  policy,  even  though  subject  to  the  same 
limitations as its discount policy. 
I  consider  that the proceedings  of  the bank  inquiry 
com~nission  instituted by the Government in 1908 at the 
instigation  of  the Reichstag,  and  the statements of  the 
experts examined at that time, go to show that only the 
last mentioned objection can be sustained, and that only 
to a limited extent. National  Monetary  Commission 
The amounts of  foreign bills  held by  the Reichsbank 
since 1876 were as follows: 
Marks. 
................................................  1876  1,672,000 
................................................  1877  1, 873,000 
................................................  1878  5,351,  m 
1879  3,560,- 
................................................  1880  9j5843~~~ 
1881  ................................................  7,481,000 
................................................  1882  5,  5907 - 
................................................  1883  4,004,000 
................................................  1884  4,631,000 
................................................  188j  7,951,000 
1886  16,961,aoo 
................................................  1887  7,864,000 
................................................  1888  3j316,~~~ 
...............................................  1889  3,798,000 
1890___..---.-..-..-  ...............................  5,420,000 
1891_-_..-.. .......................................  5,306,000 
1892  4,  715,  000 
................................................  1893  4,  113,000 
................................................  1894  2,540,000 
................................................  1895  2,569,000 
................................................  1896  2,753,000 
................................................  1897  2,411,- 
................................................  1898  4,9349  000 
1899  ................................................  I9,045,000 
................................................  1900  26,753,000 
................................................  1901  26,946,000 
1902_--_  ...........................................  22,733,000 
................................................  1903  24,068,000 
...............................................  1904  22,212,000 
.................................................  1905  339 093,000 
..............................................  1906  433 244,000 
...........................-  44~461,000 
...............................................  1908  70,881,000 
On the other hand, as a result of  the deliberations of  the 
bank inquiry commission, it has been  firmly established 
that, on the whole, the Reichsbank has not gone too far in 
the amount of  credit granted, although it was considered 
advisable that in the future stricter principles should be 
observed in discounting bills, and that the discounting of 
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long-term bills and the granting of  any kind of  permanent 
credit should, at least on principle, be abandoned. 
Neither could it be proved that the Reichsbank during 
1907 had raised the discount rate arbitrarily.  On the con- 
trary, the majority of  the members of  the bank inquiry 
commission,  and of  the experts  examined,  were  of  the 
opinion that the raise of  discount rates was  in the main 
only the natural and necessary consequence of  industrial 
credit requirements, which in turn were not arbitrary, but 
for  the greater part  legitimate  and necessary, and that 
had the discount rate not been raised, the situation of  the 
Iieichsbank would  have been much worse, and the drain 
of  gold much larger.  As  a matter of  fact, the fixing of 
the discount rate by the Reichsbank has solely a "  declar- 
atory," and not a "  normative " (konstitutive) significance. 
The majority referred to were decidedly of  the opinion 
that, for  the same reasons, the continued  high  rate of 
discount, although much to be regretted, was a necessity. 
In the course of  the deliberations it became necessary even 
for the most  outspoken  advocates to abandon the view 
that the Reichsbank ought not to conlply fully with the 
sudden  and  abnormally  large  demands  for  credit  that 
arise at the so-called "  heavy terms " (schwere Te~mine)  , 
and which come principally from the credit banks. 
It will  hardly  be  denied that the credit requirements 
at the so-called  "  heavy  terms " are  particularly  legiti- 
mate and such  as can  not  be  deferred, and that these 
requirements  are met at the time by  the Reichsbank in 
the  shape  of  short-term discount  and collateral credit. 
These requirements  are: the credit demands on the first 
day of  each quarter, when, in  accordance with German National  Monetary  Commission 
custom, rents, mortgage interest, salaries, wages, interest 
payments, coupons, and frequently bills, etc., fall due, and 
between the 15th and 30th of  September and  December, 
the periods characterized by a similar natural increase of 
credit demands on the part of  all business interests. 
The fact that the credit banks fall back to a very con- 
siderable extent on the Reichsbank just  at those periods 
is a  necessary consequence of  their being  the agents of 
the credit requirements  of  trade and industry, and that, 
accordingly, the assistance sought is mostly for the satis- 
faction of  the above  requirements-i.  e., the needs  of 
third parties-and  only to a  relatively  small extent for 
their own uses. 
This does not prevent, however, the recognition of  the 
fact that the credit banks (as may, however, happen under 
every system of  banking) have frequently been too liberal 
in satisfying the credit requirements of  trade and industry, 
and  this  not  only  in  cases where operating credit was 
granted in the shape of  short-term credit, but also in cases 
where investment credit was concerned, which in the early 
stages may have worn  the garb of  operating  credit and 
developed only little by little into permanent investment 
credit. 
Nor  is there any doubt that the demands made on the 
money  market, and above all, on the Reichsbank,  were 
frequently  increased  by  a  superabundance  of  issues, 
promotions  and  transformations  that were  not  always 
justified. 
As  far as the resources  of  the Reichsbank  were  con- 
cerned, the  majority  of  the commission proposed  that 
these should be  increased, though it was  deemed  advis- 
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able  to effect  this increase by a gradual increase of  the 
surplus instead of  an increase of  capital. 
In addition, it was considered advisable that section 2 
of  the bank law should be changed, and that, follow  lrn  g the 
example of  England and France, the bank notes issued by 
the Reichsbank should equally be  declared legal tender. 
Naturally, the obligation of  the Reichsbank to redeem its 
bank notes in gold was to remain and, if  possible, be even 
more sharply emphasised. 
The necessary proposals in these two directions are con- 
tained in the draft of  a bill  (art. I, par. 2;  arts. 3 and 4) 
laid  before  the Reichstag  in  February,  1908, and since 
made  law,  containing  amendments  to  the  bank  act. 
(Entwurj eines Gesetzes  betrefiend Aenderung  des  Bank- 
gesetzes.-Reichstag  document, No.  I I 78.)  The  provi- 
sion, however, in force in England-which  I consider both 
necessary for and practicable in Germany, notwithstand- 
ing the argument to the contrary found on page  12 of  the 
report of  the bill-according  to which bank notes are not 
to be legal tender for payments made in its giro and bank- 
note transactions by the Reichsbank itself, has been un- 
justifiably  omitted.  Further,  the  draft  authorises  the 
Reichsbank to buy checks, provided that two persons of 
known solvency are responsible for the same, an authority 
which the bank  did not possess  until  then.  This latter 
measure  is  also  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  the 
majority  of  the members of  the bank  commission.  On 
the other hand, the permission  granted by article 5, Sec- 
tion 111, of  the act of  June,  1909, to use checks (which 
in distinction  to bills can not be accepted) as part of the 
note reserve  seems to be of  doubtful wisdom.  Finally, National  Monetary  Commission 
article 2 of the act provides for an increase of  the tax-free 
"  contingent " of  uncovered bank notes of  the Reichsbank 
from the  present  amount  (472,829,000 marks)  to 550,- 
ooo,ooo marks,  so that the bank  will  have to pay  the 
5 per cent tax merely on the amount by which its note 
circulation exceeds  its cash  reserve  (see note  145) plus 
this note contingent of  ~~O,OOO,OOO  marks.  The system 
of  a  tax-free note  contingent  has  thus been  upheld,  it 
having been  proved that this factor has had 110  influence 
upon  the  discount  policy  of  the  bank.  The  Govern- 
ment  and  the  majority  of  the  commission  were  of  the 
opinion  that the passing  of  the bounds  of  the tax-free 
contingent was serving as a danger signal to the commer- 
cial  public,  although,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  from  1891 
(before which date the bounds were never exceeded) till 
1907 inclusive, this limit has been exceeded not less than 
164 time~.'5~  The last-named fact may therefore be said 
to have brought about merely an increase of  the tax-free 
note contingent. 
In concluding this review of  the activity of  the Reichs- 
bank during the period under  consideration, it must be 
acknowledged that the regulation of  our money circulation, 
and  of  our  systems  of  payments,  credit  and  currency, 
with which that institution had been intrusted, has been 
in  good  hands.  In particular  it may  be  said  that by 
means of  a circumspect discount policy, by opportune and 
energetic intervention in  1900 as well  as in  1907, i.  e., 
during the most critical periods, the bank has been of  the 
greatest aid in preserving the German money market and 
the entire economic organisation from lasting disturbances 
of the gravest character. 
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The above review of the most important factors which 
influenced the development of  industry  and banking  in 
Germany during the period in  question, would  be  quite 
incomplete without a brief reference to the cartels formedis3 
during this era,154  and especially to those formed begin- 
ning  with  the period  I 8  73-1 875.'"  These combinations 
developed  to  an  enormous extent  in  German  industry, 
and their growth was due in a great measure to the direct 
influence of  the German credit banks. 
Cartels  in  the  great  majority  of  cases  are  either 
"necessity's  offspring"  or  at least  due  to  its  influence 
or after-effects.lS6 
They are associations, founded by contract for certain 
periods  of  time, of  independent  enterprises belonging  to 
kindred branches of  industry or of  branches of  industry 
with nearly identical interests,lS7  the individual members 
of  the association  retaining their independence but join- 
ing for  the  purpose  of  regulating  production  and  sales 
according to common points of  view and in the common 
interest. 
A sharp distinction must be drawn  (at least outwardly 
and  legally)  between  cartels  and  trusts,  for  the  latter 
although following the same aims 158  represent permanent 
and  organic  combinations  of  undertakings  which  have 
sacrificed their independence, and do not always belong 
to the same branches  of  industry, but possess  common 
interests. 
Cartels are formed principally in branches of  industry 
which, like the mining and chemical industries, produce 
staple  articles  (vertretbare Artikel), and in  large quanti- 
ties  (Massengiikr).  Their  formation is rarest  and  most National  Monetary  Commission 
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difficult in branches of  industry producing special articles, 
or which work up half-manufactured  articles. 
Furthermore,  cartels  are  formed  most  rapidly  and 
easily  in  those industries  engaged  in  the production  of 
staple articles, which show an organic, local, or capitalist 
concentration into a limited number  of  large or  "giant" 
concerns (Riesenbetriebe) ; this has been the case for some 
time in  the mining  industry, and  more  recently  in  the 
chemical industry. 
The formation of  cartels is slowest and most difficult in 
cases  where  both  conditions-i.  e.,  the  production  of 
staple goods, and a limited  number  of  large works-are 
lacking.  It is more difficult and unwieldy where a con- 
siderable number of  middle-sized, and small (and  more- 
over  scattered)  works  exist  side  by  side  with  large 
concerns (Grossbetriebe) . 
The "  necessity " for the formation of  cartels in Germany 
-,xias  clearly recognized, especially during the crisis of  1873, 
as  a  result  of  the  economic  situation; by  this  means 
overproduction at home and ruinously cheap prices were 
to  be  terminated; this  "necessity"  likewise  was  the 
origin of  the protective-tariff movement of  the seventies, 
which was intended to ward off, or decrease foreign com- 
petition.  The simultaneous iritroduction of  a protective 
system of  duties  is  by  no  means  indispensable for the 
formation of  cartels, at least not in the case of  strongly 
developed industries, as may be seen in the case of  Eng- 
land.  It seems to be  only an attendant  feature, easily 
accounted for, in case of  feeble industries, and which, in 
some degree certainly, is likely to promote the formation 
of  cartels. 
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It is quite correct, and has been conclusively proved by 
Sering, that at certain times, and under certain supposi- 
tions the iron industry in particular can not dispense with 
protective duties,  and that well-organized cartels enable 
protective duties to become effective in favor of  producers. 
More  than this, however, can not  be said; consequently 
the assertion  that  the organized iron or  steel  industries 
can attain their aims only "under the system of  protect- 
ive duties "  15'  is in my opinion incorrect. 
No official statistics existed up to the end of  1905 regard- 
ing the total number of cartels established in the German 
industry, consequently  the figures found  scattered  here 
and there for earlier years must be accepted with reserve. 
In 1896 there are said to have been  250 cartels in the 
whole  German industry,160  one-fourth of  which belonged 
to  the  iron  and  chemical  industries,  one-sixth  to  the 
earthen and stone industries, and one-ninth to the textile 
industries. 
According to investigations made in the iron industry, 
which, however, can not be  regarded  as exhaustive, 44 
cartels (conventions, syndicates) existed in that industry 
in 1903. 
In the statistics contained  in the Denkschrift uber  das 
Kartellwesen  (p. 24),  laid  before  the Reichstag  during 
December, 1905, the number of  domestic cartels is stated 
to be 385, divided as follows: 
Coal  industry,  19; iron  industry,  62; metal  industry 
(excluding iron), I I ; chemical industry, 46; textile indus- 
try,  31 ;  leather  and  india-rubber  industries,  6;  wood 
industry, 5;  paper industry, 6; glass industry, 10; brick- 
making  industry,  132;  earths  and  stone  industry,  27; National  Monetary  Conzmission 
earthenware  industry, 4; food  and  delicacies,  I 7 ; elec- 
trical industry, 2 ; miscellaneous, 7.  About  I 2,000 works 
participated directly in these cartels (p. 25). 
Numerous  complaints  before,  during,  and  after  the 
serious  crisis  of  1900  among nonorganized branches  of 
industry, as  well  as  in  wider  circles,  against  the price 
policy  pursued  by  the cartels,l61  led  to serious charges 
against the cartel system, and ultimately, as usual, to its 
absolute condemnation as being positively detrimental ta 
the public  welfare.  These  complaints  gave  rise  to an 
official  investigation  by  the imperial  home office, which 
lasted from  November  14, 1902, to June 21,  1905.  The 
memorial (Part I) elaborated in the same governmental 
department, and laid before the Reichstag on  November 
28, 1905, simply  gives  a  review  of  the existing  cartels 
in Germany.162 
In  continuation  of  these  investigations,  it  was  pro- 
posed  to bring out a compilation of  the legal provisions 
and regulations applying to cartels at home and  abroad, 
including also the most important decisions of  the supreme 
tribunals.  Further,  the  results  of  the  official  inquiry 
were  to be tested in the light of  specially prepared price 
statistics.  The  material  was  to  be  brought  down  to 
date "in all  cases where the  conditions  determined  in 
the  investigation  had  changed," and,  if  necessary, the 
material  gathered was to be supplemented "through  the 
extension of  the investigation  to  other  cartels."  (See 
p. I 8 of  the memorial of I 905.) 
The  first  part  of  the  memorial  is  accompanied  by 
reprints  "  of  all  available  by-laws  (Statuten), company 
and delivery agreements, etc., and business regulations " 
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pertaining to cartels "  in order to afford an insight into the 
forms of  organisation of the combinations " (pp. I 8-19). 
In addition to the associations of  producers, the memo- 
rial  treats  also  of  the  associations  of  consumers  and 
dealers. 
In conformance with the outlined  program, Part I1  lR3 
of the memorial, laid before the Reichstag on March 25, 
1906, contains  the provisions  of  the German  civil  and 
penal laws, including the decisions of  the supreme court 
of  the Empire.  Part 111, submitted to the Reichstag on 
March  21,  1907,'~~  is  devoted solely to a  review  of  the 
cartels in the coal industry. 
Finally, Part IV, laid before the Reichstag on Novem- 
ber 3, 1908,~~~  deals with the foreign cartel laws, including 
those of  the European countries, the United  States, and 
the British  Colonies  (Australia, New  Zealand,  Canada, 
and Cape Colony). 
This is not the place to discuss in detail the results of 
the  official  inquiries  preceding  the  publication  of  the 
memorial,  nor  the  inquiries  themselves,  which  by  no 
means  exhausted  all  aspects  of  the  subject,  especially 
the  important  question  of  export  bounties.  It seems 
advisable,  however,  as the conclusions drawn from this 
inquiry are likely to occupy the attention of  the legisla- 
tive authorities, to examine some of  the questions more 
closely.  It should be stated at the very  outset  that in 
Germany, as opposed to the United States, all the rail- 
ways are state property,  and that any domination  over 
the railway tariffs by the cartels is out of  the question. 
According  to  my  conviction,  the  official inquiry  has 
established  the following preliminary  conclusions. National  Monetary  Commission 
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The charge brought  against the Rhenish  Westphalian 
Coal Syndicate of  having raised prices too high and too 
rapidly  during  the  years  of  greatest  trade  prosperity 
(Hochkunjlmhtur)  viz, I 898-1 900 was proved  unfounded; 
as to the complaint  that it did not reduce  prices  suffi- 
ciently and speedily enough after the crisis, no commoz 
ground for the conciliation of  the divergent views could 
be found.16' 
The opinion that it is bad policy, unpatriotic,  and in- 
compatible with  the public welfare to sell goods abroad 
at lower prices than at home can be regarded as refuted. 
In the event of  overproduction at home, sales to foreign 
countries are generally1" necessary in order to dispose of 
the surplus  home  production  and  to relieve  the home 
market as far as possible, whereas the determination  of 
price in such cases is governed chiefly by foreign compe- 
tition and prices prevailing  in the international market. 
The aim of the seller being always to obtain the highest 
sale  price  possible,  it may  therefore  be  assumed  as  a 
general  fact that  the  regrettable  occurrence  of  foreign 
sales  being  effected  frequently  below  home  prices  and 
even below  cost  is  solely due to the causes just  named. 
On the other hand, I am of  opinion that the following 
charges  have  been  proved:  The cartels  in  general,  and 
especially those in the mining industry, frequently lacked 
all close touch and proper connection with each other, so 
that a common business policy was out of  question, even 
if  for these reasons only.  A proper policy should at  least 
have set itself the task of  establishing a proper relation of 
prices for the products of  the various industrial branches, 
especially a ratio of  prices for raw materials, half-manu- 
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factured wares, and finished commodities.  Instead, the 
coal syndicate pursued  its own  price policy  (which was 
certainly moderate throughout)  without reference to the 
coke syndicate; the latter in turn pursued  its less mod- 
erate price policy without reference to the pig-iron syndi- 
cate,lBs  etc.  Such a common business policy, moreover, 
was  out  of  question,  because  (a) the  cartel  system 
(Kartellierung)  never  comprised  the  whole  process  of 
production, i. e., the production of  the raw  material,  of 
the partially manufactured goods, and the finished article, 
but only a single part, or parts, of  the process of  produc- 
tion, and because, furthermore, (6)  the syndicate contract 
frequently excluded a whole series of  articles, as well  as 
all foreign business, from the cartel's sphere of  influence. 
It is clear, therefore, that the increase of  prices fixed for 
Germany  by  the cartels  of  the raw-material  industries 
benefited at first those cartels only, and that they were 
able to dispose of  their home surplus in foreign markets at 
prices below those prevailing in these markets, and some- 
times even below cost. 
In the iron  industry  these  facts  caused  considerable 
injury,  in  the  first  instance,  to the  cartels  formed  in 
industries following in the process of  production, namely, 
the production of  partially  manufactured  goods.  These 
cartels in their turn endeavoured  as much as possible to 
shift the injury to their consumers, the industries follow- 
ing  in  the  process  of  production,  i.  e.,  the  industries 
engaged  in  the further working  up  or  finishing of  the 
partial manufactures.  Hence, it followed that the further 
an industrial branch was removed from the beginning of 
the productive process the more intensely it was i~~jured National  Monetary  Commission 
by the otherwise consistent (an sick naturgemiisse) business 
policy of  the raw-material  cartels mentioned. 
The unorganised industry of  the more highly finished 
products, therefore, was weakened and injured to a high 
degree, and to a twofold extent; by unrestrained domestic 
competition  as  well  as foreign  competition  on  the one 
hand, and by the enforced raising of  home prices for raw 
materials  and  partially  manufactured  materials  on  the 
other. 
A considerable number  of  these evils which were cal- 
culated to counteract the essentially true purposes aimed 
at by the formation of  cartels, and which would have led 
eventually to the disruption of  the  have been 
removed at  least for a certain number of  industries by the 
formation, on March 30, 1904 (retroactive to March I), of 
the Steel Works'  Union  (Stahlwerbsverband, Dusseldorf) , 
which united the Semi-Manufactures Producers' Associa- 
tion (the so-called Halbzeugverband)  ,  the Girder Manufac- 
turers'  Association  (Trage~verband)  , and  the  Rail  and 
Sleeper  Combine,  the total production of  which, at the 
time of  its foundation,  amounted  to 7,900,ooo tons  (of 
I ,000  kilograms).  The advantage of  this union,17"hich 
was extended on April 30, 1907, for a further term of  five 
years, consists principally in uniting within  its sphere of 
activity the whole  German  output of  partially manufac- 
tured articles, and a very considerable portion of  the roll- 
ing mills' output.  Further advantages of  the combination 
were the fact that all the works belonging  to the union 
were  so-called "mixed" works and that it comprised at 
least  some of  the mutually dependent cartels.  The new 
combinatioll has also taken in hand the export trade, and 
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is  endeavouring,  in  conjunction with the Rhenish West- 
phalian Coal and Iron Syndicates (by means of  contractual 
arrangements), to regulate  it in the common interest by 
fixing export premiums and establishing a special clearing 
house for exports.  The export premiums, which amounted 
to 2.50  marks  per ton, were  abolished, beginning  with 
July  1, 1907. 
The union also has the avowed intention, carried into 
effect  since by a series of measures, to harmonise as far as 
possible  its own  business policy, and more especially its 
price policy, with that of the cartels following or preceding 
it in the process of  production.  In particular its aim is to 
fix the prices of  all syndicate products in accordance with 
the prices of the raw materials in such a manner as to par- 
take of the benefit of  the customs duty while showing the 
utmost  regard  for the interests of  the industries of  the 
more highly finished 
However,  according  to  the  memorials  of  February, 
1908,"~  and June the 5th, 1908, presented by the "pure" 
Martin Steel Works  (engaged in the production  of  crude 
steel only) and the "pure" rolling mills  (which only roll 
steel  and  iron,  but  do  not  produce  the iron  and  steel 
material), to the Secretary of State for Home Affairs and 
to the Reichstag, the Steel Works'  Union  had  shown no 
consideration  for  the interests  of  the finishing industry 
as evidenced in many instances.  It was stated that the 
Steel  Works' Union, with  the object  of  suppressing the 
"  pure " rolling  mills,  had  systematically kept  the home 
prices of  half-finished material (the so-called "A"  products 
of  the syndicate) so high that the "  pure "  rolling mills not 
only had no profit, but at times a clear loss in the sale of National  Monetary  Commission 
the products manufactured  from this half-finished mate- 
rial.  For, simultaneously with the rise of  prices for the 
products "  A"-which  they on their part could not manu- 
facture (as most of  the members of  the Steel Works' Union 
could), but had to purchase-there  had been a fall in the 
selling prices of  the products  "B" of  the Steel %Torksl 
Union,  comprising  iron  plates  and  bar  iron,  the  sole 
product of  the "  pure" rolling mills. 
The entire advantage of  the Steel Works'  Union de- 
pended  on the duty-free importation of  such raw  mate- 
rials  as coal and ore.  As  it imported the latter free of 
duty in those exceptional cases where it did not possess 
ore of  its own, the mixed  works  (Thomas Steel Works) 
were able to keep the cost of  their products below  that 
of  the other works. 
The  superiority  of  the  "mixed"  works  belonging  to 
the Steel Works' Union, it was claimed, was therefore not 
based  exclusively on the natural advantages of  concen- 
tration, but chiefly or exclusively on the fact that these 
works, being  able to obtain their  material without duty, 
made a selfish and wrong use of  the duty on imported pig 
iron, half-finished, and scrap iron for the benefit of  the 
syndicate products  and to the detriment of  the "pure" 
works.  In the opinion of  the "  pure " works, these duties 
were unnecessary, in view of  the equally high cost of  pro- 
duction abroad, especially in England. 
This superiority of the mixed works, the argument went 
on, rested  on the further fact that although  the  cost of 
material to the pure works was enhanced by the amount 
of  the  import  duty,  the former made  it impossible  for 
the pure works to realize the benefit of the customs duty 
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in the prices of  their products by  refusing to sanction the 
organization in a syndicate of  the producers  of  finished 
iron, especially of  rolled plates and bar iron. 
Under these conditions the "  pure " Martin Steel Works 
and  the  "pure"  rolling  mills  demanded  at one time a 
suspension and early removal of  the import duties on pig 
iron, half-finished iron, and scrap iron  (cfr. memorial of 
5th June,  1908), and at another (cfr. memorial of  Febru- 
ary, 1908)-the  introduction of  import certificates for pig 
iron and exported articles (i. e., for half-finished articles- 
bar iron, plates, and wire), by which means they could at 
least secure to themselves the unhampered supply of  ma- 
terial for articles to be exported. 
The Steel Works' Union pointed out in its answer to the 
above-mentioned  memorials that the mixed  works  were 
at a considerable disadvantage as compared with foreign 
countries,  both  as  to general  conditions  of  production, 
especially cost, and as to the far smaller  social burdens 
imposed abroad, particularly in England.  A compensation 
could be found only in better technical arrangements, in 
savings in the cost of production and in a decrease of  the 
cost of  transportation. 
There could be no question of  a systematic suppression 
of  the "pure" works.  This might be seen from the fact 
that the total sales of  half-finished material amounted in 
1907, to 1,200,000 tons, whereas the firms who had com- 
plained  purchased  only  340,000  tons, the production  of 
which required the services of only 5,000 workmen of  the 
Steel Works' Union's  total  labor  force of  360,000 men. 
Added to this were the export premiums continually paid 
by  the Steel Works' Union  also to the above-mentioned National  Monetary  Commission 
works, which helped them to tide over bad times, to say 
nothing of  the ever-increasing deliveries of  half-finished 
material to these works which were a matter of  record. 
The cutting of  prices of  iron bars and plates very often 
emanated from the "pure"  rolling mills, in fact it often 
exceeded the amount of  the export bounties. 
It was  a matter of  regret  that owing to objections of 
several members of  the Steel Works' Union, and to other 
obstacles, the desired formation of  bar iron and plate iron 
syndicates  had  not  become  possible.  The  removal  of 
duties on half-finished material, pig  iron, and scrap iron 
desired by  the  "pure"  works  would  result  merely  in  a 
dissolution of  the Steel  Works'  Union.  These  duties 
were indispensable as a protection  against the enormous 
power  of  the American  steel  combination  against  the 
advancing Russian iron industry, and, lastly, against the 
constantly growing British protectionist tendencies.  The 
abolition  of  the duties  mentioned  would  prove  at the 
same time of  general disadvantage  to the whole  home 
industry, and especially to the rolling mills, as it would 
entail the removal of  the duties on iron bars and plates. 
For these duties acted chiefly as prohibitive duties, a fact 
disputed, however, by the  pure"  rolling mills. 
Finally, in the opinion of  the Steel Works' Union, the 
import  certificates  (for the export of  articles worked up 
from imported pig iron or half-manufactures) , demanded 
by  the "pure"  works,  were  too rigid  in  character  and 
could not be adjusted to  varying market conditions.  This 
pliability, however, was essential to their successful appli- 
cation.  If  the demand of  their substitution for the export 
payments made by the syndicate were to be granted, they 
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might  easily assume the character of true export boun- 
ties, especially  at times  when  home  and  foreign prices 
were equally high. 
As a sequence to this at times quite acrimonious contro- 
versy, the Steel Works' Union decided upon the reduction 
of  the domestic price of half-finished material by5 marks 
per ton  (this came into force on the 1st of  July,  1908). 
But this did not help the "pure" works, since this reduc- 
tion of  the price for half-finished material had been antici- 
pated, and accordingly the selling price of  sheet  and  bar 
iron had fallen 10 to 15 marks per ton; that is, below the 
cost to the "  pure " rolling mills.  Since November 27, 1908, 
the prices on fashioned bar iron (Formeisen) have likewise 
been reduced for the first half  of  1909 by 5 to 10 marks 
by a resolution of  the Steel Works' Union. 
As  no important improvement has taken place in the 
condition of the "pure"  rolling mills, a condition which 
resembles in  a striking manner the present  condition of 
the private  banking  business with  relation  to the great 
banks,  it will  be  necessary  to consider the demands of 
these  works.  It may  be  noted  in  this connection that 
some of  the great banks are found in their camp, at least 
with part of  their interests, though the large majority of 
the great banks and by far the greater part of  their inter- 
ests are doubtless identified with the Steel Works' Union. 
The carrying  out of  the plan  to create bar  iron  and 
sheet iron syndicates (which it would appear has been re- 
cently supported  even by the Government) would  seem 
to be the most radical, and perhaps  the only way of  in- 
proving the doubtless precarious condition of  the "  pure " 
rolling mills.  Such a plan should certainly be supported National  Monetary  Comntission 
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by  all  means  in  the  interests  of  German  trade  and 
industry. 
We must not forget,  however, that the scheme to  form a 
general sheet-iron syndicate was wrecked not only by the 
opposition of  three South German members of  the Steel 
Works' Union (de Wendel, Maxhiitte, and Dillingen), but 
also by the opposition of  a  great number  of  SiPgerland 
works.  The formation of  the wrought  iron syndicate on 
the other hand  seems  to have come to grief  owing to the 
opposition of  various works, as well as to the demands of 
wholesalers who  insisted upon being guaranteed a mini- 
mum profit for handling the products. 
Another plan would  be the extension of  the number of 
"pure"  rolling  mills  by  the erection  of  Martin  works, 
which  would  make  them  independent  of  the supply of 
half-finished material from the Steel Works'  Union.  It 
was on these grounds that the plan  was  strongly  advo- 
cated in a memorial of  the "  Association of  crude iron and 
half  -finished  material consumers," which in the main sided 
with the "pure" rolling mills against the contentions of 
the Steel Works' Union. 
The construction and successful working of  new Martin 
works presumes, however, the removal of  the import duties 
(as desired by the  pure" rolling mills) on pig iron, half- 
finished products, and scrap iron.  It is, however, very 
doubtful if  the removal of  duties would be in the interest 
of  national  industry,  and  even  more  so  whether  the 
change would  prove of  permanent benefit to the rolling 
mills themselves. 
In the first place I am not convinced t'hat these import 
duties have been used in a selfish and wrongful manner 
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by the Steel Works' Union in order to crush the "pure" 
rolling mills.  On the contrary, it seems to me that even 
the strongest combination is hardly able in the long run 
to realize through its domestic selling prices the full pro- 
tective duties on  the half-finished  material,  because  in 
the main  we  export half-finished  material.  Certainly in 
periods  of  booms  the influence  of  prices  in  the world 
markets will largely equalise the influence of  duties and 
freights on inland prices.  Even the average inland price 
for grain (the imports of  which largely exceed the exports) 
has  not  always equaled the average  foreign  prices plus 
freight and duty. 
In the foreign markets the determining price factor as 
a rule and in the long run is mainly the condition of  the 
international market as affected by  supply and demand. 
Prices  in  the  world  market  are  quite  independent  of 
domestic prices and are the result of  altogether different 
factors.  There is no reason, therefore, why they should 
correspond to the domestic prices plus protective duties 
and the freight difference. 
I also share the opinion of the Steel Works' Union that 
once a breach has been made in the cus'toms wall for iron 
such  as the pure  works  desire  by  the  removal  of  the 
duties from half-products and by the introduction of  im- 
port certificates, the abolition of  the remaining iron duties 
would  necessarily  follow.  For it will be difficult in the 
long run to maintain free trade for the export  business 
and to continue to make use of protective tariffs for other 
branches of the iron industry, such as pig iron, bar iron, 
sheet iron, and wire. 
It seems to me that much as the removal of protective 
duties may  be  desirable on  principle the removal of the National  Monetary  Cornmission 
duties on pig iron and half-products which, like the cartels, 
are the means not  only of  raising but maintaining  the 
prices of  domestic products, would be premature, for the 
reasons stated in the memorial of  the Steel Works' Union 
and in view of  present conditions.  Nor  can we  be quite 
sure that at no distant date the raw material  (Einsatz- 
material) of  the Steel Works' Union  now  entering duty 
free (at least the ores) may not become subject to foreign 
export duties. 
Added to this is the fact that as long as the agrarian 
protective duties continue, the one-sided removal of  the 
industrial protective duties would mean an unfair burden- 
ing of  the industrial population,  which would  moreover 
be left unprotected against foreign competition. 
To  return  to the other  purposes of  the Steel Works' 
Union (Stahlwerlzsverband): 
The union endeavors, by a series of  measures intended 
to insure  regular  work  for  syndicate  undertakings,  to 
reduce the cost of  production, a matter which hitherto has 
not been influenced in the slightest degree by the syndi- 
cates.  Finally, it has promoted the formation of  dealers' 
associations, limited  to  certain  districts, especially  the 
Rhenish-Westphalian, the Middle-German, and the South 
German girder dealers' associations, the existence of  which 
was at  one time endangered through dissension,  but which 
is now  assured for another  five years,  dating  from the 
summer of  1907 to June 30, 191  2. 
The Steel Works' Union, by reason of  its organisation 
and of  its freer attitude toward the export trade, is in a 
position  to pave  the  way  for  international  agreements 
with the chief  exporting countries.  In fact it has suc- 
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ceeded in bringing about such agreements, although only 
for a short period each.  On November 28,  1904 (retro- 
active from October  I I, 1904), an agreement concerning 
the export of rails was arrived at between England, Ger- 
many, France, and Belgium, to begin with, for a period of 
three years  (till March 31,  1go8), and on November  24, 
1904,  an  agreement  was  concluded  between  Germany, 
France,  and  Belgium  with  reference  to the  export  of 
girders for the period of  two and one-half years (until June 
30,  1907) 
Both  agreements have been extended  indefinitely and 
barring  unforeseen incidents are likely to remain in force 
until June 30, 1912, the date of  the expiration of  the Steel 
Cartel agreement. 
The United  States Steel Corporation  (acting also for 
the Lackawanna and Pennsylvania Companies), founded 
February 23, 1901, with a capital of  $I ,~oo,ooo,ooo,  joined 
the International Rail Cartel later on.  The Steel Corpora- 
tion does not comprise, as is frequently stated, the whole 
steel production of  the United  States, but so far "  only " 
two-thirds  of  the American  steel  output,  and  controls 
about I ,500 miles of  railway, or rather less than I per cent 
of  the whole railway mileage of  the United States.175 
We shall close the review of  the period with this men- 
tion of  the international agreements, which were initiated 
in Germany and in which up to the present German indus- 
try has been able to secure an eminently satisfactory posi- 
tion in accordance with its industrial achievements.  This 
period is characterized not only by expansion and concen- 
tration in the fields of  trade, industry, and particularly 
banking, but also by the greatest revolutions in the eco- 
nomic field; it marks the era of  international trade, the National  Monetary  Commission 
precursor,  and in part  also the cause of  the new  era of 
"  world"  and colonial politics.  It was a period of  vast 
inventions  and discoveries, which created  perfectly new 
industries, and fundamentally transformed  existing ones, 
and  which  imposed  on  the  industries  (often protected 
by high customs  duties) great tasks in the international 
market,  which were  achieved to a  considerable  extent. 
The revolutionary  character  of  this epoch, however, ex- 
pressed itself  in two tremendous  crises-in  the crisis  of 
I 873 and that of  1900. 
This period marks the complete transformation of  the 
character of  German industrial organization, begun in the 
last decade of  the preceding epoch.  The new order, de- 
spite  the  sound,  partly  inadequate,  arguments 
urged  against  it, possesses  no doubt the great merit of 
having provided-principally  by increased export trade- 
food and occupation for the enormously increased popu- 
lation, which, it was stated as early as the middle of  last 
century, agriculture was no longer able to sustain.  More- 
over, the view seems fairly justified, at least to a certain 
extent, that the recent growth of  imports, which, as was 
pointed out above (pp. I I 2  and I 2 I),  in certain branches 
largely exceeded the simultaneous growth of  exports, is a 
fair indication that the large increase of  production during 
late years is due primarily to increased home demand. 
The following question, however,  should  not  be  sup- 
pressed in this recapitulation of  the past and forecast of 
the future: What will  happen  if  imports into Germany 
continue to increase greatly, and exports fall off  consider- 
ably?  This danger must be borne in mind as a serious 
eventuality, at least for some industries, a danger which 
may  result  from  high  protective  duties  likely  to  be 
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introduced abroad, especially in America and the British 
Empire,  as  well  as  from  existing  German  commercial 
treaties. 
As far as the latest commercial treaties are concerned 
they offer one gratifying advantage benefiting the whole 
community, namely,  the assistance  and support against 
foreign  countries  demanded  by agriculturists and abso- 
lutely  necessary  in  many  directions  and  parts  of  the 
country.  As a result of  this support agriculture was able 
to  recover its  former vigor and  prosperity  by internal 
means,  especially by a  more vigorous and concentrated 
development of  agricultural credit and cooperation.  This 
development  is  highly  desirable from the point  of  view 
of  national interests, as it tends to reduce the necessity 
of  foreign grain imports to the smallest extent possible. 
But inasmuch as only such governmental measures can 
be of  general or permanent benefit in which consideration 
for the interests of  one class of  the community goes hand 
in  hand  with due regard  for  the interests  of  the com- 
munity as a whole, it is our earnest hope that the protec- 
tion of  our home agriculture may not have been accorded 
at the expense of commercial and industrial development, 
or  even of  important branches of  industry or industrial 
export branches. 
Much  depends  on the vigor  of  commerce, especially 
the vigor  of  industry, which  must continue to advance 
and must not rest  for a  moment.  Its further progress 
will  depend,  first  and  foremost,  on  the  powerful  and 
judicious  support  of  those  institutions  but  for  whose 
constant  and  energetic  cooperation  the great economic 
achievements of  the period could not have been attained, 
to wit, the German banks.lT8 The Germafi Great  Banks 
CHAPTER  111.-The  German Great BartKs during the  second 
period (1870 acntzl the present). 
SECTION  I.-(I)  . 
INTRODUCTION. 
The activity of  the banks in the economic life of  society 
has often been likened to that of  the heart in the human 
body. 
This comparison is quite proper.  For just  as it is the 
function  of  the heart  to regulate  by  means  of  certain 
organs the  circulation of  the  blood, which through countless 
arteries  and  veins  flows  through the human body  and 
returns to the heart, so, as was  shown above, it is  the 
function  of  the banks  to regulate  by  certain  economic 
measures the circulation of  capital, which flows from them 
and returns to them, and which may properly be regarded 
as the life blood of  the modern economic organism. 
The multiplicity  and  importance  of  the functions  of 
the human heart  can best be seen from a study of  the 
functions of  each part of  the human body  in the entire 
organism.  In a like manner some idea of  the tasks ful- 
filled by the German banks during the more recent period 
can be had from a discussion of those leading factors in the 
general economic development of  the period, which were 
furthered by the banks, particularly through their activity 
in  the credit  field, by  floating enterprises  and  issuing 
securities. 
Inasmuch as important phases of  this activity have been 
described in the introduction and in the chapters devoted 
to the early period of German banking, and as this activity 
has proceeded on the whole  along the same lines, though 
on a larger scale, during the more recent period, it will be 
sufficient to point out merely the special tasks undertaken 
by the banks during this period. 
For only in this manner will it be possible to achieve our 
main  purpose of  presenting  a  complete picture  of  the 
influence and activity of the banks in the general economic 
development during the two periods. 
But in contrast with former editions of  this book  I shall 
endeavor in each of  the subsequent chapters to describe, 
at least in outline, the share of  each of  the large banks in 
the common task.  It will  then be seen that, notwith- 
standing the similarity of  the purposes and of  the general 
development, each large bank has shown a peculiar char- 
acter and development, has pursued  a peculiar business 
policy (cf. Sect. 6, below) and that this policy, even within 
the same bank, has shown numerous and at times radical 
changes depending on the change of  management, times, 
and purposes. 
Before proceeding with our inquiry let us recall what 
amounts of  capital were  at the disposal of  the German 
credit banks  for  the achievement of  their  tasks  at the 
beginning of  the present period.  As  stated before, of  the 
total amount of  about 2,~o~,ooo,ooo  marks which  repre- 
sented the share capital of  the stock companies founded 
in Prussia during the nineteen years' period of  1851-1870, 
the share of  banking capital was 94,650,000 marks, that 
is to say, less than ~oo,ooo,ooo  marks, or about ~,OOO,OOO 
for each year (cf. p. 48, supra)  . National  Monetary  Commission 
In 1870 the capital of the large banks founded during 
the earlier period showed the following amounts: 
Bank fiir Handel and Industry, 25,046,000 florins (42,936,000 marks). 
Disconto-Gesellschaft,  ~o,ooo,ooo  thalers  (30,000,000 marks).17' 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, 5,625,000 thalers (16,875,000 marks). 
A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein, 5,200,000  thalers, (15,600,000 marks). 
Mitteldeutsche K~-editbank,'~~  5,000,000 thalers (15,000,ooo marks). 
In 1870 a Konzession was granted to the Deutsche Bank 17$  with a capital 
of 5,000,000 thalers (15,000,ooo marks). 
During the same year thecommerz- und Disconto- Bank at  Hamburg was 
founded with a nominal  capital of  30,000,000 marks, of  which  15,ooo,ooo 
marks were paid in. 
In 1872 the Dresdner  Bank at Dresden  was founded with  a  nominal 
capital of  8,000,000 thalers,  equal  to 24,000,000 marks,  of  which 40 per 
cent were paid in, i. e., 3,200,000 thalers (9,600,000 marks). 
In 1881 under totally changed conditions the Nationalbank fiir Deutsch- 
land was founded with a nominal capital of  45,000,000 marks, of  which 
20,000,000 marks were paid in. 
Further  substantial  increases  of  both  the  number 
and capital of  the German credit banks followed in rapid 
succession during this period.  As early as 1872 the com- 
bined  capital of  the then existing German credit banks 
(enumerated in Appendix 111, at the end of  the volume) 
exceeded I ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks (I,  I 22, I I 3,000 marks).  Of 
the total number, however, not less than 73 banks, with a 
capital of  432,500,ooo marks, were compelled to wind up 
their affairs during the six years of  business  depression 
which followed the crisis of  1873.1s0 
Here  again I shall depart from  the method  followed 
in former editions.  Following the usual classification of 
banking  business  into  credit  and  debit  transactions,  I 
shall, as stated in the preface, take up the discussion of 
the principal  credit  and  debit  transactions  (Aktiv- und 
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Passiv- Geschtifte)  of  the German banks  with  particular 
reference to the great banks. 
At  the  outset  the  following  general  considerations 
should be emphasized.  It is regarded as a fundamental 
rule both for banks  of issue and for credit banks, which 
are not permitted  to issue notes,  that  the  characte~  of 
their  debit transactions shall determine the character of 
their  credit  transactions,lsl  or, in  other words, that  a 
credit bank must not grant credit different in  character 
from  that which  it receives.  This  proposition  must  in- 
deed be recognized  also as the fundamental principle of 
credit  banks,  but  it  is  to be  understood  in  the sense 
that  a  credit  bank,  in  proportion  as  it has  procured 
moneys  repayable on demand or within  short or longer 
terms, or has contracted credit obligations which become 
due  on  demand  or  within  short  or  longer  terms,  must 
invest the funds at its disposal in such a manner that it 
shall  be in a position to meet its obligations at all times 
when  they become  due. 
At the same time, however, a bank may assume that, 
at least in normal times, not all the moneys due will  be 
claimed simultaneously, just  as a fire insurance company 
is justified  in  assuming that not  all the insured  houses 
will  be destroyed  by  fire  at the same time. 
No  general and fixed rules can be  laid down as to the 
percentage of  the claims likely to be presented for pay- 
ment.  Such a percentage can be estimated only on the 
basis of  the experience gathered  during a long time by 
thejndividual bank, with due regard to the experience of 
other  banks  and  to its own  peculiar character; in other National  Monetary  Commission 
words, by using  the care and  precaution  customary in 
business, and more especially in  the banking  field. 
The  general  practice  of  the  German  large  banks  is 
even more cautious,182  since they dispose of  their funds in 
such a manner as to be prepared at any moment to repay 
one-third  of  all  outsiders'  funds  (fremde Gelder), irre- 
spective of  whether they are payable on demand or after 
longer  or  shorter  terms, by  the aid  of  resources which 
may  be  regarded  as being  of  first-class liquidity, i.  e., 
cash,  including  bank  notes,  sight  drafts,  and  checks, 
contango  (Reports), bills,  also  the  so-called  "  Nostro " 
credits, i. e., credits  held  with  first-class domestic and 
foreign banks  and banking firms. 
"  Outsiders' funds " (fremde Gelder) include the deposits 
(Depositen), the credit  balances on  current  account, and 
other  balances  not on  current  account, resulting  from 
loan  operations  and  other  issue  business, or from the 
coupon service, or from interest-bearing funds held until 
settlement  day  to  the  credit  of  domestic  and  foreign 
states,  provinces,  districts,  communes,  commercial  and 
industrial concerns, of  land banks, note banks, and other 
banks, insurance companies, administrations, corporations, 
institutions, foundations, and private capitalists. 
The  liquid  assets  stated  above  include the so-called 
reports, which as a rule, or at least primarily, comprise only 
such as can be realized in the international market, as for 
instance those concluded in  London  and which  become 
payable  on  an average within a fortnight (instead of  the 
usual  term  of  four  weeks).  Similarly  bills  mentioned 
among this class of  assets must be such as can be used 
for international  transactions.  They  may  be  in  terms 
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of  German currency, since there is  normally a large de- 
mand abroad for German prime discounts.  Only in the 
second  place  do  the  banks  resort  for this  purpose  to 
short-term or shortly-due bills which may be rediscounted 
at the Reichsbank.  ls3 
Such a constant readiness for the repayment of  a third 
of  all "outsiders' funds" (not only of  deposits), must be 
regarded as more than sufficient, since never yet in the 
history of  the German great banks has there been a case 
when payment of  one-third of  all the liabilities has been 
demanded  suddenly without  notice.  Were  the  Reichs- 
bank to reckon with the possibility of  a sudden presenta- 
tion  of  one-third  even  of  its  notes  only,  it could  not 
maintain its present mode of  calculating its liquid assets. 
As  a matter of  fact, there is no legal provision whatever 
for cash security, so far as the giro-claims of  the Reichs- 
bank are concerned. 
SECTION  2.-THE  CURRENT  (REGULAR) BANKING 
BUSINESS. 
(A)  THE  DEPOSIT  BUSINESS. 
(I)  General observations. 
As  stated before (see pp. 73 and 74), the German banks, 
during the first period, proceeded mainly on the principle 
of  carrying on their business, as far as possible, with their 
own  means.  In the interest  of  their  own  security they 
did not deem it advisable "to bring about an increase in 
the amounts of  deposits by granting more liberal terms." 
Their customary practice, therefore, was to accept deposits National  Monetary  Commission 
repayable only after three, six, or twelve months' notice, 
on which, moreover, only a small interest was paid. 
The  systematic  fostering  of  the  deposit  business  by 
the German banks, which in  England  is regarded as an 
essential element of  banking,ls4  is due to the initiative of 
the Deutsche Bank, which  almost immediately after its 
foundation in 1870 began to devote itself  energetically to 
this class of  business. 
Already during the Franco-Prussian war, toward the end 
of  1870, the Deutsche Bank opened special deposit offices, 
at first in Berlin, then in  a number  of  suburbs, also in 
Wiesbaden,  Hamburg,  Leipzig,  and  Dresden.  In  this 
manner  manufacturers  and  capitalists were  enabled  to 
invest productively even the smallest available amounts 
(of  not  less  than  10 thalers), while the Bank  was  in  a 
position to use  these  deposits-which  became  its prop- 
erty with the restrictions mentioned above lS5-for  certain 
business purposes, having been the first to reach the con- 
viction that, in view  of  the large demands and tasks pre- 
.  sented to the banks  their credit business could no longer 
be transacted with their own means.  Since, however, even 
the use of  only a portion of  the deposits for its own busi- 
ness,  even with  the  observance of  the required restric- 
tions, can be permitted only in case the remaining por- 
tion  is  adequately  secured  by  most  liquid  assets  (stets 
greifbare Mittel), the Bank at the same time took Cxem- 
plary  precautions  to provide  for this form of  securities 
and adopted a special organization of  the deposit business, 
so arranged  that the special division created for the pur- 
pose might, when necessary, be separated at any time and 
made independent. 
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The opening  of  these  deposit  branchesls6  on  the one 
hand  made  it  easier  for  manufacturers  and  capitalists 
to obtain bank credit; on the other hand it brought  the 
Bank  in  contact  with  a  constantly  growing number  of 
customers, whose financial standing was known and who 
formed  a regular  and  steadily  increasing circle  of  sub- 
scribers to the stocks and bonds issued by the Bank. 
Conditions in Germany, unlike those in  England, pre- 
sented a number of  serious obstacles to a vigorous growth 
of  the deposit business. 
In the first place, the general custom in Germany among 
manufacturing and other circles is to keep on hand much 
larger  amounts in  cash than actually necessary.  In the 
case of the smaller traders and manufacturers this is caused 
partly by the fact that often they have no regular bank 
connections.  For this reason they keep idle at home the 
money  needed  to meet  maturing  obligations,  and  even 
much more, from sheer timidity, merely using so much of 
it as is required for their current business.  The same and 
similar remarks apply to many capitalists, who, following 
old-time tradition, are often given to hoarding their cash 
resources in the most primitive  fashion. 
To the extent, however, that the patent advantages of 
interest-bearing investment helped to overcome this tradi- 
tional inertia, it was the deeply rooted custom among large 
classes of  the German population to turn over small sav- 
ings  to the savings banks.  The latter, in  many  cases, 
were  older than the credit banks, and owed their origin 
to, and were identified with, local conditions.  They were 
conv'enient for the deposit and withdrawal of  money, even National  Monetary  Commission  _ -__ 
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in the smaller towns, besides  being  either public institu- 
tions or, at least, under state control. 
Finally, at the beginning of  the seventies, the amount 
of available national wealth was relatively  small.  Since 
the deposit business presupposes large amounts of  surplus 
funds, the establishment  of  special deposit banks would 
have proved  unprofitable  and was  therefore  out  of  the 
question, at least for a good while. 
Under these circumstances  all  that the German credit 
banks could do at first was to use their utmost care and 
efforts to prepare the ground for a gradually  developing 
deposit business.  It was utterly out of  the question, in 
view  of  the then  existing  conditions  and habits  of  the 
people, that the latter would  take their  savings  to the 
credit banks in the same manner as to the savings banks. 
In fact, the deposit offices had to create their own deposi- 
tors.  Their mode of  procedure  in  this matter, allowing 
for certain differences of  conditions, was not much unlike 
that of  the English deposit banks during the early period. 
As pointed  out before the Bank Inquiry Commission, the 
deposit offices extended credit to manufacturers and trad- 
ers, thus enabling them to pay their creditors through their 
intervention.  The creditors  quite  often  were  induced 
not to draw the money  due or to re-deposit it, receiving 
for it a higher than the customary rate of  interest. 
After the connection had been made in this or similar 
manner, it followed, as a matter of  course, that the persons 
to whom credit was extended, as well as those who shared 
in it, gradually came to deposit at the branch  their  cash 
funds and reserves and to transact there all their banking 
business. 
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The  new  customer  began  to  draw  checks  upon  the 
deposit  office, to discount  there his  commercial bills, to 
have the office attend to most of  his payments, and lessen 
the risk  in  his  import  and export  business.  The office 
granted him  acceptance credit, undertook the investment 
of  his funds and the management of  his property in secu- 
rities, gave him information and advice and procured for 
him advantages of  all sorts.  In this manner the deposit 
offices, which from the mere profits  of  the deposit  busi- 
ness  would  never  have  been  able  even  to defray  their 
operating  expenses,ls7 and which  therefore  were  equally 
interested in enlarging the scope of  their business opera- 
tions,  gradually  assumed  the  character  of  so-called 
Wechselstuben (exchange offices),  engaging in all classes of 
banking business, like the central parent bank, or its ordi- 
nary branches, except dealing in securities on own account 
and undertaking syndicate business (Konsortzalgeschafte)  . 
This was carried so far that the new competition  caused 
loud  complaints  among  the  private  bankers  affected 
thereby.  It is  thus seen that the origin of  commercial 
deposits at the German banks is altogether different from 
that of  the savings deposits at the savings banks.  Sta- 
tistically this may be proved by the observation  that the 
amounts of  deposits increase or  decrease in  accordance 
with the general increase or decrease of credit operations. 
Equally different are the purposes for which deposits are 
made at the tm classes of  banks. 
The client of  a savings bank, belonging almost exclu- 
sively to the middle  and  lower  classes, has in mind  an 
institution which shall permanently and securely keep and 
administer his savings deposits, and pay him the highest National  Monetary  Commission  - 
possible rate of interest.  The client of  a commercial bank, 
belonging mainly  to the middle  and  higher  classes  and 
particularly to the commercial and industrial groups, as a 
rule has in mind the temporary deposit and utilization  of 
his surplus funds, being  therefore in most  cases satisfied 
with a low rate of  interest until such time as he can invest 
them  permanently in  securities, mortgages, or  industrial 
enterprises ;  moreover, he is particularly interested in turn- 
ing over the administration and use of  these funds to the 
bank which attends to his other banking business. 
With few exceptions the former has but one character.188 
He is a depositor of  savings and nothing else.  The latter 
has a Protean character; one day,  in virtue of  his deposit, 
he may be a creditor, some other day, in virtue of  his cur- 
rent account--or other connections with the bank, he may 
be a debtor.  He may become creditor as well  as debtor, 
for a thousand and one reasons.  Thus, unlike the savings 
bank depositor, he is not presumed to exclude the right of 
hypothecation or detention of  the deposit on the part of 
the bank. 
For this reason it is very difficult to give a definition 
of  the German term "  bankmcissige Depositen",  since in 
Germany the term comprises not only what are known in 
England as current accounts, but likewise what are known 
there as "  deposit accounts."  As  these various designa- 
tions are far from uniform  and  on  the other  hand  are 
coterminous, it is  almost  impossible to obtain, for  the 
various German banks, uniform and comparable data of 
"  deposits " on a scientifically unobjectionable basis.  For 
these and other reasons some banks have heretofore either 
failed altogether  to give  any separate account  of  their 
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deposits, or have shown the latter combined with the so- 
called  "creditors"  accounts.  This is  true of  the Darm- 
stadter Bank (which, however, has of  late been giving sep- 
arate data  for  deposits), of  the Berliner Handelsgesell- 
schaft,  the Commerz- und Disconto-Bank, the Mitteldeutsche 
Kreditbank, and the Nationalbanh fur Deutschland.  Other 
institutions, such as the Deutsche Bank  and the Dresdner 
Bank comprise among deposits on the one hand all "  cred- 
itors"  of  their  deposit  offices and  exchange  offices-a 
proceeding which  can be  explained  only in  view  of  the 
peculiar development of  the German deposit business just 
described-and  on  the other all those  "creditors"  who 
may  have  intrusted  moneys  to  other  offices  of  these 
banks upon receipt of so-called "Depositenquittungsbucher" 
(deposit receipt  books)  or else m-ithout such  books  but 
expressly designating them  as "  deposits." 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft, while stating separately the 
"  deposits " in its regular reports, as well as in its jubilee 
report  of  1901 (p.  260),  seems, however, to include under 
that head  the current  accounts of  larger  domestic  and 
foreign firms and corporations, since the amounts of  these 
deposits show oscillations which can not be explained ex- 
clusively by contemporary business conditions or the state 
of  the money market.lQO On  the other hand, its reports 
up to the year 1908 invariably grouped under the head of 
"  creditors " instead of  "  debtors," the balances daily due 
(die taglich falligen Guthaben), held at its deposit offices. 
It is plain both from the account of  the development of 
the German deposit business and  from the purposes  for 
L  which these deposits are made and received, that, as was 
pointed out also at the third general convention of  Ger- 
man bankers at Hamburg IQ'  (Sept. j  and  6, I go7), only National  Monetary  Commission  - 
an  exceedingly  small  portion  of  the  deposits  of  the 
German  credit  banks-in  my  opinion  less  than  one- 
third-is  made up of  what may properly be called savings 
deposits.  By far the larger portion-not  less than two- 
thirds  if  not  three-fourths-of  these  deposits  represent 
"  operating reserves " of  traders  lg2 (cash on hand, reserve, 
etc.)  or  of  funds  of  traders  or  capitalists  temporarily 
deposited but destined for investment in securities, mort- 
gages, industrial enterprises, etc.  This opinion is shared 
unanimously by other students of  the question, including 
the  experts  heard  in  1908  before  the  Bank  Inquiry 
Commi~sion.'~~ 
Between  1870, when  the systematic  fostering  of  the 
deposit business on the part of  the German banks may 
be  said  to have  commenced, and  1891, that is  to say, 
during twenty-one years  of  the most intensive fostering 
of  this branch  of  business, those banks  which  hold  by 
far the larger part of  the total deposits, namely, the 143 
German  credit banks  having a capital  stock of  at least 
I ,ooo,ooo marks  each,  had  accumulated  total  deposits 
amounting to 386,000,ooo marks. 
Nine years later, according to a compilation of  the Deut- 
scher ~konomist,  118 of  the largest  German credit banks 
had accumulated ~~7,ooo,ooo  marks of  deposits; i. e., after 
thirty years of  fostering of  this branch of  business, these 
banks had succeeded in attracting not quite I ,ooo,ooo,ooo 
marks of  deposits. 
After another  nine  years, on  December  31,  1908, the 
total deposits of  all German credit banks reached about 
2,750,000,000 marks, of  which  about  2,250,000,000 were 
the share of  the 143 German credit banks having a capital 
of  at least ~,ooo,ooo  marks each. 
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'l'he  large increase within the last nine years is due not 
merely to the growth in the volume of  credit operations- 
the prime cause of  growing deposits-and  of the general 
prosperity, but above all to the large increase in the number 
of  the deposit offices of  the great Berlin and provincial 
banks, especially notable during those years.  It is  also 
due to the fact that owing to inlprovements of  the bank 
statements  and  the more thorough work of  the private 
statisticians, the statistics comprise now the operations of 
nearly  all  German  credit  banks,  413  in  number, with 
all  their  branches,  silent  partnerships  (Kommanditen), 
agencies, and deposit offices. 
In view of  this circumstance and the fact that this total 
represents the result of  nearly forty years of  concentrated 
and consistent effort, even this result can not be regarded, 
either absolutely or relatively, as a great success.  Hence 
the statement '8Wade as early  as  1904 that there was 
"an  unhealthy  growth  of  deposits,"  seems  entirely  un- 
founded.  This  becomes  especially  apparent  when  the 
above total is compared with the total volume of  the sav- 
ings deposits held by the German public and private sav- 
ings  banks,  which,  on  December  31, 1906, had  reached 
a  total of  13,25o,ooo,ooo marks,  and  by  December  31, 
I 908, amounted probably to between 14,000,000,000 and 
I 5 ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks. 
To this should be added the savings and other deposits 
(fremde Gelder,  less credit balances  on  current  account) 
held by the I 6,000 cooperative credit associations (Kredit- 
genossenschaften) in city and country, which on December 
3 I, I 906,  amounted  to about  2 ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks,  also 
the  amounts  accumulated  in  the  note  banks,  people's National  Monetary  Commission 
banks,  and, since January  I, 1909, in the check depart- 
ments of  the post-offices '" (which latter amount is likely 
to continue  increasing but can not be considered  in this 
connection). 
It is perfectly improper either to calculate a percentage 
of  growth  for  arbitrarily  chosen  periods  or  for  unequal 
numbers of  banks, or by comparing percentages to make 
the growth of  deposits in the German credit banks appear 
considerably larger than in the savings banks or in the 
English joint-stock banks. 
Thus,  for  instance,  the  total  deposits  of  92  credit 
banks at the end of  1892, 408,000,ooo marks, were taken 
as I 00, and, compared with the total deposits of  I I 8 credit 
banks  at the end  of  1907,  997,000,ooo  marks,  an  in- 
crease of  144 per cent was found.  As against this increase 
the much smaller percentual growth of  the same business 
at the English joint-stock banks between the years  1890 
and  1900  was  pointed  out,  the number  of  which  had 
decreased during  that period  from  99  to 82  while their 
deposits had  grown  from  335,000,ooo  to  572 ,ooo,ooo 
pounds sterling, or only 71 per cent. 
It is  always easy to afford both to friends and oppo- 
nents  a  small satisfaction lgF  of  this  sort  by  calculating 
percentages and proceeding in the one case-i.  e., of  the 
German deposits-from  a low  level, and in  the other- 
i. e.,  of  the  English  deposits-from  the  high  level  of 
£335  ,ooo,ooo or  7,000,000,000 marks,  since the per  cent 
increase in the case of  the English joint-stock 'banks, in 
view  of  the high level of  their deposits from which the 
start is made, can, in the nature of  things, be but small. 
It follows that the extent and gravity of the fallacies and 
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blunders will  differ merely according to the year which 
is  chosen  as  the  base  of  comparison.  An  even  larger 
blunder is committed by those who calculate first the ag- 
gregate deposits of  the savings institutions, credit banks, 
note  banks,  and  cooperative  credit  societies, and  then 
arrive  at the  "conclusion"  that  the  percentual  share 
held  by the credit banks  in the aggregate is constantly 
increasing,  while  that  of  the  remaining  institutions  is 
constantly decreasing.  This is  a graver blunder  for the 
reason  that  in  this  case  figures  of  entirely  different 
nature-namely,  of  deposits in savings banks and those in 
credit banks and similar institutions-are  thrown together 
and the calculations of percentages are then based on the 
totals thus obtained. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that with such methods, 
which, however,  often  lead  to important economic  and 
legislative  conclusions,  startling  though  arithmetically 
correct results are obtained, showing a considerable per- 
centual decrease of  deposits in savings institutions, while 
the absolute figures for these deposits show a continuous 
and  almost  regular  increase  to  between  14,000,000,000 
and  ~g,ooo,ooo,ooo  marks on December 31, 1908, for the 
country  as  a  whole,  as  compared  with  2,750,000,ooo 
marks of  bank deposits. 
By using equally fallacious methods it is quite easy to 
make the following totally different calculations : 
In 1891-i.  e., sixteen years ago-the  German savings 
banks  had  about  5,25o,ooo,ooo marks  of  savings  de- 
posit~.~~~  On December 3  I, I 906, they held I 3,250,000,ooo 
marks.  The  increase  was,  therefore,  almost  threefold. 
In the same year, 1891, the  143 German  credit  banks, National  Monetary  Commission 
with  a  capital stock of  at least  ~,ooo,ooo  marks  each, 
had  386,000,000 marks  of  deposits.  On  December  31, 
1906, these deposits were  2,250,000,000; there was there- 
fore a much  larger, almost sixfold, increase. 
If, however, instead of  I 891 the year  I goo is chosen as 
a starting point, it is seen that the deposits of  the Ger- 
man  savings  banks  amounted  thenlg8  to approximately 
9,0001000,000  marks, as  against  only 997,ooo,000,~~~  that 
is, less than I ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks deposited in the German 
credit banks.  As  compared with the above given figures 
for the end of  1906, the savings deposits are seen to have 
increased by about 4,000,000,000 marks, the deposits in 
the credit  banks  by  much  less-i.  e.,  only  by  about 
I ,5oo,ooo,ooo marks.  In other  words,  different  results 
will be  obtained by percentual calculations according as 
the level used as base of  comparison is higher or lower. 
(2)  Deposits in foreign countries. 
As  compared  with  the aggregate  absolute  figures  of 
deposits  in  the  German  credit  banks  of  2,7~o,ooo,ooo 
marks  on  December  31,  1908,  and  approximately 
2 ,5oo,ooolo00 on  December  3  I, I 906,  the corresponding 
aggregate  for  the English deposit  banks  (including the 
Scotch and Irish banks as well  as the Bank of  England) 
may be estimated at about 6,25o,~o,ooo  marks at the end 
of  1905.  According  to Edgar  JaffC  their  current  and 
deposit  accounts  (gesamte  fremde  Gelder)  on  that  date 
aggregated  19,ooo,00o,ooo  marks, while according to the 
London Economist of  May 19, 1906, whose lower data we 
shall use  as a  matter  of  caution, they  aggregated  only 
16,75o,ooo,000  marks.  If of  this  totalzo1  two-thirds is 
allowed for current accounts and only  one-third-which 
The German Great  Banks 
p---  p- 
is too low rather than too high an estimate-for  deposit 
accounts (held against deposit receipts  with seven, four- 
teen, and more days' notice), we arrive at approximately 
the above total of  6,250,000,000  marks-i.  e., an amount 
equal to the  aggregate outsiders'  funds  (gesamte fremde 
Gelder)  held  at the end of  1906 by  the  larger  German 
credit  banks  (with  share  capital  of  at least  ~,ooo,ooo 
marks each). 
To  these  6,25o,ooo,wo  marks  of  savings  accounts 
should be added for Great Britain  (exclusive of  Ireland) 
deposits in the post-office savings banks and in the trus- 
tees'  savings banks  of  about  £216,500,000,~~~  equivalent 
to  about  4,500,000,000  marks-making  thus  a  grand 
total of  10,75o,ooo,ooo marks.  These latter banks have 
to invest  their  available  funds  in  British  consols  and 
pay a fixed rate of  interest of  2%  per cent. 
In the United  Stateszo3  the total  amount  of  visible 
deposits of  all kinds, including savings deposits, held by 
banks  and private bankers  on  or  about June 30,  1909, 
was  about  $14,1oo,ooo,ooo,  or  slightly  in  excess  of 
59 ,ooo,~o,000  marks.  Of  the  total,  the  note-issuing 
national banks held $4,898,500,000 (about 20,500,000,000 
marks) while  other banks  and firms held  9,209,000,ooo 
dollars  (about  38,678  ,ooo,ooo  marks).  Of  this  latter 
total, $3,713,000,000  (about  15,595,000,000 marks)  rep- 
resented the deposits held by savings banks, $2,467,000,000 
(or about 10% billion marks) deposits in the state  banks, 
about $2,836,000,000 (or  I I ,91  I ,000,000 marks)  deposits 
in the loan and trust companies, and about $193,000,000 
(or 810,600,ooo marks) deposits held by private bankers. 
The national banks are banks of issue;  there is, however, National  Monetary  Commission  German Great  Banks 
no  central institution to rediscount their bills.  A series 
of  obligations204) has  been  imposed  upon  the  national 
banks by  twelve acts, especially those of  April 3, 1864, 
and of  March 3, I 869, viz : 
(a) To hold a cash reserve of  25 per cent of  their deposits 
in the reserve cities and of  15 per cent in the other cities. 
(b)  To publish quarterly statements and balance sheets. 
(c)  Not  to assume obligations in excess  of  their total 
liabilities, less bank notes and deposits. 
(d)  Not to loan to any single person a total amount in 
excess  of  one-tenth  of  their  capital  stock  (a provision 
which, according to an inquiry made in  1900, about 40 
per cent of  all national banks circumvented by subdividing 
accounts, etc.). 
(e)  To transfer 10 per cent of  the dividends to a surplus 
fund, so  long  as  the latter is below  10 per cent of  the 
capital. 
(f) To  make  five  reports  each  year  to  the  federal 
comptroller of  the currency.  The latter, moreover, may 
examine the banks at any time and enforce the observance 
of  his orders and of  the legal provisions under penalty of 
closing the bank. 
The above comparison shows plainly that the volume 
of  the German bank deposits even now is relatively small 
as compared  with  that found  in  England  and  in  the 
United  States.  It  also seems to be considerably below 
that held by the French bankszo5 
(3) Deposits  held  by  individual Berlin great  banks. 
The following figures  show  the growth of  deposits in 
some of  the Berlin great banks which devoted themselves 
first and most energetically to the deposit business. 
(a) DEUTSCHE  BANK. 
The amount of  deposits (expressed in millions of  marks) 
held by this bank were: 
The number of  deposit accounts at the Deutsche Bank 
rose from 3,867 in 1883 to 21,771  in 1895, the latest year 
for which the respective figures are available. 
It may be seen from the foregoing table, that the de- 
posits of  the Deutsche Bank amounted to 8,000,ooo marks 
at the end  of  the first  year  after  its  organization and 
equaled the amount of  its capital  in  1894, reaching the 
total  of  489,000,000 marks  on  December  31,  1908, as 
against a capital on that date of  200,000,000 marks.  The 
most  remarkable feature about the above figures  (espe- 
cially in view of  the above mentioned wide extension of 
the term "  deposits  l')  is the almost uninterrupted growth, 
both absolute and relative, of  the deposits  as  compared 
with that of  the capital. 
The  number  of  deposit  accounts  increased  relatively 
much  more than that of  other  accounts  (including  the 
current accounts, which numbered 230,203 at the end of 
The average size of  the deposits at the Deutsche Bank 
has steadily decreased from 4,138 marks in 1883 to 2,570 
marks in 1893 (no later data have been published).  This 
goes to prove that the aim of attracting even the smallest National  Monetary  Commission 
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available funds is  being  more  and more  thoroughly  at- 
tained. 
About two-thirds of  the total deposits throughout the 
period have been held by the central office at  Berhn 
The number  of  deposlt  offices was 74  at the end  of 
1908, compared with I 2 in 1895 and 44 in 1905  The rules 
regarding the deposlt business at the Deutsche Bank are 
reprinted  by Joh  Fr  Schaer.20  The  principal  points, 
which in the main are typical for all the large banks, are as 
follows : 
(I) The minimum deposit must be IOO marks 
(2) Each depositor, who does not stipulate a fixed term 
of repayment, receives  an account book in  hls name, in 
which  are entered  all  deposits  Each  deposlt  must  be 
accompanied by a deposlt blank, filled out by the depos- 
itor and handed to the cashier together with the amount 
deposited 
(3) The account books, which, however, do not coxtain 
the amounts withdrawn  by the depositor, must be pre 
sented each quarter for balancing 
(4) Deposits repayable at a fixed date are made against 
bank receipts 
In  case the amount to be withdrawn is 30,000 marks or 
over, written notice must be given before  I 2 o'clock of  the 
preceding business day 
The rates of  interest paid on deposlt are published by 
notices at  the tellers' windows of  the deposit branches and 
may be changed at any time; this change, however, does 
not affect rates on amounts deposited for a longer term 
if  the change of  the general  rate 1s  made  prior  to the 
stipulated date of repayment 
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(b)  DRESDNER  BANK 
The deposits of  this bank show the following growth (in 
millions of  marks:) 
(c)  DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT 
The deposits of  this bank show the following growth (in 
millions of  marks) : 
It should be  noted,  however,  that in  the case  of  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft prior to I go8 deposits included both 
"creditors  on current account" and "deposits repayable 
upon notice.,  The  above figures, as  was pointed out before 
(p.  70 and note 94), show great variations, inexplicable 
by the mere change from prosperity to business depression 
during the respective years.  Thus, deposits in 1872 show 
a  total  of  I 6,800,000 marks  (exact  figures  I 6,726,  I 63 
marks), in the following year the total reaches 64,800,ooo 
(exact figures 64,788,366 marks).  In 1874 the total drops 
to 36,500,ooo marks (36,502,613 marks) and in 1875 even 
to 9,202,000 marks  During the years of  business recov- 
ery,  1878 to. 1880, deposits did not  rise above  7,000,000, National  Monetary  Commission 
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8,ooo,ooo, and 9,000,ooo marks;  in the following  years, 
1881 to 1888, they are considerably larger, though vary- 
ing a great deal.  The exact figures for the latter period 
were as follows: 
But inasmuch as up to the 1908 report the "daily due 
credits "  were  grouped  not  with  "  deposits " but  with 
"creditors,"  it would  be correct  to  include  with  "de- 
Marks. 
1881  ................  19,784,613 
1882 ................  ZO,~~Z,OOI 
1883  ................ 13,216,197 
1884 ...............  15,215,781 
posits "  the  respective amounts, if these were known for the 
Marks. 
1885 ................ 35, 256,915 
................  1886  18,276,965 
................  1887  7,761,959 
................  1888  20,205,660 
earlier years. 
The growth of  deposits  during the decade  1901-1908 
on'the whole shows but little oscillation. 
The deposit offices of  the Qisconto-Gesellschaft in 1908' 
numbered I I,  as compared with I in 1895 and 8 in 1905. 
(d) DARMSTADTER  BANK. 
The growth of  deposits in this bank (in millions of  marks) 
proceeded as follows : 
(4)  Comparative growth  of  deposits  in all  German  credit 
banks and in the Berlin banks. 
The growth of  deposits during the last 20 years in all 
German credit banks with a capital of  at least one million 
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marks each, numbering at present  158, is  shown by the 
following figures (in millions of  marks) : 
The corresponding aggregate figures (in million marks) 
for all Berlin banks were:  Z08 
Of  the total deposits in the German credit banks about 
two-thirds constitute deposits in the Berlin  great banks. 
This is due, on the one hand to the lack of  zeal in fostering 
the deposit business  shown  by the other credit banks as 
compared with  the Berlin  banks (which have by far the 
larger number of  deposit offices), and, on the other hand, 
to the general  fact  of  the concentration  of  capital  in 
Berlin.  The five  greatest  Berlin banks on December 31, 
I 908, held the following deposits : 
Marks. 
Deutsche Bank. .....................................  489,238, ooo 
Dresdner Bank. ....................................  224,575,875 
Disconto-Gesellschaft ................................  2 I 8,544,301 
Darmstadter, Bank. ...............................  108,814,032 
Schaffhausen'scher Bankverein .......................  72,335,365 
Total. ............  :.  .........................  '1  "3,507,573 
Of  these, the Dresdner Rank and next to it the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft, both of  which opened their first deposit offices 
as late as  1896, come nearest  to the Deutsche  Bank in 
the successful cultivation of  the deposit business. 
Of  the total  outsiders'  funds  (gesamte fremde  Kapi- 
talien) held .by  the I 58 credit banks with a capital of at National  Monetary  Commission 
least  I ,ooo,ooo marks each, the following percentages are 
represented by deposits proper: 
At the end of- 
Per cent. 
1905 ....................................................  34.7 
1906 ..................................................  33.9 
....................................................  1907  36.5 
1908 .................................................  37.O 
The  corresponding  percentages  for  the  Berlin  banks 
were : 
At the end of-  Per cent. 
I905 ....................................................  27.5 
1906 ....................................................  27.5 
....................................................  1907  31.5 
1908 ....................................................  33.7 
It should be noted, however, that during this period, in 
addition to the above mentioned banks, only the Dam- 
stadter  Bank was  carrying  deposit  accounts, while  the 
Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft, the Mitteldeutsche Kredit- 
bank, the Commerz- und Disconto-Bank,  and the National- 
bank fiir Deutschland had no such accounts. 
Of  the total deposits reported at the end of  1907 for all 
banks with a capital of  at least I ,ooo,ooo marks each, 47 
per cent (as against 39  per cent in 1895) fell to the share 
of  the Berlin banks, and 41  per cent to the share of  the 
Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Disconto Gesell- 
schaft, and the Darmstadter Bank. 
Between  the years  1895 and  19c8 deposits increased 
relatively much more in the Berlin banks than in the pro- 
vincial banks, though  deposits in the latter constitute a 
larger  per  cent  share of  their  total  "outsiders'  funds" 
(fremde Kapitalien) than in the Berlin bankszo9 
On  the whole it may be said that- 
(I) The distribution of  dividends by  the banks  is  be- 
coming  steadier in  proportion  as their  deposit  business 
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(2) The floating and issue business is relegated  to the 
rear  in  proportion  as the deposit business comes  to the 
front. 
(3)  To a large extent it is the credit accorded to com- 
merce and industry by the German credit banks from their 
own means and their deposits that has caused the develop- 
ment  of  the productive  powers  of  the commercial  and 
industrial  classes.  It is  this  factor, combined with the 
increased productive  power  of  agriculture, which  made 
possible the  remarkable growth of  the purchasing  power 
of  all classes and callings of  the nati~n.~lO 
This fact alone should suffice to keep us from adopting 
ill-considered "  reform "  propositions, equally hazy at  times 
both as regards their underlying principles and their future 
effects. 
B.  THE OTHER  DEBIT-OPERATIONS  OF THE CREDIT  BANKS. 
Of  the other debit-operations of  the banks the greater 
part need not be considered in this connection, since the 
German  credit  banks  do  not  issue bank  notes,  nor  do 
they  (with the  exception of  the so-called mixed  mort- 
gage banks) issue mortgage bonds, or other bonds (Schuld- 
verschreibungen),  such as were intended to be issued by the 
Crddit Mobilier. 
To some extent, however, the credit  operations of  the 
credit banks in the shape of  bill rediscounts, bill accept- 
ances, of  sales of  drafts or in the line of current accounts, 
or in the form of  mortgage and lombard credit, must  be 
treated in the same manner in which these forms of credit 
are treated when taken by other institutions. 
develops. 
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The details of these operations will be discussed in sub- 
sequent parts of  the volume.  It is, however, proper  to 
state at this place that the Berlin  great banks in  order 
to raise cash  offer  private  long-term bills for rediscount 
at most,  and  even  this  rather  unwillingly, in  foreign 
markets or to their  own  clients, but never at the bourse. 
Ordinarily, however, as will  be seen below, money is ob- 
tained at  the Seehandlung (Prussian State Bank) by means 
of  the less conspicuous hypothecation of  bills.  The paper 
offered for rediscount to the Reichsbank either consists of 
short-term private bills, or else of  such long-term bills as 
may shortly fall due. 
A very considerable portion of  the bill holdings of  the 
Reichsbank is probably made up of  the rediscounted bills 
of  the credit banks, particularly  about the time  of  the 
monthly  and  quarterly settlements, when  the  demands 
upon the banks on the part of  the business community are 
especially heavy. 
It is also asserted-though  it would be difficult to prove 
it-that  in Germany just as in England, the credit banks 
resort  to  large-scale  rediscounting  operations  at  the 
Reichsbank and at other credit banks and banking insti- 
tution~  shortly before the dates when their balance state- 
ments are issued, in order to be able to show the largest 
practicable figures under the heads of  cash on hand, giro,  , 
and bank credits.  It goes without saying that such assets 
are counterbalanced  by  corresponding liabilities of  the 
banks in the shape of bill obligatiorls of the rediscounting 
banks. 
There is also but little doubt that in times of  money 
scarcity  when  German  private  discount  rates  went  up 
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considerably, while money rates in foreign markets were 
comparatively low, some foreign capital, possibly even in 
considerable amounts, may have been obtained by the dis- 
counting of  German bank acceptances.  This seems to have 
taken place on a particularly large scale in I 899 at London 
and to have occasioned caustic remarks directed against 
this practice of  boarding-out  of  finance bills  "  made  in 
Germany," a criticism which was  repeated  with little or 
no reason in 1908 regarding the then numerous American 
bills of  like character, a subject which is discussed later on, 
on page 278. 
The practice of  credit banks of  "  boarding out " bills- 
i. e., buying at home private bills and depositing them for 
short terms in London or Paris whenever money rates are 
low abroad and high at home-has  nothing in common212 
with the cases above cited.  This practice as a rule par- 
takes of  the character of bona fide arbitrage transactions, 
based upon the differences  of interest in the domestic and 
foreign markets.  This  is  not  infrequently done by  the 
great banks, which in  that case assume the risk  of  loss 
involved in an unfavorable turn of  exchange rates, that 
may occur in the meantime. 
A  rather  different  practice  is  presented  by  other  re- 
corded cases,213  involving efforts of  obtaining abroad the 
lacking operating capital by means of a somewhat hidden 
and complicated hypothecation of bills, which do not seem 
to have been  always of  prime quality.  Foreign banking 
houses,  according to preceding  agreements, are said  to 
have taken from the German credit banks the "discounted 
bills indorsed by the latter and permitted themselves to 
be drawn  on' or else to have given their checks on Paris National  Monetary  Cornmissiolz 
or London.  The foreign house was not expected to dis- 
pose  of  the bills, which  were  redeemed  shortly  before 
maturity, either by means of  fresh bills or of  short-term 
bills on Paris or London.  The bills were returned bodily, 
the  giro  of  the  German  bank  was  canceled,  and  the 
same bills were discounted at the Reichsbaok five or ten 
days before maturity." 
It is patent that in such cases the German credit bank 
runs heavy risks if, during the interval, a financial crisis 
develops and as a result  the renewal of  the operation is 
refused. 
Another practice is reported by Ad. Weber.2I4  Accord- 
ing  to him, credit banks  at first, when  granting  credit 
to their clients, drew in turn upon the latter to their own 
order, disposed of  the bills accepted by their debtors, and 
thus  procured  fresh  money  for  themselves.  According 
to Weber, this practice.was quite common in eastern Ger- 
many as late as 1901.  A similar procedure (in the shape 
of  so-called  solo  bills-Solawechsel)  is  reported  by  von 
Lumm 21"0  have been quite common in Alsace-Lorraine. 
It  is also stated216  by Schar that larger and smaller bank- 
ing institutions will at times "  take from their clients ficti- 
tious, i:e.,  indorsable lombard bills and have them redis- 
counted  upon  the additional strength of  their  indorse- 
ment"-a  statement which  I  am  not  in  a  position  to 
verify.  I judge, however, that none of  the great banks 
were ever guilty of any of the above practices. 
Generally speaking, the practice of the mutual drawing 
of  accommodation  bills  between  credit  banks  may  be 
regarded as very uncommon in Germany, although there 
has been no lack of  assertions that the case of  the City of 
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Glasgow Bank, in England, was not without  its German 
counterparts.  That bank  "attempted  to hide its enor- 
mous  deficit, the result of  excessive credits granted to a 
number of export firms, by accepting in increasing amounts 
drafts of  these  firms,  also  by  taking over mere  accom- 
modation bills drawn by these firms and passing them on 
for discounting." 217  Although not exactly in accord with 
our systematic arrangement, it may not be quite out of 
place to mention, in connection with the deposit business 
just  discussed, that the credit banks often undertake the  . 
management of  the financial transactions (Kassen)zthrung) 
of  their depositors, by attending to their collections and 
paying  their  obiigations on their current and check ac- 
counts and by representing  them in giro, postal-transfer 
and clearance operations. 
Regarding  the giro system used by the large industrial 
and commercial firms, which  in Germany is  at present 
concentrated  in the Reichsbank,  some  data were given 
above (p. 147),  where mention was made also of  the postal- 
transfer  business, instituted  on  January  I, 1909.  The 
latter institution fills  a  serious gap so far as the class of 
middle-sized and small traders is concerned, but is likely 
to be used in time to an increasing extent also by private 
capitalists and public  treasuries. 
The current-account business of the credit banks with 
their customers  is  found  discussed  in  detail below  (see 
Section 2, 11, B). 
We have but a few remarks to make on the subject of 
the bank-check business, as the latter does not come prop- 
erly under the head of  credit, but under that of  methods of 
payment (Zahlungsverkehr.) Accordingly, it is treated here National  Monetary  Commission 
only in so far as, like the "cash keeping'' for depositors, it 
is one of the means by which  the banks attract available 
funds for productive uses, thus bringing about an increas- 
ingly large concentration of  credit  at the banks by dis- 
pensing with  cash for  payment  and making  it available 
for the purposes of  credit. 
This  concentration  of  credit  brought  about  by  the 
check system, and in particular the agitation in its favor 
carried  on during recent  years in various ways with the 
consent and cooperation of  the Government, including the 
passing of  the check act, has been vehemently attacked by 
a recent writer, who  takes the view  that, by  the "  artifi- 
cial fostering of  the check and deposit system," 218  funds 
which in his opinion without such fostering would "  pos- 
sibly"  (p. 20)  or, "surely"  (p. 21) have found their way 
into  other  channels  (on  this  point  see 11, A,  2a)  are 
directed  to the banks, where they are turned into credit 
for large-scale industry (p. 19). 
Now,in point of  fact the agitation for theadoption of  the 
check system had been started long before the passage of 
the check  act, and the recent  considerable increase  of 
deposits, on the basis of  which alone checks may be issued, 
likewise antedates the passage of  the check act. 
The above agitation  was  fully justified, in view of  our 
downright nayve methods of  payment,239  and of  the crying 
need of  reform in this field, tending to dispense with the 
use of  currency which might thus become available for the 
purposes of  credit.  Since this purpose could be attained 
only very incompletely without the apex of  the structure- 
i. e., the transfer and clearing system-the  check act pro- 
vided  for tax-free checks (now again abolished) only in 
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case these checks were drawn upon such public or private 
institutions  or concerns which, like  banks  and banking 
firms, as a  rule participate  in  the transfer and clearing 
system, and therefore presented  the best guarantee that 
the real  purpose  of  the check  system-the  redemption 
without the use of  currency-would  actually be attained. 
As a matter of  fact, not only private banks and banking 
firms, but, as is admitted by Lansburgh (pp. 13-14), like- 
wise public banks, credit associations, and even  savings 
institutions (under certain conditions), were authorized by 
the check act to honor tax-free checks drawn on them,220 
and surely it can not  be  said of  the savings banks that 
they, like the cooperative societies, "deal, in the main, 
only with a definite narrow circle of  persons." 
Despite the agitation, the use of  checks in Germany is 
still insignifi~ant,~~~  even if  the estimate of  the Statistical 
Journal of  the year 1902 may have been somewhat exag- 
gerated, according to which the liquidation of  commercial 
transactions in Germany required from nine to  fifteen times 
the amount of currency and bank notes that was required 
in Great Britain. 
Notwithstanding the large increase in the use of  checks 
since thdt year, the general fact noted by the English pub- 
lication is only too true.  It is difficult to give statistical 
data regarding the extent to which the check system is used 
in Germany.  According to the 1907 report of the Deutsche 
Bank, the number of  checks paid during that year by the 
Berlin  central  office and  by  all  its  German  branches, 
amounted to over ~o,ooo  per day, while the total amount 
of  these checks  was about ~,ooo,o~o,ooo  marks for  the year. 
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to an inquiry sent out at my request to all the German 
credit banks by the Central Association of  German Banks 
and Bankers, can be used only in so  far as the banks in 
their replies were able to give comparative data for the 
years  1900, 1903, and  1907, as well  as to indicate sepa- 
rately their check business, and to present distinct figures 
of  their giro business with the Reichsbank, which  in the 
case of  most  banks  is  lumped with their  cash business. 
Full information  along  these lines was  furnished by  59 
banks only, and the data furnished by even these institu- 
tions  permit  only of  the general  conclusion  that  their 
check business has grown to a considerable extent since 
I 900, both absolutely and relatively, when compared with 
the simultaneous  growth  of  their  cash  business  This 
conclusion  is  confirmed by  the  following  three  tables, 
though it would not be quite safe to draw general  con- 
clusions  from  these  data, since conditions in  Oldenburg 
and Mecklenburg are somewhat peculiar (see below  Part 
IV, Chapter 111, Sec  3, I1 B 3). 
The 
Mecklenburgzsche  Hypotheken-  und  JVechselbank  (Mecklenburg  ~llortgage 
and I\  ote Bank) 
German Great 
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In view  of  the rapid  increase  of  population  and  the 
correspondingly rapid development of credit in Germany 
both during  the  first and  second  periods, it is  not sur- 
prising that, except in a few  directions, German banking 
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practice has not yet developed definite principles in the 
granting  of  bank  credit.  Generally  speaking, the  dis- 
position shown toward the banks has been that of  cap- 
tious  criticism  rather  than  of  friendly  appreciation  of 
what has been actually achieved.  The critics should not, 
however,  forget  that  even  the  oldest  German  credit 
banks  date  back  no  more  than about sixty years, and 
that  the greater  part of  these  banks  are not  even  40 
years old.  And yet in this relatively short period of  four 
to six decades our German credit banks have been obliged 
to  occupy  in  the national  economy the place  held  by 
the "maid of  all work"  in the private household.  They 
were  called  upon  to  discharge  almost  simultaneously 
nearly  all the tasks  outlined  in the introduction to this 
book, and which devolved upon them as the champions 
of  the energetic and progressive classes in industrial life. 
Except such tasks as came within the sphere of  special 
banks, such as the note banks, the provincial cooperative 
land  mortgage  associations (Landschaften)  , the mortgage 
banks, or the cooperative societies, the credit banks had 
to take upon themselves all or nearly all the tasks which in 
England are apportioned as a rule under a strict division 
of  labor among deposit banks (with a further subdivision 
between  city, west end, and  suburban banks), merchant 
bankers, colonial banks, and even bill and stock brokers. 
In the internal trade of  the nation  and in its commercial 
relations  with  foreign countries  it was  incumbent  upon 
them not  only to be  at their posts, but ever to occupy 
the outposts,  to ward  off  sudden  hostile  attacks upon 
the industrial  forces of  the  nation, and to ensure their 
safe and uninterrupted  progress. 
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The failure of  the banks,  therefore, to develop clear, 
consistent, and  organic  principles  for  the regulation  of 
credit  transactions  and  the lending  of  bank  credit  can 
occasion no  surprise, if  we  bkar in mind  the breathless, 
nerve-racking activity of  the period and the competition 
among the numerous credit banks.  It has been asserted 
that the banks are the "  directing  force of  the spirit of 
industrial  enterprise " of  the nation.  This claim, how- 
ever, whether made by the friends of  the German banks 
or by its secret or open enemies, is  greatly exaggerated. 
The banks can indeed  exert  an influence on the extent 
and the rate of  speed of  production, though not directly, 
but only indirectly.  They can do so only to the extent 
that they assist with their credit in the development of 
production  on a large scale, with its greater  division of 
labor,  its  concentration  and  decentralization  of  estab- 
lishments.  In the  midst  of  industrial  progress  even 
the banks may  not  realize that production is too much 
accelerated.  Excessive  production  does  indeed  lead  to 
exaggerated  demands for and in turn to excessive lend- 
ing  of  credit  by  the banks.  But  even  if  the mutual 
competition  of  the banks could be disregarded, it would 
be naYve to suppose that the banks might suddenly decide 
to  refuse  credit  to  their  great  industrial  customers, 
because they had come to the conclusion that production 
was excessive and overdone.  When evidences of  this are 
present, together with other symptoms  that  suggest an 
impending crisis, the banks in the first instance can do no 
more than communicate these fears and issue warnings to 
their clientele as a whole.  Except  under  special condi- 
tions, the general restriction of credit is not to be expected, National  Monetary  Commission 
unless  the  general  industrial  situation,  or  the  general 
condition  of  the banks, makes  this  step inevitable, for 
the sudden restriction of  credit would prove ruinous not 
only to individual establishments, but might under given 
circumstances bring about a general panic. 
In a just  appreciation of  all the factors at work in our 
economic  development  we  must  not  forget  that while 
the banks  are the pioneers  and the greatest  promoters 
in the  accumulation  of  capital, the  growth  of  capital 
has in turn been influenced and accelerated by the wonder- 
ful inventions made along technical and other lines during 
recent times. 
These considerations are in no way intended to deny the 
justice  of  the  criticisms  repeatedly  and  emphatically 
made with  reference  to  the  indiscriminate  granting  of 
credit.  On  the contrary, such  criticism is  beneficial so 
long  as it is  not  too  sweeping and  does  not reject  the 
whole system on the ground that errors have been made 
in single cases, or makes the most serious charges against 
the  administration  of  the  "nation's  wealth"  by  the 
banks. 
Nothing  woulg  be  further  from  the truth or  better 
calculated to call forth contradiction  than to deny that 
many  grave mistakes have been  made,  not  only in  the 
flotation  of  securities-a  branch  of  banking  that  has 
absorbed  so  much  time  and  energy-but  also  in those 
branches  which  are  concerned  with  the  facilitating  of 
payments  (Zahlungsverkehr) and  the granting of  credit. 
I have deemed it my duty to call attention conscientiously 
to these mistakes in every section of  this book.  On  the 
other hand, nothing would  be  more  one-sided  than  the 
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failure  to  recognize  the  natural  causes  of  these  errors. 
So long  as mere human beings are at the head  of  such 
enterprises, errors, though  sometimes different in character 
and direction, are bound to be made under any banking 
system.  These can be  avoided in part or lessened  only 
gradually, as  a result  of  the experience acquired  under 
the system itself, as affected by local conditions. 
I do not regard it, however,  as  an error  in  the just- 
named sense that the German banks, as has been repeat- 
edly charged, have used  their resources and their organi- 
zation in a one-sided and excessive manner in the interests 
of  trade and industry, and  too  little  in  the interest  of 
agriculture,  a  charge  that  in  former  times  was  often 
brought against the Reichsbank (223).  In an able address 
on the "  Problems of  the Money Market "  p2*)  the president 
of  the  Prussian Central  Bank  for Cooperative Societies, 
Heiligenstadt,  has  pointed  out  that  "agriculture  in 
Germany was the last great branch of  industry to adopt 
the modern methods of  money and credit economy.  In 
consequence it found  the  instrumentalities  and  institu- 
tions of the money market already firmly shaped.  Agri- 
culture,  therefore,  can  not  well  expect  that, even  if  it 
were possible, trade and industry, or, in other words, all 
other  business  interests, should  be  subordinated  to  the 
special  needs  of  agriculture."  In  fact,  however,  such 
subordination is possible only to a slight degree, and its 
scope is particularly limited in the case of the Reichsbank. 
As a note bank, the latter must see to it that its notes, or 
one large part of  its short-time liabilities, and likewise its 
other short-time liabilities arising from its giro business, 
should be offset by corresponding credit business  (Actiu- 
geschafte)-i.  e.,  short-term  credit,  granted  by  way  of National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
discounting  paper  or  making  loans on  collateral.  Now 
the situation is  essentially the same in  the case of  the 
credit  banks.  Agriculture  requires  long-term  credit  to 
conform to the extended period of  production  involved. 
Moreover the credit needed is such that the bank can not 
reimburse  itself  for  it through  the subsequent  issue of 
stocks or bonds.  On principle, therefore, the credit banks 
can make agricultural loans only to a limited extent.  Not 
having an adequate knowledge of  the basic conditions of 
agriculture, of  the profitableness of  such undertakings, or 
of the trustworthiness of  the managers of  such enterprises, 
the banks would find it almost impossible to allow them 
blank credit. 
In  agriculture  mortgage  credit  (Realkredit)  must 
naturally play  the leading part.  Here, however, special 
organizations based on landownership must step in.  For 
a number of years this has been done in an adequate meas- 
ure  by  the  mortgage  associations  (Landschaften) and 
similar public institutions, also by the banking institutions 
and loan banks established by the mortgage associations, 
the mutual credit societies  (numbering about  I  6,000 %%S), 
and the mortg?ge banks for urban real estate on the one 
hand, and in Prussia the State Central Bank for Coopera- 
tive Societies on  the other.  The credit based  on  mort- 
gages  and  other  real  estate  security  which  has  been 
extended to German  landowners  must  be estimated  at 
present at least at  40,000,000,000  marks ($~o,ooo,ooo,ooo). 
The  German  credit  banks  have  participated,  both 
directly 226 and indirectly, in extending such credit by tak- 
ing  part in the establishment of  mortgage banks, making 
temporary loans on personal security to agriculturists for 
a  more  or  less  limited  period,  to  be  repaid  in  fall  or 
~inter,~~7  thus  providing  for the needs  of  planting  and 
harvesting,  or  for  the purchase  of  lean  cattle and  the 
acquisition  of  equipment and raw material for industries 
subsidiary  to farming.  This  is  particularly  true of  the 
provincial  banks  and notably  of  the very  small banks, 
which thus seriously impaired the liquidity of  their assets. 
It may be said that these operations fall essentially within 
the scope of  the local banks, as these are in a better position 
to judge of  the trustworthiness of  borrowers on personal 
security, and to determine the probability  of  repayment 
of  such loans.  Nevertheless it has been demonstrated that 
"every  year,  during  the season  when  young  and  lean 
cattle are purchased, many  millions of  marks are placed 
at the disposal of  the trade by the Berlin banks, through 
the intervention of  the local banks." 
German  credit  banks  have  hithereto  done  little  for 
the craftsmen  and the small manufacturers  and trades- 
men, except when the banks have been closely connected 
with  the cooperative  credit  societies as  in  the case  of 
the Dresdner  Bank.  The reason for this lies in the fact 
that on the one hand  unsecured  credit  (Blankocredzt) is 
naturally out of  the question in most of  these instances, 
and on the other hand no proper security can be furnished 
for  personal  credit  (Personalcredzt) which  would  more- 
over have to be in most cases long-time credit.  Moreover 
German craftsmen, small business men, and petty traders 
have been  reluctant  to open bank  accounts.  Unable to 
maintain adequate balances, these classes are unwilling to 
subject themselves to what  they presume would  be bur- 
densome conditions.  Moreover  as checks have  hitherto National  Molzetary  Commission 
been  used but to a small extent and long book credit is 
customary in their business, the aid of  the banks in making 
and receiving payments was  not  thought indispensable. 
As things stand, there is still much to be done through 
cooperative credit organizations in which the banks can 
help a good deal.  The postal transfer and check system 
inaugurated  January  I,  I 909,  will  prove  particularly 
beneficial  in  this  connection,  as  it  will  provide  the 
craftsmen  and small  business men wi~h  a substitute for 
bank  accounts, which  few  of  them  now  have.  It will 
induce them to accumulate with the post-office for use in 
making payments not only cash immediately needed for 
this purpose, but also such sums as may be required for 
that purpose in the more  distant future.  This will, how- 
ever, come about only gradually owing  to the absence of 
any provision for paying interest on balances kept on de- 
posit with the post-office department.  This is unfortunate, 
for it will retard the adoption of  the new system.  There is, 
however, one good feature in the nonpayment of  interest, 
in that it will serve as an inducement to the depositor to 
use his deposits 'in  excess of  the irreducible minimum of 
roo marks required, in paying off  his debts at the earliest 
possible date.  This would be a good beginning in the direc- 
tion  of  shortening  among craftsmen  and small business 
men the period for making payments, a highly  desirable 
reform, heretofore often attempted in vain. 
The Reichsbank has now  joined  in the postal transfer 
system, and under  treaties to be concluded both foreign 
private institutions and postal savings banks (see p. 147) 
are expected gradually to join  in the system.  This would 
lead  to the happy result  of  bringing  about the organic 
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union which has heretofore been almost completely want- 
ing between the giro (transfer) business of the Reichsbank, 
ministering  chiefly to the needs  of  the large  industrial 
and commercial interests, and the postal transfer system, 
which, it is hoped, will meet in a large measure the needs 
of  the craftsman and small business man. 
In concluding these general introductory remarks I wish 
to call attention to the following: I have repeatedly em- 
phasized the fact that the mighty rush in the development 
of  our  entire industrial life  and of  our  system of  bank 
credit was the absolutely  inevitable consequence of  the 
rapid  increase  of  population.  We  must  not, however, 
forget the point  on which  Adolph Wagner has often  in- 
sisted,  namely, that this growth of population was not only 
a cause but also an effect of  the excessively rapid growth 
of  our general industrial and credit systems, and that for 
this as well as other reasons, a less rapid progress would 
be highly desirable.  On  account of  the natural causes 
pointed  out above (p. 89) I have no doubt that this rate 
of  growth in population will not prove continuous.  In the 
same way, and from equally natural economic causes, there 
will undoubtedly come about a slackening in the pace of 
general industrial development, and with it in the expan- 
sion of  our credit system, and the concentration of  indus- 
try and banking.  We are already beginning to feel this. 
Here, too, flood tide will of  necessity be followed by ebb. 
This, however, absolves no one from the duty of  help- 
ing to build up and maintain strong dams while the flood 
is rising, so far as it is possible and practicable to do so, 
in order to keep the turbulent waters from going beyond 
all bounds  and inflicting irreparable damage.  However, NationaZ  Monetary  Commission 
these dams must be erected at the proper points, and built 
by experts possessed of  the requisite theoretical knowledge 
and  adequate practical  experience.  These dams  should 
do no more than keep the river in its natural bed and un- 
less the conditions are exceptional and the reasons for a 
different procedure compelling, the dams should not be so 
constructed  as to force the river  to seek a new  channel 
and in so doing destroy  flourishing fields. 
I also wish to refute another view which has found fre- 
quent expression of  late, and which was presented also be- 
fore the Rank Inquiry Commission.  It is claimed that as 
a result of  their connections with the banks and the system 
of  bank credit, private concerns have to an increasing ex- 
tent  abandoned  the policy  of  investing  their  reserves, 
as  formerly, in  German Government  securities.  These 
reserves, it is contended, have been pressed by  the banks 
into the service of  German trade and industryZZ"that  is to 
say, have been put into channels which these funds "  would 
not have chosen of  their own  accord."  The official ap- 
pendices to the report on  the Imperial financial  reform 
bill of I go8  have effectually removed  every ground for 
such assertion, particularly as regards recent years.  They 
demonstrate on the one hand that the German investing 
public  have  displayed  an  extraordinary  and  increasing 
willingness  and  power  to  purchase  domestic  securities 
offering safe investment and a steady, though relatively 
low, rate of  interest, and on the other  hand  that both 
public  and  private  institutions  have  absorbed  but  a 
"  relatively small " part of  public issues, at least as com- 
pared with similar institutions abroad. 
It is true that among these "  domestic securities  'l  there 
are included municipal loans and mortgage bonds, issued 
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by  German public and private  institutions.  Bearing in 
mind the considerable  issues of  securities by the Empire and 
the federa1 states, and the fact that comparatively little 
of  this is in the possession of  state or private institutions 
in Germany and foreign countries,231 there can be no doubt 
that by far the greater part of  the Imperial loans, and of 
the securities issued by the federated states is in the hands 
of  the German public.  The proportion so held, it appears, 
has not declined in the past decade; on  the contrary, it 
has increased, and the increase has more than kept pace 
with the growth of  wealth in the country. 
(2) Observations on the  granting of  industrial credit in 
particular. 
In the foregoing it has been pointed out that one reason 
for the failure of  the credit banks to develop in this period 
firm and consistent principles to govern industrial credit 
lay  in  the fact  that even now  part of  these banks date 
back only six decades, the rest only four decades, and that 
in  this period  they were called  upon to discharge simul- 
taneously a multiplicity of  tasks.  Another reason lies in 
the fact  that the German credit  banks  have  developed 
very  differently, each in its own  way  and along special 
line~.2~~  In this there  are  advantages  as well  as  disad- 
vantages.  A  further  reason  is,  that German industry, 
though  much  older,  did  not  begin  its  great  expansion 
before the second period. 
German industry had still to learn slowly and gradually 
the fundamental principles governing the taking of credit- 
as to kind, amount, and the right time-in  the same way 
as the banks had to  evolve  the  fundamental principles NationaZ  Monetary  Commissi07z 
applying to the granting of  credit.  It  can not be doubted, 
therefore, that through ignorance of  correct principles, or 
an overestimate of  the duration of  a period of  prosperity 
or as the result  of  a  certain amount of  megalomania or 
of  competition, sins  were  committed  on  both  sides,  in 
borrowing as well as in lending.  It can be demonstrated 
without  much  difficulty  that  in  many  instances  indus- 
trial ventures took too  much  long-term  credit  from the 
banks, or took it at the wrong time, to put into improve- 
ments,  extensions, or new construction, sometimes with- 
out  stating  these  to be  the purpose  of  the loans,  and 
that the banks  often accorded  such credit to industrial 
ventures in too large amounts and at inopportune times, 
sometimes even after symptoms of  an impending crisis were 
apparent.  In a  number  of  instances,  and  particularly 
before the panic of  1901,  it can be demonstrated that some 
banks had offered their credit unsolicited to industrial un- 
dertakings, or "thrust"  it upon them,233  or at least made 
it  so easy to  obtain that the existing mania, great as it  was, 
for new construction  and reconstruction,  was  further in- 
tensified.  It  should not, however, be forgotten that on the 
other hand at certain times the opposite charge has been 
made  against  the German  credit banks  that they were 
tying  up  their  resources  in  stock-market  speculation. 
"One  of  the worst results of  the present situation," says 
Eberstadt  (Der  Deutsche  Kapitalmarkt,  Berlin,  1901, 
p. I I 5), "  is that industry finds '  the tables all taken ' and 
that the banks  are positively in no  position  to furnish 
adequate credit for industrial needs." 
Finally it has undoubtedly often happened, as we  shall 
explain more fully later, that German credit banks have 
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lent their credit to industrial concerns according to the 
usual  principles-i.  e., by  granting  short-term credit to 
industry  in  the same way  as  to commerce, a  kind  of 
credit  well  enough  suited  to commerce  but  as  a  rule 
entirely  unsuited  and  too  costly  for  industrial  needs. 
Lastly, in consequence of  the excessive decentralization 
of  German  banking, the banks  in  granting  their credit 
have  at times  disregarded  the principle  of  distributing 
the risk, giving too much credit to one industry, or one 
branch of  industry, or even a single establishment.  The 
Leipziger  Bank  went  under  because, with  a  capital  of 
48,000,ooo marks, it had allowed loans to the extent of 
93,000,000  marks  to  the  Trebertrocknungsgesellschaft 
(company for the utilization of  desiccated lees). 
The Dresdener Kreditanstalt fiir Handel und Industrie 
failed because it had  extended  too  much  credit  to the 
Kumrnergesellschaft.  Aside from these mistakes, however, 
the truth is that the capital available for commercial and 
industrial  enterprises  in Germany was  not  equal to the 
demand and capacity for industrial expansion existing for 
the most part  independently of  any stimulation  by  the 
banks.  To this fact more  than any other are to be at- 
tributed all the crises  that have taken place.  Had not 
the banks accumulated the available capital by accepting 
deposits, and made it serviceable for productive purposes, 
it is a  question  whether  this  maladjustment  would  not 
have  been  far  greater, the results much worse, and the 
crises far more severe. 
If  the reproaches cast on German banks would restrict 
themselves to the formulation of  the charges just  men- 
tioned,  every  objective  critic  of  the  German  banking National  Monetary  Commission 
system might readily admit their justice, the more so as it 
is scarcely imaginable that these or similar mistakes could 
have been avoided in  any other banking  system, where 
banks have had an equally short e~istence.23~  The injus- 
tice lies in the exaggeration which has unfortunately gone 
to great extremes and taken peculiar forms.  This is par- 
ticularly  unfortunate for the reason that the criticism is 
rarely accompanied by any proposals for reform, and still 
more rarely with any practicable proposals.  In both direc- 
tions the climax is reached in a work bearing the some- 
what sensational title "The management of  the nation's 
wealth."235 I can not ignore this work, because the au- 
thor's views have been highly appreciated by those who 
are opposed on principle to the German banking system 
and who  have used  the author's arguments  as grist for 
their own mills.  It way be stated that the author was 
himself a bank official, though not indeed one of  the bank 
directors  who  are treated  with  such  scant  indulgence 
in  the  above  work  and  in  his  other  work,  entitled 
"The  German  Banking  System." 236  That  which  is 
correct  or  partially correct  in  the book  had  been  said 
before in a more thorough  and better way by Heiligen- 
stadt and Bernhardt in the "  Plutus " and elsewhere-thus, 
for example, the statement that the banks have been too 
ready or too generous in granting credit to industry and 
that thereby they have increased the speed and extent of 
the process  of  Germany's  "  industrialization "-a  point 
that obviously can not easily be proven.237 
This  is  moreover  expounded  with  endless repetition, 
and  of  course with  the usual  embellishments that  the 
control  of  the  "nation's  wealth,"  the utilization  of  the 
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national reserve funds (Betriebsreserve)  , and the "  general 
industrial development of  Germany "  ought not to be en- 
trusted to a "dozen men" (p. 24), the alleged perversity 
of  whose banking policy is repeatedly emphasized. 
The substance of  the other criticisms which Lansburgh 
makes is as follows: The capital accumulated in German 
credit banks through deposits-he  insists on nearly every 
page-is  not utilized in accordance with  the  wishes  of  the 
defiositors.  On the contrary, the short-term loans to the 
banks  are to a considerable extent converted into long- 
time advances to industry, and accordingly into further 
industrial investments.  It is, however, "  not  a question 
(p. 17) whether the credit or advances made by the banks 
are  beyond  cavil."  In  this  connection  the distrustful 
remark is merely made  (p. 16)  that it is  impossible to 
tell  from the bills  what  their  character is.  In another 
place, however  (p. I 5), it is expressly admitted that the 
"banks have up to the present  followed sound principles 
in maintaining  the proper  liquidity  of  their resources ;" 
furthermore  (p.  11)  that  "for  economic  and  ethical 
reasons  it is  absolutely necessary that  promotions  and 
improvements should go on;" that "the banks, as a matter 
of  fact,  in  determining  the  amount  of  capital  to  be 
invested in an establishment or branch  of industry, are 
guided  by its earning  power"  (p.  IO),  and  finally that 
"provided  due care is  exercised  in  the make-up of the 
different  classes  of  investments,"  we  may  regard  the 
conditions  as  sound  (p.  15)  "so  long  as the  existing 
practice is  continued  of  investing  40  per  cent  of  the 
depositors' money  in bills  and the other  60 per  cent in 
loans to customers."  According to the author, however, National  Monetary  Commissiolt  -- 
the criticism of  a national  banking policy should be pri- 
marily  based  upon  considerations of  general  industrial 
interests  rather  than  of  private  interests  (p.  17).  He 
therefore insists that bill credit and advances be granted 
only  to  such  enterprises  "as would  have  been  granted 
such credit by  the individuals who constitute the banks' 
creditors,  if  they  had  been  disposing  of  their  money 
independently, without  the intervention of  the  banks. " 
This (ibid.) would not yet mean that "every interest would 
come  into  its  own,  that  agriculture  would  receive  its 
proper  share in the same way  as industry, the govern- 
ment in need  of  funds, as well  as the private individual 
seeking credit.  At  any  rate,  however,  there  would  be 
nothing arbitrary about it."  For, as stated in  another 
passage  (p. 20),  "the deppsitor may have had  in mind 
buying German bonds or mortgage bonds or acquiring an 
interest in a business enterprise. "  In a still more prophetic 
manner, we are told  on page 21, that "without the inter- 
vention " of  the banks, the deposits "  would  surely have 
been devoted to different  uses.  They  would  have  been 
invested in government  bonds  and would  have become 
available to the government for other than purely indus- 
trial purposes.  A part of  the deposits would have gone 
to the small dealers, craftsmen, and agriculturists. " 
As  to these claims it would really be sufficient to ask, 
How does  the author  know?  It is, however, necessary 
to  add  that  the  author  would  surely  have  arrived  at 
quite  different  conclusions  if  he  had  carefully  investi- 
gated these points, and likewise his fundamental assump- 
tions which we shall examine now more closely, for upon 
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closer  examination  it is  hard  to  take  his  contentions 
seriously. 
As  the  author has  properly observed, in an  article238 
which  appeared almost  at the same time his  pamphlet 
was  published,  the  available  resources  are  generally 
composed  of  "very many small sums of  money, each of 
which  taken alone would  remain unproductive."  These 
are made available for productive uses only because the 
credit banks have for  decades persisted in the laborious 
work  of  bringing them together.  As  I have shown else- 
where, the intervention of  the banks has made it possible 
for these small amounts to render to industry in general 
far greater service than could have been rendered by them 
singly in the hands of  the depositors, each one trying to 
utilize his amount without the help of  any intermediary.239 
Were  it not  for  the  intervention  of  the  banks  these 
amounts would  have remained  idle in the hands of  the 
depositors, their  small  size  making  them  unsuited  for 
productive investment. 
As  this money has become available only through the 
activity of  the banks, it is impossible to set up as a prin- 
ciple governing its management and  investment  that it 
should be used only for those purposes and undertakings 
for which  the various creditors of  the banks might have 
intended them, "had they acted independently and with- 
out the intervention  of  the banks  in  the disposition of 
their funds."  It  is more than likely that, had it not been 
for this intervention, they would in most cases have made 
no  use whatever of  their money, and  least of  all used it 
for industrial investment, but, following tradition, would National  Monetary  Commission 
have let it lie idle and yielding  no  interest,  a  situation 
which  even Lansburgh  would  scarcely think ideal. 
If  nevertheless the "wish of  the individual depositors " 
be accepted  as decisive in the matter of  investing  their 
deposits, in spite of  the fact that this wish is not commu- 
nicated  to the banks, and  can  scarcely be divined  by 
them, no  one would  seriously contend that the present 
situation would  be  improved  and  not  rather  be  made 
much worse.  For without being  able to do so with abso- 
lute certainty the banks with their experience and expert 
knowledge can ascertain far more correctly than the indi- 
vidual  depositors  the  conditions  of  the  market  for 
different sorts of  investments, the general state of  industry, 
the actual condition and the prospects of  a given branch 
of  industry, trade, or agriculture, and the trustworthiness 
of  borrowers  to whom  bill  credit  or  credit  on  current 
account is to be granted.240 
Morever,  it  is  evidently  wrong  to assume  that  the 
depositors, if  left to their own decision, "  might" have or 
"  surely " would have wished  a  different  disposition  of 
their  deposits  than  that  actually made  by the banks. 
In the first  place by  far the larger  part  of  the deposits 
in German credit banks is made up of  the working re- 
serves of  business men and of  other temporarily available 
funds of capitalists-in  other words, of  the funds of  persons 
thoroughly capable of  reading a bank balance sheet.  In 
regard  to the investment  of  deposits,  these  statements 
convey the information which  Lansburgh, too, has been 
able to get from them.  Thus it is certain that the ma- 
jority  of  depositors do not  object  to the way  in which 
their deposits are invested, in particular to the investment 
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in  industrial  credit  in the shape of  bills  or  of  current 
accounts.  Unless  this  were  so,  noting  the  condition 
appearing from  the bank  statement, they would  betake 
themselves with their funds to cooperative credit societies, 
or  to the savings  banks  in  case  they  wished  that the 
greater  part  of  their deposits  be  invested  in  mortgages 
or if  they regarded the savings banks as safer. 
It is highly instructive in this  connection to note the 
prevalent opinion among the Federation of  German Sav- 
ings Banks as voiced  in the testimony given  before  the 
Bank Inquiry Commission by an expert, closely associated 
with  the  savings  banks,  that  about  one-third  of  the 
deposits in the savings banks are temporary in character, 
intrusted to the savings banks by persons belonging to 
the middle or even higher classes, "  who know exactly why 
they deposit  their money  in the savings banks, even if 
only temporarily."  The percentage is particularly inter- 
esting because it corresponds almost exactly to the pro- 
portion of  the deposits in the credit banks which may be 
designated  as  "savings  deposits."  If  this be so, and I 
have no reason to doubt it, it proves that, as a matter of 
fact,  a  large  number  of  persons  who  are  thoroughly 
familiar  with  financial  affairsZ4l  prefer  to put  into the 
savings banks funds that are only temporarily  available 
pending  permanent  investment-funds  better suited for 
deposit in credit banks. 
From this we may further infer that in intrusting such 
deposits to the credit banks, or in leaving them there, the 
class  of  depositors just  mentioned, or  those still better 
situated,  do so with  a  full  appreciation of  the way  in 
which these funds are invested.  Nothing becomes, there- 
fore, of  the assertion that were it not for the banks this National  Monetary  Commission 
very class of persons would have turned their money over 
to the small dealers, craftsmen, and farmers, or to "the 
Government."  Lansburgh  himself  admits  it as  true in 
a special case  that the classes  from which  the deposit- 
ors of  the bank  are drawn  know exactly what  they are 
doing, for  elsewhereZ4z he  remarks  that  "as an imme- 
diate result of  every boom in industry and trade, part of 
the money deposited with  the banks  is withdrawn  and 
invested  in  the  most  profitable  branches  of  business." 
This is another reason why we cannot admit that through 
the activity of  the banks  "these savings are forced into 
investments which they would  not have sought of  their 
own accord " (p. I 2). 
Finally, if  it be true that the   er man credit banks have 
given  their  credit  predominantly  to industry  and trade 
(we must  not  forget the latter, particularly  the  export 
and import trade), it is a question whether, aside from a 
generous participation in government loans, this after all 
is not necessarily the chief  sphere of  operation  for  the 
credit banks. 
We have seen how mortgage and other land credit, with 
a  constantly  increasing specialization, has  been  widely 
extended  and  developed  in  a  "truly exemplary way" 
(Lansburgh, p.  5)  to meet the needs of  agricultural  and 
urban real estate.  Their  credit wants, and particularly 
those of  agriculture, are met  by  the cooperative credit 
societies, the land mortgage associations (Landschaften)  ,243 
and  the banks  and other institutions which  they  have 
founded, the mortgage banks,  and the Central  Prussian 
Bank for Cooperative Societies, and other institutions of 
the same kind.  We have also seen that, thanks to the 
The German Great  BanRs 
16,000 cooperative societies, almost the same may be said 
of  facilities for credit on personal security (organized for 
the purpose) of  craftsmen  and small business men, and 
that through the postal  transfer  and  check  system  an 
urgently  needed  improvement will  be  introduced in the 
facilities for  making  payments.  We  have  furthermore 
given the reasons why dealings with the credit banks and 
bank  credit  are  little  adapted  to  the  needs  of  these 
classes, and are therefore but little resorted to by them. 
What is the inevitable conclusion from all this so far as 
the banks are concerned ?  Their domain is industry and 
trade (Lansburgh,  p. 5),  though not their exclusive domain, 
as is evident from the fact that they have lent their credit 
to the State, the municipalities, etc. 
It has been clearly shown  that it was not the banks 
that  brought  about  the  industrialization  of  Germany, 
but  certain  elementary  economic  causes  working  with 
irresistible force. 
It is equally certain that even under the least favorable 
circumstances the banks  have stood by the Empire and 
the Federal States in raising funds.  This alone proves that 
another of  Lansburgh's contentions is incorrect, namely, 
that as a result of  the credit activities of  the banks the 
reserves  of  individuals  and  private  establishments  are 
no  longer invested in securities yielding a fixed income. 
The very opposite of  this is proved by the appendices to 
the report on the imperial financial reform bill.  Nothing, 
then, remains of  all of  Lansburgh's contentions, beyond 
the fact admitted  on  all sides that the industrialization 
of  Germany has  proceeded  too rapidly.  This is  due to 
a  number  of  causes  (no  one  can  determine  in  what National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
proportion) : to the rapid  growth of  population, the tre- 
mendous demand for credit made by trade and industry, 
occasioned  in turn to a  large  extent by  the justifiable 
struggle  against  foreign  competition,  and  finally  to 
occasional mistakes by the banks in granting credit. 
This  may  suffice in  criticism  of  Lansburgh's  conten- 
tions. 
P  shall now  turn to the much better-grounded reason- 
ing and proposals of  the late Felix  Hecht, whose views, 
based on sound knowledge of  the theory and practice of 
German banking, were recently made public  244 in connec- 
tion with his earlier treatment 245  of  the subject. 
In this connection a welcome opportunity is offered to 
supplement these "  introductory  observations " on indus- 
trial credit in a number of  points.  This at the same time 
justifies  a more careful examination of  Hecht's proposals 
in this part of  the book. 
Hecht's  proposals  are  in  effect  that there  should  be 
established a central institution for  long-time credit  which 
should  issue  debentures  indorsed  to bearer, and render 
assistance as nearly as possible to all branches of  German 
industry.  These debentures are to be issued either on the 
basis of  securities taken over from the particular industrial 
establishments, or  directly  and without  such  underlying 
securities.  They are to bear the indorsement and guaran- 
tee of  the central institution.  Bearing a higher  rate of 
interest, maturing earlier  (an amortization of  7 to 8 per 
cent as a rule being provided), and being attended with 
greater publicity1246 the debentures of  the central institu- 
tion would, in Hecht's opinion, have great advantages over 
existing industrial bonds.  Moreover, owing to the wider 
distribution of risks, the security of  these obligations would 
be greater.  In the first place the central institution would 
extend its activities to all kinds of  industrial undertak- 
ings  which  might  present  an  assured  earning  power. 
Furthermore, the earning capacity of  these establishments 
could be investigated  by it more carefully than by  the 
credit banks.  Unlike the credit banks, the central institu- 
tion could have at its command a large staff of  technical 
and commercial experts, who would  be in a particularly 
favorable position to accumulate a very large and valu- 
able stock of  specialized experience.  The supposed urgent 
necessity for establishing such an institution is based on 
the great  difficulties which  the credit  banks  encounter 
to-day in adopting a rational policy as regards the grant- 
ing of  industrial credit. 
We must accordingly begin by testing the correctness of 
these  premises.  For this purpose it will be necessary to 
discuss the conditions and  the general principles under- 
lying  industrial  bank  credit,  particularly  as  contrasted 
with commercial bank credit, in so far as these have not 
been  adequately dealt with in these "  preliminary eonsid- 
erations,"  and in  my remarks in  the Verhandlungen der 
Mitteleuropaischen  Wirtschaftskonferenz (Transactions  of 
the  Central  European  Economic  Conference)  in  Berlin 
(May  I 7 and 18, 1909)~~~  to which I refer the reader. 
With reference to this the following points may be made: 
I. The technique of  commercial credit, which  has been 
generally well developed by theGermancredit banks, is not 
identical, as Hecht rightly maintains, with the technique 
of  industrial credit.  The latter is far from being as well 
developed by the German banks as the former. National  Monetary  Commission 
(a) Whenever  industrial  credit is  given, the  creditor 
is obliged to make  sure, throughout  the continuance of 
the loan that the credit allowed has  actually been  used 
for the purpose  for  which  it was  solicited.  This he is 
seldom in a position to do.  In commercial credit, on the 
contrary, this is not necessary, or at least not to the same 
extent.  Even when short-time industrial credit is given to 
serve as working capital, the creditor is at all times obliged 
to keep watch  over it and to see that it is not used  in a 
manner at  variance with the purpose and character of  the 
loan,  by  being  put  into  permanent  improvements,  for 
this would  mean  the tying  up  of  an  equal  amount  of 
the bank's  capital.  Such  supervision  can  be  exercised 
only with great difficulty. 
(b)  For this reason, also because of  the resulting risk, 
which  is  greatly  augmented  by  the  lack  of  technical 
knowledge on the part of  the bank, it is decidedly inad- 
visable for credit banks to participate directly to any large 
extent in  industrial  enterprises.  The instances in which 
the banks became industrial entrepreneurs have  for the 
most part not turned out to their advantage.  Direct par- 
ticipation (not  always voluntary) in  the sense of  taking 
over permanently stocks and bonds of  the enterprise, is 
less objectionable in itself, but even this is likely to prove, 
under  unfavorable  conditions, a burden upon the bank's 
resources  and  may  result  in serious impairment of  the 
liquidity of  the bank's assets. 
(c) In commerce the general practice  is to give short- 
time  credit  on  personal  security,  well  suited  to  com- 
mercial  needs.  It is  necessarily  renewed  frequently or 
increased, or if  not, a proportionately higher rate of  com- 
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mission is stipulated.  But such credit is in many respects 
far too costly for industry, and often directly oppressive. 
In industry such credit is  needed only for the transitory 
purpose of  paying wages  and  salaries and obtaining the 
working  capital  required  either  regularly,  at more  fre- 
quent  intervals,  or  only  once  a  year,  for  freight  and 
insurance premiums, for the purchase of  raw material, and 
other means of operation.  Even this short-term transitory 
industrial credit to provide for wages and working capital 
is not entirely conformable to the rules and requirements 
of  short-term commercial credit, for here frequent renewals 
and increased borrowings are out of  question.  Still, as a 
rule it can be repaid more quickly than credit intended for 
capital outlays.  Nevertheless it is objectionable for credit 
banks, for it often happens that it can not be taken out of 
current income, and thus tends to develop into permanent 
credit (Anlage-Kredit), contrary to the intention of  either 
party, or at least  of the bank.  In case payment is de- 
faulted at  maturity, a suit-at-law is for  the most part out of 
question, not only for business reasons, but also because 
such a suit might lead to far more serious consequences. 
(d)  In view  of  the need  for constant supervision with 
reference to the stipulated use  of  the loan  (see remarks 
under section "  a ")  which is far more urgent in industrial 
credit than in commercial credit, a stipulation that a given 
given industrial establishment should not deal with various 
banks and bankers would seem particularly proper. 
Hecht  and Ad. Weber 240 criticise the German credit 
banks  on  this  ground,  charging  them  with  having  fre- 
quently violated  this principle, and pointing to the Ter- 
linden case, where no fewer than  14 banks and  bankers National  Monetary  Commission 
had  suffered  severe  losses  through  ignorance  of  one 
another's action.  This criticism is, however, unjustified. 
From personal  knowledge of  one of  the contracts made 
with the Terlinden Company I know that with a view to 
supervision in this  respect it was expressly agreed  that 
the company should not deal with other banking establish- 
ments.  Such an agreement, however, is entirely unavailing 
in the case of  a dishonest debtor, and particularly one who 
falsifies not only the books but also the underlying records 
(letters,  vouchers, etc.).  In that particular case the situa- 
tion would not have been easily revealed, even if  the books 
had been audited, a step for which there was no occasion 
in the absence of  any knowledge that the contract had 
been violated. 
Effective service in this direction could be rendered only 
by a central credit bureau established by the credit banks 
themselves to which they might report the names of  the 
borrowers, and the amount and kind  of  credit  granted, 
without stating the name of  the creditor bank.  It would, 
however, be exceedingly difficult to establish such an in- 
stitution,  not  only because  of  the  mutual  competition 
among the credit banks but above all on  account of  the 
imperative necessity of  business secrecy. 
2. The lending of  short-term commercial credit is, gen- 
erally speaking, less hazardous than the granting of  indus- 
trial credit. 
(a) Disregarding  the cases  where  unsecured  credit  is 
allowed to a manufacturer, in which case the terms and 
conditions are the same as in commercial credit, and con- 
sidering the problem of  secured loans, we  are concerned 
primarily with secured credit given on the hypothecation 
of  the factory and the grounds belonging to it-property 
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on which, as a rule, the mortgage banks will  not lend.250 
(We may disregard here the comparatively few instances 
in which policies or securities are pledged.)  Even where 
a first mortgage is offered, which is not always the case, 
the granting of  the loan is not entirely unobjectionable. 
If  it becomes necessary to sell at auction the mortgaged 
property, together with the machinery, at a time when it 
is idle, little more is likely to be realized on the factory and 
plant than the value of  the material and the generally low 
common value of  the ground.  In any event, the property 
which serves as security for the loan does not represent 
the same value to every future purchaser. 
Credit ultimately secured by realty (Realkredit) may be 
based  further on  the  issue  by  the  industrial  corpora- 
tion of interest-bearing bonds secured by mortgage.  The 
flotation of  such securities is, however, justified only "  in 
the case of a business with an established earning power, 
which is independent of  any particular management that 
may be in control for the time being".251 
Loans based on bonds not secured by mortgage represent 
of  course nothing more  than credit on  personal security 
(Personalkredit) ,  and if  no security of  any kind is pledged, 
it is nothing more than unsecured  personal  credit.  Such 
credit, however, should be granted  only under  the same 
conditions under which commercial loans are granted; that 
is, only after a careful investigation of the trustworthiness 
and efficiency of  the management, the earning capacity of 
the  business, as well  as  the  profitableness and  general 
market prospects of  the particular branch of  industry. 
(b)  Industrial credit secured by  lien on realty (Indus- 
trieller  Realkredit) , is  particularly  hazardous,  when  the National  Monetaw  Commission 
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industrial  establishment  concerned  does  not  fall  within 
the scope of  operation and experience of  the creditor bank 
or of  its branches.  In such  cases the investigation into 
the underlying security of  the loan can not be made with 
an adequate technical knowledge of  the business and the 
lack  of  it will  cause  losses  much sooner  and  in  larger 
amount than in the field of  commercial credit. 
(c)  Having  failed  to give  sufficient  attention  to the 
above-mentioned conditions under which industrial credit 
may be given, the creditor bank is very frequently obliged to 
urge or bring about the reorganization of  an establishment 
as a stock company in case the latter has not yet assumed 
that form.  This involves risk  for both parties, particu- 
larly when the change to the corporate form is to be made 
in  the face of  conditions which  may unfavorably  affect 
the market for  the stock  and bonds to be issued.  Such 
conditions  are  the  presence  of  strong  or  even  over- 
whelming competition on the part of  other  corporations 
in the same line of  business, the general, political, or eco- 
nomic situation, the immediate industrial outlook in the 
trade, or  the character  of  the management.  Very  often 
the expediency, from the business point of  view, of  trans- 
forming a firm  into a corporation  does not receive  suf- 
ficient  attention  in  case  of  enforced  reorganizations 
effected for the purpose of  mobilizing long-term loans, or 
short-time credit which  has gradually been  diverted from 
temporary to capital  outlays, contrary to the wishes  of 
both parties, or, at least, of  the lender; even less thought 
is given in such cases to the earning power of  the future 
corporate enterprise, which is bound to be affected by the 
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increased expense, or to the question whether the enterprise 
is at all adapted to the corporate form of  organization. 
Where the main consideration in the formation of  a stock 
company is the necessity of  mobilizing a  loan and liqui- 
dating or shifting it, the situation is particularly dangerous 
for the lender.  On the one hand, the bank may be obliged 
to carry the newly issued stock and bonds for a long time, 
which  will  diminish its power  to realize quickly  on  its 
assets and interfere with  its freedom of  action.  On the 
other hand, if  it succeeds in floating the securities it may 
impair  seriously or even permanently its ability to float 
future issues (Emissionshredit).  The same objections are 
present, though not with the same force,  whenever a bank, 
for the purpose of  mobilizing a long-term or standing loan, 
is obliged to urge  or assist  an existing corporation in the 
increase of  its capital stock or in the issue of  additional 
bonds, since in this case  as well  the bank is  obliged to 
market the securities without much delay. 
On the other hand, there certainly were many cases of 
industrial enterprises that developed slowly and gradually 
and by the judicious aid of long-term loans reached a point 
where  the  condition  of  the  enterprise,  the prospective 
earning power of  the additional  plant or improvements, 
and  the general  industrial  situation  afforded sufficient 
evidence that the organization of a stock company or the 
issue of  new  stock or bonds was desirable and feasible.252 
In the meantime  such  an establishment  can obtain the 
funds it may need in the shape of acceptance credit paying 
interest on no more  capital  than  has  actually gone into 
new construction or improvements. National  Monetary  Commission 
3. Under  existing requirements  for  admission to the 
exchanges in Berlin, Hamburg, and Frankfort-on-the-Main 
industrial securities to be listed, must be in issues having 
a minimum par value of  I ,ooo,ooo marks ($250,000).  On 
the smaller exchanges it is sufficient that the issues have 
a par value of  500,000 marks.  As a result small concerns 
may often be obliged to dispose of  their bonds among local 
circles merely without listing them on any exchange, which 
is often a difficult task, or else they may be forced to have 
recourse to short-time credit, which is not adapted to their 
needs, or even to get along without credit.  The latter con- 
tingency would, of  course, happen only in case the provin- 
cial banks or bankers failed to lend their assistance. 
Upon careful study of  these considerations we must ad- 
mit that the central institution proposed by Hecht may 
prove beneficial in many ways.  Hecht's view  is that such 
a special institution would not prove a serious competitor 
to the credit banks, but would  on the contrary develop 
a field of  usefulness of  its own which would  supplement 
their work in many ways.  This is hardly correct, at least 
not so far as moderate-sized industrial establishments are 
concerned. 
On the other hand we can not admit the necessity of  such 
a central institution.  During the next decades great prog- 
ress will undoubtedly be made among the credit banks in 
the direction of  the organic development of  long-term in- 
dustrial credit, which Hecht found wanting.  He himself, 
referring to the past, emphasized at the beginning of  his 
monograph the fact that "  during the last three decades the 
organization of  credit in Germany has  made unexpected 
progress."  This advance in my opinion has occurred and 
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will continue to occur not only in the field of  commercial 
credit, but in that of  industrial credit as  This is 
particularly true of  the latter, for many of  the obstacles 
which have hitherto stood in the way of  the development 
and organization of  industrial credit are of  a general char- 
acter, and would  have to be met by the proposed central 
institution in exactly the same way as by the credit banks, 
and perhaps  under  far  greater  difficulties.  In the first 
place such an institution would not have at its command 
the experience of  decades  and  the far-reaching connec- 
tions which the credit banks have.  The credit banks will 
undoubtedly be in  a position to avail themselves of  the 
same experts whom the central institution might employ. 
This applies primarily to the trust and auditing companies 
which  the banks have themselves  established, and is  at 
least equally true  of  those  other organizations, which, 
according to Hecht, are to cooperate with the central insti- 
tution,  like  the federation  and  association  of  electrical 
engineers, the society of  naval engineers, the association of 
German gas and water engineers, the association  of  Ger- 
man mechanical and railroad engineers, the federation of 
German mechanical engineers, the German association of 
mining engineers, and the association of  German chemists. 
In many  important  points the central institution would, 
to say  the  least,  have  no  advantages  over  the  credit 
banks  in  making  long-term industrial  loans.  On  the 
other hand it would be sure  to make some of  the same 
mistakes that have been made by the credit banks, and 
some of  these on  a  much larger scale.  If perchance it 
should  avoid some  of  these mistakes, it is likely to com- 
mit  other mistakes  of  possibly  far more serious  conse- 
quences to the industrial community. National  Monetary  Commission 
To begin with, it is evident that in the desire to find a 
market for its obligations and to place them in competi- 
tion with existing securities it would have to make every 
effort to  show  large  and  continuous  dividends.254 It 
would therefore have to be exceedingly keen for business. 
As a result, during times of  the high tide of  prosperity  it 
is  likely  to proffer  loans  unsolicited  or  to thrust  funds 
upon industrial enterprises more often than was the case 
among  the credit  banks.  Thus  the  abuse  charged  to 
the credit banks  will prove still more serious in its effects 
on  general industrial  conditions  and might  lead to the 
lending  of  credit  to  establishments which  would  never 
have received it from the credit banks. 
A more apparent and graver danger lies in this that a 
special institution of  this character can by no means be as 
familiar with the general industrial and financial condi- 
tions  as the credit  banks.  And  yet, in  granting credit, 
this factor must  be  considered  just  as  carefully as the 
special conditions obtaining in the industry or the branch 
of  it concerned in the loan.  It is to be feared that the 
central  institution  will  not  take  the  general  business 
situation  into  consideration  or  will  fail  to  give  it  due 
weight. 
~mong  the  reasons  assigned  to  prove  the  necessity 
for establishing a special institution  of  this character it 
is urged that industrial concerns are now  forced by the 
banks to resort  to short-term commercial credit, which 
is  not adapted to their  needs.  As  against  this conten- 
tion, it may be asked whether the effect of such a special 
institution would not be to force establishments to seek 
long-term credit for purposes for which only short-term 
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loans should be used, as, for example, for the purpose of 
procuring current working capital.  I think this at least 
possible, and I am convinced that Hecht's  charge (unjust 
in  my  opinion)  of  the "mechanical  standardization  of 
credit " (Schablonisierung des Kredits) brought against the 
credit banks (see his "Memorial," p. 7)  is likely to prove 
true to a greater extent in the case of  a special institution 
of  the kind proposed  than it ever was in the case of  the 
credit banks.255 
Again, as I shall show later in the course of  this book, 
a  special institution  would  undoubtedly  introduce new 
and strong competition for the local provincial banks and 
private bankers that make a specialty of  extending credit 
to the small and moderate-sized industrial establishments 
(in case where they do not  obtain  such credit  from  the 
cooperative societies), particularly  credit connected with 
the  issue  of  sound  industrial bonds in  amounts  of  less 
than  ~,ooo,ooo  marks or 500,000 marks, issues too small 
to be listed and dealt in on the exchanges (see p. 248). 
Attention  is  also called to another point-the  impor- 
tance of which Hecht by no  means underestimates-the 
need  of  having  the underlying conditions for  industrial 
credit investigated by persons and officers located where 
the establishment  is  situated.  This need  could  not  be 
met  by such a central institution  nearly  as  well  as by 
our large banks with their numerous branches, agencies, 
silent  partnerships  (Kommanditer~)  , deposit banks,  and 
allied institutions.  Not having affiliations and subsidiary 
institutions,  the  necessity  for local  investigation  would 
oblige the central institution to establish gradually all over 
Germany a far more extensive network of  local branches National  Monetary  Commission 
than those established or ever contemplated by the credit 
banks.  The desirability of  such a step is very doubtful, 
but unless this were done the facilities of  the central insti- 
tution for obtaining accurate information and carrying on 
its investigations on  the spot would be inferior to those 
of  credit banks. 
A further point of  criticism raised by the Frankfurter 
Zeitung of  September I 6 and 25,  1908, was that the bonds 
which it was  proposed to issue would in effect have all 
the characteristics of  bonds  payable  to bearer,  without 
any  governmental  authorization  therefor  having  been 
given or even requested.  Another just criticism is to the 
effect that it ought to be shown  "that  the loans to be 
made with  the proceeds  of  the sale  of  securities  have 
back of  them sufficient security to justify people to invest 
their savings therein,"  before "  a new kind of  obligation 
is introduced, which would shift to the public the risk of 
long-time industrial credit, formerly borne directly by the 
lender."  It is contended that Hecht has not  proved this 
point, for it is  not  enough to refer to the fact that the 
same objection was raised at one time against the mort- 
gage banks.  The conditions are entirely different, both 
on account of the difference in the character of  the secu- 
rity,  and  the state supervision  to which  the mortgage 
banks  are subject, and the complete difference in legal 
status, a point which will be gone into further below. 
To this I may add the following.  One of  the advan- 
tages claimed for the central institution is that its bonds 
would be issued against loans of the most varied kinds, and 
resting on different kinds of  security.  Should this indeed 
be the case, and were the prospectus to give an account of 
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all the industrial enterprises concerned and in all the details 
demanded by the requirements for listing the securities, 
the complexity would be so great that it would be as diffi- 
cult to determine the real value of  the bonds as to ascer- 
tain the actual condition of  the central institution itself. 
Baron von Pechman (op. cit., p. 94) has properly called 
attention to the point that the credit to be given by the 
central institution would prove the less attractive to indus- 
trial concerns the shorter  the period of  amortization  to 
which  they would have to agree besides the 5  per  cent 
interest and a high commission.  And yet in enumerating 
the  disadvantages  of  short-term  commercial credit  for 
industry, Hecht  lays  special  stress, and very  properly, 
on  its costliness. 
Finally it must not be forgotten that Hecht's project 
has long ago been  realized abroad, even though only in 
the form of  a provincial bank.  However, that is the form 
which  Hecht himself  contemplated, at least at the start. 
Now this foreign bank has not met with any great degree 
of  success. 
About ten years ago (1898) a special institution of  the 
kind contemplated by Hecht was established in Austria- 
the Bohemian Industrial Bank (Bohmische Industriebank) 
in  Prague-a  provincial bank with  the moderate capital 
of  I a ,ooo,ooo kronen ($2,436,000).  Of  late (since  I 906) 
it has  had  as one  of  its special  purposes  the flotation 
of  bonds  based  upon  industrial  loans  repayable  in 
annual instalments.  Up to the present the entire volume 
of  its  bonds,  secured  by  mortgages,  hadnot exceeded 
I 6,639,000 kronen  ($3,378,000).  In September, 1906, it 
established a branch in Vienna, entering thus into direct National  Monetary  Commission 
connection with the  money market  of  Vienna.  Lopus- 
zanski, secretary to the  Ministry -in Vienna, who  gives 
an account of  this bank,15"  withholds final judgment as to 
its merits, notwithstanding the reasonable length of  time 
the institution has been in existence. 
Moreover in accordance with the provisions of  a special 
enactment in Austria of  December 2 7, I go5  governing the 
issue by the banks of  certificates of  funded indebtedness, 
three large institutions were given the privilege of  issuing 
bank  bonds  (Reichsgesetz-Blatt  85. Stiick, Jahrg.  rgog), 
based on industrial loans secured by mortgage.  The lim- 
itation imposed is that the aggregate amount of  the bonds 
must not exceed the total amount of  the mortgages on the 
industrial property by which  the loans are secured.  The 
three institutions referred to are the Allgemeine Privile- 
gierte Oesterreichische Bodenkreditanstalt,  the Wiener Bank- 
verein, and the Zivnostenskd Banka in Prague.  Of  these 
only the latter began to issue such bonds as early as 1908. 
Although four years have elapsed since the law was enacted 
it can not be said that there has been any great activity 
along the new lines. 
I do not believe in the practicability of  the new venture. 
In view  of  our  conditions  in  Germany,  at any rate, I 
would not advocate the adoption of  a law which would 
authorize banks to issue certificates of  funded indebtedness, 
particularly as no great use of such a privilege is likely to 
be made in Germany, so far as can be foreseen.  We may 
recall in this connection that the issue of  such certificates 
of funded indebtedness was proposed by Pereire, and that 
provision was made for it more than 50 years ago in the 
charter of  the Credit  Mobilier  and  of  the  Darmstgdter 
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Bank.  Everybody  is  agreed that it was  fortunate that 
such issues were never made.  As it is, the concentration 
and decentralization of  the banks has led to a complexity 
and obscurity  in the bank  statements that is constantly 
increasing.  The issue of  certificates of  funded indebted- 
ness based on diverse industrial undertakings, the standing 
of  which can not  be easily found  out, would not  tend  to 
lessen this obscurity. 
Finally,  certain  weighty  objections  of  a  purely  legal 
nature remain to be 
The following are the only possible forms in which the 
bonds might be issued: 
I.  BONDS  SECURED  BY   MORTGAGE.^^^ 
I. Supposing  the  central  institution  issues  its own 
bonds, two cases are possible: 
(a) In consideration  of  a  loan  made  to an industrial 
establishment, it might  take bonds  issued by the latter 
(and secured by mortgage) made out to the central insti- 
tution or to its order.  On  the basis of  these bonds the 
central institution might  issue its own bonds, depositing 
with a trustee as security the bonds of  the establishment. 
(b)  Another way would be this: The establishment issues 
bonds  secured by  mortgage  in  favor  of  a  bank, which 
would make the loan in the first instance.  Against these 
bonds indorsed by the bank the central institution would 
in turn issue its own bonds. 
In my opinion there can be no doubt that, inasmuch as 
the purpose of  the central institution's "  activity " is "  di- 
rected "  260 exclusively or in part to the making of  mortgage 
loans on the real estate of  industrial establishments and to National  Monetary  Commission 
the issue of  bonds on the basis of  the mortgages acquired, 
the institution would be a mortgage bank according to the 
wording, meaning, and purpose of  article I of  the mortgage- 
bank  act of  July  13,  1899.  As  such  it must  obtain a 
charter.  As its sphere of business is not be to confined to 
any one of  the Federated States, it must obtain its charter 
from the federated council (Bundesrat).  This  being so, 
the central institution would be subject to the limitations 
of  the mortgage-bank act.  In this respect it would make 
no difference whether  the mortgage bonds issued by the 
various establishments receiving loans were bonds secured 
by a specific property or by the full assets of  the institu- 
tions.  These considerations  apply to the two  cases, (a) 
and (b), because article I of  the mortgage-bank act applies 
equally, no  matter  whether  the mortgage  is  originally 
made out in favor of  the central institution or the mort- 
gage is obtained  by  the  central institution from a  third 
party (cf. Komm. Bericht., p. I,  sec. 5; par. I,  No. I,  ibid.). 
If this view is correct, the purpose of  the bank, to make 
loans  to  industrial  establishments  and  to  issue  bonds 
against  them, would  in  these  most  important  cases  be 
almost  completely  nullified.  Even  if  we  follow  Ernest 
Sontag  in rejecting  Hecht's interpretation  of  section 
12, paragraph  I, clause 2, of  the mortgage-bank  act, the 
policy  of  the  mortgage  banks, as  shown  in  note  250, 
p.  82  7,  would  continue  unaltered,  according  to which, 
with  few exceptions, no loans are granted  on  industrial 
establishments. 
2.  Suppose  now  that the central  institution does not 
issue its own bonds.  We  might  then have a case where 
the bonds  secured by  mortgage would  be  issued  by the 
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industrial establishment itself  to the order of  the central 
institution, and the latter would no  more  than  indorse 
the bonds.  It would make itself  liable for them in the 
same way that a bank  assumes liability for a bill.26S In 
this case the mortgage-bank  act would not apply, for it 
would not involve the issue of  bonds by the central insti- 
tution  against  mortgage  loans  made  by  it or  by  some 
other  party.  The  central  institution  would  be  acting 
only as an intermediary, guaranteeing  the bonds  issued 
directly by the various establishments.  These securities, 
to be sure, would gain in value and become more readily 
marketable, for the reason that they had been passed on 
and  indorsed  by  the  central  institution,  but  scarcely 
more than the industrial bonds floated by a well-known 
bank. 
On the other hand, so long as the bonds are issued by 
various borrowers, and merely indorsed by the central  insti- 
tution, it would be impossible to combine and treat as one 
aggregate loan of  I million marks the issues of, say, four 
establishments  where each issue was  for 250,000 marks. 
This does away with a second argument advanced in favor 
of the creation  of  a central institution, namely,  that by 
combining a number of  loans it would enable the securities 
of smaller establishments whose bond issues were for less 
than  ~,ooo,ooo  marks  to be  listed  and  dealt  in  on  the 
exchanges. 
11.  BONDS  NOT  SECURED  BY  MORTGAGE. 
It might be thought that this difficulty could be obvi- 
ated  in  the  following manner:  The central  institution 
would have the four establishments each issue in its favor National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
bonds for 250,000 marks, unsecured by mortgage.  The 
institution might then in turn deposit these bonds with a 
trustee,  and issue  against  them  its own  bonds  to  the 
amount  of  I ,ooo,ooo marks.  These could then be listed 
and traded in.  The objection against this plan, however, 
is that,  if  one of  these establishments should become bank- 
rupt, the claim based  on  these bonds would  entitle the 
central institution to no greater a share in the assets of  the 
bankrupt firm than would  fall to the other non-preferred 
creditors  of  the  establishment.  In other words, if  the 
industrial  establishment  becomes  insolvent,  the  claims 
arising from the bonds which it has issued and pledged 
with the central institution  are on  a par with  all other 
non-preferred  claims against  the  establishment.  There 
would thus be little inducement to the public to purchase 
such bonds,  even if  these should be  admitted to the ex- 
change, which is doubtful.  Should they be listed, it seems 
to me that the exchange accepting them would  at least 
insist that, inasmuch  as it might be erroneously assumed 
from the fact that the bonds were pledged to the central 
institution that they were secured by a  preferred  lien  on 
the property (dingliche Sicherheit),  the absence of  it should 
be expressly stated in  the  prospectus.  This would, of 
course, spoil the market for such securities. 
The outcome of these legal considerations is as follows: 
I. In the case of  an issue of  mortgage bonds, the cen- 
tral institution, as such, could be active only in the case 
described under I 2.  Here, however, it would  serve pri- 
marily only  the interests  of  the  larger  establishments. 
These are, as a rule, closely connected with the banks, and 
have hitherto received too  much  rather  than  too  little 
credit. 
2. As  regards  the  issue  of  bonds  without  mortgage 
security there is no real necessity for adding further to a 
class  of  bonds  which,  contrary  to  what  the  purchaser 
generally believes, do not  confer upon  him  any right of 
lien on the property (dingliches Recht), the more so that 
it would be of no benefit to the small trader as such. 
3. To allow the issue of bonds in cases I No.  I a and b, 
there would be need for amending existing legislation in 
order to enable the central institution to avoid the neces- 
sity of  obtaining a charter as a mortgage bank.  In view 
of  the existing superabundance of  industrial bonds, there 
is no adequate justification for such amendment. 
Should the central institution  enter upon  a career as 
such, in spite of  all the existing economic and legal objec- 
tions, it can not, in txly  opinion, look forward to a rapid 
or notably successful activity. 
(B)  THE  CURRENT ACCOUNT   BUSINESS.^^^ 
Current account transactions between the bank and its 
clients are one of  the main  sources of  the commissions 
earned by the bank in the general course of business.  At 
the same time  the current  account  is  the basis  for the 
various  relations  by  which  both  parties  are  gradually 
drawn  into closer  union.  Through  the current  account 
the bank serves in the first place in the capacity of  '' maid 
of  all work"  in the business household of its customers, 
performing a thousand and one services each for  a small 
consideration.  This menial position, as  a rule, is, how- 
ever, only a temporary stepping stone in its progress to National  Monetary  Commission 
a position of  influence, at times even of  dominance, and 
one offering great advantages of  the most diverse kinds. 
For this reason the current  account  more  than  any 
other branch of  business represents the field in which the 
various banks fight their competitive battles, particularly 
the battle for the industrial clientele.  Once regular rela- 
tions are established through the current account, a direct 
road is opened to power  and  profit for the bank.  This 
road leads past the various forms of  loans, which of  them- 
selves, especially  the right to close the account, give a 
certain6amount  of  influence to the bank.  It  leads further 
to increased  power  and  profit  through  reorganizations, 
promotions, flotations of  securities, consolidations and per- 
manent participations in indlistrial undertakings through 
stock ownership,  or  representation  on  the  supervisory 
board, or both.  Through these transactions  it leads to 
the conquest of  entire branches of  industrial  activity, to 
close  affiliation  with  commanding  induStria1  concerns, 
cartels, and syndicates, and marks the beginning of  the 
supremacy of groups of  banks. 
In the systematic development of  the current account 
business in  industrial  districts,  attained only  gradually, 
and after much labor and trouble, we see at the same time 
a powerful lever in the systematic industrial policy of  the 
banks.  The successful carrying out of  this policy tends 
also to establish, strengthen, and extend the supremacy~f 
the banks over the private banking houses usually found 
in this field. 
The essential features of  the current account business 
are the following: 
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In the course of  the current account transactions, the 
German credit banks first of  all provide their customers 
with  the  facilities  for  making  and  receiving  payments 
(Zahlungsverkehr)  .  They  receive  payments,  and  make 
payments on their account, collect their bills, interest on 
mortgages, and claims.  For such of  their customers espe- 
cially as are engaged in foreign and over-sea trade, they 
draw bills, checks, drafts,  and letters of  credit.  By putting 
their signature to the commercial paper of  their customers 
they convert  this  paper  into  safe  securities,  negotiable 
every~here.~"  They accept  bills  drawn  upon  them  by 
their customers or clients of  the latter.  They place at the 
disposal of  their customers the transfer facilities (Girover- 
kehr) provided by the bank, its branch offices  and affiliated 
banks, though this need is but seldom felt, in view of  the 
giro facilities offered by the-Reichsbank. 
They also provide foreign bills of  exchange for such of 
their  customers  as  need  them  for  their  foreign  trade 
transactions.  These  have  retained  the  character  of 
instruments of  payments  to  a  far  greater  extent  than 
the domestic bills.  These  foreign bills  are held  by  the 
German  credit  banks  not  only  for  the convenience  of 
their  customers, but  also  to maintain  the liquidity  of 
their own assets.  They keep them in their portfolios not 
indeed to the same extent as the Reichsbank, but never- 
theless in considerable amounts in order to be in a position 
to draw gold from abroad, in case of a money stringency 
or a panic.  The amount of foreign bills is seldom reported 
in"  the statements  of  the German  banks.  The  annual 
report of  the Dresdner Bank  for 1908 states that out of 
a total in bills of  248,666,816 marks  (in 64,951 bills)  on National  Monetary  Commission 
December 31,  1908, there were bills  in foreign currency 
to the actual value of  24,999,370 marks.  In the same way 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft reports that on the same date, 
out of  a total of  158,928,057 marks  held  in bills, there 
were foreign bills to the value of  18,347,484 marks.  In 
1903 more than half  (54.5 per cent) of  the bill portfolio 
of  the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft  was  made  up  of 
foreign bills. 
To  meet  the  wants  of  their  customers,  the  German 
credit  banks  furnish  surety  bills  (Wechsel-Avale)  for 
their customers, more particularly in favor of  the customs 
and  railroad  authorities  to  guarantee  the  payment  of 
customs  duties  and  railroad  freight  charges,  on  which 
deferred payment has been allowed.26B 
They  also  undertake  to collect  foreign  and  domestic 
bills, deducting their expense and commission.  However, 
under the terms of  the current account, which are nearly 
always  identical  on  this  point,  they  do  not  assume 
responsibility in the case of  foreign bills or bills on smaller 
places in Germany, for presenting them on  time, or for 
having them protested.  At the request of  their customers 
they  make  remittances  by  telegraph  in  order  to meet 
outstanding obligations in foreign countries. 
In their current account transactions they reduce, for 
their customers, the risks arising from export and import 
trade by discounting or loxning on the bills drawn by the 
exporter  upon  foreign purchasers.  They allow  the  im- 
porter  credit  against  which  the foreign  merchant  may 
draw, and, on the delivery of  the bill of lading, they put 
their acceptance on the bills of  the foreign seller to the 
amount of  the invoice, thus making it possible for these 
bills to be discounted. 
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They  allow their customers credit  on  current  account 
for  a  considerable  period  of  time,  or  they  give  them 
short-time  credit  on  current  account  or  independently 
of  it, by discounting the bills of  their customers or their 
clients, or by granting them loans on collateral or in the 
shape  of  the  so-called  reports.  In  a  few  instances, 
following the example of  the Deutsche Bank, they have 
begun  lately  to discount  for  their  customers even out- 
standing business accounts. 
They accept securities and documents of  their custom- 
ers for safe-keeping in their vaults, as a rule gratuitously 
in case  a  commission  is paid  on transactions on current 
account.  In case they undertake  at the  same time to 
look  after  these  securities, they  charge  an  exceedingly 
small commission  for  this service. 
Under the latter head we have the following operations: 
The cashing of coupons as they become due and the pre- 
senting for payment of  bonds drawn by lot, or repayable 
for  other  reasons;  the collection  of mortgages and tem- 
porary  interest  (Genussscheine) the  drawing  of  incomes 
(Geltendmachu?zg  von  Bezugsrechten) ;  the exchanging of  con- 
verted securities or  the presenting of  such securities for 
stamping, in compliance with legal requirements.  In the 
case of  a reduction of  capital they deposit the securities 
of  their  customers  either  for  stamping  or  cancellation. 
They further secure new sheets of  coupons with the talon 
(or certificate  of  renewal),  they  supervise the drawings 
(with certain  reservations),  they  make  additional  pay- 
ments on securities  not  fully paid  up, they pay  assess- 
ments on mining stock, advance cash for coupons payable 
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In accordance with their general and current  account 
regulations,  the  German  great  credit  banks  require  a 
special  order  of  the  depositor  of  securities,  in  case  of 
conversions,  insurance,  giving  notice  in  the  name  of 
stockholders before the general meeting;267  also  in  case 
of  instalment  payments  on  account  of  securities  not 
fully  paid, of  assessments on account  of  mining  stock, 
and in case of  reductions of  capital when an exchange of 
stock for a  smaller amount of  new  stock is to be made 
(Zusammenlegung von A ktien)  . 
According to Waldemar Miiller,26s  the Dresdner  Bank 
alone  manages  securities  of  customers  aggregating  in 
value to nearly  2,000,000,000 marks,  not  counting  the 
securities held by its deposit offices.  The German credit 
banks  or  their  deposit  branches  and  exchange  offices 
(Wechselstuben)  take  care  of  sealed deposits  in  special 
fire- and burglar-proof  boxes  and vaults, with keys held 
by the bank and by the respective depositors, a function 
performed abroad, and particularly in England and Amer- 
ica, by  special safe-deposit companies. 
In accordance with special rules German credit banks 
buy  and sell securities on  commission  and  make  loans 
thereon, according to terms described more fully below, 
which are  essentially the same for  all  the large banks. 
Loans  on  mining stock, where they  are not  completely 
barred,  and on  American  railroad  shares,  are as a  rule 
subject to special agreements. 
Customers  having a current account with the  credit banks 
may, if  they wish it, open a check account.  Balances on 
such accounts do not bear interest.  On the other hand, 
the bank charges no commission on the turnover of  such 
accounts.  An accounting is rendered usually each quar- 
ter.  Deposits of  cash to this account, if  made before  I 2 
o'clock, are credited as of  the date of  deposit or the next 
business  day; when  made  later, they are credited  as of 
the business day next  following.  Cash paid out on this 
account is charged to the day on which it is paideZeg 
German credit banks, mainly  through  their  exchange 
offices  and deposit  branches, frequently  act as interme- 
diaries  for  their  customers  in securing  for  them  mort- 
gage  loans,  and  often  obtain  for  them  or  lend  them 
directly money for building purposes.  They make them- 
selves responsible either  in the form of  surety or of  de- 
posit  of  so-called "  Aval-bills"  to the customs  or  rail- 
road  authorities  for  the payment  of  customs  duties  or 
freight  charges, where  credit has been  allowed to their 
customers; or for the proper  fulfillment on  time of  con- 
tracts entered upon by their clients for supplies or work. 
At  the wish  of  their  customers  and  on  payment  of  a 
moderate  fee  they  insure  securities  left  with  them  for 
deposit and  care  against  reduction  in  value  in  case  of 
drawings. 
They finance the reorganization  into stock companies 
of  business firms in which their customers are interested; 
also  the  organization  of  new  stock  companies.  They 
underwrite the issue of  newly  created shares and bonds 
in a great variety of  forms and on the most diverse terms. 
Finally, they supply or secure for their clients necessarv 
or helpful information regarding new business connections 
which the latter may be contemplating and on the stand- 
ing of  individuals or firms to whom credit is to be extended, 
also on foreign connections and markets.  They grant or National  Monetary  Commission 
obtain for their customers  various advantages and facilities, 
both  in their  commercial relations and in their  mutual 
intercourse, and notably in connection with the flotation 
of  securities. 
As  a result  of  the mutual competition of  the banks, 
commissions  on  German  current-account  transactions 
have  to-day fallen to a  level  lower  than ever.  This is 
very deplorable, for it may lead to the neglect of  what is 
the mainspring  of  the  banking  business,  the  current- 
account  transactions,  and  to  the  preferment  of  other 
more speculative branches of  banking.  A point has been 
reached where a great many services for which a charge is 
made  abroad  are performed  in  Germany  gratuitously, 
and the commissions, where paid, are so slight that often 
they do not cover even in part  the share of  the general 
expense which these services involve.  Thus as a rule the 
commission for the business done on current account is fig- 
ured on the larger side of  the account, being one-half of  I 
per mille for bankers and I per mille for others.  For bill 
acceptances the commission is one-fourth of  I per cent per 
quarter.  As  a rule this charge is remitted by most large 
banks  in  the case  of  their  regular  customers, who  are 
allowed to issue time drafts on the bank.  It is exacted 
only when they have no adequate funds on deposit in the 
bank on the day when the acceptance is made.270 
In the absence of  a  special understanding, interest is 
allowed on credit balances normally at a rate I per cent 
below the Reichsbank discount rate, and charged on debit 
balances at I per cent above the Reichsbank discount rate. 
Usually, however, provision is made for a maximum rate 
in the one case and a minimum rate in the other. 
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Payments on current account are usually credited as of 
the same day or as of  the next business day when they are 
made after 4 o'clock.  Money paid out is always charged 
as  of  the  day  on  which  the  payment  is  made.  Bills 
collected  are  entered  according  to  special  agreement, 
bills discounted as of  the day on which they are discounted. 
Where the debit balance on current account against a 
customer is not merely temporary or when  the customer 
needs credit either at stated periods  (seasonal credit), at 
irregular intervals, or continuously, terms must be agreed 
upon as to the amount, the rate of  interest, the security, 
the  commission to be charged, etc.  These  are  usually 
made in writing  and mostly  as soon  as  the account  is 
opened. 
In  the course of  time and under the pressure of  successive 
legislative enactments  and  new  legal  requirements, the 
banks have developed fairly uniform forms of  contracts  271 
for  their  "business  and  current account transactions." 
Naturally,  however, reservations are made in regard to 
special terms affecting commission, interest, the amount of 
credit, and the conditions of  repayment. 
Credit on  current  account is  given only  to classes  of 
business to which bank credit is applicable, and is either 
unsecured  (Blankokredzt)  or  secured.  The  bank,  how- 
ever,  seeks  always  to find  security  against  the risk  it 
assumes in the character and extent of its current account 
transactions  and  in the differences that naturally appear 
among its current account clients.  The common policy 
of  the banks is to have as nearly as possible an equilibrium 
between the amounts it must provide for current account 
customers in the shape of  advances or payments and the National  Monetary  Commission 
active balances of  the deposits of  other current account 
customers, as well as deposits expected from them.27a 
Under such conditions, comparatively little of  the bank's 
own  capital  is tied  up  in  current  accounts.  This  safe- 
guards the bank's ability to realize quickly on its assets 
and secures to it freedom of  action.  While this favorable 
situation is not present every year, or in the case of  every 
bank, yet, on the whole, and on the average for a number 
of  years, the condition has been nearly approximated by 
the great German banks. 
In  this connection Miiller 272 justly says: "  For this reason 
the customers most highly valued are those who, requiring 
credit  during the buying season, not only repay the ad- 
vances during the selling season,  but in  addition accumulate 
balances to their credit.  This is true of  a large number of 
commercial  firms and of  many branches of  industry, notably 
in Berlin.  The seasons for various branches of  business 
being  different, a large bank  with branches and connec- 
tions  in  all  industrial  centers  of  Germany  enjoys  the 
advantage of  a proper distribution of  its accounts among 
all branches of  industry, and of  the best possible adjust- 
ment of  credit and debit accounts.  Moreover, the periodic 
covering of  loans exerts a  reassuring  influence, whereas 
loans  that  are  running  throughout  the  year  require 
greater caution and constant vigilance." 
The magnitude of  current account transactions appears 
from  the  following:  At  the  end  of  1908  the  current 
accounts in the Deutsche Bank, including accounts in the 
deposit  branches  in  Berlin  and  its suburbs, numbered 
171,305.  At  the end  of  1907  the Dresdner  Bank  had 
3 I ,63  I current account customers at its central office and 
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67,212 accounts in its exchange offices (Wechselstuben), or, 
in all, 98,843.  At the end of  1908 the number of  accounts 
at the central office had risen to 35,542. 
The security for credit on current account, or for credit 
given on current  account  through acceptance,  collateral 
loans, or bill discounts, consists as a rule of  shares, bonds, 
merchandise,  bills,  or  the  outstanding  accounts  of  the 
borrower, that is, of  claims arising from the sale of  mer- 
chandise  and  manufactures, or  of  raw  materials,  half- 
finished  or  finished  products,  belonging  to  the  firm 
receiving  credit,  or  of  life-insurance  policies,  patents, 
mortgages,  dwelling  houses,  factories, land,  or  sureties 
including  secondary  and  counter  sureties  (Nach-und 
Ruckburgschaften) and the like. 
Under normal  conditions, whenever the banks exercise 
due caution-and  most of  them do-it  may be shown that 
it is  not  the secured credit on current  account  but the 
unsecured credit which has proved the safest. 
German credit banks  grant unsecured credit  (Blanko- 
kredit) as a rule only after  a  study of  the financial state- 
ment of  the applicant for credit  and a thorough investi- 
gation of  his trustworthiness, his financial standing, and 
his  business, which  must  present  no  obscurities  to the 
inquirer, and when it is established beyond  doubt that, 
so far as it is humanly possible to foresee, the loan will be 
repaid and repaid on time.  This practice of granting un- 
secured credit is far more  extensive in southern and cen- 
tral Germany than in northern Germany, but it is seldom 
granted to other than business men, at least not in consid- 
erable amounts. National  Monetary  Commission 
When security is demanded for a loan, it is a sign of 
some doubt on the part of  the bank, excepting the cases 
when under general or special instructions of  the board of 
supervisors or  under  orders from the central  office,  the 
executive officers of  the bank or of  the branch are forbidden 
to make  any unsecured loans or  to make  them beyond 
certain amounts, or without special permission. 
Hence the demand frequently made for a separation in 
the bank statement of  secured and unsecured  loans can 
not  be based  on  the assumption  that such  data would 
indicate to what extent the management  was complying 
with  the  dictates  of  business  prudence  in  demanding 
security, as such information would tell nothing regarding 
the character of  the security-which  is the all important 
thing. 
Although  mistakes  have  undoubtedly  been  made  in 
giving unsecured credit,274  the mistakes made in German 
banking practice, and for that matter also in the practice 
of  foreign banks, in  the lending of  credit may be traced, 
so  far  as  my  experience  goes,  far  less  frequently  to 
improper unsecured  loans than to the facts pointed  out 
in our "introductory considerations. "  Among these have 
been excessive liberality  and eagerness in lending credit, 
the  giving  to  or  even  forcing  upon  establishments  of 
long-time instead  of  short-time credit, violations  of  the 
principle, which should always be observed, of  distributing 
risks, and, under the head of  secured credit, the false choice 
or false distribution of  collateral-for  which, however, the 
competition  of  other  banks  may  often be  responsible- 
accepting,  for example, as security second mortgages, mort- 
gages on building lots, unlisted or highly speculative secu- 
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rities,  or, worst  of  all,  accepting as  "security"  shares 
and bonds of  the company which  was seeking credit.  A 
practice  equally dangerous is the accepting  of  securities 
as collateral at  prices manifestly far higher than what they 
might be expected to bring at  forced sale, and the like. 
I believe  therefore  that in  general fewer  dangers  for 
the bank are involved in unsecured credit than in secured 
credit.  The most  questionable  secured  loans  are  those 
that have developed out of  original unsecured l0ans.~7~ 
The subject of  unsecured credit arising from acceptances 
will be dealt with more in detail further on.  Such credit 
is subject to its own rules and considerations.  Satisfactory 
as this form of  loan may be to a bank at  any given moment, 
it can not be denied that to give a large or the largest part 
of its credit to customers, in the form of acceptances, may 
become  a source of  danger, for it may happen that just 
during a crisis when the bank needs all of  its resources, it 
may be  called upon  to redeem  its acceptances owing to 
the inability of  the drawers to redeem the bills. 
The current account business, including the credit given 
on current account, presents considerable advantages for a 
credit bank, though in promoting  this  business  there is 
need  of  the utmost attention and caution.  Once devel- 
oped, however, it gradually yields regular earnings, which 
are of particular help during adverse times, insuring to the 
bank  certain minimum dividends, and thereby affording 
the management a certain repose and assurance even when 
the more speculative branches  of  its business and more 
particularly the flotation of  securities fail to bring adequate 
returns. National  Monetary  Commission 
While it is true that the stability of  dividends increases 
with the growth of  the deposit business, the latter in its 
turn is influenced by an extension of  the current account 
business.  On the other hand, the increase of  dividends is 
dependent mainly upon the expansion of  the current busi- 
ness and particularly the business on current accounts. 
The proportion which interest  and comn~issions  bear 
to the total gross profits may be seen from the following 
table.  So  far  as  commissions  are  concerned,  only  the 
smallest part is due to transactions on current  account; 
by far the larger part comes from the banks' brokerage 
business.  For  1908 the profit  from  the bill  business  is 
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Moreover, since a regular  flow  of  business on current 
account can take place only under favorable conditions in 
trade and industry, the transactions on current account 
give the credit banks an excellent insight into the economic 
situation as it presents itself at any moment.  At the same 
time the bank thereby develops a following of  customers 
who are able to take over the securities floated by it. 
Business  on  current  account  and  more  particularly 
industrial loans on current account tend to  promote concen- 
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alliance with the old and established  provincial banks in 
the industrial sections-an  alliance of  vital importance also 
to the latter.  This  was  in  fact  the real  reason for  the 
first community of  interests effected-the  alliance of  the 
Deutsche Bank with the Bergisch-Markische Bank and the 
Schlesisclier Bankverein  in  I 897.  Again, the provincial 
banks and private bankers must gradually lose ground in 
the competitive  struggle  for  supplying  industrial credit 
in  proportion  as  such  loans  increasingly become  long- 
time loans, which force the lender to tie up  large sums 
for an indefinite period  in  capital  loans  and  in  flota- 
tions of  securities which often do not  allow of  immediate 
realization.  With the increasing concentration of  indus- 
try  the  situation  becomes  more  acute, as  increasingly 
larger resources  are required  for industrial development 
and expansion. 
Finally, industrial loans pave the way for the employ- 
ment of  the bank's credit in the reorganization of  indus- 
trial establishments on  a corporate basis, or the flotation 
of  new  securities in their behalf.  Industrial credit thus 
naturally ends in drawing the banks into closer relations 
with all industrial interests, linking the credit banks with 
industry in a well-nigh indissoluble union for weal or woe. 
This  union  finds  effective  and  visible  expression  both 
toward  outsiders  and insiders in the mutual representa- 
tion on the supervisory boards by the leading directors on 
both sides.278 
Similar remarks  apply  to commercial credit whenever 
used  merely  for  the organization  of  corporations  or  the 
reorganization of  firms as corporations  and the flotation National  Monetary  Commission 
of  securities.  This has been the case in not a few instances, 
as for example in the case of  certain navigation concerns. 
The following data for  different years  in  the  second 
period show the amount of  loans (Debitorem),  in the main, 
though not exclusively, loans on current  account, for all 
banks  (numbering 169 at present) having a capital of  at 
least I ,ooo,ooo marks each ; also the relation which these 
loans bear to the share capital of  the credit banks: 
Year 
In the introductory considerations (p. 233 and following) 
we have dealt with the objections and criticisms urged on 
the alleged  ground  that the loans  are made  primarily 
in  an altogether one-sided and improper  manner  in the 
interests of  industry (more correctly trade and industry). 
For all German credit banks having a capital stock of at 
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Thus during a twelve-year period scarcely any change 
worth mentioning is seen.  The assets of the great banks 
vere placed as follows 27s 
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(C)  THE  ACCEPTANCE  BUSINESS. 
1906  /  1907.  1  1908 I  1906 I 1.0;  11908 
-----p 
In the field of  credit there are essentially three kinds of 
bank acceptances in use among German credit banks. 
I. In the first place we have the acceptances in domestic 
and  foreign  commodity  transactions,  that  is  to  say, 
mercantile  acceptances (Warenakzepte) . 
We  shall describe in  another place the use of  accept- 
ances in foreign trade and the difficulties which had to be 
overcome before German bills in terms of  marks could at- 
tain  to the stage of  approximate  equality with  English 
pound bills, and how long it took before these mark bills, 
at first unknown and disliked and having but a limited 
discount  market,  reached  the point  where  they  are no 
longer subjected everywhere to a higher rate of  discount 
than the pound bills on London. 
A condition in which business men support directly the 
burden of  credit transactions and bear  unaided  the risk 
involved is in general a sign that industrial organization 
is  as  yet  undeveloped.  This  is  the  situation  in  which 
products and commodities are sold on long terms by the 
manufacturer  to the wholesaler, or by  the latter to his National  Monetary  Commission 
retail customers, the seller drawing a bill on his customer 
(often running for six months)  ,280  anticipating the matur- 
ity of it, by discounting the long-time claim with a bank 
or banker. 
For  a  long  time  this was  the exclusive procedure  in 
Germany.  It involves on the one hand the serious disad- 
vantage that the entire commercial  and industrial  class 
becomes accustomed to this very long interval for loans 
and payments, often  of  six months'  duration.  Like an 
interminable disease, this  practice  affects also  the final 
link in the commercial chain, the trade of  the retailer with 
his customers.  On the other hand this practice imposes 
unusual hardships on over-sea trade and increases its cost. 
The exporter  has to draw on his  foreign customer  bills 
in foreign currency for the latter's acceptance.  Owing to 
the limited market for such notes, he finds it difficult to 
discount them, and has to pay higher rates of  discount. 
In addition, he has to bear the loss resulting from fluctua- 
tions in the rate of  foreign exchange which may take place 
in the interval."l 
This early phase  in the development  of  industrial or- 
ganization has been  outlived in Germany, at least to the 
extent that for some time past, though in the main not 
before the present period, the wholesale trade and large 
industrial concerns no longer have been the sole and direct 
grantors of  credit, having as a rule given up the practice 
of  accepting the drafts of their customers or of drawing on 
the latter.  It is much more usual for the German whole- 
sale trade and the large industrial establishments to draw 
upon the banks or bankers with whom they regularly deal. 
The bank's acceptance is then  remitted  to the creditor, 
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or arrangements  are  made with  the bank  whereby the 
creditor may draw directly on the bank, the latter accept- 
ing the draft which is then discounted by the drawer. 
This practice which has become common in large-scale 
industry and the wholesale  trade,282  whereby the imme- 
diate mercantile bill has gradually been  replaced by the 
bank  acceptance, has in the course of  time introduced  a 
certain amount of improvement in the direction of short- 
ening  the time  for  credit  and  payment  in  the  whole- 
sale trade  and  in  industry conducted  on  a  large  scale. 
The circumstance  which  has done most  to bring  about 
this change is that only two- or three-month acceptances 
of  banks  and  banking  houses  whose  acceptances  are 
regarded  as  prime  discounts  (so-called Privatdzskontos), 
can be discounted at the private discount rate. 
In England, according to the account of  Edgar Jaff4,283 
considerable  advance has been  made  toward  dispensing 
with mercantile bills altogether, transactions between the 
large firms coming more and more to be on a cash basis. 
This third  stage of  development has been  arrived at in 
Germany only by the large cartels and syndicates which 
may be thus said to undertake the solution of  an impor- 
tant economic problem, that of  restricting credit transac- 
tions between producers and their customers. 
Thus, for example, the steel works' union, as stated else- 
where (note 172,  p. 819) reduced the terms for payment on 
domestic purchases to fifteen days, at the same time cut- 
ting down to a large degree the trade discounts allowed. 
To  foreign  dealers  trade discounts  are no  longer  given 
at all. National  Monetary  Commission 
-.p-- 
The large German banks have among their holdings a 
very large number of  bills accepted by other banks (great 
banks or affiliated banks) and discounted or rediscounted 
by  themselves.  These  bills  arise  from  the  above  de- 
scribed custom, prevailing among the wholesale trade and 
large industrial establishments, to draw on the banks, or 
to make  special  arrangements  with them whereby  cus- 
tomers may draw on  the banks, the latter accepting the 
bills  which  are  then  discounted.  Some  recent  writers 
who  advocate  the  strict  separation  of  "  mercantile  l ' 
from ' '  finance ' ' bills have  improperly classed  the above 
described bills-true  mercantile bills-among  the finance 
bills, on the ground that they are accepted and indorsed 
by banks. 
The following is a good illustration.  In order to attract 
gold to America from abroad in  1908, deliveries of  copper, 
cotton, petroleum, rice, and other raw materials and food- 
stuffs were effected much more quickly than usual and the 
equivalent was collected much more promptly by drawing 
against the shipments.  As a result, an unusual number of 
legitimate American commercial bills were drawn on the 
leading German banks and accepted by the latter.  Other 
banks  were  glad  to discount  this  paper.  Obviously it 
would be wrong to follow the customary tradition and call 
such drafts "  finance bills l' merely because they were issued 
with  the manifest purpose  of  attracting  gold, or  to go 
further and stigmatize them as kite flying or accommoda- 
tion paper, as was frequently done at that time and up to 
very  recently  in  Germany  as well  as in  England.  (See 
p. 213.1 
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It  would  be  very  easy  to multiply  examples.  They 
prove that the term "finance bill "  may often be a misno- 
mer even when applied to bills which the banks are instru- 
mental in circulating by their acceptance and indorsement 
in cases where the  purpose of the  bill is clearly to  raise money. 
It would follow, from what has been stated before, that 
the term would have to be applied to most bills that cir- 
culate in Germany at  the present time.  Thus for example, 
according to a statement made before the bank  inquiry 
commission, out of German bills to the amount of  about 
qoo,ooo,ooo marks which the Deutsche Bank alone held in 
Berlin, about 300,000,000 marks' worth consisted of  accept- 
ances of  German banks-a  situation readily understood in 
view of  the foregoing considerations. 
What has been said applies not only to bills originating 
from domestic commercial transactions, but perhaps even 
more  so to commercial paper  originating  from  oversea 
commerce, and accepted by German banks.  According to 
the statement just  cited, 200,000,000 marks of  paper of 
this class had been accepted by the Deutsche Bank alone. 
It is  clear  from  the foregoing considerations  thatthe 
greater part of  the bank acceptances are found among the 
bill holdings of  the banks.  In 1907 bills to the value of 
2,621,6~o,ooo  marks were  held  by all the German credit 
*  banks having a capital of  at least  I million marks each, of 
which acceptances alone amounted to 2,o~~,~go,ooo  marks 
or 78 per cent of  the total bill holdings.  It may therefore 
be assumed that as a rule  between 70 and 75 per cent of 
the entire bill holdings of  German credit banks are made 
up of  bank acceptances, a conclusion that agrees with the 
data given above. National  Monetary  Commission 
Heiligenstadt is justly of  the opinion that in order to be 
regarded  as a  "legitimate"  bill,  as distinguished from a 
finance bill, a bill-i.  e. every claim that is presented in the 
money  market in the form of  a  bill,  must have "as its 
basis  an economic good  (Wirtschaftsgut)."  I should dis- 
card entirely  the expression  finance bill  and use  instead 
the term nominal bill (Leerwechsel).  However, the point 
should be emphasized that this "  economic good " need not 
necessarily be a present or "concrete good" or a present 
or concrete commodity transaction.  It may just  as well 
be an advance given  by the bank  to domestic or foreign 
industrial  or  commercial  firms  with the view  of  future 
production or of  a future commodity transaction. 
In  testifying  before  the  bank  inquiry  commission, 
Heiligenstadt himself pointed out another case where even 
in the absence of  such  a  loan, a  bill issued would not be 
a "finance bill,"  still less a "  nominal bill."  Thus a mer- 
chant, manufacturer, or provincial banker, who has a bal- 
ance to his credit in a bank, may draw a bill on the bank 
'in order  to convert this deposit  into a form  most  liquid 
and convenient  for  him.  Under the same head  belong 
the cases  mentioned  by  Thus a banking  house 
may take over  securities  from  a  debtor,  and  sell them 
to a third party.  It  may then draw on the purchaser, who 
may in turn be a banking  firm.  Or again, in taking over 
a loan, a bank may settle for it with  its acceptance.  As 
a matter of  fact,  in both of  these instances the transaction 
involves "  as much  the circulation of  a commodity pecu- 
liar to this branch  of  business as in the case of  grain or 
cotton bills," although all these bills may be found to bear 
the names  of  bankers  only.  It would be  impossible to 
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deal with  all the cases  belonging  under this  head  with 
anything approaching completeness. 
In view of  the foregoing it would be well  to regard as 
nominal bills only such long- or short-time bills, which are 
not based on present or future production or  on present 
or  future  sales  of  commodities in  industry, agriculture 
or  trade, or are  not  drawn  with  a view  to  liquidating 
credit balances resulting  either from  these  transactions 
or  from  other  causes.  Neither  is  it material  whether 
such bills  have been accepted  or issued  by banks or  by 
other firms, or  drawn  by one  bank  on another.  In the 
case  of  long-time bills, however, drawn by  one bank on 
another, or on private  bankers, the presumption  is that 
they are nominal bills. 
As  a  matter of  fact, neither  the Reichsbank  nor  any 
other  discount  bank  is  able  to distinguish  a  "nominal 
bill " of  this kind externally from a "  legitimate bill " any 
more  than a legitimate  stock-exchange time-transaction 
can be distinguished from an illegitimate deal of  the same 
class.  Hence there will  always be  cases where even  the 
most expert bill broker will be unable to tell with certainty 
what kind of  bill he is handling. 
In  connection with the expert testimony before the bank 
inquiry  commission,  two  members  of  the  commission, 
Heiligenstadt and  Fischel, pointed  out cases  not  at all 
rare, which show particularly well how little the banks are 
able, in many cases, to tell the true character of  a bill from 
the instrument itself, which may often come to them from 
second or third hands, unless they know the  character of the 
business which gave rise to the bill.  "  Let us take the fol- 
lowing example:  A spinner imports cotton from Anlerica National  Monetary  Commission 
-  - 
and gives his acceptance for it.  He spins the purchased 
cotton into yarn in two weeks, and sells and delivers the 
yarn to a weaving  establishment, drawing on  the latter 
for the goods.  The weaving concern makes it into cloth 
and sells the woven fabric to some print works, drawing 
on  the  cotton  print  concern  for  the  goods  delivered. 
Here we  have three bills, each of  which  must  according 
to every characteristic be classed as the most  substantial 
bill in the world;  and yet in the last analysis they are 
based only on a single commodity " (Pischel)  . 
As  a matter of  fact, according to the definition we have 
given above, we  could not characterize any of  the above 
bills as a "  nominal " bill.  The phenomenon in question 
of  one commodity furnishing the economic basis, or being 
the "economic good l'  of  a series of  bills, may in case of  a 
boom period or in times of  stress, such as was the case in 
America in 1908, be intensified by the feverish hurrying 
of  the  processes  of  production  characteristic  of  such 
periods, as witnessed likewise in  our  own  electrical and 
other industries. 
Let us assume that in consequence of  such acceleration 
a process that normally requires three months is crowded 
into  one  month.  At  the  expiration  of  three  months, 
instead of  the usual one bill for three months issued by 
one  producer,  there  will  be  in  circulation  three  bills, 
drawn at the successive stages of  the process of  production 
(by the producer of  the raw material, the maker  of  the 
partly  finished  product,  and  the  manufacturer  of  the 
finished goods).  This, by the way, is one of  the reasons 
why we  may almost  always  observe at the height  of  a 
boom period a great  increase in  the number  of  bills  in 
circulation.285 
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2.  The second class of  German bank acceptances are the 
industrial acceptances  of  the bank, particularly those in- 
tended to furnish funds for the following purposes: 
(a) To  provide  temporarily  for  current operating ex- 
penses, viz., for salaries, wages, insurance premiums, the 
purchase of  raw material, and the like, purposes for which 
short-time acceptance credit is in every way appropriate. 
(b)  To provide necessary working capital not merely for 
temporary  needs.  As  a  rule, for this  purpose  long-time 
credit should be resorted  to.  The use of  short-time ac- 
ceptance  credit  in  such  a  case,  as  we  saw  above  (p. 
242), involves considerable danger.  It is not  necessary 
to dwell here  on  both  these  points,  as they are treated 
at length  in  the introductory considerations and in the 
discussion of  Hecht's proposal of  a central institution for 
long-time  industrial credit.  What  I wish  to emphasize 
particularly here  is  this:  The volume  of  acceptances  of 
German credit banks  in circulation has been  swelled, to 
no slight extent it seems, for the reason that, as abundant 
experience has  shown, acceptance  credit, when  granted 
for other purposes than that of supplying temporary defi- 
ciencies in operating funds, is often not repaid at  maturity, 
but extended, i. e., the acceptance, before it becomes due, 
is replaced by a new bill issued by the borrower of  indus- 
trial credit.  This bill is again accepted by the bank, dis- 
counted,  and  with  the proceeds  the old  acceptance  is 
taken up. 
The danger involved here is greater for the reason that 
this form of  granting credit is particularly attractive to the 
banks, for it does not require the immediate tying up of 
their own funds. National  Monetary  Commission 
--  .p  --  -- 
3. The third category of  German bank acceptances oc- 
curs when the acceptance credit of the credit banks is made 
use of by bankers, mainly by provincial bankers, to finance 
their own stock exchange speculations or those of  third 
parties  (so-called  speculative acceptances-Spekulatzons- 
akzept) 
I11  this case the possible consequences, and the  dangers 
involved, are the same as those described under 2a, where 
the acceptance credit of  the bank is granted to a manufac- 
turer  to provide  needed  working  capital.  There  is  no 
doubt that throughout the second period the use by bank- 
ers of  short-time credit  on  the strength of  bank  accep- 
tances was resorted  to on a very large scale and to an 
ever-increasing extent, partly  as  a  result  of  the short- 
comings of  stock exchange legislation.  The three-month 
acceptances  of  the credit  banks  are  discounted  at the 
private discount  rate and the proceeds are deposited by 
the bankers in the bank in order to give them at once a 
balance to their credit.  On  the other hand, the bankers 
are debited with the acceptance  only as per date of  its 
maturity.  In this way  the bankers  attain their end  of 
getting money very much cheaper, for to use bank credit 
in another form would cost them as a rule I per cent more 
than the official bank rate. 
In so far as this practice helps to meet the regular and 
healthy demands of  investment, there can surely be no 
objection.  The procedure becomes, however, objectionable 
from the point of  view of  the general economic interests, 
when it promotes extensive speculation and overstraining 
of  the stock market by the general public.  There can be 
no  doubt that this has been indeed the effect to a large 
extent. 
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The fact is that for a  long time past one-third of  the 
loans on current account given by the banks has almost 
regularly been in the form of  acceptances.287 
For all the German credit banks having a capital of  at 
least  I ,ooo,ooo marks each, the ratio between totd loans 
and acceptances  according to the Deutscher Oekonomist 
was as follows: 
[In rnllllons of  marks ] 
Per cent of 















For all the great Berlin banks, taken in the aggregate, 
the ratio  at the end  of  1909 was  33 per  cent;  at the 
end  of  1907, 34.5  per  cent; at the end  of  1908, 31  per 
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The  amount  of  acceptances  of  the  six  Berlin great 
banks  (including their  branches) outstanding at the end 
of  each year was as follows: 
[In million marks.] 
Deutsche 
Bank.  Bank. 









Acceptance credit increased almost continuously, nota- 
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bly in the eighties and nineties, even as compared with the 











made to the table printed on page 288.  The differences 
.  1905  ......  I97 
1907..  ....  1  264 
1908  ......  ,  232 
as  compared with  the  figures  reported  by  Ad.  Weber 
(Depositenbanken, p.  I 17) are explained by the fact that 
in this table surety bills (Avale) furnished by  the banks, 
are included with acceptances. 
Large as the share of  the mercantile acceptances must 
have been, there can be no doubt that relatively, as well 
as absolutely, a very large proportion of  the total accept- 
ance credit given by bankers in this period was made up 
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ful "  speculative " acceptances described under 3.  Least 
objectionable was  the  steady  and  by  no  means  slight 
increase  of  German bank  acceptances in  oversea trade. 
Here they  were  used  to provide reimbursement for ad- 
vances on merchandise in transit, the bank in these cases 
receiving documentary security, viz, bills of  lading.  For 
the Hamburg, Bremen, and London branches of  the great 
banks, devoted  primarily  to oversea business,  a regular 
correlation can  be  traced  between  the  growth  of  that 
branch of  business and the growth of  acceptances. 
A  diminution  in  speculative  acceptances  can  be  ex- 
pected only as a result  of  self-education in the banking 
profession.  This, I feel sure, will be  effectively aided by 
the  voluntary publication,  at regular intervals, of  sum- 
mary balance sheets.  In my opinion the view that credit 
in the form of  acceptances and '  'reports, "  could be made 
"  subject  to certain  rules "  through  legislation is not 
tenable. 
The table printed  below  (p. 288),  shows the amount of 
acceptances  for  the  eight  great  banks  of  Berlin  (the 
Commerz- und  Disconto Bank and the Nationalbank  are 
added), and the amount of  the acceptances of  these eight 
banks  relative  to that in  1883, which is taken  as  100. 
It also shows the relation of  acceptances to their capital 
.stock, their  own  business  capital  (das  eigene  werbende 
Kapital, capital  plus  surplus  funds) and finally to their 
entire earning resources (das gesamnzte  werbende Kapital) , 
i.  e. their capital stock, surplus, deposits and credits on 
current account. 
of  credit  in  the  form of  industrial  aeceptances of  the 
doubtful sort described under ab, and of  the no less doubt- The  table  reveals  the same  development  which  was 
noticeable  with  regard  to the bill  circulation,  namely, 
that the amount of  acceptances  in  1903 had  not  only 
risen  again  to  a  point  reached  in  1889, but had  even 
largely gone beyond it.  In I go8 there was a considerable 
decline in the amount of  acceptances of these eight Berlin 
banks. 
National  Monetary  Commission 
1  Amount of  bills outstanding (acceptances Including "  avals" and checks) 
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In conclusion it is of  interest to note the ratio of  bank 
In percent- 
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acceptances  issued by  all German  credit ban&  (with a 
In percent- 
ages of the 
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I  In 
Year  In percent  ages of  the 
capital of  at least one million marks each) to the average 
bill circulation  (in millions of  marks)  .201 
1.  marks 
1897  .  488.521,ooo 
Year 
lgeS 
1885  '  ~~7,229,700  119 7 j  70  4  1  61  2 
I Average DIU cir- I  Bank acceptances on 
culatron, assum-  December 3 I 
1886  234,412,800 
1887  245.169.000 
1888  1  254,347,500 
1889  /  274.778 100 




1894  I  354.  241.200 
1895  I  452.919.300 
1896  441,416,900 
Ing  an average 
perrod between 
the 
57 4  26 9  257 4 
German credit banks, like others of  the same class, have 
a special motive for investing their own and their deposi- 
tor's funds in the bill discounting business, since they are 
at the same time banks of deposit, and thus are obliged 
to invest a large part of their deposits in securities matur- 
ing  at an early  date.  As  the various  bills  discounted 
become  due  on  different  dates,  the outflow  of  cash  is 
balanced by an assured inflow of  cash to redeem bills, with 
a resulting increase in the cash reserve and the opportunity 
for new investments. 
The first rank in this line of investment is held by those 
bills that are regarded as prime discount bills throughout 
the German discount marhet.  Such are the acceptances of 
the six foremost Berlin banks, namely, the Deutsche Bank, 
figures of 
1883 
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59 0  25  9 
66 o  27 8 
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88 4 
81 4  23  5 
70 8 
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134 0  I  57 5 
130  8  52 9 
l57 6  62 4 
15901  630 
186  6  74 0 
238 6 I  78  1 
1898  .  535,649,400  282  2 
1899  597.832.100  315  0 
1900  670.299.500  1  353 2 
1901  627,917,300  1  330 8 
1883  ,  189,795,100  I  100 0 
1884  2~0,532,ooo  116  z 
232 6 
1902  673,741,800 
1903  745.542.oo0 
1904  885.733.300 
1905  1,052,922,800 
1906  I,  r6z,gaz,goa 








1908  /  I. 188  077,900 
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Disconto-Gesellschaft,  Darmstadter Bank, Dresdner Bank, 
Berliner Handel~~esellschaft,  and the A.  Schaaffhausen'- 
scher Bankverein, as well as two private banks in Berlin, 
Mendelssohn & Co. and S. Bleichroder. 
In  a  general  way, bills  of  the above  description  are 
regarded as representative generic values, in the sense that 
the standing of  the seller who places them on the market 
in any particular case has no effect on the terms of discount, 
that is to say, the rate and the commission, as would be 
the case with other bills offered for discount.  However, 
since in the case of  these prime bills the rate of  private 
discount forms only the upper, not  the lower  limit, the 
statement just  made does not imply that they may not 
occasionally be discounted below that rate. 
The second rank is held by those bills which are regarded 
as prime bills in the local markets of  Berlin, Hamburg, and 
Frankfort-on-the-Main (in addition to those of  the preced- 
ing class) and are discounted at the private rate, provided 
they fulfil the existing conditions of  the bourse as regards 
time and amount, a condition which applies also to those 
of the preceding class. 
According  to  the  regulations  of  the  Berlin  Bourse 
(similar  ones  prevail  in  Frankfurt-on-the-Main),  these 
prime bills (or private discounts) must be payable in Berlin 
or at a  place where there is a branch of  the Reichsbank, 
must be at least 5,000 marks in amount, and run not less 
than  two  nor  more  than  three  months.  However,  in 
fixing and quoting actual market rates of private discount, 
no difference is made between sixty-day and ninety-day 
bills  and between "  representative " and "  Ilonrepresenta- 
tive" private discounts, a practice  which  to my mind is 
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not correct.  This quotation of  the private discount rate 
is made in  Berlin, not  officially, indeed, but  yet  after a 
uniform  fashion,  by  a  private  central  agency,  solely 
interested  in  the  discount  business  and  acting  under 
instructions from those engaged in the business.293 The 
rate of  private discount  prevailing  at the bourse  is  oc- 
casionally  underbid,  as  a  result  of  competition, in  the 
bill-discounting  operations which  take place  outside  of 
the bourse.  The Reichsbank, however, does not buy bills 
in Berlin below the Reichsbank rate of  discount. 
The  acceptances  of  the  largest  mercantile  establish- 
ments  and  industrial  undertakings  are  not  regarded  as 
prime  discounts.  However,  as  noted  in  the  previous 
chapter  (p. 276), these  firms  do  not  generally regulate 
their obligations by means of  their own acceptances, but, 
as a rule, by those of  their bankszg4 
Aside from these acceptances of  the leading commercial 
and  industrial  firms  just  mentioned,  which  are of  rare 
occurrence, the acceptances of  most of  the first-class and 
second-class provincial banks and bankers, while regarded 
as nonrepresentative bills in the above sense, are admitted 
to the benefits of  the private rate of  discount.  In this 
case the terms of  discount  are fixed  in  accordance with 
personal and objective considerations, often quite incom- 
mensurable in their nature.  If, for example, one of  these 
banks, or even a bank not belonging to this class, allows- 
in the opinion of  the bourse, which is specially sensitive 
in this matter-its  credit to be unduly  strained it is apt 
to be promptly reminded of this fact by finding the rate 
of  private discount of  its acceptances raised, even though 
but by one-sixteenth of  I per cent, which thus occasionally National  Monetary  Commission 
constitutes a very effective means of  checking the over- 
loading of  credit in the form of  excessive acceptances.2D5 
Furtherrnore, with regard to this class of  paper, and still 
more with regard to other discount  material reaching the 
bourse and not admitted to the privilege of  the private 
rate of  discount, the principle holds  that only those bills 
are discountable  at private discount that would  pass  as 
"  prime  bills "  even without  the acceptance of  a bank. 
Such, in fact, ought to be the policy  of  the banks them- 
selves in deciding whether a discount is to be made.296 
Though there be ample reason for recognizing the best 
commercial and industrial acceptances as  "prime bills," 
yet the general discount trade gives a decided preference 
to the bank acceptance  as being easier to negotiate, with 
the result that the commercial and industrial acceptances 
are being more  and more displaced by bank acceptances. 
This is one of  the factors that concurred in producing the 
result noted above under C (p. 279), that some 70  to 75 
per  cent  of  all  the acceptances  discounted  by  German 
credit banks and forming part of  their bill holdings are 
bank acceptances, discounted  by the  banks at the rate 
of  private discount.  As these acceptances are payable in 
gold, they are in demand even among foreign firms and 
banks,  especially note banks.  These acceptances repre- 
sent the  amounts granted  by  the credit banks  on  dis- 
counted bills, either to  customers having a current account 
or  to outsiders  having  no  such account, as well as the 
foreign bills.  Here also the policy  is "to take care that 
the terms of  settlement, never exceeding three months in 
duration, shall be distributed over all the months of  the 
year, and, in  particular,  that  relatively  large  amounts 
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shall become due at the end of  each quarter, when  settle- 
ments are heavier " (die schweren Quartalster~zine.)~~~  The 
material in the shape of  bills available  for discounting is 
very large in Germany. 
The sum total of bills of  exchange in Germany, put into 
circulation in the course of  any one year, was calculated 
by W. Prion 29s for twenty-one years, from the proceeds of 
the stamp tax on bills of exchange as follows: 
[In millions of  marks.] 
For 1905 the estimate was  25,506,000,ooo marks, that 
is to say, the formidable figure of  25%  billion  marks, of 
which the Reichsbank bought 9,  I 75 ,ooo,ooo marks' worth, 
or 35.9 per cent. 
For 1905, on the basis of  the stamp tax of  14,100,ooo 
marks and a  total amount of  bills  of  25,500,000 marks 
(deducting 10 per cent for rounding off),  and assuming an 
average of  seventy-five days for the circulation period of 
the bills,  it is  found  that  the  average  bill  circulation 
was  5,1oo,ooo,ooo  marks  (31  per  cent  of  which  were 
bank  acceptances)  .298  Accordingly  for 1907  (stamp tax 
1g,7oo,ooo  marks, total amount of  bills, less  10 per cent, 
in round  numbers 3  I ,~oo,ooo,ooo  marks) we get in round 
numbers the sum of  6 billion marks. 
It may be well, however, to caution the reader against 
drawing any general conclusions regarding the higher or 
lower economic development of a country from the larger 
or  smaller amount of  bills  circulating  in  it.  Such con- National  Monetary  Commission 
clusions, though not infrequently made, are bound to be 
in most cases deceptive.  The amount of  bills circulating 
in a country is determined by an infinite variety of  factors, 
such as the more or less pronounced "industrialization," 
the greater or less degree to which industry and commerce 
are habituated to bill credit, or to its complete or partial 
replacement  by cash payments, the higher development 
and greater refinement or the greater or less costliness of 
the other forms of  credit, such as the collateral and report 
business; the favorable or unfavorable state of  the balance 
of  international  payments; the greater or less  degree to 
which  the population  is habituated  to the  use of  bank 
notes, etc. 
Were  it not  so,  one  would  have  to  infer  that  the 
United  States with its relatively small bill circulation, is 
backward  in  its economic  development.  On  the other 
hand, from the fact  that in France  from  1876 to 1907 
the average per capita bill circulation has increased con- 
siderably more than in Germany, one would have to infer 
that in  France there  had  been  an enormous and rapid 
economic development.  Both conclusions would be wrong. 
France,  for  example,  being  a  creditor  nation  (while 
Germany is a  debtor nation), has a large favorable bal- 
ance of  payments, since both the number  of  her popula- 
tion  and  her  industrial  activity,  especially  her  export 
industry,  have  for some time been  stationary, and the 
available resources of the nation are in large part invested 
in the form of  savings deposits and government  bonds, 
while  commercial  and  industrial  enterprises  and  stock 
companies attract them far less than in Germany.  The 
favorable balance of  payments is  reenforced by the far 
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greater amount of  foreign securities in  the possession of 
France, and by the receipts from the enormous influx of 
foreigners, especially in Paris and on the Riviera 
Hence, before  drawing  general  conclusions  regarding 
any country, after ascertaining the amount of  bills circu- 
lating in it, we shall have to exanline its peculiar econon~ic 
conditions and the peculiar organization of  its systems of 
payment and credit, as we  are trying to do in this book 
for Germany. 
This being premised, let us note the following: 
The  amount  of  bills  held  by  all  the German  banks, 
including  note  banks 300 and  mortgage  was  as 
 follow^^ 302 
l 
Amonnt of  Amount of 
13uilness  yc ,r  1  NE:;:  of  b;i;;n(~~~  Buciness  Yunlbcr of  11111s (111 
l  1  1  year  1  banks  1  mlll~onc  of 
l  marks)  :narks) 
We see from this that in the boom year 1899 the amount 
of  bills in  all the banks (including note banks and mort- 
gage banks) rose  to  2,946,000,000 marks; that in  1900, 
immediately before the crisis, it even rose to 3,087,000,ooo 
marks  and  that  during  the  crisis  of  1901  it  fell  to 
2,776,000,000 marks. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
and the bill holdings of the six great Berlin banks in the  However, as early as 1903, as noted when  speaking of 
the acceptance circulation  of  the banks, the amount of 
bills had again risen to z,g72,ooo,ooo  marks, having thus 
not merely equaled  but even exceeded the amount of  the 
greatest  boom  year,  1899.  This  was  on  the  whole  a 
normal and satisfactory development.  Only an unhealthy 
increase in  the amount of  bills, not  accompanied by a 
quiet  and  steady  progress  in  economic  development, 
would be a matter of  regret. 
Finally, the amount of  bills in the German credit banks 
alone (with a capital of  at least I ,ooo,ooo marks each) and 
the total amount of  bills in the great Berlin hanks alone, 
during the last  eleven  years,  was  as follows  (according 
to the Deutscher ~konomist:  303 
same  year  at  about  I ,ooo,ooo,ooo  (I  ,064,000,ooo)-as 
against  I ,z3  I ,ooo,ooo marks,  given  in  the above  table, 
Prion estimates the share of  those six great banks in the 
Amount of bills 
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total bill circulation for  1905 at 20.8  per cent.  On page 
In 1908  all the German banks  together  held  bills to 
the amount of  4,300,000,000 marks, the German  credit 
banks  together  more  than  2,700,000,000,  the six  great 
Berlin banks in round numbers  I ,~00,000,000.~~~  Assum- 
ing, for I 905. a total bill circulation of 5,  ~oo,ooo,ooo  marks 





I  055 
I  327 
I  583 
I  462 
I  483 
I  518 
1  773 
I  995 
2  447 
2  621 
2,742 
279 we  noted  that as a rule  about 70  to 75  per cent of 
the bill holdings of  the German  credit banks consists of 
bank acceptances.  In that connection we  also discussed 
the various classes of  these bank acceptances 
In the Reichsbank the average amount of  domestic bills 
was as follows: 1905, 775,723,000 marks; 1906,  946,201,000 
marks;  1907, I ,060,076,000  marks 
The latter amount was classified as follows 
(a)  Commerce  transportation, and insurance  .  . . 
(b) Banklnc! and credit instltutrons  (as central agencles 
for the credit demand of business)  .  . 
(C)  Trade and lndustry  .  . 
(d)  Agriculture and allied trades  .  . 
(e)  All other credit users 
Total 
1  Amount  Per rent 
559.975 000 
284  376  ooo 
I1 130  000 
16 647  000 
1 060  076,000 
The profits from the bill  brokerage business, that is to 
say, first and foremost the profits obtained from discount 
transactions,  have not  hithereto been  always separately 
stated in the balance sheets of  the German credit banks, 
but have in many cases been combined with the interest 
earnings, or with the profits gained from trading in foreign 
bills and specie.  (Devzsen  und  Sorten)  .  Such, for example, 
is the practice of  the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. 
In England, on the contrary, according to Edgar Jaff6's 
inve~tigations,~~~  the amount of  bills  at the disposal of National  Monetary  Commission 
-- 
banks for the purpose of  discounting has shown an almost 
continuous decline. 
One reason for this is that the English deposit banks, 
which discount only for their customers, receive from them 
only a part of  their bills for discounting and as a rule the 
less desirable part, while the larger part of  the best bills 
is  turned  over  by  these  customers  directly  to the bill 
brokers, so that the deposit banks are even obliged to buy 
from these brokers a part of  the bills  necessary for the 
investment of  their funds.  The deposit banks themselves 
also sell to the bill brokers all bills on foreign countries, 
as the banks themselves do not discount these. 
Another reason, already mentioned, why the amount of 
bills circulating in England has declined is, because, owing 
to the more advanced organization of  the system of  pay- 
ment and credit in that country, cash payment, at least 
among the largest firms, is tending more and more to take 
the place of  bills, so that the very best commercial bills 
are progressively  disappearing from  the English  money 
market. 
Similarly bills drawn by importers of  raw material on 
the selling commission merchant,  the so-called  brokers' 
paper, are gradually  dropping out of  use, being in large 
measure replaced by  collateral loans on  the strength of 
warrants on merchandise stored. 
Finally, the number of  bills drawn in England on for- 
eign countries is very  small compared to the number  of 
bills drawn by foreign countries on England (about I to g), 
because the prices of goods exported from England, owing 
to the larger market for London pound  bills, are calcu- 
lated  in  pounds  sterling,  and  payment  accordingly  is 
ordinarily made in the shape of  a bill on London. 
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As a result of  all these conditions, the English banker 
wishing to invest his funds is limited in the main to the 
"domestic bills, steadily declining in number and quality, 
while his main interest in foreign bills lies in the accept- 
ance business. "  306 
As  regards  the English  deposit  banks,  there was for- 
inerly a great abuse in the granting of  credit by acceptance 
of  drafts, and as a consequence the acceptance business, 
too,  has  declined  to such  extent that it is  to-day  con- 
ducted only on a very modest scale and under  the safe- 
guard of  securities.  Thus the acceptance business, even 
in so far as it is carried on against shipped goods-that 
is to say, against bills of  lading, etc.-rests  almost entirely 
in the hands of  the so-called merchant bankers 307  and of 
the  foreign  banks1308  while  secured  or  unsecured  loans 
in current account (loans or  advances) constitute to-day 
the principal form of  credit of  the English deposit banks, 
which is granted  exclusively  to their  regular  customers. 
However, owing  to the easy transition  from short-term 
to long-term  credit  and  the  danger  of  tying  up  funds 
in the latter, the same difficulties and complaints arise in 
England  as in  the granting  of  industrial  credit  by  our 
own credit banks.309 
In contrast with these English conditions, we  saw that 
in Germany  the bill circulation  and the bill  holdings of 
the banks, especially the credit banks, are very large, and 
that of  the total assets of  the German credit banks in 1907 
(as well  as in 1895 and  1896), in round numbers, 53 per 
cent appeared under the head of  loans (Debitoren) and 20 
per cent under the head of  bills. 
The rate of  private discount resulting from supply and 
demand of  short-term  credit  at home and abroad-that National  Monetary  Commission 
is to say, the rate of  interest to be paid for short-term 
credit in the way  of  discounting of  private bills-is,  of 
course, subject to frequent and wide oscillations.  From 
it, in conjunction with other factors, especially the Reichs- 
bank  discount  and  the exchange rates,  important  con- 
clusions may be drawn regarding the business conditions, 
especially the state of  trade and  industry.  This is  un- 
doubtedly true, even though,  as we  have  seen, the bill 
acceptance is  not merely  a means of  granting credit  to 
trade  and  industry but serves also to a large extent to 
procure the means for bourse speculation.  But while the 
rate of  private discount corresponds in a general way  to 
the condition of  the money market at any given moment, 
the Reichsbank discount rate is determined not only by 
that consideration but also by the general economic situ- 
ation and by the task, incumbent on the Reichsbank, of 
regulating credit and protecting the money standard. 
It  has been pointed out, and it must be admitted, that 
the difference between the official rate of  discount estab- 
lished by  the Reichsbank for  short-term bill  credit  and 
the rate of  private discount quoted in the open market in 
Berlin  for  short-term private bills  has been  almost uni- 
formly greater during this period than at any other Euro- 
pean money center. 
The differences were as follows: 
Year.  /  Berlin.  1  Paris.  1  London.  I  Vienna. 
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It  is  also  true  that a  difference  of  over  2  per  cent 
-between official and private discount occurred in Berlin 
seven times in the period 1895-1900  and nineteen times 
in the period I 903-1 907, while no such difference was ever 
recorded in London and Paris.310  In explanation of  this 
phenomenon it was stated that this low  rate of private 
discount,  occurring  in  part  simultaneously with  a  high 
rate of  bank discount, was  due  to deliberate endeavors 
on the part of  banking circles to lower  the rate and to 
keep it low, for their sole benefit, in plain opposition to 
the official  discount policy  of  the  Reichsbank, even  in 
cases where the Reichsbank raised the rate of  bank dis- 
count, either to prevent an outflow of gold abroad or to 
draw foreign gold into Germany. 
It is  not  difficult to prove that the above-mentioned 
great  difference  between  the  rates  of  private  discount 
and Reichsbank discount is not due to the cause alleged, 
though it is much more difficult to assign the true reasons 
for that phenomenon with even a comparative degree of 
probability. 
First of  all, it is not true that the banks, and especially 
the great banks, are essent.ially interested in keeping the 
rate of  private discount low by artificial means;  on the 
contrary,  being  buyers  of  bills,  in  which  they  invest 
their funds, they are interested, like every buyer, in being 
able to deduct the largest possible amount of  interest on 
these bills.311 AS  a matter  of  fact, very  large amounts 
of  private bills are held not only by the great banks and 
the other credit banks but also by  the Reichsbank and 
the other four note  banks  as well  as  by  the mortgage 
banks,  cooperative  credit  societies  (Genossenschaften)  , N.ationaZ  Monetary  Commission 
savings banks, insurance  companies, commercial and in- 
dustrial enterprises, etc. 
This  extensive  participation  of  other  buyers  of  bills 
clearly  proves that a low  rate of  private  discount does 
not  always  nor  exclusively  "benefit 'l  the credit banks, 
let alone the great banks.  On the contrary, it benefits, 
first and foremost, the commercial and industrial  firms, 
which, profiting by  that low  rate, draw  on the  banks, 
while  the  banks  are  benefited  only  when,  either  in 
response to demand or of  their own accord, they pass the 
bills  on among their customers or into foreign countries. 
Thus  a  deliberate  or  intentional  "thwarting"  of  the 
discount  policy  of  the Reichsbank  by the large  banks 
by  way  of  an artificial  lowering of  the rate of  private 
discount is out of  the question, especially since they may 
be  in  the market  both  as  buyers  and  sellers of  bills, 
the  latter  especially  in  case  of  orders  on  commission 
(Kowzmissionsauftriigen)  .  As  a  general  rule,  the  large 
banks, having regard to the interest which they have to 
pay on the deposits held by them and the interest which 
they  in  turn draw  for  the credit  which  they  grant on 
bills, collateral loans, and contango (Reports), are essen- 
tially  interested in making  the rate of  private discount 
conform as closely  as  possible to the rate of  bank  dis- 
count, since their outlay on account of  interest depends 
on the rate of  bank  discount, while the receipts  in the 
way of  interest depend on the rate of  interest prevailing 
in the market.  Prion  312  justly  points out that the great 
banks, in calculating the interest on the advances granted 
by them, charge the lombard rate of  interest of  the Reichs- 
bank,  and that when  the difference between  bank  dis- 
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count and private discount  greatly exceeds the average, 
the customers  have  a  strong incentive  to profit  by  the 
cheaper  acceptance  credit, which  would  lead to an un- 
welcome  increase both  in  the offer  of  bills  and in  the 
acceptance obligations of the banks. 
On the other hand, it is not to be denied that the great 
banks  and  other  large  discounting  concerns  exercise 
a  certain  influence  on  the fluctuations  of  the rate  of 
private discount and its quotation at the bourse, seeing 
that in this field, as in others, they are in a position to 
compensate more  or  less  the orders  for the purchase or 
sale of  private bills  by  means  of  the sums which  they 
themselves  invest  in  or withdraw  from  the private-bill 
business, and to bring only the remainder on the market. 
There are also exceptional cases in which the great banks, 
as well as governmental and municipal offices in Germany 
and abroad, are decidedly interested in keeping the rate of 
discount as low as possible, and may attempt, at  any rate, 
by heavy offerings of  cash or other measures, perhaps with 
the cooperation of  all the large discount  dealers  (Gross- 
diskonteure), to lower  the rate of  private discount or to 
keep  it low, for example when  the issue of  public bonds, 
domestic or foreign, bearing a higher rate of  interest is in 
contemplation.  However, the  success of  such  attempts 
will not depend solely on the power of  the large discount 
dealers,  even  if  acting  in  concert,  since  the  discount 
market  is  intimately  connected  with  the entire money 
market, and  consequently  the  rate of  private  discount 
depends on a number of  other factors, such as the rate of 
bank discount and its probable development, the foreign 
exchange  rates, the rates  of  interest  for call  money and National  Monetary  .-  Commission 
monthly  settlement  loans,  etc.  In view  of  this,  and 
the  usually  very  large amounts  of  the bills  marketed, 
a notable or long-continued artificial lowering of  the rate 
of  bank discount will  be found  impracticable, even with 
the  cooperation of  all  the  large  discount  dealers.  In 
fact, if  it were practicable, it would prove a very serious 
matter, especially on those occasions when  it is above all 
desirable that the great  banks  should  go  hand  in  hand 
with the Reichsbank and lend their energetic support to 
measures which  it deems requisite in the interest of  the 
general economic well-being. 
If, for example, as a necessary and natural consequence 
of  an unfavorable turn in the balance of  international pay- 
ments, the foreign  exchange rates  (Devisenkurse)  are  so 
high that there is danger of  an outflow of  gold, especially 
of  a withdrawal of  foreign gold held on deposit in Germany, 
the raising of  the official rate of  bank discount will as a rule 
suffice to stave off  for the time being or postpone the com- 
ing of  the moment at which the exportation of  gold begins 
to pay, unless  indeed there be a demand for  gold at any 
price, as from America in 1907.  This precaution, however, 
can accomplish its object only when, as is usually the case, 
the rate of  private discount is simultaneously raised to, or 
maintained at a correspondingly high level, as indeed gen- 
erally happens. 
If  in such cases the raised rate of  bank discount consid- 
erably exceeds that of  foreign bank discount, foreign coun- 
tries, as a rule, in order to share in the advantage of  the 
high  rate of  discount in  Germany, will  temporarily  in- 
crease their gold deposits in Germany, independently of  the 
state of the balance of  payments, so that in such case the 
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raising of  the bank discount rate may lead to a temporary 
gold  importation  from  abroad; again,  however,  on  the 
supposition that the private discount rate, too, rises to or is 
maintained at a correspondingly higher 
In these cases, however, in which the prevention of  a 
rise or of  the maintenance of  a high level of  private dis- 
count rate would be especially dangerous, the great banks 
and  other  large  discount  dealers, as  a  rule,  have  no 
motive  even  to attempt  the  exercise of  such  an influ- 
ence, because the probability is that, when the raising of 
the bank discount rate is desirable in order to stimulate 
the importation of  gold from abroad or to prevent the ex- 
portation of  gold, the situation will generally be such that 
security issues are out of  question. 
The real reason for the great difference between the rate 
of  private discount and the rate of  bank discount in Ger- 
many is probably to be sought, first and foremost, in the 
fact that in Germany, as contrasted with France, there is a 
relatively much  larger  number  of  persons  or establish- 
ments, seeking to discount, whose competition in taking up 
good bills prevents the formation of  a rate of  private dis- 
count  corresponding more closely to that of  the Reichs- 
bank.  A further reason may be found in the fact that the 
rate of  private discount is made, at least in a general way, 
in conformity with the ratio of supply and demand exist- 
ing in the market.  On the other hand, the rate of  bank 
discount, while fixed  by the Reichsbank with an eye to 
the regulation of  credit transactions and the maintenance 
of  the  gold  standard,  depends  in  the  foremost place 
on  the favorable or  unfavorable condition of  our  total National  Monetary  Commission 
balance  of  payments, whose primary expression is to be 
seen in low or high exchange rates. 
However, another important factor must be considered. 
In Germany, whose  trade and industry make far larger 
credit demands than is the case in France, this demand 
is satisfied, in the first instance, by a great multitude of 
credit banks, in the most diverse forms, a feature in which 
Germany  again  differs  from  France.  Thus  trade  and 
industry in Germany, as regards their demand for credit, 
especially in so far as that demand is to be satisfied by the 
discounting of  short-term bills, depend on the Reichsbank 
only  in  the  second  place.  As  soon  as  this  condition 
changes-that  is to say, as soon as the absorbing power 
of  the credit banks is exhausted, as may happen especially 
in  boom  periods-the  offer of  short-term prime bills on 
the market will not be balanced by a corresponding num- 
ber  of  discount dealers.  As  a result, the rate of  private 
discount will rise and thus the difference between it and the 
Reichsbank rate will  grow  less.  This, it is  true, will  be 
the case  only so long as the Reichsbank in its turn is not 
compelled to raise its rate of  discount in order to restrict 
the demand  for  credit  made  on  it, especially  active  in 
boom times. 
In so far, however, as the credit banks, especially the 
great banks, do exercise an influence on the rate of  private 
discount and the difference between it and that of  bank 
discount, it is indeed their duty to aim at lessening this 
difference and to give their unstinted support to the dis- 
count policy  of the Reichsbank, whose  influence on  the 
private discount market, one of  the most important fields 
of  credit granting, has doubtless been considerably dimin- 
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ished through the concentration of  the great banks.  This 
is the very field in which it is desirable, in the interest of 
the general public, that the strict policy  of  dividends- 
that is to say, of purely private interests-be  subordinated 
to  public economic policy in cooperation with the Reichs- 
bank, the more so, as in this field some of  the functions of 
the Reichsbank, viz, the regulation of  credit, have to a con- 
siderable extent been transferred to the great banks. 
It must  be  acknowledged  that the  great  banks  and 
other great  discount  dealers have hitherto shown a  de- 
cided disposition to be in the closest possible touch with 
the management of  the Reichsbank.  Even Prion  bears 
witness that these banks occasionally are reluctant to buy 
treasury  bills  (Schatzanweisungen) , "  especially when  the 
Reichsbank, from  motives  of  discount  policy, desires to 
throw considerable sums on the market in order to influ- 
ence the rate of  private discount." 314 
(E) THE  LOMBARD  AND  REPORT   BUSINESS.^^^ 
The lombard loan (loan on collateral), like the bill dis- 
count, affords to trade, agriculture, industry, and private 
capital the opportunity of personal credit, for short terms, 
sometimes also for longer terms, but it differs from the dis- 
counting of bills in this, that this personal credit is only 
granted on security. 
The collateral may consist of  merchandise, which in the 
import  and export  trade is  replaced  by  bills  of  lading. 
These the merchant or manufacturer pledges in order to 
obtain bank credit, which, as a rule, is cheaper than mer- 
chandise credit (Warenkredit)  .  This bank credit he there- 
upon uses for a great variety of purposes.  His object in National  Monetary  Commission 
pledging the security and taking the loan may be, as we 
have seen, either to diminish his personal risk in over-sea 
transactions  or to increase temporarily or anticipate the 
realisation of  the working capital tied up in certain indus- 
trial  or  mercantile  transactions.  This  form  of  credit- 
granting by the banks may give rise to the same dangers 
that we  described above, in  connection with  the accept- 
ance and discount credit (transformation of  the original 
short-term working credit (Betriebskredit) into investment 
credit (Anlagekredit) .  Another purpose for which security 
is pledged is to avoid loss through the sale of  merchandise 
at low prices at an unfavorable moment. 
The  collateral  may also  consist  of  securities or  bills, 
the latter being in fact the only kind of  pledges admitted 
in the lombard business of  the bourse. 
Lombard loans may also be secured by insurance poli- 
cies  (at surrender value)  or  mortgages, the latter being 
the most common form in the case of  lombard credit in 
the building trade, although involving some risk, since it 
is not  always  possible  to realize  on  mortgages  at any 
given  time.  Finally  the collateral  may  consist of  any 
other kind of  paper and claims of  all kinds. 
In all these forms of  secured credit the first thing to 
be  considered  is  the value  of  the collateral, the person 
of  the  borrower  being  only  of  secondary  importance, 
which is not the case in ordinary discount credit.  How- 
ever, even in the case of  lombard loans the person of the 
borrower plays some part at the bourse, inasmuch as the 
amount of  the loan, the amounts to be put up (Einschuss) , 
the interest to be paid, and the other  conditions of  the 
lombard  business, in  a  word,  the  acceptance  or  rejec- 
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tion  of  the paper  offered,  are not  decided without  ref- 
erence to the property of  the borrower, his solvency and 
trustworthiness.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  lombard 
business of the banks, with their regular customers, aside 
from the value and quality of  the pledge, and the duration 
of  the loan, sometimes extending to as much  as  three 
months, the terms of the loan are mainly determined by 
the longer  or shorter duration and degree of  intimacy of 
the  business  connection,  the amounts  involved  in  past 
business transactions,  and  the commissions paid, as well 
as the other  advantage's which  the bank  has  derived or 
expects to derive from this connection. 
For obvious reasons,  even short-term  lombard obliga- 
tions  can  not  be  regarded  as liquid  short-term invest- 
ments to the same extent as ninety-day bills, and accord- 
ingly article 17 (44, No.  3)  of  the bank act prohibits the 
Reichsbank and the other four note banks from using these 
lombard obligations for their note reserve.  They bear no 
indorsements, but  only the name of  the debtor, and in 
case of nonpayment at maturity they necessitate a forced 
sale of  the objects pledged, which, in the case of  merchan- 
dise, and even of  securities, according to the state of  the 
market, may lead to poor results or none at all, if  there 
happens to be a simultaneous sale of the same kind of  mer- 
chandise or  securities, or  a slack  demand, or  a  general 
unfavorable condition of  the market.316 
The fact that money thus advanced is tied up for the 
period agreed on is another circumstance tending to make 
it inadvisable for banks to invest large amounts of  their 
depositors'  funds  in  the  lombard  business.  Further- 
more, the objects pledged  can  not  be repledged, except National  Monetary  Commission 
by  special agreement, which  is  not  customary.  On  the 
other hand, bills, or at any rate private bills, being readily 
transferable at any time at the bourse or elsewhere, repre- 
sent  a method of  short-term investment  which  is much 
more liquid, that is to say, more easily realizable. 
This difference must not be lost sight of  in considering 
and estimating the liquid assets of  banks.  At any rate 
the investment of  money in the lombard business as a rule 
is only for a short time, limited, in the practice of  the Ger- 
man credit banks, to days, weeks, or a month, while credit 
in the way  of  bill  discounting is as a rule granted for a 
longer period, since bank acceptances, in order to pass as 
private bills, must run two to three months. 
At  the  bourse  three forms of  lombard loans  are dis- 
tinguished : 
I. Call money  (Tagliches Geld), payment of  which may 
be required at any time.  These loans are mostly made by 
great banks or bankers, on collateral of  securities or bills, 
and the rate of  interest on them is determined by supply 
and demand of  available call money and published  each 
day.  As  a rule this rate of  interest is below the rate of 
private discount charged on two-months' or three-months' 
loans, except at the end of  the month and on other occa- 
sions  of  strong  demand  for  money, for  example,  when 
instalments on  securities issued become  due.  However, 
despite the difference of  periods for which money is loaned, 
the amounts invested in lombard call money and in short- 
term  private  bills  may  constantly  alternate  and  inter- 
change, according as the lender finds the rate of  interest in 
the one or the other field more favorable for his purpose, 
thus making the rates interdependent. 
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2.  Ultimo loans (Ultimogeld), granted from the end of 
one month  to the end  of  the next, usually at a rate of 
interest varying with the existing conditions of the money 
market, being as a rule lower  than  the rate of  contango 
money and below the Reichsbank rate of  interest  on col- 
lateral loans, but higher than the rate of  private discount. 
3.  Money loaned for a longer but fixed term, which at 
the Berlin bourse is as a rule furnished, first and foremost, 
by  the Seehandlung (Prussian State Bank).  That insti- 
tution, as a rule, grants lower rates of  interest  than the 
bourse.  When the time the bills have to run agrees with 
the duration  of  the lombard loan, the Seehandlung, in 
discounting bills,  charges the same rate of  interest as in 
case of  the fixed-term lombard loan-that  is to say, as a 
rule in both cases the rate of  private discount.  In this 
point,  again, it differs  from  the bourse.  On  the other 
hand, the Seehandlung is more exacting than the bourse 
as regards the quality  of  the securities pledged  and the 
standing of  the borrowers.  At the bourse, on the other 
hand, therate of  interest for ultimo collateral loans is as a 
rule higher than the rate of  private discount, but, except 
in case of strong demand, lower than the Reichsbank rate 
of  interest  on  collateral  loans.  The latter, too, makes 
loans only on  certain  classes  of  paper  (art. 13, No.  3b, 
of  the bank act), and the limit to which loans are allowed 
is considerably lower than at the bourse. 
The  opportunity  thus offered by  the Seehandlung of 
obtaining favorable rates of  interest  is  taken  advantage 
of  by the great banks, which are able to comply with the 
severe requirements  of  the Seehandlung as  regards  the 
standing of  the borrower and the quality of  the collateral. National  Monetary  Commission 
The usual requirement is that this collateral shall consist 
of  domestic or foreign government bonds, or of  mortgage 
bonds,  but  it  may  also  consist  of  prime  bills,  which, 
having  already been  indorsed in  blank  by the banks  or 
their  customers  when  discounted,  do  not  have  to  be 
indorsed  again.  Thus  in  the  latter  case,  through  a 
wholly  unostentatious  use  of  bills  as collateral, a form 
of  credit is created which the great banks normally use in 
preference to rediscounting private bills in the open mar- 
ket; normally, as we  have seen, the great banks, when 
they cannot  avoid  a st,ep  of  this  sort, prefer  to redis- 
count long-term private bills in foreign markets or among 
their own customers. 
Aside from the above-mentioned forms, in vogue in the 
lombard business at the bourse, the banks grant lombard 
loans for longer terms, up to three months, in which the 
lombard rate of  interest  is  fixed  by  agreement, usually 
higher than the rate of  private discount. 
The ultimo  money  loaned  in  the lombard business of 
the bourse, against collateral in securities or bins, is  used 
to a very large extent by speculators in securities, either 
to  terminate  or  to  prolong  a speculation, provided, of 
course, that they possess  such securities.  If  such is not 
the case, and the bull speculator  (Haussier) is neverthe- 
less willing to continue the prolongation, he accepts the 
securities bought  as per ultimo, obtaining  the funds for 
the purchase price by  a'loan on collateral repayable  on 
the last of  the following month, for which he has to pay 
the usual rate of  interest for ultimo loans on collateral, 
pledging  the  securities accepted  and  buying  again  the 
same securities as  per  next  ultimo.  This lombard  rate 
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of interest will, of  course, be the higher the more active 
the bull speculation at the bourse. 
The bull speculator may use another method.  Having 
to take up certain securities on the last of  the month, he 
sells them to a third party (his bank) for delivery on the 
last of  the month, receiving payment or being credited at 
the so-called settlement price (Liquidationskursus)  .  At the 
same  time  he  buys  back  the same securities from  the 
third party at the same price,  plus  the so-called report 
money, as per  ultimo of  the next month.  The amount 
of  this  charge  has  to be  such  that  the bank  shall  be 
compensated  for  the  month's  delay  in  receiving  back 
the purchase  price  of  the securities pledged, so  that it 
has  to  receive  the  interest  for  the  intervening  period. 
The rate of  interest-that  is to say, the rate of  the report 
money-is  determined by the market value of  each indi- 
vidual security or in percentages of  the face value (accord- 
ing as the security itself is  quoted in  one way or  in  the 
other). 
On the other hand, the bear speculator-that  is to say, 
the  person  who, expecting a fall in  quotations, has  sold 
securities which  he  does  not  own,  for  delivery  on  the 
last of  the month, but does not wish to procure them on 
the  last  of  the  month  because  the  market,  instead  of 
falling, has risen, or  is  not  in  position to procure them 
because  he  has  no  money,  proceeds  as  follows:  He 
procures the securities to be delivered on the last of  the 
month  by  buying  them  from  a  third  party  that owns 
such securities (his bank), to be delivered to him on the 
same  date.  The  bank  thereupon  debits  him  with  the 
purchase  price  and  at the  same  time  buys  the  papers National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
back from him  for delivery on  the last  of  next  month, 
at the same price, with deduction of  the monthly interest 
to be calculated according to the method above indicated 
(the so-called  deport).  The greater  the scarcity  of  se- 
curities on the last of  the month, and the greater there- 
fore the need for them on the part of  the bear speculators, 
the higher will be, as a rule, the interest which the owners 
of  the  securities  will  require  to be  deducted  (deport), 
which in such cases may thus be lower than the rate of 
lombard interest for ultimo loans prevailing at the same 
time. 
To the speculator, all these cases represent, economi- 
cally, a prolongation of  his speculation; juridically, in the 
last two cases (report business) the combination of  a cash 
sale with a purchase for delivery (report) or a cash pur- 
chase with a sale for delivery (deport). 
The lender in such case is simply dealing with two differ- 
ent methods of  granting credit, that is to say, of  investing 
such money as he may have at his disposal for the time 
being.  In the report business he runs somewhat greater 
risk, because he has to furnish a sum of  money exactly 
equal to the quoted  value of  the security, but then, as a 
rule, he draws  somewhat  higher interest, for as a rule the 
report money is higher than the rate for ultimo money in 
the  lombard  business,  because  the  former  includes  a 
premium for risk. 
On the other hand, if  the lender furnishes ultimo money 
on collateral in the shape of  securities, he runs less risk- 
a matter of  special importance to the owner of  investment- 
seeking funds-because  he is able to fix the amount of  the 
loan on the securities according to their quality, not being 
required to stake his money on them to the full amount 
of the market value.  However, since the rate for ultimo 
money as a rule is  lower than the rate of  report money, 
he usually draws less interest than in the report business. 
From the point of  view of  both the speculator and the 
lender, either case represents either intentionally or at  any 
rate  in  effect  a  fostering  of  speculation  in  securities, 
through the taking or granting of  short-term credit. 
Hence the increase of  the report business, especially in 
case of  a boom, is as a rule a grave symptom of  a decided 
increase  in  speculation.  Accordingly,  a  writer  in  the 
"Frankfurter  Zeitung"  justly  finds  no  cause  for  con- 
gratulation  in  the fact that in the case of  10 banks in 
Berlin  and  Frankfurt  the sums  invested  in  the report 
business rose from 148,550,000  marks at  the end of  1892 to 
284,590,000 marks at the end of  1894,  an increase of  nearly 
IOO  per cent, while  from  1888 to  1889 the increase was 
only 55 per cent (from 344,760,000 to 533,240,000 marks). 
The great banks as a rule will not act as brokers for those 
of  their customers who wish to invest money in reports, 
because that would diminish the amount held in current 
account on  which  they have  to pay  but  slight  interest, 
while they themselves, as a rule, are able to make better 
use of  their depositors' money in the way of  the lombard, 
discounting or report business. 
On  the other  hand,  so  far  as their  own  temporarily 
available resources are concerned, the great banks invest 
heavily in the two forms of  short-term credit, that is to 
say, in ultimo loans, whose rate of interest influences also 
the rate of  private discount,317 and in report money.  In 
particular, when  the domestic  rate of  interest is higher National  Monetary  Commission 
than abroad, the banks  often invest  very  large sums of 
foreign capital in report loans, although in such cases the 
borrower has  to assume  the risk  of  a  variation in the 
exchange rates. 
The tax on the report  business to the full amount of 
the transaction stamp (Umsatzstempel)  ,  based on the com- 
bined amounts of  sale and purchase, led to the result that 
at the German bourses the ultimo loans have declined in 
importance in  the lombard  business, as compared with 
the report loan, especially since the rate of  tax applying 
to the report business might also be applied to the case 
of  the ultimo loan. 
This result was rather regrettable, all the more because 
lombard loans, unlike report loans, have not one and the 
same date of  repayment, and because the pledges by which 
they are secured cannot  as a rule be  realized as easily 
as the securities of  the report loans.  Finally,  the  con- 
ditions of  the report loans are typical,  established once 
for all by the terms of  the bourse, while the terms of  lom- 
bard loans, as we have seen, have to be fixed by special 
agreement applying only to each individual transaction 
Recently  similar  factors  have  been  operative  in  the 
same direction.  By the federal stamp tax law of  June 3, 
1906  (schedule qa, sec. 4), the stamp tax on  the report 
business has been reduced to one-half  of  the former rate, 
the tax being based on the more highly appraised of  the 
two transactions into which the report business is jurid- 
ically  divided.  On  the  other  hand,  the  so-called  im- 
proper lombard business  (unezgentlzches Lombardgeschaft)  , 
in which the recipient of  the securities may return other 
securities of the same kind, is, according to the practice of 
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the revenue authorities, subject to the full tax according 
to the schedule.  Only the taxing of  the lombard business 
proper, of  little importance at the bourse, in which the 
recipient does not enjoy the right referred to, is subject 
to the law of  the individual States.  In Prussia, accord- 
ing to the exemption clause to schedule 58 of  the stamp- 
tax law  of  July  31, 1895, the documents certifying such 
lombard loans are exempt from tax, provided that they 
are repayable within at most a year and that the value 
of  the security given is at least equal to the loan granted. 
Lombard  loans on  the security  of  bills  (which there- 
upon are not further indorsable) with the view of  granting 
but not  of  securing credit  play a very unimportant part 
among the operations of  the great banks. 
The former bourse law having absolutely prohibited the 
dealing in  futures in  the case of  certain  securities and 
greatly hampered it in the case of  others, the cash busi- 
ness (Kassageschaft) has for years been the favorite sphere 
of  speculation in securities at the bourse, the bankers of 
the medium and smaller class having to resort  for that 
purpose extensively to call money in the lombard business 
in  speculating  either  on  their  own  or  their customers' 
account. 
The terms usually charged on lombard business by the 
great banks are about the same as those of  the Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft,  reprinted  below  from  W.  Prion's 
~ork.~1~  They may, of  course, be more or less modified 
in individual cases, the lender enjoying considerable lati- 
tude in this respect, since these terms  merely state the 
maximum amounts of  loans ("up to"). NationaZ  Monetary  Commission 
If the market value of  the securities no longer shows 
the  margin  agreed  on  as  compared  with  the  loanable 
value,  a corresponding additional deposit  (Einschuss) is 
to be furnished, either in cash or in securities.  The dec- 
laration to be signed by customers in the case of  a lom- 
bard  loan  (unless the conditions of  the current account 
are  deemed  sufficient)  has  been  reprinted  by  Friedr. 
Leitner 319  and others. 
MAXIMUM  AMOUNTS  LOANABLE  ON SECURITIES QUOTED AT 
THE BERLIN  BOURSE. 
I. Up to nine-tenths of  the quotation of  the day: Bonds 
of  the German  Empire  and  of  the  German  Federated 
States; mortgage bonds issued by Prussian mortgage banks 
and cooperative credit associations, as well as  the bonds 
of German cities and Prussian counties (Kreise)  ; bonds of 
German (other than Prussian) mortgage banks; stock and 
debentures of  nationalized railways; bank notes of  foreign 
states; gold and silver, in coin and in bars; debentures of 
German railways. 
11.  Up to four-fifths of  the quotation of  the day: Bonds 
of foreign governments and cities; foreign railway bonds; 
foreign farm and real estate mortgage bonds; German rail- 
way shares. 
111.  Up  to three-fourths of  the quotation of  the day: 
Foreign railway shares; bank shares. 
IV.  Up to two-thirds of  the quotation of  the day: De- 
bentures of industrial concerns quoted at not less than 90 
per cent.  Shares of  industrial concerns quoted at  not less 
than  150 per  cent; if  the quotation is higher, the excess 
above  150 per  cent  is  loaned  on  only  to one-half  the 
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amount and with the restriction  that the loan is not in 
any case to exceed  I 50 per cent of  the face value.  Secu- 
rities  quoted more than  20 per  cent  below par are not 
accepted as collateral.  Mining  shares and securities not 
quoted  at the Berlin  Bourse  are loaned  on  only under 
special agreement. 
According to the official statement submitted  to the 
Bank Inquiry Commission under date of  March 3 I, 1908, 
the  sum  total of  lombard  loans of  the  Reichsbank  (on 
5,650 pledge  receipts)  amounted  to 255,687,  IOO  marks, 
distributed as follows : 
Marks. 
I. Agriculture and allied industries (249 receipts). ..........  I, 803,300 
................................  2.  Industry and trades.  17,853,600 
3.  Commerce, transportation, and insurance.. .............  21,562,800 
4.  Banking and finance, viz. : 
............................  (a) Joint-stock banks  320  99,618,900 
(b) Other financial institutions ...................... 88,4zz,ooo 
5. Public savings banks.. ...............................  12,620,500 
................  6. Cooperative credit societies of  all kinds.  5,108,900 
..................................  7.  Private persons.  5,788,700 
8. All others (corporations, foundations, etc.) ..............  2,908,400 
........................................  Total..  255,687, 100 
The exhibit shows also how greatly, in the transactions 
of  the Reichsbank, the lombard business is eclipsed by the 
discount business, a result due, no  doubt, in part to the 
fact that lombard loans are not permitted to be used  as 
reserve for notes. 
In 1907, as was shown (p. 297), the average of  domestic 
bills  held  by  the  Reichsbank was  1,060,076,ooo marks, 
while during the time from December 31, 1907, to April 7, 
1908, the Reichsbank bought  I ,389,357 domestic bills to 
the amount of  2,897,985,044 marks. National  M'onetar~  Commission 
Unfortunately, in the German bank balances lombards 
have hitherto been for the most part combined with "re- 
ports " (under the head "  lombards and reports " or merely 
"lombards"  or  "reports ")  in one total.  This is all the 
more incorrect, because, although both  kinds  of  invest- 
ment  represent  as  a  rule  forms  of  short-term  credit, 
lombards occasionally run for longer periods (up to three 
months).  Furthermore, although in many  respects  the 
two kinds of  investment serve the same purposes, yet, as 
we saw, there are essential differences in these purposes as 
well as in the nature of  the investments. 
As regards the composition of  the "  reports,'' such an ex- 
pert as Felix Hecht3*l  has justly pointed out that they may 
include securities not easily realized, and furthermore se- 
curities issued by the banks themselves and sold on credit 
to  their customers.  However, the same may be true of  the 
lombards. 
Again, in the balance  sheets and reports of  the credit 
banks (with the exception of  some great banks) it has hith- 
erto to a large extent been the practice to make no differ- 
ence between lombard loans on merchandise relating almost 
exclusively to articles the prices of  which are quoted in the 
market or at the bourse and lombard loans on securities, 
the latter including also securities not quoted at  the bourse 
or securities issued  by banks  but not  yet  listed  at the 
bourse.  However,  in  the bimonthly  summary balances 
since published by the great banks  (beginning with Feb- 
ruary 28, I 909) ,  the "  advances on merchandise and ship- 
ments "  are separately stated, and hence it  may be assumed 
that the same will be done hereafter in the annual bal- 
ance statements.  At the same time the combination  of 
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"  reports and lombards " into one item has been retained, 
probably  on  account  of  the  practical  difficulties  that 
would be involved in their separation. 
Finally, some credit banks were accustomed formerly 
to record  advances  on  merchandise  under  the  head  of 
"  secured loans in current account " (gedeckte  Debitoren). 
Thus, in studying past records, we have to bear in mind 
that in the balance sheets of  most banks  the two  items 
were lumped, and thus the growth of  lombards and reports 
for the four great Berlin banks stated below  (in millions 
of  marks) can be traced only for the two items combined: 
DEUTSCHE  BANK. 
DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAPT. 
DRESDNER  BANK. National  Monetary  Commission 
DARMSTADTER  BANK 
Of  the total assets the following amounts (in nlillions 
of  marks)  were  invested  in  lombards and reports. 
1900  27  6 
1901  I9 0 
1902  38  9 
I903  37  9 
I904  45  7 
1905  72  2 
1906  73  3 
1907  48  5 
1908  65  2 
In the Deutsche Bank 
In the D~sconto  Gesellschaft 
In the Dresdner Bank 
In the Darrnstadter Bank 
In  the  Berl~ner Handelsge 
sellschaft 
For all the German credit banks  (with a capital of  at 
least  I ,ooo,ooo marks  each), the  lombards  and  reports 
during the  last eleven years  amounted  to the following 
sums (in millions  of  marks) . 
1890  27  6 
1891  22  7 
1892  276 
1893  24  I 
1894  30  5 
1895  314 
1896  30  5 
1897  231 
1898  323 
1899  31 0 
1870  2 o 
1871  7 9 
1872  14 7 
1873  15  3 
1874  96 
1875  10 3 
1876  7 6 
1877  89 
1878  18 5 
1879  28  o 
1906  1,099 4 
1907  I, 162  6 
1908  1,348 5 
1898  668 8 
1899  736  8 
1900  597  7 
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1880  30  3 
1881  25  3 
1882  24  8 
1883  31  3 
1884  34  9 
1885  24  6 
1886  229 
1887  26  8 
1888  39  7 
1889  41 0 
1901  594 0  1905  970 9 
At the six great Berlin banks the lombards and reports 
during  the last  eleven  years  amounted  to the following 
sums  (in millions of  marks) : 
1902  691 5 
1903  708  2 
1904  773  9 
(F)  THE  BROKERAGE  BUSINESS  (~ommisswnsgeschaft)  . 
The  brokerage business  of  the German  credit  banks, 
especially  of  the  great  banks, has never  remained  con- 
fined  within  the  narrow  scope  assigned  to  the  broker 
(Kommzsszonar)  by  paragraph  383  of  the  Commercial 
Code  (Handelsgesetzbuch) , according to  which  the  term 
broker  (Kommzsszonar)  designates  exclusively  a  person 
who  makes  a  business  of  buying  and  selling,  in  his 
own name  but  for  another's  account, merchandise and 
securities. 
On  the contrary, the German credit banks  have from 
the beginning  also engaged, in  th&r own  name  and for 
other persons7 accounts, in business not consisting of  the 
purchase  and  sale  of  merchandise  or  securities,  but 
which  are  nevertheless  subject  to  the  legal  provisions 
regulating the brokerage business, according to the present 
Commercial Code  (art. 406). 
As  instances of  such operations, the following may be 
enumerated:  The payment of  the indemnity to Spain by 
the  United  States  for  the  cession  of  the  Philippines, 
effected through the mediation of  the Deutsche Bank, as 
set  forth by  Ad.  Weber;322  the  cooperation  of  various 
great German banks in the preparation and execution of 
the nationalization  of  the private railways, first those of 
Prussia and later those of  other German States, begun in 
1879  and  continued  for  several  years,  a  cooperation 
which was very extensive and not confined to the pur- 
chase of  shares;  the  cooperation of  the Dresdner Bank 
and the A. Schaafiausen'scher Bankverein in the acqui- 
sition of  an adequate amount of  stock of  the Hibernia- 
Gesellschaft, undertaken at the instance of  the Prussian National  Monetary  Commission 
Government,  and  again  not  limited  to the purchase  of 
stock; the cooperation of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft in the 
settlement of  the French war  indemnity in 1871-72;  the 
mediation  of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft in the conversion 
of  the stock of  the Roumanian  Railway  Company into 
Roumanian  government  bonds  (I  879-1 88  I)  ; the  reor- 
ganization  of  the  Northern  Pacific  Railroad  Company 
effected  by  the  Deutsche  Bank,  partly  on  account  of 
third parties,  etc.  In the main, however, the business 
carried  on by  the credit banks  and especially the great 
banks is the brokerage business proper, conducted on the 
bourse.  The scope of  this business has been enlarged by 
all the numerous  factors tending toward  an increase of 
power and concentration, some of  which we  have already 
mentioned,  while  others  yet  remain  to  be  discussed. 
Such are especially the relations  to industry, constantly 
growing  more  intimate,  and  the  deposit  offices  estab- 
lished  gradually  in  large  numbers  by  all  the  great 
banks, with the exception of  the strictly centralized  Ber- 
liner Handelsgesellschaft.  For although Waldemar Miil- 
ler323  may  be right in stating  that the business  of  the 
deposit  and  exchange  offices  (~echselstuben)  , " so  long 
as it was confined to the use of  interest and the commis- 
sion business in securities, did not cover the considerable 
expenses for rent, personnel, etc., ' ' yet the originators of 
these  deposit  offices  acted on  the  expectation that the 
makers of  the deposits and the users of  their safes would 
little by  little  tend  to utilize the other facilities of  the 
offices for arranging all their business and property mat- 
ters,  especially  investments  of  capital,  that is  to say, 
entrust them with the brokerage of  their bourse transac- 
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tions.  This assumption, founded on the desires and wants 
of  their clientele, has in the main  proved well founded, 
as well as the further expectation that the clients of  the 
deposit branches would also little by little become habitual 
and  trustworthy  customers  for  the securities  issued  by 
the central offices,  their financial standing and solvency 
being well  known to the local offices. 
The deposit branches have often been criticised as tend- 
ing to encourage to a considerable extent speculation in 
securities on  the part of  their customers, and to urge the 
participation  of  customers  in bourse  speculations, after 
the manner of  "  touting bankers " (Animierbankiers)  .  It 
would  be  difficult to prove the justice  of  this criticism. 
As  a matter of  fact, the central authorities of  the great 
banks  and of  the other credit banks, in view  of  article 
94 of  the bourse law, as well as from an intelligent regard 
for their own interest, have from time to time issued the 
strictest  instructions  to the managers  of  their  deposit 
branches and exchange offices to refrain from encouraging 
bourse  speculation  on  the  part  of  their  customers  or 
others.  These  instructions  are  periodically  repeated. 
It  can not be doubted, however, that, notwithstanding all 
instructions  and  warnings,  certain  managers  of  deposit 
branches  have  offended  in'this respect.  This  is  likely 
to occur again, especially in the case of  those managers 
who, besides their salary, draw a commission merely from 
the net profits of  their deposit branches, a practice which 
it would be well to discontinue.  It  must not be forgotten, 
however, that the public  and the customers themselves 
often dictate to the managers, and not only resent every 
exhortation or warning, but issue their orders in peremp- National  Monetary  Commission  The Germa~  Great  Banks 
tory  form.  It may  also  happen  that  the  speculators, 
without  the knowledge  of  the  manager  of  one  deposit 
branch,  enter  into  speculative  enterprises  with  other 
deposit branches  and use  the knowledge gained  at one 
branch either to check the other or for conclusive action, 
beyond the control of  the first manager. 
Withal, the aim of  these deposit branches and exchange 
offices must be to minister solely to the legitimate invest- 
ment of  funds and to the other needs of  their customers, 
as they arise in the course of  business, and to cultivate all 
the branches of  the regular (current) bank business, with 
the exception of  the security issue business and the security 
business  for  own  account.  To  their  credit  it must  be 
said  that  a  growing  portion  of  these  establishments, 
especially the older ones, have been following the policy 
just commended. 
Extreme caution must be practiced  in  the investment 
business,  both  as  regards  the  securities  issued  by  the 
banks  themselves  and  other  securities.  It can  not  be 
maintained that this caution has always been sufficiently 
observed in the past.  In particular it ought to be laid 
down as a principle that those persons who are compelled 
by  their  financial  situation  to  follow  anxiously  every 
oscillation in  quotations and who  are  severely  affected 
by  every diminution  in  interest  income  should not be 
advised to invest  in  dividend-paying securities, because 
these are subject to great fluctuations not only as to divi- 
dends but also as to the market value, corresponding to 
the fluctuating  rate of  dividends.  On  the other  hand, 
those  persons  who  insist  on  acquiring  dividend-paying 
paper, either because of  speculative tendencies or of  their 
needs  of  seeking higher returns than are usually offered 
by government bonds and other securities bearing a fixed 
rate of interest, would do well at any rate to "mix," that 
is to say, to buy small amounts of  safe stock of  various 
industrial enterprises, in order not to stake everything on 
one card.  The better returns in one branch  of  industry 
or in one company will then offer them a kind of  insurance 
against  diminished  returns  in  other  companies.  The 
principle of  the distribution of  risk  applies also  to the 
private  capitalist,  and  it is  the  duty  of  managers  of 
deposit branches to exert their influence in this direction, 
whenever their advice is asked. 
Aside from these  cases, it is  the practice  among  the 
managers of  the great banks, so far as I know, to instruct 
the managers  of  deposit  branches and  exchange offices, 
though not always with success,  to abstain from all recom- 
mendations and advice beyond a mere statement of  facts 
within  their  knowledge  regarding  the  securities  to  be 
bought or sold, especially when  such securities have been 
issued  by the great banks themselves, since in  such case 
the very fact of  issue expresses the favorable opinion of 
the issuing bank.  When customers ask for information, 
it is the branch bank manager's duty to point out to them, 
to the best of  his  knowledge, those  factors which, after 
careful examination, he thinks will  be  apt to determine 
the intrinsic  value, safety, prospective yield and market 
of  the securities to be purchased or sold, including in the 
appropriate case, the conditions under which they are ad- 
mitted to trading at the bourses at home or abroad.  He 
should on principle decline to utter any prognostications 
regarding the future development of the market value, no National  Monetary  Commission 
matter  how  urgent  the  questions  which  are  almost 
always addressed to him on this point.  This  caution is 
especially  demanded  in view  of  the fact that the very 
shrewdest  experts in the money  market, possessing the 
most minute knowledge of  the innumerable factors that 
influence the market value, profess to be  unable to lay 
down any rule  as the result  of  their  experience, except 
that, as  they  say  at the bourse, "it always turns out 
the other way." 
In the brokerage  business  at the bourse,  the Berlin 
great banks 324  and a wide circle of  other establishments 
are guided by certain "business regulations," which in the 
main are identical, as shown by the printed blanks.  They 
embody the following principles : 
I. All orders given to the bank for the purchase or sale 
of  bills, foreign bills of  exchange (Valuten), or securities 
are executed  by  the bank  in  its own  name,  unless  the 
contrary is expressly agreed on, or unless the bank itself 
in the individual case makes an express statement to the 
contrary.32s Any phrases used in the transaction, such as 
"  I bought or sold for you," that might indicate an agree- 
ment with a third party, do not alter this rule.  In each 
instance the bank has the right to charge, in addition to 
the commission, the regular expenses, especially the usual 
brokerage (Kurtage) and stamp tax.326 
2.  Any bourse transaction undertaken by the bank for 
its customers is subject to the rules in force at the time 
in  that  kind  of  business  at  the  domestic  or  foreign 
bourse where the transaction is to be executed, even when 
the business is  transacted by the bank in its own name. 
The  bank  has  the right  to prolong  term  engagements 
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made at the bourse, if  it sees fit, or to cancel them entirely 
or in part, unless the customer gives explicit modifying 
orders  regarding  the pending  engagement,  which  order 
must be received at the latest on the last but one exten- 
sion day-the  so-called day of  premium declaration (Pra- 
mienerklarungstag)  .  The bank has the same right of  can- 
cellation before this term, if  the person  giving the order 
fails,  on  demand,  to pay  such  supplementary  margin 
(Einschuss) as may be required (see No. 3, below, second 
paragraph) .327 
3. In order to safeguard all claims against the customer 
through the current business  as well as for 
any bill obligation that may be pending (unless a special 
arrangement has been made), the bank has the right of 
pledge or retention  in regard to any securities, including 
interest coupons, annuity (Rentenscheine) and profit-share 
certificates, and all other valuable paper which may have 
come into its possession or keeping in the course of  busi- 
ness or in any other  However, if  such securities 
are turned over to the bank expressly in the name or on 
account of  other persons, the bank possesses the right of 
pledge or retention in virtue of those  claims only which 
may have arisen in connection with the respective securi- 
ties.330 Securities  deposited  in  German  banks  without 
being provided with a German stamp are not subject  to 
the right of  pledge and retention.331 
If  the margin (Einschuss) or the balance due the bank, 
including any pending bill obligations, is not paid when 
due, a written  demand for it is sent by registered mail. 
If  this remains without effect, the bank, in order to satisfy 
its claims, has the right, without further warrant or period National  Monetary  Commissi~n 
of  grace, to sell the pledges at  any time and place in accord- 
ance with the provisions of  articles 1221 and 1235 of  the 
civil code.332  Article 1237, section  2, and article  1238 of 
the civil  code are  not applicable to this case.  Neither 
has the customer the right, according to article 1246 of 
the civil  to require any departure from the regular 
form of sale of  the pledge. 
The demand just  mentioned  is deemed to have been 
delivered if  it is sent by registered mail to the last address 
known to the bank, even if  the letter comes back marked 
"  Can not be delivered. " 
The acquisition of  the pledged object by the broker him- 
self  is permitted, according to article 400 of  the commer- 
cial code, only in the case of  goods which  have a market 
or exchange price and in the case of  securities which are 
officially quoted; the broker has  to prove that the price 
which he charged to the client is  the market price pre- 
vailing at the time  of  the execution of  the order;  this 
time is the date ' '  at  which the broker delivered the notice 
of the  execution  for forwarding to the client " (art. 400, 
sec.  2, paragraph  2  of  the commercial code), a provision 
which, like a number of  others (articles 387,400, secs. gb 
and 5;  articles  401, 405,  sec. 2), is  intended  to prevent 
the so-called "Kursschnitt "-that  is to say, speculation by 
the broker to the detriment of  the client. 
As a wilful contravention of  article 400, section 2, para- 
graph 2, is subject to penalty (according to article 95, sec. 
I, No.  2 of  the bourse law), most of the great banks have 
established a special bureau whose duty it is to see that 
the law is  strictly  observed  by their  representatives  at 
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the bourse.  This or some other bureau  also  makes sure 
that the proper stamps are used. 
According to articles 3 and 4 of  the law "relating to the 
duties of  business men (Kaufleute) in the safe-keeping of 
securities belonging to third parties"  of  July 5, 1896 (the 
so-called bank deposit law), the broker who carries out an 
order for the purchase of  securities (of  the kind specified 
in art. I) is bound to send to his client within three days 
a list of  the items purchased, with indication of  the nomi- 
nal value, the numbers, and any other marks of  distinction 
(Stuckeverzeichnis-itemized  statement).  According to  the 
business regulations of  the great banks,  and most of  the 
German credit banks, however, the banks as a rule require 
of  their clients a written waiver of  the sending of  the item- 
ized statement in case the securities purchased have not 
been fully paid, and  the client  remains indebted  to the 
broker for the  rest, the purchased paper being left as pledge 
in  the custody of  the broker.  The business regulations 
expressly state that the object of  this waiver is to prevent 
the passing of  legal title in the purchased securities to the 
client,  which, according to article 4 of  the bank deposit law, 
would  be the effect (at the latest) of  the sending of  the 
itemized statement.  As it is, however, the broker-that  is 
to say the bank-retains  title until the purchase price has 
been fully paid.  Until this is done, the items purchased are 
not credited to the deposit account of  the client and do 
not become his property.  Accordingly they are not kept, 
on behalf of  the client, separate from the bank's own hold- 
ings or those of  third parties, and are not entered in the 
deposit book according to their distinctive marks (art. I of 
the bank deposit law).  On the contrary, they are booked National  Monetary  Cornrnissiort  The German Great  Banks 
by the piece without indication of  number, this record be- 
ing often known in the great banks by the name of  Account 
C (Konto C), in contradistinction to the custody account, 
pure  and  simple,  of  the items  belonging  to the  client 
(provincial  banker)  himself  (Deposit Account A),  and 
Deposit Account B.  The latter  comprises the items  in 
regard to which the provincial banker  (the client of  the 
great bank) making the deposit or transmitting an order 
for  purchase  has  made  the  declaration  (in  compliance 
with art. 8 of  the bank deposit law) that the items are the 
property of  others or that the purchase is to take place 
for the account of  others.  This Deposit B, therefore, is 
"not free;" that is to say, it does not serve the bank as 
security for all its claims against  the provincial banker. 
In order that the broker (the central banker) may dispose 
of  items booked under Deposit Account B, it is necessary 
in all cases, according to legal decision, that the client 
(the provincial banker)  shall  have declared, that he in 
turn had been given express consent to such disposition. 
According to article 3, section 2 of  the banking law, the 
waiving  of  the  requirement  of  an  itemized  statement 
(Stucbeverzezchnis) may be done by bankers in any form, 
even verbally, and once for all, but in the case of  persons 
who are not bankers only expressly334  in writing and only 
for each individual case. 
Only when the remainder of  the purchase money has 
been paid, the purchased items, on demand of  the client, 
are transferred  from  the  item  account  (Account C)  to 
the Deposit.Account A. 
As  regards  the  method  of  keeping  securities booked 
under  or  transferred  to  Deposit Account A,  the  great 
banks as a rule adopt the arrangement by classes, that is 
to say, securities of  the same kind but belonging to differ- 
ent customers are kept together, the items belonging to 
any particular customer being, of  course, marked by bands 
bearing the customer's name and the nominal value of  the 
items  This method of  keeping  by classes enables each 
item to be found more  readily and is  therefore preferred 
to the method of  keeping all the securities belonging to 
one customer in a portfolio marked with his name.  At 
the same time, for the purpose of  having a check on the 
holdings, all banks carry both "  living" account books, in 
which each customer has one account for all his securities, 
and a "  dead " account book in which each class of  securi- 
ties has  an account,  the names  of  the customers being 
entered  under  each  class, with  the  items  of  that class 
standing in their names. 
In the case of  mere safe-keeping  of  securities, or where an 
order for purchase is followed by safe-keeping, many pro- 
vincial banks and private bankers are in the habit of  ob- 
taining from the customer an authorization to return secu- 
rities of  equal value in place of  those deposited or pledged, 
or to use them for their own  (the bank's) profit.335 Such 
authorization has to be made in conformity with article 2, 
section  I  of  the bank  deposit law, expressly in  writing 
and for  each  individual  case, only  when  the  person  in 
question is not a banker.  The great banks, however, do 
not make a practice of  obtaining such authorizations. 
The  banks,  although  not  required  by  law,  regularly 
furnish a memorandum giving the issue numbers of the 
securities, generally by signing and returning one of  the 
two slips (bordereaux) which accompany the order. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
No perfectly reliable conclusions can be drawn from the 
balance sheets hitherto in vogue concerning the extent of 
the brokerage business of  the great banks,  On the one 
hand,  the heading ' '  Commissions " (Provisionen) covers 
not  only  the  commissions  derived  from  the brokerage 
business in its widest sense, but also in many cases all or 
part of  the commissions derived from the discounting of 
bills,  which  really  ought  to  be  booked  under  the bill 
account,  because  these  commissions  are  not  always 
deducted from the particular bill entries, but are calculated 
only  at the reckoning  of  the whole  account  (from  the 
amount of  the total transactions)  .336  Again, the commis- 
sions earned in the current account business are in many 
cases booked  under the commission account, so that this 
account, homogeneous as it looks, is really a  ' ' collective 
account. " 
What  has been  said  here of  the  commissions earned 
through  the discounting  of  bills  holds  true  also  of  the 
purchase and  sale of  securities, the commissions due  to 
the banker being either calculated from the total transac- 
tions  of  the account, on the larger side, or  being at once 
added to or deducted from the calculated total amount of 
each individual statement.337 In the former case the net 
profit in the way of  commissions is transferred in one sum 
at the reckoning of  the account to the collective account 
"Commissions;"  in  the latter  case  the commissions are 
booked  in  a  separate  account,  but  in  that  case,  if  a 
hrong  impression  is  to  be  avoided,  they have  to  be 
picked  out singly and transferred  to the commission ac- 
count.  This distinction while of  no importance as regards 
the  question  of  the  total  amount  of  profit  from  the 
brokerage business,  does  exert  an influence,  of  course, 
334 
on  the  amount  of  commissions.  Thus,  for  example, 
according to a resolution  of  the Stamp Union  (Sternpel- 
vereinigung), the  total  transactions  in  dividend-paying 
securities are no  longer  carried in  ordinary  account,  as 
was done so long as a commission was calculated only from 
the total transactions of  that account (on the larger side), 
but a special commission is charged, both for the purchase 
and for the sale of  dividend-paying securities, which are 
booked in a separate account, the dividend-paying security 
account. 
With the reservations resulting from the above state- 
ments, an approximate idea of  the extent of  the broker- 
age business in the German credit banks may be gained 
from the following  table, since a very  large part of  the 
commissions  (Provisionen)  booked  on  the  commission 
account (Provisionskonto) is undoubtedly derived from the 
brokerage business proper. 
According to the Deutscher Oekonomist,  338  the German 
credit banks having a capital of  at least I ,ooo,ooo marks 
each showed the following totals (in millions of  marks) : 
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From this it appears that the commissions (Provisionen) , 
with the exception of  the years of  depression of  1891 and 
1892, kept on  rising, very rapidly from 1885 to 1890, less 
rapidly but very steadily for the  period following 1892; but 
since the total gross profits from 1885 on (with  slight in- 
terruptions in 1891-1893,  1901  and 1903), also  rose very 
considerably,  the  ratio of  commissions  to  gross  profits 
remained nearly uniform throughout the period I 885-1 908, 
showing,  in fact, a slight decline. 
At  any rate, almost  one-fourth  of  the  gross  profits 
throughout that period resulted from commissions derived, 
no doubt, for the most part from the brokerage business 
(Kommissionsgeschiift)  .339 
(G) THE TRANSFORMATION, FOUNDING, ISSUING, SYNDICATE, 
AND  SECURITY  BUSINESS. 
(I)  The transformation.  and founding business. 
The objections  to the German  "mixed  banking  sys- 
tem"  are twofold.  On the one hand it is urged that the 
.deposits are not sufficiently secured by liquid assets, which 
implies a lack of  soundness in administration.  This point 
will  be dealt with at greater length in section 8.  On the 
other  hand,  it is  pointed  out  that  the transformation 
and founding business extensively conducted by the Ger- 
man credit banks involves grave dangers both for the credit 
banks themselves and for the community at large.  This 
point we shall now proceed to discuss. 
In previous sections  (pp. 4  and 5) we  noted  that the 
prompt undertaking of  the transformation and founding 
business-that  is to say, the financing business proper 340 - 
by the German credit banks, corresponded to an urgent 
need  of  the industrial and commercial  interests of  Ger- 
many.  The  very  earliest  German  credit  banks  were 
created, first and foremost, for the purpose of  promoting 
trade and industry, as indicated by the very firm name of 
the Darmstadter Bank: "  Bank for Trade and  Industry." 
The establishment in Germany of  special banks of  deposit 
was out of  the question, mainly because, in view of  the 
low level of  prosperity of  the population, such banks would 
not have yielded sufficient profits. 
Furthermore, in  the very beginning of  the volume we 
pointed out that the special nature of  the transformation 
and founding business demands a vast amount of  technical, 
business, and general economic knowledge and experience, 
which  could only  be  accumulated  little by  little in the 
credit banks.  The need  for  such  experience, combined 
with the continuous watching of  the money market and 
an accurate knowledge of  the capital market, as well as of 
the factors  connected  therewith,  such  as  the capacity 
of  the market for taking up  new securities and the con- 
ditions  determining  the  market value  of  these  securi- 
ties,  etc.,  was  of  itself  sufficient  to  create  "special 
economic  organs,"  which,  to use  Schaeffle's expression, 
were  to perform  "the special  function of  the initiative 
in the joint-stock industry. '  ' 
Moreover,  the  necessity  of  a  division  of  labor,  of 
combination  and  decentralization  of  establishments,  of 
supplying  the wholesale  demand  and of  overcoming or 
warding  off  foreign  competition,  gave  rise  to industrial 
large-scale production,  whose  favorite form is  the stock 
company, because it obtains credit more easily than the 
individual  entrepreneur,  and  on  that  account  is  more Nationul  Monetary  Commissio~ 
susceptible of  expansion.  This was another reason  why 
in Germany the task of  transforming  existing establish- 
ments into stock  companies,  or  of  founding new  stock 
companies, fell to the share of the banks, as central reser- 
voirs of  funds available for productive purposes, the stock 
companies  themselves  representing  a  concentration  of 
small amounts of  capital, each in itself insufficient for pro- 
ductive utilization. 
Large-scale  industry  and  capitalism,  bearing  to each 
other the reciprocal relation of  cause and effect, were thus 
enabled, by the aid of  the German credit banks, to unite 
in an inseparable alliance, which impressed its character- 
istic stamp on the entire economic development of  Ger- 
many during the two epochs under discussion. 
We saw (pp. 38 and I I 5) that in Prussia, up to the inter- 
vention of  the credit banks, during the entire quarter of  a 
century  from  1826  to  1850, only  102  stock  companies, 
with  a  combined  capital  of  about  638,000,0o0 marks, 
were formed.  In contrast with  this, the first epoch here 
considered  (more accurately the period terminating with 
the beginning of  the second half  of  1870), was marked by 
the founding of  295  stock  companies with  a  capital  of 
about 2,404,760,000 marks, due, first and foremost, to the 
activity of  the German credit banks in the field of  trans- 
formation and issue. 
But even this was merely the first puff  of  wind before 
the beginning of  the storm. 
Beginning with the second half  of  the year  1870 up to 
1874, 857 stock companies were formed in Germany, with 
a capital stock of  3,306,810,000 marks.  This overproduc- 
tion  in  transformations 341  and  new  flotations  in  these 
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four and one-half years, as well as the great abundance of 
money and the fever of  enterprise and speculation, were 
of  course  either  created  or  at least  reinforced  by  the 
sudden inflow of  the  ~,OOO,OOO,OOO  francs of  the French 
war indemnity.  Combined with other factors, that over- 
production was one of  the most important causes of  the 
great crisis of  I 8  73 .342 
In the first epoch  (from the middle of  the nineteenth 
century  to the  year  1870), when  industrial  enterprises 
to a large extent lacked sufficient capital and energetic 
entrepreneurs, the banks, in many, perhaps the majority 
of  cases, had to take the initiative in the work of  trans- 
formation and founding.  A natural incident of  this proc- 
ess was that the banks often took a share, at times a very 
considerable share, in the transformed or newly  founded 
enterprises through the purchase of  stock or other direct 
participation.  As noted above (p. 72), the 1852 report of 
the A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein  expressly  states 
(p. 3) that it is the function of  a large bank "to  induce the 
capitalists of  the country  to direct  idle  capital  toward 
those enterprises, which, when  properly launched, in  re- 
sponse to real needs, and offering the guarantee of  expert 
management, bid fair to bring adequate returns."  It  was 
that very  bank, the  oldest  German  credit  bank, which 
as  early  as  1851 took  a  share  in  the  founding  of  the 
Horder Bergwerks- und  Hiittenverein, in 1852 in that of 
the  Colner  Bergwerks-Verein,  the Colnische Baumwoll- 
Spinnerei, the Colnische Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft, 
the Ciiln-Miisner  Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft,  and  the 
Colnische Baumwoll-Spinnerei und Weberei, wisely  mak- 
ing choice of  local  enterprises in its near vicinity, which National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
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it was in position to keep under steady surveillance.  In 
this way it avoided  those  severe losses  to which  other 
banks, not equally cautious, were subjected at that time. 
Thus the Darmstadter  Bank, shortly before the crisis 
of 1857, took part in seven industrial enterprises which in 
1856 it had  transformed  into stock companies or newly 
founded.  These  enterprises  had  a  combined capital  of 
2,500,000 thalers, in round  figures.  Among  them was a 
woolen and cotton factory, a spinning and weaving factory, 
a mining company, the Oldenburg-East  Indian Shipping 
Company,  and two  machine  factories.  This permanent 
investment  in  stock  meant  afterward  corresponding 
amounts permanently written  off.  In one case, that of 
the Mannheim woolen factory, the entire stock was lost. 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft in  1857 founded  the Hein- 
richshiitte mining and smelting works with a capital of 
about  I ,750,000 thalers.  In 1863, after heavy losses, it 
was found necessary to separate that enterprise from the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft and  to place  it  in  control  ofthe 
.business managers,  with  participation  of  the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft on  a  silent partnership  basis.  In 1872, the 
establishment was  merged  in  the newly founded  Dort- 
munder Union Aktiengesellschaft fiir Bergbau- Eisen- und 
Stahlindustrie, which  was  destined to cause still greater 
trouble to the bank. 
The  Mitteldeutsche  Kreditbank  suffered  heavy  loss 
through the acquisition  of  the Ludwigshiitte  at Bieden- 
kopf, which  in  1858 had been transformed  into a  stock 
company  under  the name  of  Oberschlesischer  Hiitten- 
verein, the share of  the bank amounting to one-third of 
the stock.  The same happened with the Wasungen cigar 
factory, in  which  the  bank  acquired  a  share  interest 
in 1856. 
This initiative  in the business of  transformations and 
foundings, often dearly paid for by the banks, was largely 
reinforced and facilitated by  the defective legislation of 
that time, which  made practically  no  provision  for  the 
true indication nor the strict civil and penal responsibility 
of  the persons  concerned in the founding.  It  was only 
the new  law  (Novelle)  of  1884  that defined  the  term 
"  founder " (Griinder)  ,  provided for the complete publicity 
of  the founding process, and introduced strict civil  and 
penal responsibility of  the founders and their associates. 
The argument accompanying that law describes the pre- 
vious legal condition in words which deserve to be rescued 
from oblivion (pp. 87-88) : 
"The  founding process was concealed; the true indication of 
the founders was  not  legally  required;  the leading  pmmotelis 
acted  without  any  sense  of  responsibility  and  were  exempt 
from  any  kind  of  contrd.  The  temptation  to  put  private 
interest above that of  the company to be established was  too 
powerful.  No  person  was  appointed  and no  measures  taken 
to guard the interests of  the company.  For a long time after 
its foundation the newly-formed company possessed  no corpo- 
rate autonomy and remained  defenseless in  the hands of  per- 
sons whose only object was  their  profit as founders.  At the 
same time the public, which these  persons, without any risk or 
responsibility, had  in every possible manner sought to attract 
to a  participation  in  the company,  either formally organized 
or  to be  organized, had  no  reliable  data whereby  to form  a 
correct estimate of  the enterprise. 
In a  number  of  the  criminal  proceedings  that  took  place 
during the crisis just  past  [1873] it was  not  even  possible  to National  Monetary  Commission 
ascertain the names of  the authors and publishers of  the pros- 
pectuses  by  means  of  which  the public  had  been  invited  to 
subscribe." 
So long as it was possible to start industrial transforma- 
tions and foundings under the screen of  anonymity and 
freedom from any strict responsibility, there was of  course 
also an  opportunity for "  industrial stock jobbery''  ("indus- 
trielle Ausschlachtungen")  which Sattle1-,3~~  with a  some- 
what strange exaggeration,  describes as  the  essence of trans- 
formation in  general; and, above  all, overcapitalization 
of  the worst kind was the order of  the day.  There was 
no inquiry into the prices  allowed for the property  con- 
tributed  (Apports), nor  into the compensations  allowed 
for  the founding  and the preparations  for  it, nor  into 
the  intermediate  profits .made.  The  premium  on  the 
shares issued by the company did not flow into the reserve 
fund of  the company, as it does now, but into the pockets 
of  the original  owners  who  were  credited therewith  on 
account of  the property contributed by them (Apports) . 
As, moreover, the names of  the founders and the interme- 
diate profits were in nowise required to be published  the 
transformation  and  founding business could not fail  to 
become a special trade offering peculiar attractions.  On 
the other hand,  it is not surprising that of  the 857 stock 
companies, with a capital of  3,306,810,000 marks,  which, 
as we have  seen,  were  established  in the time between 
the middle  of  I 870 and the beginning of 1874, that is to 
say, before the new Joint  Stock Companies  Law of  1884, 
not fewer than I 23 were in liquidation as early as Decem- 
ber,  I 874, and 37 were bankrupt (im Konlzurs)  344. 
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As may be gathered from what has been said, the great 
banks in the first  epoch  very largely footed the bills for 
the transformations and foundings of  that time.  It must 
be further admitted that, after quickly earning the profits, 
often very  large,  from the transformation  or  founding, 
they did not leave the enterprises to their fate, as they 
might easily have done under then existing legislation, but 
retained a share in them, often to a larger extent than was 
compatible  with  the  principles  of  liquidity.  This  was 
done not only in order to retain the necessary  influence 
over the industrial enterprise, but also, as expressly stated 
in many reports of  that time, in order to exercise a perma- 
nent  supervision  over  the management  of  those  enter- 
prises, a measure which was deemed indispensable in the 
interest of  the issue credit of  the banks, since the trans- 
formation  or  founding  was  in  most cases  followed  by 
issues of  stock or bonds.  This was the main reason why 
it became customary even in the first  epoch  to appoint 
some of  the directors of  the credit banks as members of 
the supervisory boards of  industrial enterprises. 
Even in the second  epoch  (1870 to the present date) 
there was no lack  of  instances of  permanent  direct par- 
ticipation~  of  the banks in industrial enterprises, leading 
to  the  same  untoward  results  as  in  the  first  epoch, 
though during this more recent period they have been the 
exception. 
Thus the Disconto-Gesellschaft  involved itself in great 
loss and trouble ever since 1872 because of the foundation 
of  the Dortmunder Union, and after 1890 because of its 
participation  in  the Internationale Druckluft- und Elek- 
trizitats-Gesellschaft  (Popp)  and in the Venezuela  Rail- National  Monetary  Commission 
way.  The  same  happened  to  the  Dresdner  Bank  by 
reason  of  the taking  over of  the Anglo-Dewtsche  Bank 
(1892)  and the consequent  participation  in  the Export 
and  Warehouse firm (Export- und Lagerhaus-Gesellschaft) 
J. Ferd.  Nagel, which  cost  that bank  about 2%  million 
marks. 
The  Deutsche  Bank  was  for  years  involved  in  great 
difficulties  and  annoyances  through  the  foundation  of 
the Deutsch-Oesterreichische Mannesmann-Werke, estab- 
lished  under  its direction  and with  its participation  in 
1890, the bank having the presidency in the supervisory 
board.  In  1900  the capital stock of  that concern had 
to be reduced from 34,000,ooo to 25,000,000 marks. 
In the case of  the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, which 
remained in the main a flotation bank even in the second 
epoch, the loss in 1873 arose not so much from voluntary 
participations in new foundations, in which it lost in round 
figures 158,000 thalers, or  1%  per  cent of  its capital at 
that time, as from securities of  newly founded companies 
that could not be disposed of-that  is to say, involuntary 
participations-such  as are apt to occur in the issue busi- 
ness.  It suffered  also  exceedingly large  losses  through 
the founding of  the German  Local  and  Street  Railway 
Company (Deutsche Lokal- und  Strassenbalzn-Gesellschaft) 
and the Petroleum  Exploration Franchise  and Oil  Land 
Company  (Petroleum-Bohr  Gerechtsamen-  und  Oelland- 
Gesellschaft) ,  in I 880. 
It can  not  be  doubted  (see  p.  242,  under  b)  that 
the  permanent  assumption  of  large  risks  in  enter- 
prises  by  credit  banks  is  incompatible  with  the funda- 
mental  principles of  sound  banking  policy.  Transgres- 
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sions of this rule have almost always brought their own 
atonement, often of  a cruel nature.  For this reason  the 
credit banks, during the second epoch, in order to avoid 
direct participation, have to a large extent resorted to the 
intervention of  trust and finance companies for the pur- 
pose  of  exercising their promoting  activity and for  the 
financing of  subsidiary banks. 
The reorganization  of  an existing  enterprise is  a  less 
serious undertaking  for  a  bank  than  a new  foundation, 
because the earning capacity of  the enterprise has already 
been tested for some time before transformation.  On the 
other hand, it is more risky than a new foundation, if  the 
transformation  is  compulsory.  Such  may  be  the  case 
when  the industrial  enterprise is  compelled to resort  to 
this  expedient  for  the  purpose  of  canceling  the  bank 
credit  granted to it.  It may  also  happen  that a  bank 
which had granted to the enterprise long-term or short- 
term operating credit, which in  default of  repayment has 
little by little been transformed  into permanent loans, is 
compelled to demand the transformation in order, first of 
all, to mobilize that credit in the form of  stock, and then 
to realize on that stock as soon as the state of  the market 
may permit. 
The special danger  of  such  a  compulsory transforma- 
tion, as noted in another connection (pp. 243 to 247), lies 
in this that under the pressure of  necessity it is not pos- 
sible to give due consideration to the dangers that may 
arise from the transformation, in view of the overwhelming 
competition  of  other stock companies, or of  the general 
politcal, economic, and business conditions, and the market 
conditions and prospects of the special branch of industry. NationaZ  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
There arise the further questions, whether the enterprise 
is suitable for the form of  a stock company, whether  it 
can be made to pay in view of  the greater running expenses 
which may with certainty be expected to result from the 
transformation, and, finally, whether a sufficiently capable 
management is on hand and can be permanently retained. 
All these questions are apt to receive insufficient considera- 
tion in the case of  compulsory transformations, with dire 
consequences sooner or later. 
On  the whole,  however,  the transformation  and issue 
business during the second epoch proceeded  much  more 
quietly  and conservatively  than  during the first  epoch, 
the reason being that the banks had little by little acquired 
greater  technical  and  business  experience in  this  field, 
and  were  less  and  less  required  to  take the initiative 
in  foundings  and  transformations.  That  initiative was 
transferred  to a  constantly increasing extent to industry 
itself, which became more and more independent in pro- 
portion as it was enabled to determine  the necessity and 
manner  of  investments of  capital.  In many cases also, 
as we have seen, foundings or transformations were occa- 
sioned,  during  the  second  epoch, in  obedience  to  the 
requirements of  the cartel policy, by purely technical con- 
siderations, as for example, the consolidation of a number 
of  small competing enterprises into one large concern, the 
consolidation of  different stages of  the process of  produc- 
tion  in  one establishment, the combination  of  iron  fur- 
naces with coal mines and conversely, etc. 
Moreover, beginning with  1884, the intentional or cul- 
pably  negligent  overvaluation  of  property  contributed 
(Apports) was made very difficult, the concealment of  the 
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names  of  the founders and  their  associates and  of  the 
founders' profits, or of  profits made pending the organiza- 
tion, was rendered virtually impracticable  under  existing 
legislation,  and  the  value  of  shares  or  compensations 
granted  as  an  equivalent  for  property  contributed  or 
taken over was made subject to thrice-repeated audit by 
persons strictly liable civilly as well as criminally. 
These  new  conditions  helped  the industrial  concerns 
to meet the crisis of  1900 infinitely better than that of 
1873.  But in  addition,  the new  law  of  July  18, 1884 
(art.  185b, Nos.  I  and  2), had  placed  the stock com- 
panies  under  obligation to establish a legal reserve fund, 
to which a certain part of  the yearly net profits and the 
premiums  on  any new  stock  was  to be  transferred  (see 
art. 262, commercial code).  As  a result, very consider- 
able reserve funds  had  been accumulated, especially  by 
industrial companies, by the time the crisis of  1900 burst 
upon  them,  strengthening  their  financial  status,  and 
consequently  also  their  power  of  resistance  in  critical 
times. 
2.  The issuing, syndicate, and security business. 
(a) THE ISSUING  BUSINESS  IN  GENERAL. 
The issuing business is discussed in this place, because its 
development by the German credit banks has been such 
that it became a branch of  the regular banking business 
from the very  start, and because the issuing business in 
very many cases involves the granting of  credit, though 
this is not  implied in its nature.  Accordingly  it seems 
appropriate to discuss the issuing business in connection 
with the other credit business of the banks. National  Monetary  Commission 
It  was normally to be expected that the issuing business 
would grow in importance in Germany as a consequence 
of  increasing prosperity, because the higher  and middle 
classes in Germany have long been in the habit of  invest- 
ing  their  available  funds  permanently  either  in  enter- 
prises, participations, real estate, buildings and mortgages, 
or in securities.  Bank deposits in Germany are made up 
mainly  of  the  temporary  investments  of  the  available 
funds belonging to these classes and the operating reserves 
of  the trading  classes.  By  far  the commonest form  of 
permanent investment is in securities. 
(a)  METHODS USED  IN  THE ISSUING  BUSINESS  PROPER,  AND IN 
THE  PRELIMINARY  STAGES. 
The issuing business of  the banks, which in Germany 
absorbs  a very  large portion  of  banking  activity, is by 
no means one of  those occupations in which large profits 
can  be  raked  in  without  trouble  and  "without  corre- 
sponding work."345 On  the contrary, it requires  a vast 
amount of  labor, sagacity, and caution on the one hand 
and of  financial, economic, and mercantile knowledge on 
the other.  In particular, those who conduct it must have 
a clear insight into the situation and prospective develop- 
ment of  the money and capital market, the relation  be- 
tween supply and demand in both markets, and into the 
working of those factors that may influence the rates of 
bank and market discount, the exchange rates, as well as 
the absorbing capacity of  the ordinary and extraordinary 
circle of  customers. 
Thus, even before underwriting  the proposed  issue, a 
careful and detailed examination is required, which pre- 
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supposes a large amount of expert knowledge and practical 
experience.  The decision whether  the undertaking (that 
is to say, the financing) is advisable or not depends in each 
case not only on the examination of  the intrinsic value of 
the securities to be underwritten,  the reasonableness of 
the price demanded, and the solvency and trustworthiness 
of  the debtor  (state, commune,  corporation,  company, 
etc.), but on a large number  of  other important factors, 
which require close examination.34a 
First and foremost, in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of  banking  policy, to wit, the distribution  of 
risk  and  the maintenance  of  the liquidity  of  the assets 
which might be endangered by the tying up of  funds for 
a considerable period, it is necessary to inquire whether a 
quick  distribution of  the proposed issue-that  is  to say, 
a  smooth  and  prompt  completion  of  the financing and 
issuing business-may  be expected in view of  the situation 
of  the home market (occasionally also of  foreign markets), 
the general economic and political conditions, the existing 
and prospective ease or stringency of  the money market, 
the known or probable issue of  like or similar securities, 
some of  which may bear  a higher rate of  interest, or be 
presented  under  better  auspices,  or  correspond  more 
closely  to  the  existing  favor  or  inclination  of  the 
public,  etc. 
When the question of  undertaking the issue has already 
been answered in the affirmative, the fixing of  the most 
advantageous conditions of  underwriting and of  payment 
requires the closest study and discussion.  The very man- 
ner of  underwriting  will differ according to the situation 
of  the money  and capital  market  and according to the National  Monetary  Commission 
periods for taking over and payment.  In particular, these 
and a number of  other factors have to be  considered in 
order to decide whether it is advisable to underwrite the 
entire amount in question unreservedly (in a lump or  in 
partial amounts, to be determined by agreement), or only 
a part without reserve, the other ' '  under option. ' '  In the 
latter case it becomes  important to decide whether  the 
prices of  the ' '  options ' ' may be the same for all the partial 
amounts to be taken up gradually, or whether the prices 
of the '  ' options ' ' may be graduated in a manner advan- 
tageous to the financing  establishment,  while  the seller 
in  such  cases  will  frequently  demand  rising  "option" 
prices.  As regards the mode of  payment and the periods 
of  taking up and paying for the partial amounts assumed 
or to be assumed at option, the bank will have to try to 
secure the most  advantageous conditions, having regard 
to the conditions of  subscription that may afterwards be 
deemed practicable. 
If  during the negotiations there occurs an unfavorable 
turn  either in the financial situation of  the debtor or  in 
the money and capital market or in the political or gen- 
eral economic situation, and the bank while unwilling to 
undertake the issue desires to bind the other party, it may 
be found advisable to grant for  the time being  a certain 
credit to the party  in  question, and this will necessitate 
the determination of  the conditions of  payment of  interest 
and principal.  At the same time, however, the bank may 
either try to secure the right of  preemption of the future 
loan, against which the credit is to be reckoned at a  rate 
which  is known  to be seriously offered by a third party 
(which the bank  will, of  course, try to avoid  as much as 
The German Great  Banks 
possible), or  an option on the entire future loan or a part 
of  it, at a price  or  graduated  prices  to be  determined 
beforehand.  The  manner  of  this  graduation  and  the 
amount  of  the graduated  prices  may again  give rise to 
protracted negotiations. 
As regards the principle of  the distribution of  risk, the 
bank will have to consider whether it is not already over- 
loaded with securities of  the same kind, or even, if  earlier 
issues  of  the  same  debtor  have  not  been  completely 
placed, or whether such  overloading of the market with 
the same or similar securities exists or is to be expected. 
On the other hand, it is to be considered whether the risk 
of  the underwriting may not be diminished by the forma- 
tion  of  an  underwriting  syndicate  (Uebernahmekonsor- 
tium) or subsidiary participations (Unterbeteiligungen)  . 
If  the underwriting has been decided on, the juridical 
features of  the contract  may  sometimes present  serious 
difficulties, especially as regards the juridical form of  the 
act of pledging demanded by the bank of  property items 
intended to secure the loan.  In that case foremost atten- 
tion must be paid to the law  (possibly foreign law) pre- 
vailing at the place where the items pledged are located, 
and  at the same time  all the measures will  have to be 
agreed on which are necessary and admissible in order to 
afford security also to the individual holders of the certifi- 
cates of  partial indebtedness to be  issued-for  example, 
the  appointment  of  a representative,  whose  rights  and 
duties will have to be defined.  Again, it may be neces- 
sary that the so-called war clause be introduced, especially 
if a considerable period elapses before subscription, as is 
apt to be the case when the issue is to be made in different National  Mofietary  Commission 
countries simultaneously, so that official listing will have to 
be secured from several authorities.  In virtue of  this war 
clause the bank would have the right to withdraw  from 
the  contract  in  case  any  of  the  countries  concerned 
becomes  directly or indirectly involved in war.  It must 
be borne in miqd, however, that other unfavorable events 
may occur, and hence it will be advisable to endeavor to 
secure the insertion of  a general withdrawal  clause-for 
example, to the effect that the bank has the right to with- 
draw in case the  quotation  for the leading  government 
securities, such as German Imperial bonds or consols, shall 
have fallen below a certain point. 
Furthermore, the contract will have to provide that the 
debtor shall agree to furnish all documents, balance sheets, 
and other evidence required for the purpose of  the subscrip- 
tion  or  demanded  by  the  respective  listing  authorities 
(Zulassungsstellen)  ;to  remit to the issuing house some time 
before maturity the amounts required for the payment of 
coupons or  certificates drawn by  lot, together  with  the 
commission due to the bank  for this service, which also 
has to be specified; finally, to publish in designated peri- 
odicals those periodic notices which are legally required, 
in particular, statements of  the number  and designation 
of  the securities which (in the manner agreed on-that  is 
to say, by lot or by free sale) shall become subject to re- 
demption.  In regard to such redemptions, drawings, etc., 
the debtor will also have to agree to make these redemp- 
tion~,  as well  as the payments on coupons, at the home 
of  the underwriting bank, etc. 
After  the underwriting  has been  agreed on, the next 
thing to determine will be the price at which the issue is 
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to take place in order to complete the transaction as expe- 
ditiously as possible.  On this point  the following obser- 
vations may prove of value: 
A ~urely  arbitrary fixation of  the issue price is hardly 
ever ~racticable;  on the contrary, the limits within which 
anything like a free determination of  the issuing price is 
possible are, as a rule, decidedly narrow. 
In the case of  shares or bonds of  a new enterprise the 
lower limit is fixed by the price paid by the underwriter, 
with the addition of  interest, stamp tax, fees and commis- 
sions, and a suitable profit.  This profit, especially in the 
cases covered by article 41, section I, of  the bourse law,347 
must also include a suitable premium against risk.  The 
upper  limit is defined by the market quotations of  enter- 
prises of  the same or similar nature, already listed at the 
bourse, and the price of  which will correspond in the main 
and in the long run to the intrinsic value, the dividends 
distributed, and the prospective earnings. 
In the case of  domestic state and communal loans the 
upper limit of  the issuing price, unless determined by the 
debtor himself, will be fixed by the quotations reached by 
former loans of the same debtor or by corresponding loans 
of  other  states  or communes  enjoying  about  the same 
credit.  It may  happen, however, that these  quotations 
are kept artificially low  with a  view  to  the impending 
new loan, or that they are merely nominal and could not be 
maintained'in case of  large transactions.  The lower limit 
in this case, too, is the price to the underwriter, plus inter- 
est, stamps, fees,  and  a  profit, which, if  possible at all, 
varies in the case of  domestic state and communal loans 
between one-eighth, one-fourth, and, in rare cases, one-half National  Monetary  Commission 
of  I per cent, while even in the case of  foreign state loans 
a profit of  three-fourths of  I  per cent is a rarity. 
The issue prices  of  securities offered  for sale simulta- 
neously at several bourses at home and abroad have, of 
course, to be so fixed at home that a disturbance of  the 
domestic sales through foreign sales during the period of 
subscription  and for  some time after is not  to be appre- 
hended. 
In case of  an issue of  bonds of  a debtor who is already 
represented  by  listed  securities bearing  a higher rate of 
interest, the holders of  these may be tempted, immediately 
upon the publication  of  the new  issue,  to sell their old 
securities, if  they can  do so  with  profit, and  to buy the 
new securities bearing a lower rate of  interest, in case the 
price of  issue is such that a rise may be expected.  As this 
operation  is  apt to  disturb  and  disorganize the whole 
market in these securities, it may be desirable to guard 
against it by an appropriate price of  issue and by other 
conditions of  subscription. 
It may, indeed, happen that in the issuing of  securities 
the price has to be fixed at a higher figure than might nor- 
mally have been the case, especially when in time of  a rising 
market, by reason of  an actual or expected increase in the 
earnings of enterprises and the intervention of speculation, 
the entire level of  quotations rises.  This will of  necessity 
have a  marked  effect  on  the premium  on  newly  issued 
securities, especially on those issued in connection with an 
increase of capital of  existing companies.348 
The time at  which an issue (subscription) is to take place 
is of  great importance as regards the question of  under- 
writing in general and as regards the issue and the price of 
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issue.  It is to be ascertained whether the bank or market 
discount, which may be low at  the time of  the underwriting, 
or the pertinent foreign exchange rates, might not, through 
existing or impending causes, tend to become more unfa- 
vorable at the time for which the issue is planned.  If  the 
debtor desires the issue to take place at a certain time, per- 
haps coincident with the end of  a quarter, when there is 
notoriously a strong demand for cash in the money market, 
it may be well to inquire whether it would not be better to 
fix  the date at the beginning  of  the next  quarter,  for 
example, at the beginning of  January, when, by reason of 
payments on coupons, of  bills, salaries, mortgages, interest, 
rent, etc., there is wont  to be  greater  ease in the money 
market. 
If  this  be  not  feasible,  it remains  to  be  considered 
whether the taking up of  the securities should not at least 
be made easier for the subscribers or purchasers through 
a graduation of  the periods of  taking up and payment, or 
through facilities in the way of  calculating the interest, etc., 
whether a larger bonus should be paid to the bankers whom 
it is proposed to interest in the placing of  the securities,34O 
whether the requirement of  a cash deposit at the time of 
subscription should be waived, etc. 
Furthermore, steps should be taken, especially through 
a low price of  issue, to prevent the market from being dis- 
organized, after the close of  the subscription, by immediate 
realizations of  so-called  "concert  subscribers"  (Konzert- 
zeichner), that is to say, persons who, in  expectation of  a 
rise of the paper issued, subscribe solely for the purpose of 
selling their subscriptions at  once on the bourse, no matter 
how insignificant the profit.  One way of  preventing this National  Monetary  Commission 
is to give some kind of preferential treatment to those sub- 
scribers who are willing to agree not to sell the securities 
allotted to them  for some months, but  to deposit them 
with the issuing firm. 
Finally, as regards the time after the issue, especially 
when an underwriters' syndicate (Uebernahmekonsortium) 
has been  formed, it remains to be considered up to what 
amount-usually  stated in  the syndicate  contract-the 
securities shall be bought up in the market in order to pre- 
vent an immediate or premature fall of  the quotation be- 
low the price of  issue, in so far as this fall is not justified 
by the general situation or by the state of  the bourse. 
According to the *practice and banking  etiquette pre- 
vailing in Germany, an issuing firm is not merely justified 
but positively in duty bound, by the requirement of  the 
"care  of  an ordinary issuing firm, ' ' to effect  such pur- 
chases of  its own  issues.  This  practice  can  not  be  re- 
garded as an attempt to produce an artificial rise of  quo- 
tations or to effect their artificial "regulation."  There is 
always the danger that speculators may attempt, imme- 
diately or very soon after the issue, to depress the market 
value by speculative sales or realizations, while there may 
be  no  intrinsic  reason for a  decline.  To  guard against 
this, it is well to have some one in the market ready to take 
up  these  speculative  securities,  at least  within  certain 
limits.  Of  course this precaution must not be carried so 
far that speculators might be encouraged to speculate "  on 
the back "  of  this very syndicate which is ready to purchase. 
The execution of this part of the issuing programme thus 
requires special knowledge of the bourse and special cau- 
tion and alertness. 
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The considerations here sketched have to be applied to 
a greater or less extent before, during, and after each issue. 
In addition, special difficulties may arise in certain cases, 
especially in connection with the underwriting of  foreign 
loans, when care has to be used to insure against fluctua- 
tions in exchange, or against the thwarting of  the issuing 
operation  through  arbitrage  operations  of  domestic  or 
foreign  concerns, made possible by  the condition of  the 
market. 
At any rate, the multitude of  factors to be taken into 
consideration in this field suffices  to show how incorrect it 
is to suppose that this important branch of  the activity 
of  the German  credit  banks  can  be  conducted  without 
corresponding work, sagacity, and prudence. 
There have been cases in which the principles controlling 
the issue of  foreign loans were not observed by German 
issuing firms, any more than by foreign firms, possessing 
much longer experience; but aside from these, it will have 
to be admitted that in the immense number of  instances, 
especially in the second epoch, there were but very few 
cases in which the issues could be said to have been under- 
taken in a rash or otherwise questionable spirit.350 
The prospectuses published  for the purpose  of  issue, 
which, it must be said, are for the most part read only 
afterward  and  only  when  something  unfavorable  has 
happened, have almost invariably contained, in conformity 
with the law, the data necessary for forming a judgment 
regarding the intrinsic value of the securities issued.  They 
have also abstained from any undignified  advertising which 
for that matter would not be allowed by the authorities on 
whom the admission to the bourse depends. National  Monetary  Cornmissiota 
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The German credit banks know from their own expe- 
rience, or from that of  other banks, that nothing iq  likely 
to injure the reputation of  a bank so severely and so last- 
ingly among its customers and among the general public, 
as a failure to discharge in the most conscientious manner 
its duties in connection with the issue of  securities 351 
(4 THE EXTENT  OF THE  GERMAN  ISSUE  BUSINESS 
According  to the Deutscher  Oekonomist, the market 
value of  all the capital raised in Germany by way of  issues 
since 1889 was as follows (in millions of  marks) 
From  1883 to the end  of  1907, there were  issued  in 
Germany securities to the selllng value of  40,000,000,000 
marks in round figures. 
For the years 1900-1907  both the Frankfurter Zeitung 
and the Deutscher Oekonomist have arranged the issues 
by classes of  securities, in the tables reprinted m the fol- 
lowing pages. 
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Face value 
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GERMAN  sECURITIES-~O~~~U~~  I 
Ra~lway  shares 
Bank shares 
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Industrial shares 
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Insurance companies' shares 
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In  these  tablesss2  the  amounts  of  shares, bonds, and 
mortgage bonds set down are those officially reported in 
the market.  It is important, however, to note that the 
following were  omitted: Conversions; issues  effected pri- 
~ately,  outside of  the official  market  (which  were  only 
stated  when  they  were  advertised  in  public  journals); 
mere introductions  of  securities already  quoted  at Ger- 
man bourses;  finally, new  securities which  made no  de- 
mands  on  the  market, inasmuch  as  they  were  issued 
solely  for  the purpose of  exchange against  shares, etc., 
of  another enterprise. 
The figures given by the Frankfurter Zeitung are seen 
to differ  from those of  the Deutscher Oekonomist very 
considerably, both  in  the  enumeration  of  the  different 
classes of  securities and in the amounts under the head of 
the same classes of  securities.353 
A word of  explanation is required in regard to the issues 
of  foreign state loans (see article 2  I I. G. 2d, below), noted 
in both tables, because on the authority of  these tables 
the complaint has been made, even before the Bank Inquiry 
Commission, that these issues have evidently had a decided 
effect in making our balance of payment more unfavorable. 
The prospectuses thus far issued concerning the intro- 
duction of  foreign securities at the bourse give no indica- 
tion of  the amounts that have really been placed in Ger- 
many.  On  the  contrary,  according  to  the  regulations 
for  listing  hitherto  in  force,  the  entire  foreign  loan, 
even if it was offered simultaneously in different  places at 
home and abroad, had to be noted at the German bourse, 
for example, in Berlin, even when only, say, one-third of 
the entire loan was intended to be placed in Germany and National  Monetary  Commission 
was so placed.  It is true that, in virtue of  this notation, 
the other two-thirds also had acquired ' ' the right of  domi- 
cile in Germany, ' '  as one member  of  the Bank  Inquiry 
Commission  expressed  it.  However,  the  effect  of  this 
favors not  only the foreign country, which  in such case 
might throw on the German market the two-thirds placed 
in  that  foreign  country,  but  it  also  favors  Germany, 
because the one-third actually paid for in Germany may 
also be  utilized  abroad,  if  desired, since the conditions 
of  listing  at the  foreign  bourses are as a rule identical 
with those in Germany. 
If  we  were  to  change  our  regulations  for  listing, 
foreign countries would  doubtless do the same, and the 
consequence would be that the foreign market would be 
closed to us as regards the part of the foreign loan placed 
in Germany, a result which might be attended with grave 
consequences in critical times and in time of  war. 
Furthermore, in regard to the statements made in the 
tables,  it is  to be  noted  that foreign countries, if  they 
expect a profit, also partake  of  the foreign loans placed 
in Germany.  It must  also be remembered that foreign 
securities always tend to return to the home country, as 
was  extensively illustrated  in the case of  the Austrian, 
and in recent years also in the case of  the Italian securities. 
How large a part of  any foreign loan has been perma- 
nently  placed  in  Germany can  thus not  easily be  esti- 
mated,  and this  is the reason why  the  two  tables  (see 
note 353 on p. 837) differ so much. 
(b) THE ISSUING  OF INDUSTRIAL  SECURITIES.~~' 
The business of  issuing industrial securities is the key- 
stone  of  the  vast  structure of  the  industrial  relations 
between  banks  and  industry, whose  foundation  is  the 
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current-account  business.  The  reverse  process, namely 
the case in which the issue of  new securities of  an enter- 
prise  transformed  into  a  stock  company  becomes  the 
bridge for a regular  current account and credit business 
between the two parties, is of  much rarer occurrence.  The 
dangers to the banks  arising from both  classes of  busi- 
ness are equally great, being perhaps even greater in the 
current-account  business, for  the simple reason that, as 
we  saw, no  fixed  rules  for  industrial  credit  have  yet 
been developed in the German banking business, assuming 
even that such rules could possibly be evolved.  On the 
contrary, the technique of  the issuing business, its premises 
and limits, have become  more and more familiar to the 
German credit banks, often through sad experience.  Their 
details are thus well known, both as regards the issue of 
new securities of  an existing enterprise to be transformed 
into a stock company (which, according to art. 41  of  the 
bourse law can take place only one year after the entry 
of  the company on the register and after the publication 
of  the first balance sheet), or those of  a new enterprise, or, 
finally, those arising from an increase of  capital, fusion, or 
reorganization.  Of  course the risk in the issuing business 
will be less when the bank acts merely as broker, that is 
to say, on account of  the industrial enterprise, though in 
its own name. 
Speaking of  reorganizations, it may be  remarked that 
the German credit banks, especially the great banks, have 
rendered important service in that direction to distressed 
enterprises, as well as to the public in general, especially 
during  the second  epoch.  After effecting the reorgani- 
zation, which  often involved great  expenditure of  time, National  Monetary  Commission 
capital  and labor, and  could  only be carried out in the 
face  of  great  difficulties  and  opposition,  the banks,  by 
staking  their  own  issuing  credit,  restored  the  earning 
capacity of the reorganized enterprises and put an end to 
the prevailing disorder in the trading of shares, bonds, and 
mortagages.  This was illustrated  not only by  the reor- 
ganization~  of  the Berlin mortgage institutions,  effected 
by  the cooperation of  all the great banks  and banking 
houses of  Berlin, after the collapse of  1901, but also by a 
series  of  other  reorganizations,  such  as  those  of  the 
Lothringischer Hiittenverein Aumetz-Friede and the Dif- 
ferdinger  Gesellschaft  (now  Deutsch-Luxemburgische 
Bergwerks-  und  Hiitten-Aktiengesellschaft  in  Bochum 
und  Differdingen).  After  their  financial  and  technical 
reconstruction,  these  companies  contributed  materially 
toward raising the pig-iron industry of  Luxemburg and 
Lorraine to its present commanding position. 
On  the whole, however,  the relations of  the banks to 
industry take the slower  way  of  current-account  credit 
and the many forms of short-term credit above described, 
in which  the temporary  demand for  operating credit is 
satisfied.  Only little by little is the long-term credit de- 
veloped which finds its natural commercial expression in 
the issue of  shares and bonds. 
By such an issue the connection between the banks on 
the one  hand,  as principal representatives  of  the capi- 
talist system of economic organization, and industrial pro- 
duction on the other hand, is drawn so tight that they are 
thereafter joined  "for better or worse."  Sooner or later 
this connection finds further  expression in the appoint- 
ment of  members of  the bank directorate to the supervis- 
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ory council of the industrial enterprises, while occasionally 
some  "captains of  industry"  are appointed  as members 
of the supervisory councils of  banks.  The former practice, 
as was pointed out elsewhere, is virtually caused by the 
necessity for  the banks  to maintain the influence which 
they have gained through the issue; also by a regard for 
their issue credit, which makes it the duty of  the bank, 
according to the well-established and  sound practice  of 
German banking, to retain such permanent control.  The 
converse practice-that  is to say, the appointment of  lead- 
ing personalities of  an industry as members of  the super- 
visory boards of  banks, where, as a rule, they have much 
less  influence than  the representatives  of  banks  in  the 
management of industrial companies-is  not merely an act 
of  courtesy toward the latter, but also the manifestation 
of  the mutual  desire  for  an outward  expression  of  the 
close business  relations  that have  been  established and 
the expression of  a desire on the part of  industry to main- 
tain the closest possible agreement in views and aims as 
regards the industrial policy of  the banks. 
Appendix IV gives a statistical view  of  the extent to 
which such permanent  contact between the two parties, 
in mutual desires, demands, and interests, has been estab- 
lished  during the second  epoch by  the appointment  of 
representatives  of  the  great  banks  to  the  supervising 
boards of  industrial companies.  The table also shows the 
extent and degree of  intimacy (manifested especially in the 
filling of  the office of  president) of the industrial relations 
of  the great banks to the several branches of  industry.355 
This form of  "friendly"  relations through the filling of 
positions on the supervisory board, it must be confessed, National  Monetary  Commission 
was  sometimes effected only after considerable unpleas- 
ant argument, as, for instance, when  the Dresdner Bank 
gained  two  places  on  the  supervisory  board  of  the 
I,a~rahiitte.~~~ 
The slow and laborious work which often has to precede 
the moment  at which the question of  an issue becomes 
practical can not be too highly  estimated as regards its 
economic value.  The cautious  forward movement,  step 
by step and stage by stage, of  a private industrial enter- 
prise or an industrial stock company, that may have been 
founded by the aid of  a bank, toward higher and higher 
aims is aided by a gradually growing current-account and 
acceptance credit in proportion as the yearly surplus from 
operation does not suffice for the necessary reconstruction 
and additional construction.  The burden of  interest thus 
imposed on the enterprise is in the nature of  things ac- 
commodated  to  the  state of  improvements  or  enlarge- 
ments  of  the  time  being,  The larger  and  permanent 
investment credit  subsequently granted  to the strength- 
ened enterprise is merely the natural closing act of  this 
process of  healthy and organic development assuming the 
form of  an issue of  stocks or  bonds.  Examples of  this 
may be found in  abundance  in the connections of  every 
great bank with industrial enterprises  especially  in  the 
mining, machinery, and electrical industries. 
On the other hand, the banks have found an especially 
important and extensive field ot activity in the promotion 
of  industrial  combinations,  consolidations, and  fusions, 
which, as a rule, are carried out exclusively or preferably 
through the agency of  issue credit.  This tendency of the 
business  policy  of  industrial  enterprises, manifested  in 
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various ways even during the first epoch, became especially 
pronounced in the second epoch through the development 
of the cartels.  Thus, as early as  1853 the Phonix Com- 
pany in Laar, established as a stock company, arose from 
a combination of four iron furnaces and the Nassau iron- 
ore mines.  In 1898, with the powerful aid of  the banks, 
it  absorbed  the Westfalische  Union.  357  Similarly,  the 
Horder Verein, founded in 1852, decided in 1864 to under- 
take the introduction of the Bessemer process, and accord- 
ingly acquired a  number  of  iron-ore  mines  (Kleineisen- 
steingruben) .  The possession of these, however, ceased to 
be a necessity  when  the Horder  Verein, with  the assist- 
ance of  the banks, acquired in 1879 the Thomas and Gil- 
christ patents.358 
Again,  the great increase in the number  both  of  the 
so-called "  furnace mines " (Hiittenzechen)-that  is to say, 
iron furnaces which acquired coal mines-and  of  the so- 
called  "  mine  furnaces " (2echenhiitten)-that  is  to say, 
coal mines which acquired iron furnaces-during  the sec- 
ond epoch was in many cases rendered possible only by 
the aid of the issue credit of  banks.  The same was true 
of  the so-called combined plants, which became necessary 
after the introduction of  the Thomas process and which 
gave  to them so  great a  superiority  over  the so-called 
"  pure  works "  (reine  Werke) , whose  condition  became 
more and more difficult. 
In the same way the banks promoted the great number 
of fusions, whose object was either to get rid of  trouble- 
some  competition,  to combine successive stages  in  the 
process of  production, or to diminish the cost of produc- 
Such fusions were especially frequent in the min- National  Monetary  Commission 
ing industry; for instance, in the case of  the Gelsenkirchen 
Mining  Company  and  in  the electrical industry, which 
from  the very  beginnicg  was  in  close  touch  with  the 
banking interest. 
The  regular  current-account connection of  the banks 
with the great industrial establishments gradually led to 
the  result  that the influence of  private banking houses, 
till then considerable, was crowded into the background, 
despite  the long-continued business  connection between 
these  private  banks  and  industry.  The issue  business 
of  the banks, which required larger and larger capital and 
increasingly permanent investments-that  is to say, the 
assumption of  a great and long-continued  promoter's risk- 
tended  still  more  to weaken and eliminate the medium- 
and  small sized  private banking  houses, a process which 
extended  far beyond  the limits of  the individual  indus- 
trial districts, and which was intensified  and  accelerated 
in a  marked  degree  by the above-mentioned  provision 
of  the bourse law (art. 39, now 41). 
The assumption of  fiscal  agencies  (Zahlstellen) for the 
payment  of  dividends  and  interest  on  bonds  and  for 
the  redemption  of  drawn  bonds,  though  at times un- 
connected with any issue, may nevertheless be regarded 
as an incidental effect of  the issuing business, tending to 
promote not so much the process of  concentration as the 
profits of the banks, but at the same time leading occa- 
sionally to new  current-account connections.  Hence, so 
long as the requisite caution is observed, the fiscal agen- 
cies,  combined  with  the  positions  on  the  supervisory 
boards, supply a means whereby the industrial  connec- 
tions of the great banks may be measured.  From the lists 
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of the six great banks of Berlin for 1903-4  Otto Jeidels as- 
certained the following numbers of industrial fiscal agencies 
of these banks, which, however, are probably incomplete 
(especially as regards the Disconto-Gesellschaft and the 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft)  :  360 
Number of  fiscal  agencies. 
I. DeutscheBank ........................................... 
2.50 
2.  A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein .........................  2  I  1 
3.  Dresdner Bank. ..........................................  191 
4.  Darmstadter Bank. .......................................  161 
......................................  5.  isc con to-Gesellschaft  I 11 
................................  6. Berliner Handelsgesellschaft  95 
As  regards the class  of  industrial securities issued, it 
may be said that, as a rule, the issue of  shares is preferred 
for  obtaining  the capital  for permanent  improvements, 
while  the  issue  of  bonds  (redeemable by  aniortization 
within  a  fixed  period)  is  preferred  for  obtaining  the 
means for improvements of  considerable duration, indeed, 
but yet terminating after the lapse of  a certain time.  It 
must, however, always be kept in mind that the issue of 
bonds, unlike the issue of  stock, burdens  the enterprise 
permanently  with  fixed  interest  charges, so  that it re- 
quires great caution.  According  to Otto Jeidels, in the 
case of the six great Berlin banks above named, the issues 
of  industrial bonds in the boom period of 1899 amounted 
to about  one-fourth  of  all  syndicate business  (40  bond 
issues  out  of  a  total  of  161  syndicate  participations), 
and in 1901, the year of  the crisis, as much as four-fifths 
of  all syndicate participations  (83 out of 101)  .381 
According  to  the  Deutscher  Oekonomist,  the  actual 
capital raised  by  means of  issues of  German industrial 
shares was as follows (in millions of marks) : National  Monetary  Commission 
According to the table from the Deutscher Oekonoinist, 
given above (pp. 360  and 361), the actual capital raised 
in  the  shape  of  German  industrial  bonds  issued  from 
1900 to 1908 was as follows  (in millions of  marks) : 
The foreign industrial bonds admitted to trading at the 
bourse from  1897 to 1907 amounted to a nominal value 
of  I ~g,~oo,ooo  marks,  of  which  6,300,000  marks  repre-  -. 
sents the value  of  converted  bonds  (Statistisches Jahr- 
buch fur das Det~tsche  Reich, 29  Jahrgang, 1908, p. 238). 
The total number of  industrial issues by the six great 
Berlin banks 382  in the nine years from 1895 to 1903 was 
as follows: 
Deutsche Bank 
D~sconto  Gesellschaft 
Darmstadter Bank 
Dresdner Bank 
A  Schaaffhausen 
scher Bankvereln 
Berltner  Handelsge 
sellschaft 
I  I  I  I 
Finally Jeidels endeavored to ascertain the geographic 
distribution 363  of  the  industrial  relations  of  the  great 
hanks and the distribution, by classes of industries, of  the 
industrial  companies 3B4 connected with  the hanks, both 
from the data regarding their representation on the super- 
The Germafl Great  Banks 
visory boards and  the fiscal agencies, though  the latter 
method  can  yield no  reliable  results.  There  can  be  no 
doubt that the distribution of  industrial relations is most 
regular in the case of the Deutsche Bank and of  the Dis- 
conto-Gesellschaft, and next to them in the case of  the Ber- 
liner  Handelsgesellschaft  and  the  Darmstader  Bank, 
although  the  latter shows on the whole more South Ger- 
man and (as a consequence of the absorption of  the Bres- 
lauer  Disconto-Bank)  , also  Silesian  industrial  relations, 
which is also true of the Deutsche Bank.  The industrial 
relations of  the Dresdner Bank, naturally, are mostly with 
the  Kingdom  of  Saxony,  those  of  the  A.  Schaaffhau- 
sen'scher  Bankverein with Rhineland and Westphalia. 
The distribution of the industrial relations by branches 
of  industry is most regular m the case of  the Deutsche 
Bank and the Disconto-Gesellschaft, both  banks  having 
extensive relations with  foreign railway companies, and 
the Deutsche Bank also with electrical companies.  In the 
case of  the Darmstadter Bank the relations to tramways 
and  breweries predominate,  in  the case  of  the Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft the relations  to  the  "heavy  indus- 
tries, "  such as iron  and other  metals  (schwere Industrie) , 
electric companies, and tramway enterprises. 
Among particularly close connections during the second 
epoch we may mention the following: 
The Deutsche Bank with Siemens & Halske, the North 
German Lloyd, the Hamburg-American Steamship Com- 
pany, the Huldschinsky Works, the Deutsche Petroleum- 
Aktien-Gesellschaft, the German and  Oversea  Electrical 
Company (Deutsche-  UeberseezscheElektrzzztats-Gesellschaft) , 
the Electric Elevated  and Underground  Railway  Com- National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
pany  (Gesellschaft fur Elektrische  Hoch-  und Untergrund- 
bahnen) . 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft with the Gelsenkirchen Min- 
ing Company  (Bergwerks-Aktien-Gesellschaft) , which on 
January I, 1go5, entered into community of  interest rela- 
tions  with  the  Red  Earth Furnace  Stock  Company  of 
Aachen (Aachener-Hutten-A  ktien-Verein Rote Erde) and the 
Schalker Mine and Furnace Company (Gruben- und Hiitten- 
Verein) the Dortmunder  Union, the Aschersleben Potash 
Works, Ludwig Loewe & Co., the Machine Factory  and 
Flour  Mill  Construction  Works  (Maschinenfabrik  und 
Miihlenbau-Anstalt) Luther in Braunschweig. 
The Dresdner Bank with the Kattowitzer Mining Com- 
pany, Felten &  Guilleaume, the German-Austrian Mining 
Company (Deutsch-Oesterreichische Bergwerks-Gesellschaft)  , 
the Lauchhammer Stock Company and the Laurahutte. 
The  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft  with  the  General 
Electric Company (Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft) the 
Harpen Mining Company (Harpener Bergbau-Gesellschaft)  , 
the  Hibernia, the  Consolidation Mining  Company (Berg- 
werksgesellschaft Consolidation), the  Upper  Silesian  Iron 
Industry  (Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie) , the  Upper  Sil- 
esian Coke Works (Oberschlesische Kokswerke) , the Accum- 
ulator  Works,  Limited  (Akkumulatoren-Fabrik Aktien- 
Gesellschaft) in Berlin. 
The A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein with Aumetz- 
Friede, the Harpen Mining Company (Harpener Bergbau- 
GeselLschaft)  ,  the Hoesch Steel Works (StahLwerk Hoesch) , 
the Bochum Union  (Bochumer  Verein-absorbed  in  1907 
by the Phonix), the Phonix, the Hoerder Mining and Fur- 
nace Company (Bergwerks- und Hutten-Verein), the Inter- 
national Exploration Company (Internationale Bohrgesell- 
schaft) ,  the Hercynia Company (Gewerkschaft Hercynia)  . 
The  Darmstadter  Bank  with  the German-Luxemburg 
Mining  and  Furnace Company (Deutsche-Luxemburgische 
Bergwerks- und Hutten-Aktien-Gesellschaft) ,  and the Peace- 
ful  Neighbor  (Friedlicher  Nachbar) ,  the  A.  Riebeck 
Works (A. Riebeck'sche  Montanwerke  A  ktien-Gesellschaft 
in Halle) , the  Company  for Brewing  Industry  (Aktien- 
Gesellschaft fur Brauindztstrie), Griesheim-Elektron Chem- 
ical  Works  (Chemische  Fabrik  Griesheim-Elektroqz), and 
the Chemical Works formerly H. and E. Albert (Chemische 
Werke vornzals H. and E. Albert (Biebrich). 
The  representatives  of  the  banks on  the  supervisory 
boards  of  the  industrial  companies  have always taken 
special care to fulfil1  one very effective  part of  the "  advi- 
sory function "  365 of the supervisory board, viz, to provide 
for  the disposal  of  the products  of  the  industrial com- 
panies in question  to  suitable  industrial enterprises  on 
which the banks were able to exercise some influence. 
As  regards industrial issues, Eber~tadt~~O  first ascertains 
the net amount received by any particular industry from 
the issues undertaken in its behalf, which amount he calls 
net  capital  claim  [Kapitalreinanspruch]-(net  capital 
receipts  [Kapitalreinemp)ang] would  be  a  more  correct 
term)--consisting of  the nominal value plus the (purchase- 
price) -premium  or minus the agio ; whatever goes beyond 
that 'l net claim " or "  net receipts, " as a result of  a rise 
in the market value, he regards as pure "speculation," 
due to the "  gambling propensity of  the public " (p. I 5). National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
In this way, of course, he arrives at  enormous ' '  speculative 
amounts. ' '  How false this view is may be seen at once 
from the fact that the quotations of  any particular day, 
mostly  based  on  insignificant  transactions,  can  not  be 
regarded as a measure even for large amounts, let alone 
the  entire  stock,  and  because  the  "speculators"  very 
largely reinvest  the profits  of  their speculative  sales in 
industry.  Above  all, however,  the statement is  untrue 
because the quotation depends first and foremost on the 
varying intrinsic value of  the securities, that is to say, on 
the condition of  the enterprises in question, and does not 
depend  on  the "gambling  propensity"  either  solely  or 
even in large part.367 
It  is because he disregarded the above considerations that 
Eberstadt was able to arrive at the conclusion (p. 42) that 
from January I, 1895, to April I,  1900,  nearly I ,ooo,ooo,ooo 
marks, that is to say, for the average of  that period about 
186,500,000 a year, were employed solely for "speculative 
purposes ' ' in stock, mining and smelting enterprises alone 
(he does not even include "  Kuxe," i. e.,  mining shares).  In 
contrast with this, he estimates the "  demand for capital 
by  industry"  for  the  same  period  and  for  the  same 
branches of  industry at only about 419,500,ooo, or about 
~O,QOO,OOO  marks a year. 
The latter statement is as erroneous, and moreover as 
misleading, as the former.  The demand for capital in the 
mining industry, as we  had repeated occasion to note in 
speaking of  the economic development during that epoch, 
falls far short of  the amounts supplied by  issues, which 
in bad years are only possible to a limited degree or not 
at all.  On the contrary, it is supplied  also by way of 
current-account, discount, acceptance, report and collat- 
eral credit, etc., to a much larger extent than is indicated 
by  Eberstadt.  It is,  of  course,  difficult  to  ascertain 
the amounts thus placed  at the disposal of  industry in 
general and of  the mininq  industry in particular, either 
for  the period  as  a  whole  or  for  each  year,  since  the 
amounts in question are not separately booked.  Certain 
it is  that they  always played  a  great  part.  The most 
summary comparison between the demand for short-term 
credit, recorded on  a  previous page  for a  number of  in- 
dustries, with the amounts of  credit granted during that 
period, suffices  to show  that the issues  alone came no- 
where near  covering  that  demand, and that the banks 
throughout that  period  granted  industrial credit3B8  to the 
utmost possible limit, occasionally even to a degree incom- 
patible with a sound distribution of  risk.369 
As  regards  the financing of  shares and  bonds  of  real 
estate  companies  (Terraingesellschaften), it may  be  said 
that in this  direction  the great banks  have hitherto, in 
many, perhaps most  cases, not  pursued  any far-sighted 
economic aims, and that to a large extent they have not 
concerned  themselves with  the  great  questions  of  land 
policy. 
In describing the development  of  the German  banks 
during the first  epoch  (1848  to 1870), we  saw that all 
the  great  banks  then  in  existence  regarded  it  as  an 
essential  part  of  their  program  and  business  policy  to 
take part in the business of  floating state loans.  State- National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
ments to this effect are found in some of  the early annual 
reports of  these banks.370 On  page 62 we  gave a review 
of the most important state and communal loans, which 
were  taken over  during the years  1854 to  1869 by  the 
Darmstadter  Bank  and  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft, i.  e., 
the two leading banks of that period.  Success in this field 
was achieved, however, as is expressly stated in the jubilee 
report  of  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft371  in  the  face  of 
decided "opposition on the part of  the old-established and 
well-known private banking houses, which until then had 
held  a monopoly  of  the financial business  and in  every 
manner attempted  to ward  off  the invasion  of  the new 
banking companies."  The banks in many cases won  in 
this  struggle  only  by  showing  a  far  greater  liberality 
toward the individual States and communes in the fixing 
of  the terms  of  loans and in reducing the hitherto cus- 
tomary rates of  brokerage.372  As  a result numerous state 
loans were taken over even during the first period, as for 
instance, loans contracted  by  Prussia, Bavaria,  Saxony, 
Wurtemberg,  Baden,  Brunswick,  Hamburg,  Bremen, 
Austria, etc., as well as municipal loans offered by Danzig, 
Worms,  Mannheim  and  others.  As  early  as  1859  a 
Prussian  mobiliza~on  loan  of  30,000,000  thalers  was 
taken over  by  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft in  conjunction 
with  other  then  existing  Berlin  banks  and  banking 
houses,  this  joint  operation being  the forerunner of  the 
"  Prussian syndicate " (Preussenkonsortium) subsequently 
formed  under  the leadership  of  the Seehandlung  (Prus- 
sian  State Bank).  This  syndicate became  effective  in 
1868, when it took over  Prussian loans to an amount of 
45,000,-  thalers.  In the following year it took over ad- 
ditional Prussian  loans  to a  total  amount  of  5,m,m 
thalers,  made  necessary  by  the  annexation  agreement 
(Rezess) with the erstwhile free city of  Frankfort-on-the- 
Main. 
Between  the  years  1868  and  1901  the  Disconto- 
Gesellschaft,  the  Darmstadter  Bank,  and  other  credit 
banks, as well as a number of  private banking houses, at 
times  with  the partial  cooperation of  the Seehandlung, 
took over and issued 255,000,000 marks of  Bavarian State 
loans alone.  As  regards the war loan of  August 3 and 4, 
1870,  amounting  to  12o,ooo,m thalers,  its  issue  was 
effected without the cooperation of  the banks by means 
of  a national subscription at the rate of  88 per cent.  The 
jubilee  report  of  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft mentions on 
page  35  that at the preliminary negotiations regarding 
this loan, held  in  the Prussian  ministry  of  finance, the 
two representatives of  German banks and banking firms 
present declared "that the success of  this loan could be 
assured only in case it was issued at a rate of  85 per cent." 
The report continues : 
"This  rate was  recommended  upon the plain business 
consideration that the issue price would have to be fixed 
on a parity with the market prices then quoted for similar 
Prussian  state  securities.  The  authorities,  however, 
reckoned only with the prevailing national sentiment and, 
disregarding the actual conditions of the money market, 
fixed the subscription price  at 88  per  cent.  The result 
was  that  the  nominal  amount  subscribed  on  the  two 
subscription  days.  August  3  and  4,  did  not  exceed National  Monetary  Commission 
68,000,000 thalers, which at  the subscription price of  88 per 
cent yielded a net amount of  only 60,000,000 thalers." 373 
In October, 1870, a funded federal loan of  20,000,000 
thalers was issued with better regard for the condition of 
the money  market.  In November,  1870, and  January, 
I 87 I, additional  war  loans  totaling  J 42 ,ooo,ooo  thalers 
were issued in the form of  5 per cent treasury bills, payable 
in five years.  These loans were  taken over  and placed 
by a German syndicate of  banks and banking houses with 
the collaboration of  English banks.  No  use  was  made 
of  the last war credit of  120,000,000  thalers (law of  April 
26, 1870) because of  the receipt of  part of  the French war 
indemnity. 
Between 1871 and 1880 no less than 640,000,ooo Prus- 
sian and 142,ooo,ooo Imperial loans were taken over and 
issued by the Prussian syndicate and by the other syndi- 
cate for the loans of  the Empire.  The total amount of 
public  loans underwritten  and  placed  by  syndicates  of 
banks and banking houses on behalf of  Hanseatic towns, 
and  the  States  of  Wurttemberg,  Saxony,  and  Hessen 
reached nearly  I ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks. 
After  1880, notwithstanding  the successful experience 
had with the old method, it was thought that in order to 
prevent the growth of  a monopoly of  banks and banking 
houses it would  be  feasible to place  a  large portion of 
newly  issued  Prussian  and  other  State loans  with  the 
various applicants by way of  competitive subscription (im 
Wege  freier  Begebung).  The  result  was  in  the  main 
merely  a  considerable depression in the market  and  of 
the prices  of  German State bonds. 
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In February, 1899, the Deutsche Bank alone took over 
75,000,ooo marks of 3 per cent Imperial bonds and 125,- 
ooo,ooo marks of 3 per cent Prussian consols. 
In September,  1900, the entire amount of  8o,ooo,ooo 
marks  of  4 per cent treasury bills, payable  in  3%  to 5 
years,  was  awarded to the New  York banking  house of 
Kuhn, Loeb & Co.  This measure was strongly criticized, 
notwithstanding the fact that the German money market 
as  a  result  was  greatIy relieved  by  the  influx of  gold 
from abroad. 
The amount of  German communal loans issued during 
this  period  in  which  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  partici- 
pated-and  this for 40 cities only, specified in the jubilee 
volume, page 42-up  to the end  of  1900, was, in  round 
figures, 300,000,000 marks, while the amount of  mortgage 
bonds of cooperative land credit associations (landschajt- 
liche PfandbrieJe) and provincial and district loans  (Pro- 
vinz-  und Kreisanleihen) issued  during  that period with 
the  cooperation of  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  reached 
almost I ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks. 
Combining domestic State and communal loans issued 
during the last 15 years of the second period, we  find the 
following totals, according to the Deutscher Oekonomist: 
Net amounts realized (eflective Bdrage) in millions of  marks. 
The net amounts of  German state loans only, as distinct 
from German communal loans, issued yearly  during the 
important period 1900 to the end of 1908, according to the National  Monetary  Commission 
statements of  the Frankfurter Zeitung, printed above on 
pages 359 and  361, as well as of  the Deutscher Oekono- 
mist, were in thousands of  marks: 
I  Figures of the-  //  1  Plwes  of  the- 
Year. 
Year.  1 FranWurter /  Deutscher  11  )  frankfurter I  Deutscher 
Zeltung  Oebonomlst  Zeltung  Oekonomlst. 
This is not the place to discuss the causes of  the enor- 
mous growth in the yearly issues of  state loans.  Suffice it 
to say that the constant pressure weighing on the market 






issued has been one of  the main causes of  the low market 
prices of  German imperial and state issues, prices which in 
no way corresponded to their intrinsic value.  Neither did 
the reduction of  the interest rate from 3%  to 3 per cent 






who were used to a higher interest  rate paid by various 
solid  industrial  securities  and  in most  cases  could not 
afford such a low yield on their capital. 
The German  communal  loan  issues  during  the same 
period are given in the following table, which states in par- 





335  640 
those of the Frankfurter Zeitung.  The latter, however, 
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Net amounts  realized (efective Betrage) on German  wmmunal  loans during 
1900-1908 
[In thousands of marks ] 
A  comparison  of  the  annual  amounts of  communal 
loans with those of  state loans discloses the striking fact 
that the former  differ  in  size but little from the latter. 
year  plguresif  the- 
Deutsrher  Frankfurter 
Otkonom~st  Ztltung 
There  is  no  doubt  that  many  of  our  communes  have 
become  obsessed  during  the  recent  period,  especially 
during the last decades, by a sort of  mania of  greatness. 




has failed to live up to the requirements of  his office if  he 
does  not  borrow  a  million  every  couple  of  years  for 
slaughterhouses, sewers, the construction  or  purchase of 
electric plants and city railways, nay, even for paving and 
schoolhouses,  the  expenses  for  which  ought  to be  de- 
frayed out of  current revenues." 
Figures of the- 
- 
At all events, considering the large amounts added to 
Deutscher 
Oekonom~st 
German communal loans almost every year, of  which by 
far the larger portion  has been taken over  and emitted 
Frankfurter 
Zettung 
by the German banks, it can not be seriously contended 
that in this field the German banks have not taken suffi- 
cient care of  the "  domestic market." National  Monetary  Commission 
(d)  THE  FLOATING  OF  FOREIGN  SECURITIES. 
(a)  princi+Zes  underlying the flotation  of  foreiqn  securities. 
In section 7 of  this part (p. 527 and foll.) an attempt is 
made to answer the question, whether the so-called "export 
capitalism" is to be regarded as necessary, admissible, and 
unobjectionable on  general principles, and in particular 
beyond the amount required to compensate for  the ex- 
cess of  imports over  export^.^"^  In that section, however, 
the above question is  discussed  and answered only as  a 
matter of  principle, while  in the present chapter we  are 
concerned  with  the  question,  what  special  principles 
are to govern  the issue  of  foreign securities, and what 
limits are to be drawn in this field. 
In my  opinion the three fundamental requirements for 
a sound policy in this regard are as follows: 
(1)  The  issue  of  foreign  securities  in  the  domestic 
market, like  the establishment of  branches of  domestic 
enterprises and participztions abroad, is permissible only 
after  the  domestic  demand  for  capital  has  been  fully 
satisfied, since the first duty of  the banks if; tc~  use  the 
available funds of  the nation for increasing the national 
productive and purchasing power  and for  strengthening 
the home market. 
(2)  International commercial dealings as well as inter- 
national flotations ought to be but the means for attaining 
national ends and must be placed in the service of  national 
labor. 
(3)  Even  when  the  two  foregoing  conditions  have 
been  fulfilled, the greatest care will  have to be used in 
selecting the securities to be floated.  Our experience in 
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the eighties with Argentine, Greek, Portuguese, Chilean, 
Servian,  and  similar  securities  proves  the  paramount 
necessity of drawing a sharp distinction between individual 
countries and securities. 
It may be granted that so far as the eighties are con- 
cerned, when we  entered that particular field in competi- 
tion with other nations, we  obtained, in  the main, only 
those foreign loans which  the other countries, with their 
old  established  international  relations,  either  had  left 
to us  or  at least did not seriously contest, and that for 
these reasons our choice was confined within rather nar- 
row limits. 
At present, when as the result of slow, careful, and labor- 
ious efforts, our financial relations with foreign countries 
have improved to a gratifying extent, we must more than 
ever be careful to underwrite as a  rule only securities of 
such countries as possess what may be called a rich and 
extensive  "hinterland,"  either  in  the  shape  of  good 
colonies or of  large provinces presenting a hopeful field 
for  agricultural,  industrial,  and  commercial  enterprise, 
or countries which possess strong reserves in other shape 
and are thus in a position to endure and speedily emerge 
from hard times. 
Furthermore, whenever practicable and in so far as we 
are not bound by  previous  engagements toward foreign 
countries, the time and amounts of underwriting as well 
as the interest rates on foreign loans should be fixed with 
due regard to the economic and financial  conditions pre- 
vailing  at home.  In particular  (barring those previous 
engagements  just  mentioned),  in  times  of  industrial 
prosperity, a proper regard for the discount policy of  the National  Monetary  Commission  The Germa.n Great  Banks 
Reichsbank  and  for  our  balance of  payments 376  should 
induce  our  banks  to show  the utmost  conservatism in 
the flotation of  foreign securities and in the granting of 
long-term credits to foreign countries, a principle which 
has not always been sufficiently observed by the German 
credit banks.  Still, in criticising the methods used here- 
tofore, we  must bear in mind  that, when a foreign coun- 
try, possibly after a long interval, applies to us for urgently 
required funds, at a time deemed opportune to itself, it is 
only in the rarest instances that we shall be in a position 
to say that the time is not opportune for us and that the 
applicant  had  better  call  at some  other  time.  Such a 
procedure might result not only in spoiling our relations 
to the respective foreign country, but eventually in the 
loss  of  our  entire position  in  the international  market. 
Furthermore,  in  cases  where  the  purpose  of  the  loan 
permits it, such pressure as we are able to exert should be 
brought to bear in order to provide in the loan contract 
that  any  orders  for  works  and  contracts, the  expense 
of  which  is  to be  defrayed  by  the  loan, be  placed  in 
Germany, in the interest  of  our industry. 
As the jubilee report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft justly 
remarks (p. 45), it was "precisely the action of  the banks 
in underwriting foreign loans and introducing them to the 
German market that proved so signally effectual in pro- 
moting  the  development  of  German  industry. "  Thus, 
among other things,  the Russian, Austrian,  Hungarian, 
Portuguese, and Roumanian railway loans of  the nineties, 
as well as the financing of  the Venezuelan, Anatolian, and 
Bagdad railways, the constructions at the Iron Gate, the 
long-continued work carried on by the Shantung Railway 
and  Mining Companies, have brought to German indus- 
try a large number of  lucrative orders.  In  other  cases, 
however, as  a  result  of  political  and  competitive  con- 
ditions, all  efforts  to secure a  participation  of  German 
industry have failed, though on some particularly oppor- 
tune occasions, as for instance, that of  the Kongo Rail- 
the banks  insisted, as  a  condition  of  their  own 
financial cooperation, that German  industry be  given a 
share in the work. 
On  the whole,  despite painful experience, we  have to 
agree with Schmoller's general conclusion  that, in order 
to  maintain  and  strengthen  her  position  in  the  world 
markets, Germany will  have to increase rather  than re- 
strict her foreign financial business, provided, of  course, 
the  above  stated  general  and  special  requirements  are 
observed. 
Other countries have had just as bad if  not a worse ex- 
perience in this field; moreover it goes without saying that 
the mastering of  all the difficulties in  this  field requires 
an apprenticeship.  This point seems to have been largely 
overlooked by  Sartorius Freiherr  von  Waltershausen in 
his otherwise valuable work entitled "The economic sys- 
tem of  investments of  capital  abroad." 379  The sugges- 
tions made in that book are largely-notwithstanding  his 
denial-the  mere expression of  a strong and, in my opin- 
ion, wholly groundless lack of  confidence in the manage- 
ment of  our banks as hitherto conducted, which, I main- 
tain, have on the whole achieved great results in the in- 
terest  of  the  nation,  notwithstanding  some  occasional 
faults and errors.  Moreover, some of  his suggestions, in 
my opinion, are in a large measure impracticable. National  Monetary  Commission 
This is true in the first place of  the suggestion that inas- 
much as there exists no suitable representation of  the in- 
terests  of  purchasers  of  securities, the protective  com- 
mittees representing foreign bondholders whose interests 
are endangered should interfere in a preventive capacity 
(op. cit., p.  310 et seq.) by  carefully advising their con- 
stituents before the purchase of  newly  issued securities. 
This suggestion was thoroughly punctured by Kaemmerer, 
who points  out  that such  an  organization-the  lack of 
which the author deplores-does  already exist in the shape 
of  our banks.  For it can not be said that the banks advise 
their  customers against  their  own  better  knowledge  in 
questions of  purchase of  securities, underwritten by them 
or by other banks, or that, as a rule, they are not far more 
expert in this field than the members of  any protective 
committees.380 Moreover,  according to our  legal  provi- 
sions, the very purpose of  the prospectuses is to exhibit 
the  main  points  underlying  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
securities.  As  a rule this is done, but the trouble is that, 
as a rule, nobody reads them.  The people who are specu- 
lating on a rise of  securities neither read prospectuses nor 
do they listen to the counsel or warnings of  third parties, 
let alone protective organizations. 
A Like  criticism applies to the proposition  (op. cit., p. 
305)  that the underwriters, in  order to become  perma- 
nently  interested  in  state and  communal issues, should 
be  legally  required  to  retain  permanently  some  part, 
even though but  a  small part, of  the issue (one-half to 
2  per  cent  according to  a  graduated  scale)  and  to de- 
posit  it, say, at the Reichsbank.  The author may rest 
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assured that not only bankers will  "shake their heads" 
at such a proposition  (op. cit., p.  30).  It reminds  one 
of  the other proposition that the banks should redeposit 
at the Reichsbank part of  the deposits entrusted to them 
by their customers.  If  this keeps on we  may arrive at 
an ideal  state in  which  all  the  capital  or  the  greater 
part of  it is  redeposited  and  thus made safe.  It is true 
that this  will  insure  the  fullest degree of  liquidity,  se- 
curity, and  proper  management, but  the  only  trouble 
will  be that one will  no  longer be  able to do  any busi- 
ness.  Do  the  critics  really  believe  that  it suffices  to 
turn the knob of  legislation or to draw up a few govern- 
mental regulations in order to attain the proper manage- 
ment of  our banks-in  regard to which, for that matter, 
the critics are by no means agreed?  Vestigia terrent, in 
no other field, as was repeatedly shown, have state con- 
trol  and  legal  interference proved  such  dismal failures, 
as in that of  banking.  Though I am  anything but an 
advocate of  laissez-faire principles, I have too exalted a 
conception of  the State and its attributes to wish to see 
it exposed to further chances of  tests of  this kind, which 
as a rule can only result in humiliation. 
Notwithstanding  this  criticism of  the individual  pro- 
posals of the author, it gives me pleasure to acknowledge 
that fundamentally, i. e., so far as the prerequisites and 
aims  of  the issues  of  foreign  loans  are concerned there 
seems to be  no  difference of  views  between  us.  I may 
say  that  these  fundamental  principles  were  formulated 
by me in the main as early as 1906 in the second edition National  Mo~etary  Commission 
of  this work, prior to the appearance of  Waltershausens' 
book. 
My  aim in the above discussion was  merely  to prove 
that in this department of  banking, as well as in others, 
the lessons and experience of  the past may enable us to 
draw correct conclusions regarding the future and to dis- 
courage  outsiders from  proposing  all  sorts  of  impracti- 
cable reform measures. 
On  the other  hand,  granted  that  in  consequence of 
the issue  of  "  exotic " securities, German  investors  suf- 
fered  considerable  losses  during  the  eighties, especially 
from  1886  to  1889~~~  it seems to me  rather  immaterial 
whether  the data regarding the amount  of  these  losses 
are  exact  or  perhaps,  for  various  reasons, inexact.  As 
Ad.  Weber  has  pointed  out,  hardly  a  single  investor 
bought at the highest price and sold at the lowest price; 
furthermore, the calculation disregards the large number 
of  those  who  bought  these  securities  for  speculative 
purposes only and who  disposed of  them after the con- 
siderable rise  in the market  (of  10 per  cent  and more) 
which  in  many  cases  followed  immediately  after  their 
issue.  It may also be pointed out that the table of  the 
Deutscher  Oekonomist, reproduced  by  Ad.  Weber  (op. 
cit., p.  133) contains securities which had not been under 
a  cloud  (notleidend) even for  a  single  day, such as the 
Lisbon  municipal loan.  In the same manner I do  not 
ascribe  any  decisive  importance  to  the  unquestionable 
fact noted by  Schmoller in the well-known introduction 
to  the  Proceedings  of  the  Bourse  Inquiry  Commission 
(p. XXV)  that against  the losses  should be  placed  the 
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gains of about a billion marks which had accrued to Ger- 
many  from investments in American and Russian secu- 
rities alone, made during the period from 1860 to 1892.~~~ 
However, with a view both to the past and to the fu- 
ture, it is necessary to note that the time at which those 
issues took place was  characterized by  an abundance of 
money, caused  by  a  preceding  period  of  economic  de- 
pression which lowered the value of  money and the rate 
of  discount.  This was also the period of  railway nation- 
alization and of  actual or threatened conversions.383 The 
combined effect of  these factors was to start an impetu- 
ous  desire on  the part  of  the investment-seeking public 
for securities yielding a higher rate of  interest. 
In  this  connection it is  interesting  to recall  the fact 
recorded in Gilbart's book above ~ited,~84  that in England, 
also mainly as a result of  a plethora of  available capital 
and the resulting low  interest rate, as early as the years 
1822 to 1825, inclusive, there were issued foreign, mainly 
"  exotic,"  loans, totalling  £25,994,51  I, i.  e., over half  a 
billion  marks  within  four  years,385  which  later  on  gave 
occasion  for  many  a  sad  experience.  It  is  true  that 
among these loans there is found a  5 per  cent  Prussian 
loan  of  £3,~oo,ooo  issued  in  1822, a  3  per  cent  Danish 
loan of  1825 to the amount of  £5,500,000, and a  5 per 
cent Russian loan of  1822 amounting to £3,5oo,ooo, but 
the rest, i. e.,  the greater part, were  essentially "exotic 
values,"  viz,  5  per  cent  loans  of  Australia,  Brazil  (2), 
Greece  (2), Mexico,  Portugal,  and Spain  (z), and 6 per 
cent loans of  Buenos-Aires, Chile,  Colombia  (I), Guate- 
mala,  Mexico,  Peru  (2), etc.  There  had  also  been  in National  Monetary  Commissiorz 
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England a considerable reduction of  the interest rate on 
a large proportion of  British consols, which doubtless had 
long been foreseen, viz, in  1823 the conversion of  £135,- 
ooo,ooo of 5 per cent into 4 per cent consols, and in 1825 
the conversion of  £80,000,000 of  4 per cent into 3% per 
cent consols. 
(P) Amount of  foreign  securities issued in Germany. 
The combined  effective amounts  of  all  foreign  issues 
(except issues of  foreign shares of  stock), viz, the issues 
of  foreign state and communal loans, railroad bonds, etc., 
since 1894, i. e., for the last fifteen years, according to the 
Deutscher Oekonomist, were as follows: 
Million 
marks. 
1894.. .....  338 
1895.. ..... 300 
1896 .......  489 
1897.. .....  608 
Million 
marks. 
.....  1898.  891 
1899.. .... 203 
Million 
marks. 
1902. .....  445 
1903 ...... I99 
......  1904  186 
1905 ...... 874 
Million 
marks. 
.....  1906..  149 
.....  1907..  129 
1908 ....... 205 
The combined value of  the foreign securities listed at 
the German bourses from  1897 to 1907 according to the 
Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fur  das  Deutsche  Reich  (vol.  29, 
1908, p.  228)) shows a total of  28,957,700,000 marks, of 
which  8,224,600,000 marks represents the value of  con- 
verted securities.  This leaves a net value for newly listed 
securities of  20,733,100,ooo marks.  The majority of  these 
foreign  securities were  listed  simultaneously at foreign 
bourses. 
The  2g1ooo,000,oo0 marks  or  thereabouts  of  listed 
foreign securities show the following distribution: 
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[In thousands of  marks face value.] 
Class of  securities. 
Conversions  (included in 
The effective value of  foreign state and communal loans 
I. State loans..  ................................... 
a.  Provincial and municipal loans.  .................. 
3. Mortgage  bonds  of  Landschaften  (cooperative  land 
...  credit associations)  and kindred  institutions.. 
4.  Mortgage bonds of  real estate credit banks. .......... 
...................................  5.  Rank shares.. 
6. Bank debentures. ................................ 
7.  Railroad sl~ares..  ................................ 
8.  Railroad debentures.. ............................. 
g.  Industrial shares ................................. 
10.  Industrial debentures. ............................ 
Total  ...................................... 
alone according to the Deutscher Oekonomist was as follows : 
Million 
marks. 
1894.. ..... 195 
1895. ......  98 
1896. ......  264 













1898. ..... 278 
1899. ..... 102 
1900.. .... 171 













1902.. .... 400 
1903 ...... 116 
1904. .....  99 
1905..  .... 7" 
28.957. 700  1  8. 224.600 
Million 
marks. 
1906 .......  55 
1907 ...... 78 
1908. ...... 169 
For the period  comprising the largest activity in the 
issue  of  foreign  securities, viz,  the  years  1886-89,  the 
nominal value of  these issues shows the following totals: 
Marks. 
1886 .................................................  516,400,000 
1887 ................................................  456,300,000 
1888 .................................................  696,100,000 
1889 .................................................  749,100,000 
It  appears thus that during these four years the nominal 
value of  foreign issues offered to German investors was in 
excess of  2,41  7,000,ooo marks,386  or 45 per cent of  the nom- 
inal value of  5,431,000,ooo marks  of  issues of  all kinds. 
The many  serious objections to these figures are found National  Monetary  Commissiota 
stated in a previous chapter (see above pp  363)  It may 
suffice to mention here  that  as a  matter  of  fact a con- 
siderable part of  these issues was not placed in Germany 
and therefore not paid by the German public. 
If  the above-given figures of  the Deutscher Oekonomist 
(see pp. 360 to 362) are used, which comprise all classes 
of  foreign issues including foreign shares  (the amount of 
which does not  figure  in  the above table), we  obtain for 
the period 1900-1908  the following totals: 
Effectzve amounts 
I ooo  marks  i 
275,270  I905 
no.  830  1906 





The  effective  amounts  of  both  domestic  and  foreign 
securities issued during the same period are stated above 
on pages 360 and 362 by the same authority as follows: 
1,000  marks 
1,777, "0 
1,623, 140 
2, I 10,690 
I,  665, 800 
I?  995,070 





A  comparison of  these two sets of  figures proves that 
the German  banks, partly as the result  of  their  experi- 
ence  with  a  part  of  the  foreign  loans  issued  during 
the eighties, have become  much more careful in issuing 
such loans.  As  a matter of  fact the amounts of  foreign 
securities issued during 1900-1908,  as given in the above 
t~ble,  in  most  cases  are not quite one-half  and in  some 
cases  even  much  less  than  one-half  the  corresponding 
amourts for 1886-1890 
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It  also  appears  from  the  table  just  given  that  the 
amount of foreign securities issued during the year  1907, 
152,660,000 marks,  when  as  a  result  of  the  American 
crisis there was a great money scarcity in Germany as well, 
fell  much  below  the  like  amount  in  1906, ~20,650,ooo 
marks, while the amount for 1908 represents but one-fifth 
of  the corresponding amount for 1905. 
During  the  high-tide  period  of  the  issue  of  foreign 
securities (1886-1889), as stated before, the proportion of 
these issues to the total issues effected in the country was 
no  less  than 45  per  cent.  In  1905 the proportion  was 
only  a  little  above one-third, in  1906 a  little  less  than 
one-tenth, and  in  1907  only  about  one-fifteenth of  all 
issues effected in Germany during the same years. 
The above figures prove likewise that during the very 
years  which  we  found to have been  characterized by  a 
particularly  gratifying  increase  in  the  productive  and 
purchasing powers of  the nation, the "  export of  capital " 
from Germany has considerably abated, and that during 
these  years  the banks have been  acting  in  accordance 
with the principle laid down above (p. 384, No.  I) for the 
regulation of  foreign issues in general.  In so doing they 
were  partly influenced, to be  sure, by  the high  rate of 
discount, "obeying necessity, not their own impulse." 
(e)  AMOUNTS  OF  LISTED  SECURITIES  ISSUED  BY  EACH  OF 
THE GREAT  BERLIN  BANKS. 
Appendix V  at the end of  the volume contains exact 
information regarding all securities issued by each of the 
six  great  Berlin  banks  and  admitted  to  the  privilege National  Monetary  Commission 
of  being traded in and quoted at  the Berlin bourse during 
the years 1883 to 1908. 
Appendix V1 gives similar information for the securities 
emitted by  the six great  Berlin  banks  and admitted to 
like privileges at all German bourses during the years 1897 
to 1908.  For  earlier years than  1897 official  data were 
available for the Berlin bourse only. 
(f) THE SYNDICATE  BUSINESS  (Konsortialgeschaft)  . 
As stated above (p. 349) the two essential requirements 
of  any  sound  banking  policy  are  the liquidity  of  the 
resources  and  the  distribution  of  risks  with  regard  to 
persons, funds involved, time and place, even in the case 
of  the most  promising undertakings  and the most  bril- 
liant  market  condition,  when  there  is  every  prospect 
for  a  speedy  and  smooth  transaction  of  the business. 
As  a  necessary consequence  of  these  two  requirements, 
when a bank contemplates the underwriting of  a business 
of  some  magnitude, it tries to strengthen itself  by alli- 
ances, because there is always the possibility of  a change 
in  the political and economic weather conditions, and in 
the prospects and constellations bearing on each particular 
transaction. 
Accordingly we  noted that in  1859 the German credit 
banks,  probably  for  the  first  time,  formed  two  bank 
syndicates.  The first was organized by the Darmstadter 
Bank for the liquidation of  several engagements, which fell 
due in  1860, especially of  the Rhine-Nahe  bonds.  The 
1860 report of  the bank  makes  special mention  of  this 
agreement in the following terms:  "  This form has decided 
advantages, since it diminishes the risk of  the individual 
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participants  and  facilitates  the  accomplishment  of  the 
common task."  The second syndicate was formed by the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft  for  the purpose  of  underwriting  a 
part  of  the loan  of  30,000,000  thalers  required  for  the 
mobilization  of  the  Prussian  Army  and  gave  the  first 
impetus  for  the  subsequent  formation  of  the  so-called 
Prussian syndicate (Preussen-Konsortium)  . 
The members of such syndicates, as a matter of  course, 
are under  obligation to fix  or  bind  their  quota for  the 
common  use  of  the syndicate  during  the  term  of  the 
syndicate agreement, which is fixed, but may be extended 
by unanimous resolution.  The execution of  the common 
operation is intrusted, as a rule, to a syndicate manager 
or  managers, whose  action is subject to the approval of 
the executive board  of  the syndicate, or, if  the latter be 
small,  of  the  other  syndicate  members,  as  regards  all 
measures  of  importance  or  such  as  exceed  the normal 
course  of  the  syndicate  business.  In  most  cases  the 
maximum  amount  of  underwriting  that  may  become 
necessary  is  fixed  beforehand.  This  maximum  may, 
however, be exceeded, as a rule, by  majority vote or by 
assent of  the executive board  in case the management of 
the syndicate deems it necessary or profitable. 
The frequent allotting of  subsidiary or secondary par- 
ticipation~  (Unterbeteiligungen) by  the  individual  mem- 
bers  of the syndicates may  be caused by  considerations 
of greater liquidity and of  better distribution of  risk.  But 
quite often such action may be due to mere business con- 
siderations, when it is desired by such courtesies to acquire 
a claim to reciprocal treatment on the part of  the favored 
domestic or foreign houses, or else to reciprocate a similar National  Monetary  Commission 
courtesy already received.  Very frequently this action is 
a means of conferring a favor on customers regarded as 
specially valuable, or  of  indemnifying certain customers 
for participations which had  yielded poor  profit or been 
terminated with a loss.  Such "  subparticipants " (Unter- 
beteiligte) acquire no rights against the syndicate, but only 
against the member  of  the syndicate by whom  the sub- 
sidiary allotment is made.  The latter is under obligation 
of  keeping them informed and accounting to them and to 
fulfil1  toward his subsidiaries everything "  required by com- 
mon honesty with  regard to commercial etiquette"  (par. 
157 of  the Civil  Code)  and conversely to abstain from 
doing anything that might conflict with this principle. 
An  important  class  of  syndicates  are  the  so-called 
guarantee  syndicates  (Garantiekonsortien)  which  are 
formed by  several banks in the interest of  industrial or 
commercial undertakings, in order to assure the success 
of  an increase of  capital.  In such cases the legal priority 
right of  the old stockholders may be excluded-the  syndi- 
cate offering them the new shares at the price they were 
taken over by the syndicate (zum Uebernahmepreis) plus 
a certain surcharge.  If  the legal priority right remains, 
the guarantee syndicate agrees to take over those shares 
which are not accepted by the old shareholders.  In many 
cases the acceptance of  syndicate participations is by no 
means voluntary.  Whenever there are permanent groups 
(e.  g.  for Asiatic, Russian, Austro-Hungarian  business or 
for business in the domain of  the electrical industry), any 
bank belonging to the group is bound to accept its par- 
ticipation quota in the underwriting or issue unless there 
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is  a  special  arrangement-which  is  rarely  the  case- 
whereby it is free to abstain from a particular operation 
of the group.  The obligation remains even when a bank 
objects to the particular operation as a whole or to any of 
its features, to the time, or, what is not less important, 
the price, or to any other terms of  the issue. 
Since the formation of  syndicates  and  the ceding  of 
subsidiary participations may be a feature of  every under- 
writing and issue transaction and is of  daily occurrence in 
connection with an immense number of  finance operations 
of  this sort, it would serve no useful purpose-even  were 
it  practicable-to  attempt  to  state  the  number  and 
amounts of  syndicate operations and participations during 
the first and second periods.  Such an attempt would be 
futile for several reasons : 
In the first place until recently such syndicate partici- 
pations of  the banks were often lumped in the bank reports 
with "  securities owned, " which was decidedly wrong from 
the  accounting  point  of  view.  Only  in  the  summary 
reports (Rohbilanzen) of  the great Berlin banks, published 
since the end  of  February, 1909, has this practice  been 
discontinued.  On the other hand, certain amounts, prop- 
erly coming under  the head  of  "  syndicates " were often 
booked with "securities,"  and vice versa.  The true prin- 
ciple would be to book under the head of "  syndicates " all 
those participations which call for additional installment 
payments or which are not  at the disposal of  the bank, 
while securities allotted to the bank as a result of  a syndi- 
cate participation either without the above restrictions, or 
when  these restrictions  no longer apply, should go under 
the head  of  "securities."  Finally,  in  many  cases, the National  Monetary  Commission 
items "syndicates"  and "securities"  are either not speci- 
fied  at all or  only  insufficiently specified in the balance 
sheets.  The mere enumeration of  the syndicate partici- 
pations loses all interest and value, unless combined with 
information showing the distribution of  risks with regard 
to  persons,  funds  involved, time  and  place, which  is, 
however, impracticable  from the business point of  view. 
Neither is it practicable, as will be shown more fully in 
section 8, to carry out the suggestion of  giving a state- 
ment of the installments remaining due and unpaid at the 
end of  the year  on account of  syndicate participations, 
since, for obvious reasons, the amounts of  these  obliga- 
tions  may  not  be  known  to the syndicate management 
itself and at all events could, in most cases, not be ascer- 
tained on the 31st df  December. 
For these reasons I am in a position to give only a few 
numerical data; and even these data must be used with 
caution because of  the shortcomings found until recently 
in the accounting methods of  our banks. 
The number  and amounts  of  syndicate participations 
of  the Deutsche Bank in State, communal, and railroad 
securities, as  well  as  in  "shares  and  bonds  of  various 
companies," during the crisis year  1900, and  the years 
immediately preceding, i.  e., during  the period  1897 to 
1901, inclusive, were as follows  387 
Year 
Number of 
partlclpa  tt;t,"zf  1  'lona  (  marks 
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The syndicate  account  of  the  Dresdner Bank  for the 
years  I 896-1 goo was composed as follows. 
[Amounts In m~ll~on  marks ] 
1  1896  1  1891  1  1898  1  1899  ,  '  l900 
-- 
I  State securltles  land 
mortgage  bonds  and 
preference  bonds (Pn 
ance companlcs  over 
sea enterprises  Z381824109.1163  --  --p 
Total  60  27 85  1,  "4  6  1  68  1  32  o 
ontaten)  . 
2  Shares and bonds  of 
rallways  and  other 
transportation  enter 
pr~ses 
3  Bank shares 
4  Securlbes  Issued  by 




lin  banks  as per  June  30,  1909, the syndicate participa- 
real estate  companies 
I  (Terr?mgesellschaf ten)  5 
S  Industr~al  and lnsur  / 
tions of  these banks 389 on that day showed the following 
figures,  as  compared  with  corresponding figures  under 
date of  December 3 I, 1908. 
--P  - 
[ 41nounts 1n thousands of marks ] 
Banks 




A  Sc'laaffhausen  scher Bankvereln 
Nat~onalbank  fur Deutschland 
Comnlerz  und Disconto Bank 
June 30 
1909 
23  000 
48  500 
36  300 
44  900 
Dec  31 
1908 
36  840 
64  430 
33  590 
46  840 
24  I00  33  590 
31 800  1  33  -33 
I3 900  1  I2 I30 National  Monetary  Commission 
- 
The security transactions of  the banks may be said to 
be partly voluntary, partly involuntary in character. 
The  voluntary  transactions  of  this  class  include  the 
investment  of  the liquid  bank  resources  in  correspond- 
ingly  liquid  investment  securities-i.  e., such  as can be 
speedily realized and, secondly, speculative security trans- 
actions.  The latter  may  assume  the form  of  the per- 
fectly  legitimate  though  largely  speculative  report  and 
arbitrage transactions,  or  that of  regular  bourse  specu- 
lation, or finally that of  acquiring securities for the pur- 
pose of  obtaining a temporary or permanent influence on 
industrial  undertakings. 
The  involuntary  security  transactions  of  the  banks 
comprise (I) the holdings of  such securities as the bank is 
unable to dispose of, including securities either issued by 
the bank itself  or turned over to it as its share of  syndi- 
cate participations, (2) the purchase of  securities immedi- 
ately after their issue, for the purpose of  preventing an 
undue depression of  their market value. 
Generally speaking, considerable security  holdings are 
not regarded as a favorable sign, although during critical 
periods  large  holdings  of  this  class  may  represent  an 
increased  proportion  of  particularly  liquid  assets,  or  a 
special  reserve  for  deposits.  Thus,  for  instance,  the 
Deutsche  Bank  in  its  1908 report  mentions  holdings of 
32,000,000 marks in treasury bills and defends this course 
as  proper  and  correct.  As  a  rule,  however,  excessivk 
holdings of  securities will be interpreted  to mean either 
that the  times  have  not  been  propitious  for  the issue 
business  of  the  bank,  or  that  it  maintains  excessive 
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speculative  engagements, or that  it  is  involved  to  an 
excessive extent in  speculative  transactions  on  its own 
account-a  line of business which can be regarded as per- 
missible only to a very limited extent-or,  finally, that it 
has been unable to find sufficiently profitable employment 
for its funds.  It is for these reasons that a large propor- 
tion  of  the writing  off  done by the banks occurs under 
the head of  securities' account. 
In accordance with sound banking policy the investment 
securities include also foreign securities, payable  in gold 
and dealt in at several bourses, which are therefore of  an 
international  character.  During  critical  or  warlike  pe- 
riods such securities form a valuable reserve and increase 
the banks' capacity for intervention and action.  But, as 
stated above, a large portion of  these holdings may be com- 
posed of  shares of stock, through the possession of  which 
the bank intends to exercise temporary or permanent in- 
fluence upon an undertaking either by shaping the decis- 
ions  of  a  given  general  meeting  of  stockholders,  or  by 
"  controlling " it outright, or by obtaining  representation 
on its supervisory board. 
Of  all the German banks the Darmstadter Bank is prob- 
ably the one that since its foundation and up to the present 
time has published more detailed statements regarding the 
composition  of  its  security holdings3Q0  than  any  other 
bank. 
The Darmstadter Bank gives the following groups:  (I) 
German public securities, real estate mortgage bonds, and 
railway  debentures;  (2)  foreign  state  and  communal 
bonds, first mortgage bonds of foreign railways, and bonds 
of  German  industrial  undertakings;  (3)  stock  shares of National  Monetary  Commission 
German and non-German industrial and mining concerns; 
(4) bank shares;  (5) sundry holdings. 
The Deutsche Bank groups its security holdings under the 
following four  heads:  (I)  State  and  communal  bonds, 
mortgage bonds and railway bonds ; (2) shares of railroads, 
banks,  and  industrial  concerns;  (3)  bonds  of  industrial 
concerns ; (4) sundry holdings. 
The  Dresdner  Bank  distinguishes  among  its  security 
holdings only three groups, viz:  (I) State bonds, mortgage 
bonds, railway and industrial bonds;  (2) shares of  banks, 
railroads, other  transportation  companies, and insurance 
concerns ; (3) shares of  industrial corporations. 
It would therefore be of  but little value to give figures 
of  securities held by the various banks, since, as was  re- 
marked  on  page  399, the account "  securities owned" in 
many cases  appears understated, inasmuch as  a  certain 
portion  of  the securities, properly  belonging  under  that 
head, is booked under the head of  " syndicate participa- 
tion~." On the other hand, it is equally true that securi- 
ties which properly belong under the head of  " syndicate 
participations " are at times found booked under the head 
of  "securities owned."  A  similar  shifting  is frequently 
noticed between the account "securities owned " and that 
of  "permanent  participations  in  other  banking  institu- 
tions and concerns," if  the two accounts are separated at 
all.  The bimonthly summary statements, now  published 
by  a number of  banks, separate-the  two accounts. 
During the period of  great activity preceding the drisis 
of  1901 the account "  securities owned " showed a large 
increase over  that shown for the previous years.  Thus 
the  Dresdner  Bank  showed  the  following  changes 
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(in  millions  of  marks)  under  that  head  for  the years 
1896-1900: 
--p-- 
1896  (  1897  1899  I  1900 
Group I  99  98  IS  12 8  1  16  I 
Group I1  27  49  29  61  6  5 
Group I11  58  81  821  19  107 
-  P- 
This table shows a considerable increase largely in the 
amount of  industrial shares held. 
In the case of  the Darmstadter Bank the like account 
for  the  period  1896-1902,  classed  by  its  five  groups, 












The  summary  balance  sheets  (Rohbilanzen)  of  the 
undermentioned banks published under date of  June 30, 
1909, show the following figures (in milllons of  marks) for 
the account "  securities owned, "  though without detailed 
grouping, as compared with the figures for the end of  the 
preceding year.392 
1897 





A  Scliaaffhausen scher Bankvere~n 
Natlonalbank fur Deutschland 
Commerz und Dlsconto-Bank 
1898 
Sltuatlon on  Sltuat~on  on 
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26  5 
31 8 
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55  68 
29  49 
61 03 
47  77 
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21  I7 
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In closing this chapter the following points regarding 
the investment and issue activities of  the banks must be 
emphasized : 
The  successful accomplishment of  the important  and 
various tasks devolving upon the banks, becomes possible 
only when there is a strong bourse-i.  e., an organization of 
the utmost strength  and  elasticity during normal times 
and of  the utmost power of  resistance during critical and 
bad times.  It is only through the concentration of  the 
converging  streams  of  offers, demands, and  news  that 
resultant prices  will present  a fairly  accurate picture of 
underlying  conditions.  But  this  function  of  balancing 
offer  and demand can be performed by the bourse in a 
satisfactory manner only in case there can be enlisted for 
permanent as well as temporary service sufficient amounts 
of capital to be used in transactions, which, like trading 
in  futures,  prevent  as  much  as  practicable  violent  and 
sudden variations in the quotations of  securities and are 
apt to give timely warning of  impending disturbances of 
the financial  equilibrium.  As  Schmoller puts  it in  his 
Grundriss,Volume 11, page 37, in the security market the 
option business represents "  a more refined technique of  the 
modern business for future delivery;" it is "  an instrument 
of increasingly correct calculation of  future probabilities, 
a means of  controlling  the most  important elements of 
price formation" and a form of  business, "which may be 
improved, regulated, and placed  on a higher moral  level 
but can not he dispensed with."  The same author Very 
properly  says, on  page  493  of  the same work:  "Every 
improvement in the organization of the market has in view 
a more  correct  price  formation, while  any  lessening  of 
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extreme  price  variations  results  in  the lessening  of  the 
damages caused by crises. " 
It is often said that the strength of  a bourse lies in the 
fact, that in times  of  general business prosperity  it will 
register invariably a strong upward  movement of  values 
notwithstanding all obstacles caused by fiscal and bourse 
legislation.  But such a view is due to imperfect knowl- 
edge and excusable only on that ground.  Economic laws 
are superior  to governmental  laws.  No  bourse or fiscal 
law can prevent altogether the upward movement of  busi- 
ness, nor  a  corresponding advance of  values-which  is 
merely  emphasized by  speculation-of  concerns sharing 
in that advance. 
This error  is  the more  regrettable,  because  the need 
of  a  strong bourse is felt more and more in view  of  the 
impending grave competitive struggle.  Now, the strength 
of  a bourse is  shown precisely in the fact, "that  during 
prosperous  periods it  is  successful  in  preventing impet- 
uous and excessive advances of  values, during bad times- 
in averting excessively rapid and sudden declines in val- 
ues, and during a  crisis-in  preventing  the unreasonable 
discouragement of  the public and thus an undue  depre- 
ciation  of  values. "  (Memorial  of  the  Zentralverband 
December, 1903, p. 35.)  It is only necessary to recall the 
disastrous 9th of  February, 1904,  the date of  the outbreak 
of  the Russian-Japanese war, in order to get a clear idea. 
of  a strong bourse-and  its reverse. 
SECTION  3  .-BANK  GROUPS. 
The subject of  this chapter are not those bank groups, 
which are formed as the result of the permanent clustering National  Monetary  Commission 
of  a  number  of  so-called "  concern-banks " (Konzern- 
banken) around a leading bank, representing a permanent 
community of  interest and action of  the banks concerned 
and  embracing  the  entire  field  of  banking  operations. 
These groupings are the result of  concentration tendencies 
and will be discussed at length in a subsequent chapter. 
Nor  will  the discussion of  this section take in the so- 
called "  syndicates ' ' (Konsortien) which, as was  pointed 
out above, are formed with the view  of  distributing the 
risk, of  preserving the liquidity of  resources and in the in- 
terest of  smoother and more rapid performance of  a single 
given financial operation.  It  has been shown that when- 
ever the risk or the engagements assumed are especially 
large, syndicates composed of  a shifting number of  bank- 
ing firms are constantly formed for each given case either 
under the name  of  a  ' '  guarantee-syndicate ' ' or '  ' loan- 
syndicate." 
The bank groups, which are to be discussed in the pres- 
ent  chapter,  are  permanent  combinations,  formed  by 
certain banks and banking firms for certain operations or 
classes  of  operations, and  involving a more or less  close 
alliance among the individual banks.  Among the reasons 
of  such formations the following may be mentioned: 
I. In the beginning of  the first period  they  were  the 
only  means  of  enabling the new  banks  to share in the 
participation  of  domestic  and  foreign  loans  in  compe- 
tition  with  the powerful  private  houses,  especially  the 
Rothschilds, who  until that time had  an almost uncon- 
tested  monopoly  in  that field.  This  was  the  occasion 
which  gave  rise  to  the  so-called  Preussenkonsortium 
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(Prussian  syndicate)  for  the underwriting  and  issue  of 
the  Prussian consols, to a somewhat differently composed 
group, formed  during  the  second  period, to  underwrite 
the loans of  the German  Empire  and  to the  so-called 
Rothschild group for undertaking  the issues and kindred 
operations of the Austro-Hungarian Government. 
(a) The Prussian syndicate, as already stated, owes its 
origin to a syndicate of  large Berlin banks and banking 
houses formed in  1859  under the leadership of  the Dis- 
conto-Gesellschaft on the occasion of  the Prussian army 
mobilization loan of  30,000,000 thaler~.~~~  It  took a lead- 
ing part in the loan operations of  the sixties and seven- 
ties, continuing its activity to the most recent years in 
floating most of  the Prussian state loans.  This arrange- 
ment, however, was by no means exclusive, as the Prus- 
sian  Government during the eighties, also  during  most 
recent years, in order to prevent a monopoly, repeatedly 
appealed to the market direct.  On  other  occasions the 
Government  would  dispose  of  portions  of  its loans  to 
individual banks and banking  houses,  although the per- 
manent  effects  of  such  a  policy  on  the  market  were 
rather unfavorz~ble. Sometimes a member  of  the group 
would  underwrite singly an entire  imperial or  Prussian 
loan.  The latter mode was followed in May, 1900, when 
the Deutsche  Bank  undertook  the issue  of  200,000,000 
marks  of  German imperial bonds and  Prussian consols. 
The Prussian  syndicate, as at present  (in 1909)  con- 
stituted, is  headed  by the Royal Seehandlung (Prussian 
main bank), and after  the elimination of  defunct  firms 
includes the following banks and banking houses: National  Monetary  Commission 
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Bank  syndicate  fay  Prussian stdte  1actn.s. 
Konigliche  Seehandlutlg  (Prussian 
main bank). 
Bank  fur  Handel  und  Industrie. 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. 
S. Bleichroder. 
Commerz- und Disconto-Bank. 
Delbruck, Leo & Co. 
Deutsche Bank. 
Direction der DiscontoCesellschaft. 
Dresdner Bank. 
F. \V.  Krause & Co. 
Mendelssohn & Co. 
Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank. 
Nationalbank fur Deutschland. 
A.  Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein. 
Sal. Oppenheim, jr.,  & Co., Cologne. 
Lazard  Speyer-Ellissen,  Frankfort- 
on-the-Main. 
Jacob  S. H. Stern, Frankfort-on-the- 
Main. 
L. Behrens & Sohne, Hamburg. 
Norddeutsche Bank, Hamburg. 
Vereinsbank, Hamburg. 
M.  M. Warburg & Co., Hamburg. 
Allgemeine  Deutsche  Creditanstalt, 
Leipzig. 
Rheinische Creditbank, Mannheim. 
Bayerische Hypotheken- und  Wech- 
selbank, Munich. 
Bayerische Vereinsbank, Munich. 
Kiinigliche Hauptbank, Nuremberg. 
Ostbank fur Handel  und  Gewerbe, 
Posen. 
Wurttembergische  Vereinsbank, 
Stuttgart. 
(b)  The bank group for  underwriting the loans of  the 
Empire,  as  at present  constituted,  is  headed  by  the 
Reichsbank, and after the elimination of various defunct 
firms includes  the following  banks and banking houses: 
Syndicate for  imperial loans. 
Reichsbank. 
Konigliche  Seehandlung  (Prussian 
main bank). 
Bank fur Handel und Industrie. 
Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft. 
S. Bleichroder. 
Commerz- und Disconto-Bank. 
Delbriick, Leo & Co. 
Deutsche Bank. 
Direction  der Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
Dresdner Bank. 
F. W.  Krause & C3. 
Mendelssohn & Co. 
Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank. 
Nationalbank fur Deutschland. 
A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein. 
Sal. Oppenheim, jr., & Co., Cologne. 
Lazard  Speyer-Ellissen,  Frankfort- 
on-the-Main. 
Jacob S. H. Stern, Frankfort-onlthe- 
Main. 
L.  Behrens & Siihne, Hamburg. 
Norddeutsche Bank, Hamburg. 
Vereinsbank,  Hamburg. 
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M.  hl. Warburg & Co., Hamburg. 
Allgemeine  Deutsche  Creditanstalt, 
Leipzig. 
Rheinische  Creditbank,  Mannheim. 
Bayerische Hypotheken- und IIrech- 
selbank, Munich. 
Bayerische  Vereinsbank, Munich. 
Konigliche Hauptbank, Nuremberg. 
Ostbank  fur  Handel und  Gewerbe, 
Posen. 
Wurtternbergische  Vereinsbank, 
Stuttgart. 
(c)  In  Austria  there  has  existed  since  1848  a  close 
relationship of  the financial administration of  the Govern- 
ment with the Vienna  house  of  Rothschild, which  until 
1855, when  the ~sterreichische  Kreditanstalt was added, 
conducted practically  all the financial operations for the 
government.  It was  only  in  1864  that  the Disconto 
Gesellschaft, at the head of  a syndicate of  German bank- 
ing houses, entered into competition with the Rothschild 
house  and the Kreditanstalt, and was  allotted, out of  a 
total  silver  loan  of  70,000,000 florins,  the  portion  of 
23,500,000  florins.  It  was  this  successful  competition 
which brought about the entrance of  the Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft into the group known  subsequently  as the Roth- 
schild syndicate.  During  the following years  a  number 
of  other  banks  and  banking  houses  joined,  including 
the  Allgemeine  ~sterreichische  Bodenkredit-Anstalt  of 
Vienna, the Ungarische Allgemeine Kreditbank, and the 
Bank fiir  Handel und Industrie.  The latter institution, 
as early as 1854, had joined the Rothschild firm in under- 
writing a loan for the  Government of  Baden, and in 1862, 
that is  to  say, much  earlier  than  the Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft, had participated in an issue of 83,000,000 florins of 
the Austrian 5 per cent  1860 lottery loan  by the Roth- 
schild  firm  and the Kreditanstalt.  Later on the group 
was joined  by the ba~king  houses of S. Bleichroder, Sal. 
Oppenheim, jr.,  of  Cologne, and Mendelssohn & Co., and National  Monetary  Commission 
during the most recent  period-for  state loans-by  the 
Austrian Postal Savings Bank. 
The  Rothschild  syndicate  represents  to-day  a  firm 
organization  for  the common  management  not  only  of 
Austro-Hungarian  finance  operations  of  a  public  char- 
acter, but also  of  all  other finance  operations which  it 
cares to undertake in either of  these two countries.  It is 
composed at present of  the following concerns: 
Rothschild  group. 
(2)  The organization in 1890 of  a group for Asiatic busi- 
ness was the natural consequence of  the founding, in 1889, 
by a number of  large banks and private banking houses, 
of  the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank.  A great many difficulties 
had to be overcome before this bank could be founded. 
In the first place there was the nearly  always  successful 
tactics of  the Chinese negotiators in charge of the national 
finance and railroad  business  of  playing  off against each 
other the individual competitors in the various countries. 
On the other hand, for a  long time no concerted  action 
with English banking circles nor even of German banks 
with  each  other  could  be  attained,  the  latter  having 
formed two separate groups under the leadership of  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft  and of  the Deutsche  Bank respec- 
Direktion der Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
Osterreichische  Kreditanstalt  fiir 
Handel und Gewerbe. 
M. Wodianer. 
S. M. von Rothschild, Vienna. 
Ungarische  Allgemeine  Kreditbank 
in Budapest. 
S. Bleichroder. 
Bank fiir Handel und Industrie. 
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de Rothschild frkres, Paris. 
N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London. 
Allgemeine  Osterreichische  Boden- 
kredit-Anstalt,  Vienna. 
Sal. Oppenheim, jr., Cologne. 
Mendelssohn & Co. 
Osterreichische  Postsparkasse  (for 
state loans). 
tively.  The organization  of  the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank 
and  the  formation  a  year  later  of  the  Syndikat  fur 
Asiatische  GeschiiJte (syndicate for  Asiatic  business)  put 
an end  to the competitive  struggle between  those two 
groups.  Inasmuch as independent  action  of  other Ger- 
man  banks had but little chance  in  the future,  united 
action of  German interests became assured not only with 
reference  to Chinese, but also  all Asiatic  financial opera- 
tions, the new powerful  syndicate, led  by the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft, undertaking the conlmon planning and man- 
aging of loans and advances to the central governments, 
provinces,  and railroad  companies in China, Japan,  and 
Korea  and the organizing of  railroad  and mining com- 
panies in China.  The structure of  this syndicate is, how- 
ever, somewhat loose, as it is left to each member to keep 
aloof from any individual transaction.394 
The successful activity of  this syndicate was frustrated 
for the time being  by the outbreak in the nineties of  the 
Chinese-  Japanese war.  In March, 1896, the syndicate suc- 
ceeded for the first time, with the gratifying cooperation 
of  the English  Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, in taking 
over £8,ooo,ooo of the total Chinese loan of  £16,ooo,ooo. 
An agreement was also reached with the English bank for 
future common action in Chinese business  on the basis of 
equal participation, resulting, soon afterwards, in I 898, in 
the common taking over of the remainder of  the Chinese 
war  indemnity to Japan  in the shape of a  4%  per cent 
loan of  another £16,000,000. 
Since then the Asiatic syndicate has managed success- 
fully a number of  other financial transactions. National  Monetary  Commission 
(3)  The formation of  groups for the permanent common 
handling of other domestic state loans-as  for instance, the 
underwriting of the Bavarian and Baden loans and of  for- 
eign state and railroad  loans  (such as Swiss, Argentine, 
Mexican, Russian, Roumanian, Portuguese, etc.)-occurred 
more frequently during the second period.  These groups, 
however,  if  we  except  the  Russian  group  headed  by 
Mendelssohn  & Co., did  not  attain the same solidity of 
structure and consequent  exclusive  power  as the group 
formations mentioned in paragraph  2.  Their origin was 
often due to a combination into one group of  syndicates, 
originally opposing each other, or to the subsidiary banks 
of  a great bank combining into a single-issue group for cer- 
tain underwriting purposes.  The same remarks  apply to 
group formations for the taking over of  municipal loans, 
as, for instance, of  Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfort-on-the- 
Main,  and  Munich.  In the  latter  case  the groups  are 
composed of  local houses, strengthened in some cases by 
the joining  of  friendly outside  banks.  However, these 
groups  show  frequent  changes  of  membership,  since 
they were  never  strong  enough  to completely shut out 
competition. 
As  this  chapter is  devoted  exclusively to the discus- 
sion  of  permanent  bank  groups,  no  specific  mention  is 
made of  those  syndicates which, originally formed  inde- 
pendently of  each other, for the taking over of  state or 
municipal loans, frequently coalesced into one group for a 
single transaction, in order to do away with mutual out- 
bidding.  Such transitory combines may be characterized 
as mere price conventions. 
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On  the  other  hand,  syndicates  originally  formed  as 
societates unius rei,  for instance,  for  the taking  over of 
a municipal loan, may gradually coalesce into solid and 
permanent group formations.  During the second period, 
particularly, it became more and more customary to main- 
tain the combination after the first successful cooperation 
in case the character of  the transaction was such that its 
recurrence at regular  intervals might  confidently be ex- 
pected.  This was unfortunately true of  municipal loans, 
the recurrence  of  which  could be predicted  with almost 
mathematical certainty.  In such cases each party of  the 
syndicate felt  at first only morally bound to refrain from 
independent  bidding or from  joining  another  syndicate, 
but to either suggest or await an invitation to a meeting 
of  the syndicate, unless it had  informed beforehand  the 
management of  the old syndicate of  its contrary decision. 
The management of  such syndicates, unless a change was 
expressly provided for, as a rule  remained  unchanged for 
subsequent transactions. 
(4)  A large number  of  bank  groups originated  during 
the second period as a result  of  the changed relations of 
the banks to industry as set forth in previous chapters. 
In  this  field  the  formation  of  groups,  while  due  to 
designed  industrial policy, had become more pronounced 
and definite since the nineties, and in turn caused a more 
refined differentiation and growing intensification  of  this 
policy.  The principal cause was, however, the enormous 
demand for capital by industry in general, and the electro- 
technical  industries  in  particular.  Accordingly we  find 
such bank groups closely allied with the so-called "  heavy National  Monetary  Commission 
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industries  (mining, iron  and  steel)  as well  as  with  the 
"  light "  industries,  especially  the  electrical  industry, 
breweries, secondary railways, and petroleum  enterprises. 
Until about 1900  there had been formed, to correspond 
with  the seven  combinations  of  electrical undertakings 
to be discussed later on, seven bank groups, each back- 
ing the respective  industrial  combination and  attending 
to the issue  business of  the  industrial  combination  as 
well  as  to its other  financial operations.  In particular 
the Siemens &  Halske  stock  company  was  backed  in 
1900 by  a group  of  I I  banks  headed  by  the Deutsche 
Bank; the combination  formed under  the leadership  of 
the Allgemeine  Elektrizitatsgesellschaft  (A.  E. G.)  was 
backed by a bank group consisting of  8 banks headed by 
the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft ; the combination known 
as  the  Union-Elektrizitatsgesellschaft  (U.  E.  G.)  was 
backed by a bank group headed by the Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft, etc. 
In the same year the so-called " Loewe-Gruppe"  (i. e., 
the group of  industrial undertakings controlled by the firm 
Ludwig Loewe & Co.) was backed by the same six banks 
and banking houses which  stood behind the Union-Mec- 
trizitatswerke.  This banking  syndicate, formed  at first 
for purposes of  common underwriting, subsequently con- 
ducted also the other financial operations of  the indus- 
trial gro~p.~"  It  appears that since the nineties the ever 
increasing extension of  the plant and the annexing of  a 
number of  hitherto independent concerns made it impos- 
sible to have the largely increased demands for capital met 
either by the original firm or by any single banking institu- 
tion, the latter partly for tlle reason that a number of  bank- 
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ing institutions were simultaneously interested in several 
of  the electro-technical industry. 
In the field of  secondary railways  (Kleinbahnen)  sev- 
eral groups were formed.  One of  them is headed by the 
Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft,  which  founded  the  West- 
deutsche  Eisenbahngesellschaft.  Another  is  headed  by 
the  Darmstadter  Bank,  which  organized  the  Siid- 
deutsclze  Eisenbahngesellschaft  at  Darmstadt;  a  third, 
headed by the Nationalbank  fiir Deutschland, is backing 
the  Allgenzeine  Deutsche  Kleinbahngesellschaft  und  ver- 
einigte Eisenbahn- Bau- und Betriebsgesellschaft at Berlin 
(General  German  Secondary  Railway  and  Consolidated 
Railway Construction and Operation Company). 
The object of  the first group was to assist the firm of 
Lenz & Co., engaged in the construction and operation of 
secondary railways;  that of  the second  group, to assist 
the similar enterprises of  the firm Herrmann Bachstein; 
while  the  group  headed  by  the  Dresdner  Bank  has 
founded  trust  companies  for  the  floating  of  German 
and Austro-Hungarian railway securities (Zentralbank fur 
Eisenbahnwerte), also the firm Orenstein & Koppel  (now 
consolidated with the firm Arthur Koppel) ,  engaged in the 
construction of  field and secondary railroads. 
In the field of  the petroleum industry the two foremost 
groups are those headed  by the Deutsche Bank and by 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft.  These organizations  are the 
expression of  the industrial  enterpreneur activity of  the 
great banks, an activity which during this period  has for 
good reasons been slackexling.  The aim is to counterbal- 
ance the monopoly  position  in the petroleum  market of 
the American and  Russian producers. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
In 1903 the Deutsche Bank became interested on the one 
hand  in  the  Roumanian  petroleum  company  Steaua 
Romana  by taking over a large portion  of  newly issued 
stock and by having one of  its directors made chairman 
of  the  supervisory  board,  and,  on  the  other,  in  the 
Galician petroleum company "  Schodnica. " 
Subsequently, on January  21,  1904, together with the 
U'iener  Bankverein, the Darmstadter Bank, the National- 
hank fur Deutschland, the Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank, and 
the banking firm of  Jakob  S. H. Stern in  Frankfort-on- 
the-Main, it founded  in  Berlin  the Deutsche  Petroleum 
Aktiengesellschaft  (with  a  share  capital  of  20,000,000 
marks), into which  it  merged  its  participations  in  the 
Roumanian, Russian, and Galician, also in some Hanover 
petroleum  enterprises.  The  new  company  soon  after 
made an agreement with the Petroleum-Produkten-Aktien- 
gesellschaft  in  Hamburg  for  the  transportation  of  the 
Roumanian petroleum. 
About the same time  (1903) the Disconto-Gesellschaft, 
together with  the firm of  S. Bleichroder, participated  in 
the petroleum industry company "  Bustenarii ' ' and in an- 
other large Roumanian  petroleum company, the ' '  Telega 
Oil Company  (Limited), ' ' which made an agreement for 
the transportation of  the petroleum with the Shell Trans- 
port and Trading  Company, which in turn owned shares 
of  a nominal  amount of  2,600,000 marks, out of  a  total 
nominal  capital  of  3,000,000  marks  in  the  Petroleum- 
Produkten-A  ktiengesellschaft. 
In 1905 the  Roumanian  petroleum  refining  company 
"Vega"  and the  'Society  for the Development of  the 
Roumanian  Petroleum  Industry  Credit  Petrolifer " were 
organized,  the  first  under  the  combined  auspices  of 
the   isc con to-Gesellschaft,  S. Bleichroder, and  the Com- 
~~gnie  Industrielle des Pktroles at Paris, for the purpose 
of  refining crude petroleum.  In the same year  the Dis- 
conto-Gesellschaft group merged its Roumanian petroleum 
participations  in  the  "  Allgemeine  Petroleum-Industrie- 
Aktiengesellschaft,"  founded  by  it  with  a  capital  of 
I 7,000,000 marks. 
A third group, headed by the Dresdner Bank, and com- 
prising the A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein, the Inter- 
nationale  Bohrgesellschaft,  and  several  industrial  and 
banking firms, founded in  Roumania  a third petroleun~ 
company under  the name of  the "  Petroleum-A Ktiengesell- 
schaft Regatul Romana, '  ' with a capital of  24,000,000 lei 
(francs). 
In 1906 the European Petroleum Union, with a capital 
of  37,000,ooo marks, was founded by Russian petroleum 
producers,  closely  connected  with the crude-oil produc- 
ing  firm  of  Nobel  Brothers  in  St. Petersburg  and  the 
banking house de Rothschild Fri.res in Paris, in company 
with the Deutsche Bank and other (Russian, Roumanian, 
and Galician) petroleum interests, with the object of  con- 
solidating  the  various  European  selling  organizations 
controlled by them. 
In all the above described cases special care was taken 
to distribute  the  risk  by  the  formation  of  groups,  to 
mobilize the participations by the organization  of  stock 
companies, with the view, undoubtedly, of disposing of at 
least part of  the participations  as the companies grew in 
strength, and of  retaining only an amount required for the 
continuance of  permanent influence. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
The industrial-bank groups are thus seen to differ from 
other bank groups in that they represent a combination of 
the industrial entrepeneur activity-which  as matter of 
principle it would be better to leave to industry itself- 
with that of  bank financing proper and a special banking 
initiative  (Bankinitiative).  It  is  the  latter  that  has 
caused  the unprecedented  growth  in  Germany  of  some 
new industries, such as the electro-technical, or the crea- 
tion  of  hitherto  nonexisting  industries,  such  as  the 
petroleum industry. 
SECTION  4.-THE  OVER-SEA  AND  FOREIGN  BUSINESS 
OF  THE GERMAN  CREDIT BANKS.396 
I. THE PART  TAKEN  BY  THE  BANKS  IN  DEVELOPING 
GERMAN  OVER-SEA  IMPORT  AND EXPORT  TRADE. 
As  stated  before,  a  special  section  (Sect.  7)  will  be 
devoted to the discussion of  the question whether, to what 
extent, and under what circumstances the so-called "ex- 
port capitalism7'-i.  e., the investment of  German capital 
in foreign enterprises, businesses, and securities, particu- 
larly the founding of  subsidiary companies destined  ex- 
clusively for over-sea business, is necessary  and proper. 
For the present we will merely note the fact that the Ger- 
man great banks, since the beginning of the second period, 
devoted themselves energetically to the promotion  of  our 
industrial and commercial relations with  over-sea coun- 
tries.  We shall attempt now to describe briefly the com- 
mercial objects of  this activity and the gradual develop- 
ment of  this part of  German banking policy. 
The earliest  formulation  of  this policy, which extends 
far beyond  the  previous  limits  of  German  banking, is 
found in paragraph 2 of  the charter of  the Deutsche Bank. 
There can be no doubt that the founders of  that institu- 
tion, in view of the general economic position of  Germany, 
regarded this as their foremost aim and a necessary and 
true policy, for its execution was stated to be part of the 
program of  the new bank in the following terms: 
The  object  of  the company  is  the  transaction  of  all sorts 
of  banking business, particularly the fostering and facilitating 
of  commercial relations between Germany, the other European 
countries, and over-sea markets. 
The purpose of  this program  was to fill  a gap in the 
organization  of  German credit  and banking clearly per- 
ceived by the founders and more particularly by the early 
managers of the bank.  This "bold stroke " and the eco- 
nomic  insight  disclosed  can  not  be  appreciated  too 
highl~.~~7 
The  Deutsche  Bank  has  followed  its ambitious  pro- 
gram3g8  with  the utmost  vigor  and tenacity, preparing 
its future success  by  a  number  of  deliberate  and  far- 
sighted measures. 
The activity of the Deutsche Bank as an intermediary on 
behalf  of  import and export trade was soon taken up also 
by the Disconto-Gesellschaft,  which in many lines of  bank- 
ing activity during this period showed a degree of  devel- 
opment as large, czr nearly as large, as the Deutsche Bank. 
Previously, German  industrial and commercial interests 
in foreign, especially over-sea countries  had  to fall back 
almost exclusively upon the intermediary of English and, 
in  some cases,  French  banking  institutions.  For while 
bills in terms of  German currency had no foreign market, 
English bills particularly, had almost boundless and unlim- National  Monetary  Commission 
-- 
ited circulation, since English banks were  represented in 
one form or another in all parts of  the world. 
As  the first result  of  its activity, the Deutsche Bank 
secured for German commerce and industry a firm posi- 
tion  in the world  market,  and introduced German  bills 
into the channels of  over-sea commerce where they were 
almost unknown  up  to that time.  This was  especially 
difficult  at the beginning  of  the period,  when  the gold 
standard did not yet exist in Germany, for bills in terms 
of  the  multifarious  German  currencies  (see p. 39) were 
unknown  and disliked in  international. business,  (which 
is transacted mainly by  means of  bills,) and were there- 
fore subject  to higher rates of  discount than the London 
sterling bills.  399 
In  order  therefore  to  improve  these  conditions, the 
first requisite was  to open credit at London to the Ger- 
man  importer  and  exporter.  This  the Deutsche  Bank 
attempted to do at first through an agency of  its own at 
that place.  When this attempt failed, through difficulties 
of  formal nature, the bank acquired an interest in the Ger- 
man Bank of  London, Ltd., without, however, attaining 
fully the desired object. 
On  the other hand, the German exporter and importer 
was to be given an opportunity4O0  "  to obtain such credit 
in  Germany by the introduction of  German currency bills 
in over-sea markets and by offers to buy the bills drawn on 
German  exchange  centers."  The  Deutsche  Bank  at- 
tempted to attain both  these objects by  establishing in 
1872, i.  e., before  the introduction of  the German  gold 
standard, branches  in  Yokohama  and  Shanghai  which 
were to buy bills  drawn  on  Germany, so  that the Ger- 
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man exporter, who  had calculated the selling price of  his 
goods in marks, might be  paid  abroad  in  marks, while 
the importer  might credit the foreign seller at the bank 
with the amount of  the invoice in  marks  and  meet  pay- 
ment  in marks  upon  bills  subsequently  drawn  by  the 
seller. 
Both branches in eastern Asia had to be closed in 1874, 
i. e., after an existence of  barely two years, mainly because 
the continuous depreciation of  silver had diminished the 
invested capital.  Similarly the La Plata bank, opened in 
1872 by the Diseonto-Gesellschaft and taken over by the 
Deutsche Bank in I 874, had to be liquidated in I 885.  But 
in the meantime the Deutsche Bank opened branches in 
German  centers  of  over-sea  trade-one  in  Bremen  (in 
1871) and another in Hamburg  (in 1872).  In the same 
year a silent partnership (Kommandzte) in New York was 
formed.  By 1871,  in order to obtain the means required 
for these enlargements of  its business, its capital had been 
doubled from 5 ,om,ooo to I o,om,ooo thalers. 
Finally, in 1873, it succeeded  in  opening in  London  a 
branch of  its own, whose business operations soon assumed 
considerable proportions.  The clients of  the bank, who 
imported goods from over-sea markets, were now in posi- 
tion  to  draw  their  bills  either  in  marks  on  Germany 
(Berlin,  Bremen,  Hamburg)  or  in  pounds  sterling  on 
London,  as it appeared  to them  more advantageous  in 
accordance with  the respective discount  and  exchange 
rates in the two countries.  Thus the first and most diffi- 
cult stage in this development was successfully passed. 
It must be said that even the program of  the Deutsche 
Bank  was  regarded  with  little  favor  in  banking  and National  Monetary  Commission 
bourse  circles.  The sentiments prevailing  among  these 
circles  at that time  are accurately  reflected  in  a  South 
German  newspaper,  which  has  been  used  by  Model  as 
the  only  journalistic  source  not  only  as  regards  this 
subject but  also in  discussing the activity of  the banks 
during the earlier period.  This paper 401 stated, not more 
than four  weeks  before  the foundation  of  the Deutsche 
Bank, that the houses which were chiefly interested in the 
projected  bank were  "not  regarded as able" to manage 
an institution of  this class  "in accordance with modern 
requirements " and "that  its founders would save them- 
selves from a  splendid  fiasco  if  they  were to take  over 
their own shares, since there was absolutely no sympathy 
for the project in Berlin." 
The same paper,  in  speaking  of  the doubling  of  the 
share-capital in  1871, stated that there was no need  for 
such  an increase,  "even  if  it were  true that  the bank 
intended to  establish  silent  partnerships  in  the regions 
peopled by the Riff  pirates, Kaffirs, and Blackfoot Indians.'' 
After the initial failures, when the branches in Eastern 
Asia  had  to be  closed  (in 1874), the following remarks 
were made:  "The  Deutsche Bank, in closing its branches 
in  Shanghai  and  Yokohama,  confesses  its inability  to 
execute  its original high-sounding program, since it was 
primarily  founded  for  the  purpose  of  freeing  German 
commerce  in  foreign  countries,  particularly  in  China, 
Japan, and the East Indies, from the tutelage of  English 
and French bankers.  The question  of  liquidation of  the 
bank  is  now  being  seriously debated; at all events, a re- 
duction of its capital would  seem to be advisable." 
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A  still sharper criticism of  the ~eutschk  Bank  by the 
same paper in I 875 reads as follows : "  One of  those bank- 
ing  establishments, which  has anything but fulfilled its 
program,  and  whose  right  to exist  can  only be  based 
on the fact that, though long moribund, it still manages 
to exist, is the so-called Deutsche Bank in Berlin. ' 
The Deutsche  Bank, however, has  not  allowed  itself 
to be diverted from its path either by its early failures or 
by criticism.  Mainly through its branches  and agency in 
Bremen, Hamburg, and London, it fostered  the over-sea 
business consistently and with ultimately brilliant success. 
In a  subsequent chapter we  shall relate the attempts of 
the Deutsche  Bank, and after it of  a  number  of  other 
banks, to lend  their energetic and ever-growing support 
to German import and export trade by means of  branches 
as  well  as through  the  founding  of  subsidiary  banks. 
The principle which may be said  to have dominated their 
entire  activity  has  been  correctly formulated  by Emil 
Herz  402  as follows : ' '  The part of  the confidential adviser 
in business  (der wirtschaftliche  Vertrauensmann) both at 
home and abroad must be taken by the banker. ' ' 
As  soon as German trade felt certain of  banking sup- 
port in its import and export activity on the part of the 
branches  of  the banks  in  the great  centers  of  oversea 
trade  (Hamburg,  Bremen, London), or  of  the  German 
subsidiary banks working hand in hand with the parent 
banks in Germany,  it naturally emancipated itself from 
the foreign intermediaries  by enlisting the usually much 
cheaper services of  the German banks and their branches 
or  of  their subsidiary  banks. National  Monetary  Commission 
Let us first take the case of the exporter.403 He sells 
his goods as a rule on  long terms for delivery at over-sea 
places, where after possibly several months' sailing they 
are paid by the buyer only when  unloaded and then only 
by  means of  the buyer's  acceptance.  Through his  con- 
nection with  a German bank the exporter is now enabled 
to turn over his bill of  lading to that bank with an order 
to  deliver  the  same  to the buyer  through  its over-sea 
connection, say its subsidiary bank, after payment of  the 
amount of  the bill or  after acceptance of  the draft, the 
latter in case the goods  have been  sold on longer terms. 
In case of  nonpayment, of  which  he is to be  advised by 
cable, the order further provides that the goods are to be 
insured and stored at the over-sea place of  destination at 
the expense of  the seller. 
In such cases the exporter is usually able to procure at 
least part of  the purchase price, and thus fresh operating 
capital, long  before  the arrival  of  the goods,  the bank 
granting him an advance upon the floating goods.  This 
advance is  made upon  the  pledging  by  indorsement of 
the bills of lading, which secure the delivery of  the goods 
at the point of  destination and upon the transfer of  the 
accompanying insurance policy  either according to fixed 
loan terms or according to such terms as may have been 
agreed upon on the particular occasion.  These advances 
vary between  40  and  75 per  cent of  the invoice, a copy 
of  which is to be handed to the bank. 
It goes without saying that such advances are granted 
as a rule only on such goods which are not easily subject 
to the risk  of  decay, waste, breakage, loss  of  weight, or 
leakage. 
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Provided the documents are genuine and the exporter's 
personal credit is good  up to the amount advanced, the 
bank, when  taking the above precautions, will  run but 
little risk.  The risk will naturally be greater, in case the 
advance is made on goods which are not yet definitively 
sold.  In the latter case, when, for instance, the exported 
goods  are directed to the oversea representative  of  the 
domestic export firm, who is to try to sell them only upon 
arrival, the loan will  be made  as a rule by a subsidiary 
institution of  any of  the German banks (as for instance 
the Deutsch-Ueberseeische Bank, the Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank, the Bank fiir Chile und Deutschland, etc.).  These 
banks, at the request of  the oversea agent of the domestic 
exporter, who  turns over to them the bills of  lading, will 
receive and store the goods upon arrival at destination, 
and in turn will  honor the bills drawn upon the German 
exporter's  oversea  representative  who  takes  the goods 
from the storehouse and gradually makes good the credit 
on the drafts as he sells the goods. 
In such cases the loan transaction is particularly risky 
when  the agents order too  large a stock and  thus cause 
a reduction in the price of  the export goods, which may 
be  even  intensified, in  case  the banks  have  to under- 
take the forced sale of  the goods after failure of  the subse- 
quent payments.  In these cases the bank may suffer loss 
if the recipient of  the advance proves of insufficient solv- 
ency, or the pledged goods-of  insufficient value. 
Besides granting advances upon merchandise the banks 
render  assistance to the export  trade  in  various  other 
ways.  They will, for instance, give him reimbursement 
(rembours) credit (see p. 428, below) against the documents National  Monetary  Commission 
by  attaching their acceptance to the draft of  the seller, 
who  is thus enabled to discount  it at the private rate. 
The bank may also accord its acceptance to the domestic 
exporter on the basis of  bank credit, extended not by him 
to the foreign buyer, but by the latter to him, the bank 
being ordered by the foreign buyer to accept the drafts of 
the domestic  exporter  up  to a  certain  amount,  against 
receipt of  the shipping documents, which order is usually 
confirmed by the bank to the exporter (' ' confirmed letter 
of  credit ") . 
However, the most prominent function of  the branches 
of  the German banks at Hamburg, Bremen, and London, 
also of  the oversea banks, is the financing of  imports from 
oversea countries, especially of  raw materials.404 
This  is  done  in  the following  manner: The domestic 
buyer of  the article (importer) procures in the first place 
from his German  bank  a *"  draft " credit  (Trassierungs- 
kredit) in  the form of  ' ' rembours ' ' credit up to approxi- 
mately the amount  of  the invoice in favor  of  the over- 
sea seller of  the article (wool, cotton, grain, rice, coffee, 
ore,  etc.), with  the  understanding,  that  the  seller,  or 
the  latter's  bank,  shall  have  authority  to  draw  upon 
the bank of  the importer to the extent of  the purchase 
price.  The bank will  accept the foreign bill, which the 
oversea seller or  his bank will  send  to it after the load- 
ing of  the goods, or have  presented  to it for acceptance 
by a German banking connection, only in case a full set 
of  the  bills  of  lading  together  with  insurance  policy, 
invoice, description of  weight  and quantity and, if  need 
be, the certificates of  origin, are turned over to it.405  In 
this way the delivery of  the goods to the bank is assured, 
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as are also  the identity of  the article and the terms of 
sale, as described by the importer, as well as the fact that 
the particular transaction is a real, bona fide commercial 
transaction, corresponding to the importer's statement. 
After the bank has accepted the bill, which  as a rule 
runs for thirty or one hundred and eighty days after sight, 
the seller is enabled to discount it either abroad or at an- 
other  German  bank, the first  bank  having to honor  its 
acceptance on maturity. 
In case the importer, as is normally the case, has resold 
the goods to another domestic buyer, the goods must be 
forwarded to this new buyer.  In that case the bank will 
have to deliver to its customer  the shipping  and other 
accompanying documents, for  the purpose of  forwarding 
them to another trusted party.  This does away with its 
collateral security, and up to the time of  payment or the 
remittance of  a draft by the buyer the bank has to grant 
blank credit, which, however, is usually of  but short dura- 
tion.  When  this remittance  is  received,  the bank  dis- 
counts it, credits the amount to the importer as per date 
of  maturity, and as a rule finds itself  in possession  of  the 
cash a good while before maturity of  its own acceptance. 
In case the buyer  has  not  resold  the goods, they  are 
stored after their arrival in Germany, under  the super- 
vision  of  the bank  or  of  its  representative,  the bank 
receiving  a new security in the shape of  the storehouse 
certificate, the bill of lading having been delivered to the 
master of  the vessel at the time of  unloading. 
In the case of  these import transactions the granting 
of  credit may likewise be required, as for instance when 
the German importer has to pay at once, at the time of National  Monetary  Commission 
loading abroad, the purchase price for the goods bought. 
In such case his German bank  accords him "reimburse- 
ment"  credit  (Rembourskredit) by  ordering  its  oversea 
affiliation to pay the purchase price upon receipt of  the 
documents, the  importer  returning  the  purchase  price 
upon  arrival  of  the goods, or  in  case  of  sale to a third 
party (see above) on return of  the documents. 
Finally, if  the importer has sold the goods to another 
country, prior to their shipment, his German bank will for- 
ward the bills of  lading to its affiliated bank in that country 
and order it to hand the documents to the buyer  or his 
bank  upon  payment  of  the purchase  price  or  against 
acceptance. 
It is in this manner  that transactions relative  to the 
importation of  cotton from America, of  wool  from Aus- 
tralia, Cape Colony or  Argentina,  of  grain  from  Russia 
or  America, of  rice  from  eastern  Asia,  of  copper from 
America, of  ores from Spain and Sweden, are effected to an 
annual aggregate amount of  several billions of  marks406 
As the underlying documents and declarations are exam- 
ined with extreme care (much more needed  in this than 
in other classes  of  business  transactions) the settlement 
is made as a rule without any hitch, since, as Waldemar 
Miiller justly remarks, the bank in granting the combined 
reimbursement and acceptance credit, runs a risk only in 
case the documents happen to be forged, or if  after the 
goods are handed to the importer  "  in trust " (zu  treuen 
Handen), the latter as well as his buyer fail at the same 
time.  Against  such  emergencies  the  banks  may  take 
some, though not always sufficient pre~autions.~O7 
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Loans  on  merchandise  collateral  may  be  combined 
with "reimbursement transactions " ("Rembour~~eschiift") 
in case  the importer or  his  foreign  agent  desire  to lay 
in abroad a stock of  raw materials.  In the latter case, 
upon receipt of  the acceptance the goods are held insured 
in store at the disposal of  the bank by its shipping agent 
(to whom the documents are sent) until such time as the 
client has released them in total or in part by remitting 
the corresponding amount of  the purchase price. 
It is clear that the "reimbursement"  business can be 
successfully handled  only  by  first-class banking  houses 
whose  acceptances are known  as  prime  bills  abroad  as 
well as at home, and are therefore taken without question, 
even in larger amounts.  For such bank  acceptances are 
to be preferred per se to the acceptance of  the commercial 
house which receives the goods, and usually also for the 
additional reason that they can be realized at the private 
rate of  discount.  As  a  rule  these  banks and  banking 
houses will grant such credit in terms of  German currency; 
only in  exceptional cases,  as  in some countries of  South 
America, Asia, and Australia such credits will be in terms 
of  pounds  sterling  and  bear  the  acceptance  of  their 
London agency.40s 
Since as the result of continuous efforts mark bills have 
gained a respected position in foreign markets alongside 
of  sterling bills, British aid and intervention is no longer 
required in nearly the same proportion to settle the bal- 
ance  of  payments  on  account of  German  imports  and 
exports.  The time may be said to have passed, at least 
in the majority of  cases, when German exporters, in order 
to collect their foreign claims, and foreign exporters when National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
selling  goods  to  Germans, had  to draw  on  London, or 
when German importers had  to settle the credits of  their 
sellers via London. 
When the Deutsche Bank made its first efforts to gain 
for mark bills an equal standing as compared with sterling 
bills, it had not merely to struggle against foreign lack of 
confidence  and  the  competition  of  the  English  banks, 
it also became the object of  attack on the part of  domestic 
banking and other interests on the ground that, as a result 
of  the above-described fostering of  our oversea import and 
export trade, in accordance with its program, its accept- 
ance account  at times became  so  greatly swelled  as to 
exceed, and sometimes even greatly exceed, the amount 
of  the share capital  of  the bank,  even  after the large 
increases of  its capital during the later period.  But as was 
shown above, the acceptance business for the promotion 
of  oversea commerce,  which is transacted chiefly by means 
of  international  bills, contains no  excessive elements of 
risk,  provided  only  due  caution  is  observed.  Hence 
i.n  criticising  the  extent  of  the  acceptance  accounts 
of  our banks, regard should be had not so much to the 
quantity as to the quality of  the drafts which the banks 
accept. 
(I) Participations of  the Deutsche Bank. 
In thc  preceding  chapter we  saw how  the  Deutsche 
Bank opened branches  first at Bremen (187  I),  and Ham- 
burg  (I  872), the German  centers of  oversea  commerce, 
and London  (1873), with  the view  of  fostering German 
oversea import and export trade.  These branches were to 
serve, so to say, as advanced  posts for the observation, 
exploration, and winning of  new territory by the German 
banks. 
(a) In 1886 the Deutsche Bank organized in  place of 
the above-mentioned La Plata  Bank, which  had  to  be 
liquidated  in  I 875, the Deutsche  Ueberseebank  (effective 
July  I, 1887), with a paid-up capital of  6,000,ooo marks 
(~o,ooo,ooo  nominal), for  the purpose  of  fostering com- 
mercial relations  with  South America, especially Argen- 
tina.  This  bank  in  turn  was  superseded  on  June  17, 
1893, by  the  Deutsche  Ueberseeische  founded  in 
Berlin with a capital of  20,000,000 marks, and increased in 
I 909 to 30,000,000 rnarks410 
The bank has had a continuously prosperous career, as 
may be seen by the rate of  dividends paid: 
The number of  its branches totals at  present 2 I,  of  which 
8 are in Chile (Santiago de Chile, Antofagasta, Concepci6n, 
Iquique,  Temuco,  Valdivia,  Osorno  and  Puerto-Montt), 
4 in Argentina (Buenos Aires, Bahia Blanca, Cordoba, and 
Tucuman), 4  in  Peru  (Lima,  Callao, Trujillo, and  Are- 
quipa), 2  in Bolivia (La Paz and Oruro), I  in  Uruguay 
(Montevideo), I  in Ecuador  (Guyaquil), and  2  in Spain 
(Madrid and Barcelona).  The firm name of the branches 
in foreign countries reads: Banco AlemAn TransatlAntico. 
Per cent. 
.........  1893  6 
.........  1894  7 
.........  1895  9 
.........  1896  9 
Per cent. 
1897 .......  8 
1898 ........ 8 
1899 ........ 8 
........  1900  8 
Per cent. 
......  1901  8 
1902 ........ 8 
1903  ........ 8 
........  1904  8 
Per cent. 
1905  ........ 8 
1906  ......... g 
1907 ......... 9 
.........  1908  9 National  Monetary  Commission 
The former branch of  the Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank 
in the City of Mexico was merged, in 1906, with the Mexi- 
kanische Bank fur Handel und  Industrie (see below under 
"m  "),  founded  with  the  cooperation  of  the  Deutsche 
Bank.  In turn  the  Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank  ab- 
sorbed  the  firm Guillermo  Vogel  &  Co.,  in  Madrid,  in 
which  the Deutsche Bank had  previously held  a silent 
partnership interest (Kommandite) . 
(b)  In March,  1889,~~~  the Deutsche Bank, in conjunc- 
tion with the Dresdner Bank and other institutions, with 
the view  of  fostering German commercial relations with 
Turkey,  founded  the Anatolian  Railway Company  (So- 
cittt  du  Chewin  de  fer Ottoman  d'Anatolie), with  head- 
quarters at Constantinople, which, having acquired before 
December 3  I, I 892  ,412  a small railway opposite Constanti- 
nople, undertook  to extend  it from  Haidar-Pasha, near 
Constantinople, to Ismid (92 kilometers) ,  thence to Angora 
(486  kilometers)  and  from  Eski-Shehir  to  Konia  (445 
kilometers).  The  capital  of  the  company  was  at first 
45,000,000 and subsequently 60,000,ooo francs. 
(c) In the same year (1889) the Deutsche Bank, jointly 
with the Wiener Bankverein, acquired the share interest 
held  by Baron von  Hirsch  in  the Actiengesellschaft  der 
Orientdischen Eisenbahnen (Oriental Railway Company), 
founded in 1879 with a capital of 20,000,000 Austrian gold 
florins and operating  I ,563 kilorneters of rail~ays,~l~  and 
with it the concession for the Macedonian line Saloniki- 
Monastir.  This  concession  it  ceded  to  the  Socie'te'  du 
Chemin de  fcr Ottoman Salonique-Monastir, founded Feb- 
ruary 5, I 89 I  (with headquarters at Constantinople), with 
a  share capital  of  20,000,000 marks  and  debentures  of 
60,000,000 francs. 
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In North America the Deutsche Bank maintains very 
active business connections, resulting in numerous finan- 
cial  transactions  and  underwriting  of  American  public 
securities,  treasury  bonds,  various  railway  bonds,  and 
other railway transactions.  The temporary depression in 
the price of  Northern Pacific securities caused, for the time 
being, grave anxiety to the bank, which was terminated 
by  the reorganization of  the railroad,  effected under  its 
auspices. 
At  first  (beginning with  October  I 5,  1872)  the bank 
secured a silent partnership interest in the banking firm 
of  Knoblauch & Lichtenstein, in New  Y0rk,~1~  amounting 
to $500,000 currency  (1,845,000 marks), but as a result 
of  financial losses  of that firm it had to reduce its par- 
ticipation  to  $4oo,ooo  (I  ,680,000  marks) ,415  while  the 
liquidation of the firm, which took place October I g, 1882, 
caused even a loss of  about 700,000 marks416 
In 1890 the Deutsche Bank, mainly because of  its con- 
nection with many American railroads, especially the  North- 
ern Pacific Railroad  Company, instituted, in conjunction 
with Frankfort  and American houses, the Deutsch-Ameri- 
kanische  Treuhand-Gesellschaft  (German-American Trust 
Company)  at Berlin,  with  a  nominal  share  capital  of 
20,000,000  marks,  whose  main  object  was  to  issue  its 
own  debentures  on  the basis  of  solid American  securi- 
ties to be purchased  by  it, and, in the second place, to 
represent  the interests of  holders of  securities issued by 
American enterprises which had become insolvent.  When 
the first  object  of  the company, mainly  in  view  of  the 
precarious financial situation  in  the United  States, was 
found to be unrealizable, the capital of the company was National  Monetary  Commission 
at first  reduced  to ~,ooo,ooo  marks417 Later on, by the 
by-law  (Statut)  dated  December  9,  1901, the company 
was reconstructed under the new name of  Deutsche Treu- 
hand-Gesellschaft.  While the second of  the above-named 
purposes still remained  one of  the objects of  the recon- 
structed company (whose capital was increased to I ,500,000 
marks), its principal function became the examination of 
the accounts of  stock companies and the undertaking  of 
trustee operations and those of  pledge holding.  Its activ- 
ity in these fields has proved eminently satisfactory. 
In 1889 the Deutsche Bank, with the view of  promoting 
commercial relations between Germany and Eastern Asia, 
participated  in  the  founding  of  the Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank at Shanghai, with a capital of  7,500,ooo taels.  (See 
111, par.  I, below.) 
(d)  With the view of  executing the financial part of  the 
tasks  of  the  Anatolian  Railway  Company,  there  was 
founded at Zurich in  1890, with the participation of  the 
Deutsche  Bank, the Bank fur Orientalische Eisenbahnen, 
with a nominal  capital of  50,000,ooo francs  of  common 
shares (Stammaktien) and  13,000,000 francs of  preferred 
shares  (Vorzugsaktien)  .418  The  debenture  capital  since 
May,  1907, amounts to 30,000,000 francs. 
(e)  In  1894, with  the  view  of  fostering  commercial 
relations between Germany and Italy, the Deutsche Bank 
participated  in the founding  of  the Banca  Commerciale 
Italiana  at  Milan,  the  present  capital  of  which  is 
~og,ooo,ooo  lire.  (For particulars, see 111, par. 2.) 
(f)  Between  the years  1898  and  1904 the Deutsche 
Bank, together with other banks and firms, participated 
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in  the  founding  of  the  Deutsch-Atlantische,  Ost-Euro- 
pciische  und  Deutsch-Niederlandisclze  Telegraphen-Gesell- 
schajt, and the Norddeutsche Seekabelwerke (North-German 
marine  cable works).  In 1908 it took part in the found- 
ing of  the  Deutsch-Sudamerikanische  Telegraphen-Gesell- 
schajt.  (See pp. 458 and 459, No.  6.) 
(g)  In  1899  the  Deutsche  Bank  cooperated  in  the 
launching of  the Schantung-Bergbau- and the Schantung- 
Eisenbahngesellschaft  (Shantung  Mining  and  Shantung 
Railway  Companies)  founded  by a number  of  German 
banks and firms.  See pp. 458 and 459, No. 6.) 
(h) When in 1901 the Anatolian Railway Company was 
granted the concession for the extension of  its lines from 
Konia to Bagdad and the Persian  that company, 
in  conjunction  with  a  number  of  Turkish,  German, 
Austrian,  French, Swiss, and  Italian firms, founded the 
Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Railway  During 
I 905 a controlling interest in the railroad between Mersina 
and Adana was  acquired  in behalf  of  the Bagdad  Rail- 
way, the first portion  of  which, from Konia to Burgulu, 
was  opened for traffic October  25,  1904.  In the spring 
of  1908, "after four years of  laborious  negotiations," 421 
the required state guarantees were at last secured for the 
further  construction  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  over  the 
Taurus and Amanus  mountains to Syria and upper Meso- 
potamia as far as  El Helif  near  Mardin (840 kilometers 
from the last point  reached  by the Bagdad  Railway in 
1908, 1,738 kilometers  from Constantinople, and  about 
I,  I 55  kilometers  from  Bassora  on  the  lower  Shatt-el- 
Arab),  "assuring  thus  the  furtherance  of  this  great 
undertaking. ' National  Monetary  Commissiort 
(i)  In  1904  the  bank  founded  the  Ost-Afrikanische 
Gesellschaft (East-African  Company), with  headquarters 
in Berlin, a colonial company with 21,000,000 marks of 
nominal  capital,  the  Empire  guaranteeing  a  minimum 
interest return of  3  per cent and repayment  at the rate 
of  I 20 per  cent. 
(k)  In 1904-1905  the  Deutsche  Bank  participated  in 
the founding of  the Deutsch-Ost-A  frikanische Bank with a 
capital of  2,000,000 marks  and central office  at Berlin, 
which is both a credit and note issuing bank for the Ger- 
man colony of  East Africa.  (See 111, sec. 3, below.) 
(I)  In  December,  1905, the  Deutsche  Bank, in con- 
junction  with  the  Deutsche  Ueberseeische  Bank,  the 
banking  house  of  Lazard  Speyer-Ellissen in  Frankfort- 
on-the-Main and the Schweizerische Kreditanstalt, with 
the view of  promoting German commercial relations with 
Central  America,  founded  the  Zentral-Amerika-Bank, 
Aktiengesellschaft,  with  central  office  at Berlin  and  a 
capital of  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks,  of  which  25  per  cent  was 
paid  in  for  the time  being.  But, as  the company  was 
unable to secure the state concession for the transaction 
of  banking operations for its proposed branch in Guate- 
mala, the original object of  the enterprise  was  changed 
in 1906, so that the present name reads Aktiengesellschaft 
fur iiberseeische Bauunternehmungen (" Company for over- 
sea building  enterprises").  Its present  object has thus 
been considerably narrowed.  Dividends paid during 1905 
to 1908 were:  o, o, 5, and 4 per cent. 
(m)  In  1906 the Deutsche Bank, in conjunction with 
the banking house  of  Speyer & Co.  in  New  York, with 
the view  of  promoting  German  commercial  interests  in 
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South America  and more  especially in  Mexico,  founded 
the Mexikanische  Bank fur Handel und Industrie (Banco 
Mejicano  de Comercio  6  Industria), with  its main office 
in New  York.  This bank, as stated above, assumed the 
business of the Banco AlemAn  TransatlAntico in  Mexico; 
its nominal  capital is  ~o,ooo,ooo  pesos, the term of  its 
concession is forty years; the dividends paid in 1907 and 
1908 were at the rate of  6 per cent. 
As  regards  the foreign participations  of  the Deutsche 
Bank in Europe it may be stated that- 
(n)  The  bank  had  entered  into  a  silent partnership 
as early as January I, 1873, with the Paris banking house 
of  Weissweiller  &  Golds~hmidt~~~  by  a  participation 
(Kommanditeinlage) of  ~,ooo,ooo  francs, but this partici- 
pation  was  reduced  to  5oo,ooo francs as early as  1876, 
and  terminated soon  after, owing to the liquidation  of 
that firm. 
(0)  In 1877 (Oct. I) the Deutsche Bank entered into a 
silent  partnership  with  the  Vienna  banking  house  of 
Giiterbock, Horwitz & Co. by a participation  of  750,000 
florins  (~,ago,ooo  marks),  which  was,  however,  repaid 
December  31,  I 883.423 
(p) In 1895 the Deutsche Bank formed a silent part- 
nership with another Vienna banking firm, Rosenfeld & 
Co.,  but subsequently  organized a group of  German and 
Austrian  banks  for the purpose of participating in Aus- 
trian and Hungarian business. 
(q) In 1895 the Deutsche  Bank  entered  into a  silent 
partnership  with  the  Madrid  firm  Guillermo  Vogel  & 
Co.4a4 The latter, as mentioned  above, was  taken  over 
in 1906 by the Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
(r) The bank became interested in the mining business 
in the early nineties by a  participation  in  the firm Ad. 
Goerz & Co., of  Berlin and Johannesburg. 
*4lmost all the other great banks followed the example 
of the Deutsche  Bank in  developing  and extending for- 
eign  and oversea  relations,  some  of  them  rapidly  and 
energetically, others hesitatingly and to an inconsiderable 
extent.  The bank which did so most rapidly and exten- 
sively was the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
This  bank  as early  as  1873 had participated  in  the 
founding of  the La Plata Bank, subsequently transferred 
to the Deutsche Bank. 
(a)  In  1880  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  cooperated  in 
the reconstruction of  the Deutsche Handels- und Planta- 
gen-Gesellschaft der Sudseeinseln (German Commercial and 
Plantation  Company  of  the South Sea  Islands).  The 
capital  of  this company was  2,750,000  marks.  During 
I 883-1 887,  at the instigation  of  Ad.  von  Hansemann, 
it cooperated  in  the organization  and  founding  of  the 
Neu-Guznea-Kompagnie  (with  a  capital  of  6,000,ooo 
marks). 
(b)  In  1887 the Disconto-Gesellschaft,  in  conjunction 
with the Norddeutsche Bank, founded the Braszlzanische 
Bank  fur Deutschland42"ith  main  office in  Hamburg 
and a capital of  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks, for  the promotion  of 
commercial relations between Germany and Brazil.  This 
bank  has at present  (1908-9)  five  branches (in  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  S50  Paulo,  Santos, Porto Allegre,  and Bahia). 
The rates of  dividends were as follows: 
F~scal  yea  endmg June  30-1  Dmdends  /  Flral year endmp June so-  l  Dir~dends 
(c)  In  1889  the Disconto-Gesellschaft  participated  in 
the founding of  the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank,42G  organized 
by seven Berlin banks with the view of  fostering German 
trade with eastern Asia (cfr., p. 455, No. I).  Particulars 
regarding this bank are found further below. 
(d)  In  1890  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  entered  into 
silent  partnership  connections  (Kommandzte)  with  the 
banking firm of  Ernesto Tornquist in Buenos Aires, and 
the Antwerp firm H. Albert de Bary & Co., allied with the 
former, the aggregate participation being 2,  I 87,000 marks. 
The latter firm was  transformed  in  1900 into the stock 
company "  Compagnie Commerciale Belge, anciennement 
H. Albert de Bary & Co. ,' ' with a share capital of  5,000,000 
francs,  the Disconto-Gesellschaft continuing  its  partici- 
pation through ownership of  sto~k.~~7 
(e)  In 1894 it cooperated in the formation of  the Banca 
Commerczale Italzana (see below, p. 456, No. 2). 
(f)  In  1895  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft, together  with 
the Norddeutsche  Bank, and in cooperation with  several 
business  houses  having  trade  connections  with  Chile, 
founded the Bank fur Chzle und Deutschland 428  at Ham- 






























10 National  Monetary  Commission 
now  nine branches in Valparaiso, Santiago, Conception, 
Temuco,  I,a  Paz,  Oruro,  Antofagasta,  Victoria,  and 
Valdivia.  Its dividends show the following development: 
1896,  0  per cent, 1897,  5 per  cent, 1898,  a  per  cent; 18~~-1go1,  7 per 
cent, 1902-6,  8 per cent, 1907,  4 per cent, 1908,  8 per cent. 
(g) In  1897  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft in  conjunction 
with  the  firm  of  S.  Bleichroder,  founded  the  Banca 
Generala Romana 429  in  Bucharest  for  the  promotion of 
German-Roumanian trade relations.  The bank has now 
(1909) two branches in Braila and Craiova, and an agency 
in  Constanza.430  Its capital  is  ~o,ooo,ooo  francs  (Lei). 
Its rates of  dividends were as follows: 
1898,  6  per cent, 1899,  5 per  cent, 1900,  7  per cent, 1901,  8 per  cent, 
1902-3, o  per cent, 1904,  6 per cent, 1905,  8 per cent, 1906-8,  9 per  cent. 
(h)  In  1898 the  Disconto-Gesellschaft participated  in 
conjunction with a number of  domestic and foreign firms 
in the founding of  the Banque Internationale de Bruxelles 
for the promotion of  German-Belgian trade relations.  The 
nominal capital of  the new bank was  25,000,000 francs. 
It paid the following rates of  dividends: 
1899,  6  per cent; 1900,  4 per cent; 1901-3,  o per cent, 1904,  4  per cent, 
1905-8,  5 per cent. 
(23  In 1899 the Disconto-Gesellschaft participated,  in 
conjunction with a number  of  German banks  and bank- 
ing houses, in the founding of the Shantung Railroad and 
Shantung Mining companies (particulars for which are given 
below).  During the period  1898-1904  and again in 1908 
it took  part also in the organization of  several telegraph 
and cable companies (see below, pp. 458 and 459, No. 6). 
(k)  In 1900 the Disconto-Gesellschaft founded the Otavi 
Mining and Railroad Company with a capital of  I ,ooo,ooo 
marks, which was increased to 20,000,000 marks as early 
The German Great Banks 
as May  I 2, I 903, for the purpose of  constructing a railway 
between Swakopmund and Tsumeb.  Through the com- 
pletion of  a branch line between Onguati and Karibib a 
junction was effected in 1906 with the main line Swakop- 
mund-W'indh~k.~~1 
(L)  In 1904 it founded the East African Railroad Com- 
pany,  with  a  share  capital  of  21,ooo,ooo marks.  A 
minimum dividend of 3 per cent on this capital, as well as 
a redemption price of  120 per cent, have been guaranteed 
by the Empire. 
(m)  In 190.1-5  the Disconto-Gesellschaft  took part in the 
establishment of  the German-East African Bank, with the 
main  office  at Berlin  and  a  branch  at Dar-es-Salaam, 
which  acts  as  a  credit  and  note-issuing bank  for  the 
German East African colony. 
(n)  In  I 905  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft, together  with 
the firm of S. Bleichroder, the Norddeutsche  Bank,  and 
several Bulgarian firms, for the purpose of  fostering Ger- 
man-Bulgarian trade relations, established the Ranque de 
Credit (Kreditna Banka) at Sophia, with a nominal capital 
of  3,000,000 francs (lev)  . 
(0) In the same year  (1905) the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
in conjunction with the firm C. Woermann at Hamburg, 
established  the  Deutsche  Afrika-Bank  with  a  capital  of 
I ,ooo,ooo marks.  This bank opened branches in  1904 at 
Swakopmund,  Windhuk,  and  Luderitzbucht  and  took 
over  the business  at those  places  of  the  Damara  and 
Namaqua  Trading Company  (Limited) which  had  been 
founded in 1904 by the above-mentioned firm. 
(p)  By the taking  over of  stock in 1905 the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft became  interested  in  the  General  Mining National  Monetary  Commission 
and Finance Corporation (Limited) in London, founded 
by the Dresdner Bank in conjunction with Albu  Broth- 
ers, with a capital of  £ I ,250,000.  The investment did not 
prove profitable, as may be inferred from the fact that the 
value of  this stock as carried on the books of  the company 
had to be reduced considerably several times. 
(q)  In  I go6  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft in  conjunction 
with  a  number  of  German  banks, banking  houses, and 
firms took part in the foundation of  the Kamerun Rail- 
road Company.  (See below, p. 458, No.  s.) 
It is  noteworthy  that to the end  of  the  nineties the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft adhered  to  the principle of  strict 
centralization  in the internal  management of  its affairs. 
In particular it discountenanced the opening of  branches 
for the promotion of  over-sea trade.  It should  be  said 
though, that it had been represented for years at Ham- 
burg  by  the  Norddeutsche  Bank,  with  which  it  had 
become closely allied during the first period. 
It was  only in  1900 that the Disconto-Gesellschaft, in 
view  of  the  considerable  growth  of  its  own  over-sea 
connections, decided  upon  the  opening  of  a  branch  in 
London,  followed  in  1903  by  the  opening  of  another 
branch in Bremen. 
It  may be also noted that as early as 1888 the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft,  together  with  the  Norddeutsche  Bank 
entered into an agreement with the firm Friedr. Krupp, 
which had obtained a state-guaranteed concession for the 
construction of  the Great Venezuelan  Railroad between 
Caracas  and  Valencia  with  a  total  length  of  180 kilo- 
meters, by  which  it took  over  the construction of  that 
road  432.  The transaction, while resulting in considerable 
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contracts and orders for German industry, caused the bank 
nuplerous  long-continued  troubles  and  annoyances  of 
all kinds. 
Finally, it should not be overlooked that the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft, as  a  member  of  the Rothschild Syndicate, 
participated in a large number of  Austro-Hungarian state, 
railroad, and other finance transactions, took part in 1887 
and  1888 in the emission of  Argentine loans, and partici- 
pated in a number of finance and loan operations in behalf 
of  the Finnish,  Russian,  and  Roumanian  Governments 
and railroads.  (For particulars see App. V and VI.) 
(3)  PARTICIPATIONS  OF THE  DRESDNER  BANK. 
(a) With the view of  promoting its foreign, particularly 
its over-sea relations, the Dresdner Bank founded the fol- 
lowing  branches:  1892, one  in  Hamburg;  1895, one  in 
Bremen, and  1901, one in London. 
(b)  In  1889  the  Dresdner  Bank  participated  in  the 
founding of  the Anatolian Railway Company, also of  the 
Company for the Operation of  the Oriental Railroads (see 
above, I  b and c),  and in the establishment of  the Deutsch- 
Asiatische Bank.  (See below, p. 455, No.  I .)  In 1891 it 
took part in the founding of  the Bank for Oriental Rail- 
roads.  (See above sub. ~d.) 
(c)  In 1894 it participated in the founding of  the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana.  (See below, p. 456,  No.  4.) 
(6)  In 1899 it took part in the founding of the Shantung 
Mining  and  Shantung Railway  companies.  (See below, 
pp. 458 and 459, No.  6.) 
(e) In  1904-5  it participated  in  the founding of  the 
German West-African Bank.  (See below, p. 457, No. 4.) National  Monetary  Commission 
(f) In  1905 it entered  into a  close  alliance  with  the 
banking house J. P. Morgan & Co., of  New York, London, 
and Paris433, for the  purpose  of  common  action  in  the 
field of international finance and issue operations and of 
extending  the  German  market  for  American  securities. 
This alliance led  to the common participation of  the two 
parties  in the now  liquidated  Sovereign Bank of  Canada 
at Montreal. 
(g)  About the end of  1905 the Dresdner Bank, in con- 
junction with the A. Schaafiausen'scher Bankverein and 
the Nationalbank fur Deutschland, with  the view of  pro- 
moting  trade relations  with  the  Orient, especially with 
Turkey, Greece,  and  Egypt, founded the Deutsche Orient- 
bank  stock company in Berlin, with a share capital (now 
fully  paid-in)  of  16,000,ooo  marks434  and  two  branches 
in Constantinople  and  Hamburg, taken  over  from  the 
Banque  d'Oriertt  in  Athens.  Since  then  additional 
branches have been opened in Alexandria, Brussa, Cairo, 
Kalamata,  Smyrna,  and  Casablanca  (Morocco).  Divi- 
dends in I go6 were 4 per cent, in  I 907, 4 per cent, and in 
1908, 4 per cent. 
(h)  About the same time (end of  I 905 435)  the Dresdner 
Bank, with the view of  promoting German commerce with 
South  America,  founded  jointly  with  the  A.  Schaaff- 
hausen'scher  Bankverein  the  Deutsch-Szidamerikanische 
Bank stock company, with the main office  at Berlin, and 
a nominal capital of  20,000,000  marks, divided into 4 series 
of 5  ,om,ooo marks each.  This bank has at present (I  909) 
3  branches  (in  Hamburg,  Buenos  Aires,  and  Mexico). 
In 1908 it entered into close relation with the above-men- 
tioned  Sovereign  Bank  of  Canada  in  Montreal  (capital 
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$~,ooo,~~o),  severed however  in  1908 by  reason  of  the 
liquidation  of  the  Canadian  bank.  No  dividends have 
as yet  (i. e., for the  years  1906, 1907, and  1908) been 
declared by the Deutsch-Siidamerikanische Bank. 
(i) In  1906  the  Dresdner  Bank  participated, in  con- 
junction with several German banks, banking houses, and 
commercial firms, in the founding of  the Kamerun  Rail- 
way Company.  (See below, p. 458, No.  5.) 
(k)  It became interested in the mining business by par- 
ticipating, in company with the Disconto-Gesellschaft, in 
the  General  Mining  and  Finance  Corporation,  London, 
which had been founded by it jointly with Albu Brothers, 
with a capital of  £I  ,250,000. 
The Dresdner Bank also participated in the emission of 
the 1905 Chinese state loan, in the 5 per cent loan of  the 
Tehuantepec  National  Railway  Company,  and  in  two 
(4% per  cent and 4 per  cent) Japanese gold loans.  (For 
particulars, see Append. V and VI.) 
(4)  PARTICIPATIONS  OF THE  DARMSTADTER  BANK. 
The  Darmstadter  Bank  up  to  the  present  has  not 
established any  branches for the promotion  of  over-sea 
trade.  But as early as 1854 it acquired a silent partner- 
ship  interest  (Kommandite)-the  first  of  similar  inter- 
ests-in  the  New  York  firm  E. vom  Baur  & Co.  This 
firm,  however,  went  into  liquidation  about  the  end  of 
1885.436  In I gm, jointly with the Bankers' Trading Syndi- 
cate  of  London-its  own  creation-which  in  turn  was 
closely allied with the banking house S. Japhet & Co.  and 
the Nordwestdeutsche Bank  (subsequently the Deutsche 
Nationalbank,  Kommanditgesellschaft  auf  Aktien)  of National  Monetary  Commission 
Bremen, it took the first steps for the promotion of  foreign 
business. 
In 1906, with the view  of  extending business relations 
with  the United  States, it founded, in  cooperation with 
other German and American banking firms, the Amerika- 
Bank,  a  stock  company  in  Berlin,  with  a  capital  of 
25,000,000 marks, divided into 5 series, of  which 5  ,ooo,ooo 
marks were fully paid in, and the rest to the extent of 25 
per cent, while  10 per cent premium on the shares, i. e., 
2,500,000  marks,  was  placed  into  the  reserve  fund. 
However, this bank went into liquidation in 1909, and its 
shares were taken over by the Darmstadter Bank. 
The  Darmstadter  Bank  participated  in  the launching 
of  the following organizations for the promotion of  over-sea 
commercial relations : 
(a)  1889: In  the  founding  of  the  Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank.  (See below, p. 455, No.  I.) 
(b)  I 898-1 904 and I go8 : In the founding of  several tele- 
graph and cable companies.  (See below, pp. 458 and 459, 
No. 6.) 
(c)  1899: In the founding of  the Shantung Mining and 
the  Shantung  Railway  Companies.  (See  below,  ibid., 
No. 6.) 
(d)  1906: In  the  founding  of  the  Kamerun  Railway 
Company.  (See below, p. 458, No.  5.) 
Its own foreign, though not over-sea connections, were 
quite numerous even during the first period. 
(a) As early as 1857, for the purpose of promoting busi- 
ness with France, it formed  a comwzandite in Paris.  The 
latter, after excellent results, had to be liquidated in I 871, 
owing  to the unfriendly sentiment  then  prevailing.  In 
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1873 a new commadte was established, which, however, 
went into liquidation shortly after, in 1877. 
(b)  In  1870  a  commandite  was  formed  in  Vienna 
(Dutschka  &  Co.), which  was  liquidated  in  1902.  Its 
clientele  was  taken  over  by  the  Wechselstuben-Aktien- 
gesellschaft Merkur in Vienna, which in 1908 had a capital 
of  20,000,000 kronen ($4,06o,ooo) and 9 branches.  There 
is a close alliance between this institution and the Darm- 
stadter Bank. 
(c)  In  1871 it founded  for  the  promotion  of  trade 
between Germany and the Netherlands the Amsterdamsche 
Bank  in  Arn~terdani,~~I  with  which  it  has  since  main- 
tained  the most intimate relations.  Simultaneously, for 
promoting trade with Belgium a commandite was formed 
in Brussels. 
(d)  In  1873-74  the  bank  formed  a  commandite  in 
Milan.438 
(e)  In 1877 the Darmstadter Bank, jointly  with other 
firms, founded the Ungarische Escompte- und Wechslerbank 
in Budapest. 
(f)  In  1881 it founded the Wiirttembergische  Bankan- 
stalt, formerly Pflaum & Co., in Stuttgart (share capital, 
in  I 909,  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks), which in turn fornied in the 
same  year  a  contractual  community  of  interest-the 
earliest union  of  this class-with  the Wiirttembergische 
Vereinsbank. 
(g)  In  1890 it acquired a  commandife interest  in the 
banking house Marmorosch Blank & Co. in Bucharest.  In 
conjunction with the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft  it trans- 
formed that firm into a stock company under the name of 
the Banca Marmorosch Blank & Co., Societate Anonima National  Monetary  Commission 
(effective  January  I, 1905)~  whose  capital  amounts  at 
present to ~o,ooo,ooo  lei ($I ,930,000). 
(h)  In 1898 it founded, in conjunction with a number 
of  domestic and foreign houses, the Banque Internationale 
de Bruxelles, with a capital of  25,000,000 francs. 
It  also became interested in the mining business through 
the acquisition of shares of  the Consolidated Mines Selec- 
tion  Company  and  of  the  African  Venture  Syndicate 
founded in I 903. 
During  the  second  period  it participated  in  all  the 
Austrian  and  Hungarian  emissions  of  the  Rothschild 
group, and together with several other banks and banking 
houses  took  part  in  the emission  of  Portuguese  state, 
municipal, and railroad securities, which latter operations 
for  several years  proved  a  source of  great  trouble  and 
financial losses.  It also shared in the emission of  the 5 
per cent Chinese state loan, the 4% and 4 per cent Japanese 
loans of  1905, and other finance omerations, for which see 
Appendices V and VI. 
(5) PARTICIPATIONS  OF  THE  BERLINER  HANDELSGESELL- 
SCHAFT. 
The  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft  participated  in  the 
founding of  the following companies for the promotion of 
German oversea interests : 
(a)  1889 : Deutsch-Asiatische  Bank.  (See  below,  p. 
455, No.  1.) 
(b)  I 898-1 904 and I go8 :  Several German cable companies 
and cable works.  (See below, pp. 458 and 459, No. 6.) 
(c)  1899: Shantung  Railway  and  Shantung  Mining 
companies. 
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(d)  I g06 : Kamerun Railway Company. 
Among its foreign, other than oversea connections, the 
following may be mentioned : 
~t  had a share in the founding of  the following institu- 
tions : 
(e)  1872: Schweizerischer  Bankverein  in  Base1  with  a 
share capital of  ~o,ooo,o00  francs. 
(f) I 898 : Banque  Internationale  de  Bruxelles  (jointly 
with several other firms). 
(g)  I 904-5  : Banca  Marmorosch Blank & Co., Societate 
anonima  in  Bucharest  (jointly  with  the  Darmstadter 
Bank). 
(h)  1908:  Stock  company formerly Andreevics & Co. 
in Belgrade, with a share capital of 4,000,000 francs (jointly 
with the Pester Ungarische Commerzialbank)  . 
Moreover  the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft  maintains 
close relations to the stock company Labouckk.re Oyens  6" 
Co.  Bank  in  Amsterdam  (capital 6,000,000  florins)  and 
since  1903 to the New  York  banking  house,  Hallgarten 
& Co. 
It  also took part 439 
1887 : In the founding of the Dutch South African Rail- 
road  Company in  Amsterdam.440 
1889: In  the  acquisition  of  the  Egyptian  railroad 
1894 : In the founding of  the Banca Commerciale Ita- 
liana. 
1894: In the founding  of  the Compaiiia  Sevillana de 
Electricidad in Sevilla and the Compaiiia Barcelonesa de 
Electricidad in Barcelona. National  Monetary  Commission 
1897: In  the  founding  of  the  Bank  fur  elektrische 
Unternehmungen in Zurich. 
I 898 : In the founding of  the Aluminium-Industrie-A k- 
tiengesellschajt in Neuhausen  (Switzerland). 
I 898 : In  the  founding  of  the  Deutsch-LTeberseeische 
Elektrizitatsgesellschaft  (German  Oversea  Electric  Com- 
pany). 
I 899 : In  the  establishment  of  the  Deutsch-Ostafrika 
Linie (German East Africa Steamship Line). 
I 903 : In  founding the  Deutsch-Chinesische-Eisenbahn- 
gesellschaft  .442 
1904: In founding the Deutsche Kolonial-Eisenbahnbau- 
und  Betriebsgesellschaft (German  Colonial  Railroad  Con- 
structing and Operating Company)  for  the execution  of 
railroad  and port constructions  in the German colonial 
possessions. 
Since 9pri1,  1905, it has been  operating under a lease 
contract the Usambara  railroad  in German East Africa. 
In conjunction with the firm Lenz & Co. it has contracted 
with the Imperial Government for the construction of  the 
railroad Liideritzbucht-Kubub. 
The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft took a prominent part 
in the underwriting of  all Russian, Chinese, and Japanese 
loans emitted in Germany during the second period.  It 
also  emitted  several  Servian  state and  railroad  loans. 
(For particulars see  Append. V and VI.) 
(6)  PARTICIPATIONS  OF  THE  A.  SCHAAFFHAUSEN'SCHER 
BANKVEREIN. 
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than foreign business, it participated also in the founding 
of the following concerns engaged in the foreign field: 
(a)  1889: Deutsch-Asiatische Bank.  (See below, p. 455, 
No.  I.) 
(b)  1894: Banca Commerciale Italiana in  Milan.  (See 
below, p. 456, No.  2.) 
(c)  1898-1904  and 1908: A  number  of  telegraph com- 
panies and cable works.  (See pp. 458 and 459, No. 6.) 
(d)  I 898 : Banque Internationale de Bruxelles. 
(e)  1899: Shantung  Mining  and  Shantung  Railway 
Companies.  (See below, pp. 458 and 459, No. 6) 
(f)  1905: Deutsche Orient-Bank in  Berlin, jointly with 
the Dresdner Bank (see above sub. 3, g) and the National- 
bank fiir Deutschland. 
(g)  1905: Deutsch-Sudamerikanische  Bank, stock  com- 
pany, in  Berlin, jointly  with  the Dresdner  Bank.  (See 
above sub. 3, h.) 
(h)  1906: Kamerun  Railway  Company,  jointly  with 
several other banks.  (See below, p. 458, No. 5.) 
(7) PARTICIPATIONS  OF THE NATIONALBANK  FUR DEUTSCH- 
LAND. 
This bank took part in the founding of  the following 
institutions : 
(a)  1889: Deutsch-Asiatische  Bank.  (See below, p. 455, 
No. I.) 
(b)  I 895 : Credito Italiano in Rome.  The present share 
capital of  the institution is 7~,000,000  lire ($14,475,000) ; 
its branches number at present  I 7. 
Although the main strength of  this institution from the 
start has been due to the promotion of  domestic rather National  Monetary  Commission 
(c)  1899: Shantung  Mining  and  Shantung  Railway 
companies.  (See below, pp. 458 and 459, No. 6.) 
(d)  1904: Banque d'orient, established by it in Athens. 
(Share capital. ~o,ooo,ooo  francs ; branches in Saloniki and 
Smyrna.) 
(e)  1905 : Deutsche  Orientbank, stock company, in Ber- 
lin, founded in conjunction with the Dresdner  Bank (see 
above, sub. 3, g)  and the A. Schaafiausen'scher Bankve- 
rein.  This bank was detached from the Banque d'orient 
and took over the latter's branches in Berlin, Hamburg, 
and  Constantinople.  Additional  branches  have  been 
opened  since  in  Cairo,  Alexandria,  Brussa,  Kalamata, 
Saloniki, Smyrna, Tangier, and Casablanca. 
Since 1905 the Deutsche Orientbank has maintained a 
community of  interest with the Deutsche  Palastina-Bank 
in  Berlin, founded in 1899 by the banking  firm Von der 
Heydt & Co., for the promotion of  trade with  Palestine 
and the Levant.  The latter bank  took over the assets 
and liabilities of  the Deutsche Palastina und  Orient-Gesell- 
schaft (Limited) in Jerusalem, with a capital of  5,000,ooo 
marks.  It has  now  4  branches  (in  Jaffa,  Jerusalem, 
Beirut, and Hamburg), and in turn founded a subsidiary 
company, the Levante-Kontor (Limited), with a branch in 
Constantinople.  The  dividends  on  its  preferred  stock 
show the following rates: 
Per cent. 
......................  1899.  0 
......................  1900.  5 
.......................  1901  5 
......................  1902.  4 
.......................  1903  0 
Per cent 
......................  1904.  0 
1905. ......................  5 
......................  1906.  6 
.......................  1907  6 
.......................  1908  6 
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(f)  1909 : The bank took part in the increase of  capital 
of the Crkdit Mobilier Fran~ais. 
111.-THE  COMMON  SUBSIDIARY  COMPANIES  (Tochter- 
Gesellschaften)  OF  THE  GERMAN  CREDIT BANKS  FOR 
THE  PROMOTION  OF OVER-SEA  AND FOREIGN  BUSINESS. 
The  following  subsidiary  institutions  were  founded 
jointly by a large number of German banks and banking 
houses  to assist  German trade and industry in  gaining 
new markets and to preserve and expand existing markets 
or to develop our colonies. 
I. In  1889 there  was  founded  for  the promotion  of 
our trade in  eastern Asia  the Deutsch-Asiatische 
at  Shanghai, which at  the end of  1908 had twelve branches 
in Berlin, Hamburg, Tientsin, Tsingtau, Hankow, Hong- 
kong,  Calcutta,  Tsinanfu,  Peking,  Yokohama,  Kobe 
in  Japan,  and  Singapore.  The  share  capital  amounts 
to 7,500,000  Shanghai taels, fully paid  in.  The follow- 
ing great banks participated in its founding: The Deutsche 
Bank,  Disconto-Gesellschaft,  Dresdner  Bank,  Darm- 
stadter Bank, Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, A. Schaafiau- 
sen'scher Bankverein, and Nationalbank fiir Deutschland. 
By grant (Konzession) dated July 6, 1906, based on par- 
agraph 3 of  the law regarding the colonies and the imperial 
decree regarding the issue of bank notes in the colonies, 
dated October 30,1904, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was 
given the right for a period of fifteen years to issue bank 
notes in denominations of I, 5, 10, and 25 Mexican dollars 
and of  I, 5,  10, and 25  taels through its branch  offices 
located  in the German  possession of  Kiauchau  and  in 

















2.  In 1894, for the promotion of  our trade with Italy, 
there  was  founded  the  Banca  Commerczale  Ital~ana~~~ 
in Milan.  Among the participants  there were the same 
great banks,  except  the Nationalbank  fur Deutschland, 
which was interested  in the Credito Italiano.  The capi- 
tal of  the  Banca  Commerciale  Italiana  at the end  of 
1908  was  108,ooo,ooo lire.  It has  now  35  branches, 
among them one recently opened at Constantinople 

















For  the promotion  of  trade with  Tunisia  the Banca 
Commerczale Italzana  in turn founded in  1907 the Banca 
Commerciale  Tunzszna  with  the  head  office at  Paris. 
During the same year it also participated in the increase 
of  capital of the Banco Commerciale Italzano in S50 Paulo, 
Brazil, whose firm name has been  changed since to the 
Banco Commerciale Italo-Braszlzano  (capital 5,000 contos). 
In 1908 it founded in Constantinople the Soczetd Commer- 
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czale  per  190rzente (share capital, 3,000,000 lire)  for  the 
promotion of  trade between Italy and Turkey. 
3.  During  1904-5  the Deutsch-Ostafrzkanzsche  Bank446 
was  founded with  the head  office  at Berlin,  a  nominal 
capital  of  2,000,000 marks  and  branches  at  Zanzibar, 
Mombassa and Dar-es-Salam.  This institution acts both 
as an ordinary  and a central note bank  for the German 
colony  of  East  Africa 447  In  its  latter  capacity  it  is 
to  regulate  the  money  market, to  facilitate  payments 
within the colony  and to make remittances between the 
colony on the one hand and Germany and other countries 
on  the other.  It has also been  granted the privilege of 
issuing bank notes in terms of  rupees in accordance with 
business demand up to the threefold amount of  its capital 
with minute provisions regarding the reserve for its note 
circulation  448  Among  the  institutions  participating 
in  its  foundation  there  figured  also  the  Deutsch-Ost- 
afrzkanzsche  Handelsgesellschaft  (German  East  African 
Trading Company) which had been organized in the same 
colony  likewise with  the cooperation of  German banks. 
Among the great  banks which  took part in the founda- 
tion of the East-African Bank we find the Deutsche Bank 
and the Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
4.  During I 904-5  the Deutsch-Westafrikanische Bank 449 
was  formed,  a  colonial  company  with  a  capital  of 
~,ooo,ooo  marks  and  its main  office at Berlin.  At  the 
end of  1908 it had three branches  (in Hamburg, Lome in 
Togo, and Duala in Kamerun)  Its function is to act as a 
bank in the colonies of  Togo and Kamerun, i. e., to regu- 
late the money market and to facilitate payments in these 
colonies ;  also to facilitate remittances between these cola- National  Monetary  Commission 
nies on the one hand and Germany and foreign countries on 
the other.  The Deutsch-Westafrikanische Bank does not 
possess,  however, the privilege of  note issue. 450  It may 
be noted that the participants  in its  foundation include 
besides the Dresdner Bank and several commercial firms, 
also the Deutsch-Westafrikanische Handelsgesellschaft (Ger- 
man West African Trading Company) which operates in 
the  same colony. 
5. The year 1906 witnessed the foundation of  the Kam- 
erun Railroad Company for the construction of  a railway 
from Duala to the Manenguba Mountains with a capital of 
5,640,000 marks preferred and I I ,ooo,ooo marks common 
stock.  In accordance with act of  May  4, 1906, the Ger- 
man Imperial Government guarantees a 3 per cent yearly 
dividend on the common stock, besides the redemption of 
the capital at the rate  of  120 per  cent.  (Reichsgesetz- 
blatt, 1906, p. 525.)  Of  the great banks the following took 
part in the foundation of  the company:  Berliner Handels- 
gesellschaft,  Darmstadter  Bank,  Disconto-Gesellschaft, 
Nationalbank  fiir  Deutschland,  Norddeutsche Bank  and 
the  A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein.  Among  the 
founders  figure  also  the  banking  firms  S.  Bleichroder, 
von der Heydt & Co. in Berlin, Wilh. Schlutow in Stettin, 
M.  M.  Warburg  & Co.  in  Hamburg, also the commercial 
firm  C.  Woermann  in  Hamburg, and  the Aktiengesell- 
schaft fur Verkehrswesen (Stock Company for transporta- 
tion  enterprises). 
6.  Again in the interests of  national policy all the banks 
and  firms concerned  in  the foundation  of  the Deutsch- 
Asiatische  Bank  took  part  also  in the launching of  the 
following enterprises.  In all these  cases there could be 
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no thought of the speedy realization of  the capital tied up in 
these enterprises. 
1898: Land -und  Seekabelwerke  A.  G.  (Stock  Com- 
pany for  land  and  sea  cable works)  in  Cologne - Nippes 
(share capital 6,000,ooo marks). 
I 899 : Schantung-Bergbau-Gesellschaft  (Shantung Mining 
Company) in Berlin,  with a share capital of  6,000,000  marks. 
I 899 : Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft  (Shantung Rail- 
way Company) in Berlin, with a share capital of  ~~,OOO,OOO 
marks. 
I 899 :  Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft, Stock 
Company in Cologne, with  a share capital of  24,000,000 
marks. 
I 899 : Norddeutsche  Seekabelwerke  (North  German  Sea 
cable works), stock company in Cologne-Nordenham, with 
a share capital of  6,000,000  marks. 
I 899 :  Osteuropaische  Telegraphen - Gesellschaft  (East- 
European Telegraph Company), stock company in Berlin, 
with a share capital of  ~,ooo,ooo  marks, 
I go4 :  Deutsch-Niederlandische  Telegraphen-Gesellschaft 
(German-Dutch Telegraph Company), stock company in 
Cologne, with  a capital composed of  7,000,000 marks of 
stock and 7,250,000 marks of  bonds. 
I go8 :  Deutsch-Sudamerikanische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft 
A. G.  (German-South American  Telegraph  Stock  Com- 
pany), in  Berlin, with  a  capital  composed  of  4,000,000 
marks of  stock and 7,800,000 marks of  bonds. 
1907: A number of  German banks participated in the 
establishment of  the State Bank of Morocco. 
At the end of  the nineties there were in existence only 
4 German over-sea banks.  In I903 their number was 6, 
with 32  branches, while at  the beginning of  1906 there were National  Monetary  Commission 
as many  as  I 3,  possessing a  combined  capital  of  fully 
~oo,ooo,ooo  marks and about 70 branches. 
But even these achievements appear rather unimportant 
when compared with those of  other countries in the same 
field  Thus, for instance, England, in 1904, had 32  colo- 
nial banks with head offices  in  London and  2,104 in the 
colonies,  besides  18  (30  in  1907)  other  British  foreign 
banks  with  175  branches.451 France  in  1904-5  had  18 
colonial and foreign banks with 104 agencies; Holland 16 
over-sea banks with 68 branches. 
The financial results of  all German credit banks (with a 
share capital of  at least  ~,ooo,ooo  marks) for the years 
1885 to 1908, inclusive, their number, and the dividends 
paid by them, are summed up in the following table:  452 
Year  Number 




of  marks 
Net earn  I 
t~~~~a~$s  Amount of 
Rate of 
of marks  iz;d","tf  (per cent)  1  marks  1 
56  140  46  430 
57  180  47  170 
57  740  48  ooo 
75  390  58  970 
I10  500  81 920 
98,300  79  630 
74  140  63  070 
76  850  61,230 
71  770  59  740 
85  IIO  68  620 
I11 920  83  550 
118.350  92,690 
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It may be seen from this table that the German credit 
banks have paid an annual dividend below 6 per cent only 
three times  during  the last  twenty-four  years,  namely, 
for  the years  of  depression,  1892  and  1893, when  the 
rate went  down  to  5.80  and  5 72  per cent  and for the 
crisis year  1901, when  the rate was  as low  as 5.66 per 
cent.  Even  for the years  1902 and  1903 following the 
crisis the average dividends  exceeded 6 per  cent, while 
for each  of  the last  five years  the average has been  in 
excess of  7 per cent.  During the years of  the high crest 
of  business  activity,  1889 and  1899, average  dividends 
in excess of  8 per cent were paid, viz, 8.77 and 8.12 per 
cent.  These  are exceedingly satisfactory and moreover 
stable results. 
It is further seen that the average  1907 dividends  of 
7.45 per cent show a decline since 1906, when the average 
was  7.88  per  cent,  notwithstanding  the fact that  the 
average discount  rate of  the Reichsbank  in  I907 stood 

































218  380 
261  170 
262  020 
258,400 
256  760 
253  210 
273,500 
330  200 
377  080 
382  280 
417  230 
Net earn- 




162  800 
195  470 
185  270 
152  640 
156  170 
170 560 
189  780 
224  730 
255  530 








148  560 
140  520 
110,520 
120  510 
130  880 
I45  540 
168  540 
186 880 







8  12 
7  I9 
5 66 
6  19 




7  45 
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preceding year.  This may  serve as an additional  argu- 
ment against the contention that the banks are interested 
in a high bank rate  The truth is that whatever advan- 
tage they may derive from the higher  interest  rates on 
current account, this advantage is  as a  rule more than 
compensated by  the fact that in  such  times  emissions 
are either  out of  question or  else made quite difficult; 
that in addition  the security business is  less  profitable, 
that  the  value  of  the  security  holdings  is  shrinking, 
necessitating  corresponding amounts  to  be written  off, 
and  that at such time  losses  under  the head  of  debit 
accounts  are also  inevitable.  A  continuous  high  bank 
discount rate is  therefore as a rule not  favored by  the 
banks. 
If it is considered that the operating capital of  a bank 
includes  also  the surplus  funds  and  that  therefore  in 
calculating the dividend rates the former  must  also be 
reckoned, the following  results for the last  seven years 
are obtained, according to the Deutscher Oekonomist.  453 
[Amounts expressed in thousands of  marks ] 
I  I  I 
Rate  of  dlvldends  calculated  on 
the basis of capital and surplus 
per cent 
Rate  of  dvidends calculated  on 
the  basis  of c a pit  a l  only 
per cent 
Share capital on which  dividends 
are earned 
Surplus  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year 
Total of  capital and surplus 
(Gcsamles  ezgenes  Kab 
tal) 
Dividends  amount of 
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I 948 476 
380 211 
a  328 687 
120 512 
Share  capital on  which  dividends 
are earned 
Surplus  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year 
Rate  of  dividends  calculated  on 
the  bass of  capital and  surplus 
per cent 
Rate of dlvldends calculated on the 
basis of  capital only  per cent 
Total  of  capital and surplus 
(Gesamles  ezgenes  Kafz 
tal) 
Dividends  amount of 
I 984  642 
391  36a 
2 376 004 
130 881 
It appears that on an average more than I  per cent 
of  the dividends is to be imputed to the surplus funds. 
It is  hardly  possible for  an outsider to calculate the 
return to the banks themselves on the capital invested, 
since neither  the average amounts of  capital employed 
during a given year nor the interest paid by the banks 
are  known.  For  the  same  reason  it is  impossible  to 
calculate the profits of  the various business branches of 
the banks.  Neither  are the net  returns  to the holders 
of  bank shares identical with the dividends received by 
them, in case a premium was paid, when the shares were 
purchased.  For  the  period  1871  to  1900  the  average 
income from dividends derived by shareholders of  German 
credit banks  amounted  to 6.74  per  cent, for 1880-1900 
to 6.84 per cent, while the net income of shareholders for 
the last ten years was 6.70 per cent.454 
For the year  1908 the returns on various shares from 
the shareholders' point of  view 45Lthat is, the net returns 
to shareholders-were  as follows : 
2 371 781 
479 561 
2 851  342 
186  884 
2 005.136 
400  372 
2 405  508 
145 511 
2  559 202 
554 4x1 
2.175  315 
448 380 
z  623 695 
168 536 
2 627 855 
586 750 
3 113 613 
190  722 
3 214 60$ 
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Banking,  7.7  per  cent;  insurance,  19.3  per  cent; 
chemical  industry,  15.7  per  cent  (large-scale chemical 
enterprises,  I I .5 per cent) ; mining, smelting, salt works, 
etc , 9.5  per  cent; textile industries, 9.4  per  cent; elec- 
trical  industry,  8  per  cent ; secondary  railways (Klezn- 
bahnen) and street railways, 4.3 per cent 
The average  dividends  of  the 14 Berlin banks 456 were 
invariably higher than those of  other banks, as may be 
seen from the following table, which gives the compara- 
tive figures for the last seventeen years: 
I  Average t;en&  pal*  /  Average :;lends  patd 
Year 











surplus, a fact which he regards of  the utmost economic 
All German 
banks wlth a 
capltal of  at 
least 
I 000 000 
marks each 
interest.  As  a  matter of  fact, the reverse is true: With 
the progressive growth of  profits-that  is, with the growth 
We may reiterate here what we stated in the earlier part 
of the volume, viz, that the rate of  dividends increases 
with the increase of  the current business of  the bank,  while 
the steadiness of  the dividends increases with the increase 
of  its regular deposit business. 
On the other hand there is no basis of fact for the notion 
of  a recent writer,457 according to which the profits of  the 
bank increase in proportion to their combined capital and 
- 
Per cent 
5  80 
5  72 





8  12 
7  I9 
of business, especially their current business-the  banks, 
Berlln 
banks 
in  accordance  with  sound  business  policy,  have  been 
Per cent 
603 
5  73 
8  14 
8  29 
8  48 
8  45 
8  45 
8  59 
7 61 
increasing their capital. 
year 









capital  of  at least  ~,ooo,ooo  marks each)  almost  one- 
All German 
banks wlth a 
cap~tal  of  at 
least 
I 000 000 
marks each 
quarter is due to commissions earned chiefly in the broker- 





5  66 
6  19 
6  59 
7  25 
7  75 
7  88 
7 45 
7  41 
gross  profits,  commissions,  and  the proportion  of  com- 
Per cent 
5  75 
6  72 
7  23 
8  15 
8  72 
8  77 
7 93 
8  06 
missions to gross profits show the following figures. 
Year 
Number  Gross profits  Comm~sslons  1  of banks  I  ,118  ,,$&G  gross  slons  profits  to 
83  ooo 
77  800 
78  700 






158  900 




258  400 
256  700 
253  200 
273  500 
330  200 
377  000 
382  300 
417  zoo 
28  I00 
34  300 
35  400 
40  400 
50  500 
57  900 
60 ooo 
58  800 
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The gross profits of the Berlin banks show the following 
figures (in million marks) 
According to a calculation of  the Kolnzsche Zeztur~g~~~  the 
total gross profits of  57 German banks in 1903 originated 
as follows:  From bills  and  interest, 48  per  cent;  from 
commissions, 2 5 per cent ; from issues and participations, 
22 per cent 
For the years  1905-1908  the profits from commissions 
and interest constituted the following proportions of  the 
total gross profits:  (a)  for all banks:  71 per  cent, 75  per 
cent, 86 per cent, and 76 per cent;  (b) for 9 Berlin banks: 
67 per cent, 71 per cent, and 78 per cent 
Of  the gross profits of  the Berlin great banks the follow- 























70  6 
61 4 
84 8 
66  6 
82  9 
84  4 
The assertion has been made that as early as 1894 all the 
banks except the Darmstadter Bank, and in 1905 all the 
banks, except  the Disconto-Gesellschaft and the Darm- 
stadter Bank derived sufficient earnings from their current 
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business, that is, the specie, coupon,  and bill  business, 
interest and commissions, also from their commandites, to 
fully pay their dividends.  This assertion made by Loeb 
(see Model-Loeb op. cit. p. 152) is erroneous, as the author 
fails to deduct from the above earnings the corresponding 
expenses of  operation.  These expenses461  for all German 
credit banks with  a  capital of  at least  ~,ooo,ooo  marks 
each were as follows (in million marks). 
It is seen that during the course of  concentration the 
cost of  operation has been steadily and largely increasing. 
In 1908 it constituted about 32 per cent of  the gross earn- 
ings of  all the larger banks, compared with 31 per cent in 
1907, 28  per cent in 1906, 27 per cent in 1905 and only 18 
per  cent  in  1895.  For  the 9  Berlin  banks the cost  of 
operation in  1908 amounted to not less than 66,800,ooo 
marks, as against gross earnings of  1g6,ooo,ooo  marks, that 
is, 34 per cent, as against 32 per cent in 1907, 30 per cent 
in  1906, and 28  per  cent in  1905, the individual banks 
showing  proportions  more  or  less  favorable  than  the 
averages just given. 
For the 6 Berlin great banks the cost of operation for 
1908 was  55,900,ooo  marks; that is, 33  per  cent of  the National  Monetary  Commission 
gross earnings, the figures for each of these banks being as 
follows (in million marks) : 
I  Cross  1  Cost of  I  Gross  I  Cost of 





Berl~ner  Handelsgesellschaft 
A  Schaaffhausen scher Rankvereln 
The most noteworthy facts brought out by the table is 
the relatively small cost of  operation in the case of  the 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, due to its continued strong 
centralization, and the relatively high cost of  operation in 
the case of  the Deutsche Bank, due undoubtedly  to its 
strong decentralization. 
The amounts written  off  by  all German credit  banks 
(with a capital of  at  least I ,ooo,ooo  marks each) prior to the 
fixing of the clear profits were as follows (in million marks) : 
year  1  year  1 
Mtllton 
marks 
This  table  does  not  include the  amounts  written  off 
prior to the fixing the gross earnings by reducing the valua- 
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tion of  particular  assets  (so-called silent reserves).  The 
specially large amounts written off in 1901, viz, 5 I ,600,ooo 
marks, are due to the crisis of  1900-1901. 
According  to the  Deutscher  Oekonomist, the  surplus 
funds showed the following total amounts and proportions 
to the share capital: 
Year  :,",it$,  Surplus (tn  Propor-  t~on  of  s.,"gt$,  surplus (tn  Propor-  tlon of  thousands  thousands  surplus to  thousands  thousands  surglus to 
of marks )  of marks )  capital  of marks )  of marks.)  capttal  1  1  stock.  stock 
Data for all banks  Data for the Berhn banks 





























A very material part of  the surplus funds does not come 
from the business profits, but represents chiefly amounts 
paid in by the stockholders in the shape of  premiums and 
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1,906 250 
1.959  550 
I  959  290 
1,980 590 
1 989  960 
S  066  540 
2  223  580 
2  432  140 
2  572.890 
2  646  610 
93,240 
99,270 
107  go0 
115 320 
156 060 
187  880 
191  720 
200,310 
196  330 
199  820 
210  620 
235  250 
270  750 
330  3-70 
373  930 
390  930 
380.210 
391  360 
400  370 
448  380 
479  560 
554,410 
586  750 
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15  00 
15 go 
17  82 
18  20 
18 95 
18  77 
18  72 
18  56 
19  00 
19  10 
19  60 
19 61 
I9 95 
19  40 
19  75 
20  12 
21  68 
21  50 
22 70 
22 80 
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placed with the surplus funds in accordance with the pro- 
visions of paragraph 262 of  the Commercial Code (formerly 
article 185, b, secs. I  and 2 of  the Aktiennovelle (corpora- 
tion share act) of July 18, 1884.  The surplus funds grew 
according to the above table in the case of  all banks with  - 
a capital of  at least  I ,ooo,ooo marks each from I 2.90  per 
cent in  I 885 to 22.90 per cent in 1908, and in the case of 
the Berlin banks from I 7 per cent in I 885 to 29.10 per cent 
in  1908.  On  an average, the surplus funds  grew  more 
rapidly than the capital stock. 
During the year  1900, when the surplus funds in all the 
banks amounted to nearly  20  per cent (19.95) and in the 
Berlin  banks to nearly  23  per  cent  (22.62), the surplus 
funds in  other  enterprises  (according  to  Ed.  Wagon, 
op. cit., p.  170) were: 
Per cent. 
......................................  In the wood industry.  8.89 
......................................  In building companies.  10.87 
....................................  In the brewery industry..  17.07 
........................................  In the coal industry.  20.48 
..................................  In the machinery industry.  22.94 
....................................  . In the chemical industry.  23.38 
......................................  In the rubber industry.  27. 15 
.......................................  In the paper industry.  2;.  16 
I must say, however, that this very favorable develop- 
ment of the surplus funds of  the banks is due to the excel- 
lence of  our corporation laws rather than to the excellent 
policy  of  our  banks,  as  Ed.  Wagon  would  have  us 
believe.  463 
At all  events it is  due chiefly  to the relatively  large 
surplus funds that the German banks and industrial com- 
panies were able to  pass through the  crisis of  I goo relatively 
well, in strong contrast to the crisis of 1873, and that their 
recovery after the crisis took so little time.  It is seen that 
The German Great  Banks 
the surplus  funds  of  the German banks compare  quite 
favorably with the surplus funds accumulated in the most 
important branches of  industry.  It  must, however,  be 
borne in mind, that, like the industrial corporations, our 
banks  have  endeavored  to accumulate  so-called  "silent 
reserves"  in  addition  to the  legally prescribed  surplus 
funds  as  shown  in  the  balance  sheets.  These  "silent 
reserves " can be traced chiefly to the extremely cautious 
and  conservative  modes  of  valuing  the  assets  of  the 
institutions before the gross earnings are calculated. 
The fairly steady progress of  the former period  (1848- 
1870) contrasts with the rapidity with which Germany's 
whole  econolnic  life  and, with  it, German  banking  are 
advancing in the present  period, in about the same way 
as the speed of  the mail coach of  the times of  the Holy 
Roman Empire of  the German nation, contrasts with the 
flight  of  the modern  automobile,  which  while it speeds 
along,  overcoming  all  obstacles,  corners,  and  surface 
difficulties, endangers at times both the innocent pedes- 
trian as well  as the occupants.  Just  as in  the case  of 
the automobile,  so in the case of  German banks, public 
safety  and real progress  are safeguarded  only when  the 
persons  in charge combine  great technical  skill with the 
greatest  virtue  of  persons  in  control,  that  of  keeping 
within bounds. 
Not only private but also public interests are at sta~e. 
With the power and the influence of the large enterprises 
grows  also  the responsibility  of  the managers,  as well 
as  the  necessity  of  supplanting  the  indiscriminate 
choice  of  means  by  wise  self-restraint  of  the  leaders. 
It is not without significance that a  distinction is made National  Monetary  Commissiort 
between banks proper and private banking concerns, and 
that the bank employees are spoken of  as bank officials. 
They  are,  in  fact,  employees  of  enterprises  which  by 
reason of  their functions and development "can  not be 
regarded  as purely private  undertakings "48'  and toward 
which  the regulations  of  private  law  are becoming  less 
and less applicable. 
SECTION  6.  THE CHARACTER  OF  THE  BUSINESS  MAN- 
AGEMENT  AND  BUSINESS  DEVELOPA~ENT  OF  EACH  OF 
THE GREAT  BERLIN  BANKS. 
Before describing in the next chapter the concentration 
movement in German banking during the second period, 
I shall attempt to characterize summarily the particular 
methods  of  management  and  operations of  each  of  the 
great  Berlin  banks,  as  shown  in  previous  chapters,  in 
connection with their various activities. 
THE  DEUTSCHE  BANK. 
I. The distinct merit of  the management of  the Deutsche 
Bank, which was  founded only  in  the beginning  of  the 
second period, is that from its very inception is showed a 
clear insight both into the needs of  the hour  as well  as 
of  the more  distant future.  Accordingly its policy  has 
been to make timely and proper provisions for these more 
distant needs, so  that the bank  was  hardly  ever  taken 
unawares  by unexpected happenings  and  in  its actions 
and  policies  was  almost  never  influenced hy  untoward 
developments.  The bank  was  thus never  compelled to 
make sudden changes in its policy, dictated by the pressing 
needs of  the moment, and in all its activities presents a 
picture of  safe, quiet, and steady progress. 
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2.  There are three main directions in which the above- 
mentioned qualities of  management are brought out most 
clearly and brilliantly,  and in which the Deutsche Bank 
has become a model for German banking as a whole: 
(a) The Deutsche Bank, immediately after its creation, 
adopted as an integral and essential feature of  its banking 
policy,  the systematic fostering of  the deposit  business 
through the establishment of  deposit offices, (which num- 
bered 74  at the end of  1go8), thereby  effecting the con- 
centration of  a part of  the available funds of  the nation in 
the credit banks for productive investments and uses. 
The  amount of  its deposits incre?sed  from  4,800,000 
marks at the end of 1871 to 74,800,000 marks in the year 
1894 and reached the total of  779,500,000 marks at the 
close of  I 908. 
(b)  It was first among the banks to recognize the ne- 
cessity for the German credit banks, of  following a syste- 
matic  industrial policy, and  immediately  upon  recogni- 
tion of  this necessity it took the proper practical steps in 
line with its new policy. 
In  the  year  1897  a  community  of  interests  formed 
simultaneously  with  the  Bergisch-Markische  Bank  in 
Elberfeld and with the Schlesischer Bankverein in Breslau, 
both of  which had long been active in the chief  industrial 
districts  of  Rhineland-L\Testpl~alia  and  Silesia,  secured 
to the Deutsche Bank, with one stroke, a firm foundation 
for permanent industrial connections in these districts. 
(c)  Although  other banks  had  made  scattered  efforts 
along the same lines, the Deutsche Bank was the first to 
recognize the need of  a systematic fostering of  industrial 
exports by the German credit banks and proceeded to lend National  Monetary  Commission 
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its support to that policy with an energy undaunted either 
by difficulties or occasional failures.  Soon after its crea- 
tion  it established branches in  Bremen,  Hamburg,  and 
London,  followed  later  by  the  creation  of  subsidiary 
companies in foreign  countries or  for  the foreign trade, 
such  as the Deutsclz-Amerikanische Treuhand-Gesellschaft, 
(1890)  the  Deutsche  Ueberseeische  Bank  (1890)'  the 
Deutsch-Ostafrikanische  Bank,  (1904-5), the  Central- 
Amerika-Bank  (I  go5), and  the  Mexikanische  Bank  fzir 
Handel und Industrie (I  906). 
The same and even larger purposes were served by the 
founding of  the Anatolische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft (1889), 
the  Betriebsgesellschaft  dev  Orientalischen  Eisenbahnen 
(I  889), the Bank fur Orientalische Eisenbahnen (I  89 I), the 
Kaiserl.  Ottomanische  Eisenbalzngesellschaft  (I  903)~  the 
Bagdad-Bahn  (1go3),  and  the  Deutsch-Ostafrikanische 
Bank (I  904-5). 
In all its activities  abroad  the  Deutsche  Bank  was 
governed by the viewpoint which I endeavored to express 
'in another part of  this  book (Sec. 7) in the words:  "The 
skirmishes of  the political advance posts are fought out 
on  financial ground "  (Die  politischen  Vorpostengefechte 
werden auf finanzielLewt Boden geschlagen).  This is shown 
best by the bank's activities in Turkey, in the case of  the 
Anatolian and the Bagdad railways, etc. 
It  was  the  above-mentioned  lines  of  policy  which 
caused the Deutsche Bank  (as we  shall see in the next 
Part,  IV)  to develop  a  strong  tendency  toward  con- 
centration, particularly  by  decentralizing its operations. 
In this  connection  the bank  quite frequently  and  suc- 
cessfully availed itself  of  opportune moments for prompt 
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and  energetic action,  even  at times  when  other  banks 
preferred to follow a  cautious and waiting policy.  For 
instance, on the same day when the business and bank- 
ing world  was  shocked by  the news  that the Leipziger 
Bank had closed its doors the Deutsche Bank announced 
the opening of  a branch in Leipzig. 
The  beginnings  of  concentration  d~te  back  to  the 
seventies,  when  the  Deutsche  Bank  participated  in  a 
number  of  bank  liquidations,  which  will  be  discussed 
in  detail  later  on.  This  action  proved  the  source  of 
considerable  profits,  and,  what was  more  important, 
resulted at the same time in the gain of  a large clientele 
of  the  first  order  in  various  sections  of  the  Empire. 
It also gave the bank  an opportunity to obtain a  firm 
foothold in southern Germany by founding in Frankfort- 
on-the-Main,  one  of  the  leading  financial  centers,  a 
branch of  its own on the ruins of  the Frankfurter Bank- 
verein. 
By  constantly  extending the network of  communities 
of  interest and by the conclusion of  friendly agreements 
(Freundschaftsvertrage)  on  the  basis  of  the  "  most- 
favored treatment,"  it steadily increased the concentra- 
tion and through it extended  its sphere of  activity and 
influence.  With each further phase  of  concentration the 
bank  also increased  the  domain  of its current-account, 
bill,  contango, acceptance, and emission  business.  This 
can  be  seen  very  plainly  from  a comparison  of  the 
table below (p. 480), which  shows the earnings from its 
various  lines  of  business, with  the  table  showing the 
progress  of  concentration  (Appendix VII)  .  The  bank 
recognized  from the very beginning, even  while  it was NationaZ  Monetary  Commission 
planning large activities abroad, that the fostering of  the 
deposit and the regular business must always constitute 
the backbone of  a German credit bank,  and it took no 
step  in  its  concentration  development  which  did  not 
involve also a vigorous advancement in this direction. 
The  systematic  development of  its  industrial  policy 
began with the "bold  move"  of  1897.  During the first 
two  decades,  however,  the bank  did  little  or  nothing 
toward  extending  its  industrial  connections  through 
the  founding  or  transforming. of  industrial  enterprises. 
At that time it  sought to improve these connections rather 
through  expanding  its current-account  and  acceptance 
business.  When  in  1890  it followed  the  example  of 
the other banks by founding the Deutsch-Oesterreichische 
Mnnnesmannrohrenwerhe (German-Austrian Mannesmann 
Tube  Works),  this  "step  from  its  straight  path"  did 
not prove profitable. 
Since  the  nineties,  however,  the  German  Bank  has 
shown  but  little  difference  from  the  other  banks  as 
regards its industrial, founding, transforming, credit, and 
emission  business, 46~ltllough,  generally  speaking,  it 
shows far less  activity than the other banks in the field 
of  industrial  promotion  proper.  It  was  only  recently 
that it entered  upon  this  line  of  activity  on  a  large 
scale by  financing, with  apparent success, a number  of 
petroleum companies.  (See above, p. 418 and following.) 
It should be said that the Deutsche Bank was also in 
advance  of  most  other  banks,  in  adhering  the  more 
strictly  to  the  principles  of  distribution  of  risk  and 
liquidity  of  resources  the  more  it extended  its  sphere 
of  activity. 
The German Great Banks 
Increases of  capital for the purpose  of  restoring  the 
liquidity of its resources were never resorted to at a time 
when  the  liabilities  had  already  grown  to  dangerous 
proportions  as  conipared  with  the  liquid  assets  of  the 
institution, but were secured beforehand, when  such an 
unfavorable change was to be reasonably expected as the 
natural  consequence  of  the normal  growth of  business. 
Such increases often proved unpleasant surprises to stock- 
holders and speculators, causing unjustified apprehension 
of  decreased earnings. 
As  a  result  of  the mutually  interdependent  business 
policies described above, the Deutsche Bank has shown a 
greater steadiness in the development of  its dividends as 
well  as its surplus funds than any other bank.  This is 
proven by the table below, taken from the report of  its 
operations for  1908.  Its surplus funds, as shown in  its 
balance  sheets  (exclusive of  the no  doubt  considerable 
"  silent reserves ") , amount at present to  g I  per  cent of 
the capital stock of  200,000,000 marks, the latter having 
grown from an original capital stock of  15,000,ooo  marks 
in 1870. 
With  reference to earnings from the current business 
and the extent of its oversea business, the Deutsche Bank 
takes first rank.  Its acceptance account as a  result  of 
its large oversea business often reached proportions which 
were  deemed  excessive  in  some  quarters.  The  bank 
undertook the underwriting and emission on a large scale 
of  German state and communal loans.  It had a leading 
part in  the emission, among others, of  the loans  of  the 
following  states : Argentina,  Bosnia,  Bulgaria,  Chile, National  Monetary  Commission 
China,  Mexico,  Spain, and  Turkey  (for  particulars  see 
Append. V  and VI).  It took  up  in  their  entirety the 
German and Prussian loans of  1899, amounting altogether 
to zoo,ooo,ooo marks. 
The bank repeatedly suffered losses through the specu- 
lations of  the managers of  its branches and commandites; 
thus in 1882 through the speculations of  the managers of 
its New  York commandite, in  1897 through the specula- 
tions of the manager of  an exchange office (Wechselstube) 
of  the Hamburg branch, and in 1891 through the specu- 
lations  and  embezzlements  of  a  Berlin  official, which 
necessitated a writing off  of  I ,ooo,ooo marks.  The losses 
in the current-account business have been relatively small, 
and in view of  the large surplus have had no appreciable 
effect on the bank. 
On  the other  hand, like the other  banks, it had  to 
write off  repeatedly  serious losses on account of  partici- 
pations  and  industrial  business.  Under  this  head  fall 
the losses due to the liquidation of  its early branches in 
Shanghai  and  Yokohama,  of  its  commandites  in  New 
York and Paris;  the Argentine participations  and emis- 
sions,  the  Deutsch-Amerikanische  Treuhand-Gesellschaft 
(German-American Fidelity Company), the Mannesmann- 
undertaking;  also losses  occasioned  through  its partici- 
pations and connections in the United  States, especially 
with the American railways, such as the Northern Pacific 
Railroad  Company.  The  successful  reorganization  of 
,this  road is due primarily to the energy and sagacity of 
the Deutsche Bank. 
The standing which  the German  mark  bills  attained 
in foreign markets, and which constituted the first stage 
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in the increasing independence of  our export trade from 
foreign  intermediaries,  is  primarily  the  work  of  the 
Deutsche  Bank  and  in  the  second  place  that  of  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
The German Bank participated  and as a rule took  a 
-  - 
leading part in all the joint enterprises of  the large banks, 
initiated  for the advancement  of  the foreign and  esne- 
cially the oversea relations of  Germany, as, for instance, 
in  the founding  of  the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank  (1889)) 
the Banca  Commerciale Italiana  (1894)~  the Banque In- 
ternationale  de  Bruxelles  (I  898), the Schantung-Bergbau 
und  Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft  (1899) ,  the  telegraph  and 
-  cable  companies  of  the  years  1898  to  1908,  and  the 
Kamerun-Eisenbahngesellschaft  (I  906). 
The following table shows in  detail the  development 
of  the  Deutsche Bank: National  Monetary  Commissiarc 
Statzstzcal revzm of  the akvelofi 
I  I  I 
Cash  coupons.  nebll 
blh,  bank  Credlts 
d of  I1  rredlts.  con  curren 
:S  on current account. 
uvru~es  on  mercl~andir,  etc I  1 
En 
calendar  t;;p;,  ea.-  I  account :nd  1  Acceptances 
Year-  hrlls and  deposits  I-\ %cured  (b) Unsecured  l  -1  l 
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THE  DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAP?'. 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft was  founded  at first  as a 
Kreditgesellschaft  (credit  partnership)  by  the later-day 
Prussian Minister of  Finance, David Hansemann, and in 
I 856 transformed into a Kommanditgesellschaft auf A ktien. 
(limited stock company), under the firm name Direktion 
der Disconto-Gesellschaft.  As we showed above, this bank, 
as early  as the first  period  (1851-1870), took  a  leading 
part in the fostering of  the current-account business and 
in  the underwriting  and  emission  of  German  state and 
communal loans and railway shares. 
Until  the year  1900, however,  i.  e., for  nearly  fifty 
years, this company apart from commandite participations 
adhered strictly to the policy of  strict business centraliza- 
tion.  It was  only  through the fostering and extending 
of  over-sea relations that it came to establish in  1900 a 
branch in London.  In I 901 the liquidation of  the banking 
house M.  A. von Rothschild & Sons in Frankfort-on-the- 
Main led to the opening of a branch inthat city.  During 
the second  period  it was  prominently  connected,  as  a 
member of  the Rothschild syndicate, with all the under- 
writing  and  issue  business  conducted  by  this  group, 
especially the state loans and the railway  enterprises in 
Austria  and  Hungary, also with  the  issue of  Russian, 
Roumanian, Chinese, and Japanese loans. 
It fostered  industrial  relations  even  during  the first 
period  with relatively good success, though refraining as 
a rule from speculative excesses.  In so far, however, as 
it permitted itself  to be led into financing and managing 
industrial enterprises, it had to suffer the same, and at 
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times, even  worse  experience than the other banks, as, 
for  instance,  in  the  case  of  the  taking  over  of  the 
Heinrich,shutte (Heinrich  Smelting  Works)  in  I 85 7 ; the 
founding  in  1872  and  the  subsequent  development  of 
the Dortmunder  Union;  the Grosse  Venezuela-Eisenbahlz- 
Gesellschaft, the Internationale Druckluft- und Elektrizitats- 
Gesellschaft  (Popp), founded  in  1890, and  the blasting 
works  at the  Iron  Gate  in  Hungary  taken  over  from 
the firm G.  Luther.  Between  the years  1891-1894  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft  had  to write  off  losses  of  about 
~o,ooo,ooo  marks  on account of  its industrial and other 
participations. 
On the other hand,  in I 873 it founded the Gelsenkirchener 
Bergwerksgesellschaft  (G. Mining Co.), which became one 
of  the most  prominent concerns in the mining industry. 
Adolph  von  Hansemann, who  at that time was one of 
the  general  partners  of  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft,  and 
its most talented manager, became the chairman of  the 
supervisory board  of  the new  mining company.  In this 
way the bank secured numerous connections with indus- 
trial undertakings and cartels.  These connections became 
even more important when  on January  I, 1905, a com- 
munity of  interests was formed between the Gelsenkirchener 
Bergwerksgesellschaft, the  Aachener  Hutten-Aktien-Verein 
Rote Erde (Aix-la-Chapelle Smelting Company Rote Erde) 
and  the  Schalker  Gruben- und  Huttele-Verein  (Schalke 
Mining and Smelting Company). 
The  Disconto-Gesellschaft  actively  and  successfully 
participated  in  the  organization  of  the  Rhenish-West- 
phalian  Coal  Syndicate,  which was  finally accomplished 
in 1893, after many grave obstacles had been overcome. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
In the eighties and nineties it effected a number of  issues 
for the August Thyssen Mining and Smelting enterprises, 
especially the Schalker Gruben- und Hiitten-Verein and the 
Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser.  In I 8  74 it participated in 
a syndicate formed under the leadership of  the Seehand- 
lung (the Prussian State Bank) for the underwriting and 
issuing of  a  5 per cent loan of  ~o,ooo,ooo  thalers for the 
Krupp Works.  This operation deserves special mention 
because, on this occasion, for the first time in Germany, 
the loan  took  the form  of  fractional bonds  secured by 
blanket mortgage  and provided  for common  representa- 
tion  of  the holders of  these bonds, which since then has 
become the common form of  such obligations.467 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft maintains close relations with 
the Rheinische Stahlwerke (since 1877),  the Stumm Works 
in  Neunkirchen,  the  Aktiengesellsclzaft Gute  Hoffnungs- 
Hiitte (Gute Hoffnung Smelting Company) in Oberhausen, 
the Bochumer  Verein  fur Bergbau  und  Gusstahlfabrika- 
tion  (Bochum Mining and Cast Steel Manufacturing Com- 
pany) and the Kattowitzer Aktiengesellschaft fur Bergbau- 
und Hiittenbetrieb (Kattowitz Mining  and Smelting Com- 
pany) ,  the latter founded with a capital stock of  16,000,ooo 
marks through the reorganization of  the mining and snielt- 
ing properties of  the von Tiele-Winckler estate. 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft through its connections with 
Herm.  Schmidtman  and the  Schmidtman  mining  and 
other enterprises, especially the potash works in Aschers- 
leben, stands  in  close  relation  to the  potash  industry. 
In the field of machinery construction it is closely related 
to the Schichau  ship yards  in  Elbing  and  Danzig, the 
Henschel Machine  Works in Cassel, the Saxon Machine 
Works  (formerly Richard  Hartmann)  in  Chernnitz, the 
Berlin  Machinery  Construction  Company  (formerly L. 
Schwartzkopff)  and the machine  and milling machinery 
works of  G. Luther in Brunswick. 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft  has always taken a prominent 
interest in the business operations of  the Ludwig Loewe 
Company and in all the enterprises founded by this com- 
pany, a managing partner of the Disconto Bank serving on 
the supervisory board of each of these undertakings.  Thus 
it participated in the administration and the security issues 
of  the Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken (German 
Arms and Ammunition Works) in Berlin and Karlsruhe, the 
Union-Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (Union Electric Company), 
which took over the electrical department of  the Ludwig 
Loewe Company, the Gesellschaft fur Elektrische Unterneh- 
mungen  (Corporation for Electrical Enterprises), etc. 
It also cooperated in a large number of  stock and bond 
issues of  the firm of  Siemens & Halske. 
In the sphere of  insurance it maintains close relations 
to  the  Aachener  und  Munchener  Feuerversicherungs- 
Gesellschaft  (Aix-la-Chapelle and  Munich Fire  Insurance 
Company), the Lebens- und  Feuerversicherungsbank  (Life 
and Fire Insurance Bank)  in  Gotha,  the Lebensversiche- 
rungs-Gesellschaft Nordstern (Northern Star Life Insurance 
Company), which was organized in 1881 in Berlin, etc.  It 
participated in the financing of  minor and secondary rail- 
ways  (Klein-  und  Nebenbahnen)  only  through  its close 
relations to the Westdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. 
In the sphere of  real estate business proper the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft  participated  only  occasionally, assisting  in 
the parcelling of some land tracts. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
In  more  recent  times  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  de- 
veloped an energetic activity in the petroleum  field.  (See 
above, p. 418 and following.) 
Finally, the Disconto-Gesellschaft has been very active 
in  the sphere  of  mortgage  and  agricultural  credit.  In 
1864 it participated  in the founding of  the Erste  Preus- 
sische Hypotheken-Gesellschaft (First Prussian  Real Estate 
Mortgage Company), which was later (Mar. 4, 1870) taken 
over by the Preussische Zentral-Bodenkredit-A ktien-Gesell- 
schaft;  and in  1895 in the organization of  the Landbanb, 
which  was  intended  to encourage domestic colonization 
and to promote German landed interests and agriculture in 
the eastern provinces.  The presidency in the supervisory 
board of the new  institution  was  taken by the managing 
partner of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft,  Ad. von Hansemann. 
The picture so far presented of  the industrial and kin- 
dred activities of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft,  while unusually 
varied  and animated, does not, however, vary materially 
from the general picture of  the activity of  the other great 
banks in the same field. 
As  regards concentration  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, as 
we  shall  show  later  in  greater  detail,  was  active  as 
early as  I 87 I, when it organized the Provinzial-Disconto- 
Gesellschaft in  Berlin, which  in  turn became  the parent 
institution of  a large number of  other provincial discount 
banks.  We shall explain later the reasons why this first 
step necessarily failed.  The failure caused the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft to refrain for a long time from founding any 
subsidiary  institutions.  It was  only in  1880  (Feb.  13) 
that the Disconto-Gesellschaft participated in the recon- 
struction of the Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft (Com- 
mercial and  Plantation Company)  of  Samoa, more  par- 
ticularly in the organization of  the Neu Guinea-Kompag- 
nie and in the preliminary negotiations during the years 
1883 to 1885.  By assuming certain  obligations this com- 
pany, on May  17, 1885, obtained a special charter giving 
it the rights of  territorial sovereignty; also the exclusive 
privilege to acquire landed property. 
These  activities  were  followed in  rapid  succession by 
the organization of  the Brasilianische Bank fur Deutsch- 
land  (Brazilian  Bank  for  Germany)  in  1887, the estab- 
lishment  of  commandites  in  Buenos  Aires  and Antwerp 
(189o), the founding of  the Bank fur Chile und Deutsch- 
land (1895),  the Banca Generala Romana (1897), the Otavi- 
Minen- und  Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft  (Otavi  Mining  and 
Railway Company) (~goo),  the Banque de Crddit in  Sophia 
(~gog),  the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische  Bank, and the Deutsche 
Afrika-Bank  in  1905.  Aside  from  this,  the  Disconto- 
Gesellschaft participated in all the enterprises undertaken 
jointly  by the large banks, thus, in the founding of  the 
Deutsch-Asiatische  Bank  (I  889), the Banca  Commerciale 
Italiana (I  898), the two Shantung companies  (I  899)) the 
telegraph  and  cable  companies  (1898-1908)~ and  the 
Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft (I  906). 
From  what  has been  said  it appears  that the special 
characteristics  of  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  were  the 
extensive  and  far-sighted  assistance  rendered  by  it to 
industrial exports, as well  as to all foreign, particularly 
oversea commerce;  also the fostering of the regular bank- 
ing  business,  especially  the  current  account  business, 
begun in the first period  and developed with great skill 
and success during the second period. National  Monetary  Commissiort 
The results in the various lines of  operations, while very 
considerable, are not so steady as those of  the Deutsche 
Bank.  This is particularly brought out in the presenta- 
tion, by ten-year  periods, of  the current account figures, 
as  found in  the jubilee  report  (1901)  of  the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft . 
During the first nine years  (beginning with  1852) the 
debits on current account amounted to 32,000,000 marks 
in  round  numbers.  At  the  close  of  the  decade  they 
showed  a  decline  in  1869  to  about  29,000,000  marks, 
though rising again in 1870 to 30,500,m marks. 
The next decade since 1871, starts with the greatly in- 
creased figure of  nearly 93,000,000 marks;  at the close of 
1880 the amount had  fallen  again to 49,000,000 marks. 
In the decade following we  see  the figures rapidly  rise 
from  53,m,mo  marks in  1881 to I 12,000,000  marks in 
1885, and then again decline to 82,500,000 marks in 1890. 
Beginning with 1901, however, we find, with the excep- 
tion of  a few small interruptions, an almost steady growth 
of the debits on current account, which reached a total of 
294,000,000 marks at the close of  the fiscal year  1908. 
The figures of  credits in current account show a similar 
fluctuation.  In 1860 they were about 13,000,000  marks, 
in  1865 they  had  fallen to ~o,~oo,ooo  marks,  while  the 
closing year  of  the decade,  1870, showed a  decided  in- 
crease to gg,ooo,m marks.  In 1877 the amount  had 
declined  to  29,000,000  marks,  in  1880 it had  risen  to 
55,000,000 marks, and in the next decade, in 1885, again 
the maximum figure up to that time was shown, namely, 
154,000,ooo marks, which, however, declined at the close 
of the decade (1890) to 90,000,000 marks. 
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Similarly, beginning with I 891, and with much smaller 
fluctuations than before,  a  steady growth  of  the credit 
figures is shown, the statement for  December  31,  1908, 
inaicating a total of  credits on current account of  235,000,- 
ooo marks. 
In the discussion of  the deposit  business we  gave the 
reasons why the deposit business of  the Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft  showed  similar and at times even  greater fluctu- 
ations.  We  may  disregard  the first  period  because  at 
that time, as we  have shown (p. 73), there was no  sys- 
tematic fostering of  the deposit business. 
In 1870 the total deposits amounted to 3,500,ooo marks 
only. 
The new period begins, however, with ~~,ooo,ooo  marks 
deposits (1870)~  which rapidly  grew to nearly 65,000,000 
marks in 1873, but dropped to 10,000,ooo  marks in 1880. 
Similar  fluctuations  occurred  in  the  following  decade, 
which  began  in  1881 with  20,000,000 marks.  By  1887 
the amount had declined to 8,000,ooo marks, while at the 
close of  the decade (1890) a total of  36,500,000 marks was 
reached.  The next decade again starts with only I 7,000,- 
ooo marks, but, beginning with 1895, when the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft, with the view of systematically fostering the 
deposit  business, opened deposit  offices, the amount  in- 
creased steadily to 48,000,000 marks in 1900.  According 
to its 1908 statement, in which, however, the deposits are 
calculated in a different manner, (p. 207)~  the deposits of 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft amounted to 2 I 8,500,000 marks. 
Similar fluctuations are observed in the case of  the com- 
missions,  which  in  1870 amounted  to about  ~,ooo,ooo National  Monetary  Commission 
marks.  From I ,333,000 marks in 1871 they increased to 
4,660,000  in  1872, declined to I ,500,000 in  1876, rose to 
4,500,000 in 1900 and to 6,500,000 marks in 1908. 
The dividends on the commandite capital of  the Dis- 
conto-Gesellschaft in the second period  (those of  the first 
period were shown on p. 68) were as follows: 
Tear  1  per cent.  1  year.  I per cent.  I  year  I per cent. 
There is no  other  German  credit bank  whose annual 
dividends ever came near the dividends of  24 and 27  per 
cent,  which  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  was  able  to dis- 
tribute in the years 1871 and 1872. 
The capital stock of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft on De- 
cember 31, 1908, amounted to ~'jo,ooo,ooo  marks, while 
the surplus amounted to 57,500,ooo marks, or 33.88  per 
cent of  the capital stock. 
The manner  in which the current banking business of 
the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  has  increased  is  illustrated 
statistically in its Jubilee Report of  1901 (p. 25)  by the 
amount of  correspondence carried  on  in  this branch  of 
business. 
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received.  sent. 
The  Disconto-Gesellschaft from  the start was  promi- 
nently  connected  with  the  Prussian  Syndicate  and 
subsequently  with  the Rothschild  Syndicate,  thus  par- 
ticipating  in  the  Prussian,  Austrian,  and  Hungarian 
state loans.  It was likewise a member of  the syndicate 
organized  for  handling  the  Russian  and  Italian  state 
loans and those of  the German Empire.  It  took a leading 
part  in  the financial operations  of  the Chinese Govern- 
ment and participated to a very large extent in the issue 
of  Brazilian and Argentine loans.  It  was also the leading 
member of  the bank syndicate which handled the various 
Roumanian  state and railway  loans  (for particulars  see 
Append. V.  and VI) . 
In  reviewing  the  activities  of  the  Prussian  and  the 
Rothschild  syndicates as  well  as  the other  great  inter- 
national financial operations of  the German banks during 
the second period,  the jubilee  volume of  the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft contains the following remarks:  "The small 
proportion of  failures in carrying out the numerous enter- 
prises of the last half  of  the nineteenth century  *  *  * 
is a lasting glorious testimony to the honest and efficient 
management  of  the  financial  business  of  this  period." 
A considerable part of  this fully deserved praise may be 
claimed by the Disconto-Gesellschaft. National  Monetary  Commission 
The Dresdner Bank, which  was  founded in 1872 and in 
1881 transferred  its center of  activity to Berlin, by the 
establishment  of  a  branch  there,  claims  our  special 
interest in a number of  directions. 
It achieved remarkable success in the deposit business 
within  an  unprecedentedly short period, although it was 
not until 1896 that it followed the example of  the Deutsche 
Bank in establishing deposit offices.  At the close of  1908 
it was conducting an extensive deposit business by means 
of  its 16 branches and 44 deposit offices. 
Its deposits grew  within  less than twenty  years from 
less  than  3,000,000 marks  in  1875 to 94,000,ooo at the 
end  of  1894, and  reached  an  aggregate of  224,000,000 
marks at the close of  1908, or fifteen years later.  It thus 
overtook  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  in  this  branch  of 
business,  although  the  latter  had  been  in  this  field  a 
much longer time. 
In the same rapid and brilliant  manner it managed to 
develop  its regular  business, the first  extensive increase 
of  which, just  as in the case of  the Deutsche Bank, dates 
back to the seventies, when it participated in the liquida- 
tion of  4 Saxon banks.  Its further growth is due largely 
to the founding of  branches,  the  absorption  of  a  large 
number of banks and private banking concerns, and the 
establishment of  numerous communities of  interest.  Its 
branches numbered I 6 at the close of 1908, this being the 
second  largest  number  for  any  German  bank.  It also 
managed to secure a strong foothold in southern Germany 
by taking over in 1904 the banking  house von  Erlanger 
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& Sons at Frankfort-on-the-Main with its extensive rami- 
fications, in  the place  of  which  it established a branch 
of its own.  In the same year it secured a large clientele 
among  the membership of  the mutual  credit societies by 
taking over the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank Sorgel, Parri- 
sius & Co.  For this new business it established a special 
mutual credit department. 
The credits on  current  accounts  rose  from  4,000,000 
marks in 1873 to 95,000,000  marks in 1894 and 371 ,000,000 
marks in 1908; the debits from about 9,ooo,ooo marks in 
1875 to about 95,000,000 marks in  1894 and 445,000,ooo 
marks in 1908.  As  a result of great alertness and liberal 
commission  and  interest  terms, the  bank  succeeded  in 
securing  a large  number  of  customers  wherever  it ob- 
tained a footing, first among the circles of  Saxon industry, 
and soon after among wider circles.  Its clientele increased 
considerably through the absorption in rapid succession of 
a number of  banks and private banking houses, and later 
through the  entering of  community-of-interest relations 
with other banks in Rhineland-Westphalia and in Silesia, 
by  following the example of  the  Deutsche  Bank.  The 
number  of  industrial undertakings,  for which it acts as 
fiscal agency  (Zahlstelle), is exceeded only by that of  the 
Deutsche Bank. 
Since 1892 it also undertook the systematic promotion 
of  foreign and oversea business, by  establishing, just  as 
the  Deutsche  Bank,  though  not  in  the  same  order  of 
time,  branches  in  Hamburg  (1892), where  it  absorbed 
the  Anglo-Deutsche  Bank,  next  in  Bremen  (189~)  and 
finally also in  London  (1901). National  Monetary  Commissiolz 
Moreover, as early as 1889 it participated in the forma- 
tion of the Anatolian Railway Company and the Company 
for the Operation of  Oriental Railways (Betriebsgesellschajt 
der Orientalischen Eisenbahnen) ,  of  the Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank,  and  the Deutsch-Ajrikanische  Bank.  In 1891 it 
took part in the foundation of  the Bank fur Orientalische 
Eisenbahnen, in  1894 in  the organization  of  the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, in 1899 in the establishment of the 
two  Shantung companies, and during the period  1898- 
1908  in  the  organization  of  the  Deutsche  Telegraphen- 
Gesellschaften und Kabelwerke, in the establishment of the 
Deutsch-  Westafrikanische  Bank  (I  904-5)  and  of  the 
Kamerun-Eisenbahngesellschaft  in  I 906. 
About the end of  1905, jointly with the A.  Schaaffhau- 
sen'scher  Bankverein  (with  which  it  had  entered  in 
1903  into  community-of-interest  relations,  now  practi- 
cally  dissolved) and the Nationalbank  fur  Deutschland, 
it  established  the  Deutsche  Orientbank,  and  about  the 
same time, in conjunction  with the first-named  institu- 
tion, the Deutsch-Szidamerikanische  Bank. 
It  also  promoted  and  fostered  with  growing  success 
the over-sea "  rembours " business  (see p. 428),  without, 
however, attaining in this  field, as well as in the general 
field  of  international  connections,  nearly  as  favorable 
results as the Deutsche Bank or the Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
In various  ways  it sought  to  extend  its  continental 
foreign connections.  Thus, with the view  of  promoting 
business in  Austria-Hungary,  it entered  into close  rela- 
tions  with  a  number  of  Vienna  banks.  In  order  to 
gain a foothold in the Italian and Swiss markets, it par- 
ticipated  in  the foundation  of  the Banca  Commerciale 
The German Great Banis 
Italiana  and  founded  the  stock  company  Speyr & Co. 
in Basle. 
In the field  of  "minor,"  i.  e.,  urban  and interurban 
railway  enterprises  (Kleinbahn-Unternehmungen)  the 
Dresdner Bank manifested considerable activity by found- 
ing the Central  Bank for railway  securities (Centralbank 
fur Eisenhahnwerte)  and  the Continental  Railway  Con- 
struction  and  Operation  Company  (Kontinentale Eisen- 
bahnbau- and BeQiebsgeseZlscbaft) in Berlin; also by partici- 
pating  in  the Orenstein  &  Koppel Works  for  field  and 
"minor "  railways.  In 1898 it took a prominent part in the 
formation  of  the  Central  Bank  for  railway  securities 
(Centralbank  fur  Eisenbahnwerte) ,  a  trust  company, 
which  issues  bonds  of  its  own  on  the basis  of  Austro- 
Hungarian and German railway securities acquired by it. 
Since 1909 it has been financially interested in the Oren- 
stein & Koppel Works for field  and  "minor"  railways, 
Berlin,  amalgamated with  and successors to the former 
firm Arthur Koppel. 
According to Otto Jeidels (op. cit., p.  137)~  the number 
of  industrial emissions under the auspices of  the Dresdner 
Bank for the years  1895-1903  compares as follows with 
those  of  the other  great  banks: Dresdner  Bank,  220; 
A. SchaafThausen'scher Bankverein, I 87 ;  Berliner Handels- 
gesellschaft,  170; Disconto-Gesellschaft,  151; Deutsche 
Bank, 150; Darmstadter Bank, 148. 
In  the electro-technical  industry  the  Dresdner  Bank 
from the  very  beginning  participated  jointly  with  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft and  the Darinstadter  Bank  in the 
firm Ludwig Loewe & Co.  and its subsidiary companies. 
After  the  absorption  by  the  Allgemeine  Elektrizitats- National  Monetary  Commission 
On the whole it may be said that the Dresdner Bank 
has succeeded in very short time in gaining the permanent 
favor of a large dientele because of  the skill and alertness 
of  its management. 
THE  DARMSTADTER  BANK. 
Among  the great banks the Darmstadter Bank during 
the first, and largely also during the second period  took 
special care in  guarding most  carefully the liquidity  of 
its resources and the principle of  the distribution of  risk, at 
times even refusing to engage in operations that might 
impair in any way the liquidity of  its resources.  If  en- 
gagements of  this sort  were  unavoidable, it showed the 
utmost endeavor to liquidate as soon  as practicable its 
long-term engagements.  This was  the reason why  soon 
after its foundation it passed quite successfully the crisis 
of  1857, and was able during that time to render effective 
aid both to its clients as well  as to various corporations 
and other banks. 
From the outset its reports contained many more par- 
ticulars regarding its operations than those of  almost any 
other bank.  This is especially true of  the information- 
given regularly up to 1900-regarding  the composition of 
its security holdings and its syndicate parti~ipations.~69 
It was shown before that during the first period it took 
a most prominent part in the construction of the German 
private railways, in the underwriting of a large number of 
state and communal loans, and in promoting the rapidly 
developing  industry.  It may  be  said  that  during  the 
first period, and to a large extent even in the beginning of 
the second period, it was  almost exclusively a bank  for 
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industrial promotions and only to a small extent a bank 
for the emission of  state, communal, and railway securities. 
During the first epoch the bank, or  at least  its central 
office,  made but few systematic efforts to develop its cur- 
rent-ac~~~nt  business.  Its industrial  connections origi- 
nated  during  those  years  mainly  from  its emissions  of 
industrial securities, mainly industrial shares, which the 
bank from the outset retained in large blocks, thus preserv- 
ing  a  permanent  influence  on  the administration of  the 
enterprises.  This  policy,  while  frequently  the cause of 
heavy losses, on the other hand enabled the bank to keep 
a  constant  watch  over  those  industrial  undertakings 
which  it had  founded  or  transformed  into  stock  com- 
panies.  We  showed  above that during the single year 
1856 it founded seven industrial companies, in which it 
retained  a  permanent  participation  extending to about 
one-third  of  the entire share capital, or  about  800,000 
florins.  Since these holdings resulted not from emissions, 
but  from  promotions, it may  be  said  that it engaged 
designedly in entrepreneur  activity, the risks  of  which, 
it is true, were somewhat lessened by its continuous regard 
for the liquidity of  its resources, but which, nevertheless, 
were quite apparent. 
Neither  did  it make  systematic  efforts  to foster  the 
deposit business during the first period and even during 
a considerable part of  the second period, for general rea- 
sons similar to those which are stated in the 1850 report 
of  the SchaafThausen'scher Bankverein.  (See pp. 73 and 
74.)  The bank proposed to carry on its business, as far  as 
practicable, with its own  means, and in the interest of 
the safety of  the institution did not regard it expedient National  Monetary  Commission  ___ -- _- -  -- 
to  .'bring about an increase of  deposits by holding out 
more  attractive terms.''  It was shown, however, that in 
the beginning of  the second period its deposits amounted 
to  about  II,OOO,OW  florins,  as  against  only  2,000,ooo 
marks in the case of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft and about 
2,500,000 marks in the case of  the A.  Schaafft~ausen'scher 
Bankverein.  This  relatively  large  amount  most  likely 
resulted from its close connections with various railway 
companies, such as the  Hessian  Ludwig  Railroad  Com- 
pany, and  from the credits  on  current  account of  large 
corporations and firms. 
It  was only in 1900, or much later than the other banks, 
that the Darmstadter  Bank resolved upon the founding 
of  deposit offices and thus upon a systematic fostering of 
the  deposit  business.  But  meanwhile  the  other  banks 
had  gained  a  considerable start and secured  a  growing 
number  of  permanent  and reliable investors  for  the se- 
curities emitted by  them  and, what is  more important, 
an ever-enlarging circle of  current-account depositors. 
To the credit of  the bank it may he stated that it re- 
frained  from  issuing  long-term  bank  obligations.  The 
charter  of  the  Darmstadter  Bank,  following the model 
of  the Credit Mobilier, provided for the issue of  such bank 
obligations which, secured  indirectly  by  the newly  cre- 
ated  industrial  enterprises,  were  to  combine  the  scat- 
tered  small  capitalist  forces  in  the launching of  large 
enterprises. 
The Darmstadter Bank as a rule kept aloof  from exces- 
sive speculative dealings, except in a few cases, when it 
was subjected to particularly  vehement criticism.  Thus 
during the first ~eriod  it lost heavily, having like many 
The German Great  Banks 
other  banks  become  involved  in  speculative  contango 
and share transactions, which  about the same time, i. e., 
in 1857, were  compensated by improper profits  from  the 
trading  in  its own  scrip  (Berechtigungsscheim), the so- 
called Darmstadter Enke1.470 
Even  during the earlier period the bank  took  a  con- 
siderable part in the foreign business in  Italy, Belgium, 
and more particular19 in Austria-Hungary, where in the 
beginning  of  the  sixties,  jointly  with  the  Rothschilds 
and the Kreditanstalt, it had engaged in Austrian  state 
and  railroad  finance  operations,  though  joining  the 
Rothschild syndicate only some time later.  As  a result 
of  these and similar financial operations it felt constrained 
- .  .  -  -  - - - 
as early as  1855 to have its capital of  ~o,ooo,ooo  florins 
fully paid up  (only q,ooo,ooo florins having been   aid in 
up to that time), and to increase it to 25,000,000 florins 
in 1856.  On the other hand, in 1857, when, according to 
the by-laws adopted, the capital was  to undergo a fur- 
ther increase to the maximum  of  50,000,ooo  florins. the 
-, 
increase was effected only  to the infinitesimal extent  of 
additional 46,000 florins, a larger issue being headed off 
by the crisis of  that year. 
The  function  of  its  offices in  Frankfort-on-the-Main 
(agency opened in 1854) and in Mainz  (branch opened in 
1854) was  to foster,  more largely than could be  done by 
the central office  in  Darmstadt the bill and draft busi- 
ness  and especially the current-account  business.  Until 
the eighties and even later the bank was extremely con- 
servative in granting acceptance credit, so much so that 
during  the middle of  the seventies the acceptance obli- National  Monetary  Commissiolz 
gations of the Berlin office and of  the branch at Frank- 
fort-on-the-Main amounted to only a few million florins. 
For  the  promotion  of  domestic  and  more  especially 
foreign business relations, a large number of  commandites 
were  founded, which did not, however, justify  expecta- 
tions, as they proved to be in advance of  the time. 
As  early  as  1854 the first  commandite in  New  York 
was formed with the firm G. vom Baur & Co., in 1857 the 
first commandite in Paris, and in  1867 a commandite in 
Vienna  with  the  firm  Dutschka  & Co.  The  establish- 
ment  of  other commandites was planned in London, St. 
Petersburg, Prague, and even in Smyrna and Constanti- 
nople, but these plans failed of  realization partly because 
of  the unpropitious  times,  partly  also  because  of  legal 
difficulties.  At  all  events  the  Darmstadter  Bank  may 
claim to have proceeded first  designedly in this field in 
accordance with the program laid down in its very first 
report  for  the  year  1853,  which  stated  among  others 
"that the bank's organs both at home and abroad were 
to facilitate the export trade as well  as the innumerable 
relations of  German industry to the money market." 
How far-reaching the plans of  some people were even 
in those early days  may best be seen from the fact that in 
1856 two of  the founders and members of  the supervisory 
council  of  the Darmstadter  Bank-Gustav  V. Mevissen 
and  Abraham  Oppenheim-quite  seriously  sounded  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft  whether it would not be advisable 
to organize jointly a central bank for foreign commandites 
with a capital of  about ~oo,ooo,ooo  thalers, whose function 
it should be "  to prevent in the future  the scattering of  the 
capital of those German banks  which strove after foreign 
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commandite  connections and to bring  about  the  most 
competent  possible  representation  of  their  interests."  471 
With the view of decentralizing its business, the bank 
from the early years until the nineties preferred the com- 
mandite system to the establishment  of  branches.  This 
is largely accounted for by the unsatisfactory experience 
it had had with some of its branches founded about the 
end  of  the fifties and the beginning  of  the sixties.  In 
1863,  "in  order  to  reduce  the number  of  institutions 
whose operations might lead to direct commitments of the 
bank,"  it thought  it necessary to transform its branch 
at Mainz into a commandite.  It was only in 1890 that it 
parted with this principle by opening a branch at Han- 
over, shortly afterwards followed by another in Strassburg 
(in Alsace).  At that time it still had 8 commandites in 
Heilbronn, Mainz, Dresden, Halle, Mannheim, Bucharest, 
Berlin,  and  Neustadt,  while  in  1909 this  number  had 
fallen to 3. 
The average rate of  dividend for the period  1854-1862 
was 634 per cent. 
Between-  1863-1872  the bank took over independently 
many  German  and  foreign,  including  several  Russian 
and Italian state bond issues, and participated  in other 
similar  transactions.  Its main  activity,  however,  con- 
sisted in the financing and the construction of  the German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  railway  systems,  among  others 
the financing of  the  Gotthard  Railway.  During  that 
period  it  also  founded  a  number  of  subsidiary  banks 
(Tochterbanken);.  for  instance, the Amsterdamsche  Bank 
(in  I 87 I),  the  Sziddeutsche  Bodenkreditbank,  the  Siid- 
deutsche Immobilien-Gesellschaft, the Ungarische Escompte- National  Monetary  Commission 
und  Wechslerbank  in  1877, and  the Deutsche Gold-  und 
Silber-Scheide-Anstalt, preceded by the foundation of  the 
Hessian Note Bank  (Bank fur Sziddeutschland)  . 
The  average  dividend  for  the  period  1863-1872 
amounted to 8.7 per cent. 
During  the  following decade,  I 873-1882,  after safely 
passing  through  the  crisis  of  1873, finance  operations 
in Austrian  and German  railway, state, and communal 
securities were  effected, while  beginning  with  1879 the 
conversion  of  German  state,  railway,  and  municipal 
debentures was started, which attained increasingly large 
proportions in the following years. 
The average rate of  dividends for that decade  (1873- 
1882) was 8% per cent. 
As  a  result  of  the state purchase  of  the railroads  in 
Germany and Austria the finance transactions with large 
railway  companies  greatly  diminished.  Instead,  the 
bank, first  among  the great  banks,  during  the decade 
I 883-1 902, in conjunction with the railway constructing 
and  operating concern  Herrmann  Bachstein,  undertook 
on a large scale the construction, operation, and financing 
of  the so-called minor railways (Kleinbahnen), in the first 
place in Hesse, Baden, and Thuringia.  'I'he  same period 
witnesses the founding by the bank of  several industrial 
companies and the participation in the underwriting of  a 
number  of  state and communal issues and in the fusion 
of  the Jura-Berne-Lucerne Railway with the  Swiss Western 
Railway.  During  these  years  the bank  jointly  with  a 
number of  other banks and banking firms took over the 
issue of  the Lisbon municipal and Portuguese state loans. 
Apart from the Lisbon municipal loan, interest on which 
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has been regularly paid, the other loans proved a source 
of  great losses and annoyance to the bank and greatly 
hampered its subsequent activity, inasmuch as the bank 
felt in honor bound to mitigate, as far as practicable, the 
consequences of the defaults on the part of  the State and 
railways,  with  regard  to the holders  of  the state and 
railroad securities. 
The  average  rate  of  dividends  during  that  decade 
(1883-1892)  was below  7%  per cent. 
During the following decade  (I  893-1 902)  its  activity 
became  concentrated  chiefly  in  the field  of  minor  rail- 
ways.  In 1895 it took a leading part in the founding of 
the  Siiddeutsche  Eisenbahngesellschaft.  This  company 
amalgamated  the small  railways  which  had  been  com- 
pleted  by that time and on the whole were then  in a fair 
financial  condition.  The  bank  also  had  a  hand  in  a 
number  of  state and municipal  issues and of  industrial 
real  estate transactions. 
About  the end  of  the decade  the bank  derived  con- 
siderable profits from a number of  reorganizations of  sev- 
eral banking and industrial concerns such as the Deutsche 
Grundschuldbank,  the  Preussische  Hypotheken-Aktien- 
bank,  the Pommersche  Hypothekenbank, and  the mining 
and  iron  works  Difierdingen-Dannenbaum,  also  from 
taking over in 1902 the Bank fur Suddeutschland and the 
Breslauer Disconto-Bank.  About  the  same time  it en- 
tered into a community of  interest with the Ostbank fiir 
Handel und Gewerbe in Posen. 
Notwithstanding  all  these  multifarious  activities 
the  average  dividend  rate  for the decade was  but 6% 
per cent. National  Monetary  Commission 
During the most  recent  period  the bank  paid  special 
attention  to  the  fostering  of  the  current-account  and 
deposit  business.  Its efforts  in  this  field  proved  emi- 
nently successful, so much so that by skilful management 
it was able to restore the liquidity of  its resources, which 
had become temporarily impaired.  As  a member of  the 
Loewe group it participated in all the enterprises of  that 
combination.  It also took part in a number of  state and 
municipal loans as well as in several industrial issues.  In 
1905 it established community-of-interest relations  with 
the Bayerische Bank fur  Handel und Industrie. 
The number  of  its deposit offices  at the end of  1908 
was 39, exclusive of  7 agencies. 
In 1900 it strengthened its foreign connection? by the 
founding of  the Bankers'  Trading Syndicate in London, 
in 1902 by entering into close relations with the Wechsel- 
stuben-Aktzengesellschaft  Merkur  in  Vienna, and in  1903 
by establishing community-of-interest relations with the 
Nordwestdeutsche  Bank  in  Bremen.  During  the years 
1904-5  it  participated  in  the  transformation  of  its 
former commandite  in  Bucharet into a stock company, 
which  assumed the firm name Banca Marmorosch  Blank 
€5'  Co.,  Societate  anonima.  During  the same  period  it 
absorbed the banking firm Rob. Warschauer & Co., which 
had important foreign business connections, especially in 
Russia,  and  in  which  it had  held  a  silent-partnership 
interest since  1898. 
In 1889 the bank participated in the founding of  the 
Deutsch-Asiatische  Bank; in  I 898, jointly  with  other 
domestic and foreign institutions, it  took a prominent part 
in the founding of  the Banque Internationale de Bruxelles. 
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During the years  1898-1908 it cooperated in the launch- 
ing  of  the German Telegraph  and  C:ble  companies, in 
1899 in the founding of  the two Shantung companies, and 
in  1906 in the organizing of  the Kamerun Railway Com- 
pany- 
In  1906,  jointly  with  several  domestic  and  foreign 
banks, it founded the Amerika-Bank for promoting busi- 
ness  relations with the United  States.  This institution, 
however, was placed in liquidation in 1909. 
It may  be  said  in  conclusion  that the  Darmstadter 
Bank from the very beginning acquired a high standing 
among large circles.  Its management, while not always 
following  a  uniform business  policy, adhered, however, 
almost steadily to the principle laid down in paragraph 10 
of  its  first  by-laws.'I2  AS  a  result,  it  continued  to 
enjoy  public  confidence in  an undiminished  degree,  at 
first in southern Germany and subsequently in the whole 
country, even during times which proved critical for many 
commercial undertakings  and banks. 
THE  A.  SCHAAFE'HAUSEN'SCHER BANKVEREIN.~'~ 
This institution is the oldest German credit bank.  Its 
foundation  dates back to the year  1848, when  it super- 
seded the banking firm A. Schaaffhausen, which at that 
time had become  involved in  financial difficulties.  The 
capital of  the reorganized institution was fixed at  5,187,000 
thalers,  of  which, however,  only  3,199,800 thalers  were 
paid  in.  As  the firm A.  Schaaffhausen had maintained 
extensive industrial connections in Rhineland-Westphalia, 
the new institution was in a more favorable situation than 
the other present-day  great banks, which  were  able to National  Monetary  Commission 
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acquire a  steady clientele  only  after  years  of  laborious 
efforts.  Its primarjr task was to maintain and develop the 
connections of  the old and well-renowned banking firm, 
whose clientele  it had  taken  over,  by  means  of  trans- 
forming industrial undertakings  into stock companies or 
otherwise to mobilize the industrial participations in which 
the capital of  the old firm had been tied up, and to liqui- 
date them  as  soon  as  the  profitableness  of  the under- 
takings  and  general  business  and  market  conditions 
would permit such action. 
On pages 71 and following we enumerated a long list of 
transformations and new foundations, effected by the A. 
Schaaff hausen'scher  Bankverein  during the  years  I 85 I- 
1858.  We mentioned there that from the outset the far- 
sighted and expert management of  the institution recog- 
nized clearly "that the permanent  success of  the Bank- 
verein was  inseparable  from  the  prosperous  growth  of 
Rhenish industry in all its branches."  Subsequent develop- 
ment  fully proved the soundness of  its position.  The A. 
Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein has grown great with the 
surprisingly rapid and strong development of  the Rhenisch- 
Westphalian industry, which  until the most recent period 
has been furnishing the very core of  its industrial clientele. 
The careful fostering of  the current-account and under- 
writing  business was  a natural corollary of  its industrial 
connections and the necessity  to extend  and strengthen 
these connections.  The same can not be said of  the deposit 
business, to which  the  Bankverein  paid  no  systematic 
attention during the first period for general reasons men- 
tioned in the chapter relating to the Darmstadter  Bank. 
As a matter of  fact, its total deposits about the end of  the 
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first period,  in  1869, amounted  to 883,616 thalers  only. 
The  founding of  branches,  agencies,  and  commandites 
contemplated as early as 1853 did not at first materialize. 
Neither did the bank succeed, as it then intended, in open- 
ing a branch in Berlin, as such action presupposed a change 
of  its by-laws, for which the then required state sanction 
could not be obtained.  The Bankverein  passed through 
the crisis of  185  7  without being compelled to cancel any 
outstanding credits. 
During the first epoch, while manifesting great activity 
in the founding and transforming business, it figured to a 
relatively  small extent in the underwriting  field, though 
participating  in  numerous  syndicates  organized  during 
that period by other banks. 
Even during the second period the Bankverein was an 
"industrial"  rather  than  an  "emission " bank.  At  the 
same time it was careful enough not to permit any undue 
swelling of  its acceptance  account.  Having  its central 
field of  activity in the domain of  the rapidly developing 
Rhenish-Westphalian industry, its importance during the 
second period  as an industrial bank became preeminent. 
Owing  to  its  old-established  industrial  connections,  it 
continued during all stages and changes of  business, not- 
withstanding severe competition, as the foremost industrial 
counsel, financial aid, and agent in the execution of  the 
ofttimes  ambitious  schemes  of  a  number  of  industrial 
establishments.  Foremost among the latter is the Horder 
Bergwerks- und Huttefzverezn,  founded as a stock company 
in  1852, whose  rapid  growth  up  to  1873 and  financial 
troubles  after  1873 claimed the energetic support of the 
Bankverein  up  to the reorganization  of  the concern by National  Monetary  Commission 
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the Banberein jointly with the firm of  Deichmann & Co., 
of  Cologne.  It was only after some time and the general 
improvement of  the business situation that this operation 
led to a series of  profitable emissions and other transac- 
tions.  Even  at present  a director of  the Bankverein is 
the chairman  of  the supervisory council of  the Hordey 
Verein, while, in turn, the general director of  the latter is 
a member of  the shpervisory council of  the Bankverein. 
Close relations were established with a number of  large 
industrial  concerns, such as the Harpener Bergbaugesell- 
schaft, the Bochumer  Verein, the Phoenix and the Hoesch 
steel  works.  This  necessitated the increase  of  the re- 
sources of  the bank, and thus fostered its concentration 
tendencies.  Both in the interest of  successful  industrial 
issues as well  as for other reasons to be considered later 
closer  relations  with  the leading  bourse  center  became 
necessary.  It was only in I 891, however, that the Bank- 
verein established such relations by opening a branch in 
Berlin.  Notwithstanding this action, the Bankverein by 
no  means became a Berlin great bank.  It preserved its 
essential character  of  a  Rhenish great bank, though  its 
importance at the new center grew, as a matter of course, 
with the absolute and relative growth of  the branch, in 
contradistinction  to  the  Darmstadter  Bank,  which  by 
shifting its center of  activity from the commercially unim- 
portant town of  Darmstadt to Berlin became to all intents 
and purposes a Berlin great bank, the more so as with the 
further growth of  its business its clientele gradually ceased 
to be exclusively or mainly south German. 
In proportion as the tasks of  the Bankverein in the field 
of  industrial credit and issues grew in size and number it 
had to increase in comparatively rapid succession its paid-in 
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capital from 9,600,000 marks  to 36,000,ooo in  1880, to 
60,000,ooo in 1895, and to 145,ooo,ooo  at the end of  1905. 
During the second  period  it joined  the concentration 
movement by  the opening of  branches, which  numbered 
10 at the end of 1908,  and of  deposit offices, the number of 
which increased to 13 during the same time; also by the 
establishment  of  a  subsidiary  bank  (Tochterbank), the 
Westfalisch-Lippische  Vereinsbank,  Atitiengellschaft  in 
Bielefeld, and finally by  the absorption of  several banks 
and  banking  houses.  It has  only  one  commandite '(in 
Dresden), and after the dissolution of  the community of 
interest with the Dresdner Bank maintains such relations 
at present only with the Pfalzische Bank in Ludwigshafen 
(1901) and the Mittelrheinische Bank in Coblenz (1903). 
From what has been said heretofore it may be seen that 
the Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein possesses no extensive 
international connections.  This probably was one of  the 
main reasons which induced it to establish the community 
of  interest  with  the Dresdner  Bank, which  maintains  a 
large number of  such connections.  This community of 
interest became effective January  I, 1904, for a term of 
thirty years,  but was  essentially  terminated January  I, 
I 909.  One result, however, of the temporary combination 
was that the Bankverein had to take part in the common 
foreign enterprises of  the other great banks, such as the 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the Banca Commerciale Italiana, 
and to take even  a leading part in the establishment of 
the telegraph and cable companies.  It also participated 
in the founding of  the Banque Internationale de Bruxelles, 
the Shantung companies, and the Kamerun Railway Corn- 
pany, and jointly with the Dresdner Bank in the founding National  Monetary  Commission 
of  the Deutsche Orient  Bank  and the Deutsch-Siidameri- 
kanische Bank. 
The special domain of  the Bankverein  is, however, the 
industrial field, especially that of  the Rhenish-Westphalian 
district.  It is particularly interesting and instructive to 
observe the various types of  relations, as were shown by 
the example of the Hijrder Verein, which the bank formed 
during the second period. 
The bank  as  a  rule  and with  good  reasons  avoided 
permanent  large participations in  industrial  enterprises. 
Its holdings of  the stock of  the Internationale Bohr-Gesell- 
schaft (International Exploration Company) at  Erkelenz- 
devised to continue indefinitely---can  hardly be regarded 
an  exception,  since  it needed  this  stock  to support its 
industrial policy in various directi0ns,~7~  as, for instance, the 
maintenance of  its influence in the second coal syndicate, 
the penetration into various mining branches in Germany 
and foreign countries, especially in Belgium, and, finally, 
for the purpose of  developing the Roumanian  petroleum 
business, entered  into  jointly  with  the Dresdner  Bank. 
(See  above, p.  419.)  These  latter connections brought 
it into contact with Silesian industrial interests, likewise 
interested in the Roumanian petroleunl fields.  The result 
was a new combination in 1904,  which included, beside the 
interests named, also the Dresdner Bank, the International 
Exploration Company, and became known as the Petro- 
leum Stock Company Regatul Romana. 
The Bankverein also took a leading position in the group 
of  the Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft  vormals  Schuckert 6 Co. 
until 1898, when it withdrew, having failed in its efforts to 
bring  about the amalgamation  of  the above group with 
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the Loewe group.  It  was only in I 903 that a combination 
with  the Siemens  & Halske  group  was  effected.  Since 
1898 the Bankverein  participated  in  all the enterprises 
and  transactions  of  the  Loewe  group,  viz,  the  British 
Thomson-Houston Company, the Benrath Machine Works, 
the stock company Boehler Bros. &Co., etc.  The A. E. G. 
(Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft) group and its activity 
assumed larger proportions in 1904 by the accession of  the 
banks forming the Loewe group, after the taking over of 
the  U.  E.  G.  (Union Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft)  by  the 
A. E. G. 
As  a result of  its connection with  the Dresdner Bank, 
the  Bankverein  was  brought  into contact  with  various 
transportation  companies,  in  the  first  place  with  the 
Great  Berlin  Street Railway  Company.  It also became 
connected  with  the Aktiengesellschaft fur  Verkehrmesen 
(Stock  Company  for  Transportation  Enterprises)  Lenz 
& Co., and the Bank  fiir Deutsclze Eisenbalznwerte (Bank 
for German  Railway Securities).  It was  these  corpora- 
tions which for several operations brought about the joint 
action of  the Bankverein with the close ally of  the Lenz & 
Co.  concern,  the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft.  Jointly 
with the latter it founded in 1895 the Westdeutsche Eisen- 
bahngesellschaft, which, in  turn, organized the Vereinigte 
Westdeutsche  Kleinbahn Aktien-Gesellschaft (United West 
German  Minor  Railways Stock Company) with a capital 
of  6,000,000 marks, and in  1896 the Bank  fur Deutsche 
Eisenbahnwerte with a capital of  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks. 
Through  its current-account  business  the Bankverein 
as a matter of  course came to arrange for and undertake 
the  transformation  into  stock  companies  of  industrial National  Monetary  Commi'ssion 
undertakings of  its customers.  Under this head fall the 
transformation  of  the  firm  Carl  von  Born  into  the 
Hiitten-Aktiengesellschaft  vormals Carl  von  Born at Dort- 
mund  in  1896 ; af  the firm Biicklers & Jannsen into the 
Diilkener Baumwollspinnerei A.  G.  (Duelken Cotton Spin- 
ning Stock Company) ;  of  the firm Burtscheid, Ulrici & Co. 
in  Dulken  into  the  Rheinische  Webstuhlfabrik  A.  G. 
(Rhenish Weaving Looms Manufacturing Stock Company), 
in 1897; and of the firm Mannstaedt & Co. into the Kalker 
Walzwerk (Kalk Rolling Mills) Mannstaedt G.'  Co. in 1898. 
Other  operations  of  the  Bankverein  originating  in  the 
same manner  were:  A commandite interest  acquired  in 
the firm C. Luckerath  (Limited), cloth  dealers, the trans- 
formation  of  the Siegrheinische Gewerkschaft  (Sieg-Rhine 
Mining Concern  (Limited), into a stock company  (1897) ; 
the transformation of  the Selbecker Bergwerksverein into a 
limited  mining company  (Gewerkschajt) ; the taking over 
in  1901 of the bankrupt worsted spinning works, Eitorf, 
Karl Schafer  G.'  Co.,  and  its immediate  transformation 
into the Worsted  Spinning  and  Weaving  Works  Eitorf 
Stock  Company, and the reorganization  of  the machine 
tool  factory, de  Fries  &'  Co., stock company, in  Heerdt 
near  Dusseldorf.  In the same class belong  the amalga- 
mation  of  two  friendly  concerns into the United  Steel- 
works von der Zypen and the Wissen Iron Mills Stock Com- 
pany, and the union of  the works of  two of  its current- 
account  customers  into  the Eschweiler-Koln  Eisenwerke 
A ktien-Ge~ellschaft.~75  In I 904 the Bankverein, in the inter- 
ests  of  its  clients,  the Kolnische  Maschinenbau-Aktien- 
gesellschaft  in  Cologne-Bayenthal,  for  the  purpose  of 
settling the deficit in its balance sheet, purchased  jointly 
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with other firms certain grounds owned by the works and 
transferred them to a newly formed real estate c0mpany.~7@ 
In  connection  with  the operations  just  described,  a 
number  of  other  transactions  were  effected  partly  in 
the interests of  the bank itself, partly in the interests of 
friendly business  houses,  as for  instance, the sale of  its 
participation in the above-mentioned Hiitten-Aktiengesell- 
schaft vormals Carl von  Born in Dortmund to the likewise 
mentioned Harder Verein. 
The  number  of  industrial  issues  of  the  Bankverein 
during  the years  1895-1903  amounted  to  187, as  com- 
pared  with  220 effected by  the Dresdner  Bank,  170 by 
the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft,  151  by  the  Disconto- 
Gesellschaft, 150 by the Deutsche Bank, and 148 by the 
Darmstadter  Bank.  Among  the  187  industrial  issues 
of  the Bankverein  103 were those of  industrial  bonds.471 
The number  of  companies for which  the Bankverein  ef- 
fected industrial issues during the period  1895-1903  was 
207,  compared with  181  served  in  this  manner  by  the 
Dresdner Bank, I 54 by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, I 49  by 
the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft  ,  I 40 by the  Darmstadter 
Bank, and  139 by the Deutsche Bank.  It is seen that in 
this field the Bankverein attained the highest record. 
Of the various  industries the Bankverein  has  been in 
closest  touch  with  the mining  and  smelting  industries. 
As  shown above, it maintained particularly intimate re- 
lations with the Hiirder  Verein  in  Dortmund,  also with 
the Lothringischer  Hiittenverein Aumetz-Friede in  Kneut- 
tingen, which it reorganized in  1901 and again in  1903, 
and which was amalgamated in the same year with the 
Fentscher Hutten-Aktienverein.  The indirect consequence National  Monetary  Commission 
of  these  close  relations  was  that  the  Aumetz-Friede 
works ordered its machinery from a client of  the Bank- 
verein, the Cologne Machine Construction Stock Company, 
a practice which is  often found among customers of  the 
same bank.  The Bankverein maintained also close rela- 
tions to the Harpen Mining Company, which it had founded 
jointly  with  the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft, the  iron 
works Phoenix  in Laar, the Hosch Steel Works, and the 
Bochumer  Verein,  and  through  its connections with  the 
firm Spaeter 6.  Co., part owners of  the Rombacher  Hut- 
tenwerke, with the latter works. 
By reason of  the above-named and other close connec- 
tions  with  the Rhenish-Westphalian industry, the lead- 
ing element in the coal mining and metallurgical indus- 
tries  of  the  country,  the Bankverein  came  to  play  a 
most  important part in the development of  the industrial 
cartels.  Thus in I 899 it opened a syndicate office (Syndi- 
kats-Kontor) with a capital of  I ,ooo,ooo marks, which was 
to undertake the representation of  industrial combinations 
and syndicates.  The Steel Works' Union was formed after 
hard struggles mainly for the reason that the Bankverein 
held the majority of  stock of  the Phoenix Works and was 
thus able to force a resolution in the general meeting of 
stockholders to join  the union  against  the wishes of  the 
director of  the works. 
In conclusion, it may be said that the A.  Schaaffhau- 
sen'scher  Bankverein from the start to the present  day 
was  the leading institdion in  the Rhenish-Westphalian 
industrial  region.  When  in  the course  of  development 
the policy  and management of  these industries began to 
exercise  a  considerable influence on  the other  German 
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industrial districts, the Bankverein in its capacity as the 
leading institution in a special branch of  business gained 
also an influential position among the great German banks. 
THE BERLINER  HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT. 
The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft which was founded in 
I 856, was organized as a stock company "  en commandite " 
for the reason that the latter form of  organization did not 
require a state concession in Prussia.  At the time of  its 
organization  its  capital  stock  amounted  to  15,000,ooo 
thalers  (45,000,ooo  marks)  of  which,  however,  only 
3,740,150 thalers were  paid in.  Since the first period it 
has  been  a  prominent  flotation  bank  (Emissionsbank) 
with the result that in the matter of  issuing and placing 
securities it may boast of  methods technically equal if  not 
superior  to  those  used  by  any other  bank.  As  shown 
above (p. 75  and following) it participated during the first 
period in the underwriting of  a large number of  domestic 
and foreign state and railway loans, including the issue of 
Russian railway bonds. 
In section  2  of its constitution it was expressly stated 
that its activities should comprise  especially "industrial 
and  agricultural  enterprises,  mining, smelting, the con- 
struction  of  canals,  highways,  and  railways,  as  well 
as the  creation,  fusion, and  consolidation of  joint  stock 
companies  and  the  issue  of  stock  or  bonds  of  such 
companies. ' ' 
Although during the earlier period it ventured but com- 
paratively  little  into  the industrial  field and conducted 
neither  a current-account  nor  a  deposit business,  yet  it 
succeeded in earning large and almost steadily increasing National  Monetary  Commission 
gains  from  its  business  of  reorganizing  and  floating 
enterprises  and from its operations  in  the underwriting 
and issue field.  Its dividends in  the  first  period  were 
as follows: 
Per cent. 
1857 ....................... 5% 
.......................  1858.  5% 
......................  1859.  5 
I 860. ...................... 5% 
1861 ....................... 5 
......................  1862.  9 
.......................  1863  8 
Per cent. 
......................  1864.  8 
......................  1865.  8 
......................  1866.  8 
1867. ......................  8 
.......................  1868  10 
......................  1869.  I0 
Negotiations for the establishment  of  "  commandites in 
other  localities,"  provided  for  in  the by-laws and men- 
tioned  in the report  for  1857, had to be  abandoned  on 
account of  the crisis of  1857.~~' 
Among  serious  losses  which  the  Handelsgesellschaft 
suffered during  that period  may  be  mentioned  that of 
150,000 thalers on account of  the Dessauer Kreditanstalt, 
or  more  correctly,  the latter's  New  York  commandite, 
besides a loss growing indirectly out of  the failure of  an 
export firm in Danzig.  This failure involved the banking 
house  of  Breest  & Gelpcke, of  Berlin, which  was  con- 
ducted  on  account  of  the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft 
since January  I, I 857.  No  difficulties were  experienced 
by the bank during the crisis of  1857.  During the second 
period  the bank  devoted  itself  systematically  and with 
correspondingly good results  also to the current-account 
business, though keeping aloof  from the deposit business. 
It also took  a leading part during the first years in the 
foundation and transformation of  industrial  enterprises. 
These operations, while a source of  rich returns, naturally 
resulted  also  in  some  losses.  In  1871 it was  able  to 
increase its capital to 10,500,ooo thalers.  Its attempts at 
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enterpreneur  activity  at  the  beginning  of  the  second 
period  proved,  however,  disastrous,  as  mentioned  on  a 
previous  occasion.  The  construction  of  the  Muldetal 
Railway,  which  was  financed  by  the  bank,  consumed, 
according to the report of 1876, a large part of  its available 
resources.  This necessitated a call for the payment of  30 
per cent on the new stock. 
The  dividends  during  the first  thirteen  years  of  the 
second period were as follows: 
1875.. ....................  5  1  1882.. .....................  o 
......................  1876  0  i 
The losses occasioned by  the Muldetal Railway enter- 
prise  caused  the passing  of  dividends  during the years 
1876 to  1878, which  in  the year  1872  were  as  high  as 
12%  per cent; in fact, they caused even a deficit. 
In  1878, after  the sale  of  the railway  to the Saxon 
government, which entailed a loss to the bank of  6,500,000 
marks, its capital stock, which had  grown to rg,ooo,ooo 
thalers  (45  ,OOO,OOO  marks), was  reduced  to  30,000,000 
marks, and the profits from this operation were  devoted 
to the creation of  a large special reserve fund for pending 
industrial  business.47@  During the following years,  1879 
and 1880, the bank was able again to pay dividends of  5 
and 5% per cent, respectively. 
During  the year  1880--81 the bank  again  suffered  on 
account of  its participation in two industrial enterprises, 
viz:  The  Deutsche  Lokal-  und  Stmssenbahngesellschajt 
Per cent. 
1870  9  ...................... 
1871 ......................  12% 
1872. ..................... 12% 
......................  1873  6% 
1874 ......................  7 
Per cent. 
1877  o  ....................... 




1880  5% 
1881 ....................... 6 National  Monetary  Commission 
(German  Local and  Street  Railway  Company) and  the 
Petroleum-Bohr-  Gerechtsamen-  und  Olland-  Gesellschaft 
(Petroleum  Drill  Privilege and  Oil  Land  Company), as 
well as on account of  extensive speculations in shares of 
the bank's own capital and in Russian paper currency by 
one of  the partners of  the institution.  The losses resulting 
from these operations necessitated in  1882 a reduction of 
the capital  stock from  30,000,000 to  z0,000,ooo  marks. 
The  above-mentioned  speculation alone  entailed  a  loss 
of  8,250,000 marks. 
There is no doubt that many present-day economists, 
who  on  such  occasions  as  well  as  after  every  general 
crisis demand government intervention, including official 
supervision, control, and inspection, or  restrictive  legis- 
lation, would at that time have seen the only salvation 
in the carrying out of  similar demands with regard to the 
Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft and  for  that matter  to all 
German  credit  banks.  But  there  is  likewise  no  doubt 
whatever  that  such  measures  would  have  caused  only 
further disaster, and would  have prevented or restricted 
the splendid development of  German banking, which was 
so very essential to the interests of  the nation.  In this 
respect, as in  many  others, the practical wisdom  of  the 
English, resulting from greater business experience, and 
finding  expression  in  the  maxim,  "Not measures,  but 
men,"  has proved far more successful. 
Splendid results  followed  the inauguration  of  a  new 
management  by  careful as  well  as  skilful  partners  (of 
whom one is still on the board of  management) and the 
adoption  of  a  business  policy  based  on  new  principles, 
and this notwithstanding the fact that confidence in the 
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bank, which had been  almost completely lost, had to be 
regained by the new  partnership. 
Even for the first  year after the reorganization (1883) 
a dividend of  7 per cent could be declared, and ever since, 
with the exception  of  slight interruptions  from time to 
time,  due  to general  economic conditions, the  Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft has  been  following  a  career  of  con- 
tinuous  and  increasing success. 
Its dividends during the following years were as follows: 
Per cent. 
1883 ..................... 7 
1884 ...................... 9 
1885 ...................... 8 
1886 ...................... 9 
1887. ..................... 9 
1888 ......................  10 
1889.. ....................  12 
I 890. ..................... 9% 
1891 ...................... 7% 
1892.. ................... 6 
1893 ...................... 5 
1894 ......................  7 
1895.. ....................  8 
Per cent. 
1896. .....................  9 
1897 ......................  9 
1898 ......................  9 
1899. ..................... 9% 
1900. ..................... S 
1901 ......................  7 
1902 .................... 7% 
1903. ..................... 8 
1904. ..................... 8 
1905. .....................  9 
1906. .....................  9  ......................  I907  9 
1908 ......................  9 
On  December  31, 1908, the "commandite"  capital of 
the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft was  I ~o,ooo,ooo  marks, 
while the surplus amounted to 34,500,000 marks, or  31 
per  cent  of  the  capital  stock.  The  debits  on  current 
account  amounted  to  I~~,Z~O,OOO  and  the  credits  to 
206,250,000  marks. 
The peculiar character  of  the  Berliner  Handelsgesell- 
schaft among the other great Berlin banks grew out of its 
relations to : 
I. The electrotechnical industry. 
2.  The so-called "  heavy " industries, especially mining 
and smelting enterprises. NationaZ  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
3. The street railways and minor steam railways. 
It was particularly in the first-mentioned field that the 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft developed a many-sided and 
fruitful activity.  The great success achieved by the Allge- 
meine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft  (General Electric Company) 
was due as much to the marvelously efficient management 
of  its general director, Emil Rathenau and his associates, 
as  to the intelligent and  skilful financial cooperation of 
the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft.  The latter, as the chief 
financial adviser of  the General Electric Company, proved 
as successful as did the Deutsche Bank in the case of  the 
firm of  Siemens & Halske. 
The Handelsgesellschaft undertook  a large number  of 
financial transactions of  all sorts as a result of  its connect- 
ion with the General Electric Company.  Aside from the 
numerous issues which it carried through for the General 
Electric Company and other concerns which were either 
allied with or subsidiary to it, such as the Berliner  Elek- 
trizitatswerke, I  may mention its organization of  separate 
electrical companies in Seville and  Barcelona  (1894), in 
Warsaw  and Bilbao  (1896), the foundation of  the Bank 
fur  Elektrische  Unternehmungen  in  Zurich  (1897);  the 
Deutsche  Ueberseeische  Elektrizitatsgesellschaft  (German 
Transmarine  Electrical  Company)  in  Berlin,  and  the 
A lu~ninium-Industrie-A  ktiengesellschaft (Aluminum Manu- 
facturing  Company)  in  Neuhausen  (I  898), the  Elektro- 
Chemische Werke (Electro-Chemical Works) in Bitterfeld 
and Rheinfelden  (1896), which were consolidated in 1899 
and, finally, the Elektrizitats-Lieferungs-Gesellschaft  (Elec- 
tric Light and Power Company), etc. 
After  the  union-Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft  (U.  E. G.) 
was taken over by the General Electric Company in the 
year  1904, the bank  group which financed the General 
Electric Company was strengthened by the alliance with 
the  bank  group  which  financed  the  Loewe  enterprises 
(viz, the  Disconto-Gesellschaft, the Dresdner Bank, the 
Darmstadter Bank, and the A. Schaafiausen'scher Bank- 
verein).  This group thus represents an enormous power 
alongside that af the bank group headed by the Deutsche 
Bank, which finances the Siemens & Halske concerns and 
the newly organized limited stock company (G. m. b. H.) 
of  the Siemens-Schuckert Works,  which  grew  out  of  a 
combination in 1903 of  some of  the Siemens-Halske works 
with  the Schuckert  Company.  This latter  con~bination 
presents  many  points  of  contact  and  common  interests 
with  the  groups  mentioned.  The  Berliner  Handelsge- 
sellschaft is, moreover, represented in the syndicate for 
handling the Siemens & Halske securities. 
In the "heavy"  industries, especially  in  mining  and 
smelting, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft also played an 
important and at times even the leading part alongside 
the A.  Schaafiausen'scher  Bankverein.  Together  with 
this institution, it is  largely interested  in the Harpener 
Bergbaugesellschaft  (Harpen Mining Company), is  closely 
connected  with  the  Rombacher  Huttenwerke  (Rombach 
Smelting Works), and wields an important influence in the 
Ruhr coal district through its intimate connection with 
the  Konsolidation  and  the  Hibernia  mining  companies. 
In conjunction with the banking house of S. Bleichroder 
and other banks, it  succeeded in preventing the acquisition 
of  the Hibernia mines by the Government. National  Monetary  Commissiort 
The  Berliner  EIandelgesellschaft,  furthermore,  is  well 
connected with the Upper Silesian iron and coal  district 
through its close business relations with the Oberschlesische 
Eisenzndustrie-A  ktiengesellscha  f  t Caro-  Hegenscheidt (Upper 
Silesion Iron Company Caro-Hegenscheidt) and the firm 
Emanuel Friedlander & Co. in Berlin, one of  the two sales 
agencies of  the upper Silesian coal combination. 
Finally, in the field of  street and minor railway enter- 
prises  the activities  of  the Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft 
had  a  particularly  wide  scope.  It assisted  the General 
Electric Company in 1895 by the founding of  the Leipzig 
Street Railway  Company  and through  the issue  of  the 
securities  of  the Karlsruhe, Breslau  and  Stettin street 
railway companies and those of  the Allgemeine Lokal- und 
StrassenbahngesellschaJt (General Local and Street Railway 
Company).  Like the Darmstadter  Bank, but at a later 
date, it undertook  also the promotion on a large scale of 
minor railways (Kleinbahnen) . 
In this field its relations with the Stettin Railway Con- 
struction and Transportation Concern, 1,enz  & Co. were as 
close  as  those  of  the Darmstadter  Bank  with  the firm 
I-Ierrmann Bachstein.  In view  of  its own  former disas- 
trous experience and that of  other large banks, it began 
its activity in this field by organizing in 1895, in conjunc- 
tion with the A. SchaafThausen'scher Bankverein, a trust 
company at Cologne, known  as the  Westdeutsche  Eisen- 
bahngesellschaft  (West German Railway Company), which 
took the place of  the Handelsgesellschaft in the operating 
and financing of  the Lenz enterprises.  In 1896 another 
trust  company,  the  Bank  fur  Deutsche  Eisenbahn.werte 
(Bank  for  German  Railway  Securities)  was  organized, 
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while the Badische  Lokal&senbahnen-A.  G. (Baden Local 
Railway Company) was founded to take over a part of the 
Lenz railway system located in Baden and the Ostdeutsche 
Eisenbahngesellschaft  in Bronlberg (in 1899) to take over 
another  part  of  that  system.  In  1899  the  Vereznzgte 
Westdeutsche  Kleinbahn-A ktiengesellschaft  (United  West 
German  Minor  Railway  Company)  was  founded, which 
controlled as separate enterprises a large part of  the rail- 
roads of  the West German Railway Company.  In 1901 
the  Handelsgesellschaft  founded,  alongside  the  older 
limited company, Lenz & Co., a new Aktiengesellschaft  fur 
Verkehrmesen (stock  conipany  for transportation), with 
a capital of  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks, which took over all the shares 
of the former company.  The Berliner I-Iandelsgesellschaft 
engaged, in a large measure, also in speculative dealings 
in urban land tracts (Terraingeschaft)  . 
We  saw  above  (in the discussion  of  the A.  Schaaff- 
hauen'scher Bankverein, page 5 15) that with  reference to 
the number of  industrial issues effected during the years 
1895  to  1903, the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft  ranked 
third, with  170 issues  (as  against  220 effected  by  the 
Dresdner  Bank  and  187 by  the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher 
Bankverein).  It  ranked fourth if  the number of  financed 
companies is considered, this number being 1.1-9. 
It is also represented by its managing partners on the 
supervisory boards of  a  large number  of  industrial  cor- 
porations.  The international connections of  the Handels- 
gesellschaft are extensive and of  a high order.  The com- 
pany took a leading part in the formation of  the Deutsch- 
Asiatische  Bunk  in  1889 and  of  the Banca  Commerciale 
Italiana in  1894.  It also participated  during the years National  Monetary  Commission 
1898 to 1904 and in  1908 in the organization of  all the 
German  telegraph and  cable  companies, in  1899 in  the 
organization  of  the  two  Shantung  companies,  and  in 
1906 in the founding of  the Kamerun Railway Company. 
Among  its connections in  the countries of  continental 
Europe  we  may  note  the  following  institutions  in  the 
foundation of  which it took part. 
Schweizerischer Bankverin in  Basle  (I  872), the Banque 
Internationale de Bruxelles  (1898), the Banca Marmorosch 
Blank 6 Co.,  Societale  anoniwta in  Bucharest  (1904-5) 
and  the banking  company, formerly  Andrdevics 6 Co., 
in  Belgrade  (1908).  Since  1905  it has  been  operating 
the  Usambara  Railway  in  German  East  Africa,  and 
in  conjunction with  the firm of  Lenz & Co. it is engaged 
in  the construction  of  the railway  from  Luderitzbucht 
to Kubub. 
It participated,  in  some  cases  most  prominently,  in 
all  of  the  Russian,  Chinese,  and  Japanese  bond  issues 
effected  during  the  second  period  and  emitted  several 
Servian state and railway loans.  (See App. V and VI.) 
The  prominent  place  among  the  large  Berlin  banks 
attained by  the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft proves in a 
striking way the truth established by years of  experience 
that the fate of  banks as well  as of  industrial and com- 
merical  enterprises depends chiefly  upon the ability and 
trustworthiness  as well as the energy and  farsightedness 
of  the management. 
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SECTION  7. THE  SO-CALLED  EXPORT  CAPITALISM-THE  IN- 
VESTMENT  OF  GERMAN  CAPITAL  IN  FOREIGN  INDUSTRIAL 
AND COMMERCIAL  ENTERPRISES,  AND SECURITIES.  THE 
ESTABLISHMENT  OF  SUBSIDIARY  BANKS  (TOCHTER- 
BANKEN)  EXCLUSIVELY  FOR  pOREIGN  BUSINESS,  WITH 
SPECIAL  REFERENCE  TO  ITS  CONNECTION  WITH  THE 
INDUSTRIAL  EXPORT   POLICY.*^^ 
(A)  In a  previous part  (sec.  4,  sub.  I) it was  shown 
that the development of  the foreign, and especially  the 
over-sea  banking  business  during  the second  peri~d,~~l 
which  was  started  by  the  energetic  activity  of  the 
Deutsche Bank represents the outcome of  a well-designed 
business  on the part of  the great German banks 
which  is  directly  and  inseparably  connected  with  the 
general industrial export policy. 
In order  to  judge  whether  this  business  policy  has 
been  proper,  necessary,  or  desirable from  the point  of 
view  of  the public  welfare, we  must  bear  in  mind  the 
facts presented in  Part  111, Chapter  I, page 87  et seq., 
bearing  on  the  development  of  the  general  economic 
conditions in  Germany  during the second  period  (1870 
to the present time). 
We  saw  that German  agriculture and forestry during 
this period were not in a position to supply the domestic 
demand  by  their  own  products.  We  also  know  that 
in view of  the large and continuous growth of  our popu- 
lation,  notwithstanding  the  best  efforts  and  zeal,  this 
deficiency  in  the  domestic  supply  could  not  be  made 
up  by  the  application  of  more  intensive  methods  in 
agricultural production or by  the extension of  the culti- 
vated  area.  Our  deficiency  in  agricultural  products, National  Monetary  Commission 
therefore, had to be made up to an increasing extent by 
the foreign i~nportation  of  foodstuffs. 
Moreover, German  industry was  not  in a position  to 
supply  its needs  at home,  especially in  the matter  of 
raw  materials, and  was  compelled  on  the whole-i.  e., 
apart from  single branches-to  supply  the demand  for 
raw materials largely and, in some instances almost exclu- 
sively, by importation from abroad. 
It  is self-evident that we  can not pay in cash for these 
very large imports of  agricultural products and raw mate- 
rials used in manufacture without impairing our national 
capital resources.  These  imports  must  be  paid,  there- 
fore, in some other way; and this is unavoidable, because 
we need  these  imports for the existence of  our agricul- 
ture and our industry-that  is, for the sustenance and the 
employment  of  our population. 
Such payment has been made thus far in an unimpor- 
tant degree by the exchange of  such raw products as we 
do not need for home consumption, but mainly by export- 
. ing manufactured products  to the countries from which 
we import foodstuffs and raw products.484 
The necessity for these exports of  manufactured prod- 
ucts is thus growing in proportion to the increasing defi- 
ciency in the supply of  domestic foodstuffs and raw mate- 
rials.  Under  present conditions, therefore, especially in 
view  of  the constantly increasing population, our indus- 
trial export policy can not be said to have been a device 
arbitrarily  adopted,  and  therefore  one  eventually  to 
be abandoned.  Nor  is it an  end  in  itself, but  on  the 
contrary a  means, indispensable to our entire economic 
exi~tence,~"  of  paying  to a very material extent for our 
absolutely necessary imports. 
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As stated before, the German banks regarded it as one 
of their chief  functions actively to support both at home 
and abroad  domestic  industry486  and  the export policy 
adopted by the latter by promoting energetically German 
foreign commerce.  In connection with this general policy 
they came to establish branches in foreign countries and 
to organize  for  the  foreign  business  special  subsidiary 
banks both at  home and abroad, which, it is true, in many 
cases proved at the same time the means of  securing new 
and profitable business.  They also cooperated  with the 
government  policies  regarding  the  colonies,  navigation, 
canals, the navy, and cable connections, all of  which bore 
the closest relations to the above business policies. 
It  is plain, therefore, that the activities of the banks in 
all these  fields were  of  national  importance.  For  upon 
the successful discharge of  the above  functions depends 
not only the maintenance and the extension of  our influ- 
ence and our importance abroad, but, what is more, our 
entire economic existence. 
It may be said that for some time at least the necessity 
of  this development from the point of  view  of  the com- 
mon  national  interests  did  not  appeal t~ wide  circles, 
especially to those classes which were injuriously affected 
by this development.  For it goes without saying that in 
the course and as the result of  the industrial export move- 
ment, as in the case of  any other fundamental economic 
change,  serious  disadvantages  manifested  themselves. 
With the steady growth of  population  the industrial ex- 
port policy continued  to be emphasized more and more 
until about 1882, when  it may be said to have reached  its 
point of culmination.  During all these years agriculture, National  Monetary  Commission  - 
notwithstanding all its importance to the economic well- 
being  of  the nation, received but scant support, losing 
much  of  its former strength, means, credit, and labor. 
It is  that policy which  is  partly responsible for the fact 
that the percentage of  population engaged in agriculture 
decreased  from  about  61 per  cent  of  the entire  popu- 
lation in Prussia in the middle of  the past century to 28.6 
per cent of  the entire German population in 1907, while 
at the same time the population engaged in commerce and 
industry increased from about 24 per cent (in the middle 
of  the past century in Prussia) to 56 per cent of  the Ger- 
man population engaged in gainful occupations in  1907. 
The latter circumstance has contributed materially to the 
enormous growth of  the manufacturing towns  (up to I 7 
and I 8 times the figures for the middle of  the  past century). 
(B)  The  above-mentioned  activities  represent,  how- 
ever,  only  part  of  the functions  of  the banks  in  this 
field. 
For as was made clear from the statistical compilations, 
which were closely scanned by the banks as well, notwith- 
standing all efforts in the fields of  industry and foreign 
trade, only part, though quite a considerable part, of  our 
imports of  foodstuffs and raw materials could be compen- 
sated by means of  exports of  manufactures and similar 
products.  After deducting the value  of  our exports of 
manufactures  there  still  remained  a  very  considerable 
balance in favor of  the foreign countries.  The excess of 
imports  for consumption  over  domestic  exports  at the 
close of  1907, as we saw above (p. I I 2) ,  amounted, in round 
figures, to  I ,~oo,ooo,ooo  marks.  To this  extent, there- 
fore, the balance of  trade was  against us. 
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Now, there is no doubt that the claim that an unfavor- 
able balance of  trade in itself  is disastrous for a country 
can not be maintained as a general proposition, since nu- 
merous countries may be cited which show an unfavorable 
balance of  trade, but which  with a particularly favorable 
balance of  payments, enjoy the utmost prosperity.  These 
are the countries which  utilize  the available surplus  of 
large capital accumulations, derived from their industrial, 
agricultural, or colonial successes, for the improvement of 
their balance of  payments.  The more favorable the bal- 
ance of  payments of  such a country the less perilous will 
be an unfavorable balance of  its trade.  In other words, 
the more favorable its balance of  payments becomes, the 
less a country may hesitate to let other countries "work 
for it," that is to say, permit itself to be supplied by other 
countries with raw materials and foodstuffs, even though 
as a result of  such a policy its balance of  trade may be- 
come unfavorable.  For Germany the problem presented 
itself  of  compensating the unfavorable balance of  trade 
by  the utmost  practicable improvement of  our  balance 
of payments, in order to escape ultimate disaster through 
a  constant accumulation of  unfavorable trade balances. 
In this respect, as well, there was no choice of  means. 
The problem  was  primarily  one  of  creating  debits  in 
our  favor  on  the part  of  those  countries which  had  a 
favorable balance in their trade with  debits at least 
large enough to counterbalance the credits due them from 
us  by  reason  of  the excess  of  their sales over their  pur- 
chases in their trade with us.  In the case of industrially- 
developed  countries,  the  activities  accomplishing  this 
result  develop  to  a  considerable  extent  automatically, National  Monetary  Commission 
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i.  e.,  as natural consequences  of  the industrial relations 
to the less developed foreign countries, and to a smaller 
extent, as the result of  fixed plans and designs. 
Foreign countries may become our debtors- 
(I) Through  business  operations  which  we  carry  on 
in  and with  foreign  countries, which  include  exchange, 
arbitrage, and commodity  transactions with these coun- 
tries undertaken either for speculative purposes, to secure 
payment, or to attract gold from them, and through serv- 
ices which we render those countries, or through mercan- 
tile,  industrial,  or  transportation  enterprises  which  we 
establish in the foreign countries or in which we partici- 
pate. 
The German  enterprises  established  in  foreign  Euro- 
pean countries, which were mentioned in section 4, sub. I1 
(p. 432  et seq.), include the foreign branches of  the Ger- 
man banks, such as the Deutsche  Bank, the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft,  and  the  Dresdner  Bank  in  London.  The 
foreign German participations include the ownership by 
German banks of  stock in foreign  banking  institutions, 
such as the ownership  by  the  Commerz-und  Disconto- 
Bank of  shares in the London  and Hanseatic Bank, by 
the Dresdner  Bank of  stock in  the General  Mining  and 
Finance Corporation  (Limited) in London, etc.  Accord- 
ing to the report  of  the Central Pederation  of  German 
Banks and Bankers (Centralverband des Deutschen Bank- 
und  Banbiergewerbes)  of  December,  I 903  (concerning 
the effects of  the stock exchange act and the stock ex- 
change tax act), since the stock exchange act of  January 
I, 1897, went into effect, numerous time transactions and 
other dealings of  the German public in  (American)  rail- 
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way  stock  and  in  mining  shares  transacted  in  many 
foreign  countries,  particularly  in  London,  Paris,  and 
New York, have to be considered in which, to escape the 
German tax on securities, the securities to a large extent 
remained abroad.  According to the inquiry of  the central 
federation (see above report, p. 48), which was  only par- 
tially successful, the securities (for the most part probably 
of  the classes above mentioned) 488  which  the  I 8 largest 
banks and banking houses of  Berlin, namely, the members 
of  the so-called Stem~elvereinigung,  had in foreign deposi- 
tories on December 31, 1902, on  their  own  and  outside 
accounts amounted to 602,268,000 marks, while the value 
of  securities  which  only  149 other German  (provincial) 
banks  and  bankers  had  at the  same  time  in  foreign 
depositories amounted to 454,  I 5  I ,000 marks. 
According  to  Paul  Dehn 489  the  total  investments  of 
French capital in foreign countries in  the middle of  the 
year I 902, according to official investigations, amounted to 
24,000,000,ooo  marks  (~o,ooo,ooo,o00  francs)  .490  Dehn 
further states:491  "It is reported  that the English  draw 
annually  I ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks in  interest from American 
securities  which  they  hold,  from  plantations,  factories, 
constructions, etc., which they have instituted  and with 
which they pay for the foodstuffs which they import from 
the United States."  According to an address of Sir Edgar 
Speyer before the Institute of  Bankers, made on June 7, 
1900,  on  "Some  aspects of  national finance," the total 
amount  of  British  working  capital  invested  in  foreign 
countries  was  estimated  to  aggregate  £2,~oo,ooo,ooo 
or  ~o,ooo,ooo,ooo  marks.  According to Helfferich,4g2  the 
former director of  the Credit Lyonnais, Germain, estilrlated National  Monetary  Commission 
that during recent years France invested annually about 
I ,~oo,ooo,ooo  francs in foreign securities. 
(2)  Through our  acquisition  of  foreign  securities the 
interest or dividends on which are to be paid by foreign 
countries,  or  the capital  amounts  of  which  we  are  to 
receive when they become due, or when the securities are 
sold abroad. 
It may be objected that these investments in the first 
place require means which must be drawn from domestic 
sources and which go abroad (as, for instance, when a for- 
eign loan is taken up at  home)  in consequence of  such 
investments, and that in the beginning at least we become 
debtors of  the foreign country, while any improvements 
in this balance begin to show only later from the earnings 
of  our investments, and that, for the time being, our bal- 
ance of  payments is not improved but rather made more 
unfavorable.  But while there are doubtless cases where 
this argument is effective, yet in the majority of  cases the 
amounts which we invest  abroad-that  is, which we have 
to pay to  foreign countries in gold-are  paid out of  the  earn- 
ings on other foreign securities which are in our possession 
or through the sale or exchange of  other foreign securi- 
ties, or else are paid with goods which we furnish to the 
foreign countries, it being as a rule agreed, when loans are 
made  to foreign  countries, that our  industries  shall  be 
favored with the contracts and orders for the payment of 
which the loans were contracted.  A portion of  the securi- 
ties which have been  taken up eventually find their way 
back  to  the foreign countries,  or  other  changes in  the 
international  balance  of  payments  may take place with 
which we  must also reckon.  Such changes happen con- 
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tinually and daily through the importation and exporta- 
tion of  securities.  Absolutely no information exists  as to 
the course in  time  or the volume  of  these  movements, 
although such data only would enable us to perceive more 
fully the significance of  the imports and exports of  mer- 
chandise and specie, i. e., of  the international commercial 
exchanges.4Q3 
In  so  far  as  the Gernlan  banks, either  on  their  own 
account  or  as  intermediaries,  have been  active in  both 
directions named, and granting that they have observed 
the necessary care and foresight in preventing or arrest- 
ing  a dangerous decline in those earnings of  our  foreign 
investments, which  might  be  applied  to improving our 
unfavorable balance of  payments, they have undoubtedly 
rendered valuable  service, absolutely essential in the in- 
terests of our national economy.  The following important 
limitations, however, must be made: 
The undertaking of  or participation  in foreign invest- 
ments  is  practicable  only when  there  is  a  considerable 
surplus of  capital at home and permissible only after the 
domestic demand for capital is fully met.  Even if  these 
conditions exist such investments are not to be favored, 
when in the long run they result in the strengthening  of 
foreign industry and the enhancing of foreign competition 
against our domestic trade and industry. 
Such participations of  German capital in foreign coun- 
tries comprise chiefly banks, manufacturing, colonization, 
plantation, mining, light, power, and railway  undertak- 
ings and other land and water transportation enterprises. 
The earnings from these participations increase the credit 
side of  our balance of  payments only to the extent that National  Monetary  Commission 
they exceed the earnings of  foreign investments in Ger- 
many.  The latter are chiefly  gas works  and street and 
local railway enterprises. 
One of the important, if  not the most important, item in 
the balance  of  payments  is  represented  by  the credits 
which we  grant  to  foreign  countries in  our commercial 
dealings with them.  Since these amounts can be obtained 
only from the books of  the individual concerns which grant 
these credits, it follows again that a total of  the item in 
question can at best be but approximately estimated. 
On the other hand domestic enterprises and participa- 
tions abroad, in so far as they do not merely benefit foreign 
industry, are to be regarded favorably as a rule, especially 
when  proper care is used  in their selection, when, in the 
main  at least, they are conducted  on  domestic account, 
and when they are either intended or suited to extend the 
domestic sphere of  influence and to serve  as a basis  for 
larger activity of  domestic industry.  These factors do not 
affect immediately the balance of  payments, though sooner 
or later they are bound to find expression in ponderable 
items in our necessarily inexact balance of  payments. 
The  above  considerations,  it  is  true,  do  not  justify 
foreign investments, whenever and in so far as the earn- 
ings from our foreign investments and enterprises exceed 
the amounts required  to pay  for  our excess of  imports. 
As  a matter of fact the returns from our foreign invest- 
ments by far exceed the latter amount (see below, p. 545). 
But we  must always reckon with the possibility that 
our  domestic  exports  may  decline,  while  our  imports 
will  remain  the  same, or  even  increase.  This  would 
result in a steadily growing adverse trade balance, which 
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might become the more  portentous the smaller the credit 
items in our balance  of  payments,  i. e., our foreign in- 
vestments which render the foreign country tributary to 
us, and  the returns from which can be used  to counter- 
balance the debit items in  our trade balance.  Further- 
more,  unless  we  render  foreign  countries  tributary  to 
us to an  increasing extent, the time  might  come when, 
with  the growing  importance of  their  own  home  mar- 
ket,  these  countries  would  no  longer  be  constrained 
to  furnish  us  with  their  foodstuffs and  raw  materials. 
As  it is, these  exports or the money  equivalent  thereof 
go  to meet  their  obligations toward  us  in  the shape of 
profits  and interest. 
A large decline of  our imports would also tend to de- 
stroy our industry, and thus our export trade, which fur- 
nish food and employment to our population, and which, 
as it is, is  greatly jeopardized  by the growth of  imperi- 
alistic  and  protectionist  tendencies  in  countries  which 
are at present  our  principal  customers. 
(C)  It is clear even  from what has been  said that our 
foreign  investments,  as  a  whole, must  necessarily  go 
beyond  the lowest  limits  set by our  adverse trade bal- 
ance.  But  for  a  number  of  special  classes  of  invest- 
ment,  the  returns  from  which  serve  to  improve  our 
balance of  payments, the necessity and utility is proven 
by  other  important  and  cogent  reasons,  which  retain 
their validity,  even  if  the above  general  considerations 
be regarded of  insufficient strength. 
(a) As  regards  the  German  insurance  business  in 
foreign  countries,  it is  desirable  for  the  domestic  in- 
surance business  for  the reason, among  others, that by 
extending  the scope of  the business  a broader  distribu- National  Monetary  Commission 
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tion  of  the risks  is  effected  in time and  ~lace.'~'  The 
returns  from  the  foreign  business  of  the  German  in- 
surance  enterprises  naturally increase the credit  side of 
the balance  of  payments only in so far as they are not 
counterbalanced  by  the  earnings  of  foreign  insurance 
companies in and on  account of  German~.'~5 
(b)  The oversea banking business makes it possible for 
our domestic exporters and importers, as well  as for our 
general commercial  activity in foreign countries, to dis- 
pense  with  foreign  intermediaries  for  their  financial 
transactions and credit needs.  Through the financing of 
the  foreign  business  of  our  merchants  German  bank 
acceptances  have  been  introduced  to  foreign  markets, 
with  the result  that the ofttimes  considerable earnings 
of  foreign concerns in  this  field  have been  turned  into 
German  channels  and  have  thus  become  available  for 
improving our balance of  payments.  'I'hus,  for instance, 
as late as  1888, according to consular reports, the com- 
mercial  exchanges  between  Germany  and  Chile  valued 
in  the  aggregate  at  60,000,ooo  marks  yielded  about 
500,000  marks  of  profits  to  British  bankers,  merely 
because  all  acceptances  by  means  of  which  these  ex- 
changes were effected had to be liquidated in the British 
market  .496 
In  the  excellent  "  Tabellen  zur  Wahrungstatistik "  4Q7 
(tables  regarding  currency  statistics)  of  the  Austrian 
Ministry of  Finance an estimate is mentioned-according 
to which out of the total value of  the oversea trade of  the 
European Continental countries more than ~,OOO,OOO,OOO 
marks is yearly drawn on England.  According to estimates 
of  the British board of  trade, which relate to the year I  898, 
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hankers' and  other commissions aggregated  in that year 
I 8,ooo,ooo  pounds  sterling  (that  is,  about  432,000,ooo 
marks). 
The over-sea banking business, furthermore, opens up 
possibilities for the investment  of  the domestic  surplus 
capital (see above, p. 92).  This annually growing surplus 
increases the demand for investment opportunities, which 
can not be met fully by the issue of  domestic state, com- 
munal, and other loans. 
Our foreign banks are also in a better position to obtain 
timely  information regarding  more important  contracts, 
works,  and government  orders  about to be  awarded  or 
regarding  the impending issue of  foreign  loans, and are 
thus able to lend much more effective assistance to German 
concerns seeking the awards.  Through their connections 
with the foreign markets they are also in a position to call 
the attention of foreign purchasers to German firms and, 
vice versa, to bring to the notice of  German manufacturers 
and traders suitable representatives and purchasers in the 
foreign countries. 
Under the same head come also the profits of  domestic 
banks from trading in foreign securities and returns from 
other  foreign business.  Against  these  earnings  have  to 
be set, as elsewhere, the corresponding earnings of  foreign 
banks from German business, including the commissions 
paid to foreign fiscal and disbursing agencies on account of 
our coupons and bonds, loan conversions, talon renewals, 
etc. 
There is no means of  estimating even approximately the 
volume  of  the  foreign  business,  including  dealings  in 
foreign securities effected by our banking institutions, nor National  Monetary  Commission 
of  the returns  from this business in the shape of  interest, 
commissions, etc.  They include chiefly the earnings from 
underwriting, emitting, converting, unifying, and rehabil- 
itating foreign state, railroad, and private securities; from 
the financing of  foreign operations and enterprises, from the 
granting of  credit to foreign firms, institutions, enterprises, 
concerns,  and  individuals  by  way  of  current  account, 
bills and other credit operations; profits from the loaning 
of  domestic securities abroad, from the foreign bill busi- 
ness, including brokerage and remittances;  from the for- 
eign trade in specie, also earnings of  interest, commissions, 
and brokerage  in international commercial  transactions; 
profits from the purchase of  foreign bills of  exchange and 
the accumulation  of  credits  (payable in gold) abroad ;  498 
from services in connection with the payment of  foreign 
coupons,  from  the  redemption  of  drawn  or  otherwise 
matured debentures, the delivery of  new  coupon  sheets, 
as well as the talon renewals of  foreign securities. 
(c)  The earnings of  the German merchant marine from 
oversea  shipping  also  constitute an important factor  in 
our balance of  payments.  The above-mentioned "  Tabellen 
zur Wahrungsstatistik,"  prepared by the Austrian Ministry 
of  Finance, estimate the freight  receipts of  the Austro- 
Hungarian merchant marine in the foreign trade at  60,000,- 
ooo crowns and the credit accruing therefrom to the inter- 
national balance of  payments of  the country at 30,000,000 
crowns.499 It is unnecessary to demonstrate that the ser- 
vices of  our merchant marine in the oversea  trade have 
proved of  immense value in the development of  our export 
trade and have contributed largely to increase our prestige 
among foreign nations, our national power and influence, 
as well as our financial strength. 
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(d)  Furthermore, we  must take into account the earn- 
ings on account of  foreigners traveling in Germany, which 
are, however, more than fully set off  by the corresponding 
foreign earnings on account of  Germans travelling abroad. 
(e) Other items in  the balance of  payments are: The 
charges of domestic railways for carrying goods in transit 
to  foreign  countries;  the  excess  charges  for  the  mu- 
tual  renting  of  railway  cars;  clearance  balances  re- 
ceived  in  the international postal,  passenger,  telegraph 
and  telephone  services; the  expenditures  of  foreign 
vessels in the home ports  (minus  our own  payments in 
foreign ports) ; the charges for the construction of  vessels 
on foreign account in our dock yards and our claims from 
the sale of  domestic vessels to foreigners; the claims arising 
from  the international  exchange  of  patents  and  copy- 
rights; the claims of members of the liberal professions, 
i.  e.,  technical  experts,  teachers,  physicians,  actors, 
musicians, etc., engaged abroad; the claims resulting from 
the  ownership  in  foreign  countries  of  land  and  mort- 
gages, from liquidated inheritances and from marriage con- 
tracts concluded abroad, and, according to Ad. Soetbeer,sOo 
also  the  extraordinary payments  501  which  one  country 
must make to another as the result of  political  relations 
or  events  (war  indemnities,  subsidies, pensions, cost  of 
administration). 
Finally,  an  important  factor  in  the balance  of  pay- 
ments is presented by- 
())  The investments of  home capital in foreign securities, 
the utility and necessity of  which are based on a number 
of  weighty reasons besides those mentioned above. 
Any attempt to liquidate the very considerable adverse 
balance  of  our trade with foreign countries by means of National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
cash  remittances  instead  of  the interest  and  dividends 
on foreign securities or the sales of  such securities would 
prove  to be  very  expensive.  It would  lead  to serious 
disturbances  in  the  money  market,  at times  even  to 
crises, and might  endanger in a  large measure our cur- 
rency  and  credit  systems.  Besides  we  need  proper 
foreign securities, i.  e., such  as are payable  in  gold  to 
secure our financial readiness for war (see p.  22 et seq.) 
as a necessary  means of  compensation against eventual 
withdrawals of  large foreign credits. 
We  need  them,  furthermore,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
draw gold from abroad to satisfy the urgent and pressing 
needs  for  credit  and  instruments  of  payment  which 
usually  occur  in  the  last  days preceding and  the first 
days following  a declaration of  war,&02  as well as to meet 
the violent  demand for  cash, which  is  apt to occur  at 
such times during a temporary loss of  confidence in any 
form  of  currency  except  gold.  The  holdings  of  such 
international  securities  which  can  be  realized  at  the 
various  international  bourses  present,  therefore,  the 
best protection against the excessive fall during warlike 
times  in  the quotations  of  our  domestic  securities  and 
against  the  weakening  or  glutting  of  our  own  stock 
exchanges. 
In this connection it must be remembered what impor- 
tant political results have been brought about by the grant- 
ing or refusing of loans to foreign states and to what extent 
the home government may use for political purposes its 
power  of  permitting  or  prohibiting  the  issue,  official 
listing, and  pledging  of  foreign  securities, especially  at 
times when the foreign state, either because of  the closing 
or overstocking of  other foreign  markets, is  confined to 
our exclusive assistance and when  it is in our  power  to 
inflict great damage on  it by  our refusal or prohibition. 
The skirmishes of  the political advance posts are fought 
on  financial  ground,  though  the  selection  of  the  time 
and  the  enemy  as  well  as  the manner  in  which  these 
skirmishes are to be fought depends upon those responsible 
for the direction of  our foreign policy. 
Much  more than ever before we  Germans will  have to 
bear in mind that industrial contracts, commercial enter- 
prises, and  capital investments are conveying  from one 
country to another  not  only capital  and labor but also 
political influence. 
Dehn  very  properly  shows  how  French  capital,  for 
instance,  has  rendered  pioneer  services  to  the  French 
foreign  policy  in  Tunis  and  Morocco,  in  Turkey  and 
Greece,  and,  above  all,  in  Russia, while  Sombart goes 
so  far  as  to  characterize  "the  whole  Franco-Russian 
alliance  as  a  bankers'  creation"  (Bankiergebilde)  an 
assertion  which  is  rather  extreme.  In  the  same  vein, 
Georg v. Siemens, in his article on "The National Impor- 
tance of  the Bourse"  (in the Nation, Oct. 6, ~goo),  calls 
attention  to  the  great  political  advantages  which  we 
gained  in  Italy,  after political  discord  had  grown  up 
between  Italy and France, when we  immediately placed 
at Italy's disposal our capital and  stock exchanges, and 
that the battle between Russia and England about Persia 
was primarily fought "on financial ground." 
In more  recent  times  we  witnessed  the beginning  of 
better  political  relations  between  France  and  Italy, 
brought on primarily through financial reconciliation, par- 
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banking group of  a  large amount of  stock in the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana,  created  at the start  without  the 
cooperation  of  French  capital.  We  saw  only  recently 
that  the  French  Government  threatened  to withdraw 
the listing  privilege from the Turkish state bonds unless 
certain  contracts  were  awarded  to  French  industry. 
The British Government  sought to prevent  in every way 
the granting  of  a  banking  concession  in  Persia  to the 
German Orientbank for fear that such a  grant might lead 
to a diminution of  its own political influence. 
The taking over of  loans for China and Japan became 
an object of  contention among all great nations, for the 
well-known reason that financial influence  merely  paves 
the way for political influence.  France and England are 
competing in Spain and Portugal-and  nearly all the great 
powers in Turkey-to  gain political influence by means of 
financial aid.  Notwithstanding  some  painful  experience 
in Argentina, the English banks and capitalists have been 
tenaciously lending financial support to the efforts of  their 
Government to maintain and strengthen the British politi- 
cal sphere of  influence in that part of  the  world.  In  Canada 
and  Mexico and in Central and South America the Ameri- 
cans are systematically planning by investments of  capi- 
tal and  all  sorts of  financial measures to drive out both 
European political interference and European commerce. 
In view of  the above facts and considerations, the ques- 
tion whether issues of  foreign securities even beyond the 
amount  required  to balance  the excess  of  our  foreign 
imports  are economically  correct  in  principle  must  be 
answered in the affirmative. 
The presumptions under which, in each individual case, 
the issue  of  foreign  securities  is  permissible  and unob- 
jectionable  from  the national  point  of  view  have been 
discussed in detail above (p. 384 et seq.). 
(D)  With regard to the volume of  the foreign invest- 
ments of  home capital,504  the report of  the Reichs-Marine- 
Amt  of  December,  1905, on Die Entwickelung der Deut- 
schen Seeinteressen im letzten Jahrzehnt  (the development 
of  German marine interests during the last decade) gives, 
on the basis of  consular reports, the following estimates. 
The latter, of  course, are based  in  turn upon estimates 
more or less  accurate of  others furnished to the consuls at 
their respective  seats. 
(a) The amount of  German capital invested in foreign 
undertakings,  plants,  business  enterprises,  and  partici- 
pations  is  estimated  at  7,700,000,000 to  9,200,000,000 
marks, equivalent to an income, reckoned at an average 
of  6 per cent, of  462,000,000 to 552,000,000  marks. 
Concerning this estimate the report remarks as follows 
(Introduction, p. XI) : "  In these amounts (7,700,000,000 
to 9,2oo,ooo,ooo marks) the current German merchandise 
credits, which  amount to at least one-fourth to one-third, 
perhaps even to one-half, the amount of  the yearly German 
exports-that  is, to I ,500,000,ooo to 2,750,000,ooo marks- 
are included only in part, and the same is true of  the credits 
frequently advanced on  account of  imports."  We have 
already remarked above that there are no means of  even 
estimating the total credits  granted  by  us  to foreigners 
in international trade, and the same is true of  our charges 
for services of  all sorts rendered by us. National  Monetary  Commission 
(h)  The amount of  foreign securities in the possession 
of  German holders is estimated at least at 16,00o,ooo,ooo 
marks (ib., introduction, pp. XII, and 169)~  equivalent to 
an income of  8oo,ooo,ooo marks, reckoned at 5 per cent. 
Accordingly  the  total amount  of  our  foreign  capital 
investments  for  the year  1905  may  be  estimated  at a 
minimum  of  24,000,000,ooo  to  25,000,000,000  marks 
(with yearly  earnings  of  about  I ,352,ooo,ooo marks)  an 
amount which  very likely falls  considerably short of  the 
true amount.  (See note 20, p. 803.) 
As  a matter of  fact, as was illustrated before in a few 
important instances, the true volume of  the foreign invest- 
ments of  domestic capital in  the main fields, on account 
of  the lack of safe statistical bases, can not be estimated 
even approximately.  This is shown strikingly and in great 
detail by the "  Tabellen zur Wahrungsstatistik  prepared 
in  the Austrian  Ministry  of  Finance,  especially  in  the 
chapter  dealing  with  "earnings  in  foreign  countries" 
(Erwerbstatigkeit  ausser  Landes) ,  although  the  subject 
is  treated  in  the  report  with  the  utmost  care  and 
thoroughness. 
I.  GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS  (506  a). 
It  was  pointed  out  in  an  earlier  chapter  how  the 
German banks developed  hand in hand with the scanty 
means of the German people and in accordance with the 
demands of  German trade and industry.  In England a 
different development took place, which, while in equally 
close  touch  with  English  requirements  and  the  given 
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concentration  in  the  fields  of  distribution,  credit,  and 
national  wealth-all  of  which  was  entirely  lacking  in 
Germany-led  from the outset to a sharp differentiation 
between  the deposit  banks  and  other  banks.  This  is 
sufficient ground for a large number of  Germans, who are 
wont  to  underrate  domestic  as  compared  with  foreign 
achievements, to point to the English system as the only 
true  one,  and  to  demand  its  unrestricted  adoption  at 
home.  Similar views are, however, held in certain nota- 
ble scientific quarters.  It is particularly Adolph Wagner 
who has been  advocating for a long time a reform  along 
English lines, based in his case upon scientific conviction, 
which, as is well known, is least apt to change under the 
influence of  mere practical experience. 
To my mind  it was a fortunate fact that the German 
banks,  from  the  very  start, placed  themselves  at the 
particular  service  of  trade  and  industry.  But  at all 
events it will be granted that this was due to the histori- 
cally given German conditions  and  requirements.  As  a 
result of  this connection the banks have taken a consider- 
able  part  in  the  splendid  industrial  and  commercial 
development of  the country, which is characteristic of  the 
last  decades.  Starting at a  time  when  domestic  agri- 
culture was no longer in a  position  to provide sufficient 
food and work  for  the greatly increased population the 
German banks  contributed indirectly  toward  transform- 
ing Germany from an agricultural country, if not into an 
exclusively  industrial  and commercial  cohntry  at least 
into one where  these  two economic  interests  are of  pre- 
ponderant importance.  This is sufficient to arouse against 
the banking interest all those who detest the whole trend National  Monetary  Commission 
of  "industrialization."  The charge is  made  against the 
banks  that  through  their  deposit  system  they  deprive 
agriculture of  considerable funds, which they use instead 
for the support of  industry, especially of  the export indus- 
tries.  Political circles sharing these views are supported 
in  this  campaign  by  the  extremists  on  the  opposite 
side-i.  e., the social democrats, who oppose the banks as 
the  most  powerful  and  dangerous  representatives  of 
movable capital. 
A  regrettable  feature of  German banking in  common 
with other industries is the gradual ousting of  small enter- 
prises  by  large-scale enterprise.  This  development  has 
caused  a  number  of  members  and  spokesmen  of  the 
"  middle classes " (in this  case the snialler bankers-for 
instance, Caesar Straus) to attack the German banks on 
the ground that they were pursuing an altogether wrong 
course.  Notwithstanding  the heterogeneity  of  political 
and economic views and the great variety of  motives and 
mutually  exclusive  purposes  of  those  who  have  been 
advocating "reform"  in the field of  deposits during the 
last few decades, there is unanimity on one point, namely, 
that "something  must  be  done"  that  in  some  way  or 
other the funds flowing to the banks should be diverted 
in a larger degree to agriculture, or "national  economic 
ends,"  to use  the  more  popular  catchword.  As  soon, 
however, as practical proposals are called for, various cur- 
rents  and parties  appear with often obscure and contra- 
dictory demands, despite the fact that the several parties 
and assailants very often contrive to veil their true ends 
and purposely move in separate columns with  the view, 
however, of  colhbined attack.  Moreover, each  time  a 
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crisis occurs, an event which can hardly ever be avoided 
in economic life under  any banking system, there appear 
on the scene any number  of  patented critics or persons 
who  have  become  experts  overnight,  who,  to say the 
least,  try  to  impress  the public  that had  the German 
banking  system  been  intrusted  to their  care  it would 
have  worked  faultlessly, and  who  use  such  favorable 
occasions to prove their capacity of  "  saving the country " 
by means of  the most radical proposals. 
I. SAFETY  OF  DEPOSITORS-A REASON  FOR  REFORM  PROPOSALS. 
The  majority  of  known  reform  proposals  hitherto 
made are based on the following considerations : 
The German banking system, which, unlike the English 
system, combines the issuing of securities and speculating 
activity on own  and outside accounts with the receiving 
of  money  deposits endangers, of  necessity, the safety  of 
the  deposits.  These  are  intrusted  to  the  banks  with 
the  confidence  in  their  absolute  security.  The  banks, 
however,  use  them  in  providing  the  means  for  their 
own  enterprises and for speculation in securities on out- 
side  account.507  In  Germany  the  detrimental  effects 
of  such  a  system  have  already  become  evident  in  a 
marked degree through overspeculation, excessive security 
~ssu~s,~~~  and  bankruptcies,  which  have  caused 
great losses to depositors. 
2. THE  PARTICULAR  PROPOSALS, MADE  WITH  THIS  END IN VIEW BY C~SAR 
STRAUS,  OTTO WARSCHAUER,  AND  COUNT VON  ARNIM-MUSKAU. 
We  are therefore  urged  to adopt the British banking 
system.  The  latter,  it  is  said,  provides  for  a  strict 
division of  the field and for the complete divorce between National  Morzetary  Commission 
stock  exchange  and  deposits,  and  thus  guarantees  the 
safety  and  prudent  administration  of  the  moneys  de- 
posited.  In other  words,  it  is  imperative  to  effect  a 
complete  separation  between  the  deposit  business  and 
the  issue  and  flotation  business.  This  is  the  general 
trend of  the proposals of  the late C~sar  Straus, a former 
private  banker  in  Frankfort-on-the-Main, and  of  Otco 
Warschauer. 
Straus advocates the establishment of  a central deposit 
bank  for  the whole  German  Empire by  private means, 
but  under  government  supervision,  with  a  capital  of 
60,000,ooo marks, of  which 25 per cent, that is, I g,ooo,ooo 
marks, is to be paid  in; the bank to maintain branches 
in all important trade and money centers and to transact 
business in other places through the intermediary  of  the 
Rei~hsbank.~lO 
Warschauer advocates the establish~nent  of  a Reichsde- 
positenbank  (Imperial Deposit Bank) with a share capital 
of  50,000,ooo marks,  of  which  50  per  cent,  that is, 
25,000,000  marks,  is  to  be  paid  in.  Alongside  this 
imperial  institution,  deposit  banks  for  the  individual 
States might  be  founded, which  would  bear  the same 
relation  to it as  the present  private  note  banks  do  to 
the  Reich~bank.~11  The  proposed  institution,  just  as 
the Reichsbank, should follow a plan of  decentralizing its 
operations through the opening of a large number of  local 
offices  in  the various  confederated States.  He presages 
for  the proposed  central deposit  bank, the deposits  of 
which, in his opinion, would reach  the total of  at least 
~,ooo,ooo,ooo  marks, a  dividend  of  21  to  22  per  cent 
(l' an extremely low  estimate,"  as he expresses himself). 
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Judging by the average profits of the London stock banks, 
he  assumes as  "extremely  probable"  a  dividend  in  the 
long run of  12 per cent.  The above prediction  may pos- 
sibly explain the fact that, according to Warschauer, the 
proposed  deposit  banks  are to be  permitted  to acquire 
first-class  mortgages  as  well  as  to  advance  money  on 
industrial  securities  and  bank  shares,  to  be  sure  with 
the  limitation  that  only  "first-class  securities"  are  to 
be  considered.  This  he  thinks  will  cause  a  gradual 
defection  of  depositors  from  the  credit  banks.  The 
latter,  in  his  view,  represent  merely  private  interests 
with  no claim to special protection  by the Empire, -and 
through  their  alertness  will  undoubtedly  soon  find  new 
and perhaps even more profitable fields of  operation.512 
At the same time both Warschauer  and others before 
and  after him  made  a  number  of  substitute  proposals 
to be applied to those of  the existing banks which receive 
deposits.  Most important among these are the following: 
The proportion of  deposits, in so far as they are savings 
deposits,j13 to  the  share  capital-in  other  words,  the 
maximum amount of  deposits a bank might be permitted 
to receive should be fixed by  law at about  200 per cent 
of  the share capital, as against 50 per cent, which is the 
legal maximum for mortgage banks, since the smaller the 
working  capital the  less  secured  were  the rights of  the 
creditors. 
Furthermore,  the  principle  of  publicity  should  be 
adopted  more  largely  than  heretofore  with  regard  to 
"  savings  deposits "  (Spareinlagen)  ,  which  should  be 
stated  separately in  the balance  sheets  either  by a11514 
banks,  banking  associations  with  limited  liability,  and National  Monetary  Commission 
mutual credit societies1515  or  by such professional deposi- 
taries, who receive the funds of  the general public t~  the 
extent of  50 per cent over and above their own invested 
capital, who  carry  on  a  flotation  and  speculation  busi- 
ness,  or  who  participate  in  industrial  undertakings,jlB 
which would  again be inclusive of  all present-day banks 
and even bankers.  All of  them should be held to publish 
quarterly (as proposed by Count v. Arnim-Muskau before 
the Bourse Law Committee under date of  March 10, 1896) 
or  monthly  reports,  the form  of  which should be  fixed 
by  law, and  which  should  also state the percentage of 
savings deposits to share capital. 
These summary balance sheets should state: 
(a) The total amounts of  undertakings or flotations on 
own or  outside account. 
(b)  The total liabilities on  the date of  the statement 
on account of  participations or undertakings of  any kind 
whatever. 
(c)  The amounts of  stock held  apart from securities of 
other  classes. 
(d)  The amounts used for contango or collateral credit. 
(e)  The total liabilities incurred through the hypothec- 
ation or "  carrying over " (Reportierung) of  securities and 
participations owned by the bank or through the hypothe- 
cation or "carrying over " of  securities and participations 
owned by outsiders. 
Other  proposals  include the  demand,  either  that the 
savings deposits, as in the case of  the national banks in 
the United States, should be granted a prior lien as over 
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other creditors  or else that a certain percentage of  the 
deposits should  be  invested  in  a  special  manner  to be 
prescribed  by  law. 
Under  this  head  comes  the recent  proposal  made  by 
Heiligenstadt,  the  president  of  the  Prussian  Zentral- 
genossenschaftskasse  (Central  Bank  of  Mutual  Credit 
Societies).  Without  desiring to prejudice further neces- 
sary legal enactments, and pointing to American regula- 
tions, he demands that at least a beginning of  legal regu- 
lations  be  made  by  requiring  that  "whoever  makes  a 
profession"  of  lending  or  administering  moneys  shall 
maintain at the Reichsbank a cash reserve of  I  to 2  per 
cent of  all funds held on current account or dep0sit.5~8 
This  proposal,  which  was  advocated  on  nearly  the 
same grounds also  by  two  experts  before  the  bank  in- 
quiry  commission, is  not  based  on  the  claim  that  the 
German credit banks  do not present sufficient safety for 
their  deposits, but  primarily  on  the  consideration that 
mainly through  the fault  of  the  banks, the  proportion 
in  German trade and commerce as a whole  of  invested 
capital  to the  necessary liquid working  capital and the 
proportion  of  the  liquid  assets  of  the  banks  to  their 
liabilities, which  represent  their  working  capital, is  un- 
sound and should be improved. 
At the same time, and perhaps even in the first place, 
the proposed reform, together with other measures, advo- 
cated  by  him,  is  intended,  as  Heiligenstadt  expressly 
states1519  "to.  strengthen  the  operating  resources of  the National  Monetary  Commission 
. 
Reichsbank " and to raise it to the position  of  "  steward 
of  the  national  reserve,"  with  the  view  of  providing 
greater  security  for  the  constantly  increasing  deposits 
on current-account  and other bank  deposits.5z0 
It is probably in this sense that the resolution  of  the 
Tax and Economic Reform Association  (Vereinigung der 
Steuer- und Wzrtschaftsreformer) dated February I 3 and 14, 
1906,~~~  is to be interpreted, in which  the imperial  chan- 
cellor is requested  "to provide for the legal regulation  of 
the modes of  securing the deposits at the Reichsbank  (!) 
and other banks, especially in view  of  the growing pro- 
portions of  the giro and deposit business ever since 1875, 
that is, the year of  the foundation of  the Reichsbank. 
So far as the Reichstag  is concerned it confined itself 
until the present to point out the presumed insecurity of 
the deposits by passing  on June  17, 1896, the following 
resolution, proposed by one of  its committees: 
Whereas  the professional  use  by  banks and business  men  of  current 
account- and other deposits urgently demands protective measures in the 
interests of  the depositors,  the Chancellor is requested to inquire into the 
subject with the view of  ascertaining how such measures can best be taken, 
to examine the principles underlying the present draft and the accompany- 
ing  report,  and  to lay before the House as soon as practicable a bill in 
regulation of  the matter. 
4. CONSIDERATIONS  ON WHICH  THE FIRST-NAMED REFORM  PROPOSALS  ARE 
BASED. 
Before proceeding to a critical discussion of  the individ- 
ual reform proposals, it seems  proper to inquire whether 
reforms in the field of  bank deposits-that  is, protective 
measures in the interests of  depositors-are  at all neces- 
sary or even urgent  in the present  state of  affairs or in 
view of  past experience.  It  is  such measures  that are 
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advocated  in the first  batch of  proposals, mentioned  on 
page  550 and following and in the Reichstag resolution. 
(a) SUPPOSED  SUPERIORITY  OF THE ENGLISH  BANKING  SYSTEM. 
It has been asserted repeatedly that the English banking 
system, with its division of  labor between  deposit banks 
proper and other banks engaged also in the flotation and 
underwriting business, necessarily presents a larger degree 
of  security for depositors, as compared with the German 
"  mixed " system.  For  the underwriting  and  flotation 
business,  it is argued, as is amply proved by the experi- 
ence of  the various countries, carries with it great dangers, 
which in the case of  the regular banking business do not 
exist at all, or at least, only to smaller  extent. 
As a matter of  fact, however, it has been incontestably 
proven,  especially  by  Ad.  Weber  and Edgar  Jaff6  that 
it is precisely the English deposit banks-not  to mention 
the most recent experience of  the American note banks- 
which despite their theoretic superiority have in practice 
shown the most serious evils and abuses. 
It  is  true,  that  the  English  joint-stock  companies, 
conforming  to theory,  have  abstained  in  a  direct  way 
from  flotations  and  the  underwriting  business  as  well 
as from bourse  speculation.  But this  very  fact  causes 
another  great  evil, namely, that the banks  have  never 
shown any interest  in  the newly founded  companies or 
in the securities issued by these companies, while it is a 
distinct advantage of  the German system, that the Ger- 
man  banks,  even  if  only  in  the interests  of  their  own 
issue credit, have been  keeping a continuous watch  over 
the development  of  the companies, which  they founded. National  Monetary  Commission 
On the other hand the English banks have been promoting 
stock exchange  speculation,  company flotations  and se- 
curity issues to an alarming  extent  by their  practice of 
placing  at the disposal  of  the larger  jobbers and dealers 
their daily surplus money against the hypothecation of  se- 
curities of  all kinds."2  This went so far that the Journal 
of  the Institute of  Bankers referring to  this practice in its 
issue of  October, 1899, page 409, used the following strong 
terms: "  Nearly the whole of  the professional speculation 
on the Stock Exchange is carried on with bank money." 
Among  the  securities  hypothecated  during  the  last 
decade there was an enormous number of  gold-mine and 
American railway shares, which during critical times can 
either not be realized  at all  or  only  at great  sacrifice; 
thus it is just in critical times that the joint-stock banks 
have  had  to fall  back  for  assistance  on  the  Bank  of 
England.623  During  critical  times  therefore  the  joint- 
stock  banks  have  to  depend  upon  the  "single-reserve 
system,"  that  is,  upon  a  system,  which  even  English 
authorities have long ago condemned as inadequate and 
dangerous, the more so as the Bank of  England  in turn 
is  lending  out  the  funds  deposited  with  it.524 It  is 
these  large  sums,  indirectly placed  at the  disposal  of 
the stock exchange and speculators, which  in the state- 
ments  of  the  joint-stock  banks  constitute  the largest 
part  of  the item "money  at call  and  short  notice." 
In Germany these sums would  figure under  the head of 
"Reports  and  Lombards,"  whereas  Caesar  Straus, 
strangely identified  them with  the  item  ' Kupons  und 
Sorten"  (coupons  and  specie)  of  the German  balance 
sheets, and therefore regards them as perfectly harmless.5as 
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It is these  amounts loaned by the deposit banks and 
looking  so  innocent  in  the  summary  balance  sheets, 
which  are mainly  responsible  for  the conditions, which 
Edgar  Jaff6  527  characterizes  in the following caustic ex- 
pressions : 
Nowhere  are there so many  swindling  prornotions  as on  the London 
Stock Exchange, nowhere else has the general public lost such enormous 
sums. 
On the other hand it is  also a fact  628  which I believe 
to have amply proven  in another work  of  mine,"g  that 
during the great crises, through which England, like other 
countries, has had to pass, an alarmingly large number of 
deposit banks have failed. 
It may also be shown that in other respects as well the 
much-vaunted merits of  the English joint-stock banks are 
but illusory.  The paid-up capital of  the English deposit 
banks is extremely small, both taken by itself  as well  as 
in proportion to the liabilities.  In 1904 it amounted for 
87 deposit banks to 65,250,000 pounds sterling in round 
figures, equal to 1,305,000,ooo marks,  or  an average of 
only 15,000,ooo marks per bank.  On the other hand the 
proportion  of  surplus funds to the paid-up  capital,  but 
not to the total liabilities is shown to be exceedingly high, 
ranging between  one-half  to two-thirds  and even  up to 
IOO per cent.  This is the sole cause, why even with small 
gross  profits  the banks  have  been  able  to  declare  the 
high  dividends  (on their  paid-up capital, of  course) to 
which Warschauer refers, though advocating a much larger 
paid-up capital for his proposed Imperial deposit bank. 
Finally Jaff6531  showed that "with the exception  of  a 
small number of  the very best banks, which have a cash- 
reserve of  5 to 10  per cent, the English deposit banks kept National  Monetary  Commission 
no amounts on hand, which may be regarded as reserves 
in the above sense."  In view of  the large amount of  time 
deposits and  deposits on  current  account  and the small 
paid-up capital of  the English deposit banks, Jaff6 rightly 
considers it impossible to class under this head the item 
"money  at  call"  (contango-and  other  loans  to  bill- 
brokers and on  exchange), since a portion  of  the money 
lent out on the stock exchange could not be rea!ized  in 
the event of  a panic. 
Neither can the item "cash"  (i. e., cash on hand plus 
credits at the Bank of  England), the only one that niight 
be regarded as reserve, be classed as such in its entirety, 
since part of  it is absolutely necessary for the daily use of 
the  hanks  themselves.  But  even  this,  he  emphasizes 
expressly,  is  probably  too  favorable  a  picture,  since, 
according to his experience, a large number of  the English 
deposit  banks-and  some  of  the largest  banks  are  the 
worst offenders in this regard-in  order to make the item 
"  cash on hand " appear as large as possible in their public 
statements, withdraw from the market large amounts at 
the end of  each month and particularly at the end of  each 
half  year.532 It may  be  said,  though,  that this state- 
ment no longer holds true for the most recent time, since 
under  the pressure of  public  opinion  and  following the 
example of  the leading institutions, nearly all the English 
deposit banks maintain at present  reserves in the above 
sense which amount from 10 to 15 per cent of  the liabili- 
ties.  It may thus be seen how far the practical operation 
of  the English system justifies the enth.usiasm for it as a 
model to be adopted by us. 
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We shall now take up the discussion of  the reform pro- 
posals, which  start with  the assertion that the German 
banks do not accord sufficient security to their depositors, 
and  examine  the validity  of  the  underlying  assertions 
that in Germany, as distinct from England, the propor- 
tion  of  share capital and reserves to liabilities, also the 
proportion of  liquid assets to immediately or shortly due 
liabilities, is far too small; further, that deposits are used 
in Germany for syndicate business and stock speculation, 
and finally that the combination of  the deposit business 
with  the underwriting  and  issuing  business  has  caused 
great injury to the public. 
We shall start with the first and most prevalent charge. 
(b)  TIIE ALLEGED  SMALL OWN  RESOURCES  (SHARE  CAPITAL  AND  SURPLUS) 
OF THE GERMAN CREDIT BANKS AS COMPARED WITH THEIR LIABILITIES. 
The 169 German  credit banks with  a  capital  each  of 
~,ooo,ooo  marks and over, of  which nearly all are holding 
deposits  (totaling about 2,750,000,ooo marks) separately 
mentioned  in  their  balance  sheets, show  under  date of 
December 3 I, I go8 
Marks. 
Share capital.. ...................................... 2,646, ooo, ooo 
Surplus  .............................................  607,000,ooo 
Total own resources. ...........................  3,253, WO,  om 
As  against these items there stand- 
Marks. 
Credits on current account, including acceptances. ........ 4,510,000, om 
Deposits  ...............................................  2,746,000,  ooo 
Or total liabilities. ................................  7,256, ooo, ooo 
In other words, the own resources of these 169 banks con- 
stituted almost one-half of  their total liabilities, including 
acceptances and deposits, whereas in England the paid-up National  Monetary  Commission 
capital constituted only about 10 per cent of  deposits of 
all kinds (fremde Gelder).  533 
The  2,  ~~6,000,ooo  marks  of  deposits  in  the German 
credit banks were  more than fully covered by  the share 
capital and the surplus.  534 
As far as the eight great banks are concerned, the pro- 
portion between deposits of  all kinds  (liabilities) to share 
capital and to share capital plus surplus, or to the bank's 
own operating capital (eigenes werbendes Kapital) ,  may be 
seen from the following table 
Share cap-  Liabilities in per 
ital plus  Deposits  cent of  the- 
Share cap-  (Frende 
Banks.  ital (1,000  Gelder) 
(1,000  Share 
(1.000 
marks).  =loo.  -100. 
Deutsche Bank. . . . . .  .  . .  .  . . . 
Dresdner Bank. . . . . . . .  .  .  . .  . 
Disconto-Gesellschaft . .  . .  . .  .  . 
Bank fiir Handel U. Industrie. 
Schaafihausen'scher Bankve- 
rein. . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . 
Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft 
Comm.-U. Discontobank. . . . 
Nationalbank  fiix  Deutsch- 
land. .  . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . 
It goes  without  saying that the own  resources  of  the 
German credit banks have grown far less than the liabil- 
ities, for it must be borne in mind that during periods of 
depression, when  only  small dividends were  paid,  fresh 
issues of  stock were  altogether  out of  question.  At all 
events, there was  no  inducement  then for working  with 
excessively large capital  on  which  no  adequate returns 
could be expected. 
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The  surplus  funds alone  of  all  credit  banks  steadily 
increased from 12.90 per cent of  the share capital in 1885 
to 22.90 per cent in 1908, amounting then to 6o~,o~o,ooo 
marks.  In the case of the Berlin banks these percentages 
grew from 17  per cent in 1885 to 29.10 per cent in 1908. 
It is my opinion, however, that this splendid showing 
is  due  not  so  much  to the superiority  of  our  banking 
methods,  as  is  thought  by  Ed.  Wagon,535  as  to  the 
excellence of  our corporation laws.  These surplus funds 
contribute at present more than  1% per cent of  the divi- 
dend earnings of all the banks and I.  73 per cent (as against 
1.87 per  cent in  1906) of  the dividend  earnings  of  the 
Berlin banks. 
It should be stated, though, that while the share capi- 
tal and surplus are "guaranties,"  and while the increase 
in their size improves the financial condition of  the bank 
and diminishes the danger  of  bankruptcy, yet  they,  as 
well  as the part of  the debits which  is not  required  to 
meet the claims of creditors, are on the main  guaranties 
for the stockholders. 
(C)  THE  LIQUIDITY OP THE RESOURCES  OP  TIIE  GERMAN  CREDIT  BANKS- 
COEPPICIENT OP LIQUIDITY  (Liquiditatsschlii~~el). 
The  guaranties  for  the  creditors,  especially  for  the 
depositors,  are  represented  in  the first  place  by  those 
assets in which the capital of  the bank is invested, since 
the creditors must have assurance not  merely of  the sol- 
vency of  the bank, but even more so, that their demand 
claims will be paid upon presentation and that the other 
claims which are due on stated terms will be met when due. 
In other words, the security of the creditors, especially of National  Monetary  Commission 
the  depositors,  depends  primarily upon  the amount of 
liquid  assets  which  the  bank  possesses  and  the mode 
of  their  investment.536 
The liquid assets for  securing the demand  and short- 
tern1 liabilities must be large enough and of  such a kind 
that the bank  may  be  able to pay  without  delay those 
liabilities, the presentation of  which might  be  expected 
during a  crisis.  The question  as to what  percentage  is 
likely to be presented for payment during a crisis can be 
answered only according to rules of  pr0bability,~~7  differ- 
ing  according to circumstances (time, state of  the mar- 
ket, etc.), which  are learned only from practical experi- 
ence, change with it, and can not therefore be fixed by 
law.  Similarly only experience during a long period can 
teach what kind  of  assets may  be regarded in a general 
way as liquid assets, though it is much easier to deter- 
mine those which can not be so regarded. 
It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that there is no fixed 
method of  calculating the degree of  liquidity applicable 
at all  times  and  places  and  to  all  institutions.  Any 
method  may  and  will  be  objected  to in  one  point  or 
another.  There is the further drawback that the manner 
in which the balance  sheets  are drawn up  have varied 
greatly, at least until the most recent period.  Moreover, 
there is no  means of  telling to what extent the various 
items which, like bills, contango, gdvances on collateral, 
may be regarded generally as liquid assets, contain amounts 
that are not liquid, and inversely, to what extent an item 
which, as a rule, does not  come under  the general head 
of  liquid assets does not comprise, in any concrete instance, 
consols or  other securities which can be quickly realized 
under all circumstances or  at least during normal times. 
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Finally, in  calculating  the degree of  liquidity,  exact 
and correct results may be obtained only if  a distinction 
is made between the daily liabilities, including commer- 
cial deposits, and those which fall due after some time, 
since  it is  only  the former  which  require. security  by 
means of  quick assets, while the latter nlay be properly 
secured by  those  assets which  will  be realized  on  some 
future date.538 
After  these  preliminary  remarks  we  may  state that, 
according to the method  most commonly used  in calcu- 
lating  the  liql~idity of  bank  resources,  the  liabilities 
include the following items : 
Credits on current account, including acceptances, 
Deposits (Depositen) , 
Claims to net profits, undivided at the end of  the busi- 
ness year ; 
while the liquid assets include: 
Cash on hand, 
Contango  and  loans  secured  by  collateral  (the two, 




Debits on current account are not included among the 
liquid assets. 
There is no doubt that this method, which is followed 
by  the  daily  press, especially  the  Frankfurter Zeitung, 
and special periodic publications, as the Deutscher Oekon- 
omist, is extremely schematic, as no  distinction is drawn 
in the case  of  credits  on  current  account  and  deposits 
between those claims which are daily due and those which National  Monetary  Commission 
fall due at a later date.  Nor is it borne in mind that as a 
rule, even during critical times, the majority of  the clients 
will forward to the bank at maturity funds to secure the 
payment of  their acceptances.  The scheme is also faulty 
for the reason  that it includes  among  liquid  assets  all 
securities-an  altogether too optimistic an assumption- 
while it excludes all debits on current account, notwith- 
standing that even during critical times a great number of 
the debtors may be expected to pay up their due debts 
within reasonable time after demand. 
All  these  faults  of  classification  are,  however,  of  no 
serious  account, since  the  errors are  not  only in  favor 
of  greater liquidity  (as, for instance, when  securities are 
included  among the liquid assets) but  also  against  its0 
(as, for instance, when all debits on current account are 
excluded from  among the liquid  assets  and  all  accept- 
ances are included among the liabilities), and thus com- 
pensate each other to a certain extent; also because the 
same methods of  calculation are used  in the comparison 
of the more recent with the older balance sheets. 
This can be proved arithmetically by changing slightly 
the schedule so as to avoid the errors named, for instance, 
by  omitting  acceptances from the liabilities or consider- 
ing them only to the extent of  one-third of  the total, by 
including at the same time among the liquid assets debits 
on current account to the extent of  one-half  or one-third 
of  the total, and by including not the total securities, but 
only  one-third  or  10 per  cent of  that total.  It will  be 
seen that even with such a change of the schedule very 
similar results will be obtained. 
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According to the customary schedule the coefficient of 
liquidity-that  is,  the  proportion  of  the  immediately 
available  or  quick  assets  to  all  liabilities, without  dis- 
tinction between those daily due or those maturing after 
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The proportion has grown constantly worse during the 
last  fifteen years  (except for  the years  1896, 1897, and 
1902) UP  to 1907, and it is mainly this fact which supplies 
grist to the mills of  the heterogeneous elements opposing 
our present banking system.  There can be, however, no 
doubt that this falling off  can be traced on the one hand 
to  the  strong  concentration  movement  in  banking  and 
industry, particularly characteristic of  this period, and on 
the other to the unexpectedly large demands of  industry 
and the accompanying growth of  speculation.  It would 
not  be  difficult  to trace  in  detail  the  influence  of  the 
above  factors  through  the  growth  of  debits  on  current 
account and the long-term credits.  The working of  the 
first factor, particularly in the shape of the so-called com- 
munities of  interest, is discernible in the increase of  the National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
permanent participations; the two last factors are mainly 
responsible for the  growth of  debits on current account 
and  of  acceptances.  The  expectation  seems,  however, 
justified  that with  the  abatement  of  the  concentration 
movement  and  the  strengthening  of  the  numerous 
branches, agencies, etc., founded by the banks during the 
period, all of  which make large demands upon the parent 
institutions until they are able to stand on their own feet, 
these  items  will  show  some  reduction.  An  adverse 
change in industrial activity may contribute to the same 
result while causing a similar reduction of  the bank dis- 
count  and  general interest rate.  The picture  presented 
by the balance sheets of  the banks must necessarily reflect 
that of  the entire national economy, since the banks are 
the cash keepers of  the nation.  It is, therefore, hardly in 
accord with the truth to speak of  or  object to the banks 
as the  "leaders of  national  enterprise"  or  of  domestic 
economic activity. 
As it is the above table shows that the proportion of  the 
quick assets of  the banks to their liabilities or the coeffi- 
cient  of  liquidity  of  their  resources  even  for  the worst 
year of  the period  (1907) was  60 per  cent for all credit 
banks,  taken  as  a  wh0le,~~1  and  63  per  cent  for  the 
Berlin banks.  That is to say, the liabilities of  the Ger- 
man credit banks  to the extent of  almost two-thirds  of 
the total were secured  542 by liquid resources.543 
The coefficient of  liquidity in  1907 for 11 great Berlin 
banks has been calculated by Heinemann in an article in 
the Nation  (No. 32, dated May  7,  1898) at 61 per  cent, 
while for I 906 544  (by disregarding the item of  securities)  545 
he reckons it  at  a little over 50 per cent.  Similarly A. Kop- 
pel, writing for the Plutus of  May  26,  1906, figures out a 
decrease of liquidity for the 5 largest banks from 75  per 
cent at the end of  1890 to 50 per cent at the end of  1905. 
In this calculation he fails, however, to include securities 
among  the  assets, while  including among the  liabilities 
even the so-called Avale (i. e., bank sureties for the pay- 
ment of  railway freights, excise, and import duties). 
An  article  of  the Frankfurter  Zeitung, dated April 4, 
1907 (No. 93), discussing the coefficient of  liquidity for 45 
banks (g Berlin great banks and 36 provincial banks, each 
of  them with  a  minimum  capital of  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks), 
with a total nominal capital of  2,198,800,000 marks, fol- 
lows the customary method (without, however, considering 
the net profits) and places this coefficient at 67.8 per cent 
for the 8 Berlin great banks, arriving thus at the same 
proportion  of  two-thirds  security  for  the  outstanding 
liabilities. 
Finally, the  Deutscher  Oekonomist  of  November  23, 
1907, page 561, by using the customary method of  calcu- 
lation, but omitting acceptances from the liabilities and 
securities from the liquid assets, places the coefficient of 
liquidity  on  December  31,  1906, for  143 banks,  with  a 
minimum capital of  ~,ooo,ooo  marks each, also at about 
two-thirds  (credits  on  current  account  and  deposits, 
6,304,ooo,ooo marks;  cash on hand, bills, and  loans  on 
collateral, 4,043,000,ooo marks).  Almost the same result 
would  have been  attained  by  reckoning  in  the case of 
these  143 banks the acceptances among the liabilities at 
the  ratio  of  one-third  of  the  total  and  placing  with 
deposits and  net profits  the  credits  on current  account 
at the ratio of  one-half  of  the total, i. e., by considering National  Morcetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
merely the immediate  liabilities  (as  distinct  from those 
maturing  after  some  time),  according  to  the  average 
ratio between the two and by including among the liquid 
assets, besides cash on hand, bills, and loans on collateral, 
including  contango, also one-third of  the securities, but 
excluding  from the liquid  assets  any  debits on current 
account.  The amounts thus obtained  are  7,394,000,000 
marks  of  liabilities, as  against  4,406,000,ooo marks  of 
quick assets. 
These  results  tally  fairly  well  with  the coefficient  of 
liquidity of  62.76 per  cent, which Waldemar  Mueller  as- 
sumed for 45 banks with a minimum capital of  IO,OOO,OOO 
marks each, at  the Hamburg bankers' convention, although 
he counted among the liquid assets one-half instead of  one- 
third of  the securities and omitted the net profits, but, on 
the other hand, placed among the liabilities all credits on 
current  account.  By excluding the total of  acceptances 
from the liabilities, which I regard, however, as improper, 
he obtained an even higher coefficient of  liquidity of  81.92 
per cent. 
It will  hardly be  denied that the coefficient  of  about 
two-thirds obtained by the various methods, even for the 
worst year, unless the methods used were altogether arbi- 
trary, is sufficiently satisfactory, although in this regard 
conditions  in  the  English  banks,  for  reasons  already 
stated, are far more favorable.  But even for the German 
credit banks  the coefficient would  be far more favorable 
if  we compared their quick assets merely with their imme- 
diate liabilities.  This, however, is  impracticable, at least 
for the present, since the balance  sheets of  many  banks 
contain no information on that point. 
The composition of  the liquid assets may  likewise  be 
regarded, on the whole, as satisfactory. 
On  December  31,  1908,  cash  on  hand  in  all  banks 
amounted to 537,500,000 marks,546  i.  e., almost to 8 per 
cent of  the 7,256,000,000 marks, the combined credits on 
current  account  and  deposits,  exclusive of  acceptances. 
In England, as we  saw, even the best  joint-stock  banks 
show a cash reserve of  only 5 to 10 per cent, whereas the 
majority of  the banks have no  amounts which  may  be 
regarded as reserves in the sense used by Edgar Jaffg.  In 
the case of  the German banks, the item cash is supple- 
mented by the bill holdings,  which on an average 547  present 
a  very  satisfactory amount, amounting to 2,742,400,000 
marks, on the above date, so that on December 31, 1908, 
the items  cash and bills alone constituted  3,279,900,000 
marks, as against deposits of  2,745,800,000 marks. 
The statement was  made  and assiduously propagated 
in the foreign press that part of  the funds entrusted to the 
banks, and even part of  the deposits, are being  used in 
syndicate operations  or  speculation.  This is  refuted  by 
the mere fact that at the end of  1908 the combined total 
of  the items-securities,  mortgages, and syndicate partici- 
pations-in  the case of  the above-mentioned  143 (169 in 
1908) credit banks, with a minimum capital of  ~,ooo,ooo 
marks  each, was  1,298,052,000 marks, or  less  than  one- 
third of  the combined capital and surplus funds of  these 
banks, viz, 3,253,673,000  marks.54s About two-thirds more 
of  this amount would therefore have to be invested in this 
manner  before  there  could  be  any  talk that outsiders' 
funds, not to speak of  deposits, were  invested  in specula- 
tive securities or participations. National  Monetary  Commission 
The above, it is hoped, will afford sufficient proof  that 
neither  the  amount  nor  the  composition  of  the  liquid 
resources, nor the coefficient of  liquidity afford any cause 
for demanding the "reform" of  our banks for the sake 
of  increasing the security of  the deposits.  Finally,  the 
statement, that the combination of  the deposit business 
with the promoting and issuing business has led to grave 
losses, is correct only to the extent that in a number  of 
failures  of  credit  banks  as  well  as  cooperative  credit 
societies and private banking firms depositors have also 
suffered.  So far  as  private firms were concerned, these 
failures were brought  about by the criminal acts of  the 
bank  management,  which  had  no  connection  whatever 
with  promoting  or  issuing  transactions.  Similar  expe- 
rience, only on a larger scale, was had with the English 
deposit banks and is not likely to be avoided through any 
legal regulations. 
The figures of  such losses as given by Otto Warschauer 549 
brought down to the year  1907 by the managing partner 
of  the Disconto  - Gesellschaf  t , Dr. Arthur  Salornonsohn, 
were presented to the bankers' convention at Hamburg.550 
These  data,  the  accuracy  and  completeness  of  which 
will  hardly  be  doubted,  relate  to  nine  credit  banks, 
nearly all of  them with very small capital, and two other 
institutions, the Hannoverscher Hypothekenverein and the 
Spar-und Vorschussbank, in Dresden, which either at the 
opening of  bankruptcy proceedings or before were coop- 
erative societies.  The total losses sustained by depositors 
by reason of  all these failures during the fourteen years 
between 1894 and 1907 are calculated at about24,ooo,ooo 
marks.  It is rather difficult to ascertain the proportion 
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which these losses bore to the total deposits of  the German 
credit banks. 
It would not be correct to compare the total losses with 
the amounts  due  to the depositors  on  December  31  of 
each of  these fourteen  years, since the amount for each 
successive  year  includes those  for  the preceding  years. 
Even if  only the amount for December 31, 1906 (2,700,- 
ooo,ooo marks), were taken the total would be altogether 
too small.  For what we are concerned with are the total 
amounts deposited during each year, and these naturally 
will be much larger in view of  the withdrawals, which are 
especially  heavy  during  the  last  months  of  the  year. 
This maximum amount of  2,  ~oo,ooo,ooo  marks represents, 
therefore, a total far below the actual amounts deposited. 
On  the other hand, the total loss of  24,000,000 marks, 
as  estimated  by  Salomonsohn is  probably  far too high, 
since  according  to  his  explanation  the  claims  of  the 
depositors  were  figured  froni the last  bank  statements 
preceding  the  failures.  In  many  cases,  however,  the 
opening of bankruptcy proceedings is preceded by a run, 
during which part of  the deposits is  repaid.  It is plain, 
therefore,  that the amount  of  deposits--of  which  only 
part  represents  savings  deposits-is  estimated  too  low, 
while the losses are estimated too high.  But even if  we 
accept both figures without change and divide the total 
loss of  24,000,000 marks by the total deposits of  2,700,- 
ooo,ooo marks it will be seen that the average loss on all 
bank deposits in the German Empire during the fourteen 
years from 1894 to 1907  was  about nine-tenths  of  I  per 
cent; in other words, of  every IOO marks deposited during 
the  fourteen  years,  from  1894  to  1907,  not  quite  go National  Monetary  Commission 
pfennigs was  lost.  This period includes the crisis years 
of  1901 and  1906, during which the German banks and 
banking system, on the whole, proved their utmost sound- 
ness despite all difficulties and dangers.  It is true that 
subsequently,  in  1907  and  1908, new  important  cases 
occurred, when banking institutions which were receiving 
deposits failed and the depositors suffered losses.  Accord- 
ing to my  own  inquiries these cases  include 29  private 
banking establishments,  I I  registered  cooperative credit 
societies with limited liability, I industrial bank, I savngs 
and  credit  bank,  2  loan  and  credit  societies, I people's 
bank, not registered as  a limited credit society, and only 
2 credit banks, viz, the Solinger Bank in Solingen and the 
Bonner Bank fur  Handel und Gewerbe in B~nn.~~l 
After  the  foregoing  discussion  it would  seem  rather 
unreasonable to  maintain  that deposits  are being  used 
for syndicate participations  or  speculative operations or 
that "  grave losses " have been caused to German deposi- 
tors by our banks and banking system, and to demand in 
the same breath the introduction of  special deposit banks 
or special safeguards, the more so, as failures have by no 
means been rare even among the special deposit banks in 
England.  It is not surprising that the constant reitera- 
tion of  such statements, hurtful to German credit abroad, 
in  the long  run finds  a  loud  echo  in  foreign  countries, 
which are only too anxious for such news, and that even 
the London Economist could treat his readers in a recent 
issue to the news that the German banks were "  investing 
their deposits in mortgages." 
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11.  CRITICISM  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL  REFORM  PROPOSALS. 
I. THE  CREATION  OF  A  CENTRAL  PRIVATE  DEPOSIT  BANK  OR  OF  A  GOV- 
ERNMENT  DEPOSIT  BANK  FOR  THE GERMAN  EMPIRE  AND OP  SIMILAR 
DEPOSIT  BANKS  FOR  EACH  OF  THE  GERMAN  STATES. 
In  order  to  bring  German  banking  into  conformity 
with the English model, Caesar Straus proposes the crea- 
tion  of  a  private central  deposit  bank  and  Otto War- 
schauer the establishment of  a government deposit bank 
for  the German  Empire  alongside of  a  series of  deposit 
banks for the individual States. 
In view  of  the above discussion and the German  and 
English experience in this field, the change does not seem 
justified in the interests of  greater security for the depos- 
itors.  Furthermore,  the  proposed  changes  are  either 
impracticable or  dangerous.  Straus's idea  of  a  central 
(einheitliche) deposit  bank  is  impracticable, even if  only 
for the  reason  that  neither  the  German  great  banks, 
nor the other banks or bankers, are likely to join  in the 
foundation of  such a central bank, since, being more con- 
servative in their  business views, they believe  that, con- 
trary to Warschauer's calculations, such a bank  for the 
present and a considerable time to come is not likely to 
prove profitable. 
The idea is impossible of  realization, also, because the 
Reichsbank, for obvious reasons, will never agree to trans- 
act  the business  of  the  deposit  bank  in  those  places, 
where  the  former  only, but  not  tke  latter, may  have 
branches of  its own.  If  I am rightly informed the pro- 
posal  met with scant favor at the time, just  in the last- 
mentioned quarter. National  Monetary  Commission 
For  various  reasons  the  Warschauer  proposal  of  an 
imperial special government deposit bank, either singly or 
in conjunction with like banks for the individual States, 
is  likely, at least for the time being, to share the same 
fate."3  In the first place our  authorities  would hardly 
disregard the reasoning that it would not do to substitute 
bodily  a  foreign  credit system, which  owes  its develop- 
ment  to special local conditions, for a domestic system, 
which is no less the result of  peculiar conditions at  home. 
It  will also be recognized that our banks have had a con- 
siderable  share  in  the  brilliant  economic  development 
during the last decades, and that, therefore, any attempt 
to paralyze their activity is likely to inflict grave injury 
on our national  industry.  There will  be the more hesi- 
tation about making the change when it is borne in mind 
that the coming decades will  undoubtedly bring  a very 
severe struggle for our national industry against foreign 
competition,  in which the unimpaired  assistance  of  our 
banks will be needed more than ever before. 
Nor is it likely that there will be much sympathy with 
any  plan  that is  likely to diminish  the "highly  appre- 
ciated" and always welcome ability of  our banks to con- 
tribute their share of  taxation.  In the case of  the Reichs- 
bank,  which has had to pass  through  a  severe struggle 
with  the  competing  note  banks,  there  would  be  the 
additional  danger  that the newly  established  state de- 
posit banks might interfere with and thwart its discount 
policy.  That such a danger exists, is shown by conditions 
in England,554  where  the  Bank  of  England's  own  bill 
business  has  been  declining  for  some  years  past,  and 
where the bank, owing  largely to competition  with  the 
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large deposit banks, is compelled to discount bills at the 
prevailing market rate, which in most cases comes nowhere 
near the official discount rate.  It may also be shown that 
the Bank  of  England no  longer controls the market for 
loans  on  collateral,  as  the large  deposit  banks  find  it 
possible to supply the market with vast amounts forsuch 
loans and are thus in  a  position  to oppose successfully 
any increase of  the discount rate which the Bank of  Eng- 
land might  deem expedient.  Thus it has come to pass 
that of  all the functions devolving upon it, and of  which 
no one can he eliminated without  injury to the commu- 
nity, the Bank of  England exercises successfully only one, 
viz, the regulation of  the currency. 
This also  proves  the error of  the writers  who  holds55 
that  "no  conflict  of  interests  between  the Reichsbank 
and a private central deposit bank need be feared," that, 
on the contrary, "they have common interests," and that 
both  institutions,  with  the Reichsbank  as  "the leading 
institution,"  would  "cooperate  in  maintaining and sup- 
porting the proper monetary circulation " of  the country. 
The establishment  of  state deposit  banks  would, more- 
over, involve a radical change for the worse, and not for 
the better. of  the entire German banking system. 
It is not likely that the German credit banks will  re- 
sort to any measures of  self-protection during the early 
stages, believing, no  doubt, that for some time at least, 
their deposit business will not be seriously endangered by 
the fresh competition.  Should, however, the founding of 
government deposit banks, or even a more energetic quest 
after deposits on the part of the Seehandlung and other 
state institutions, come to be regarded as a serious danger National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
to their cwn deposit business, the credit banks would, as a 
matter of course and of  self-protection, have to enter the 
competitive struggle with all the means at their disposal. 
In such a case they  would proceed  to transform, as far 
as  practicable,  their  present  deposit  departments  into 
separate  deposit  banks  or  to  found  new  ones,  and  in 
either case take over or keep the control,556  management, 
and shares of  the new deposit banks. 
We should then have an imperial deposit bank, deposit 
banks  for the individual  States, and a  large number  of 
competing private deposit banks, all of  which, including 
the state and private banks, would be compelled to cover 
the country with a network of  branches.  Sooner or later 
all  these  institutions,  possibly  in  conjunction  with  the 
then surviving state note banks, would be found seriously 
hampering,  if  not  entirely  blocking, the discount  policy 
of  the  Reich~bank.~~~  This,  contrary  to  Ad.  Weber 
(op. cit., p. 262), we regard by no means as a "  cura pos- 
terior."  Such a picture of  the future is by no means ex- 
aggerated,  if  we  are  to  judge  by  English  experience. 
Warschauer's  proposal is based upon the erroneous view 
that our banking system is inferior to the English system 
and must  give  place  to the latter.  In order  to refute 
his views, it may suffice to state that for a long time the 
English have been  energetically demanding  a  reform of 
their  own  banking,  while  pronouncing  our  system  su- 
perior to their own, until their usual keenness of percep- 
tion became blunted by the agitation which had sprung up 
in  our own midst.  As  late as  July, 1906, the following 
expressions were  used  in  an  article  on  "The future of 
international banking,"  which  appeared in the Bankers' 
Magazine (No. 748, p. 51): 
"In Germany we  find a banking  policy which, though 
in  minor  points  borrowed  from  other  countries, differs 
essentially from all others in giving full expression to the 
national genius.  It is as scientific and thoroughly  coor- 
dinated as English banking is unscientific and haphazard. 
German banking does not stand aloof  from industry and 
commerce, as ours does.  The three are all closely asso- 
ciated.  They  have  a  common  understanding  and  a 
strong sentiment  of  solidarity." 
This  is  a  foreign  opinion.558 In  Germany  the mere 
fact that a hen is laying golden eggs suffices to call forth 
in many quarters the desire to have it killed. 
In view  of  the above considerations and the negative 
attitude assumed by the imperial chancellor at the open- 
ing of  the deliberations of  the bank  inquiry commission 
toward  the  proposals  to  change  by  law  our  existing 
mixed  banking  system,  it  would  seem  unnecessary  to 
repeat  again  the arguments  propounded  in  the second 
German  edition  of  this  work  (pp.  155-I~o),  that  the 
profits of  the new  central deposit bank, at least  during 
the early  period,  would  most  likely  be  very  moderate 
and not, as Warschauer  believes, 21-22  per  cent  ( !),  or 
at least  12 per  cent.55g 
It was shown above that our past experience does not 
justify  the demand  that priority  rights  be  granted  to 
depositors.  Such  a  demand,  even  if  better  founded, 
could hardly be conceded, as such a preferment of  depos- 
itors to other creditors  of  the bank, who  may  have en- 
trusted  their  cash  to  the  bank  in  current  account  or National  Monetary  Commission 
otherwise, would  be  a  death  blow  to the credit  of  the 
banks.  It may be also argued against it that the very 
conception of  deposits is not fixed either in theory or in 
practice and still less defined in law with regard to their 
manifold  and constantly  varying relations  to credits on 
current account, contango, etc.560 
3.  THE FIXING  OF  A  LEGAL  RATIO  BETWEEN  SAVINGS  DEPOSITS  AND 
THE  SHARE  CAPITAL. 
The objection  to a fixed  ratio between share capital 
and deposits "in so far as they are savings deposits"  is 
directed  mainly against TVar~chauer,~~~  who  advocates  a 
scheme similar to that legally  prescribed  for  our  mort- 
gage banks. 
This scheme would be unacceptable even if  the words 
"in so  far as they  are savings deposits"  were  omitted. 
As a matter of  fact,  while it might have been desirable to 
fix such a ratio in the case of  the mortgage banks, which 
are engaged in what may be called the standard business 
oi issuing mortgage bonds, such or other regulations would 
be ill adapted to the credit banks with their innumerable 
and constantly varying business relations.  Warschauer's 
proposal is based on the premise that the share capital 
(he wrongly disregards entirely the surplus funds) ought to 
bear a certain ratio to the deposits, whereas it was demon- 
strated above that the foremost protection of  the creditors, 
including depositors, are the liquid assets562  and not the 
capital (and surplus), and that in Germany  large  share 
capitals are required mainly in view  of  the diversity  of 
business transacted by our banks.  This view  is  shared 
in England, to which our opponents are in the habit of 
turning for their  authority. 
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4.  LEGAL  REGULATIONS  REGARDING  THE INVESTMENT  OF DEPOSITS. 
Proposals were made by certain experts who  appeared 
before the bank inquiry commission of  1908, to the effect 
that those modes  of  investment of  deposits which were 
found correct and had been carried out at that time by 
most  of  the great  banks  should  be  made  the basis  for 
legal regulation, as it was intolerable that the "adminis- 
tration  of  the national  wealth "  should  be  entrusted 
to  10  or  12 persons without  any legal safeguards.  This 
remark  occurs  frequently  in  banking  literature  and  in 
other connections. 
Accordingly  a  legal  regulation  is  demanded  requiring 
that a certain proportion of  the deposits is to be invested 
in German government  bonds, the price of  which would 
thus  incidentally  be  raised.  As  an  alternative  it  is 
proposed  that  about  one-third  or  35  per  cent  of  the 
deposits in savings banks, cooperative societies, and credit 
banks be required by law to be invested as follows: Twenty 
per cent in bills of  exchange in accordance with the Reichs- 
bank regulations, i. e., provided with three signatures and 
running for a term not exceeding three months, and I 5 per 
cent either in other bills, in accounts at "  giro " banks, and 
in loans on collateral not exceeding a term of  three months 
on securities quoted at a German bourse  (excepting the 
bank's own  shares or those of  a "  concern " bank, or such 
securities as have been put on the market by the institu- 
tion in question within three years preceding), or in Ger- 
man  state loans or German  imperial government  bonds, 
or finally, in first mortgages. 
Against this  it may  be  urged  that even  if  the above 
demand  were  complied  with,  the depositors,  having  no National  Monetary  Commission 
exclusive lien  on  these  securities, would  run  the same 
risk as they do  now  in the case of  bankruptcy or crisis, 
the only difference being that believing themselves guar- 
anteed by law against all losses they would have all the 
more reason to complain. 
Unlike  the mortgage banks and  insurance companies, 
whose  business  moves  along beaten  paths,  the German 
credit  banks  engage  in  an  immense variety  of  compli- 
cated  enterprises.  Hence  no  regulations  of  the  kind 
above described could be applied to them without injury 
to  the special activity  of  each  bank  and  of  the credit 
business in general.  It seems impossible to imagine how 
any set of  regulations, suitable for all times, places, and 
conditions, could  be  devised  to  determine  the  manner 
in which the working capital is to be invested.  At  any 
rate, the attempt to do so would be a very risky under- 
taking.  Moreover, it is  more than doubtful whether any 
manner  of  investment could  be  legally prescribed  that 
would  under  all  circumstances guarantee  the  liquidity 
of  the investments. 
Heiligenstadt's proposal m4  that the credit banks should 
be required to deposit one to two per cent of  the average 
annual amount of  all their  credit  items in  cash  at  the 
Reichsbank  represents  a  totally  different and  broader 
standpoint.  The ~roportion  was raised to 5 per  cent by 
some experts of  the bank inquiry commission, who in all 
other points adopted bodily the proposal and its argument. 
Starting with the alleged fact that on an average only 
50  per cent (between 1895 and 1905 only 37 per cent) of 
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the  annual  national  economic working capital  (" volks- 
wirtschaftliches Betriebskapital ")  placed  in  the hands  of 
the banks between  1886 and  1895 was  used for working 
purposes in the shape of  cash, bills, and loans on collateral 
(p. 83 loc. cit.) , Heiligenstadt concludes  that the balance 
(i. e., during the latter period 63 per cent) of  the money 
belonging  to the creditors or depositors was  used for pur- 
poses  of  investment; in  other words,  that an  excessive 
part  of  the nation's working capital was  converted into 
investment capital through long-term credit or otherwise. 
The above proposal was  therefore considered  justified, 
inasmuch as the increase of  the capital of  the Reichsbank 
(the regulator of  the money circulation and of  the credit 
business) would  be the best  means  to keep an adequate 
portion of  Gernian working capital permanently liquid for 
working purposes (p. 87) and to take the power of  decid- 
ing the mode  of  employ~nent  of  capital,  at least  to  a 
certain degree, out of  private hands (p. 85). 
Thus the proposal is said to be intended, first and fore- 
most, to strengthen  the working  capital  of  the  Reichs- 
bank  (p. 98, under X),  and at the same time to prevent 
the banks from tying up an excessive proportion of  their 
resources  and  thus  endangering  the  security  for  their 
liabilities (p. 95). 
The supporters of  this  proposal described the sum to 
be deposited in cash at the Reichsbank as "the national 
working reserve,"  or "  iron reserve " (" eiserne  Reserve ") 
which  would  enable the Reichsbank to issue three times 
the amount in bank  notes, the security for which could 
not  be  withdrawn,  and  by  which  the  nation  could  be 
constantly supplied with liquid working funds. National  Monetary  Commissiofi 
When subjected to analysis, both the premises on which 
these views are based  and  the aims, as well  as the con- 
clusions arrived at, prove untenable. 
As  regards the premises, the facts set forth on previous 
pages of  the present work suffice to disprove the assertion 
that German credit banks are in the habit of  tying up an 
excessive  part  of  their  resources  (p.  83), and  thereby 
endanger  the security  of  their  liabilities.  On  the con- 
trary, we  saw that all the liabilities of  the German credit 
banks are covered almost up to two-thirds of  their amount 
by  liquid resources, whereas  the law  requires that even 
bank  notes  payable  on  sight  may  be  covered  by  cash 
reserves only up to one-third of  their amount. 
Heiligenstadt's method of  calculating the coefficient of 
liquidity (p. 83) is altogether too unfavorable.  I can not 
see on what ground cash, bills, and even loans on collateral, 
are by him considered orlly partly as liquid means, con- 
tango and securities being omitted entirely.5B5 
As  regards the purpose aimed at by the proposal, it is 
not clear how  the Reichsbank  (in the event of  its note- 
issuing power being increased by the 2 per  cent or  5 per 
cent of  fresh cash funds to be furnished by the banks) will 
be able to keep these funds in any more liquid form than 
that in which they are furnished by the banks;  for  the 
banks  would  have  to  withdraw  these  very  cash  funds 
from their  most  liquid resources, namely, cash balances, 
bills, loans on collateral, etc.  The same cash funds would 
thereupon be invested by the Reichsbank in practically 
the  same form, namely, in  bill  discounts and  loans  on 
collateral, for which it would issue its notes. 
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Most probably, however, no fresh cash would flow into 
the Reichsbank at all in this manner.  The banks would 
deduct from their  "giro"  account (which almost always 
exceeds  the contemplated  "iron  reserve")  and place  to 
the credit of  the Reichsbank whatever amount they might 
be required to deposit, just as they would probably do in 
case of  a direct increase of  the Reichbank capital in which 
they were to participate. 
Nor  can it be  maintained  that even in  this case the 
Reichsbank, by reason of  the sums placed  to its credit, 
would  become  possessed  of  a  permanent  security  for  a 
threefold issue of  bank  notes.  A permanent  deposit, or 
"iron  reserve," is out of  the question for the reason that 
the  sums which,  it  is  supposed,  can  not  be  withdrawn 
from  the Reichsbank  directly  can  be  withdrawn  indi- 
rectly in the form of  larger loans, through bills, discounts, 
or loans on collateral, or through deductions from the giro 
balances exceeding the minimum  deposit. 
During a crisis-and  Heiligenstadt's proposal is essen- 
tially intended for times of  crisis, since for times of  pros- 
perity  no  reform proposals  are needed-very  many  de- 
posits will  be withdrawn from the banks,  and they will 
themselves be  forced  to withdraw from the Reichsbank 
at least a part of  their 2 to 5 per cent reserve. 
But even if  this were not the case, the Reichsbank in 
time of  crisis, ill order to prevent  a run or  bankruptcy, 
would have no other means than to put in circulation all 
or  part  of  the  "national  working  reserve,"  whereas  in 
times when money is plentiful this reserve would prove a 
useless ballast. National  Monetary  Commissiorz 
This brings  us  to  a  question which  is  by  no  means 
unimportant, namely, whether the 2 to 5 per cent reserve 
at the Reichsbank should bear interest or not. 
If it is  to  yield  interest,  then  all  the grave  reasons 
become valid that may be urged against the acceptance 
by  a central note bank of  interest-bearing deposits, and 
which  have  caused  the most  prominent of  these hanks, 
upon repeated deliberation, to refrain from accepting in- 
terest-bearing deposits.  This attitude is mainly dictated 
by the consideration that, if  the central note bank does 
not wish to bear the loss involved in the payment of  such 
interest-and  it is hard to see why  it should bear  such 
loss  with  indifference-it  would  be  compelled  to  seek 
lucrative business  in the form of  discounting  and loans 
on  collateral, and possibly just  at a time when  it ought 
to employ all the resources at its command to combat an 
excessive demand for credit throughout  the country, es- 
pecially by raising the discount rate. 
On the other hand, if  the 2 to 5 per cent reserve is not 
to bear interest, that would mean a considerable loss for 
the credit banks carrying those reserves.  They, too, wot~ld 
of  course not regard that loss with indifference, but would 
be  compelled  to  reimburse  themselves  in  one  way  or 
another, especially by paying their depositors less inter- 
est-a  decidedly undesirable result.  Furthermore-a  still 
more undesirable result in normal times-they  would have 
less funds to place at the disposal of the credit business. 
An  increased  demand in  the money  market  being  thus 
met by a diminished supply, the result would be a rise in 
the rate of  interest.  Finally-and  this would be the most 
undesirable result of  all-the  banks, judging  by past ex- 
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perience, would probably diminish their noninterest-bear- 
ing cash reserves necessary for their liquidity by an amount 
corresponding to their share in the "national working re- 
serve " carried at the Reichsbank. 
The ultimate result would  be that the liquidity of  the 
banks, and with it of  the body economic, would  be im- 
paired  to  exactly  the  same  extent  that  Heiligenstadt 
intended to improve it. 
In substance, if  not in form, this proposal amounts to 
the same thing as the proposals which the Reichstag com- 
mittee, for good reasons, had rejected on the occasion of 
their  deliberations on  the stock-company bill  of  1884.~~~ 
These proposals, which aimed at  prescribing a special mode 
of  investing the legal reserve funds in cash, or  in trust- 
fund securities,  were revived in  1901 in an article in the 
Gegenwart  by  Imperial  Bank  Director  Doctor Vosberg. 
They  are, however, liable  to  serious objections,  at any 
rate so far  as the joint-stock banks  are concerned; and 
the same objections, therefore, apply also to the proposals 
now under disc~ssion.~%7 
If  the banks were  compelled to keep  their  surplus in 
cash, or  to maintain a  cash  reserve  at the Reichsbank, 
they would  have to withdraw this  sum from their fully 
employed working capital  (for the suggestion that only 
surplus capital is to be withdrawn is absurd), to wit, such 
assets, as the bill holdings, securities, etc. 
Thus they would  be compelled either to restrict  their 
business  operation<, i.  e.,  to  call  in  credit  previously 
granted  and  refuse  to  grant  new  credit,  a  proceeding 
which  might  lead  to a  crisis, especially  in  industry;  or 
they would have to attempt to make good this defciency National  Monetary  Commission 
working funds by the issue of  fresh shares, which course, 
if successful, would lead to a fresh strengthening of  con- 
centrative tendencies and, furthermore, to a fresh with- 
drawal of  ready  money  from the market  to an amount 
equal to the total value of  the share issues.  If  the attempt 
to issue fresh shares proved unsuccessful, the calamitous 
state would  continue, namely, the injury  to  trade  and 
industry, which were to be protected by the proposals in 
question.  In many  cases,  however,  the  issue  of  fresh 
shares would not be possible, because the deposit of  ready 
money would either lead directly to a curtailment of  busi- 
ness transactions, and hence of  dividends, or would create 
the fear  of  such  curtailment, the result  in  either  case 
being a fall in the market value of  the shares. 
If  the banks,  despite the curtailme~it  of  business, en- 
deavored to obtain satisfactory dividends-which  is neces- 
sarily the aim of the business management of  every joint- 
stock company-they  might easily find themselves com- 
pelled  to resort to  hazardous  transactions,  particularly 
to force the founding and issue business more than ever. 
Since, moreover,  after  the deposit of  the  guaranty  re- 
serve, they  would  possibly  and even probably pay  less 
regard  to  their  liquidity,  that  liquidity,  as well  as the 
quality of  their investments, might in the event of  a run 
turn out to have been impaired to a greater extent than 
ever.  If, however,  securities were  deposited instead  of 
cash, most of the banks, being compelled, in case of  a run, 
to sell the deposited securities, might not be able to do so 
at all or only at a great loss.  If these happened to be 
trust-fund  securities their  market  value  would  become 
unduly depressed during the time of  panic. 
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Heiligenstadt's proposals would  thus deprive the busi- 
ness  community  of  productive  capital  in  two  ways- 
through the deposit of  a cash reserve at the Reichsbank 
and through the issues of  shares that might become neces- 
sary.  Some  of  the  supporters  of  the  proposals  have 
already raised the amount of  the proposed reserve from 
1-2  per  cent to 5 per cent; in fact, the amount would he 
variable at pleasure in  an upward  direction.  I  assume 
that this  amount is to be  deposited at the Reichsbank, 
without the creditors having a lien-that  is to say, a right 
of  segregation  of  these  deposits  (Absonderungsrecht) in 
case of  failure of  the credit banks.  If  this  be  the case, 
the Reichsbank, as has been pointed out, would have to 
part with this cash reserve in the case of  a run,  which 
might result in the claims  of  other creditors than the de- 
positors being  satisfied, on the principle of  "  first come- 
first served,"  and the depositors might  be  turned  away 
empty handed. 
If  this is not to be the case, that is to say, if  all creditors 
are to be  given  a  lien on the cash reserve, or the right 
of  segregation, then the Reichsbank, according to general 
regulations, would  not  be  permitted  to  part  with  this 
reserve in case  of  a run,  so  that the failure which  the 
cash reserve was  intended to ward off  would in that very 
case become inevitable. 
It is also clear from the above that the practical con- 
sequences of  these proposals would  be  directly opposed 
to the efforts, recently made with such commendable zeal, 
of  expanding  the check and transfer system,  and  thus 
dispensing with the use of  ready money in payments and 
making it available for credit transactions. National  Monetary  Commission 
Again, it should  be borne in mind  that a cash reserve, 
even  of  5 per  cent  of  all  credit  accounts at the Ger- 
man  credit  banks, that is to say, about  200,000,000 to 
250,000,000 marks, could in  nowise  influence "  the ratio 
of  working  capital  to  invested  capital"  in  German 
trade  and  industry  to  any  appreciable  extent.  Fur- 
thermore,  while  Heiligenstadt's  proposal  lays  special 
stress  on the strengthening of  the working resources  of 
the Reichsbank, a bill (since then disposed of) "to change 
the  bank  act"  (No.  I 178 of  Reichstag  documents)  ad- 
mitted  that the  Reichsbank's  own  means  had  sufficed 
hitherto for the purposes  they were  intended  to serve, 
and that consequently there was  no  need  of  increasing 
them.  Accordingly provision  has been  made merely for 
a gradual increase in the working resources, by a gradual 
strengthening  of  the  surplus.  Lastly,  it must  not  be 
forgotten that the Reichsbank will, as a  matter of  fact, 
be  placed  in  possession  of  considerable  and  increasing 
working  resources,  through  an agreement  by  which  it 
undertakes  the  administration  of  the  sums  which  the 
postal administration collects through the postal transfer 
and check systems. 
The  fact  that  Heiligenstadt  began  by  proposing  a 
reserve of  I to 2 per cent, that the experts before the bank 
inquiry  commission  afterward  thought  a  reserve  of  5 
per  cent  appropriate,  and that since then  one of  these 
experts  has  felt  prompted  to  raise  the  proportion  to 
10  per  cent,568  ought  to  suffice  to  demonstrate  the 
inept and dangerous nature of  all these proposals.  For 
why stop at 10 per  cent?  Someone is  sure to turn up, 
whether inside or outside the Reichstag, who, with "holy 
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zeal " and with perfectly incontestable  logic, will declare 
even the 10 per cent insufficient, for it is obvious that 50 
per cent at the Reichsbank are a far better safeguard than 
10 per cent.  The banks, to be sure, would in that case 
fare like the donkey who was just  getting accustomed to 
live without food when he died. 
My  attitude  toward  the proposals  here  discussed, as 
well as toward any reform proposals in the banking busi- 
ness, is based on the fundamental principle that all those 
proposals are  to be  condemned which, without  being of 
any appreciable benefit to the community as a whole, are 
injurious  to  so  important  and  necessary  a  factor  in 
German  national  economy  as  the banks.  In the same 
way I am opposed to those proposals which do more harm 
than good to the community at  large, or which are obscure 
in their motives and aims, and of  whose consequences no 
estimate  can  be  formed.  On  the other  hand,  I should 
not  a  priori  be  opposed  to measures  the  execution  of 
which would impose certain sacrifices on the banks, pro- 
vided such proposals promise to result in notable benefit 
to the whole  community  and thus  perhaps  in  indirect 
advantages to the banks. 
Such a benefit  to the general public and to the banks 
is put forward as an argument for the publicity proposals, 
especially that of  Count Arnim-Muska~.~~~hough  not 
worded to that effect, yet the meaning of  this proposal, 
in view  of  the nature of  the German banking business, 
amounts to this, that all banks and merchants who  as a 
part of their business accept deposits to amounts exceed- 
ing on an annual average half  (?) of  their liable capital National  Monetary  Commission 
shall be under legal obligation to publish summary state- 
ments  on  the first of  every  quarter.  These statements, 
it is proposed, are to conform to a legal schedule, a draft 
of  which is given, and are to be published at the latest on 
the first  of  the following  month  in newspapers publish- 
ing official communications. 
I do not believe that such statements would fulfill the 
purpose  of  adequately  enlightening  the general  public, 
and especially the depositors, as to the condition of  the 
bank to which they have entrusted or intend to entrust 
their deposits, no matter what schedule may be adopted. 
If  the schedule goes into minute details, it will as a rule 
not be read any more than long prospectuses.  If  it does 
not go into details, but merely gives "total amounts" for 
the various items, as is natural, and as is in fact contem- 
plated  in  the Arnim  proposal,  it will  be  read, but  will 
seldom fulfill  its purpose of  enlightenment, since it will 
leave the reader in the dark on those very points that are 
of  the greatest importance as regards the soundness of  the 
banks. 
In particular, if  the statement draws a distinction  be- 
tween  the secured  and  unsecured  debit  accounts,  the 
essential point will  be the kind  of  security given  in the 
individual case, whether a mortgage on improved rural or 
urban real  estate, a factory, or  unirnproved  ground, and 
whether the mortgage is  first or  second, whether  securi- 
ties  have been  deposited,  and  if  so, what  is their qual- 
ity, whether bond has been given, and if  so, what  is the 
financial standing  of  the bondsmen,  etc.  On  all  these 
points  the  balance  sheet  will  fail  to  enlighten  the 
reader.  Neither will it be possible to gather from it the 
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composition of  the various items, such as the security and 
syndicate accounts.  In particular,  it will  be  impossible 
to tell  whether  the securities, bills,  contango, loans  on 
collateral,  debits on current account  enumerated in the 
statement  are good  or  bad; and yet  the quality  of  the 
assets is the main point, the quantity being of  secondary 
importance.  Further,  acceptances  may  quite  properly 
have  been  substituted  for book  credit,  and  vice  versa. 
Business  discretion,  which  is  an  imperative  necessity, 
will of  itself forbid the publication of  details, but even if 
such  publication  were  attempted it would  simply cause 
the statement to remain unread.  This is precisely what 
took place with the prospectuses, the publication of  which 
was vehemently demanded some time ago in the interest 
of  public enlightenment.  If  they are too long they are 
never  read,  except long  after  their  publication,  for  the 
purpose of  constructing  a claim for indemnity when the 
market value of  the securities has greatly declined. 
Further "  total amounts " fail to indicate the most dan- 
gerous  cases of  credit granting, which have so frequently 
caused  banks  to fail 570  in  England  as  well  as in Ger- 
many-I  need  only  refer  to the  Leipziger  Bank-for 
instance, the case in which a bank has granted excessive 
credit  to one  and  the same  person,  firm,  company,  or 
institution,  or to one and the same branch  of  industry. 
The obligation imposed on American note banks never to 
grant  individual  credit  beyond  a  certain  portion  (one- 
tenth)  of  their  share capital, does  not  take sufficiently 
into account the situation and status of each bank.  It  is,' 
therefore, on the one hand, too  schematic, while on the 
other  hand,  as  experience has  shown,  it can easily  be 
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Experience  has  proved, moreover, that the most  dis- 
graceful failures, such as those which took place in  Eng- 
land, particularly in time of  crisis, occurred among those 
very deposit banks that had published their statements. 
The collapse frequently occurred immediately after such 
publication,  perfectly  legal  in  form,  without  anyone 
being  able  to  gather  from  these  documents  even  the 
slightest hint of  the impending crash. 
Space  does  not  permit  all  the details  of  the Arnim 
proposal  to  be  discussed  here.  I  should  only  like  to 
make  the  following  remarks  in  reference  to  the oft- 
repeated  demand for a statement of  all assessments due 
on account  of  participations.  Even the managers  of  a 
syndicate are often unable to foretell the amount of  these 
assessments with  any degree of  certainty.  Such  is  the 
case  with  the  liquidation  of  long-term  engagements 
resulting from the taking over of railways or factories or 
other establishments, with the rehabilitation of  distressed 
or  wrecked  undertakings,  with  international  business 
whose management and central offices are located abroad. 
Again, there are cases in which it is utterly impossible at 
the time of  publication  of  the statements to foretell the 
amount to be ultimately invested  in an enterprise (per- 
haps  h  fonds  perdu)  or  the date of  maturity  and  the 
amount  of  subsequent  assessments,  or-a  case  of  par- 
ticularly  frequent occurrence-the  amount of  the repur- 
chases (Ruckkaufe) which have to be undertaken so often 
and  to such  extent  even  after  the  syndicate  business 
proper is ended.  Syndicate  assessments  are like house- 
hold  budgets; those expenses that could not be foreseen 
at the time the estimate was made are the very ones that 
crop  up  most  frequently  and are  surest  to disturb  the 
whole forecast.  571 
Finally, summary statements may  be  misleading, be- 
cause  frequently  losses  to  be  written  off  and  other 
deductions  (Rucklagen) can  only be  ascertained  in the 
course of the business year or  at or even  after its close, 
just  before the drawing up of  the annual balance sheet; 
and yet the necessity and amount of  these  items are of 
essential  importance  in  gauging  the  bqnk's  position. 
Again, in  a  summary  bank  statement  credit  and debit 
items appear without anything to show whether a creditor 
is at the same time a debtor, and vice versa, and whether 
compensations must accordingly be  allowed for to a large 
extent.572 
But while  I do not believe that the periodical publica- 
tion of  summary statements can contribute much toward 
the enlightenment of  the public regarding the true condi- 
tion of  a bank, yet I will not dispute the beneficial effect 
of the public criticism that may be elicited by such publi- 
cations.  The comparison of  statements of  different banks, 
published simultaneously, would afford a far broader and 
more reliable basis for such criticism than can be expected 
of a single statement. 
1  also  regard  these  publications  as  a  very  excellent 
means  of  self-education  for  the  banks.  Their  mutual 
criticism, based  on the published statements, may  grad- 
ually lead to uniform or approximately uniform principles 
of business management, especially regarding the manner 
and extent of  credit granting, and gradually to an under- 
standing  concerning  some  lines,  at  least,  of  business 
policy.  This understanding might  thereupon develop in National  Monetary  Commission 
all these directions into firm and sound traditions, which 
hitherto have largely been lacking. 
For theoretical and practical reasons I should also con- 
sider  it  a  very  desirable  and  beneficial  result  if  these 
periodical  statements should  lead  to uniformity  in their 
compilation,  and  gradually  also  to uniform  annual bal- 
ance sheets.  This would facilitate the comparison of  the 
balance sheets of  all the credit banks, a matter which  at 
present is attended with great difficulties. 
Finally, it must not be forgotten that every new device 
which enables us, unswerved by the current of  phenomena, 
to read, as it were, from a barometer, the present  and the 
near future of  economic conditions must naturally restrict 
the limits of  error, which in this matter are necessarily so 
wide.  Summary statements of  credit banks,  573 published 
periodically, would  serve that purpose,  just  as does  the 
publication of  the condition of  the Reichsbank, or of  the 
fluctuations of  the Reichsbank discount (official) rate and 
of  private discount rates, of  the demand for labor at the 
German labor exchanges, as well as the publication regard- 
ing the revenue from the stamp tax,  fromwhich the amount 
of  bills in circulation  at any moment can be ascertained, 
and of  the receipts from railway traffic, from which  the 
existing condition of  industry can best be gauged.  These 
publications supplement each other. 
Despite  the  undeniable  and  considerable  advantages 
which the periodical publication of  summary bank state- 
ments thus affords, I am decidedly  opposed to the legal 
enforcement of  such publication.  My objections are based 
on what seem to me the following cogent reasons: 
In the first  place, I consider  it an ill-advised  step on 
the part of  the legislator to give rise to the belief  (which 
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would  naturally  gain  ground  among wide  circles of  the 
general public) that from a publication of  this kind, which 
has never yet been adopted in England, depositors could 
gain  a clear idea  as to the status,  and therefore  as to 
the soundness,  of  the bank  to whose charge they have 
entrusted or intend to entrust their deposits.  This belief 
would be an erroneous one, no matter what form of  publi- 
cation  might  be  adopted,  and  it  is  not  becoming  or 
incumbent  on  the legislator  to aid  in  propagating  such 
errors.  Cases  like  those  of  the Leipziger Bank and the 
Marienburger  Privatbank  would  most  probably  have 
occurred under the same management, even if  those banks 
had published summary statements.  As a matter of  fact, 
they did  publish most  handsome  annual balance  sheets, 
which were, moreover, accompanied by a "  business report.'' 
My  second reason, which to my mind is decisive, is that 
a compulsory legal regulation of this kind can not be con- 
ceived without a legal schedule for drawing up the state- 
ment.  In  fact,  a  multitude  of  such  schedules  have 
already  been  suggested  by competent and incompetent 
persons. 
Now, a legal schedule, unalterable for a series of  years, 
is an absurdity, for the business spheres of  banks are con- 
stantly changing, and accordingly  the schedule would  of 
necessity  be  ~ubject  to constant  changes,  dictated  by 
practical experience.  A  schedule drawn up by the bank 
themselves  to-day would  of  necessity  be  different from 
One  drawn up ten years ago and from one that might be 
drawn up ten years hence. 
If ever  the impotence  of  legislation  in  any field  was 
evident a @riori,  it is  in this field, where the business in National  Monetary  Commission 
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question does not proceed in a stereotyped and automatic 
manner, as is in the main the case with note-issuing banks, 
insurance  companies, and  mortgage  banks.  The latter 
are, on that account, much more  susceptible of  govern- 
ment  regulation, which our German habit, the result  of 
centuries of  drill, still prompts  us  to regard  as the last 
resort (ultimum refugium) in all cases demanding a remedy. 
In the third  place,  practical  experience, in Germany 
especially, has  abundantly  shown  that  legislative  ca- 
pacity and skill are as yet imperfectly developed among 
us, especially in economic matters.  Such matters as the 
publication  of  bank  statements  or  the  deposit  of  cash 
reserves for the security of  deposits, which to the layman 
seem  self-evident,  urgently  necessary,  and  simple  in 
execution-"simple  solutions  are  always  seductive  to 
simple minds "--are  in  reality  exceedingly  difficult  and 
complicated.  Hence it is to be feared that the advocates 
of  these proposals, starting from the most diverse premises 
and  pursuing  the  most  diverse  purposes,  would  carry 
them into execution in a form which can not fail to lead 
to the gravest embarrassments, as experience has repeat- 
edly  proved.  Above  all, there  is imminent danger-as 
illustrated by the very wording of  the Arnim resolution- 
that, aside from  credit  banks,  not  only  savings  banks 
and mutual credit societies would  be compelled to pub- 
lish statements, but also  private bankers,  which, to my 
mind,  is utterly inadmissible, for  deposits are entrusted 
to a private banker not so much in consideration of  the 
amount of his private means, but in consideration of  his 
supposed integrity.  To compel him  to publish  a  state- 
ment of  his financial position would injure and paralyze 
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him in the competition within  the private banking  pro- 
fession.  Legislators should under all circumstances guard 
against  ill-advised  measures  likely  to  cause  injury  to 
and to hasten the suppression of  the small bankers and 
thus repeat the mistakes of  the Bourse law. 
Impressed  with  these  considerations,  I  heartily  wel- 
comed the decision  of  the Berlin great banks to publish 
voluntarily (beginning wit11 1909) at the end of  February, 
April, June, August, and October (in December the annual 
statement is issued) summary statements according to a 
schedule  discussed  and  agreed  on  among  them  which 
essentially corresponds to the schedule of  the "  Deutsche 
Bank."  This  example has  been  followed  to  a  great 
extent  by  the  joint-stock  banks,  and will  doubtless  in 
time  become  the  universal  practice.  During  the early 
deliberations of  this question I pointed out that whatever 
schedule was  chosen, it would  be  sure to be  criticized. 
However, it is not easy to conceive a schedule which would 
not be condemned by some critics, no matter whether it 
was drafted by the banks or by other critics. 
7.  PENALTY  FOR  "BANKS  AND  BANKERS  WHO  BY  PUBLIC  OR  WRITTEN 
APPEALS  OR  THROUGII  AGENTS SOLICIT  (anreizen)  DEPOSITS OR 
SAVINGS." 
On the occasion of  the passing of  the bank-act amend- 
ment  of  1909  the  Reichstag  petitioned  the  imperial 
chancellor for a bill to ward off  the danger caused by banks 
and  bankers  who  by  public  or  written  invitation  or 
through  agents  solicit  (anreizen) the  public  to "  invest 
with them their deposits or savings." 
According  to the  debate  in  committee,  the bill  aims 
at the  suppression  of  low-class  or  touting  bankers National  Monetary  Commission 
(Winkel-oder Animierbankiers) , or  of  business  men  who 
have no claim to the name "banker," but who, by prom- 
ises of specially high rates of  interest or other advantages, 
entice the public to hand over to them their savings, while 
the persons  making  these promises  are neither  able, nor 
in many cases willing, to return the deposits.574 
Certainly these are the only cases in which there exists 
any danger for the public, and some of  these cases may 
at once be eliminated from the discussion.  If  a written 
invitation to open an account is issued by a business man 
who at the time of invitation is not willing to return the 
deposit, nor  likely  to be able to do so at that or  some 
future time, it should  be  considered  as an attempt to 
defraud. 
Under  the  law  relating  to  unfair  competition,  the 
Central Union of  Bankers and Banks at Berlin (" Central- 
verband  des  Deutschen  Bank-  und  Bankiergewerbes  zu 
Berlin")  established  for  the protection  of  banking  and 
bankers'  interests,  is  empowered  to  proceed  against 
persons who by their  occupation are not entitled to call 
themselves  "  bankers,"  with  a  view  to  enjoining  them 
from making public use of  that designation.  I am in a 
position  to state that such  action  has  been  taken  on 
several  occasions.5T5  But  neither  these  sham  bankers 
(Nicht-Bankiers) nor  savings banks, whose resources,  as 
we have seen, are often far from liquid, are aimed at in 
the  badly  worded  Reichstag  resolution,  which  only 
demands that steps be taken against banks and bankers. 
Besides this the two absolutely different terms "  deposits " 
and  "savings"  are  once  more  lumped  together. 
Furthermore, the resolution recommends that legal action 
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be taken even when the invitation to invest deposits (?) 
or savings  (meaning, probably "investment  of  funds  in 
the form of  deposits or savings ")  (zur Anlage  von Depos- 
;ten)  is  not  made  publicly,  provided  it be  in writing. 
But such a  written invitation, which  certainly is one 
form of  "solicitation,"  may under certain circumstances 
become  the duty of  a  bank  or banker  in  a  case  where 
through negligence or ignorance a customer whose busi- 
ness  they  look  after  leaves  money  deposited  without 
interest. 
Moreover, as the word "solicit " (anreizen) used  in the 
resolution is extremely elastic, having received the most 
diverse interpretation both in  theory  and in  practice, I 
do not believe that the measure  proposed  in  the Reichs- 
tag resolution  can  lead  to any practical  results.  It  is 
hard to say which is the graver mistake, to enact penal 
laws whose effect far exceeds the desired  and economic- 
ally correct purpose or such as are rendered nugatory in 
practice. 
8. A SUPERVISORY  BOARD. 
I am equally unable to approve the idea  of  a govern- 
ment  board  of  supervisors recently  advocated  in many 
quarters,  especially  by  Obst.  Such  an  institution  has 
never yet afforded protection against fraudulent manipu- 
lations, while on the other hand it is very apt to lull the 
public into a feeling of  security which such a board, from 
its very nature, is not able to provide.  Even though pos- 
sessed of  the most thorough expert knowledge, such a body 
would not  be in position  to obtain  a  sufficiently correct 
estimate of  the quality of  the assets of  a bank, to say 
nothing of  the fact that no bank can be expected to allow National  Mofietary  Commission 
its  competitor  who  might  be  called  upon  to  act  as 
expert adviser to the board  to gain  an  insight  into its 
business. 
The experience of  all countries and at  all times in regard 
to the natural inadequacy  of  state supervision (see note 
23 on p. 789, also pp. 54 and 601) should serve as a warn- 
ing against  any repetition of  such experiments. 
Herewith  ends the discussion of  the reform proposals 
hitherto made.  In obedience to the prevailing tendency 
in Germany and to the current  of  the times,  nearly  all 
these proposals aim at some intervention by the State or 
by  legislation, which,  as far  as  deposit  banks  are con- 
cerned,  has  always been  most  decisively  condemned  in 
England, the very  country which  is  assumed to be the 
pattern for Germany to follow in this matter.  Although 
I am by no means an adherent of  the defunct Manchester 
theory,  I must  confess that in  this  important,  compli- 
cated, and difficult question I share the opinion expressed 
fifty years ago by a prominent authority in this very mat- 
ter,  an  opinion  which  unfortunately  has  not  lost  its 
actuality  and  correctness:  "The  unfortunate  system  of 
tutelage  has  never  yet  stood  the test  of  practice.  It 
merely leads from step to step, and when it has once been 
adopted, there  is  nothing  in which  the State does  not 
think itself  called upon to interfere in the interest of  its 
citizens  and for which  the latter do  not  look  hopefully 
and imploringly to the State, while they themselves limit 
their activity to complaints." 
The man who wrote these words in 1857 was no other 
than Adolph Wagner.577  I frankly admit that I find this 
confession written  during  his  younger  years  more  con- 
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vincing than his la.ter views and proposals, which, I regret 
to say, are quite different. 
No  State  measures  will  avail  against  a  criminal  or 
negligent treatment of  deposits, especially no legal regu- 
lations nor  any supervisory board, such as Wagner pro- 
posed some years ago while under the immediate impres- 
sion of  the crisis of  1901, that is to say, at a time least 
suitable  for  judicial  and  matured  pr0posals.~7*  I  feel 
convinced that the German banking community did not 
in any way deserve such a manifest vote of  censure-for 
a vote of  censure it was; there is no use in blinking the 
fact.  The one thing that is  essential  above  all  in  this 
matter is the honesty, trustworthiness, and efficiency of 
the bank  managers.  In the United  States57g  the Comp- 
troller  of  the Currency, who  may order  an investigation 
of  the national banks by special examiners, declared in 
his official report for  1895 (p. 57  et seq.) that as a rule 
the examiners detect mistakes,  defects, and crimes only 
after the failure  has  occurred,  and  that no  supervision 
by  outsiders  can  serve  as  a  substitute for  the honesty 
and competency of bank managers.580 PART  IV.  THE  PROGRESS  OF  CONCENTRATION 
IN  GERMAN  BANKING  DURING  THE SECOND 
PERIOD  (1870 '1'0  THE  PRESENT). 
I. GENERAL  CAUSES. ' 
As  was  shown  in  the  first  part  of  the  volume, the 
German  banks  entered  upon  the  present  period  with 
very  limited  capital.  The  question  therefore  remains 
to be answered: By what means have they managed to 
meet  the ever-increasing duties imposed  upon  them by 
the tremendous  industrial  development  of  this  period? 
In  a  general  way  the  answer  is  as  follows: The  same 
factors  which we have shown above to have been domi- 
nant in the general economic development of  the period 
appear  again  in  the  development  of  banking,  viz,  the 
expansion  and  concentration  of  capital, resources,  and 
industrial  enterprise.  These two  factors  appear  to the 
superficial  observer to be  mutually  exclusive.  In fact, 
however, they  are related  to one  another  as cause  and 
effect . 
Concentration,  a child of  the capitalist system, is pe- 
culiar  neither  to modern  development  nor  to German 
conditions.  It is  as  old  as  the capitalist  system  itself 
and  equally  international.  It appears  with  practically 
all its concomitants in the activities of the state as well 
as in private industry. 
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As  proof of its age we  may quote one of  many exam- 
ples.  As  early as "the last quarter of  the fifteenth and 
the  first  quarter  of  the  sixteenth  century  there  took 
place a concentration of  capital invested  in mining with 
a rapidity scarcely equaled in our time."  Certain forms 
of  concentration  such  as the combination  in one  enter- 
prise of  successive stages of  industrial production may be 
traced back to the very beginnings of  large-scale industry. 
Its international character is  evident from its appear- 
ance  in  England  and  America, in  France  and  Belgium 
in the same or even in a more pronounced form than in 
Germany,  both in industry and in banking. 
It is present equally in public and in private industrial 
activities.  This is but natural, for the same causes are 
at work  in both spheres even  if  not to the same extent. 
Above  all there is the necessity for uniform management 
of  all industry from one center.  Thus the postal system 
was united practically  under  one authority after all the 
original enterprises, systems, and regalia had been  abol- 
ished.  In the same way the railroads passed out of  the 
control of  the innumerable  private companies, to be op- 
erated, in the first  place  independently  by the various 
States.  Ultimately, after  passing  through  intermediary 
stages, they  may  be  operated by the Imperial Govern- 
ment or form part of  an imperial railroad union.  Even 
now, there are some unmistakable signs of  a  movement 
in that direction.  Thus, for example, there is the Prus- 
sian-Hessian Railroad  Union, entered into by two States, 
and the agreements regarding the joint  use of  operating 
material among a number  of the States of  the Imperial 
Pederation. National  Monetary  Commission 
A  similar development is shown  in  the absorption  of 
capital, industrial  enterprise, and  labor  forces  by  large 
cities; in the ever-increasing migration  of  rural  laborers 
to the cities during this period; in the great increase of  the 
urban population, particularly in the industrial cities; in 
the conflict between commerce and industry  on  a  large 
scale  and the retail  trade, house  industry, and handi- 
craft, between large and small industrial establishments; 
in  the  ascendancy  of  mixed " over  "  pure " establish- 
ments;  of  commercial  distribution  on  a  large  scale, in- 
cluding department stores over the small retail trade; of 
the large landowner over the small peasant proprietor, the 
large flour mill over the small milling establishments, etc.4 
The difference in this period has been  only in the in- 
tensity  and  rapidity  with  which  the tendencies  toward 
concentration  have  manifested  themselves.  This  has 
been the result of  certain factors which completely revo- 
lutionized  the  conditions  and  scale  of  production  and 
marketing, to wit: The extension  and greater reliability 
.of  the means of  transportation as well  as the great dis- 
coveries  and inventions  which  revolutionized  entire  in- 
dustries  and imposed new  tasks on them or created new 
industries. 
It was  inevitable  that the movement  toward  expan- 
sion  and  concentration  during  this  period  should  have 
proceeded  with  particular  rapidity in German industry, 
which  at that time was developing by leaps and bounds. 
This applies also to the German banking system, united for 
weal and woe with German industry by a thousand and 
one  ties,  due  to its  current-account,  check,  giro,  and 
credit business, and to the banks'  activities in the fields 
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of  flotation  of  securities, organization  of  firms into cor- 
porations, the rehabilitation of  companies, consolidations, 
and 10ans.~ The main  reason  of  this  development  was 
that  the  German  banks,  with  scarcely  an  exception, 
appeared on  the scene organized as stock companies or 
in the kindred form of stock companies "  en commandite." 
The stock company is the keenest and surest, and hence 
the favorite  weapon  which  the  capitalist  system  can 
use in its struggle for concentration.  In itself  the stock 
company  represents  a  form  of  concentration,  viz,  the 
union of  small and scattered units of  property, in most 
cases too small to be fitted for productive uses, into a single 
mass of  capital suited and intended for industrial or pro- 
ductive purposes under single management.  The facility 
with which the shares can be marketed or transmitted by 
inheritance, the probability of  a longer term of  existence for 
the corporation, owing to the far greater degree to which 
it is independent of  the personality of  the entrepreneur as 
compared with other forms of  business organization, and 
finally the absence (at least  in theory) of  any limitation 
on the amount of  dividends that may be expected on the 
combined  capital-all  these  elements  give  the corpora- 
tion great power to attract available capital.  More than 
any other form of  business organization, the stock com- 
pany has the means of  satisfying its needs for credit and 
for expansion by capital increases.  The ease with which 
additional capital can be secured naturally stimulates the 
tendency toward capital increases.  This tendency grows 
in constantly increasing ratio by reason of what may be 
regarded  as  an economic law  in the realm  of  industry, 
trade,  and banking alike, according to which  a twofold National  Monetary  Commission 
increase of  capital means more than a twofold  increase 
of  production  and sales6  For  this reason the tendency 
toward capital increases is enhanced by this very growth 
of  capital. 
2  SPECIAL  CAUSEb. 
As  stated above (p. 383) the period under consideration 
was characterized by an unforeseen, suddenly developing 
demand for capital on the part of  the state and communes 
and particularly industry and trade.  This demand natur- 
ally made itself  felt in the two important fields of  bank- 
ing activity, viz. that of  national and international clear- 
ings  and payments,  and  mainly  in  that of  credit.  It 
became, therefore, an imperative necessity for the banks 
to strengthen and extend the exceptionally weak  foun- 
dation of  capital and credit with which they had  entered 
upon this period. 
Accordingly, the available funds of  the country were 
forced under great pressure to the central institutions of 
credit-the  banks which served, so to speak, as the dis- 
tributing reservoirs for the collection of  the resources of 
capital and credit.  Prom there, as from a higher altitude, 
it was easiest to survey the extent of  the general needs, 
to calculate the proper mode of  distribution of  the avail- 
able  resources  and  to  direct  them  more  readily  and 
quickly into the various channels below.  In other words, 
the concentration of  banking capital brought about in the 
first place through an increase in the capital stock of  the 
banks meant  the progressive accumulation in the banks 
of  the funds needed for industrial credit. 
In this field concentration became especially urgent, on 
account of  the imperative necessity for distributing and 
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minimizing  risks '-a  principle  which  can  be  applied 
most thoroughly  where business is conducted on a large 
scale.  There  are  a  number  of  purely  technical  factors 
which work in the same direction.  When the banks are 
relieved by central banks of  issue of  the task of  providing 
the necessary  currency, they  concentrate  their  activity 
in the field  of  credit.  The latter has the unmistakable 
tendency to increase much faster than the cash resources 
on which it is based.  Moreover, the difficulty of  securing 
these  resources,  especially  by  way  of  capital increases, 
grows  more  rapidly  than the demand  for  credit.  This 
is  because  the ability  of  a  bank  to increase its capital 
depends not only on the dividends which it has been pay- 
ing  and on  the market value of  the old  shares, mainly 
though  not  exclusively determined  by  these  dividends, 
but also  on  the condition  of  the money  market.  The 
value  of  bank  stock,  like  that of  industrial  securities, 
fluctuates  with  variations  in  industrial  prosperity  and 
the prospect of  dividends.  At a critical moment it may 
easily happen that no market, or only a very limited mar- 
ket,  can  be  found  for  new  issues  and  for  new  bank 
stock in particular, as the market may be paralyzed by 
blundering legislation or by the fact that new issues had 
been made in excessive amounts or in too rapid succession. 
Furthermore,  there  are  special  technical  or  business 
limitations  on  a  bank's  ability  to increase its capital. 
Hard  times  are never  entirely  absent, and these  affect 
the profits from the flotation of  securities as well as from 
the regular banking business  Under  such conditions  it 
may become difficult for abnormally large stocks of capi- 
tal to earn adequate dividends, though we  may question National  Monetary  Commissiort 
the remark made to the writer in 1889 by the head of  one 
of  the largest private banking firms, that in the long run, 
with their larger capital, the banks could not earn more 
than  the  current  rate  of  interest-a  pessimistic  view, 
which has since been proved to be entirely groundless. 
There being thus limits-differing,  of  course, with par- 
ticular  circumstances-beyond  which  the  banks'  own 
capital can not be increased, it becomes evident that the 
banks must attract outside funds for use in their expand- 
ing  business.  The accession of  these funds enables the 
banks to do more than merely increase the earnings of  the 
business-i.  e., the rate and,what is more, the steadiness of 
dividends.  In establishing  special deposit offices for the 
purpose of  attracting available funds the banks are able to 
increase the size of  their clientele, particularly among the 
investing class, to greatly extend their capacity to float 
securities on  their own or  outside account, and to place 
them securely and permanently among customers whose 
circumstances  and  reliability  are  accurately  known. 
Every successful flotation of  securities tends  in turn to 
increase the bank's power through its psychological effect, 
which in this matter counts for a good deal.  Every in- 
crease in the power of  the bank tends to augment largely 
the tendency  toward  concentration.  It also  serves  to 
enlarge the volume of  the bank's business.  Furthermore, 
the bank gains the custom of  the provincial bankers, who 
form such an important part of  the clientele of  the Berlin 
banks.  These as well as other customers naturally pre- 
fer to deal with those banks from which they are likely to 
derive, in addition to the ordinary benefits, the largest 
financial  advantages  in  connection  with  the  issue  of 
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securities, either  by  being  allotted  subsidiary participa- 
tion~,  by  being  designated  as offices  for the receiving of 
subscriptions or  instalment payments, or by being given 
special bonuses. 
To  accomplish successfully the flotation  of  securities 
presupposes very large capital resources on the part of  the 
bank undertaking the operation, for it must be in a posi- 
tion  to carry  for  a  long  time unsold  securities  without 
detriment to its other business.  The flotation of  securi- 
ties promotes concentration in another direction.  Every 
issue of securities naturally seeks a center where a strong 
stock exchange offers the best prospects for the ready and 
permanent  sale of  the securities.  Accordingly, from the 
very beginning of  this period, Berlin was preferred to all 
other places, because from 1870 to the time when it was 
greatly  weakened  by  the stock  exchange  act  (Jan.  I, 
1897), the Berlin bourse greatly surpassed all other Ger- 
man exchanges in strength-that  is, in its ability to absorb 
securities in good times and in its power of  resistance in 
bad times, and was able to exert a great and at times de- 
cisive influence on the other markets, especially those of 
London and Paris. 
This gave to the Berlin banks another advantage over 
the other banks.  Besides, they were first to attract out- 
side funds, particularly in form of  deposits.  In this they 
were successful partly for general reasons and partly as a 
result  of  the system  of  deposit  offices  which  they  had 
inaugurated.  Thus  the  business  of  issuing  securities 
again  stimulated  concentration  of  capital  in  the  me- 
tropolis-that  is, in the Berlin banks. 
This  increased  power  to float  securities  of  necessity 
proved important in a number of ways in the international National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
business  of  the banks.  For  in  the case  of  large inter- 
national  operations  in  the issue  field  the preference  is 
naturally given to those banks which by previous success 
in that field have proved their power to issue and dispose 
of  securities.  Whenever the German market is resorted 
to in the quest for a larger sale of  securities-a  practice 
which has become less and less frequent since the end of 
the nineties owing to wrong legislation, which impaired the 
power  and  importance  of  our  exchange-the  bank that 
will naturally be favored above all others is the one that 
shows the greatest  strength both by reason  of  the large 
number of  its customers and the extent of  its business. 
The same or  similar considerations will  hold  in other 
instances, where it is not so much a question of  extending 
the market for the securities, of  giving them a wider cur- 
rency, or of  facilitating arbitrage transactions, as a ques- 
tion of  the successful and prompt accomplishment of  tasks 
dependent  on  international  cooperation,  such  as  the 
conversion  of  large  amounts of  securities which  have 
been listed and placed in many countries.  In such cases 
preference will  again be  shown  for the bank which has 
given evidence that it is likely to prove a valuable ally 
for the  successful  liquidation  of  the  business  in  hand 
because of  its demonstrated ability to float successfully 
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its own issues, and of  its large circle of  cutomers, extensive 
international connections, and the large amount of  coupon 
redemptions on account of  the loan in question. 
As  the number  of  issues  and  the amounts  involved 
increase, it becomes more and more necessary and advan- 
tageous for the banks to follow a policy of  expansion and 
simultaneous concentration, so  as to be in a position to 
meet  all the demands of  the domestic and international 
security market.  This involves the flotation and sale of 
securities on  a large scale and can  be  done successfully 
only by  powerful establishments,  whose  extensive busi- 
ness operations and exact knowledge of  the character and 
financial standing of their large clientele enable them to 
dispose of securities permanently and securely by placing 
them  "in strong hands.  Such banks free themselves 
and  their  domestic  or  foreign  associates  of  the  very 
unpleasant  necessity of  having to intervene and to take 
up  securities thrown  back  on  the market  immediately 
after they have been issued. 
Similar phenomena may be observed where the banks 
have  built  up  an  extensive  bill  business.  The bills  of 
customers  flow  most  abundantly  toward  those  banks 
which have learned first how  to  extend  their  industrial 
and commercial connections.  With the growth of  these 
connections there goes  a simultaneous  concentration  of 
capital and an expansion of  operations which in turn leads 
to still more extended business connections, also to con- 
stantly  increasing  activity  in  the  international  money 
market,  and  thereby  to  business  in  foreign  bills  of 
exchange.  The processes  here  involved are both  cause 
and effect of  progressive concentration. 
The same is true of  the acceptance business of  the banks. 
The extent of  these  transactions, as we  have seen, has 
been  largely  increased  by  the  development  of  oversea 
relations  (cf. supra, sec. 4, 1-111).  These  in  turn  lead 
to the establishment of  branches or the founding of  special 
banks  abroad,  of  commandites, or  other  connections  of 
various kinds.  This serves largely to increase the tend- 
ency toward concentration, for it is but natural that in a National  Monetary  Commission 
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foreign  market  particularly  the  acceptances of  a well- 
known  large  bank  with  extensive  capital  should  be 
taken  and  circulate  for  larger  amounts  and  on  more 
favorable  terms  than  the acceptances  of  a  small bank 
unknown abroad. 
When provincial bankers or traders want bank accept- 
ances their preference will be not merely for those banks 
which  can offer  better  terms or  other conveniences, and 
in  addition  further favors  outside  of  acceptances,  but 
rather  for  those  banks  whose  acceptances  can  be dis- 
counted  with  the  least  difficulty  at the  private  rate, 
regardless of  the number of  bills and their amount. 
The  development  of  clearing  and  giro  methods 
likewise makes for  concentration in the sense that this 
service  becomes  of  greater  value  in  proportion  as  the 
connections of  the bank extend and the number of  cus- 
tomers  benefited  by that service  increases.  The latter 
moreover presupposes the carrying of  a minimum account, 
the  amount  of  which  has  been  considerably  increased 
during recent  years."  For after all the giro, check, and 
clearing methods  constitute merely a system of  making 
payments  through  the  banks  which,  while  carried  on 
without  the transfer  of  cash, nevertheless  rests  on the 
presence of  a cash reserve.I1 
Aside  from the special  economic  causes  enumerated, 
as making  for expansion  and  concentration  in  German 
banking,  we  must  refer  also  to  such  influences  which 
were not purely  economic or commercial in nature, but 
were  due  to other  external  motives  such  as  etiquette, 
competition, and so forth. 
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Thus quite often a bank would feel impelled to follow 
suit after another bank had led, as for example in estab- 
lishing a branch at the identical  place where it had been 
established  by  another  bank,  though  not  in  the same 
order."  In  determining  the  amount  by  which  the 
capital should be  increased banks would be  guided not 
merely by  consideration of  their needs, but also  by the 
determination not  to be outdone in the capital increase 
by a competing bank. 
CHAPTER 11.-CAUSES  DETERMINING  THE  EXTENT  AND 
RAPIDITY  OF  THE  CONCENTRATION  MOVEMENT. 
SECTION  I. GENERAL  CAUSES. 
The extent to which concentration may go  in banking 
is  a  priori  unlimited.  In theory  at least  there  are  no 
bounds to capital in this field.  Here concentration meets 
with less  resistance  and fewer  technical  difficulties  and 
obstacles of  the kind likely to be met with in industry, for 
instance, when it is intended to enlarge the plant or estab- 
lishment.  On  the  contrary,  banking  capital  not  only 
permits but even incites constant and continuous expan- 
sion and concentration.  This inherent tendency of  bank- 
ing capital grows with the increase of the country's wealth, 
i. e., with the growth of  capital available for productive 
use.  It is strengthened in proportion  as this productive 
capital comes to be distributed among increasingly larger 
strata of  the population.  Nor is there any such powerful 
counterweight to this tendency  of  capital as there is  in 
trade, where business on a small scale still predominates 
and offers very serious resistance to the progress of  large- 
scale enterprise.  The situation is also different from that National  Monetary  Commission 
in industry, where, at  least at  times and in some branches, 
the cartels have to a certain extent done more to help and 
maintain than to  hamper the existence of  small and weaker 
establishments. 
SECTION  2.  SPECIAL  CAUSES. 
Both the intensity and the rapidity of  the movement 
toward  concentration  are  greatly  enhanced  whenever 
special  causes,  operative in banking to a  greater degree 
than elsewhere, remove existing obstacles in the way of 
the movement,  or  introduce new  factors which  initiate 
this development  with great suddenness,  or cause  it to 
develop more powerfully  and rapidly than might other- 
wise have been the case.  In such instances the movement 
toward  coricentration  precipitates  itself  headlong  like  a 
flood and proceeds with awful violence, as if  all contriv- 
ances for stemming the tide had been swept away and all 
darns had been  destroyed by some natural catastrophe. 
In both directions just mentioned there have been at  work 
during the last period three factors of  particular irnpor- 
tance. 
I. The  liquidation of  banks  (Entgriindung) , which set 
in after the panic of  1873.  The course of  this movement 
is described more fully below (p. 636 and following). 
11.  The cartel movement in industry, which had begun 
as early as the seventies, but became most noticeable in 
the  nineties.  In  this  connection  the most  important 
events were the formation  of  the Rhenish-Westphalian* 
Coal Syndicate in  1893 and of  the Rhenish-Westphalian 
Pig Iron Syndicate in 1897.'~ 
The psychologic effects of  the formation of  these com- 
binations were felt  all  over Germany, and not the least 
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among banking circles, which naturally were first to appre- 
ciate the commercial advantages of  the new development. 
In the first  place,  it was  universally  assumed  that the 
concerted  action of  these syndicates would  soon put an 
end to reckless cutting of  prices at home and to competi- 
tion  abroad and usher  in a  period  of  prosperity  in  the 
mining and smelting industries and with it also in bank- 
ing.  But in order to win  the struggle both within and 
without,  and also  to  be  prepared  for  the boom  period 
which  was  believed  to  be  imminent,  large  funds  were 
needed.  These funds had to be provided in the first place 
by the banks, which, as many financial reports in those 
days kept emphasizing, were in duty bound to stand by 
industry in its struggles.  On the other hand, the banks 
might naturally expect decided business advantages from 
the development of  more intimate relations  with indus- 
try, and  particularly  with  the mining and smelting in- 
dustries in Rhenish-Westphalia and Upper Silesia.  Furth- 
ermore, the assumption seemed justified  that, with con- 
stantly increasing operations, the mining industry would 
not content itself with the capital and credit which the 
banks heretofore connected  with the industry were  able 
to  supply, although  some- of  these,  like the A. Schaaff- 
hausen'scher  Bankverein, had from  the start made the 
mining  industry  their  special  field.  Intimate  relations 
with the mining industry and particularly with the newly 
created  coal  and iron  syndicates  in  the Rhenish-West- 
phalian and Upper Silesian districts held out the hope of 
profitable business both in the fields of  current account 
and credit;  they also promised a large influx of  available 
funds, and in addition increased power  and influence in 
various directions. National  Monetary  Commission 
stimulus  for various industrial establishnlents  to extend 
their operations and influence in their respective districts, 
to establish  more  firmly  their  position  as against  other 
establishments, groups,  and particularly  cartels, as well 
as within the cartels, by way of  combinations, consolida- 
tions, and fusions of  all sorts.  In this way concentration 
in banking, which had been greatly influenced both in the 
extent and rapidity  of  its progress  by  developments  in 
industry, and particularly by the formation of  cartels, in 
turn helped to bring about concentration in industry. 
111.  Mistakes  of  legislation.-The  stamp  and  stock- 
exchange  laws.-The  rapidity of  the movement toward 
concentration  was  heightened  by  the  heavy  burdens 
imposed  on  the trading  in  securities  by  the imperial 
stamp acts  of  *4pril 27, 1894, and June 14, 1900, and by 
the stock-exchange  act of  June 22,  1896, which entered 
into force on January I of  the eventful year 1897. 
I. As early as 1884, when it was proposed to impose a 
percentage  tax on  stock  transfers  (as was  done by act 
of May 24, 1885), it was pointed out by experts that the 
effect would be "to monopolize the banking business  in 
the hands of  a few powerful concerns." 
Nevertheless  the policy  once  entered  upon  was  con- 
tinued.  The  imperial  stamp  tax  of  April  27,  1894, 
doubled the existing tax on transfers  (increasing it from 
one-tenth  to two-tenths per  mille)  and  prescribed  that 
the tax should no longer  be  levied  as  before  on  every 
full  thousand  marks,  but  also  on  any  additional  frac- 
tion of  a thousand marks.  It left, however, transactions 
of  less than 600 marks exempt as heretofore. 
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The act of  June  14, 1900, not only abolished this ex- 
emption,ls but  increased  substantially all  the  rates  of 
the stamp tax on securities, raised the stamp tax on the 
final certificate of  transfer (Orzginalschlussnote) of  shares 
and  bonds  of  foreign  corporations  to  three-tenths  per 
mille, and introduced a tax on the issue and transfer  of 
mining stocks (Kuxe)  . 
Under the act of  October I, 1885, the provincial banker, 
who  had  forwarded  his  customer's  order  to  a  central 
banker  on the  stock  exchange, was  at least  permitted 
under  certain  circumstances  to hand  over  the original 
transfer certificate to his custonler without paying a new 
tax.  However,  the  provincial  banker  could not  avail 
himself of  this relief  unless he was willing to disclose the 
name of  the central banker to his customer.  Accordingly 
until a niore practicable method was introduced by the 
act of  April  27,  I 894, the provincial banker had to affix 
a stamp also to his own certificate to the customer.  The 
result was an increase in the expense of  the business, to 
which there had to be added the commission of  the pro- 
vincial  banker  and the commission  and brokerage  fees 
of  the  central  banker,  which  at the  time  were  more 
equitable and in accord with the trouble and the general 
expense involved  than they are at present.  The direct 
result was that, in order to save expense, the customers 
of  the provincial  bankers,  in  spite of  all  efforts  on the 
latter's  part,  began  to  deal  directly  with  the  central 
banker  or  with the branches established  in  the district 
by the great banks.  This trend assumed ever larger pro- 
portions  when  the  banks  started  to  propose  to  their 
custoniers to participate in the issue of securities as well National  Monetary  Commission 
as to hold  out to then1 more favorable terms and lower 
comnlissions  with the view  of  attracting  orders  in  the 
field of  security business. 
There were further defects in the stamp-tax legislatioll 
which contributed to bring about a reduction in the rates 
of  brokerage.  The banks  to an increasing extent were 
able  to offset  against  one another  within  the bank  the 
large number of  buying and selling orders that came pour- 
ing  in  from  customers.  As  long  as  this  procedure  of 
offsetting  orders  continued  to be  exempted from  taxa- 
tion they were alde to gain at least the equivalent of  the 
entire stamp on every transaction settled within the bank. 
Owing to this profit, they were able to cut lower and lower 
the rate of  commission for their services until it reached 
the unprecedented rate of  one-half per mille, a rate which 
nowhere comes  near  a  reasonable  compensation for  the 
trouble, expense, and risk involved, and which probably 
is not found in any foreign country.  These "compensa- 
tory transactions" became subject to taxation only three 
and a half years after the stock exchange act went into 
effect under section  12  of  the imperial stamp tax law  of 
June 14, 1900.  In other words, they remained untaxed 
until the extensive increases in bank  capital, which had 
been  made as a result  of  the stock exchange legislation, 
and  the large  number  of  branches  and  deposit  offices 
which  had  meanwhile been  established,  made  it  seem 
hopeless for the smaller provincial bankers ever to over- 
come  the lead  which  the banks  in  the  meantime  had 
gained on them. 
Moreover, the increase in  the stamp tax rendered  it 
impossible for the smaller private banker, or at least for 
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a large proportion of them, to engage in what had been in 
former years important and lucrative branches of  business. 
Under  this  head  comes  speculation  in  daily  exchange 
quotations.  This consists in taking  advantage of  fluctu- 
ations in the daily  quotation  of  securities.  Its effect  is 
to bring  about more stable and  uniform  quotations  bv 
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eliminating  small  variations  in  the  daily  quotations. 
This function of  the banker has ample business justifica- 
tion  and renders  a  valuable  service in  the formation  of 
prices.  Ilowever, as the margin of  profit is small it can 
not stand a tax of  three-tenths per n1ille.lg 
Under  the  same  head  comes  the  so-called  arbitrage 
business.  This consists in taking advantage of  variations 
existing  on  different  exchanges  in  the  quotations  of 
domestic securities  and of  so-called international securi- 
ties  dealt  in  also  on  foreign  exchanges.  This  activity 
serves to a great degree to equalize and establish a uni- 
form level for prices of  securities and, moreover, renders 
valuable  economic  service in  facilitating the settling of 
our international balance of trade and payments.20 
Furthermore, a part of  what had been the business of 
the private banker was now taken from him partly as a 
result  of  the tax burden  inlposed  and  partly  in  conse- 
quence  of  the  provisions  of  paragraph  8  of  the  bank- 
deposit  law  of  July  5,  1896,'~  and  of  the  restrictive 
stock exchange legislation to be discussed below.  I refer 
to trading in foreign securities.  This part of  the business 
went to foreign countries and came to be attended to by 
foreign bankers in place of  our own bankers.  As  a result 
of  all this the brokerage business in securities left to the 
smaller private  bankers  fell off  from year  to year  and National  Monetary  Commission 
became  progressively less  profitable.  The only  way  to 
increase profits, given the ruling low rates of  commission, 
was to increase the scale of  operations.  This, however, 
was  out of  the question, since the bulk  of  the business 
now went more and more to the banks, and primarily to 
the Berlin banks and their branches. 
2.  We can not enter here upon the extent of  the injury 
inflicted by the stock exchange legislation on the German 
bourses,  and  indirectly  also  on  the strength  and  com- 
petitive power of  German banking.  On this point I must 
refer  particularly  to  the  discussion  and  the data  con- 
tained  in  the two  memorials  of  the  Centralverband  des 
Deutschen  Bank-und  Bankiergewerbes  (Central  Union  of 
German  Banks  and  Bankers)  of  June,  1901, and  De- 
cember,  1903.~~  Here  only  a  particular  aspect  of  the 
question  can  be  dealt  with,  namely,  to  what  extent 
this legislation  tended  to hasten  the movement  toward 
concentration. 
The  prohibition  of  "  future "  dealings  in  securities, 
affecting large  and  very  important  classes,  particularly 
mining and industrial securities, and the extensive limi- 
tations  on  "  future "  dealings  in  other  sec~rities,~~  ac- 
complished but little more than the bringing to the fore 
of  cash  dealings in  the stock  exchange  business.  The 
result was that since 1897 "a larger amount of  cash was 
made necessary for the same amount of  transactions and 
that the total requirements  of  currency  on  the part  of 
the German business community  was  increased still fur- 
ther just  at a time when  the volume of  business showed 
extraordinary gains."24 
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The smaller private bankers were naturally in no posi- 
tion to meet with their own funds the increased require- 
ments  of  ready  money  for  cash  transactions,  neither 
could they afford to tie up their funds in this way.  On 
the other hand, as soon as the stock exchange legislation 
was  proposed the banks foresaw that the restrictions  of 
future dealings would necessitate the use of  larger amounts 
of  cash.2s  Accordingly, when  the law went  into  effect, 
and even before, they largely increased their  capital and 
available  funds  without  diffic~lty,~~  and  as  a  result 
were  able  to draw  to themselves  even  more  effectively 
than before the custom of  the private bankers. 
Granted even that the tendency toward unification and 
toward operation on a large scale is common to all branches 
of  industry, and that,  judging by the experience of  foreign 
countries  (except the United  States for the time being), 
sooner or later the position of  the private bankers as a 
class would gradually have become weakened as a result 
of  the general concentration  tendencies  27 there can be no 
doubt that the provisions of  the stamp tax and the stock 
exchange legislation did much to hasten this movement, 
or, in other words, to accelerate and aggravate the decline 
of  the economic power of  private banking.28 
In judging  of  this development the main  question  is 
whether  there  has  been  an  essential  decline,  and  not 
whether there has been a decrease in numbers.  It  is only 
the former question which may claim economic and scien- 
tific interest.  There may be a decline of  a profession  in 
spite of an increase in the number of  persons or establish- 
ments belonging to it.2g This is particularly  SO when  the 
i~crease  is only the natural and proportionate result of the National  Monetary  Commission 
general growth of population or when  the gain is due to 
numerous accretions, though all insignificant  in point of 
capital, while the losses, though small in number, involve 
a large exodus of  capital. 
Again, a profession may be highly flourishing and  improv- 
ing in position and influence, even when the  number of  indi- 
viduals or establishments is declining.  This has happened 
frequently abroad, notably in England and France,  where 
the number of  banks decreased because of  the absorption 
of  a  large number  of  small concerns  by  large establish- 
ments, which have thereby increased their power.30 
It is, therefore, unscientific to base any general conclu- 
sions merely on an observed increase or decrease of  abso- 
lute numbers without making  a  most  careful analysis of 
the underlying causes.  It is self-evident that we  do not 
mean to deny that an absolute numerical  decrease or in- 
crease in the number of  establishments or persons may go 
hand in hand with the decline or advance of  the particular 
class, but this is  not  necessarily so.  This much by way 
of  preface.  We may now  take up Ernst Loeb's  data.31 
According to the table prepared by him, during the period 
I 892-1 902-the  decade including the great boom period 
of  1898-190-the  number of  private bankers rose from 
2,180 to 2,564.  In all, there was an increase of  380 for the 
whole of  Germany.  Even if  there were no doubts of  the 
accuracy  of  the statistics, they would  prove very  little. 
An increase so small as not to be proportionate, either to 
the growth in population during this period or to the eco- 
nomic  progress  of  the decade mentioned, would tend to 
confirm rather than to refute the view that the class, as a 
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whole, had  been on the decline, even though there might 
be no falling off  in absolute numbers. 
As a matter of  fact, however, the table, in my opinion, 
is not correct; in fact, it is out of  question that it be so. 
In the Deutsches Bankierbuch, on the basis of  which  the 
table is prepared, the names of  extinct firms or of  firms 
which have gone out of  business are frequently continued 
for  some  time.  This  is  easily  comprehensible.  More- 
over,  as Loeb  himself  admits  (op.  cit.,  p.  248),  a  large 
number  of  persons  who  appear in  the table as bankers 
are either brokers or curb dealers (Remisiers).  For Ber- 
lin alone this is true of  at least 93 names as early as I 896, 
and of  more than  120 at present.  In Frankfort-on-the- 
Main  there  were  between  30 and 50  names  of  persons 
who  style  themselves  bankers,  but  who  are,  in  fact, 
merchandise  dealers  engaged  in  the  grocery  or  other 
trades, who do banking only incidentally and as occasion 
offers.  This view is confirmed by the investigations made 
by  the  Central  Union  of  German  banks  and  bankers 
among 154 official trade bodies.32  The returns made are 
surely  not "  consciously falsified as to facts  and  figures 
in  order  to mislead  public  opinion."33  The  answers  of 
I 15 of  the trade bodies cover  both the newly  organized 
establishments and those that had retired from business. 
The answers show that in the districts of  these I I 5 cham- 
bers of  commerce for the years  1891-1896, or before the 
stock-exchange law was enacted, the number at the close 
of the period as compared with the number at the begin- 
ning was 65 more for banks and 32 less for private bankers. 
In  both  cases  branches  are  included.  For  the years National  Monetary  Commission 
1897-1~02,  however,  the  number  of  banks  and  their 
branches  at the end of  the period was  207 greater than 
at the beginning, whereas the number of  private bankers, 
including  branches, was  at the close  of  the period  125 
less  than  at  the  opening.  There  seems thus  to  have 
been, also, an absolute decline in numbers. 
As  has  been  explained  before,  without  a  detailed 
examination of the phenomena under discussion, no con- 
clusive scientific proof  can  be  attached to the absolute 
figures.  Relative  numbers  are,  however,  much  more 
important when and in  so far as they permit of  definite 
conclusions.  In this  respect  even  Loeb3&  calls  atten- 
tion to the fact that for the ten-year period 1892-1902, in 
which, as he thinks, there has been an absolute increase 
by 380 in the number of  private bankers, the growth of 
the banks, both in number, in capital, and in the number 
of  branches  and  deposit offices, has been  incomparably 
greater.  The number of  joint-stock banks  grew  in this 
period from 379  to 616, the number of  branches (even if 
we  disregard the branches of  the Berlin banks) from 73 to 
264, while even in the briefer period from 1894 to the end 
of  1899 the amount of  their capital stock had grown from 
449 ,ooo,ooo to 87 I ,ooo,ooo 
The  decline  of  private  banking, 3"n  part  absolute 
and in part relative, is more striking in comparison with 
the rapid strides toward concentration among the banks. 
It is, moreover, marked by a variety of other phenomena. 
In the first place it is notable that in  Berlin, the seat of 
the greatest stock exchange, there was a great decline in 
the  absolute number  of  private  bankers.  According  to 
Loeb3' the  decrease was  from  538  in  1892  to 370  in 
1899.  In  the  other  larger  cities  the  number  appears 
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either to have remained stationary or to have increased 
somewhat. 
More important, as showing the decline of  the private 
bankers as a class, is  the relative number  of  those par- 
ticipating in the giro business.  As these statistics include 
only the better class of  private bankers, they give evidence 
not only of the numeric but also of  the more serious qual- 
itative decline of  the private bankers as a class. 
Number participating  in  the giro business within the German Empire. 
At the end of- 
These figures are very eloquent.  They prove an enor- 
mous  growth  of  giro  accounts  for  the period  from  the 
beginning of  1877 to the close of  1890.  It is seen that 
the number of  accounts of  banks and their branches had 
increased by only 73, while those of  private bankers and 
their branches had grown by no less than 439.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  the  period  affected  first  by  the  stock 
exchange legislation and later by the imperial stamp-tax 
legislation of  June  14, 190-the  period from the begin- 
ning  of  1897 to the  end  of  1902 38  the giro  accounts of 
the banks  and their branches had increased by 214 and 
those of  private bankers and their branches by 29 only.3g 
Little as this increase is, nearly all of it is to be ascribed 
primarily to banking in the large cities, to which this bus- 
iness has drifted along with business in general.  It shows 
Banks 
and  their 
Private 
branches. National  Monetary  Commission  - 
a  tremendous  speed of  the movement  of  concentration, 
notably  in these  six years,  and a corresponding decline 
during the same period in the position of  private bankers 
as a class. 
In view of  the notorious outcome of  the entire develop- 
ment, it may be doubted whether it is still worth while 
at this  time  to  differentiate  and  contrast  the rate  of 
growth of  the Berlin banks for this period  with that of 
the  provincial  banks.  The  clearly established  fact  is 
that the same concentration  which  went  on  among the 
large banks took place also among the provincial banks, 
though the rapidity of  this movement was not the same 
for  the  provincial  banks  in  the  various  parts  of  the 
country. 
Thus, for example, during the years  1893-1900,  inclu- 
sive-the  period when with the exception of  the Bergisch- 
Markische Bank  (to be sure the most important of  these 
banks),  the  Rhenish-Westphalian  banks  had  not  yet 
become "  affiliated "-the  I 2  most important banks of  the 
district increased their capital from  107,000,000 to 350,- 
ooo,ooo marks, or  about  226  per  cent.*O  The following 
statistics  compiled  from  the  returns  in  the  memorial 
of  the Centralverband, under  date  of  December,  1903, 
show that as contrasted with the average for the period 
I 883-1 890 the average capital and surplus funds (zererben.de 
Kapitalien) had increased as follows: 
(  Between the years-- 
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22 institutions  at that time independent of  the Berlin great 
banks .............................................. 
.................................  Io  Berlin great banks. 
After a large part of  the provincial banks had become 
"affiliated " with the several Berlin great banks, there can 
be no question but that their striking growth in capital, 
number of  branches, etc., was naturally affected in a large 
degree by their connection with the great banks.  On the 
other hand, since 1905 and as a result  of  the very rapid 
growth of  the great banks and their chains of  banks out- 
side of  Berlin, the provincial banks which had not become 
affiliated  with  the great  banks  sought  to extend  their 
sphere  of  operations,  with  a  view  to maintaining  their 
independence and field of  action.  This was particularly 
the case during  1906 and 1907, when the process of  con- 
centration among the great banks had become arrested. 
I  shall  call  attention  here  only  to  a  few  striking 
examples.  Thus  in  central  Germany  the  Magdeburger 
Bankverein, founded in 1867 as a stock company en com- 
mandite under the firm name of  Klincksiek, Schwanert & 
Co., incorporated  under  the above name in  1897 with  a 
capital  of  I 5 ,ooo,ooo  marks, had on December 30, I 908, seven 
branches (in Aschersleben, Burg near Magdeburg, Dessau, 
Hildesheim, Nordhausen, Peine, and Stendal).  In 1909 a 
branch at Braunschweig was added.  It  also has a deposit 
office (in Greussen) and a commandite (G. Vogler in Qued- 
linburg).  It has absorbed  the following banking firms: 
I 905, S. Frenkel, Nordhausen;  I 905-6,  Herzfeld & Biichler, 
Aschersleben; I 906, H. Bach, Nordhausen ; I 907, Gebriider 
Dux, Hildesheim; 1907, Friedrich Franz Wandel, Dessau; 
1908,  I.  Wertheimer,  Peine  (1909,  Otto  Weibezahl, 
Braunschweig) . 
Since  1907 it has been intimately connected with  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft.  A director of this bank is a mem- 
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Thus between  1905 and the close  of  1909 alone  the 
Magdeburger  Bankverein  absorbed  seven banking  firms 
for the purpose of  establishing branches. 
The Magdeburger Privatbank  of  Magdeburg and  Ham- 
burg (founded  I 856, capital stock 36,000,000 marks, sur- 
plus about 4,000,000 marks) has- 
Thirteen branches (Dessau, Eisenach, Eislebcn, Erfurt, 
Halberstadt, Halle-on-the-Saale, Langensalza, Mulhausen 
in Thuringia, Nordhausen, Sangerhausen, Torgau, Weimar, 
Wernigerode a. H.). 
Twenty-eight deposit  offices  (Aken a.  E., Bismark  in 
the Altmark, Burg near  Magdeburg, Calbe a. S., Egeln, 
Eilenburg,  Finsterwalde  N.-L.,  Frankenhausen,  Garde- 
legen,  Genthin,  Helmstedt,  Hettstedt,  Merseburg,  Neu- 
haldensleben, Oschersleben, Osterburg, Ostenvieck, Perle- 
berg,  Quedlinburg,  Schonebeck  a.  E.,  Sondershausen, 
Stendal, Tangerhutte, Tangermiinde, Thale i. H., Witten- 
berg (district of  Halle) ,  Wittenberge (district of  Potsdam), 
Wolmirstedt) . 
One commandite (Ascherslebener Bank, Gerson Kohen 
& Co., Kommanditgesellschaft in Aschersleben) . 
The Magdeburger Privatbank has absorbed the following 
banks and banking firms: 
1905.  Nordhauser Bank, Nordhausen; Wilhelm Hauff e, 
Eilenburg; Julius Elkan, Weimar; Tobias Fricke, Garde- 
legen. 
I 906.  F.  W.  Quensel, Sangerhausen;  Diskonto-Gesell- 
schaft, Hettstedt. 
1907.  F. Unger, Erfurt; Wittenberger Spar- & Leihbank, 
Registered  Mutual  Society  (Limited), Wittenberg ; Paul 
Thiele, Merseburg; Eislebener Bankverein, Ulrich, Zickert 
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&  Co.,  Eisleben;  Kreditbank  Eisenach  (Incorporated), 
Eisenach  (capital,  I ,500,000 marks) ; Vereinsbank  Mul- 
hausen (Thuringia) with a branch in Langensalza (capital 
2,  I 00,000  marks) ;  Torgauer  Bank,  Torgau  (capital, 
I ,om,ooo marks) ;  Sangerhauser Bankverein, Sangerhausen 
(capital, 898,000 marks) ;  Wernigeroder Kommanditgesell- 
schaft  auf  Aktien  (stock company  en commandite)  Fr. 
Krumbhaar,  Wernigerode, with  a  branch  in  Osterwieck 
i. H. (capital, I, 500,000 marks) ;  Wechslerbank, Hamburg 
(founded 1872; capital, 7,500,ooo marks). 
1908.  Erfurter Bank Pinckert, Blanchart & Co., Erfurt 
(capital  3,008,100 marks);  A.  Sonnenthal, Dessau; Vor- 
schuss- & Sparverein, Weimar, Registered Mutual Society 
(Limited),  continued under the name Thuringische Landes- 
bank, A. G. Weimar, which in 1908 absorbed the Gewerbe- 
und Landwirtschaftsbank G. -m. b. H. Jena. 
I 909.  Dresdner Bankverein, Dresden (founded in I 887; 
capital  21 ,ooo,ooo mark).  This bank  had  absorbed  the 
following :  I 88 7, Weimarische Filialbank, Dresden;  I 890, 
the branches of  the Geraer Bank  in Dresden, Chemnitz, 
and Leipzig;  1900, Hch. Wm. Bassenge & Co., Dresden, 
continued  under  the old  firm name.  This firm  in  turn 
has  branches  in  Meissen  (1904)  and  a  deposit  office  in 
Lommatzsch;  1907,  Ernest  Petasch,  Chemnitz,  and 
Krober & Co., Meissen. 
In addition to the branches growing out of  these banks 
and firms which had been taken over, the Dresdner Bank- 
verein  has  branches  in  Wurzen,  Kamenz,  and  Sebnitz, 
and a deposit ofice in Oecleran. 
After  the  consolidation  (effective  January  I,  I 909) 
the Magdeburger  Privatbank  adopted  the firm  name of National  Monetary  Commission 
Mitteldeutsche Privat-Bank Aktiengesellschaft and increased 
its capital stock to ~O,~O,OOO  marks. 
Thus since  1905  the Magdeburger  Privat-Bank  (now 
Mitteldeutsche Privatbank) , for the purpose of  establish- 
ing branches and deposit offices, absorbed 8 private bank- 
ing firms and I 2 banks. 
In southern Germany the following banks have been in 
the forefront of  the concentration movement. 
The  Bayerische Vereinsbank in Munich (capital 45,000,000 
marks).  It has I 2  branches-Augsburg,  Bad Kissingen, 
Bayreuth,  Erlangen,  Kempten,  Kitzingen,  Landshut, 
Nuremberg,  Passau,  Regensburg,  Straubing, and Wiirz- 
burg.  It also  has  2  deposit  offices  in Munich.  It has 
absorbed the following banks and banking firms:  1885-86, 
Joseph  von  Hirsch, Munich;  I 89 I -92,  Guggenheimer  & 
Co., Munich;  I 898-99,  Adolph  Bohm,  Landshut;  1905, 
Stiglmeier & Bohm, Straubing;  Gregor  Oehninger  Sohn 
&  Co.,  Wiirzburg;  1906-7,  Franz  Eglauer,  Passau; 
I 907-8,  Niirnberger  Bank in Nuremberg, Lauf, Erlangen, 
Schwabach,  and  Hersbruck;  Wiirzburger  Volksbank, 
Wiirzburg;  Friedrich Feustel, in Bayreuth and Kissingen; 
Leyherr  &  Co.,  Augsburg;  F.  S. Euringer,  Augsburg; 
August Leipert, Kempten. 
Thus since  1885 the Bayerische Vereinsbank absorbed 
10 banking firms and 2 banks. 
The Bayerische  Handelsbank  in  Munich  increased  its 
capital in 1906 from 27,171,800 marks to 33,963,800, and 
in 1908 to 35,600,000 marks.  Between 1906 and 1908 it 
established branches in Ansbach, Immenstadt, Bayreuth, 
Hof, Gunzenhausen, Lichtenfels, Miinchberg, Nordlingen, 
Neuberg  on  the  Danube,  Markt-Redwitz,  Mindelheim, 
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Regensburg,  Rosenheim,  Schweinfurt,  and  Wiirzburg. 
Earlier it had established a branch at Kempten (in 1899), 
and  branches  at Bamberg,  Kronach,  Kulmbach,  Mem- 
mingen, and Aschaffenburg  in  1905.  For the purpose of 
establishing or enlarging branches it took over the follow- 
ing banking establishments:  , 
I 899.  Ignaz Wolfsheimer, Kempten. 
1905.  Hermann  Hellmann,  Bamberg  and  Kronach; 
F. L. Bauer, Kulmbach; L. Ullmann & Sohne, Kempten; 
Gewerbebank Memmingen. G. m. b. H. (Limited), Mem- 
mingen ; Heinrich Mayer, Memmingen ; Wolf  S. Gutmann, 
Ansbach; M.  Wolfsthal, Aschaffenburg. 
1906-7.  A.  Krauss,  Bayreuth and Munchberg;  Schiil- 
lcr & Co., Bayreuth and Hof. 
1907. Hans  Mayer, Lichtenfels;  Ludwig  Rosenfelder, 
Niirdlingen; Fr. H. Miller, Mindelheim; Max  de Crignis, 
Neuberg on-the-Danube. 
1907-8.  Wilhelm Frank, Gunzenhausen. 
1908. Haymann  &  Co.,  Regensburg;  Richard  Kirch- 
ner,  Wiirzburg;  Kreditbank  Rosenheim  A.  G.  (capital 
I ,ooo,ooo marks) ; I. Gutmann, Ansbach. 
Thus the Bayerische Vereinsbank absorbed since  1899 
17 banking firms and 2 banks. 
In western  Germany among others the Barmer Bank- 
verein  of  Barmen  absorbed  the Bonner  Privatba?zk, the 
FVestfaZische  Bankkommandite  Ohm,  Hermekamp & Co. 
(now  the  Niederdeutsche  Bank),  and  the  Godesberger 
Bank. 
The Rheinisch-l.Vestfdische  Disconto-Gesellschaft in Aix- 
la-Chapelle (capital 80,000,ooo marks), which we omitted 
from  the  chain  of  banks  belonging  to  the  Disconto- The German Great Banks  NationaZ  Monetary  Commission 
Gesellschaft for the reasons given on  p. 673 (regarding it 
as an independent provincial bank) has now 17 branches 
at the following places:  Bielefeld,  Bochum,  Bonn, Cob- 
lenz, Cologne, Dortmund, Diisseldorf, Godesberg, Giiters- 
loh, Lippstadt,  Maria-Gladbach,  Neuss,  Neuwied, Reck- 
linghausen, Remscheid, Traben-Trarbach, and Viersen.  It 
has, besides, 7 deposit offices-3  in Cologne and I in each of 
the towns of  Kalk, Kreuznach, Malmedy, and Ratingen, 
and 2 commandites, Delbriick, Leo & Co., Berlin, and M. W. 
Koch  &  Co.,  Frankfort-on-the-Main.  It  has  absorbed 
the following banks and firms: 
....................  Volksbank Geilenkirchen-Hunshoven  3 I 5, ooo 
Oberbergische-Bank,  Oh1 42. ............................  1, 505,@JO 
..................................  Eupener Kreditbank.  500, ooo 
Herforder Discontobank. ...............................  2,500,800 
Biinder Bank. 
Establishments. 
........................  Bank fiir Rheinland and Westfalen. 
.......................................  Koblenzer Bank. 
.........................  Groethuysen & Linxweiler, Viersen 
..................  Kolnische Wechsler-und Kommissionsballk 
...................................  Neuwieder Bankverein. 
...................................... 
Bochumer  Bank.  Bochum  (with branches  in  Dortmund  and 
Recklinphausen) 
Westialische Bank, Bielefeld, Lippstadt, and Giiterdoh. ...... 
...............................  Otto Lohmann, Bielefeld. 
Diisseldorfer Bank, Diisseldorf. ............................ 
...........  Johann Ohligschlaeger  (Limited). Aix-la-Cllapelle. 
Ziilpicher Volksbank. Ziilpich ............................ 
.......................  Remscheider Kredit-und Sparbank. 
..................................  Unnaer Bank in Unna 
Crefelder Bank in Crefeld (continued as a branch). .......... 
SECTION 4.  SPECIAL  CAUSES OF THE RAPIDITY OF THE CON- 
CENTRATION  MOVEMENT  DURING  1901-1 904. 
The concentration  movement  proceeded  with  an un- 











again during the years  I 901-1 904, inclusive.  The earlier 
period,  characterized  by  the establishment  of  so-called 
provincial  banks,43  is  at present  of  no  more  than his- 
toric significance.  It was during the latter period partic- 
ularly that concentration assumed striking and at times 
even  uncanny  dimensions.  While  even  before  this  the 
movement  had  advanced  quite rapidly, these four years 
witness a record speed in this development. 
The progress  in concentration was  greatly accelerated 
by the influence of  psychologic  factors, as is so often the 
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............  Volksbank, Erkelenz. ..............................  .I} I909 
Hardy & Co. (Limited), Berlin.. ......................... 
I.  THE  CRISES  OF 1873  AND  1900. 
........... 
The general observation may be made that every crisis 
is followed by a marked strengthening of  existing tenden- 
cies toward concentration and by an increased rapidity of 
the movement in that direction.  The  Rheinisch-Westfalische  Disconto-Gesellschaft  has 
formed communities of  interest with the following banks: 
Capital (marks). 
.....................................  Eschweiler  Bank.  a I,  000, 000 
DiirenerBank ........................................  8,500,000 
This bank  absorbed in 1905 the Euskirchner  Volksbank 
and the Julische  Volksbank and established  branches  at 
Euskirchen and Jiilich. 
a 600,000 marks paid in. 
After every crisis, which results in the annihilation and 
sweeping away of  many undertakings, the weaker estab- 
lishments which  were  able to survive in halfway  sound 
condition  only  through  assistance  of  some  sort  realize 
that they can achieve permanent safety only by merging 
with  other establishments.  This is  particularly  true of National  Monetary  Commission 
those establishments which have broadened their base of 
operation  during the prosperous  years before  the panic 
by enlarging their business or increasing their capital to a 
point  where they  cannot make full  and  rational  use  of 
their plant or capital while business is at a standstill. 
Wallich 44 properly points out, therefore, that the move- 
ment  of  concentration  which  set in  in German banking 
during the boom  period  1870--1872 proceeded at a more 
rapid pace immediately after the crisis of  1873, as a result 
of  the liquidation or "  disestablishment"  of  banks, which 
was carried out by stronger banks.  While the latter fre- 
quently saved from total collapse weaker banks that had 
fallen into sore straits, and at any rate made it easier for 
them to realize their assets, they made sure at the same 
time of  taking over valuable existing business connections, 
fiscal agencies, etc., and thus largely increased their power 
and influence. 
It was in this manner  and with this purpose in view 
that the Deutsche Unionbank during the period 1871-1874 
undertook  the  liquidation  of  four  banks, the  Deutsche 
Bank  during  the period  1873-1876-the  liquidation  of 
the  Allgemeine  Depositenbank,  and  of  the  Elberfelder 
Disconto-  und  Wechselbank,  also  of  the  just-mentioned 
Unionbank,  which  paid  the  extreme  penalty for  tying 
up its resources in the above operations.  The Dresdner 
Bank during the years 1873-1878  undertook the liquida- 
tion of  four banks, viz, the Dresdner Handelsbank, Scich- 
sischer Bankverein, Siichsische Kreditgesellschaft, and Thur- 
ingische  Bank.  in  Sondershausen.  Lastly, in  1875, the 
Wiirttembergische  Vereinsbank  undertook  the liquidation 
of  the Stuttgarter Bank. 
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Soon after this (from 1876 and on into the eighties) the 
Deutsche  Bank  carried on the  liquidation of  four  other 
banks-the  Berliner  Bankverein, the  Berliner  Wechsler- 
bank, the Frankfurter Bankverein  (which resulted in the 
establishment of  a branch in Frankfort-on-the-Main), and 
the Niederlausitzer Bank in Kottbus.  In 1876 the state- 
ment of  the Deutsche Bank contained an item of  6,500,000 
marks  of  "  securities "  chiefly  of  banks  in  liquidation, 
which it had bought up cheaply.  During the same period 
the number of  its accounts on which it had to pay com- 
missions had increased from 855 to I ,354. 
The establishments that had weathered the crisis with 
their own resources, without being obliged to resort to out- 
side help,  weremainly those that had been able to strengthen 
their resources greatly before  the crisis through the con- 
centration and consolidation of their business and capital. 
Outsiders usually learn of  this for the first time during the 
panic, and those establishments which have failed to do 
so in time now  hasten to follow the example set by the 
successful establishments.  On the other hand, those banks 
which have been able not only to survive the panic, but 
also to extend assistance to others, come out of  the panic 
with  renewed  spirit  of  enterprise.  Moreover,  during  a 
panic they are able, at relatively small cost and with the 
prospects of  more  than average profits, to satisfy  their 
ambition for expansion by making suitable investments. 
The  result  is  liquidation  or  absorption  of  the  concern 
seeking assistance, at all events, however, permanent  de- 
pendence  upon  the  assisting  bank.  According  to  the 
memorial of  the Centralverband des  Deutschen Bank- und 
Bankiergewerbes, during 1901-2, i. e., during and after the National  Monetary  Commission 
panic,  no  fewer  than  41  branches  were  established  by 
banks, mostly in place of  private banking firms that had 
been absorbed.  During the same brief  period 116 bank- 
ing firms had gone out of  business.  Moreover,  quite an 
array of  larger banks might be cited which had been able 
to preserve their independence during the boom  period, 
but which by adverse circumstances were forced to seek 
the aid of  one of  the great  Berlin banks  and to resign 
part of their former independence according to the looser 
on closer relationships established, being thus made to pay 
a heavy tribute to the crisis.4i 
In 1903 the "  permanent participations" of  the Deutsche 
Bank  amounted,  in  round  figures,  to 57,000,ooo marks 
(as  against  5o,ooo,ooo in  1899), those of  the  Disconto- 
Gesellschaft  to 58,000,000 marks  (as against  51,000,ooo 
marks in I 899). 
Confidence plays a notably large part in banking, and 
after every crisis general confidence naturally turns, above 
all,  to those  institutions  which  have  displayed  energy, 
insight, and power in going to the rescue of  other institu- 
tions or in intervening energetically on the stock exchange. 
On the other hand, there is a loss of  confidence, often thor- 
oughly  unjustified,  in other  institutions-that  is to say, 
in the smaller banks and private bankers.  In other cases 
the safety of  the securities left on deposit with those insti- 
tutions  may  be  brought  into  question,  particularly  if 
events like those which took  place in Berlin during the 
fall of  1891 are of  a nature to disturb, even only tempora- 
rily  and  in  isolated  instances,  public  confidence in  the 
safety of  the institutions. 
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Owing to such causes, the concentration movement re- 
ceived  a  great  impetus  from the prompt  and  effective 
intervention of the large banks on the occasion of  the col- 
lapse in 1901 of the Pommersche Hypotheken Bank (Pomer- 
anian Mortgage Bank), the Preussische Hypothekenaktzen- 
bank  (Prussian Mortgage  Bank,  Incorporated), and the 
Deutsche Grundschuldbank (German Real Estate Mortgage 
Bank).  A  similar effect was  produced  by the  notably 
energetic  intervention  of  the Deutsche Bank, which  an- 
nounced the opening of its own branch in Leipzig on the 
very  day, June  25,  1901, when  the Leipziger Bank  sus- 
pended payments. 
2. THE FOUNDING  OE*  THE UNITED  STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION,  FEBRUARY 
23,  1901. 
During those years  (from  1901 onward), and again in 
1904, the record year in the rapidity of  the concentration 
movement,  other  important  events  exerted  a  profound 
psychologic influence.  It is no exaggeration to say that 
few events during the second epoch (1870-1905) occupied 
the thoughts and stirred the feelings of  the widest circles 
so strongly as the founding of  the United States Steel Cor- 
poration on February 23, 1901, with the enormous capital 
of  I,  IOO million dollars. 
The Germans had either overlooked or ignored the fact 
that this event simply marked the culminating point, pro- 
visional at that, in a concentration movement which had 
begun in the United States with great energy as early as 
1881 in  many  lines  of  industry, mainly  in  the form  of 
trusts.  The "  law of  the large numbers " has rarely pro- 
duced so great an effect  as in this case.  Not  until this National  Monetary  Commission 
culminating event took place were Germans of  all classes, 
far  bevond  banking  circles  and  the  industrial  circles 
directly concerned, made aware that Germany would have 
to prepare for a struggle destined to grow more and more 
severe, a struggle which threatened to be defensive rather 
than offensive and in which Germany's chances were not 
likely to be improved by her far inferior capital resources. 
In the face of  this situation it seemed urgently necessary 
to accelerate the movement of concentration.  This neces- 
sity became  the more  apparent in  view  of  the peculiar 
form  of  American  industrial  combinations,  the  trusts, 
which involves complete control of  the associated enter- 
prises  and  of  their  business  management,  permitting  a 
reduction in the cost of  production, an effect which  the 
German  cartels  had  almost  completely  failed  to attain 
owing, for one thing, to the autonomy of  the enterprises 
included in the cartels. 
3  THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  STAHLWERKV~RBAND (STEEL  WORKS'  UNION)  IN 
DUSSELDOKF,  MAKCH  1, I904 
Such a  reinforcement of  the concentration  movement 
seemed demanded both in the field of  industry, represent- 
ing the most advanced and exposed part of  the battlefield, 
as in the field of  German banking, the auxiliary of  industry. 
Thus under the fresh impression of  the event that had oc- 
curred in the United States, the long-continued and labo- 
rious efforts  to establish the Steel Works' Union in Dussel- 
dorf were, on March I, 1904, brought to a successful issue 
and hailed far and wide as an auspicious result.  This was 
followed, on January I, 1905, by the founding of  the Upper 
Silesian Steel Works' Union (Oberschlesischer Stahlwe~kver- 
All  these  developments in  the  United  States 
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and in Germany in their turn gave a new impetus to the 
movement  of  concentration  in  German  banking.  This 
movement proceeded by  leaps and bounds during those 
years, especially in 1904, to a large extent at the expense 
of  the smaller banks. 
SECTION  I.  OUTWARD  COLrRSE  OP  DEVELOPMENT. 
The outward development of  the Berlin great banks," 
of  which as many as ten were usually enumerated even as 
late as 1903, is represented in tabular form at the end of 
this  book  in  Appendix  VII.  From  that tabular  state- 
ment the following data may be gathered as regards the 
present number of  the great banks: 
The ~~,ooo,ooo  marks of  capital of  the Mitteldeutsche 
Kreditbank  has been  considerably surpassed by  that of 
several provincial banks.  Thus the Allgemeine Deutsche 
Kreditanstalt  has  a  capital  of  9o,ooo,ooo  marks; the 
Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft, 8o.ooo.ooo 
.  ,  marks; the  Rheinische  Kreditbank,  75,0oo,oo0  marks; 
the  Bergisch-Markische  Bank,  75,000,ooo  marks : th~ 
,  ----  Barmer Bankverein, 6o,mo,ooo marks;  the Essener Kre- 
ditanstalt,  60,om,oa, marks.  The capital of  the Com- 
merz- und Disconto-Bank (Bg,ooo,ooo marks) and of  the 
Nationalbank  fur Deutschland  (80,000,ooo marks)  was 
also surpassed by that of  the Allgemeine Deutsche Kredit- 
anstalt and was equaled in 1908 by that of the Rheinisch- 
Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft,  and even surpassed in 
1909, when it reached g5,ooo.w marks.  Thus beginning National  Monetary  Commission 
with  January  I, 1905, and ranging  them  solely by  the 
amount of the capital, the term great bank being assumed, 
as  usual,  to  imply  a  minimum  capital  of  ~oo,ooo,ooo 
marks, only the following six banks can be grouped under 
that term. 
Capttal (marks) 
I  Deutsche Banh  zoo,ooo,oo~ 
2  Dresdner Bank  18o,ow,oo0 
3  D~sconto-Gesellschaft  170,000,000 
4  Bank fur Handel und Industrle  154,000,ooo 
5  A  Schaaffhlusen'scher Bankvereln  145,000,ooo 
6  Berhner Handelsgesellschaft 
I 10,  000,ooo 
But if we  place the limit  at 8olooo,ooo of  capital, we 
shall now have to include in the list of  great banks also the 
Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft (8o,ooo,om, 
since  I 909,  g~,ooo,00o  marks), the Allgemeine  Deutsche 
Kreditanstalt  (go,ooo,ooo  marks),  the  Comrnerz-  und 
Disconto-Bank (8~,ooo,ooo  marks), and the Nationalbank 
fur Deutschland  (8o,ooo,ooo marks). 
With  8o,ooo,ooo as  the limit, the term "Berlin  great 
banks" would include not only the six above enumerated, 
which have their home office or at any rate their financial 
center of  gravity  in Berlin, but also the Commerz- und 
Disconto-Bank and the Nationalbank fur Deutschland, so 
that the total number would be eight. 
Of  all these banks the Berliner IIanclelsgesellschaft only 
has strictly adhered  to the principle of  absolute centrali- 
zation,  it  has  neither  branches,  nor  commandztes,  nor 
deposit offices, nor communities of  intere~t.'~ 
At  the  present  time  the  five  largest  Berlin  banks, 
together with their domestic communities of  interest either 
through the ownership of  stock or through contract, and 
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the domestic communities of interest of  the latter (count- 
ing only capital and surplus funds,  but not deposits), form 
the following groups, whose capital power is given as per 
December 3 I, I 908. 
I. The group of  the  Deutsche Bank.-Including:  40 
The Deutsche Bank itself 
Also the followtng 
-p- 
Marks 
200 000 000  50 
Cap~tal  Surplus 
Marks 
101 831 917 
l  l 
I  Bergtsch Marklsche Bank In Elberfeld 
2  Schlestscher Banhveretn in Breslau 
3.  Hannoversche Bank In Hannover 
Together wtth 
(a) Osnabrucker Bank tn Osnabruck 
(b) Htldeshetmer Bank tn Hlldeshetm 
4  Dutsburg Ruhrorter Bank In Dutsburg 
5  Essener Kred~tailstalt  In Essen a  d  R 
Together with the Westfaltscher Rankvere~n 
In Munster 
6  S~egener  Bank fur Handel und Gewerbe in 
Strpen 
7 Sachstsche Bank in Dresden 
8  Esscner Bankveretn in Essen a  d  R 
9  Oldcnburglsche  Spar- und Leihbank In 01 
denburg 
10  Prtvatb~nk  zu Gotha 
XI hlecklcnburger  Hypothckcn-  U  Wcchsel 
b 11th ~n  Schwertil 
Tc  irctl~tr  with the hIeckltnburglschc  Spar 
bank 
11.  Rhe~n~sche  Kreditbauh In hlannheirn 
Wilh the 
M mnhctincr l3ank tit hlannhcim 
And the 
Suddcutschc Bank tn Mannlicitu 
Total 
3 775 000 
2 200 000 
247 152 
18  176 ooo 
75 000 000 
30 000 000 
22 500 000 
14  500 ooo 
8 ooo ooo 
I2 000 000 
60  ooo ooo 
8  ooo ooo 
4 ooo ooo 
30 ooo ooo 
IS 000 000 
4 ooo ooo 
7 900 000 
y  ooo ooo 
?  000 000 
75 ooo 800 
I 000 000 
10  000 000  -- 
588 900  800 
197 957 295 
1 621 ooo 
970 000 
7 500 ooo 
2 200 000 
I 900 ooo 
1 615  735 
Total capital and surplus combtned  786 858 095 
Adding the "  friendly (befreundete) banks " (see Append. 
VII, p  993), the share capital of  the group is  increased 
by  2 I 2,500,000 marks,  the surplus funds by  46,038,260 National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
/  capital.  1  ~urplus.  marks, making a total of 258,538,260 marks, so that the 
total power of the group rises to  I ,045,396,355 marks.  Continued.  I  I 
7.  Landgrafficl~  Hessische konzessiouicrte Landes- 
bank in Homburg v. d. H.. .............. 
8.  Scbwarzburgische  Laudesbank  zu  Sonders- 
hausen, z,~oo,ooo  marks nominal, paid in . 
Marks. 
I,  000,000 
Marks. 
225,006  11.  The  group of  the Disconto-Gesel1schaft.-Including : 
I  Capital.  1  Surplus. 
- 
Marks. 
1~0,000,  000 
Marks. 
57,592,611  ...................  The Disconto-Gesellschaft  itself. 
Also: 
...........  I. Norddeutsche Rank in Hamburg. 
2.  Allgemeine Deutsche Kreditans talt in Leipzig. . 
Together with: 
(a) A. Busse & Co. in Berlin.. .......... 
(b)  Vogtlandische Bank in Plauen i. V. .. 
(c)  Oberlausitzer Bank in Zittau. ....... 
(d)  Vereinsbank in Zwickau. ........... 
............  3.  Barmer Bankverein in Barmen.. 
4.  Siiddeutsche Disconto-Gesellschaft, Mannheim . 
Gubsidiary institutions (Tochter-Gesellschaften): 
5.  Bayerische  Disconto-  und  Wechselbank  in 
Total. ............................... 
Add surplus. ............................. 
Grand total.. ......................... 
I  Capital.  /  Surplus. 
Marks. 
145,000,000 
IV. The  group  of  the  A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankve- 









The A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein itself. ...... 
Also: 
I. Pfilzische Bank in Ludwigshafen. .......... 
2.  Mittelrheinische Bank in Kohlcnz.  ......... 
3. With the h1iilheimerBankinMulheima.d. Ruhr 
4.  Subsidiary bank:  Westfalisch-Lippische  Ver- 
.............  einsbank A.-G. in Bielefeld 
...................................  Nuremherg 
6.  Bank fur Thiiringen vorm. B. M. Strupp, stock 
company in hfeiningen,  capital  ~o,ooo,ooo 
.................  marks, of  which paid in. 
..............................  Total..  437,786,200  126,961,129 
.............................  ..............  Add surplus.  I 26,961,  I 29 
........................  ............  Grand total..  ./  564,747,329  1.. 
Total. ............................... 
Addsurplus  .............................. 
Grand total. .......................... 
111.  The group  of  the Dresdner Bank.-Including: 
V.  The group  of  the  Darmstadter Bank.-Including:  54 
231, ooo,ooo 
47,538,001 
1  Capifal.  I  Surplus. 
47.538. OOI 
.............. 
I  Capital.  I  ~urp~us. 




~1.~00,000  Marks 
154,000,  coo 
Marks. 
30.250.000 
.......................  The Dresdner Bank itself. 
Also: 
I. M5rkische Bank in Bochum.. .............. 
2.  Rheinische Bank in Essen. ................ 
...........  3. Oberschlesische Bank in Beuthen 
4.  Wiirttembergische Landesbank in Stuttgart. 
5. Oldenburgische  Landesbank  in  Oldenburg, 
....  ~,ooo,ooo  marks. paid in 40 per cent = 
6.  Mrcklenburgische Bank in Schwerin, ~.ooo,ooo 
marks, paid in 40 per cent = ............. 
Together with the following: 
(a) Rostocker  Gewerbebank,  A.-G.  in 
The Darmstadter I3ank itself. .................... 
Also: 
I. Breslauer Discontobank in Breslau.. ........ 
2.  Ostbank fur Handel und Gewerbe  in Posen6' 
I. 060, ooo 
Is350,0O0 
445.000 
273.605  3.  Nordwestdeutsche Bank in Bremen ......... 
4.  Bayerische  Bank fur Handel und Industrie. . 
5,  Subsidiary bank:  Wiirttembergische Bankan. 




(b)  Neuvorpommersche  Spar- und  Kre- 
ditbank in Stralsund.. ............ 
Grand total.. ........................  .l  297,437,490  1 National  Monetary  Commission 
Combining  capital  and surplus  (with the reservation 
explained  above)  and  adding  those  of  the  "friendly 
(befreundete) banks"  of  Group  I, these  five  groups thus 
comprise  a  capital  power  of  js  2,470,061,594 marks,  or 
not far short of  2,500,000,000 marks,  while  the capital 
alone amounted to 1,954,617,000 marks and the surplus 
funds to 516,444,594 marks. 
Evidently these sums would be much higher if  we were 
to add the deposits used in the business  of  these banks, 
but this seems to me improper.59  The growth of  these 
affiliations is shown in Appendix VII. 
It is interesting to note the shiftings that have occurred 
and still occur, both within the banks of  a group and as 
regards their connection with the various groups.  Thus the 
Bergisch-Markische Bank in Elberfeld, originally founded 
by the Provinzial-Discontogesellschaft (see note 43, p. 862) 
belongs  not  to  the group  of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
but to that of  the Deutsche Bank.  Again  the Ostbank 
fiir Handel und Gewerbe, belonging to the group of  the 
Darmstadter Bank, has absorbed the Ostdeutsche Bank 
Aktien-Gesellschaft  vormals J. Simon Wittwe in Konigs- 
berg in  Prussia  (province), which  used  to belong to the 
group of  the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein.  Thus 
again, within the group of  the Deutsche Bank, the Essener 
Kreditanstalt  in  1909  absorbed the Duisburg-Ruhrorter 
Bank  and  in  1906  the Westfalischer  Bankverein, with 
which it had  maintained  a community of  interest  since 
1904.  Finally  the Emder  Bank, which  belongs  to the 
group  of  the Deutsche  Bank and has  a  community of 
interest with  the latter, was  absorbed  in  1907  by the 
Osnabriicker  Bank, which  has  a community of  interest 
with the Hannoversche Bank (Deutsche Bank group). 
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Judging from the past course of  concentration, partic- 
ularly as affecting the proviricial  banks  in  recent  years, 
it would  seem that the end of concentration in German 
banking, at  least outside of Berlin, is not yet in sight. 
SECTION 2.  GENERAL TENDENCIES  AND FORMS  OF 
CONCENTRATION. 
The concentration in German banking was on the one 
hand  a  local  concentration  of  banks  in  Berlin;  on  the 
other hand a concentration of capital and power. 
The latter was acco~nplished  either- 
(A)  In a direct way, to wit: 
(I) By increase of  capital. 
(2)  By  affiliation  of  enterprises  (banks  or  private 
banking establishments). 
(3)  By  the  creation  of  permanent  conl~nuriities  of 
interest, to wit: 
(a) By the founding of  subsidiary or  trust  com- 
panies. 
(b)  By the acquisition of  shares. 
(c)  By agreement. 
(d)  By exchange of  shares. 
Or it was accomplished- 
(B)  In  an  indirect  way,  O0  by  decentralization  of 
operation, to wit : 
(I) By the founding of  commandites (silent partner- 
ships). 
(2)  By the founding of  branches. 
(3)  By the founding of agencies. 
(4)  By the founding of deposit offices. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
In this  classification  the  term  "  local  (' ortliche ')  con- 
centration " is coextensive with the term "  local (' lokale ') 
concentration"  used  by  Ad.  and  the  term 
concentration of  capital is coextensive with Ad. Weber's 
term  concentration  of  property  (Vermogenskonzentra- 
tion)-i.  e. absorption of  previously  independent institu- 
tions or increase of  capital.  Under the term "  concentra- 
tion of  capital  and  power"  I have comprehended  both 
Ad. Weber's" concentration of  property " and his "  admin- 
istrative concentration " (founding of  friendly institutions, 
extension  of  the network of  branches, in certain cases the 
undertaking of  liquidations and reorganizations) . 
I used  this  expression  "concentration  of  capital  and 
power"  because it is hardly accurate to speak of  a "  con- 
centration of  capital " when the actual operation consists 
in a decentralization of  operation through the founding of 
commandites, branches, agencies, and deposit offices, while 
this operation certainly involves a concentration of  power. 
To my mind  Weber's  term, "  administrative  concentra- 
tion," is liable to the same objection, when, as in the case 
of  an extension  of  the network of  branches,  the actual 
operation involves, not administrative concentration, but 
the very contrary, viz, decentralization of  functions. 
On  the other  hand,  I  purposely  excluded  from  my 
scheme of  concentration the operation called by Ad. Weber 
"  concentration  of  interests,"  to wit, "  combinations  of 
banks for the common pursuit of definite single interests; 
for  example,  the  Prussian  syndicate,  the  Rothschlid 
group."  In so  doing  I  was  led  by  the consideration 
pointed out in the footnote 2, on page 233 of  the second 
edition, that the formation of  syndicates or groups, while 
constituting one of  the factors which indirectly promote 
concentration, is not prompted by any conscious aim to 
bring about concentration.  On the contrary, this forma- 
tion of permanent syndicates or groups is due to entirely 
different motives and pursues quite different aims.  It is 
founded on the principle of  the distribution of  risk, and 
aims  at a  greater  safeguarding  of  the underwriting  or 
issuing bank, on the one hand, and, on the other, at  facil- 
itating the issue operation, etc. 
However, I am in complete accord with Weber as re- 
gards the bearing of  his classification, and I hope that the 
present work will prove it.  If  such is the case, the ques- 
tion of  the true scheme is immaterial.  Both he and I are 
trying to lay bare the motives,  the internal or external 
factors  that lead  to  concentration.  He  tries  to  show 
where concentration in banking leads to concentration in 
industry, and vice versa.  To this I had not devoted suffi- 
cient attention in earlier editions of  this book, while in the 
present edition I have laid special stress on it (see Part V, 
p. 703,  et seq.). 
In connection with this subject the following remarks 
may not be inappropriate. 
On surveying the process of  development, especially in 
recent time, I can not agree with Weber's statement that 
the great  banks  show  an unmistakable  course  toward 
specialization,  inasmuch  as  the  A.  Schaaffhausen'scher 
Bankverein  devotes  special  attention  to  mining,  the 
Dresdner  Bank  to the textile  and  chemical  industries, 
the Deutsche Bank to the electrical industry and oversea 
trade,  the  Discontogesellschaft  to  transportation-the 
Darmstiidter Bank not being mentioned.  So far as such National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
specialization can be observed, it may at least in  part be 
explained historically.  Thus in the case of  the A. Schaaff- 
hausen'scher  Bankverein, the special attention to mining 
in the Rhenish-Westphalian  district inay be explained by 
its geographic location and by its continuation of  the old 
connections of  the A. Schaafiausen banking house from 
which it sprang;  in the case of  the Dresdner Bank by its 
special  connections  with  tlie  industry  of  Saxony.  To 
some extent this specialization was merely the expression 
of  a definite program, whereby, for example, the Deutschc 
Bank was led to devote special energy to the development 
of the deposit business, of  oversea business relations, and 
the vigorous pro~notion  of  the policy of  industrial exports 
(see above, Ch. 111, sec. 6, under I). 
Such specialization as did exist has become less and less 
pronounced, for the reason that the scope of  banking ac- 
tivity has constantly widened, each bank being led, even 
if  only by competitive reasons,  to extend its activity to 
departments  in which  previously  some  other bank  had 
been  predominant.  Thus, for  example, it would  be de- 
cidedly inexact to say nowadays that the Deutsche Bank 
makes a specialty of  the over-sea or the electric business, 
or even that it devotes its main attention to them, the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft  and  the  Berliner  Handelsgesell- 
schaft being its close rivals, the former in the over-sea busi- 
ness, the latter in the electric business. 
Similarly, as shown by Jeidels and in the  present work,  the 
mining industry has long ceased to be the special preserve 
of  the  A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bank~erein,~~  which,  in 
fact, is no longer completely  dominant  in its own home 
district.  In the matter of  banking relations to the mining 
industry it has been either equaled or surpassed by a num- 
ber of  other banks, such as the Dresdner Bank, the Ber- 
liner  Handelsgesellschaft, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, and 
the Deutsche Bank.  Of the Dresdner Bank, too, it can no 
longer be said that the textile and chemical industries are 
its special province.'j3 
In the field of  transportation  all the great banks are 
to-day as active as the Disconto-Gesellschaft, while in the 
special field of  local and street railways the Dresdner Bank, 
the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft, and  the  Darmstadter 
Bank are about equally represented. 
Thus in speaking of  the business  activity of  the great 
banks we  can no longer speak of  specialties, but only of 
more or less pronounced tendencies. 
These criticisms, however, are directed only against one 
of  the arguments underlying Weber's proposal.  The pro- 
posal itself, as I have tried to show in this third edition, is 
none the less well founded. 
Rud.  Eberstadt O4  proposes  a  distinction  between  a 
"  centralization of capital " and a "  centralization of  organi- 
zation," according as the capital or the organization is con- 
centrated at a single point.  I have not been able to con- 
vince myself of  the propriety of  this distinction.  At any 
rate it does  not bring out any factor of  decisive impor- 
tance in German development, and hence fails to render 
the subject clearer, since the two kinds of  concentration 
are as apt to occur in combination as separately. 
11.  THE TWO  PERIODS  IN  THE  HISTORY OF  CONCENTRATION. 
Two periods may be distinguished in the process of  con- 
centration. 
In the first  period  (1870-1897)  the tendency  toward 
concentration made itself felt along those lines which had National  Monetary  Commission 
led to concentration in industry and commerce-that  is to 
say, first of  all, through the system which, after the prece- 
dent  of  industrial  combmations,  we  have  called  the 
"  mixed " method  of  operation-the  combination of  the 
current business (including the deposit business) with the 
founding,  transformation,  and  issue  business,  next  by 
way of  increases of  capital and through the various forms 
of  decentralization  of  operation,  such  as  commandites, 
branches,  agencies,  and  deposit  offices.  Of  the  great 
banks the only ones that remained completely centralized 
during that period were the Disconto-Gesellschaft and the 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, while the Nationalbank  fur 
Deutschland also remained almost completely outside the 
process of  decentralization. 
During the second period  (189  7 to date) the tendency 
toward concentration manifested itself to an ever-increas- 
ing degree, not so much in the decentralization of  opera- 
tions  as in  the extension of  community-of-interest rela- 
tions, whose main object is the strengthening of  industrial 
connections, together with the broadening of  the basis of 
issues and the increase in marketing power. 
During this period the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft was 
the only one that remained completely centralized. 
In both periods the choice of  the forms of  concentration 
was dominated by economic considerations which may be 
formulated as follows: 
Among  the various  forms available  the preference is 
always given to that which is deemed most likely to enable 
the nearest  and most  important aim to be  reached not 
only most fully, but also  most simply and quickly, and 
with the least possible cost and risk. 
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SECTION  3. THE  SEVERAL  WAYS AND  FORMS  OF  CONCEN- 
TRATION, THEIR ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES. 
Some of  the advantages and disadvantages  of  concen- 
tration become manifest from the discussion of  the various 
ways  and  forms  which  the  process  of  concentration 
assumed in the German banking business.  This discussion 
may  most  conveniently  follow  the scheme given  above 
(Sec. 2, under I, pp. 647 et seq.) for the general direction 
of  concentration. 
1  LOCAL  CONCENTRATION. 
After what we  have said of  the economic development 
of  Germany in general, and of  Berlin in particular, it will 
readily  be  understood  that  the capital  city  became  a 
special point of  attraction for banks  and bank  capital.65 
The drift toward the capital, in which most of  the federal 
offices  of  the Empire are located, naturally became most 
pronounced in the banking business, because the city of 
Berlin, with the exceedingly rapid growth of  its popula- 
tion, which meant a vast increase in the number of  wage- 
earners and consumers, became not only the central point 
of  wholesale demand and wholesale consumption, of  finan- 
cial, tax-paying, and purchasing power, and of  numerous 
industrial  and mercantile  enterprises, but also the most 
powerful focus of  attraction  for available funds.  It be- 
came the seat of  a number  of  the most important gov- 
ernment offices and establishments closely connected with 
our  system  of  payments  and  credit, in  part  also with 
the issue business.  Among these may be mentioned the 
Reichsbank, established in 1875-76, the Seehandlung, the 
increasingly influential Berlin Bourse, the Bank des Ber- 
liner Kassenvereins, founded as early as 1850, etc. National  Monetary  Commission 
Accordingly, we find that very soon after the establish- 
ment of the German Empire the German banks established 
during the first epoch, with main offices outside of  Berlin, 
hastened, one after the other, to open  offices in  Berlin.6B 
The following are worthy of  note: 
I 87 I. The Bank fiir Handel und Industrie (Darmstadt) . 
I 873.  The Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank (Meiningen, later 
Frankfort-on-the-Main)  . 
I 88 I. The Dresdner Bank (Dresden). 
I 89  I. The A. SchaafThausen'scher Bankverein (Cologne). 
I 898. The Commerz- und  Disconto-Bank (Hamburg)  .67 
From the moment these branches were established, the 
business  center of  these banks tended more and more to 
be shifted  to Berlinlps  so that they have for  many years 
been  classed  as Berlin  banks  and reckoned  among  the 
Berlin great banks.  In the case of  the A. SchaafThausen'- 
scher Bankverein, it is to be noted, this displacement was 
effected only in a qualified sense. 
This  process,  of  which  the recent  acquisition  of  the 
banking firm Hardy & Co. G. m. b. H. in Berlin (in 1909) 
by  the  Rheinisch-Westfalische  Disconto-Gesellschaft  in 
Aachen  (Aix-la-Chapelle) formed  an interesting continu- 
ation, must not be overlooked.  It tends to disprove the 
alleged  contrast  of  "the  general  tendency  of  develop- 
ment "  in England, based on the  supposition that the expan- 
sion of  banking in  England proceeded from the provinces 
toward London, while in Germany it proceeded from the 
capital  toward  the   province^.^'  Furthern~ore,  it  must 
not  be forgotten  that the establishment  of  branches  in 
Berlin  must  have  appeared  to the provincial  banks  in 
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general,  up  to  1897,  as  an  enterprise  of  questionable 
promise,  in  view  of  the treniendously  rapid  rise  of  the 
financial power of  the Berlin banks.  After 1897, of  course, 
the amalgamated  banks (Konzernbanken) had  no longer 
any motive to establish  branches in Berlin.  The estab- 
lishment of  a community of  interests between the Deutsche 
Bank, the Bergisch-Markische Bank, and the Schlesisclier 
Bankverein  in  1897 is  expressly stated in the 1897 busi- 
ness report of  the Deutsche Bank to have been prompted 
by the following considerations : 
"  The continued concentration of  the banking business 
in Berlin, which has already led a number of provincial insti- 
tutions to  establish branches in Berlin, seemed to make it 
necessary  that  our  connections  with  the  provinces  be 
strengthened." 
Here we see that the expansion toward the provinces is 
positively described as a  consequence  of  the movement, 
already in progress, of  the provincial banks toward Berlin. 
For  that matter,  even  as regards  England, we  must 
remember  that  the movement  of  the provincial  banks 
toward the capital170  which I agree with Eberstadt in re- 
garding as a "  natural "  rnovemcnt, did not begin until late, 
having  been  artificially kept back by  legislation.  Only 
since I 833 have provincial banks been allowed to establish 
themselves in London, and within a radius of  65 English 
miles, and even then only on condition that they were to 
issue  no  bank  notes.T1  Later  on  the situation  was  re- 
versed, owing to certain advantages which were  granted 
only to banks domiciled  ;n  London.  In particular, the 
provincial banks, in order to secure for themselves  and National  Monetary  Commission 
their customers  the advantages  of  participation  in the 
"country clearing," had  to appoint  as clearing agent  a 
banking firm domiciled  in London and belonging to the 
clearing house, and to make a large deposit with that firm. 
Finally, beginning with 1896, a tendency of  the London 
banks to spread to the provinces has been observed.72 
A  IN  A  DIRECT  WAY 
I. By  means of zncrease of capztal -In  the  preceding pages 
we  have had repeated occasion to speak of  that kind of 
concentration of  capital which finds its expression in in- 
creases of  capital and which is going on in other countries 
as well  as in  German~.7~  We have pointed  out in par- 
ticular  the limits  within  which  it is confined, both  for 
economic and of  business reasons.74 Increases of  capital 
were prompted7"oth  by external processes, such as the 
founding of  branches, the absorption of  banks, the estab- 
lishment of communities of  interest through exchange of 
stock, etc.,  and by internal reasons.  Foremost among the 
latter is the necessity of  obtaining the means of  strength- 
ening and extending the current business and to establish 
the equilibrium of  the balance sheet, the liquidity.  Ac- 
cording to sound principles, the increase of  the bank's own 
capital must take place also in those cases in which the 
volume of business has largely grown through the increase 
of  outsiders' funds entrusted to the bank. 
It may be said that the undertaking or omission of  such 
increases of capital at the right moment and in sufficient 
amounts furnishes a test of  the perception, prudence, and 
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foresight  of  the  bank's  administration.  However,  the 
movers for an increase of capital must often be prepared 
for disappointment at the bourse, which, as a rule, is not 
interested in an increase of  capital, unless  there is left a 
rather wide  margin  between the rate of  issue of  the new 
and the market  rate of  the old  shares, which  opens the 
field for speculative operations. 
It is interesting to study the increases of  capital of  the 
great banks. 
The capital of  the four oldest banks increased as follows: 
[Amounts expressed In  millions of marks 1 
While 'the  capital  of  the  Mitteldeutsche  Kreditbank, 
also one of  the oldest banks (founded in 1856 with a capi- 
tal of  zq,ooo,ooo marks;  see  above, pages  77  et seq.), 
had by the end  of  1905 risen  to 54,000,ooo marks, hav- 
ing thus little more than doubled,80  the four banks above 
enumerated, during the twenty-one years  from 1848 to 
1869, increased  their  capital  only  by  8,700,000 marks; 
on the other hand in the thirty-eight years from 1870 to 
the end  of  1908 their  capital  rose  from  88,zoo,m to 
579,000,000 marks,  having  thus  multiplied  more  than 
sixfold 
Darmstadter Bank  7s 
Berllner Ilandelsgesellschaft  77 
Dlsconto Gesellschaft 
A  Schaaffhausen'scher Bankvereln 79 
Total 
l  Capital 
Year 
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The capital of  the two banks founded in the beginning 
of the second epoch (I  870 and I 872) increased as follows. 
[4mounts expressed rn  mtlllons of  marks l 
Thus  in  thirty nine  and  thirty-seven  years,  respec- 
tively,  it multlplled  more  than  fifteenfold. 




Deutsche Bank " 
Dresdner Bank 
Total 
[Amounts expressed rn  mlllrons of  marks 1 
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Commerz und Dlsconto Bank  1870 
Nattonalbank fur Deutschland  R6  1  1881 




24  6 
Caprtal 
zoo 
180  -- 
380 
Thus the increase was more than fourfold. 
2  Through  absorptzon  of  bankzng  firms and  fuszon  of 
banks-We  have  already  discussed  the  main  reasons 
that led  to the concentration of  capital through the ab- 
sorption of  private banking firms 
Up  to the end  of  1908 the great  banks  had  directly 
absorbed only private  banking firms, while the number 
of  banks combined with them through fusion was only I I. 
On the other hand, the 5 bank groups (Konzernbanken), 
according to Appendix V111 at the end of  this book, had 




1  35 




80  -- 
165 
up to the end of  1908 absorbed 89 private banking firms 
and 43 banks, as follows 
Prrvate 
Darmstadter Bank  group 
Deutsche Bank group 
Dlsconto Gesellschaft group 
Dresdncr Bank  group 
A  Schaaffhausen scher Bankvereln  group 
Total  I  89  i: 
Thus the great  banks  and bank  groups together had, 
up to December 31, 1908, absorbed  129 private banking 
firms  and  54  banks.  Including  the firms  absorbed  by 
the banks  before their  fusion  with  the great banks,  or 
by subsidiary banks of  the latter, the total number  ab- 
sorbed by  the great banks  and their  "concerns"  up to 
December 3  I, 1908, included  164 p~ivate  banking firms 
and 60 banks 
The  provincial  banks  which  remained  independent 
show a similar record 
Such absorptions were often prompted, outwardly, by 
the desire of  the banks  to gain  a  firm  footing, a  wide 
circle  of  customers  and  business  relations  for  contem- 
plated branches  by the acquisition of  flourishing private 
banking  firms  at  the  localities  in  question  Those 
(domestic) branches  that were  established without  such 
absorption  were in fact greatly in the minority, and, as 
might be expected, had as a rule to pass throu~h  a much  - 
longer time of  waiting until  they were established on  a 
fairly  paying  basis,  with  appreciable  influence in  their 
district  Generally, also, their  dependence on the home National  Monetary  Commission 
office  continued  a  good  deal  longer.  The  number  of 
branches created by means of  such absorption or without 
it varies greatly in the case of  the different banks.  In the 
case of  the Dresdner Bank  the great majority of  its 27 
branches  originated  in  such  absorptions; in  the case of 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft, which up to 1908 had only 3 
branche~,~7  2 of  them, Brernen and Frankfort-on-the-Main, 
originated in that way, the latter branch having assumed 
at least  a  large  part of  the business connections of  the 
firm of  M. A. von Rothschild and Sons; in the case of  the 
Deutsche Bank, out of  8 branches only 3 were the result 
of  absorption, viz, those of  Leipzig, Dresden, and Frank- 
fort-~n-the-Main;~~  finally, in the case of  the Darmstad- 
ter  Bank, out of. I I  branches  only 2, those of  Hanover 
and Halle-on-the-Saale, were acquired in that way. 
A similar condition prevails among the banks belonging 
to the groups.  Of  these the Pfalzische Bank, belonging 
to the Dresdner Bank-Schaaffhausen community of  inter- 
est, established nearly all, if  not  all of  its 16 branches in 
this way.  The same is true in the main also of  the great 
provincial banks, such  as  the Bergisch-Mcirkische Bank, 
the Magdeburger Bankverein, the Magdeburger Privatbank, 
the Bayerische  Vereinsbank, and the Bayerische Handels- 
bank. 
The absorption  of  banks  by way  of  fusion also took 
place for the most part with a view to the creation of  a 
basis for the establishment of  branches.  Aside from this 
aim, however, fusion, as we  have seen, never played  an 
important part, either in the case of  the great banks or in 
that of  the so-called "  concern " bankslS8  which, according 
to Table VII, absorbed  during the second epoch only  a 
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total of  20  banks.  Experience teaches that at each fusion 
a number of connections, sofne of  them quite valuable, are 
lost, being taken away by competitors, etc.  Hence fusion 
is  not  attempted  unless  prompted  by  special  business 
reasons, particularly the following: 
(a) To get permanently rid of  inconvenient competition. 
Cases of  this kind are exceedingly rare.  In the case of  the 
provincial banks the fusioi  of  the Dresdner Bankverein, 
with a capital of  21,000,000 marks, with the Sachsische 
Discont-Bank (capital, 3,000,ooo marks), effected in 1905, 
may be cited under this head. 
(b)  To  secure  an  extension  of  business  connections. 
This refers to those cases where the institution to be fused 
with the expanding bank is pursuing about the same busi- 
ness policy in the same or another district (province, fed- 
eral state), having, for example, for many years devoted 
itself to the commission, current account, or bill business, 
like the expanding bank.  (Example:  The fusion of  the 
Magdeburger Privatbank at Magdeburg with the Dresdner 
Bankverein in Dresden, in 1909.) 
(C)  When  a bank  is unable either from the very start 
or not to the proposed extentlgO  or when  it  is  no longer 
able to accomplish its purpose,g1 its fusion with another 
bank  may  sometimes  be  accomplished  under  specially 
favorable conditions  for  the latter.  In such  cases  the 
fusion is as a rule a forced one so far as the less successful 
bank  is  concerned."  One  of  the  specially  favorable 
conditions in such cases may be this, that the intrinsic 
value  (liquidation value) of  the bank to be absorbed by 
fusion may greatly exceed the purchase price of  its stock, 
so that the absorbing bank thus acquires silent reserves, National  Monetary  Commission 
provided,  of  course, that the status assumed to exist at 
the moment of  fusion is not altered in the course of  liqui- 
dation through diminished returns or losses.g3 
Such a forced fusion may also occur when  a bank be- 
longing  to  a  bank  group  is  induced, through pressure 
exerted by the leading bank, to fuse with another bank of 
the same group.  Such a case occurred in 1905, when the 
Ostfriesische  Bank,  having  suffered  considerable  loss 
through  a  bankruptcy,  was  induced  to fuse  with  the 
Osnabriicker Bank. 
Motives of  a different nature, but yet belonging to the 
domain of  group policy, led in 1909 to the absorption of 
the Duisburg-Kuhrorter Bank by the Essener  Kreditan- 
stalt, the latter, together with the Deutsche Bank, as the 
leader of  the group, having in 1902 acquired a majority of 
the stock of  the Duisburg-Ruhrorter Bank. 
In foreign countries the concentration of  banks was ac- 
complished mainly by way of  fusion.  Thus in Scotland as 
early as 1829-1844  there were no fewer than 16 fusions of 
great  banks,  followed  by  4  more  during  1857-1864.~~ 
In England fusions were the ordinary way by which pro- 
vincial banks expanded and finally  made their  entrance 
into London.  According to the Bankers' Magazine (Lon- 
don), the number of  bank fusions in Great Britain was as 
follows:  1877-1886,  42;  1887-1898,  124; 1889-1905,  86. 
In London  alone the number of  private banks (excluding 
colonial banks) was thereby diminished from I I 5 in I 885 to 
38 in I 905, while the number of joint-stock banks decreased 
from 112 in 1889 to 62 in 1905.  One bank, now known as 
the London City and Midland Bank, founded under another 
name in  1836 in Birmingham, in its career of  expansion 
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and concentration  absorbed  not less  than some  20 pro- 
vincial banks and  2  great London banks, while another, 
the  Lloyd's  Bank,  in  twenty-one  years  (1884-1904) 
swallowed 35  other banks.  In England the huge  bank- 
ing establishments were invariably formed by the absorp- 
tion of  the small or  medium-sized  banking firms within 
their territory, either step by step or, if  an opportunity 
presented itself, at one fell swoop.  The number of  bank- 
ing firms incorporated in the large firms during the recent 
decades is exceedingly great; the external organization of 
English banking has thereby been completely altered since 
1880.  The process of  fusion continues,  and has become 
rather more pronounced  during recent  years.g5  In 1909 
a fusion was effected between two of  the most powerful and 
oldest London deposit banks, the London and Westmin- 
ster Bank (Limited) and the London and County Banking 
Company  (Limited).  The former was the oldest deposit 
bank in London  (founded in 1834) ; the latter was estab- 
lished in 1836, had 222 offices, and over £~O,OOO,OOO  ster- 
ling in current and deposit  accounts.  The united bank 
will bear the name London County and Westminster Bank 
(Limited),  with a capital of  £14,ooo,ooo sterling, (£3,500,- 
ow, paid up),  surplus funds to the amount of  £4,25o,ooo in 
round  figures,  and current  and deposit  accounts  to the 
amount of  more than £~O,OOO,OOO,  which will put it in the 
second place among the deposit banks of  Great Britain. 
"The growth of  banks solely through the extension of 
their own system of  branches, without any amalgamation 
with existing banks, occurs only where the aim is to open 
up entirely new territory not previously reached by bank- 
ing  operations."  In the period  1877-1904  not  fewer National  Monetary  Commission 
.p 
than 224 banks were absorbed in England by other banks 
which still exist. 
In the United States, in which the concentration on the 
whole tends  to be  effected  rather by way of  communi- 
ties  of  interest  of  great groups  of  banks,  21  national 
banks were in 1901 absorbed by other national banks and 
6 by other banks ; in 1902~46  by national banks and I I by 
other  banks;g7 in  1903-4,  altogether,  38  banks.  In 
France, fusions of  different  banks are of  frequent occur- 
rence in the case of  the so-called banques d'affaires,  while 
they have been rare among the great credit institutions, 
which,  however,  have  absorbed  many  private  banking 
3.  Through the  creation of  permanent communities of  in- 
terest.--Since  I 897 the process  of  concentration in Ger- 
man banking has been mainly effected in the form of  com- 
munities of  interest between great banks and provincial 
banks,  mostly  brought  about  through  an  exchange  of 
stock. 
At the end of  I 896 there were only two (domestic) com- 
munities of  interest, to wit: 
(I  88  I) That of  the Wiirttembergische Bankanstalt vor- 
mals Pflaum & Co. (subsidiary of  the Bank fur Handel und 
Industrie)  with  the Wiirttembergische  Vereinsbank,  this 
community being based on agreement.99 
(1895)  That of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft with the Nord- 
deutsche Bank, based on ownership of  shares. 
Between the beginning of  1897 and the end of  1900 as 
many as 9  (domestic) communities  of  interest were  en- 
tered into, so that the number of them had quadrupled by 
the end of  1900. 
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By the end of  1902 the number had risen to 16, an eight- 
fold increase, compared to 1895; by the end of  1908 it had 
risen to 32, and, including the subcommunities of  interest 
of  the banks  in  the groups  (Appendix VIII), to 41, a 
twenty-two-fold increase over I 896. 
The lion's  share in this increase  belongs  to the years 
1904  and  1905,  in  which  18  communities  of  interest, 
including  those of  the banks  in  the  groups  (Konzern- 
banken), were entered into, as follows : 
Communities of  in- 
terest  formed  by 
the- 
Leading  b,"d2:if 
bank.  thegroup  I  I 
Bank fiir Handel und Industrie. ....................  ........ 
DeutscheBank .................................... 
Disconto-Gesellschaft ..............................  ........ 
Dresdner Bank. .................................. 
Total. ....................................  .I  1.5  1  3 
On December 3  I,  1908, the communities of  interest, en- 
tered into both by principal  and subsidiary banks within 
the groups up to that date, were distributed as follows: 
Communities  of  in- 
terest  formed  by 
Lt:2  banksof  1  !t:::p. 
Bank fur Handel und Industrie. ....................  1  4  l........  . 
Deutsche Bank. ................................... 
Disconto-Gesellschaft .............................. 
Dresdner Bank.. .................................. 
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Of  these  communities  of  interest,  not  less  than  13 
belong to the mining districts, Rhlneland-Westphaha and 
Upper Silesia, distributed as follows  loo 
I  In Upper Szlesza -Communities  of  interest: 
r  Of the Rank fur Handel und Industr~e  w~th  the Breslauer D~sconto 
Bank m Breslau (10 branches) 
2  Of the Deutsche Bank wlth the bchles~scher  nankverein m Breslau (13 
branches) 
3  Of  the Dresdner Bank wlth the Oberschles~sche Bank  in Beuthen (2 
deposit offices  In Korugshutte) 
Marks 
25  000  000 
11. In  Rhzneland-Westpha1za.-Communities of  interest: 
I  Of  the Deutsche Bsnk mth- 
(a)  The Berasch Mdrhsche Bank in Elberfeld  (I  9 branches) 
(b)  The Duisburg-Ruhrorter Bank m Dulsburg (4  branches) 
(C)  The  Cssener  Kred~tanstalt  m  Essen  (13  branches  and  4 
agenc~es) 
(d)  The S~egener  Bank fur Handel und Gewerbe in S~egen 
(e)  The Essener Bankvereln In Essen (3 branches) 
Tota  (30  branches and 4  agenucs) 
a  Of  the Disconto GesellschaftlaI w~th  the Barmer Bankverem m Bar- 
men (I  7 branches) 
3  Of  the Dresdner Bank with- 
(a) The Mark~sche  Bank m Bochum  (g branches) 
(b)  The  Rheln~sche  Bank  14  Essen  (formerly  m  Mulham on- 
the Rh~ne)  (6 branches) 
4  Of the A  Schaaffhausen  scher Bankvere~n  'B  m Cologne (Rhmeland) 
(8 branches) w~th 
(a) The M~ttelrhe~n~sche  Bank in Koblenz  (2 branches) and its 
corntnunlty of  Interest 
The Mulhe~mer  Bank m Mulheim on the Ruhr (2  branches) 
(b)  The  Westfal~sch  Lipp~sche ~ere~nsbank  m  Rielefeld  (4 
branches) 
Marks 
75  000  000 
I2 000  000 
60  ooo  ooo 
4 000  000 
15 000  000 
Total (16 branches)  1  1x1 000  000 
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Thus in the Rhineland-Westphalia mining district alone 
there were  in existence on  December  31, 1908, beside a 
great  bank  with  8 branches,  not  fewer  than  11 "con- 
cern " banks  with  a  share  capital  (without  counting 
surplus funds and  deposits)  of  291,836,000 marks,  and 
in addition 79 branches, 4 agencies, and I deposit office of 
such banks, the number of  the latter being constantly on 
the increase.  This  organization-as  yet  far  from  com- 
pleted-thus  represents  a considerable part of  the outfit 
with  which  the  several  groups  of  banks  carry  on  the 
competition  for  the industrial  connections which  at the 
present day constitute their foremost interest. 
The  creation  of  permanent  communities  of  interest 
may be effected: 
(a)  Through  the  founding  of  subsidiary  companies 
(T~chter~esellsclzaften)  or trust companies 
(b)  Through the acquisition of  shares of  existing banks; 
(c)  Through agreement ; 
(d)  Through exchange of  shares. 
We will now discuss these various kinds of communities 
of  interest in detail. 
(a) Through  the  foundzng  of  subszdzary  companzes 
(Tochtergesellschaften) or trust  companzes.  The establish- 
ment  of  subsidiary  banks  played  a  rather  prominent 
part  in  the beginning  of  the  second  epoch,  but  is  at 
present merely of  historic interest, inasmuch as all these 
subsidiary banks have  disappeared  We  have m  mind 
the  so-called  provincial  banks  of  the  early  seventies, 
to which attention has recently been called by Tischert lo3 
and  especially  by  Wallich lo4  They  were  independent 
creations of the parent bank, established by it at its own National  Monetary  Commission 
home.  In most cases they proceeded, immediately after 
their  foundation, and  as a rule on the basis  of  private 
banking business acquired by them, to open branches and 
commandites in the several states or provinces.  However, 
being established at the home of  the parent bank, in con- 
trast  with  branches  established elsewhere,  they had to 
limit their activity so as not to compete with the parent 
institution.  Owing to that fact, as well as to the circum- 
stance that the provincial banks, even before they them- 
selves had taken root, began to set up branches and com- 
mandites  elsewhere,  without  being  able  either  to  sup- 
port them  adequately by  their  own  means or  to super- 
intend  them  properly in virtue of  their own  experience, 
and  also  for  general  economic  considerations, all these 
provincial, branch, and central banks bore  the germ  of 
death within  them  at their very birth.  The industrial 
relations of  banks at that time were  quite undeveloped, 
while private banking firms were for the most part still of 
great importance.  Thus I am unable to share the view 
that the plan was "  well devised,'' lo5 but in advance of  the 
time. 
Four such "  provincial discount companies " were estab- 
lished in Berlin in  1871 and  1872.  The largest of  them 
was the Provinzial-Disconto-Gesellschaft in Berlin, founded 
by  the Disconto-Gesellschaft  with  a  nominal capital of 
30,om,ooo thalers.  It soon  set up  a  large  number  of 
branches and commandites, to wit, in Hanover (involving 
the  absorption  of  the banking  firm  M. J. Frensdorff), 
in  Bernburg,  Strassburg,  Hamburg,  Duisburg,  Braun- 
schweig, Hameln, and Halle;  also the Bergisch-Markische 
Bank in Elberfeld and the Aachener Disconto-Gesellschaft 
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in Aachen  (Aix-la-Chapelle).  In the two cases last men- 
tioned the parent bank  retained an interest  in the form 
of  an undivided  share  of  500,000 thalers  in  each case, 
which is noteworthy as a special and early case of  "per- 
manent participation " of one bank in another.  However, 
in  1878  the  Provinzial-Disconto-Gesellschaft had  to be 
taken  over  by  the Disconto-Gesellschaft at the cost  of 
great sacrifices and difficulties, the branches having pre- 
viously been given up one by one. 
The other "  provincial banks " founded at  the same time 
in Berlin by parent banks were : The Provinzial-  Wechsler- 
bank  (founded by  the Berliner Wechslerbank), the Pro- 
vinzial-Gewerbebank  (founded  by  the  Gewerbebank  H. 
Schuster  &  Co.  in  Berlin),  and  the  Provinzial-Makler- 
Bank in Berlin. 
Beginning  with  I 872  the following  were  established : 
The  Suddeutsche  Provinzialbank  in  Stuttgart  (by  the 
Stuttgarter Bank), the Provinzial-Wechsler-Bank in Bres- 
lau (by private banking firms in Breslau), and the Allge- 
meine  Deutsche Filialen-Kreditanstalt (by the Allgemeine 
Deutsche Kreditanstalt in Leipzig). 
Finally, the Deutsche Unionbank in Berlin, which itself 
had to be liquidated as early as 1876, with the aid of  the 
Deutsche Bank, founded a chain of  Unionbanks, beginning 
with  1871, of  which  only  the  Unionbank in  Mannheim 
(absorbed by  the Pfalzische Bank in  1895) eked  out a 
somewhat longer existence;  while a Berlin banking firm 
founded  a  number  of  South German Zentralbanken in 
1873 (the Bayerische Zentralbank in Munich, the Badische 
Zentralbank in Karlsruhe, the Prankische Zentralbank in 
Nuremberg, the Wiirttembergische Zentralbank in Stutt- National  Monetary  Commission 
gart, and the Siiddeutsche Zentralbank  in Frankfort-on- 
the-Main)  .  All  these,  however,  underwent  liquidation, 
most of them immediately after their foundation. 
As may be seen by the sketch of  the development of  the 
several great banks (Appendix VII), the establishment of 
subsidiary  companies by the banks never  assumed large 
proportions in Germany, either in the first or in the second 
epoch.  On the other hand, the establishment of  German 
"  subsidiary banks " in foreign countries  played  a rather 
important part,,inasmuch as, for reasons already set forth, 
they  proved  to be  a  business  necessity  for  the special 
purpose of  the development of  over-sea trade, for which 
the establishment of  mere branches was neither sufficient 
nor desirable, at least on a large scale, for reasons to be 
discussed later. 
Except for the purpose of  subsewing the needs of  over- 
sea trade, the relations to the colonies, or the extension of 
business relations with foreign countries,lo6  the number of 
"  subsidiary companies " established has never been great 
even in recent time (aside from the above-mentioned pre- 
mature and hence unsuccessful experiments of  the seven- 
ties).  In addition to two stock companies established in 
1905 after the model of  the Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft 
(the Revisions- und  Vermogens-A ktiengesellschaf  t  and the 
Treuhand Vereinigung, Aktiengeseblschaft in Berlin) the fol- 
lowing instances of  recent date  lo7  may be enumerated : The 
establishment,  in  1900,  by  the A.  SchaafThaus.-n'scher 
Bankverein,  of  the  Westfalisch-Lippische  Vereinsbank, 
prompted  probably  by  special  personal  and  local  rea- 
sons; of  the Bayerische Disconto- und Wechselbank  in Nu- 
remberg, in 1905, by the Disconto-Gesellschaft jointly with 
the Bayerische Hypotheken- und  Wechselbank ;  los of  the 
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Bank fur  Thuringen vormals B. M. Strupp A ktiengesellschaft 
in Meiningen, in I 905, by the Disconto-Gesellschaft jointly 
with  the Mitteldeutsche  Kreditbank, the B.  M.  Strupp 
Banking House and the Allgemeine Deutsche Kreditbank; 
the transformation of  the private banking firm of  Ludwig 
Peters  Nachfolger  at  Braunschweig  into  the  Braun- 
schweiger Privatbank Aktiengesellschaft,  in  1905, by  the 
Hannoversche Bank jointly  with  the Osnabriicker Bank 
and the Hildesheimer Bank, and the transformation of  the 
banking  firm  Perls & Co. in  Breslau into the Schlesische 
Handelsbank  A  ktiengesellschaft  in  Breslau,  in  I 905,  by 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft in cooperation with the Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft. 
On  the  whole,  practical  experience  has  shown  that 
domestic subsidiary companies possess almost exclusively 
the disadvantages of  branch banks without their advan- 
tages. 
Not only do subsidiary companies readily escape all in- 
fluence on  their  business management, which  may  thus 
adopt methods fundamentally different from those of  the 
parent bank, but they are equally apt to rid themselves 
of  anything  like thorough  and permanent  inspection  of 
their business activity.  On  the other hand, they require 
a permanent  ownership of  shares, and often make large 
demands  on  the parent  bank  for  capital,  especially  in 
critical times, which of  course is particularly inconvenient. 
We were  able to trace this process in the history of  the 
Credit-Mobilier, whose collapse was largely brought about 
in that way.lO" 
These  are probably  the main  reasons  why  the sub- 
sidiary  banks  have hitherto exercised  far less influence, National  Monetary  Commission 
within Germany, both on the development of  banking and 
in  particular  on the concentration  movement,  than the 
trust companies, which have been extensively established 
by the great banks either directly or with their coopera- 
tion, in the industrial field, especially in the domain of  the 
electro-technical industry.  To discuss the nature and the 
advantages and disadvantages  of  these  trust companies 
would  be  beyond  the scope of  the present  work.  The 
most important trust companies in the field of  the electro- 
technical industry are enumerated in notes g8 and IOO on 
page 8 I I.  They are related to our present subject only in 
so far as they served, directly or indirectly, to relieve the 
banks  of  a  part  of  their  financial  tasks,  especially as 
regards  the issue business;  also in so far  as  they  were 
intended  to  serve  the  needs  of  smaller  enterprises, 
whose  securities  could  not  be  emitted  by  the banks 
themselves,  the  trust  companies taking  up  the securi- 
ties of these  enterprises  and  utilizing  them  as  a  basis 
of  obligations to be issued, thus rendering  them market- 
abler,  110  finally, in  so  far  as  they were  employed  to in- 
crease the influence of  the banks on certain branches of 
industry in the establishment or enlargement of  industrial 
enterprises, through aid rendered at the time of  organiza- 
tion and in the sale of  sec~rities."~ 
Prom the nature of  these functions it is evident that the 
trust companies subordinated to the banks strongly tended 
to promote concentration. 
(b) Through acquisition  of  shares.  The creation of per- 
manent  connections through communities of  interest by 
means of  the acquisition of  the stock of  existing banks, 
which is going on very extensively, needs no special discus- 
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sion.  Only one point has to be mentioned, viz., that a mere 
possession of stock does not of  itself result in a community 
of  interest, unless it is accompanied by other factors es- 
tablishing a close connection, which, in fact, in most cases 
becomes the occasion for the purchase of  shares.  These 
factors  may  be  (I) an agreement with  the bank  whose 
shares have been acquired by which that bank undertakes 
to transact at least the larger part of  its business with the 
acquiring bank, while the latter guarantees to the former 
the "  most favorable treatment," or (2) the appointment of 
one or more representatives of  the acquiring bank as mem- 
bers of  the supervisory board  of  the bank whose  stock is 
acquired.l12 
So far as I am able to learn, these two factors are for the 
time being absent from the relation of  the Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft  to  the  Rheinisch-Westfalische  Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft.l13  Accordingly, reversing the views expressed in the 
first German edition of  the present work (p. 188, No. 3), I no 
longer include that bank  in  the group of  the  Disconto- 
Gesellschaft, although the Disconto-Gesellschaft is said to 
own shares of  the Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft to the amount of  about  2,000,000 marks.l14  On 
the other hand, the Magdeburger Bankverein, having en- 
tered into a closer relation with the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
by the reciprocal appointment of  a representative of  each 
bank  on  the supervisory board  of  the other, is  properly 
included in the group of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
(C)  Through agreement.  A community of  interest may 
be established by agreement between two banks, generally 
about equal in strength, providing for a pro rata division 
of  the proceeds resulting from the business transactions National  Monetary  Commission 
of  both.  From  a purely  theoretic  standpoint, this  ar- 
rangement  certainly  can  accomplish  the  intended  pur- 
poses only on condition that the two contracting parties 
either follow in the main the same business policy or are 
mutually complementary in their business activity. 
For a while the typical example of  a community of  in- 
terest through agreement was the Dresdner Bank-Schaaff- 
hausen  combination,  created by  the agreement  of  Sep- 
tember  10, 1903.  In this case the activities  of  the con- 
tracting parties were certainly complementary, inasmuch 
as the Dresdner Bank, at the time of  the agreement, had 
devoted  itself  far more extensively to the promotion  of 
foreign business, Bourse transactions, the deposit business 
and  the  issuing  business, while  the A.  Schaaffhausen'- 
scher Bankverein had cultivated intimate relations to in- 
dustry, especially  mining, and more  particularly  to the 
iron  industry  of  Rhineland-Westphalia,  not  only  for  a 
much longer period than the Dresdner Bank, but also to a 
much greater extent and with greater success.115 
In this case, therefore, it may be assumed that this com- 
plementary  character of  the two banks was  the decisive 
factor that led to the creation of  the com~nunity  of  inter- 
est.  Evidently every such combination, with the result- 
ing union  of  forces, intelligence, enterprise, and  capital, 
signifies an immense increase of power on the part of  the 
contracting parties, whose organic union will always mean 
a far greater force than the mere arithmetic sum of  the 
separate forces. 
However, as I previously pointed out, the weakness and 
dangers of  such a community of  interest must not be un- 
derestimated.  They are especially apt to be felt in cases 
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where there is not a substantial equality of  weight between 
the two scales. 
First  of  all,  a  community,  which  leaves  the  formal 
independence of  the contracting parties unimpaired, does 
not necessarily lead to a saving in the operating expenses, 
at least not to a large extent. 
Differences of  opinion regarding the business manage- 
ment and the common business policy can hardly lead to 
serious danger, provided the contracting parties are about 
equally strong; but if  one of  the parties has any degree 
of  preponderance,  such  differences  may  lead  to  grave 
consequences.  The weaker  party in  such cases has gen- 
erally no other recourse but an appeal to the committee 
or council of  delegates, consisting as a matter of  course 
of  members of  the two  administrations,  and  hence  apt 
to decide  in  favor  of  the stronger  party.  But  even  if 
this  is  not  the case, disappointment  is  apt  to result.ll0 
The agreement  being  as a  rule made for a  long period, 
such disappointment  becomes  a  source  of  annoyance. 
Having gained an insight into each other's business con- 
duct, the two  parties  find  it difficult  to separate,  even 
when  separation  would  be  the  natural  course,  while 
fusion, the opposite alternative, is not without its objec- 
tions. 
Dissatisfaction of  another sort may arise from the fact 
that one of  the two parties may have made poor profits, 
perhaps repeatedly, while the other has made good profits. 
The latter thereupon  will  not  be  greatly pleased  at the 
prospect  of  having  to "feed"  its needy  partner.  Such 
a situation may  become dangerous if  the less  successful 
partner,  impressed  by  the  regular  good  results  of  the National  Monetary  Commission 
successful one, finds in them not so much a spur to its own 
ambition  to  attain equal  success,  as  a  comfortable  in- 
surance of  the share which by virtue  of  the agreement 
will accrue to  it in any case from the earnings of  its partner. 
In a word, one partner may get into the habit of  letting 
the other work for him. 
A still graver situation may present itself  if  one of  the 
parties, insisting on the mode of  distribution established 
on the basis of  the status existing at the time of  signing 
of  the agreement, but which  would  no longer be fair in 
case of  the enlargement  or extension of  the enterprises, 
attempts to prevent the other from an expansion which it 
feels  justified  to undertake.  This  situation  would  be 
especially difficult to endure if  the weaker partner should 
try thus to prevent the development of  the stronger. 
Other  sources  of  dissatisfaction  and  dissension  may 
arise from a difference of  views regarding reserves, losses, 
etc.  This may happen even when there exists a council 
of  delegates  for the decision of  such questions, because 
such a council can only decide disputes, but not  remove 
the dissatisfaction. 
It is not to be expected that there will be many cases 
in which two enterprises will so happily complement each 
other in their business operations, or be so nearly of  equal 
weight, that the danger here indicated  will  either disap- 
pear or be greatly diminished.  Hence this form of  com- 
munity  of  interest  is  hardly  likely,  in  my  opinion,  to 
make  much  headway  among German  banks.l17  At  the 
same time it can not be denied that, theoretically at least, 
this method  of  eliminating mutual competition  through 
the placing of  two institutions  on  a footing of  equality 
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by agreement  is  better  than  the annihilation  of  one of 
the two institutions through ruthless competition. 
(d) Through  exchange  of  shares.  A  totally  different 
situation  as  shown  by  practical  experience  is  created 
through a community of  interest resulting from exchange 
of  shares, such as was  effected in  1897 by the Deutsche 
Bank, first with  the Bergisch-Markische  Bank  and  the 
Schlesischer Bankverein. 
Many  such  communities  of  interest  were  established 
in  the German banking world between a large bank and 
other banks, some of  them much smaller, in the pursuit 
of  definite aims of  industrial policy on the part of  the large 
bank.  Thus, for example, in entering on the community 
of  interests above indicated, the aim of  the Deutsche Bank 
was  to gain  a  footing in  the most  important industrial 
districts,  those  of  Rhineland-Westphalia  and  Upper 
Silesia. 
In  entering  on  a  community  of  interest  with  the 
Duisburg-Ruhrorter Bank, in  1902, the  Deutsche  Bank 
was  doubtless prompted  by  a consideration of  the close 
connection  existing  between that  bank  and  the  Haniel 
family, the owners of  the Gute Hoffnungshiitte  and the 
Rheinpreussen mines. 
In entering into a community of  interest in  1904 with 
the Essener Bankverein, the foremost aim of  the Deutsche 
Bank was  doubtless to form a connection with Mr.  Car1 
Funke, the large industrial  entreprenefir  in  Bssen, who 
owns the Konig Ludwig mines. 
Finally, in  entering  into a  community of  interest in 
I903 with the Mittelrheinische Bank in Koblenz, the A. 
Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein was evidently prompted National  Monetary  Commission 
--  - 
by  the desire  to get  in  touch  with  the collier firm  of 
Spaeter & Co., founders of  the Rombach Smelting Works, 
closely  allied  with  the  Mittelrheinische  Bank, the fur- 
ther aim being  to become  connected  through  that firm 
also with  the Lorraine-Luxemburg iron  industry.  This 
desire may have been sharpened by the consideration that 
Mr.  Hugo Stinnes, a large entrepreneur, was a member  of 
the supervisory board of  the Mittelrheinische Bank. 
It is not difficult to explain the rapid spread of  commu- 
nities of  interest through exchange of shares. 
First of  all, this kind of  community of  interest among 
banks either pursuing the same business policy or supple- 
menting each other in their business activity, especially in 
their relations to industry, offers a strong business attrac- 
tion, which will be all the greater the higher the premium 
on the shares of  the bank which  makes the offer  of  ex- 
change to the shareholders of  the banks to be "annexed," 
the exchange rate being calculated for the party making 
the offer and the party consenting to the exchange by the 
ratio of  the market values of  the stock to be exchanged. 
This ratio will, of  course, be all the more favorable for the 
bank making the offer the higher the market value of  its 
own shares. 
In other respects  a community of  interest through ex- 
change of  shares offers hardly  anything but advantages 
for both parties. 
While eliminating any competition that may have ex- 
isted between the two parties, it leaves to each complete 
internal autonomy, with freedom of movement and devel- 
opment, at the same time securing singleness of  manage- 
ment outwardly from one central point. 
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It enables the  "concern"  banks to concentrate their 
strength on the district where the roots of  that strength are 
located, without "  causing them to be diverted from their 
proper  sphere by an establishment in  the national capi- 
tal,"  and without being obliged to engage in competition 
in  Berlin  itself, in which their chances would  be all the 
smaller  the  later  their  entrance  into  the  capital.  It 
affords  to  them  the  advantage  of  connection  with  a 
great bank, which means not only a strengthening of  their 
position, power, and influence, but a large part of  the ad- 
vantages possessed by the great bank itself.  Finally, in 
case of  need, in critical times, it assures to them a strong 
hold, the very existence of  which is apt to serve as a sup- 
port of  their own arrangements. 
On the other hand, the great bank also derives numerous 
advantages from the combination.  It extends the area of 
its power  and  business  activity and enlarges its knowl- 
edge of  the situation of the different branches of  industry 
and commerce through expert information obtained from 
institutions  situated  or represented  at the locality.  In 
case of  an issue it has at its disposal a wide market.  It is 
in position to procure for its customers greater advantages 
and  better  information,  and  especially  to  lend  them 
prompter  and  more extensive support in their business 
operations.  Finally, it is enabled to set up a uniform pro- 
gram for  its entire business  policy,  and is  able to take 
account  of  the general  economic  interests  better  than 
with a smaller business scope or with scattered forces. 
All of these advantages are obtained, both to the largest 
possible extent and in the simplest and least risky manner, 
through communities of  interest  established by means of National  Monetary  Commission 
an exchange of  shares, since the object may be attained 
even by a relatively unimportant ownership of  shares. 
There is, indeed, some danger in this case, too, that the 
leading bank may expose itself  to excessive demands for 
as~istance,"~  but this danger is lessened from the very start 
by the fact that,  by virtue of  the combination, the leading 
bank  acquires  greater  and  greater  available  resources 
through the amalgamated banks and their customers. 
B.  IN  AN  INDIRECT  WAY,  BY  MEANS  OF  DECENTRALIZATION  OF  OPERA- 
TIONS. 
I. Through the  founding of  silent fiartnershifis (comman- 
dites).-The  number of  commandites, which  in  1895 ac- 
cording to  Appendix V1 was only I 3 for all the great banks 
together-that  is to  say, very small-dropped  to I I by the 
end of  1905, so that there is  on an average only I  com- 
mandite to each great bank. 
The  32  allied  banks (Konzernbanken)  had  at the end 
of  1908 only 18 commandites (Table  10, p.  IOI~),  a  still 
lower average.lZ0 
The Darmstadter Bank possessed originally a very large 
number of  commandites  (as many as 16), having set up 
one of  them in New  York  as early  as  1854, another  in 
Paris in  1857, at the same time planning  others at St. 
Petersburg, London, Smyma, and Constantinople, to foster 
foreign business.  As  early  as  1856 one  of  its founders, 
Gust. von Mevissen, planned nothing less than the estab- 
lishment of  a "  Central Bank for Foreign Commandites " 
with a capital of  ~oo,ooo,ooo  thalers (!  ), to the end "  that 
the capitals of  the various German banks-all  of  them 
seeking to establish commandites abroad-might  no longer 
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be scattered, and that at the same time the ablest pos- 
sible representation might be secured." 121 
In the years of  business depression toward  the end of 
the fifties and the early sixties the Darmstadter Bank had 
had a discouraging experience with the system of  branch 
banks to which it had at first given the preference.  Ac- 
cordingly, in  1863 it abolished even its branch in Mainz, 
founded in  1854, and transformed  it into a commalidite, 
"solely  in order to limit  the number  of  institutions apt 
to create liabilities for the bank by their operations." 
But while  the commandite  does  have this  advantage 
over the branch, that the leading bank is not made directly 
liable through the business  transactions of  the comman- 
dite, yet the difference is rather  formal, because when a 
commandite through bad management has got into diffi- 
culties, the leading bank  can  not  abandon it any more 
than it can abandon a branch.  In addition, the nature 
of  the commandite  gives  rise  to dangers  which  do not 
affect the branches, or at any rate, not to the same extent. 
First of  all, a commandite, like a subsidiary company 
(Tochtergesellschaft), even  though  bound  by  an  agree- 
ment  granting  special  rights  of  control  to the  leading 
bank, is  more difficult to control than a branch.  More- 
over, it will  be  all the less  willing to be  controlled  the 
greater its success, the justifiable feeling of  self-confidence 
on  the part of  the management  leading it in such cases 
to resent  any  attempt  at interference.  Hence  a  com- 
mandite is more apt than a branch to develop its entire 
business  policy along  lines  at variance with  the leading 
bank, occasionally even in opposition to it. National  Monetary  Commission 
It is also more  apt to cause surprises, since the com- 
mandite is less disposed to submit-all  the less the longer 
it has existed-to  binding instructions, impeding its free 
movement,  for example, as regards the amount of  uncov- 
ered credit, the kind of  security in case of  covered credits, 
the amount of  acceptances, etc.  We have seen that by 
reason of  such surprises the Deutsche Bank, among others, 
had to liquidate with heavy loss  its commandites in New 
York  and Paris (see sec. 4).  Moreover, such instructions 
are apt to neutralize the advantages afforded by the very 
autonomy of  the management and by its freedom to give 
untrammeled  expression to its individuality in business 
matters. 
Furthermore, while the commandite derives very marked 
advantages  in  diverse  directions  from  its  connection 
with  the leading  bank, the advantages accruing to the 
latter are often inconsiderable, especially since the com- 
mandite, with its limited means, often finds it difficult to 
face the competition  of  large banks  in its locality.  On 
the other hand, there is the danger that the cornmandite, 
having  attained a certain importance, may terminate the 
agreement  with the leading bank and  make  itself  com- 
pletely independent. 
Finally, in case the manager of  a commandite is remiss 
or unsatisfactory in the conduct of  its business, the leading 
bank has no  power  to interfere, while  in  the case  of  a 
branch bank  such power  exists and is most likely to be 
exercised. 
If  the  manager  dies, the  business  will  have  to  be 
liquidated, which in most cases is not to the interest of  the 
bank, or, if  the agreement contains special provisions for 
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this event, as is generally the case, the bank may become 
involved in great difficulties and annoyance until a suit- 
able successor is chosen.  The fact is that the commandite 
is essentially bound up with the person of  its manager, 
not only in its success but to a large extent in its very 
existence.122 
Furthermore, the  advantage which  the leading bank 
might  obtain  through  a  widening  of  its  business  rela- 
tions  and its industrial  and commercial information,  in 
virtue of  its connection with the commandite, is lessened 
by  the greater  looseness of  the connection between the 
commandite  and  the  leading  bank,  as  compared  to  a 
branch bank, whose manager is obliged to make periodic 
reports, etc. 
On  the other  hand,  it must  be  acknowledged, as  an 
advantage  of  the  commandite, that in many  cases the 
personal influence and reputation  of  the manager,  com- 
bined with his accurate knowledge of  the local conditions 
and customers, secures to the bank both a dignified rep- 
resentation  and a satisfactory income,  even  though  this 
in most cases is  not  high.  The Darmstadter  Bank, for 
example, obtained 7 per cent interest on its commandite 
investments of  I 53,ooo,ooo marks between 1875 and I 889, 
during which  time  the number  of  its commandites  fell 
from I 3 to 9.  During the same time its "  permanent partici- 
pations " in joint-stock banks, amounting to I ,69o,ooo,ooo 
marks, yielded  only 6  per  cent  interest.lZ3 During  the 
period 1896-1900  the reams  from its commandites varied 
between 73,  IO,~,  10,  and 7% per cent, while in 1901 and 
1902 they were only 4 and 6 per cent.134 National  Monetary  Commission 
That advantage, however, as we  h'ave seen, is counter- 
balanced  by  weaknesses and  dangers.  Hence it is  only 
natural, as shown  by  the figures above given, that the 
establishment  and maintenance of  commandites tends to 
become rare in the German banking world. 
2.  Through  the  founding of  branches.-As  regards  the 
decentralization  of  operations  through  the  creation  of 
branches  (within Germany), we  see from Appendix V111 
that their number in the case of  the German great banks 
at the end of  1908 was exceedingly small, both absolutely 
and  relatively;  the  total  being  69  for  the eight  great 
banks of  BerlinlZ5  (61, if  we  deduct the 8 established in 
the same city where  the home offices  of  the banks  are 
located),  and (according to Table 10 of  the same appendix) 
241 for 32  allied banks (Konzernbanken),  making an aver- 
age of  not quite 8 branches to each concern bank.lZ0 A sim- 
ilar situation exists as regards the other provincial banks. 
In the provinces the number of  branches, at least so far as 
the  absolute  figures  are  concerned,  is  greater  than  in 
Berlin, but in the latter case regard should be had for the 
very large number of  deposit offices. 
On  the whole,  however,  the number  of  branches,  at 
least  in proportion  to the number of  banks concerned, is 
not large. 
This is  all  the more  surprising  because  in  almost  all 
foreign  countries,  with  the  exception  of  the  United 
States,l27 the system of  branch  banks has become  enor- 
mously  developed.  Thus  Ad.  Weber lZ8  reports  that in 
England and Wales as far back as the end of  1899 there 
were  12 banks, each of  which numbered  more than  IOO 
branches, and which together (including the main offices) 
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had 2,304 establishments, while the total number of  bank- 
ing  establishments  in  England  and Wales at the end of 
1899 was  4,540  (3,548 in  1876), of  which  816 were  not 
open daily but only on special days (for example, market 
days). 
In 1901 there were  in  England  2 I  banks having more 
than IOO branches each, and the total number of  banking 
establishments in the United Kingdom was 6,672, to wit, 
4,872 in England, 1,087 in Scotland, 690 in Ireland, and 
23  on  the Isle  of  Man,129  of  which, however, 1,124 were 
not open  every day.130  Over one-fourth of  all the exist- 
ing branches  were  opened in the eight  years  1896-1903, 
"so that the president of the London and County Bank 
at the  general  meeting  in  February,  1902, was  able to 
say that there was almost  no  street in  London that did 
not have a branch bank, and if  things continued in that 
manner, the branch  banks woulcl  by and by  exceed  the 
barrooms in number."  131  A single bank, the London City 
and Midland Bank, had in the beginning of  1905 as many 
as 447  branches, that is to say, 257  branches more than 
all the Berlin great banks, together with the 52 provincial 
banks affiliated with them at the end of  1904; on Decem- 
ber  31,  1907, according to the Economist,  the English 
joint-stock  banks, then numbering only 74  (excluding the 
colonial and foreign banks), 35 of  these being authorized 
to issue bank notes, had not less than 6,809 branches and 
subbranches. 
The  Lloyd's  Bank  and the above-mentioned  London 
City and Midland Bank have each more than 400 branches, 
the former,  in  round  numbers,  500  "places  of  business National  Monetary  Commission 
(branches)  "  and,  in round numbers, 160 "  subbranches and 
agencies,"  making a total of  560 establishments. 
In France132  the number of  agencies and branches in- 
creased in the fourteen years from the end of 1894 to the 
end of  I go8 as follows : 
Agencies and brancbes. 
1894.  1  1908. 
Credit Lyonnais.. . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  . .  .  96  20 
Comptoir National  d'Escompte. . . . . 
Societe generale . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  .  .  . . . .  2 
Thus at the end of  1908 these three institutions alone 
had, together,  199  branches  and agencies  in  Paris  and 
suburbs, and 961 branches, agencies, and bureaus in the. 
provinces. 
In Scotland133  the number  of  branches, as compared 
with the above-mentioned  1,087 in  1901 (belonging to 10 
banks), was as follows:  589 in  1865, 688 in 1872, 912  in 
1873, 1,021 in 1895, and 1,015 in 1896.  -4s early as 1871 
there  were  in  that  country  branch  banks134 at  283 
places, including 61 localities having less than I ,000 inhab- 
itants, 70 between  1,000 and 2,000 inhabitants,  35  be- 
tween 2,000 and 3,000 inhabitants, and 33 between 3,000 
and 4,000 inhabitants.  As  early as the seventies  there 
were at Brechin, which then numbered 9,000 inhabitants, 
not less than 7  branches of  different banks.  This is an 
exceedingly large number, even allowing for the fact that 
the town includes the rural districts adjoining. 
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At the end of  1908 the Credito Italiano founded in Rome 
as late as 1895, with German cooperation, had already 17 
branches in Italy, and the Ba~zca  Commerciale Italiana, in 
Milan,  founded in  1894, also  with  German cooperation, 
even as many as 33. 
It must not be supposed however, that all these figures 
may,  without  further  qualification,  be  compared  with 
those of Germany, as is often done, and that they indicate 
a more profound difference than really exists. 
(a) As regards France, the numerous branch establish- 
ments existing in that country are, in large part,135  not so 
much  branches, in  the German  sense, as "  agencies,"136 
much easier to establish and possessing far less importance 
and a far less extensive business  circle than the German 
branches, some of which occasionally undertake operations, 
especially of  local  scope, in which  the home office  does 
not participate. 
(b)  Nor can any direct comparison be made with Brit- 
ish conditions.  On the one hand, as already pointed out, 
many  of  the banking  offices  enumerated  as  branches, 
especially in London, have the character of  the German 
deposit offices rather than that of  the German branches. 
On the other hand, the banks in Scotland are mere note 
banks, while those in England are partly note banks and 
partly deposit banks, which, in founding branches, were 
Prompted  by business  reasons,  sometimes  cogent  ones, 
totally different from those prevailing  in German bank- 
ing.  German banks  either  do not carry on the deposit 
business at all, or only in combination with a great num- 
ber  of ofher activities, among which the deposit business 
never occupies the foremost place. National Molzetary  Commission 
Now, the note banks, in order to raise the note circula- 
tion,l37 are positively forced to create an ever denser net- 
work of  branches, if  they are to carry out their plans suc- 
cessfully, while the deposit banks are compelled to resort 
to the same policy for the purpose of  attracting the funds 
of wider and wider circles, especially of  the middle class and 
small capitalists and tradesmen, who are not confined to 
the great cities.  We  should probably  witness  a similar 
development  in  Germany  if  the "central  (einheitliche) 
deposit  bank,"  or even several competing deposit banks, 
were to become realities. 
"Without  the issuing power, the Scotch banks  would 
have been unable either to establish so many branches or 
to extend so  many  facilities to depositors, and without 
the branches and the facilities granted they would never 
have had any deposits." 138 
(c)  In Gemany there was from the first but little in- 
clination to allow the advantages of  central management 
from one point  to be weakened by the establishment of 
branches.  Again, it was largely feared that the demands 
by the branches on the parent bank might easily become 
excessive, and that they might thwart the business policy 
of  the bank  as well  as the general  disposition over its 
resources, which must rest in a single hand. 
Still even  in  Germany it was  impossible not to recog- 
nize the advantages afforded through  a decentralization 
of  operations by means of  branches, including increase of 
power and greater resisting capacity. 
Foremost  among these  advantages is  the close  touch 
which a branch necessarily gains little by little with in- 
dustry  and  commerce  within  its  district; the  accurate 
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insight which daily contact gradually affords into the needs 
for credit, the habits, financial condition, and reliability 
of firms and individuals within that district, so  that such 
a branch is  in a position  to give the most  accurate and 
reliable  information on all these  important details to the 
central bank.  Moreover, in many cases the special local 
conditions lead to a widening of  the field of  activity of  the 
bank in that district; it is found necessary or possible to 
engage in special lines of  banking which the bank had not 
previously  put  on  its  program, owing, perhaps, to lack 
of expert personnel.  Thus the branches and their man- 
agers, as well as the officials trained in them, often form 
a  welcome  addition  to  the central  administration  of  a 
bank, its directors, and subordinate officials. 
Various means suggest themselves and are actually used 
by some banks by which the advantage of  the information 
gained by the central bank through its branches may be 
considerably increased.  Since  these  branches  are  as  a 
matter of  course required to submit periodical statements 
regarding their cash on hand, the state of  their engage- 
ments, their loans on collateral, debit and credit accounts, 
bills, acceptances, etc., they may readily be required, in 
addition, to furnish to the central bank written reports 
on the state of  the industries specially represented in their 
district, and these  reports may  thereupon  be  circulated 
among the other branches.  In addition to this, the man- 
agers of  the branches may assemble at stated periods- 
say quarterly-at  the seat of  the home office, and there, 
at a meeting presided over by one of the directors, make 
verbal  reports  on  the business  events that have  taken 
place in their locality in the interval, while on the other National  Monetary  Commissiort 
hand they may learn the views of  the home office and its 
aims for the immediate future, as well  as  its judgment 
regarding  the general  economic  situation,  the branches 
being  thereby  enabled to shape their  business manage- 
ment accordingly.  The written and oral reports  will  at 
the  same  time  enable  the  central  office  to  ascertain 
whether, and to what extent, the branches have been too 
partial  in  the  distribution  of  the  credits  granted  by 
them, or whether  they  have exceeded the limits which, 
for general or special reasons, are deemed advisable, or 
whether there has been an overstretching of  resources, to 
be remedied by appropriate measures, etc.  All these views 
may at the same time be brought to the knowledge of  all 
the managers of  branches. 
The branches afford to the central bank another advan- 
tage in enlarging its security issuing power, since the cir- 
cle of  customers for the securities issued is often greatly. 
extended through the branches, while at the same time 
the issuing operations are rendered easier.  The branches, 
as a matter of  course, relieve the central bank of  all the 
issues of  merely  local importance, such as industrial se- 
curities of  local enterprises, or communal obligations, agri- 
cultural and other mortgage bonds, etc., within the district 
covered by the branch, also of  all issues which, owing to 
their insufficient amount, do not come up to the require- 
ments for admission at the bourse, and hence can not be 
effected by the central office  itself  in its home city. 
Again, the branches tend to enlarge the field of  invest- 
ment for the customers of  the bank, since a branch will, 
as a rule, be able to furnish to the central office expert 
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and reliable information, difficult to obtain otherwise, con- 
cerning the intrinsic value of  local securities. 
Furthermore, the branches, possessing accurate knowl- 
edge of  the firms and individuals of  their district, their 
financial status, the situation of  their business, etc., will, 
as a rule, be  in  position  to attract as deposits available 
funds, especially those belonging to the small and petty 
traders and capitalists.  Through the collective activity of 
its branches the parent  bank  is  thus also enabled to an 
ever-increasing extent to grant facilities to its customers 
in the matter of  payment and handling of  bills and to aid 
these customers by valuable information and advice.  The 
central office  will  also  gain  thereby a broader  basis for 
the giro, clearing-house, and check business, with decided 
advantage to the public at large. 
At the same time the variety of  the business activity of 
its branches is  a kind  of  insurance to the parent  bank 
against losses which it might suffer, either in its own busi- 
ness or in that of  any of  its branches, since these losses 
may be more easily compensated by the larger profits of 
other branches during the same period. 
According  to the table prepared by Ernst Loeb 13B the 
collective turnover of  the branches of  the Deutsche Bank 
in the years 1896-1902  was somewliat larger than the total 
turnover of  the central office, their cash account was con- 
siderably higher, the bill and current accounts were about 
the same, while the acceptance account, owing, no doubt, 
to the over-sea business carried on by  the central office, 
was  only  from  one-third  to one-fifth of  the acceptance 
account of  the central office. National  Monetary  Commission 
During those years the deposits of  the Deutsche Bank 
were distributed as follows : 
[Amounts expressed in millions of  marks.] 
Year.  /  5;:'  I  Branches.  Total. 
However, these advantages are offset by a number  of 
disadvantages, some of  them quite grave. 
First of  all, the carrying out of  a general business policy 
of  the bank will, of  course, be more difficult the greater the 
number of  its branches, since each branch has to receive 
special instructions, according to the kind and extent of 
its business and the special aims which it pursues in view 
of  the special conditions of  its  district.  To reduce the 
whole system to one scheme by means of  general instruc- 
tions to be observed by each branch is in most cases im- 
practicable, except as regards certain rules deduced from 
experience, as, for example, that second mortgages or mort- 
gages on  unimproved  real  estate  (Terrainhypotheken) or 
special kinds of  paper, or unlisted securities shall not be 
accepted as security for credit, or only under certain con- 
ditions, or not without  additional security.  General in- 
structions for this purpose not accurately adapted to the 
individual case would be habitually disregarded, and hence 
had  better  not  be  issued.  But  even  carefully devised 
instructions will be of  use only in the hands of  intelligent 
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branch managers.  Even then they may fall short in two 
ways : 
They may be too strict, leaving too little room for the 
independent action of  the manager and compelling him in 
any matter of  importance to consult the board of  directors. 
In such case the initiative of  the manager is paralyzed, he 
is converted into an automaton, or he loses the very spirit 
by which he should be constantly animated, namely, that 
of personal responsibility. 
Or the instructions may be too loose and too mild, in 
which  case  they  may  readily  add  to  the  centrifugal 
tendency  which is  inherent in the branches in any case. 
Unchecked by clear and definite directions, the branches 
may take little interest in the general business and admin- 
istrative policy of  the bank; they may regard themselves 
as entirely detached and independent, and not as members 
of  a single organism, all of  which may lead to grave con- 
sequences. 
As  regards  the supervision, the theoretical  aim  is  to 
forestall  every  surprise  and  to  discover  any  defect  in 
time  to apply a remedy.  The law in article 246 of  the 
Commercial Code  (Handelsgesetzbuch)  even  imposes  this 
task on the members of  the supervisory board in the words: 
"'I'o  superintend the management of  the business in all its 
branches."  This task presents great difficulties both for 
the board  of  directors,  located  at a  distance from  the 
branches, and for the permanent inspectors appointed by 
it.  It necessarily  becomes  more  and more difficult  and 
complicated the more the branches grow in number and 
in the extent of  their business activity.  Hence it becomes 
of special interest to learn how  in England a bank with National  Monetary  Commission. 
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some 400 branches is able to solve this question always in 
a perfectly satisfactory manner,140  since, in view of  the ex- 
treme conscientiousness and integrity of  English business 
men, it may be assumed as certain that they devote the 
most scrupulous care to this subject.  This is all the more 
noteworthy in view  of  the fact that in England the law 
imposes on  the board  of  directors hardly  any duty "of 
using  the  proper  diligence,"  it  being  even  questioned 
whether  the directors are liable for  "  gross  negligence," 
that is to say, for a degree of  negligence known to English 
law, which is even higher than our "  lata culpa"  (culpable 
negligence)  .141 
Another disadvantage, to wit, the more or less long time 
of  waiting before the branch has been permanently estab- 
lished on  a paying basis, has already been pointed out. 
Especially in those cases where the branch has been estab- 
lished without being grafted on a previously existing busi- 
ness, it will generally be a good while (aside from excep- 
tional cases) before it is able to stand on its own feet, and 
to become a creditor of  the parent bank, instead of  being 
its debtor, as is generally the case, to very large amounts. 
Still longer will be the time before it yields an adequate 
return.  The expenses of  operation142  as a rule are very 
considerable  from  the  start,  and  in  many  cases  are 
greatly increased by the acquisition of  buildings, which the 
branch, for the sake of competition, if  for no other reason, 
endeavors to erect either at once or as soon as possible. 
In most cases also, at least in the beginning, the capital 
which the bank is obliged to invest in its branches is very 
large.  In fact it often requires an increase of  the share 
capital.  The  table  drawn  up  by  Ernst  I.,~eb'~~  shows 
The German Great  Banks 
that the Deutsche Bank, for example, at the end of  1902 
had invested not less than 40 per cent of  its capital in its 
branches. 
Finally, by reason of  the legal requirement of  recording 
and the official publication of  the record, a branch whose 
establishment proves to have been  a mistake can not be 
transferred or abolished with nearly the same ease as an 
agency or deposit office. 
Most  of  these disadvantages, however, existed also in 
foreign countries, where nevertheless the development of 
the  branch  system  has  been  very  great.  Hence  they 
would hardly suffice to explain the slight development of 
branches  in  Germany,  especially  since  those  disadvan- 
tages, as we have seen, are offset by important advantages. 
In view  of  the pronounced  tendency  toward  concen- 
tration, manifested in other directions, it seems to me that 
the slow  development of  branches in Germany can only 
be explained as follows: 
First  of  all, owing to the importance and urgency  of 
the tasks  which  the German  banks  had  to accomplish 
during that epoch in very brief  time, the development of 
their internal organization was somewhat retarded. 
In the next place, up to the nineties, a large proportion 
of the German banks, as shown by the entire attitude of 
various great banks at that time, felt little inclined, as a 
matter  of  principle,  to  favor  the  concentration  move- 
ment  through decentralization of  operations,  except  as 
regards the establishment of  deposit offices at the locality 
of the main office, where they could be more easily super- 
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Finally, as regards the time after 1897, the method of 
communities of  interest offered a means of  concentration 
by  which the objects of  a system of  branches could be 
attained both more fully and simply, and with less capital, 
expense, and risk. 
However,  since  the  development  of  communities  of 
interest will  within  measurable  time attain  its  natural 
limits, while the tendency  toward  concentration is sure 
to continue, it seems to me beyond doubt that in Germany 
too, we shall witness a larger development of  the branch 
system as soon as those limits shall have been attained, if 
not before. 
3.  Indirect  concentration  through  the  founding  of 
agencies.-As  regards  the decentralization  of  operations 
through agencies, there can be no doubt that in Germany 
these would be the best form for an extensive development 
of  banking organs.  An agency is the easiest form to set 
up, and since, unlike a branch, it need not be recorded-in 
fact,  can not be legally recorded-it  can with the same ease 
be abolished or transferred.  It requires a much smaller 
personnel,  and  in  other  ways  involves smaller  running 
expenses,  since  it is  less  prominent  outwardly  than  a 
branch; 144  but the fact that an agency, unlike a branch, 
can not be recorded in the commercial register as such, 
leads  to  important  consequences, the first being  this- 
that the legal representation of  the agency can  not  be 
effected  according to the principles prevailing  in  bank 
by-laws and banking practice, but only in a roundabout 
and laborious way.  One difficulty that is particularly irk- 
some is this-that,  for the same formal reason, the agency 
is not  recognized as such  by  the very  authorities  with 
- 
which it has to deal every day.  The Reichsbank does not 
admit the agency as such  to the giro  transactions;  the 
post-office delivers no  letters  and other mail,  and espe- 
cially no  valuable  matter, to the agency.  This attitude 
on the part of  the Reichsbank involves considerable loss 
of  interest through the shipment of cash to and fro, while 
the attitude of  the post-office compels the bank to appoint 
special representatives, who can only represent the bank, 
not the agency. 
Thus the establishment of  agencies  as local offices of 
banks is unfortunately subject in Germany to very great 
and regrettable difficulties.  From the considerable num- 
ber of "  agencies " which are actually maintained  by pro- 
vincial  banks, and which, according to Appendix VIII, 
amount to 325 in the case of the 32 amalgamated banks 
alone, one might be tempted to infer that these agencies 
had after all made themselves at home in the provinces, 
and that thus the means had been found to attain through 
"  agencies " what it was found impossible or inadvisable 
to attain by means of  branches.  This inference would be 
a grave mistake.  Of  the 325 agencies of  the amalgamated 
banks, not fewer than  287, according to Appendix VIII, 
are found in Mecklenburg and adjoining districts (Neuvor- 
pommern and Oldenburg) , where peculiar conditions pre- 
vai1.l45  The  so-called  agencies  in  these  districts  are 
agencies only in name, if  by that name we  denote inde- 
pendent  banking  establishments  (Bankniederlassungen)  . 
In reality the agents in these cases are either independent 
merchants, engaged also in other lines of  business, or, in 
accordance with local customs, retired mayors and lawyers 
or other prominent  or reliable persons, who  perform the National  Moqzetary  Commission 
functions of  bank agents as a side issue.  In some cases, 
when they are registered as merchants, they add to their 
firm name the designation : "  Agency of  the -  Bank," 
in order to characterize their business, in accordance with 
article I 8, section 2, clause 2 of  the Commercial Code. 
These  agents,  of  course,  act  only  under  a  limited 
authority, extending, first and foremost, to the receiving 
of  money and securities and possibly to a limited number 
of  incidental operations.  Such  authority can  be  given 
only in case the bank has at its disposal in the districts 
in question a number of  absolutely reliable persons, and 
when, moreover, in view of  the restricted and easily sur- 
veyed field of  operations, such objections as may exist can 
not become very grave.  Por in such cases the bank faces 
a peculiar dilemma.  Either the agent, who is not one of 
the regular employees of  the bank, has to be authorized, 
contrary to the usual banking practice, to receipt in the 
name  of  the  bank  for  deposits  intrusted  to  him,146  in 
which case the bank runs the risk of  not receiving the sums 
thus deposited  or  not  receiving  them  in time,  or  this 
authority is not given, the bank or one of  its branches, to 
which the agency is subordinated, reserving the right to 
receipt for the sums deposited with the agency.  In such 
case the public will  hesitate to confide large amounts to 
the agency, and no great custom can be developed. 
All these caditions arise from local needs and usages 
and can only be understood by reference to them.  They 
are in  fact practically  confined to  Mecklenburg,  Olden- 
bug, and adjoining districts and can not be transferred 
to larger  areas. 
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4.  Indzrect concentration through the  foundzng of  deposit 
offices.-We  have  thus  arrived  at the  last  form  which 
the movement  of  decentralization has  assumed  in  Ger- 
many, to wit, the creation of  deposit offices-that  is  to 
say,  establishments which  conduct  all kinds of  banking 
business,  with  the  exception of  the issue business  and 
the  purchase  and  sale  of  their  own  securities.  The 
managers of  such offices receive an authorization which, 
as a rule, is displayed in  the office.  By this  authoriza- 
tion the manager is usually empowered to perform such 
functions  and  to  make  such  declarations in  the name 
of  the bank as are involved in the regular  operations of 
a  deposit  office (and exchange office). 
In  Germany,  as  elsewhere,  the  establishment  of  de- 
posit  offices  with  any prospect of  success was  only pos- 
sible  at a  time  when  the  accumulation of  capital  had 
already assumed certain  proportions. 
According  to Appendix VIII, the number  of  deposit 
offices  of  the Berlin  great banks was  only 27  at the end 
of  1896.  In 1897 the bourse law, which  accelerat6d the 
movement  of  concentration, became effective, and  from 
that year to 1900 the number of  deposit offices rose to 53, 
and thus almost doubled. 
Between  1900 and 1902 the increase was even greater. 
While  in  1896  the number  of  deposit  offices  was  only 
27,  in  1902  it was  87,  having thus more  than trebled. 
It continued to rise, though less rapidly,  to the end of 
1908, when it amounted to 264, so that from 1896 to the 
end of  1908 the number  of  (domestic) deposit  offices  of 
the great banks multiplied  almost elevenfold. National  Monetary  Commission 
On the other hand, according to Table 10 of  Appendix 
VIII, the number of  deposit offices of  the 32 amalgamated 
banks at the end of  1908 was only  102, being thus quite 
insignificant, both absolutely and relatively. 
We  have  repeatedly  discussed  the  economic  and 
commercial  advantages  afforded  by  the  deposit  offices. 
One  prominent  advantage  consists  in  the  opportunity 
afforded  to  the  smaller  and  smallest  capitalist  and 
trader  for  the productive  investment  of  their  savings, 
even  of  the  smallest  amounts.  This  very  opportunity 
constitutes a strong  inducement to the accumulation of 
cash  and  of  surplus, which can  thus  be  made  produc- 
tive.  Moreover,  the  bank  in  this  way  assists them  in 
keeping  a  proper  cash  account,  which  otherwise might 
be  quite  irregular.  The  bank,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
thus  enabled,  within  certain  limits  and  under  certain 
restrictions,  to  utilize  these  deposits  within  the  limits 
of  the  current  account  business;  147  to  profit  by  a 
constantly  growing  circle  of  customers  whose  habits, 
integrity, and financial condition it learns to know quite 
fully.  In this  way  it is  enabled to find  a  market  for 
its  securities-that  is  to  say,  to  reinforce  its  issuing 
power.  It  will  also  be  enabled,  through  this  circle  of 
customers, to extend the check, giro, and clearing busi- 
ness-that  is  to say, to facilitate payments  and  dimin- 
ish  the  need  of  cash  circulation,  thereby  rendering  a 
service to the  public  at large  and  contributing  to the 
better  developn~ent  of  credit.  Finally,  mention  must 
be  made  of  the  other  advantages  pointed  out  by 
Conrad 148  and  0thers.1~~  "Through  the activity  of  the 
bank, the deposit is made to perform  several  economic 
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tasks at one and the same time.  The same sum which 
the  customer  has  entrusted  to the  bank  may be  used 
by  him  for business  purposes,  the  manufacturer  being 
able  to  make  contracts,  the merchant  to order  goods, 
etc.,  on  the  strength of  his  bank  balance;  the banker 
uses  the money  for  his  own  purposes,  granting  a  loan 
to a  customer.  This  customer  again-say,  a  manufac- 
turer-uses  the loan to pay  his  workmen, who  in  turn 
use  it  to make  purchases;  and  all  these  transactions 
take place  during  the  intervening  few  weeks  while  the 
deposit remains  at the bank.  Thus the same sum has 
performed  several economic functions at the same time 
and in so doing has rendered to the public several times 
the amount  of  service that it could  have done without 
the  intervention  of  the  bank.  Herein  lies  the  main 
advantage  of  the  banks  for  the  money  circulation,  an 
advantage which is not sufficiently appreciated." 
For  the  present  the  number  of  deposit  offices  as  a 
general  thing  is  still  rather  insignificant,  not  only  in 
the case  of  the  32  amalgamated  banks,  which  at the 
end  of  1908 had  only  102 such  offices, but  also in the 
case  of  the  other  provincial  banks;  but  it  can  hardly 
be  doubted  that  it  will  greatly  increase.  It  is  also 
entirely  probable  that  the  number  of  deposit  offices 
of  the Berlin great banks, which even now  is quite con- 
siderable  (264  at the  end  of  1908)~  will  be  multiplied 
both  in  Berlin  and  elsewhere.  Even  now  there  are 
streets  in  Berlin  which,  as  regards  the deposit  offices 
of  the several banks, fully answer the description given 
of  the  conditions  in  London:  "In  one  of  the  London 
suburbs there are on a  single street, within  a radius  of National  Monetary  Commission 
ten  minutes'  walk,  seven  branches,  and  three  more  on 
an adjoining street."  150  In fact, in  Berlin  the radius of 
ten minutes' walk would have to be shortened. 
Soon  the  time  will  come  when  the  array  of  deposit 
offices in Berlin will vividly recall  the picture  drawn  of 
the region between  Duisburg and Dortmund  as an illus- 
tration of  industrial concentration:  "Shaft follows shaft; 
furnace crowds on furnace." 151 
PART V.  THE MUTUAL  INFLUENCE OF CONCEN- 
TRATION  IN  BANKING  AND  IN  INDUSTRY. 
As  the present  book  is  not  exclusively  devoted  to a 
study of  the development of  concentration, the question 
whether concentration of  banking has been influenced by 
concentration  in  industry, and vice  versa,  can  only be 
discussed in outline. 
I. The beginning of  the tendency toward concentration 
in industry is necessarily coincident with the moment at 
which  domestic industry  is  replaced  by  what  is  called 
town industry-production  for one's own use by produc- 
tion for customers, where the product of  labor is no longer 
intended  exclusively for the consumption of  the worker 
and his  family, but  also to satisfy  the needs  of  others. 
The demand for this product begins forthwith to create 
the  laws  of  production.  At  that  moment  begins  the 
necessity of division of  labor.  With increasing uniformity 
of  demand and increasing concentration of  requirements 
there arises also the necessity of  extending the volumeof 
production  and concentrating  the producing units. 
The  increase  of  the  volume  of  production  becomes 
necessary  also  by  reason  of  the  knowledge, gradually 
gained, that production  becomes profitable  only after it 
has reached a certain amount.  The profitableness of  pro- 
duction  depends,  among other  things, on  the  greatest National  Monetary  Commission 
possible  diminution  of  the cost  of  operation,  which, in 
industry at least, as a rule, diminishes  in  proportion to 
the increasing size of  the establishment.  Now, the possi- 
bility  of  development  of  production  with  simultaneous 
increase  of  profit  and  relative  diminution  of  cost  of 
operation depends largely on the centralization of  opera- 
tions and of  management. 
Such centralization may be attained in various ways: 
(a) By concentrating the industry as much as possible 
in  certain  localities  (districts, towns)  with  a  numerous 
trained  and  cheap  labor  force or with available  water 
power and other advantages, such as convenient,  rapid, and 
cheap transportation  of  raw  material  and  of  industrial 
products by water or land, etc. 
(b)  Through the combination of  e~tablishments,~  which 
is effected- 
(I) Through the union of  an establishment with other 
establishments engaged in operations preceding or follow- 
ing in the process of  production,  one of  them furnishing 
the raw material, while the other works it up.  This is 
the  combination  of  several  stages  of  production.  In 
this  way  coal  mines  are  combined with  furnaces,  steel 
works with furnaces, machine factories with rolling mills- 
that is to say, establishments which depend on each other 
for the supply of  raw material, such as ore and coal, or 
establishments  which  depend  on  each  other as  regards 
the finishing of  the products, such as pig  iron, wrought 
iron, blooms,  rolled wire, etc. 
(2) Through the union  of  several plants working  side 
by side. 
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(3) Through the union  of  related  plants or of  such as 
bear toward each other the character of  auxiliaries. 
Such  cases  occur,  for  example,  when  iron  furnaces 
combine with  coal mines into "furnace-mines"  or when 
coal mines unite with iron furnaces into "  mine-furnaces." 
According  to  the  German  cartel  inquiry,  there  were 
4,962  plants  in  the  German  iron  industry  alone  that 
had  entered  into  such  combinations  up to  1905, com- 
prising  18 branches of  production.  Of  these 4,962 com- 
bined  plants,  12  united  with  10  others,  23  with  11 
others, and  29  with  12  others?  The  advantages  of 
such  combinations,  from  the  standpoint  of  operating 
technique, consists  in  this-that  the several operations 
come  under  one  management,  which  sees  to  it  that 
the different  plants  shall  work  hand  in hand  and  act 
as  mutual  checks,  so  that,  for  example,  the  finishing 
plant shall receive from the other plants material of  only 
such  grade  and  composition  as  it needs  for  its special 
purposes,  while  poor  material  and  waste  may  easily 
find use in the original plant.  There is also an opportunity 
for  a  better  division  of  labor  or,  conversely,  a  more 
rational combination of  labor.  The economic advantages 
consist, in  the main, at least  in  most  cases, in  a  dimi- 
nution of  the general expenses of  operation, of  the cost 
of  raw material,  of  freight rates, etc., also in  a  kind  of 
insurance, since one branch can make a profit while the 
other  is  losing,  and  diversified  production  may  com- 
pensate  for  an  unfavorable  market  condition  in  one 
branch by a favorable one in another, while the complete 
stoppage  of  an  individual  plant,  which  is  apt  to be 
hurtful, both  technically  and  economically, can  more National  Monetary  Commission 
easily  be  avoided.  Again,  in  mixed  works,  barring 
provisions  to the contrary  in  the cartel  contracts, the 
production and sales in one branch-that  is to say, one 
stage of  production-may  be enlarged  in critical times, 
while that in another branch is curtailed. 
The  advantages  of  such  combinations  are  further 
enhanced when the different plants are also concentrated 
locally,  "so that a  combination  of  enterprises  is joined 
to  a  combination  of  operations."  This,  however,  is 
not usually the case. 
A combination  of  operations may also be  effected- 
(c)  Through  other  modes of  concentration, as, for ex- 
ample, through the complete union of  several enterprises, 
even  though  of  different  nature,  by  way  of  fusion, or 
through the establishment of  a community of  interest, or 
through the purchase of  the stock of  another enterprise, 
or through the making of  contracts excluding competition 
or aiming at the delivery of  coal or ore, etc. on preferen- 
tial terms, etc., or, finally, through a combination of  mere 
operation in conjunction with fusion- or community-of- 
interest agreements. 
All  these cases may be illustrated by an abundance of 
examples.  I will only cite a few of  the more recent ones.4 
Among  fusions  may be  mentioned: The  Hoesch  Iron 
and Steel Works with the Westfalia mines; the Rheinische 
Stahlwerke with the Zentrum  mines;  the Eschweil  Roll- 
ing Mills  with  the Ehrenfeld  Tube Works; the Phoenix 
Mining and Smelting Stock Company with the Nordstern 
coal  mines  (1907);  the Bismarckhutte with  the  Bethlen 
Falva Iron and Steel Works (1906) ; the German-Austrian 
Mannesmann  Tube Works  with  the  Saarbriicken  Cast 
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Steel Works.  Under this head come also the purchase of 
stock  in  the machine factories  of  Escher,  Wyss & Co. 
in Zurich by the Felten & Guilleaume-Lahmeyer  Works 
Stock Company (1906) ; and the acquisition of  the Upper 
Suabian  Cement  Works  Stock  Company  by  the Stutt- 
garter  Immobilen-  &  Baugeschiift  (1906).  Other  com- 
binations were  the acquisition of  the Henrichshiitte with 
rolling  works  and furnaces  by the locomotive  factory of 
Hendschel  & Son  in  Kassel  (1904),  the community  of 
interest  of  the Upper Silesian  Railway  Operation Stock 
Company with the firm  Steffens & Nolle  in Bcrlin,  and 
the community of  interest of  the Berlin-Anhalt Machine 
Construction  Stock Company with the Stettin Fireproof 
Tile Factory Stock Company, formerly Didier, etc. 
The following cases  of  most  recent  occurrence  are of 
special interest because of  the motives that prompted the 
combinations. 
The acquisition  of  the Huldschinsky Smelting Works 
Stock Company  by the Upper  Silesian  Railway  Supply 
Stock Company by way of  fusion, which took place in 1905, 
was  mainly  prompted  by the fact that in this way  the 
works of  the former company received  a  welcome com- 
plement  in  the shape of  raw material arid  half-finished 
products  which  they  had  till  then  lacked,  while  the 
absorbing  company  was  thereby  enabled  through  ex- 
change of  lahor to systematize and extend its operations. 
The fusion of  the Phoenix Mining and Smelting Stock 
Company in Ruhrort with the Hoerder Mining and Smelt- 
ing Company, that is to say, two works of  quite the same 
nature, was  mainly prompted  by the fact that the two 
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production.  Thus, for example, the iron works united in 
the Rhenish-Westphalian Pig Iron Syndicate, while unable 
to increase their production quota, were yet able to employ 
their works more remuneratively  than would  have been 
possible under the syndicate conditions, by producing non- 
syndicated articles, which they were enabled to do through 
combination. 
Similarly,  the formation  of  the  Rhenish-Westphalian 
Coal  Syndicate induced  the iron  works  to acquire  coal 
mines, because the coal produced by themselves cost them 
less than that bought of  the syndicate. 
The following examples may be mentioned: 
Under  the  first  coal  syndicate: The  fusion  of  the 
Vereinigte  WestFhalia  Mine  with  the Hoesch  Iron  and 
Steel Works  (1899) ; of  the  Vereinigter  Hannibal  Mine 
with  Friedrich  Krupp  (May,  I 899) ; of  the Pluto Stock 
Company  with  the  Schalke  Mine  and  Furnace  Stock 
Company  (June, 1899) ; of  the Dannenbaum Stock Com- 
pany with the Differdingen-Dannenbaum Stock Company 
(end of  1899) ; of  the General  Mining  Concern with the 
Lorraine Smelting Corporation Aumetz-Friede  (January, 
1900); and  of  the  Zentrum  Mining  Concern  with  the 
Rhenish Steel Works (May, I 900). 
Under the second coal syndicate :  The union of  two works 
into the United van der Zypen Steel and Wissener  Iron 
Works  Stock  Company  at  Cologne-Deutz  (September, 
1903) ; the union  of  the  Lorraine  Smelting Corporation 
Aumetz-Friede with the Fentscher Furnace Works (Octo- 
ber, 1903) ;  of  the Upper Silesian Iron Industry Stock Com- 
pany and the Bismarckhutte (February, 1904), and of the 
above-mentioned Henrichshutte of  the Dortmund  Union 
with the Hendschel & Son  Locomotive Works  (March, 
1904).~ For  the  same  purpose,  other  enterprises  ac- 
quired small coal fields, on which they themselves estab- 
lished coal mines, as, for example, Stumm Brothers, who 
acquired  the  Minister  Achenbach  coal  field,  the  Georg 
Marien  Mine-Furnace Corporation,  which  acquired  coal 
fields near Osnabriick (Werne), the firm de Wendel, which 
acquired the de Wendel mine near Hamm, the Maximilian 
Furnaces, which acquired  the Maximilian coal mine near 
Hamm, Friedrich  Krupp and  the North German Lloyd, 
who  acquired the Emscher-Lippe mine near Mengede.' 
The Upper Silesian Coal Convention did not equally pro- 
mote  the acquisition  of  coal  mines by  smelting works, 
because nearly all the great smelting works of  Upper Silesia 
had had their own mines in most cases since their founda- 
tion.  The same remark applies to the Ruhr district. 
Thus, the Bochum Cast Steel Corporation had had coal 
mines of  its own since 1868, the Dortmunder Union since 
1872, and  the same was  true of  Friedrich  Krupp, the 
Horder  Mining  and  Smelting  Association,  the  Phoenix 
(in the last-mentioned case through the purchase of  the 
Meiderich Coal Mining Company and the Westend, Ruhr, 
and Rhein  mines in  1886), and  finally the firm  August 
Thyssen (through the acquisition of  the Deutscher Kaiser 
mine). 
Finally, the concentration of  enterprises served- 
(c)  as a means to secure a stronger basis and reduce the 
number  of  serious  competitors,  in  the event  that the 
Rhenish-Westphalian  Coal  Syndicate should  not be  re- 
newed at its expiration in 1915, or in  case it was broken 
up before that time. National  Monetary  Commission 
This applies particularly to the association of  the two 
iron  works,  the Aachener Smelting Company Rote Erde 
and the  Schalke  Mining  and  Smelting Company with 
the Gelsenkirchen  Mining  Company (Jan. I, 1905).  The 
advantages of  this union will become apparent only later, 
because, so long as the present coal syndicate exists, the 
furnace-mines, so far as their coal production exceeds their 
own  consumption,  are bound  by  the provisions  of  the 
coal syndicate, a situation which no fusions can alter. 
From the statements just  made it is evident that the 
immediate reasons for industrial concentration,  perhaps 
also the weightiest reasons, especially in the coal and iron 
industry, were  technical  in  character,  arising from  the 
nature of  industrial operations and large-scale production, 
and  from the formation  of  cartels  within  the industry. 
At the same time that concentration was also influenced, 
pron~oted,  and even made possible  by the banks and their 
concentration. 
As  might be expected, this influence differed with the 
various branches of  industry, being decisive in some cases, 
less so in others, and hardly perceptible in some cases. 
I. INFLUENCE OF BANKS ON  INDUSTRIAL  CONCENTRATION  UNAFFECTED  OR 
BUT SLIGHTLY  AFFECTED  BY  THE  FORMATION  OF  CARTELS. 
If  it be permitted to distinguish between creditor in- 
dustries and debtor industries, according as they are able, 
as a rule, to keep balances in their favor in the banks, or 
are obliged, as a rule, to ask the banks for credit, we  may 
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say  that, on  the whole,  the electro-technical industry,s 
as hitherto developed, is in the main  a debtor industry, 
while the chemical industry  is  a  creditor industry.  In 
the mining industry the relation  varies with  the times, 
companies, and market conditions. 
(a)  THE  ELECTRO-TECHNICAL  INDUSTRY. 
The very fact that the electro-technical industry was in 
the main a debtor industry would suffice to show, if  any 
proof  were needed, that the development of  that industry 
(and the same is true of  the street railway and minor rail- 
way business largely connected with the electrical business) 
would have been simply inconceivable at any stage of  its 
concentration  without  the help  of  banks.  At  the very 
birth of  the industry, in the beginning of  the eighties, that 
aid was all the more necessary and welcome, because  at 
that time the possibility of the development of  electric 
light and power on an industrial scale was doubted by the 
immense  majority  of  the  population.  In  this  matter, 
therefore, the banks which, despite the great risk, did not 
refuse their aid, may justly  claim to have been in  part 
creators  of  one  of  the  most  vigorous  and  important 
branches of  German industry of the present day.  In  order 
to set  forth the influence of  the banks  on  the electro- 
technical industry, it is  necessary to sketch the external 
development of  that industry in Germany. 
In 1883, with the vigorous cooperation of  a number of 
banks and banking firms, the first German stock company 
in the electric industry was  established by Emil  Rathe- 
nau, in concert with  Siemens & Halske, the Paris Expo- 
sition of  1881 having led to the  conviction, especially in National  Monetary  Commission 
Rathenau's mind, of  the great possibilities of  the new in- 
vention.  That stock  company was the "German Edison 
Company for Applied  Electricity " (Deutsche Edison Ge- 
sellschaft fur angewandte Elektrizitat) , which  in  I 884 made 
itself completely independent of  Siemens & Halske and in 
1887 assumed the present  firm  name of  the Allgefneine 
Elektrizitats Gesellschaft  (General Electric Company).  It 
succeeded in improving the so-called three-phased current 
system to such an extent that in 1891 it was able to con- 
duct 300 horsepower with very favorable working effect a 
distance  of  I 73  kilometers to the electric  exposition in 
Frankfort-on-the-Main, an achievement which produced a 
great impression. 
In 1896 there were already in existence, as noted clse- 
where (p.  I 23), 39 stock companies in the electrical indus- 
try, nearly all of them called into life by the aid of  banks. 
In 1900 the German bourses had already listed the stock 
of  34  such stock companies, with capital of  436,000,ooo 
marks  (in  Berlin  alone  22  companies  with  capital  of 
396,700,o~  marks)  for trade and quotation.  The divi- 
dend income of  stockholders in those 34 stock companies 
in the period 1883-1900  averaged 8.38 per cent. 
In  1898  the total production  of  the German electro- 
technical  industry  was  valued  at  2 28,700,000  marks; 
21 I ,100,000 marks,  or 92.3 per cent, being the value of 
products  of  the strong-current factories, which  twenty 
years earlier .was insignificant, while the products of  the 
weak-current industry in 1898 amounted only to I 7,600,000 
marks.  Beginning with  the middle of  the nineties  the 
expansion of  the electro-technical industry was enormous. 
It can not be denied, however, that this rapid and desul- 
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tory expansion was  largely  responsible  for the  general 
overproduction which led to the crisis of  1901. 
The fact is that during those years, up to 1900, a veritable 
chaos of  forms of  enterprises and methods of  financing had 
been developed within the electrical industry, resulting in 
seven groups with 28 companies, as follows: 
I. The Siemens & Halske group, with: 
I. The Siemens & Halske Stock Company in Berlin. 
2. The Swiss Conlpany for Electric Industry in Basle. 
3.  The "Siemens"  Electric Works Stock Company, Berlin. 
4.  The Electric Light and- Power Establishment  Stock Company, 
Berlin. 
11.  The A.  E. G. (Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft) group, with: 
I  The Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (General Electric Com- 
pany), Berlin. 
2.  The Bank for Electric Enterprises, Zurich. 
3. The General Local and Street Railway Company, Berlin. 
4.  The Electricity Supply Company, Berlin. 
111.  The Schuckert group, with: 
I. The Electricity Stock Company (formerly Schuckert & Co.), Nu- 
remberg. 
2. The Continental Company for Electric Enterprises, Nuremberg. 
3.  TheRhenish  Schuckert  Company for Electric Industry, Mannhein~. 
4.  Tlle Elektra Stock Company, Dresden. 
IV. The U. E. G. (Union Electric Company) group, with: 
I. The Union Electricity Company, Berlin. 
2. The Company for Electric Enterprises, Berlin. 
V.  The Helios group, with: 
I. The Helios Electricity Stock Company, Cologne. 
2.  The Stock Company for Electric Establishments, Cologne. 
3. The Stock Company Bavarian Electric Works, Munich. 
4.  The Bavarian Electric Company, Helios Stock Company, Munich. 
5.  The  Electricity  Company,  Felix  Singer  &  Co.,  and  Bank  for 
Electric Industry, Berlin. 
VI. The Lahmeyer group, with : 
I. The Electricity Stock Company (formerly W. 1,ahmeyer & Co.), 
Frankfort on-the-Main. 
2. The German  Company  for  Electric  Enterprises,  Frankfort  on- 
the-Main. (Q) 
VII. The Kummer group, with : 
I. ":le  Stock Company Electric Works (formerly 0.  L. Kummer & 
Co.), Dresden. 
2.  The Stock Company for Electric Establishments and Railways, 
Dresden. Nationa  E  Monetary  Commission 
VII. The Kummer group, with-Continued. 
3.  The Baltic Electricity Company, Kiel. 
4.  The Electric Stock Company (formerly Hermann Page), Chenlnitz. 
5. The Northern Electric and Steel Works, Danzig. 
6. The South German Electricity Stock Company, Ludwigshafen. 
7. The Electric Operation Stock Company, Dresden. 
Each of  these groups thus had at  least one trust company 
associated with it, intended to relieve the banks of  a part 
of  the financing operations (founding, transforming, issue) 
to which they  would otherwise hardly have been equal. 
These were the companies marked 2 and 4 in Group I, and 
2  in  Groups  11-VII.  All  these  trust  companies were 
founded between 1894 and 1898.  On the other hand, the 
independent  electric  firms  organized  themselves  into  a 
"  Union  of  Electro-technic  Installation  Firms  in  Ger- 
many" and the factories of  electro-technic specialties-into 
the  "Union  for  the  Protection  of  Common  Economic 
Interests of  the German Electro-technical Industry." 
Behind those seven groups of  electric enterprises stood 
at that time (1900) as many banks and groups of  bankers 
whose organization was caused by the vast demands made 
on their financial capacity by the electro-technic industry 
united  in  the  corresponding  groups.  These  banking 
groups were as follows: 
I.  Siemens & Halske Stock Company: 
I. Deutsche Bank. 
2.  Bank fur Handel und Industrie (Darmstadter Bank). 
3. Berliner Handelgesellschaft. 
4.  Diskonto-Gesellschaft. 
5.  Dresdner Bank. 
6. Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank. 
7. S. Rleichroeder. 
8.  Delbruck, Leo & Co. 
9.  Jacob S. H. Stern, Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
10. L. Speyer-I3llissel1, Frankfortan-the-Main. 
I I.  Bergisch-Markische Bank. 
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11. General Electric Company: 
I. Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. 
2.  Deutsche Bank. 
3.  Nationalbank fur Deutschland. 
4.  Delbruck, Leo & Co. 
5. Hardy & Co. 
6.  Gebruder Sulzbach, Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
7.  E. Heimann, Breslau. 
8.  Rheinische Diskonto-Gesellschaft. 
111.  Electric Stock Company, formerly Schuckert & Co.: 
I. W. H. Ladenburg & Sohne, hlannheim. 
2. Anton Kohn, Nuremberg. 
3.  Kommerz- und Diskontobank. 
4.  Von der Heydt-Kersten & Sohne. 
5.  E. Ladenburg, Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
6.  J. Dreyfus & Co., Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
7.  Rayrische Vereinsbank. 
8.  Bayrische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank. 
IV.  Union Electric Company: 
I. Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
2. Dresdner Bank. 
3.  Bank fiir Handel und Industrie (Darmstadter Bank). 
4.  A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein. l0 
5.  S. Bleichroeder. 
6.  Born & Busse. 
V. Helios Electricity Company: 
I. J. I,.  Eltzbacher & Co., Cologne. 
2. J. H. Stein, Cologne. 
3. Sal. Oppenheim, Jr., & Co., Cologne.  . 
4.  Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank Soergel, Parrisius & Co. 
5.  Berliner Rank. 
6.  C. Schlesinger, Trier & Co. 
7.  Deutsche Effekten- und Wechselbank. 
8.  L. Behrens Sohne, Hamburg. 
9. Niederrheinische Kreditanstalt. 
VI.  Elektrizitats-Aktiengesellschaft,  formerly  \V.  Lahmeyer & CO.: 
I. vori Erlanger & Sohne, Prankfort-on-the-Main. 
2. Bank fur Handel und lndustrie (Darmstadter Bank). 
3.  Grunelius & Co., Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
4.  Oberrheinische Bank. 
5.  R. M. Strupp, Gotha. 
6.  D. und J. de Neufville, Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
7.  Phil. Nic. Schmidt, Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
8. Joh. Go11 & Sohne, Frankfort-on-the-Main. National  Monetary  Commission 
VII.  Aktiengesellschaft  Elektrizitatswerke,  formerly  0. L.  Kummer & 
Co. : 
1.  Kreditanstalt fiir Industrie und Handel, Dresden. 
2.  Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank  Soergel, Parrisius & Co. 
The development, however, did not stop at this point. 
The Kummer group (V11 in the table above) collapsed in 
1900.  About the same time the Helios group lost a large 
part of its importance, and ownership of  the shares of  its 
trust company, the company for Electric Establishments 
~assed  to the Electric Light  and Power  Establishment 
Stock Company,  one  of  the  subsidiary corporations  of 
the Siemens & Halske group. 
In the year  1902-3  a community of  interest was con- 
cluded between the Allgemeine Elektrizitatsgesellschaft and 
the Union-Elektrizitatsgesellschaft, the subsidiary company 
of  the Loewe concern, which was followed in  1904 by a 
complete merger, accompanied by the combination of  the 
banks of  the U. E. G. group (IV, 1-6)  with those of  the 
A. E. G. group. 
In 1903 a part of  the Siemens & Halske enterprises were 
combined with the Schuckert Company into the Siemens- 
Schuckert-Werke G. m. b. H. (original capital go,ooo,ooo 
marks),  so  that  at present  the  Lahmeyer  and  Helios 
groups are confronted  by  the much more powerful Sie- 
mens-Schuckert  group and the Allgemeine Elektrizitats- 
Gesellschaft . 
Toward the end of  1908 an agreement for cooperation 
was concluded between the Siemens-Schuckert group and 
the A. E. G., with the result that they jointly  organized 
the Elektro-Treuhand-GesellscIzaft  (Electrical Fidelity Com- 
pany) with a capital of  3o,mo,ooo marks, a credit institu- 
tion whose object is to make loans on securities issued by 
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electrical undertakings and, on the basis of  the securities 
deposited, to issue bonds.  In this work  it will  have to 
make  use  of  the assistance  of  the great  banks,  solidly 
united  for  this  purpose.  The  object  seems  to be  to 
make loans,  repayable  in  annuities,  to large  customers 
in the electric  industry-that  is to  say, mainly  public 
corporations  and large  private companies-for  the pur- 
pose  of  enabling them to enlarge or remodel their plants, 
so as to insure a permanent demand for light and power, 
even under  unfavorable market  conditions, without  the 
investment of  large capital. 
Thereupon  the Felten  & Guilleaume-Lahmeyer-Werke 
Aktien-Gesellschaft in the beginning of  1909 established a 
similar credit institution under the name of  Treuhand-Bank 
fiir die elektrische Industrie, A ktien-Gesellschaft in Cologne, 
with a share capital of  25,000,000 marks.  The by-laws of 
both companies permit the issue of bonds up to three times 
the amount of  their capital. 
As  regards the question  of  concentration, each of  the 
great  electric  companies,  through  the  above-described 
network  of  trust, operating,  and subsidiary companies, 
which as a rule can only be started with the aid of  the 
supporting banks, forms a widely ramified group, whose 
gradual  development,  extension,  and  differentiation  is 
rendered  possible,  or  at any rate largely  promoted,  by 
the banks.  But when such groups are once formed their 
demands  quickly  outgrow  the forces of  a  single bank, 
which of  course is interested in a multitude of other indus- 
trial enterprises.  The natural result  is the formation of 
bank groups behind the industrial groups, so that at this 
stage  the  industrial  concentration  tends  once  more National  Monetary  Commission 
directly  to induce and greatly to promote concentration 
in  the  banking  business.  Finally,  the  many  relations 
existing between the several industrial groups and indi- 
vidual banks belonging to a group of  banks (some banks 
belong to several groups) lead the banks on their part to 
promote further industrial consolidations.  This was the 
case in particular with the establishment of  a community 
of  interest between the Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft 
(A. E.  G.) and the  Union-Elektrizitats-Gesellschajt  (U. E,  G.), 
founded by the firm Ludwig Loewe & Co. in 1902-3,  which 
subsequently (1904) was followed by the complete absorp- 
tion  of  the  latter  by  the  former,  combined  with  the 
admission  of  the banks  of  the  Loewe  group  into  the 
A.  E. G. group, which meant a complete realignment  of 
the groups previously existing. 
Similar  processes  took  place when, in  1898, the  A. 
Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein,  which  till  then  had 
occupied  the leading  position  in  the Schuckert  group, 
attempted to effect a combination of  the Schuckert group 
with the Loewe group  (U. E. G.  group), and failing in 
this  attempt,  seceded  from  the  Schuckert  group  and 
passed over to the Loewe group.  In  this way the Schuck- 
ert group in its turn was driven to seek an alliance with 
another group, which took place in  1903 in the form of 
a  combination  with  the  Siemens  &  Halske  concern, 
though in this case the combination did not involve the 
admission of  the banks of the Schuckert group into the 
Siemens & Halske group. 
Thus we see a constant fluctuation of  mutual influence; 
we perceive the powerful effect which the grouping process 
in the industrial field exerts on the similar process in the 
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banking field, and vice versa, and how readily changes in 
the one induce changes in the other. 
(b)  THE  CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY. 
The  concentration  movement  presents  an  entirely 
different  picture  in  the chemical  industry.  As  I  ob- 
served  above,  the  chemical  industry  may  properly  be 
described, for  a  number  of  years  back,  as essentially a 
creditor industry.  It has been less  subject to the sharp 
alternations  of  business  prosperity  and  adversity  than 
other  branches  of  industry.  On  the other hand  it has 
had to face daily new problems.ll 
At  the  close  of  this  period  the  chemical  industry 
passed  through  a  development  similar  to  that  of  the 
electrical  industry.  This  applies  particularly  to  the 
aniline  dye  works,lz which  supply  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  world's  demand  for  artificial  dyes.  As  a 
result  of  severe  domestic  competition,  however,  these 
establishments  recently  felt  the  need  of  combination. 
The most  important  aniline  (coal  tar)  dye  factories  of 
Germany  are  the  following: The  Badische  Anilin-und 
Sodafabrik  in  Ludwigshafen-on-the-Rhine;  the Farben- 
fabriken vormals  Friedrich  Bayer  &  Co.,  in  Elberfeld; 
Leopold  Cassella  & Co.,  in  Frankfort-on-the-Main;  the 
Farbwerke vormals Meister, Lueius & Bruning, in Hochst- 
on-the-Main, and  the  A ktiengesellschaft  fur Anilinfabri- 
katiod3  (Aniline  Dyes  Manufacturing  Company)  in 
Treptow, near  Berlin. 
In October,  1904, a close alliance was founded by the 
following two concerns: The Dye Works, formerly Meister, 
Lucius & Brrining, of  Hochst-on-the-Main, a corporation National  Monetary  Commission 
having  at the time  a capital stock of  20,000,000 marks 
and a bonded debt of  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks, and the firm of 
Leopold Cassella & Co., in Frankfort-on-the-Main.  This 
union became effective on January  I, 1904.  Its primary 
justification lay in the fact that the first-named concern 
was  producing a  large variety  of  raw  materials  needed 
by  the  latter  in  its  manufacture.  Furthermore,  these 
plants could  advantageously supplement one another for 
the reason  that a  number  of  commodities produced by 
the one were  needed  by the  other, while for  a  number 
of  commodities, there was  danger of  increasing competi- 
tion between the two concerns.  This union involved the 
interchange of  raw materials, cooperation in  all matters 
of  patents and licenses, the joint  purchase of  coal, and 
joint  activity in  establishing branches both in Germany 
and  in  foreign  countries.  It was  expected  that  this 
combination would  call a halt on the enormous decline 
in  the prices  of  coal-tar dyes,  and  put  these  establish- 
ments in a materially stronger position to meet competi- 
tion  of  foreign producers, particularly  those  in  Switzer- 
land.  At the time that country did not afford protection 
to patented chemical products, with the result that Swiss 
factories could exploit German inventions wit'hout extra 
expense to themselves, a situation that was remedied to 
a limited extent by the most recent German-Swiss com- 
mercial  treaty. 
The combination  was  effected  in  the following man- 
ner:  The firm  Leopold  Cassella  & Co.  was  reorganized 
as  a  limited  liability  company with  a capital  stock  of 
20,000,000 marks and a bonded debt of  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks, 
and  transferred  to  the  Hiichst  Dye  Works  (formerly 
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Meister, Lucius & Briining) 5,500,000 marks of  its shares 
in exchange for the same amount of  shares newly issued 
especially for the  purpose  by  the  Hochst works.  The 
capital  stock  of  the  latter  concern  had  thus  become 
increased  from  20,000,000  marks  to 25,500,ooo marks. 
At  the  same  time  the  partners  of  the  firm  Leopold 
Cassella  & Co.  were  made  members of the supervisory 
board of  the Hochst  Dye  Works, while  some  members 
of  the executive  board of  the Hochst concern joined the 
advisary board of  the firm of  Leopold Cassella & Co. 
In  1908  the  firm  Kalle  &  Co.,  a  stock  company  in 
Bieberich-on-the-Rhine,  joined  the  combination.  This 
union was  effected by the acquisition of  the majority of 
the  stock  of  the  above  company  by  the  Hochst  Dye 
Works.  The latter increased its capital stock by ~o,~oo,ooo 
marks to a total of 36,000,000 marks, using part of  the 
increase  (1,600 shares)  to  acquire  a  controlling interest 
(3,200,000  marks)  in  the  concern  Kalle  &  Co.  The 
dual alliance thus became a triple alliance. 
On  the basis of  a contract  entered  into  December 3, 
1904, a closer union than the above was founded by the 
Rhenish  establishments,  the  Badische  Anilin und  Soda- 
fabrik, of  Ludwigshafen,  having  a  capital  stock ,  of 
2 I ,ooo,ooo marks, and the Farbenfabriken vormals Fried- 
rich Bayer & Co., of  Elberfeld, having a capital stock of 
21 ,ooo,ooo marks, on the one hand, and  the Aktiengesell- 
schaft fur Anilinfabrikation, of  Treptow, near Berlin, hav- 
ing a capital of  9,000,000 marks, on the other.  The last- 
named company was  drawn into the combination during 
the  course  of  negotiations  between  the  other  two.  It 
was about to embark upon the manufacture of  additiobal National  Monetary  Commission 
articles on which the patents had expired, and to increase 
its output through the establishment of  a new  plant at 
Rheinau, being  thus in a position to offer  keen competi- 
tion to the Ludwigshafen concern.  A triple  alliance was 
thus founded which became effective on January I, 1905. 
The members were to share in the profits and losses of  the 
combination, 14 per cent of  the joint results to be the share 
of the Treptow concern and 43 per cent the share of  each 
of  the other two. 
It is  self-evident that  this development  has  not  yet 
reached its final goal.  There is even now  an agreement 
between  the  Badische  Anilin - und  Sodafabrik and  the 
Hochst  Dye  Works  by  which  they  act  in  common  in 
fixing  the selling  price  of  artificial indigo manufactured 
by both.  It  is  quite  likely  that  the  Hochst-Cassella- 
Kalle  & Co.  combination  and  the  other  triple  alliance 
(Badische  Anilinfabrik,  Buyer,  and  the  Aktiengesell- 
schaft fur Anilinfabrikation) will  gradually get  together 
in one way or another and at some more or  less  distant 
future time form a consolidation of  all aniline dye works 
or some looser union. 
There is no doubt that the decisive factors making for 
the progress  of  concentration  in  the chemical  industry 
have been  essentially technical ones.  'I'he  initiative for 
the developments  thus  far  has  come,  in  the main, we 
may say, exclusively from the industry itself.  The extent 
of  concentration,  the direction  taken, and the rapidity 
of  the movement have accordingly been dependent on the 
special needs of  the industry.  Whatever  the assistance 
of  the banks in the formation of  these alliances and groups 
in the chemical industry-not  to speak of  their initiative 
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in  this  movement--is  so  little  perceptible that  it niay 
safely be  put  down  as very slight, indeed.  In marked 
contrast to the progress of  concentration in the electrical 
industry, there is no evidence of  any considerable influence 
exerted  by  the banks on the movement toward  concen- 
tration.  Inversely, this industry has had as little effect 
on concentration in banking. 
2  INFLUENCE OF RANKS AND RANKING CONCENTRATION  ON CONCENTRATION 
IN  INDUSTRIES  WITH  STRONG  CARTEL  TENDENCIES.  (THE  MINING  AND 
METALLURGICAL  INDUSTRIES ) 
The  process  of  concentration  consummated  in  the 
mining  industry  presents  an  entirely  different  picture. 
As  we  saw, it was largely influenced by the formation of 
cartels.  Here  banks  and  concentration  in  banking 
have exerted a vast influence on industrial concentration. 
As  we  shall show  in  detail, this influence varied  greatly 
not only in the different districts, but also in the different 
coal mines and iron works. 
There can  be no question that  in mining as  in  other 
industries the choice of  the forms in which  concentration 
was  effected-merger,  comn~unity  of  interest, etc.-was 
not  made without  the  influence of  the banks  or with- 
out  due  regard  to  their  business  interests  or  policies. 
This was  but the natural outcome of  the fact that bank 
directors  were  represented  largely  on  the  supervisory 
boards  of  the mining  and metallurgical companies, fre- 
quently occupying the very influential posts of  chairmen 
or vice-chairmen.  Moreover, the intimate relations with 
the  banks  existing  in  all  business,  and notably  in  the 
mining and metallurgical industries, as a result of  credit National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
and current-account relations, naturally had  their  effect 
on the choice of  the forms of industrial concentration.14 
In discussing above  the industrial activity  of  the A. 
Schaafhausen'scher Bankverein (p. 509 et seq.), we  men- 
tioned a large number of  instances which could be readily 
multiplied in which the bank not only brought about the 
organization of  new  corporations, the change of  private 
firms  into  corporations  and  reorganizations,  but  also 
effected  mergers  of  concerns  which  formed  part  of  its 
clientele.  It did this with  the express purpose of  com- 
bining  establishments  devoted  to various  operations, a 
type of  concentration discussed above (p. 704  et seq.). 
Moreover, as we  saw, the A. Schaafhausen'scher Bank- 
verein in  1899 assumed  directly  the function of  a sales 
agency and clearing house for the Federation of  German 
wire rope manufacturers.  Going  farther, it organized  a 
special Syndicate  Bureau  of  the  A. Schaafhausen'scher 
Bankverein (Limited),  with a capital of  I ,ooo,ooo marks. 
The bureau  was  intended  to  serve for  other  industrial 
combinations in the same capacity as the parent bank did 
for the federation just  named. 
It is certain, moreover, that the entire German banking 
world, as may be seen from numerous reports, not only 
welcomed  such  important cartels  as  the Rhenish-West- 
phalian  Coal  and  Iron Syndicates and the Steel Works' 
Union,  but  in  many  cases  helped  to bring  them  into 
existence,  as  far  as  it lay  in  their  power  and  within 
limits  compatible  with  their  other  duties.  This  they 
did not only in the interest of  the general welfare, and of 
the  prosperity  of  industry  in  general,  but  in  the  last 
analysis  also  in  the  interest  of  their  own  business, 
closely bound up with  the growth and prosperity of  the 
industry which was  to be  fostered by  the establishment 
of cartels.  An  example of  the banks' activity in bringing 
about the formation of a cartel is the case of  the Phoenix. 
The management of  the Phoenix was unwilling to enter 
the Steel Works'  Union-which  could  not  be  organized 
without  it-unless  it received  greater  advantages  than 
the union  felt able to grant.  There is  little doubt that 
these  efforts  on  behalf  of  the cartel were started by the 
banks  which  were  not represented on the directorate of 
the  Phoenix  and  which  were  therefore  entirely  free in 
their action.  We may also grant that those firms which 
were represented on the board, as they asserted, refrained 
from exerting a direct influence on their customers as to 
how  they  should vote  at the special  meeting of  stock- 
holders of  April  26,  1904, at which  final  action  was  to 
be taken.  On  the  other  hand, it is  equally  true  that 
they maintained  an attitude of  "  benevolent neutrality " 
toward  the wishes for the realization of  the Steel Works' 
Union. 
A benevolent neutrality of  this kind was maintained on 
similar  occasions  also by  banking  establishments which 
counted  among  their  clients  concerns,  whose  interests 
lay in the opposite direction.  In business, as in politics, 
such  an  attitude may  be  of  great  importance.  Under 
given  circumstances it may  be  equivalent  to  the  ad- 
vancement of  the cartel.  At  least it would  absolve the 
latter from the necessity of  taking measures for defense or 
of  granting concessions such as might  otherwise become 
necessary.  Hans  Gideon  Heymann l5  therefore  justly 
assumes that with the A. Schaafiausen'scher  Bankverein National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
in control  of  the  Internationale  Bohrgesellschaft  (Inter- 
national Exploration Company)  through ownership of  an 
overwhelming majority of  its stock, it was certain that no 
obstacles would be put in the way of  the Coal Syndicate 
from this source, such as might have arisen from the sale 
of its coal fields to interests outside the syndicate. 
As far as my  knowledge  and experience  go, complete 
neutrality toward a cartel contemplated in any branch of 
industry  has  been  observed  by  the  banks  only  where 
there was a conflict of  interests, and whenever they were 
forced into that position through having influential clients 
in  both  camps.  Such  a  conflict  of  interests  has  fre- 
quently existed between the coal and iron industries, and 
has become very pronounced when syndicates were con- 
templated  in  either  industry.  It  was  such  a  situation 
which  dictated  the  position  taken  by  the  A. Schaaff- 
hausen'scher  Bankverein  and the Berliner  Handelsgesell- 
schaft at the time when the organization of  the first coal 
syndicate  was  being  planned.  Both  institutions  were 
maintaining  close  relations  with  the  HarFener  Berg- 
baugesellschaft;  at  the same time, however, both of them 
had large customers among the iron works. 
A similar situation confronted the banks in the struggle 
which has continued to the present between the so-called 
"  mixed "  and the "  pure " works (see p. I 75), and again in 
the conflict between the pure works and the Steel Works' 
Union,  and  particularly  during  that  phase  when  the 
former  demanded  the abolition  of  the tariff  duties  on 
their raw materials, an issue involving far-reaching conse- 
quences for other industries closely related to the banks. 
Here, however, there was an entirely different alignment 
- 
of  forces, which  made it easier  for  the banks to decide 
what position to take. 
On the other hand, there were cases, when the affairs of 
some powerful  customers were bound up so closely with 
the bank, that the latter felt  constrained to help  them 
directly  in carrying out their  plans, even where circum- 
stances would have seemed to make it imperative for the 
bank to observe neutrality. 
Thus we  pointed  out that in the negotiations  looking 
to the formation of  the first coal syndicate (in September, 
1903)  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  was  most  active in  its 
assistance to the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft, one 
of  its best customers, which took the leading part in the 
negotiations.  In the same way  the Darmstadter  Bank 
must surely have used every endeavor to help the Deutsch- 
Luxemburgische  Bergwerks-  und  Huttenaktiengesellschaft 
(German-Luxemburg Mining  and Furnace Company)  in 
its efforts to organize or extend the Luxemburg-Lorraine 
Pig Iron Syndicate, for it had furnished the large resources 
needed for the reorganization of the Aktiengesellschaft fiir 
Eisen- und Kohlenindustrie Differdingen-Dannenbaum (the 
Differdingen-Dannenbaum  Iron  and  Coal  Corporation) 
and its transformation into the above-named corporation, 
and had made of it technically one of  the best equipped 
concerns in the industry.  The same no doubt applies to 
the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein, whose  relations 
to the Aumetz-Friede  Company  were  so intimate as to 
compel the bank to pursue a similar line of  action. 
Under  this  head  we  may  include  also  the strenuous 
efforts made by the banks to prevent the taking over of 
the Hibernia Mining Company by the Government, and National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
to insure its independent existence by  equipping it with 
all modern means of  existence and growth.  This case is 
of  particular interest as illustrating in a marked form how 
the  industrial  policies  of  the  great  banks  are  shaped 
according to the  character  of  their  industrial  clientele. 
On the one  side, opposed to the government  ownership 
of  the Hibernia, there was arrayed  a  number  of  banks 
headed  by  the  banking  firm  of  S.  Bleichroder  and  the 
Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft.  On  the other side, favor- 
ing  the  Government, there  were  lined  up  other  banks, 
notably the  Dresdner  Bank  and  the A. Schaaffhausen'- 
scher  Bankverein,  making  equally  strenuous  though 
futile efforts  to carry through the acquisition of  the mi~ies 
by the Government. 
The activity  of  the large banks  in  the formation  of 
syndicates  has, however, as a rule, more  important  con- 
sequences.  As  we  observed, the organization  of  large 
cartels, which in themselves represent  a type of  concen- 
tration,  usually  involves  the  erection,  equipment,  and 
amalgamation of  large "  mixed "  works devoted to a vari- 
ety of operations, thus promoting another form of  concen- 
tration.  Such were primarily the results of  the organiza- 
tion of the great coal, iron, and coke syndicates.  Particu- 
larly  is  this  true  of  the  Lorraine-Luxemburg  Pig Iron 
Syndicate, the operations  of  which  extend  dso to  the 
export trade.  This syndicate was first organized in 1879 
under the lead of  the trading firm of  Spaeter & Co., which 
was particularly interested in the Rombach Furnaces. 
Establishments carrying on more than one operation, or 
so-called "  mixed " works, have long been overwhelmingly 
in the majority in the Lorraine industry, the beginning of 
which may be traced back to the thirteenth century.  As 
early as 1704 the de Wendel family had taken over the 
Hayinger  Works, and at the opening of  the nineteenth 
century  it had  established  "mixed " works.  With the 
annexation of Lorraine part of  the works was transferred 
to France or French branches were founded. 
The  chief  works  on  the  Saar  (Burbach,  Dillingen, 
Stumm, Rochling) added their own blast furnaces in the 
eighties  and  nineties.16  The  Diidelingen  Steel Works 
were built from the very beginning as a "  mixed "  establish- 
ment.  Here there is no evidence that the banks were an 
important factor in the movement toward concentration. 
In the Saar district, where  coal  mining dates back to 
the fifteenth century, the Prussian Government is in con- 
trol of  by far the larger part of  the coal fields.  Here coal 
mining was from the beginning a prerogative of  the terri- 
torial  overlord.  The  only  noteworthy  private  interests 
in  this  district  are  those  of  de Wendel,  which  have  an 
output  in  the  Lorraine district  of  about  one  million 
tons,  and of  the Saar- und Mosel-Gesellschaft.  The latter 
is under the influence of  Thyssen, Stinnes, and the Dresd- 
ner  Bank.  New  coal  fields in the Lorraine district have 
been located by the International  Exploration Company 
(Internationale  Bohrgesellschaft) ,  controlled  by  the 
A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein,  both  of  these  cor- 
pora~ions being  closely  related  to  the  Rhenish-West- 
phalian  Coal Syndicate. 
More  than  one-half or"  the iron  furnaces in  the Saar 
district  were  in  the hands of  the  Stumm  family more 
than  one  hundred  years  ago.  The Neunkirchener  Iron 
Works,  the Dillinger  Hiitte Aktiengesellschaft, and  the National  Monetary  Commission 
limited company Gebriider Bocking & Co. do not compete 
with one another, and are owned in whole or  in part by 
the Stumm family.  Each plant  "takes in the different 
processes in the manufacture of  iron from the ore to the 
finished product," but each specializes in the production 
of different finished articles.  Here, too, we can not speak 
of any large influence of  banks on the process of  concen- 
tration.  Neither the coke nor the pig-iron syndicate have 
entered the district, the establishments in the Saar district 
consuming raw  materials produced  in  the same section. 
There was, however, a conflict of  interests between the 
Saar  establishments  and  the  works  in  the Moselle and 
Ruhr districts, the latter closely  allied with the banks. 
The Saar establishments carried on a vigorous campaign 
against the Moselle  Canal, fearing they would be injured 
by  it, while  the Moselle  and  Ruhr works would benefit. 
The banks  interested  in the latter plants had to refrain 
from taking part in this conflict, out of  regard for their 
clients in the Saar district. 
The mining  industry invaded  the Sieg district  in the 
fifties, when  mineral coal supplanted charcoal.  With it 
came the influence of  capitalism  as represented  by  the 
banks.  Mineral coal involved operation on a large scale 
and  this  meant  the  application  of  capitalist  methods. 
When in  1856 the old furnaces of  the Musener Stahlberg 
were united into one of  the most important of +he  mixed 
establishments in the customs union-the  Koln-Miisener 
Bergwerks-Aktien-Verein-there  stood  at the head  of  it 
great  Rhenish  bankers  and  merchants  like  Deichmann 
and Mevissen.17 
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To-day  the  sway  of  large-scale  production  and  of 
relatively  large  establishments  is  well-nigh  absolute  in 
the  Sieg  district.  Rhenish-Westphalian  furnaces  have 
also entered this section, some with the assistance of  the 
banks.  Here, too, the activity of  the coal syndicate has 
led to the establishment of larger and larger furnaces in 
combination with mines.  The same tendency resulted also 
in the formation  on October 27, 1894, of  the association 
for the sale of  Siegerland pig iron (Verein fur den Verkauf 
von  Siegerlander Roheisen), which in the very same year 
established secure relations to the Rhenish-Westphalian 
Pig  Iron Syndicate.ls  In other districts, the small blast 
furnaces and rolling mills were  more and more  consoli- 
dated with the help of  the banks, and transformed  into 
"  mixed " works.  The small concerns in the Sieg district 
which  did not follow their example, and still survive as 
"pure"  works,  are engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle for 
mere existence, hovering between life and death.  Similar 
conditions are found in the Lahn and Dill  district con- 
sisting of parts of Upper Hessia, the administrative dis- 
tricts  of  Wiesbaden,  and  the  circuit  of  Wetzlar.19 
The large coal  production  of  the Aix-la-Chapelle region 
affords a strong basis for the iron furnaces of  this region. 
These, however, draw part of  their coal supply also from 
the Ruhr district.  Adjoining the Aix-la-Chapelle district 
on  the east  is  the Eschweiler coal  district,  and  on  the 
north the Wurm  district, the latter, however, presenting 
less advantages for furnaces. 
The adoption of the Bessemer process at the close of  the 
seventies led to the rapid  development of  the Aachener 
Hutten-A ktienverein Rote  Erde  into a powerful "  mixed " National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
steel-making  establishment.  On  the  other  hand  the 
Hoesch Iron and Steel Company of  Dortmund abandoned 
its plants in the district  almost  entirely and transferred 
the main  part of  its works to Dortmund.  In the same 
way  the Phoenix  made no  progress  with  its furnace in 
the Aix-la-Chapelle district.  Under the direction of  the 
A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein both works were amal- 
gamated into one establishment in I 903  .20 
With  the  continuous  assistance  of  the  banks,  coal 
mining  in  the Ruhr  district  has  developed from  small 
beginnings to a dominant industry in the Rhenish-West- 
phalian  territory,  a  section  well  provided  both  with 
industrial establishments and banks.  Here, as elsewhere, 
the higher prices, established by the coal and coke syndi- 
cates and  particularly by the Rhenish-Westphalian  coal 
syndicate  founded  March  I, 1893, were  the immediate 
occasion for the furnaces to acquire their own coal mines, 
a  movement  which  won  for  them  their  increasing  su- 
premacy over the concerns which have remained "  pure " 
iron works.  In 1896 the Phoenix acquired the Westende 
mine; the Dortmunder Union-the  Adolf  vqn Hansemann 
mine  (Mengeder  Bergwerksgesellschaft); in  1897 the Gel- 
senkirchener Bergwerksaktiengesellschaft,  the leader  of  the 
coal  syndicate,  acquired  the  Westhausen  mine;  the 
Aktiengesellschaft Kannengiesser-the  Roland  mine.  All 
these mines had been independent of  the syndicate. 
Hoesch, Krupp, and the Rhenish Steel Works followed 
suit by buying up syndicate mines, a movement in which 
the banks were  often the intermediaries.  At first  they 
attempted to secure through legal proceedings the right 
to  divert  the coal  production  of  their  newly  acquired 
properties  for  their  own  use.  When  this  proved  inef- 
fective they were soon able to secure this right by agree- 
ment.  The syndicate had to yield, for these works were 
in a position to cause it great annoyance. 
When  the coal  syndicate  agreement  was  renewed  in 
1903-a  result  brought  about largely by the activity of 
the banks in the open and behind the scenes-all  the mines 
owned by the iron and steel works, except those belonging 
to the Government,  joined  the syndicate.  The former, 
however, arranged  it so that under the new  agreement 
the syndicate  provisions  did  not  apply  to their  entire 
output but only to the portion over and above that which 
was  consumed in their own works.  On the other hand, 
however,  the owners  of  the coal  mines  were  prohibited 
from selling coal fields or pits to other than members of 
the syndicate without first securing permission from the 
general convention  of  coal mine owners. 
There remained, however, a point in dispute as to what 
should be done in the case of  the sale of  coal mines to fur- 
nace owners, for the purpose of  supplementing the inade- 
quate supply of  coal for use of  their own furnaces.  The 
contention of  the syndicate was  that in such  cases the 
entire  output  of  the newly  purchased  mines  was to be 
subject to the regulations of the syndicate.  The German- 
Luxemburg  Mine  and Smelting Stock Company, having 
bought the Kaiser Friedrich mine for its own use, brought 
suit against the coal syndicate, and the contention of  the 
syndicate was not upheld by the imperial supreme court. 
The court took the position of the company, namely, that 
as much of  the output of  the newly acquired mine as was 
needed  by  the  furnace  proper  might  be  used  without National  Monetary  Commission 
restriction.  Another case, not regulated directly, is that  of 
a mining company "erecting a furnace "  in order to find a 
more profitable use for its coal in the manufacture of  pig 
iron  or  steel  than  in  the  sale  of  its  product  to the 
syndicate." 21 
It should be mentioned, however, that when the syndi- 
cate was extended it itself included among its purposes the 
acquisition of  coal fields and mining shares.  On the other 
hand, the syndicate was protected against the sale of  coal 
fields or mining shares to outsiders  by the International 
Exploration Company, through the "benevolent neutral- 
ity " of  the  A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein, which con- 
trolled this corporation, a policy which the bank had to 
adopt, on account of  its relations to the companies which 
dominated the syndicate.  There are no coal deposits of 
any importance in the district which are not held by the 
International Exploration Company, nor  any sites to be 
had for new plants or for extensions, not even at fanciful 
prices.  Furthermore, for a long time most of  the ore has 
had to be imported from abroad.  Here, again, the Ger- 
man banks have repeatedly  tried to procure for friendly 
industrial interests ore mines or ore deliveries at  reasonable 
prices, as, for example, from Sweden. 
In  the same fashion the banks were active in many ways 
in  the  consolidations,  out  of  which  sprang  the  great 
"  mixed" works that to-day dominate the Ruhr district, 
though some of  these, such as Krupp, Bochumer  Verein, 
Phoenix, Horder Bergwerks-und-Huttenverein,  and the Gute 
Hoffnungshiitte,  were founded  as early  as the fifties.  In 
the early seventies the Dortmunder Union, which enjoyed 
the patronage of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, absorbed the 
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Heinrichshutte and the Neu-Schottland works, which even 
then  were  mixed  works.  Similarly,  it  absorbed  the 
Strousberg Works, in which the Disconto-Gesellschaft was 
likewise  interested.  In the same  way  the Westfalische 
Union  and  the  Westfalischer  Drahtindustrie-Verein ab- 
sorbed a number of  wire works of  this district. 
The part played by the banks in these consolidations had 
not been unimportant, but around the middle and toward 
the end of  the seventies their services were called in on a 
much larger scale.  The iron industry was then in a state 
of  prostration, and for years not even the Phoenix and the 
Bochumer  Union  paid  dividends.  The  Horder  Verein 
became involved in great difficulties, and both the Gute 
Hoffnungshiitte  and  the  Rheinische Stahlwerke had  to 
resort to a heavy reduction  of  their capital.  The West- 
falische Union  was  saved  from  extinction  only  by  the 
assistance of  banks and a reorganization. 
In Upper Silesia capitalist production did not begin to 
make progress before the fifties, and even then its advance 
was slow.  For the most part the land and the iron ores 
were in the hands of  the large feudal  landowners.  Here 
Borsig  was  the pioneer  in  evolving  a  machine  factory 
into enormous mixed steel work? by acquiring or erect- 
ing  blast  furnaces  and rolling mills.  This example was 
followed later by the machine factory of  Hendschel & Son, 
in  Kassel.  In the seventies  the  Vereinigte Konigs-und 
Laurahutte and the Donnersmarck-Hiitte passed out of  the 
ownership of  the magnates, who continued, however, to 
hold by far the larger proportion of the iron furnaces and 
coal mines.  With the aid  of  the banks, the newly  ac- 
quired furnace works were organized as stock companies. National  Monetary  Commission 
In the same manner "  pure " rolling mills were started, as, 
for instance, the Bismarckhiitte. 
At present the center of  gravity of  the industry in Upper 
Silesia is not in its iron production, but in its output of 
coal and  This is regulated by the Upper Silesian 
Coal Convention of  1890.  Of  the total product approxi- 
mately two-thirds is sold by two Berlin firms, Casar Woll- 
heim, intimately connected with the Dresdner Bank, and 
Emanuel Friedlander &  Co., closely allied with the Berliner 
Handels-Gesellschaft  . 
In this district, too, it is  scarcely possible  to-day to 
acquire coal mines or coal fields.  Free competition has 
been well-nigh  "banished  from Upper  Sile~ia."~~  Here 
the mining and metallurgical concerns have always been 
mixed works.  It is therefore only in the works recently 
established that the movement toward concentration and 
combination has been closely interwoven with the cartel 
movement.  The  concentration  and  cartel  movements 
have been on a smaller scale in this region than in the 
Rhenish-Westphalian district, but here, too, the stimulus 
has come from the banks, which are behind the different 
establishments.  Of  these the Borsig  Works is the only 
undertaking still owned privately. 
Of  the  concerns  established  in  recent  times  the one 
deserving  special  mention  is  the  Upper  Silesian  Iron 
Manufacturing Stock Company (Caro Hegenscheidt)  .  This 
company developed in 1887 out of the Caro Works, and is 
closely related  to the Berliner  Handels-Gesellschaft.  In 
1899 it absorbed the Upper Silesian Wire Manufacturing 
Stock Company, from which it had hitherto been obliged 
to purchase  25,000 tons of  pig  iron.  Thereafter  it was 
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able to obtain its pig iron more cheaply, for the wire com- 
pany had in  1888 contracted for the entire output of  the 
Count Henckel-Siemianowitz Works for a period of  twenty 
years.  Since 1889 the Upper Silesian Iron Manufacturing 
Company  has  been  closely  allied  by  contract with  the 
Oberschlesische Eisenbahnbedarfs-Gesellschaft  (Upper  Sile- 
sian Railroad Equipment Company), which is on intimate 
terms with the Breslauer Disconto-Bank, and through it 
with  the  Darmstadter Bank.  This equipment  company 
(the so-called  Oberbedarfs-Gesellschaft) in turn  united  in 
1904 with the Huldchinsky furnaces.  To all appearances 
the alliance was  made for purely business and technical 
reasons, and did not call for any significant help from the 
banks.  Similar business  policies  and  technical  reasons 
seem to  have been the  determining factors in bringing about 
the community of  interest in 1903 between the Bismarck- 
hiitte and the Upper Silesian Iron Manufacturing Company, 
extended  in  1904  so  as  to  include  the  Donnersmarck 
Bethlen-Falva Hiitte. 
The same may  be  said  of  the community of  interest 
founded in 1904 between the Konigs-und Laurahiitte (with 
which  are affiliated the banking house of S. Bleichroder 
and  the  Dresdner  Bank),  the  Upper  Silesian  Railway 
Equipment  Company  (Friedenshutte)  (closely  related  to 
the Breslauer Disconto-Bank and the Darmstadter Bank), 
and  the  Kattowitzer  (Tiek-Winckler'sche)  Aktiengesell- 
schaft  ffiir  Bergbau- und  Huttenbetvieb  (Marthahutte)  .  In 
such cases the services of  the friendly banks often take but 
the form of  removing obstacles and hindrances, or refrain- 
ing from interference when  the interests of  other clients 
might call for such interference. National  Monetary  Commissiolz 
Occurrences of  this kind are, however, to be regarded as 
exceptional.  Moreover, it is not a matter of  chance that 
they have happened in the district of  Upper Silesia.  For 
here there was little room for banks or their initiative and 
assistance, for the reason that the land, the coal mines, 
and the ore rights were in the hands of  feudal owners, and 
that from early times mixed works predominated. 
The conditions in the Saar district are similar.  There 
the family ownership of  the iron furnaces by the Stumm, 
the de Wendel, and  the Rochling families held back bank 
domination,  which  usually  asserts  itself  in  connection 
with  stock  companies.  Purthermore, here  the Govern- 
ment was  in  control of  the coal, and the entire district 
gradually became dependent on Lorraine for its coke and 
ore.  More and more it is becoming clear, in all essentials, 
that the fate of  the mining and metallurgical industries as 
a whole will be decided not in Upper Silesia or on the Saar, 
but in the two districts in which primarily the great banks 
are contending for financial control-the  Rhenish-West- 
phalian and the Lorraine-luxemburg districts.  Between 
the latter  and  the former  there  are  close  connections. 
Largely  through  the help  of  the banks  the Lorraine- 
I,uxembmg  district  has  recently  attained  a  position  of 
more dominating importance, its extensive ownership of 
mines in the Ruhr section giving it large influence also in 
the Rhenish-Westphalian territory.  In the main it was 
the mixed iron works of  the two districts which were able 
to impose their will upon and have their interests taken 
care of  by a syndicate primarily devoted to the interests 
of coal at the time when the second coal syndicate was 
formed (in September, 1903).  Coal  had to yield to iron. 
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These two  districts, which  may  be regarded the cap- 
ital seats of  the mining and  iron  industries,  witness at 
present  the  great  struggle  for  industrial  supremacy 
between  the leading mining  concerns  and  for  financial 
supremacy  between  the  leading  banks.  It  is  highly 
interesting  to watch  the turns in this battle, the numer- 
ous ups and  downs,  surprises, and  combinations  which 
present  themselves in  varied  and exciting array to the 
attentive  observer  as  the  contending  parties  maneuver 
and  clash  in  the  combat.  There  is  no  lack  of  either 
large  and  comprehensive plans  or  of  scenes  of  petty 
jealousy in these campaigns.  Here a great part is played 
by  two  captains  of  industry whose  power  is  constantly 
growing in the two opposing camps contending for mas- 
tery-August  Thyssen, of  the firm  of  Thyssen & Co.,  in 
Miilheim  on-the-Rhine,  and  Hugo  Stinnes,  of  the firm 
of  Mathias Stinnes, of  Mulheim on-the-Rhine.  Thus far 
both  have,  as  far as  possible,  pursued  the  policy  of 
maintaining  the  friendliest  relations  with  a  number  of 
banks without  wedding themselves to any one. 
It  is  not, however,  the first  time that  such  captains 
of  industry  have  played  the leading r61e  in  the indus- 
trial  evolution  of  Germany.  One  need  only  recall  the 
names  of  Strousberg  and Friedrich  Grillo, whose  enter- 
prises either failed or were dispersed on their death and 
were  liquidated  or  sold  by  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
Part of  the Grillo works passed into the hands of  August 
Thyssen, of  whom we shall have more to say here.  The 
modest steel and rolling mill of  Thyssen & Co., in Mulheim 
on-the-Rhine, founded in the early seventies, has gradually 
grown into the very important Thomas and Martin Steel National  Monetary  Commission 
and Rolling Mills of  that firm.  It  annexed first the  Gewerk- 
schaft Deutscher Kaiser, a mine and furnace company in 
Bruckhausen-Hamborn, and  developed  it into  powerful 
mixed steel works especially noteworthy for its highly effi- 
cient blast furnaces.  In 1903 the latter works joined the 
Rhenish-Westphalian Pig  Iron  Syndicate.  The two  es- 
tablishments  employ  more than  17,000  men  and  insure 
Thyssen an important  place  both  in  the pig  iron  syn- 
dicate and in the Steel Works  Union. 
Thyssen has also a controlling interest in the Schalker 
Gruben-und Huttenverein, which owns large coal mines and 
blast furnaces and operates the largest iron foundry in ex- 
istence in Germany.  He also controls the Victor Mining 
Company, which  was  organized by  the former  concern. 
In Lorraine he owns the Minette mines and holds a con- 
siderable interest in the mixed steel works of  the Sambre 
et Moselle  Mining  Corporation.  In  the  coal  territory 
his  control is  even wider than in the iron region.  This 
is  due as much to the extensive coal properties of  the 
Gewerkschaft  Deutscher  Kaiser  as  to  his  large  interests 
in the Mulheirn Coal Company which is jointly controlled 
by him and Stinnes. 
With  Stinnes  he  shares  also  in  the  control  of  the 
Friedlicher  Nachbar  Mining  Company.  Early  in  1904 
he  joined  the  supervisory board  of  the Gelsenkirchner 
Bergwerksgesellschaft, the coal properties of  which adjoin 
those  of  the Schalter  Gruben-und  Hiittenverein,  having 
acquired a large part, perhaps  a majority, of  the shares 
of  that  company,  either  individually  or  through  the 
Mulheimer  Bergwerksverein (3  ,ooo,ooo marks).  Finally, 
in  1903, he acquired the development company Bohrge- 
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sellschaft Lippermulde and thereby extended and rounded 
out his  coal  properties, until  they reached  on  the east 
of  the Rhine  as  far  as  the government mines  and  on 
the  south  as far  as  the properties of  the Gewerkschaft 
Deutscher Kaiser and Gute-Hoffnungshutte.  After the pur- 
chase of  the development  company  Tiefbohrgesellschaft 
Lubisch  his  holdings extended east of  the Rhine as  far 
north as the Dutch  border.  His  present  ownership  of 
coal  properties  is  about  twice  as large as  that of  the 
Government in the same region. 
While  Stinnes  is  closely  allied  with  Thyssen,  as  is 
evident from the above, and owns jointly with him the 
Mulheimer  and  the Sambre et Mosselle  mining  compa- 
nies, he  owns also in his own right  the coal mines Ma- 
thias  Stinnes,  Victoria  Mathias,  Graf  Beust,  Carolus 
Magnus,  Friedrich,  and  Ernestine.  He  owned  also  the 
Friedlicher  Nachbar  mine  (transferred  in  1904  to  the 
Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergwerks-und Huttenaktiengesell- 
schaft).  In the southern  part  of  the  Ruhr  district he 
is  almost  in  sole  control;  in  the rest  of  this  territory 
he shares control with Thyssen.  Stinnes likewise joined 
the supervisory board  of  the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks- 
gesellschaft.  In addition he is on the board of  the Nord- 
stern  and  of  the Mittelrheinische Bank  in  Koblenz  and 
Duisburg.  The latter is closely related to Spaeter & Co., 
in Koblenz. 
The  supremacy of  Thyssen  and  Stinnes in  the Ruhr 
district is disputed in the main only by the Hank1 family 
and by  Karl Funke, of  Essen.  The Kaniel family owns 
the Rheinpreussen Mines  and the Gute  Hoffnungs Mines, 
adjoining the Thyssen coal mines.  Karl Funke owns the National  Monetary  Commission  German Great Banks 
Konig  Ludwig mines.  The  Haniel  family is  allied with 
the Duisburg-Ruhrorter Bank, and Funke with the Essener 
Bankverein.  As  both  of  these banks have communities 
of  interest  with  the Deutsche  Bank,  both  Haniel  and 
Funke are now  in close touch with the Deutsche Bank. 
Stinnes's  relations with  the  firm  of  Spaeter  & Co.,  of 
Koblenz,  are  particularly  close  through  their  common 
shipping  interests  on  the  Rhine,  both  of  them  being 
large river  carriers of  coal. 
In some cases  both  Thyssen  and  Stinnes  have  been 
fighting the syndicates.  In the majority  of  cases, how- 
ever,  their  attitude  toward  them  was  more  friendly, 
resembling their  attitude toward  the banks, maintained 
successfully for  a  number of  years. 
From  the beginning  the Schalber Gruben-und Hutten- 
verein  controlled  by  Thyssen,  was  a  member  of  the 
Rhenish-Westphalian  Pig  Iron  Syndicate,  while  his 
Gewerkschaft Deutscher  Kaiser  with  its  blast  furnaces 
did  not  join  this  syndicate  until  1903.  The  Schalker 
Verein with its Pluto mines, and its subsidiary company 
Victor,  as  well  as  the  Miilheimer  Bergwerksverein,  in 
which Stinnes was also interested, were members of  the 
coal syndicate, while at the same time Thyssen's Deut- 
scher  Kaiser  mines  were  most  active  in  fighting  the 
syndicate. 
Stinnes,  on  the  contrary,  joined  the  coal  syndicate 
with nearly all his  mines.  However, he kept outside of 
the syndicate his Friedlicher Nachbar mines.  The intoler- 
able  conditions  thus  produced  have,  however,  in  the 
main, been ended by  the syndicate regulations. 
Their  relations  to  the  banks  we  have  characterized 
before.  Thus Thyssen  was  at first on  close  terms  with 
the  Disconto-Gesellschaft.  Particularly  in  the  eighties 
and nineties it was this bank which floated the securities 
of  the  Schalker  Gruben- und  Huttenverein and  of  the 
Gewerkschaft  Deutscher  Kaiser.  Later  his  relations  be- 
came  intimate  with  the  Dresdner  Bank,  after  it  had 
reorganized  in  1902  and  entered  into  a  community  of 
interest with the Rheinische Bank in  Miilheim, an insti- 
tution with which Thyssen was  affiliated. 
Hugo  Stinnes  had  some  relations  with  the  Dresdner 
Bank, having participated  with  it in the reorganization 
of  the Saar- und  Moselle  Mining  Company.  He  estab- 
lished relations also with the A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bank- 
verein, after the latter had founded a community of  in- 
terest  with  the  Mittelrheinische  Bank  in  Koblenz,  of 
which  Stinnes  was  a  board  member.  In  1901 Stinnes 
established  relations  also  with  the  Darmstadter  Bank, 
when  he  became  vice-president  of  the  board  of  the 
Deutsch-Luxemburgische  Bergwerks-  und  Hutten-Aktien- 
Gesellschaft, which  owes  its financial  strength  and  high 
technical standing  to the Darmstadter  Bank.  The con- 
cern  combined  both  mining  and  smelting  operations 
after  the  acquisition  in  1904  of  the  Stinnes  mines, 
Friedlicher Nachbar. 
On  January  I,  1905,  a  community  of  interest  was 
entered  into  between  the  Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerks- 
Aktiengesellschaft,  the  Aachener  Huttenverein  Rote  Erde 
and  the  Thyssen concern Schalker Gruben- und Hutten- 
verein.  By  this step a  group  of  competing banks,  viz, National  Monetary  Commission 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresd- 
ner  Bank  and  the  A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein 
were brought together in a joint undertaking,  This event 
served also to enhance the power  of  Hugo Stinnes and 
August  Thyssen,  who  became  members  of  the  "joint 
committee  of  this community of  interests. 
This combination seems to have brought  about  some 
sort  of  equilibrium  in  the  Rhenish-Westphalian  indus- 
trial  territory,  and  simplified  certain  complex  relation- 
ships in the banking  and industrial field.  On  the other 
hand, there are already  evident  the beginnings  of  new 
conflicts in another field. 
As we  saw, the Lorraine-Luxemburg iron industry has 
in recent times been coming to the front more and more 
and is beginning to overshadow even the Rhenish-West- 
phalian industry.  One reason of  this development is the 
far lower cost at which it can produce pig  iron as com- 
pared  with  the Rhenish-Westphalian  district.  Another 
reason  is  that  owing  to  the  electrical process  recently 
introduced in the manufacture of  steel the value of  Luxem- 
burg-Lorraine ores, which  formerly were  hard  to work, 
because they were  rich in phosphorus, has been  greatly 
enhanced.  These  can  be  utilized  most  cheaply  and 
advantageously  by  the works  located  close  to  the  ore 
bedsz4 The quantity of  such ore is  estimated  at about 
2 ,oo0,000,000 tons. 
Realizing that a serious movement of  the German pig 
iron industry toward the southwest has set in, the leading 
captains of  industry  and  the leading banks  alike  have 
felt obliged  to increase their  influence in  the Lorraine- 
Luxemburg region. 
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In this territory the position of  the firm, Spaeter & Co., 
in Koblenz, is  very  powerful.  It is the founder of  the 
Rombacher Hiittenwerke, which have bought up the Mosel- 
hiittenwerke and dominate the blast furnaces in Rodingen, 
Riimelingen, and the Eisenhiittenaktienverein  Dtidelingen. 
In this district Thyssen  has  thus  far gained  a foothold 
practically only through  his interest  in  the Hiittenverein 
Sambre et Moselle, while Stinnes's hold in this territory is 
only throu'gh his membership in the Supervisory board of 
what  is  now  a very  important  company-the  Deutsch- 
Luxemburgische  Bergwerks- und  Hiitten-Aktiengesellschaft, 
and his rather unimportant connection with Spaeter &CO.~~ 
As recently as April, 1909, a step was taken which is certain 
to affect  deeply  the relations of  the different  industrial 
groups  and their relative positions.  In all likelihood it 
will also exert a powerful influence on the relations of  the 
different  bank  groups  which  are  dependent  on  these 
industrial  groupings,  and  on  the  general  movement 
toward  concentration.  An  enormous increase was made 
in  the capitalization  of  the Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerks- 
Gesellschaft.  Its  capital  stock  was  increased  by 
26,000,ooo  marks  to a  nominal  amount  of  156,000,000 
marks,  and  its  bonded  debt  by  20,000,000  marks  to 
70,000,000  marks.  The  latter  increase  was  made  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  there  was  still  available  an 
unissued  amount of  9,325,000 marks in 4 per cent bonds 
authorized in 1906. 
This move attracted attention not only by the size of 
the capital increase but  also because it was  made  at a 
time of  money stringency and unfavorable market condi- 
tions.  The company justified this step on the ground that National  Monetary  Comm.ission 
the additional resources were indispensable for the erection 
of  new  blast  furnaces and  steel works  in  Esch  and  in 
Deutsch-0th.  It was  also  given  out officially  that the 
measure was necessary to insure an "  adequate position" 
for the company in case the Steel Works' Union, which ter- 
minates June 30, 191  2, were not renewed.  Doubtless this 
had  reference to an increase  of  its  quota  in  the syndi- 
cate.  The  Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerksgesellschaft  had 
originally been a producer of  coal and coke only.  After 
it had  entered  into  a  community  of  interest  with  the 
Rote  Er&  and the Schalke Works  it became also a pro- 
ducer  of  pig  iron, steel,  semimanufactures of  iron  and 
steel,  beams  and  rails, but  it  nevertheless  continued 
to hold the largest production quota in the coal syndicate. 
Through its action of  April,  1909, however,  it  entirely 
shifted its center of  gravity away from the production of 
coal to that of  iron and steel. 
This step was in keeping with the movement of  the iron 
industry to the southwest.  The  new  resources were to 
be  expended for the purpose  of  operating  its steel and 
rolling mills in combination with its blast furnaces, where 
conditions made possible the cheapest cost of  production, 
i.  e.,  in  the heart  of  the Lorraine-1,uxemburg Minette 
district, where it owned extensive ore beds. 
Through  this  action,  however,  the  Gelsenkirchener 
Bergwerksgesellschaft  became  a  direct  competitor  of 
August  Thyssen, who  had been  a member  of  its board. 
He at once accepted the logical consequence of  the situa- 
tion and resigned from the board.  Earlier he had with- 
drawn also from the board of  the Phoenix.  The Thyssen 
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concern Deutscher Kaiser owns very important ore rights 
in  the Lorraine-Luxemburg district,  and  he  himself,  as 
was shown above,is interested in the Sear- und  Moselbe~g- 
wrksgerellschaft in  Karlingen.  Moreover,  early  in  1909 
he invested several million  marks in land in this section 
and acquired the oatent rights to produce electro-steel in 
all his works. 
In the near future the struggle for supremacy is likely 
to  be  fought  out  in  the  Lorraine-Luxemburg district. 
The trial of  strength  between  the leading interests will 
come as soon as negotiations begin with a view to renew- 
ing the Steel Works'  Union at the expiration of  the pres- 
ent agreement. 
The progress of  the conflict  and its outcome and the 
industrial concentration that is likely to precede or follow 
it will undoubtedly be influenced by the banks and groups 
of  banks that stand back of  the captains of  industry and 
their enterprises.  This influence may indeed not be de- 
cisive, but it is likely to be in  the direction of  new com- 
binations  and  the avoidance of  further conflicts  which 
must prove harmful to all.  So far as we  can foresee, the 
important part will  be taken by those banks which now 
possess, or by that time will have attained, a controlling 
influence over the industrial concerns which dominate the 
Lorraine-Luxemburg district.  It will  be  of  the utmost 
interest  to  watch  further  developments.  These  will 
reveal many different combinations and changes in indus- 
trial  and  banking  concentration,  and  new  group  align- 
ments in both fields. National  Monetary  Commission 
111.  THE  INFLUENCE  OF INDUSTRY  AND INDUSTRIAL  CON- 
CENTRATION  ON  CONCENTRATION  IN  BANKING. 
A detailed  account  of  the  tremendous  effects  which 
industrial  development  and  concentration  have  exerted 
on the growth of  the great banks and on concentration in 
banking would  involve a repetition  of  practically every- 
thing  discussed  in  previous  chapters  of  this  book.  At 
every step in the development of  the banks and at every 
stage of  their growth the mighty  influence of  industrial 
progress may be  seen.  We showed this connection par- 
ticularly  in discussing the current business of  the banks 
as well as their activity in the field of  floating securities, 
forming  new  corporations,  and  converting  firms  into 
corporations.  This  influence is  equally apparent in  the 
activities of  the banks both at home and abroad. 
The far-reaching influence of  the cartel movement in 
industry  and of  the national export policy on the extent 
and  the rapidity  of  the  movement  of  concentration  in 
banking,  also  the  ways  in  which  concentration  in 
banking  was brought  about and the forms it assumed, 
have been shown in great detail.  The reader is therefore 
referred to the previous chapters for an account of  these 
subjects. 
PART  VI.  THE  SITUATION  RESULTING  FROM 
CONCENTRATION;  ADVANTAGES  AND  DAN- 
GERS  OF  CONCENTRATION-THE  OUTLOOK 
FOR THE FUTURE. 
By far the most serviceable of  the tools employed by 
modern capitalism have been first the machine and second 
the corporation.  Machinery made  possible  the elimina- 
tion of  the personal element of  labor and the utmost con- 
centration of  mechanical forces,  The corporation elimi- 
nated  the personal element of  the entrepreneur,  and led 
to the utmost concentration of  the forces of  capital. 
The cooperation of  these two factors, i. e., machine pro- 
duction  and  the  corporation,  has  made  possible  the 
culmination of  capitalist development in the shape of  cen- 
tralized management of  combined forces and enterprises. 
The  abundance  and  variety  of  detail revealed  in  the 
history  of  the  development  of  concentration  may, on 
superficial observation, fill one with  dismay.  On  closer 
inspection we find, however, that the successive stages of 
this  development  are subject  to remarkable  regularity, 
partaking almost of  the character of  natural law. 
At first sight there is a confused mass of  complicated 
events, so  intricately interlaced that it seems impossible 
to grasp them in their entirety.  Upon closer examination 
three stages of  development become discernible.  In the 
first stage we  find a large number  of weak, independent 
enterprises, incapable of  much  resistance.  In the second 
stage we  notice the transition  to a  large number  of  far National  Monetary  Commission 
more complicated enterprises, better organized and capable 
of  greater  resistance.  In the third  stage we  have  the 
situation  again  simplified  by  the  formation  of  a  small 
number of  powerful groups of  enterprises. 
In the economic struggle for existence, as shown in the 
movement toward industrial concentration, we see first a 
large number of  weak  individual  establishments.  Out of 
these by a thousand devices and in seemingly roundabout 
ways,  and  through  as  many  types  and  forms,  there 
emerges gradually the fewest practicable number of  strong 
and unified groups of  enterprises, i. e., increasingly simple 
industrial formations. 
This  process  of  evolution can  be  traced  in  every 
domain of  industry.  In the most  modern  of  industries, 
the  electrical  industry,  the  process  is  revealed  most 
clearly.  At  the outset numerous companies were organ- 
ized in feverish haste.  By 1900, as we saw (p. 7 I 5 et seq.) , 
there had  developed  out  of  them  seven  groups, which 
dominated the field, comprising in all 28 allied companies. 
After some of  these groups had lost much of  their power 
and others had been absorbed, two groups remained more 
powerful than the others-the  Siemens-Schuckert group 
and the General Glectric (A. E. G.).  Prom present indi- 
cations these will  be able to ally with themselves the re- 
maining groups or companies either through price agree- 
ments or by more efficient means.  They will also be in a 
position  to hold  in  check  international  competition  by 
means of  mutual understandings, the beginnings of  which 
may be seen even at present. 
In the chemical industry we see the same development. 
There  is  on the one side the union of  the  Hochst Dye 
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Works and the firm of Leopold Cassella & Co. in the form 
of  a  community  of  interest, and on the other a similar 
community  of  interest  among the Badische  Anilin-und 
Sodafabrik, the dye works formerly Friedrich Buyer 13  Co., 
and  the Aktiengesellschaft  fur  A nilinfabrikation.  These 
are  in a position to bring  about  a  consolidation of  all 
the remaining dye works, as far as it may become neces- 
sary, and to enable the German aniline  dye  industry to 
meet successfully foreign competition. 
In the mining and metallurgical industry a light has ap- 
peared in  the darkness of  the "cartel  chaos"  since the 
organization of  the Steel Works' Union.  The latter com- 
bines establishments engaged in every stage of  the process 
of  production.  It  is,  therefore, in  a  better  position  to 
carry out a sound cartel policy at home and to arrange for 
the elimination of  international competition by bringing 
about agreements for a division of  the export trade to im- 
portant foreign markets among the competing countries 
on  the basis  of  the amount  of  their past sales in these 
markets.  Meanwhile,  more  rapidly  than  ever,  there  is 
going on in the mining and iron industries a movement of 
concentration  and  consolidation  among  the  different 
groups of  enterprises, and in this process the weaker and 
smaller establishments are being absorbed or eliminated. 
The shipping industry is dominated by two companies, 
the Hamburg-American  Packet  Line Company  and  the 
North  German  Lloyd.  These are united  by  agreement 
between  themselves  and also  with  a  British - American 
combination. 
Finally, in banking, out of a large number of  independ- 
ent banks, there have been developed five powerful groups, National  Monetary  Commission 
comprising, in all, 41 "  concern " banks  (Konzernbanken). 
In this field, however, the process of  concentration has by 
no means yet ended.  It will, in all probability, not stop 
until it has come nearer its goal than to-day, by develop- 
ing the smallest number of  bank groups practicable, each 
embracing  the  largest  possible  number  of  "  concern " 
banks, under centralized management.  Until the groups 
of  banks shall have reached a point of  fairly equal strength, 
so that each one will respect the other's domain, we  can 
not  look  to  a  halt  in  the movement  of  concentration. 
However, even now  it is possible to realize many of  its 
advantages and dangers. 
To  begin with the advantages  of  concentration.  Un- 
questionably the business policy of  a great bank, and not- 
ably of  one standing at  the head of  a chain of  banks (Kon- 
zernbanken) ,  can and will be carried out more in accordance 
with a uniform program, which takes into account the gen- 
eral economic interests including those of  the nation and 
of  the Government.  Such a business policy can be pursued 
by it much more readily than by a moderate-size or small 
bank or by a large number of  small scattered banks, which 
are compelled by the increasing struggle for existence to 
shape their policy merely with a view to dividends.  Ex- 
perience has taught that the great German banks realized 
the necessity of  supporting a vigorous policy in encourag- 
ing the exports of  manufactures (see p. 527 et seq.).  They 
accepted the logical demands of  the situation and acted 
accordingly, as shown by their attitude toward industry 
and the export trade, the investment of  German capital in 
foreign commercial and industrial enterprises and securi- 
ties',  and in promoting actively the national  policies in 
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regard to shipping, colonies, the building of  canals, and 
the laying of  cables. 
Neither will it be denied that the administration of  the 
great German banks is far more subject to control by the 
special  press  and  the  public  than  a  large  number  of 
isolated small or moderately large banks.  Furthermore, 
it is clear that powerful banks and groups of  banks of  this 
kind, under centralized control, can serve the German Em- 
pire as one of  its most potent agencies in both its economic 
and world  policies.  This is  true, at least so long  as the 
leaders of  the banks continue, as they have done, to regard 
their duty to the state as one of  their important obligations. 
The Government and its various organs,  moreover,regard 
it as a great help to carry on negotiations with a few great 
banks, having their center in Berlin, when it is a question 
of  measures the execution of  which is to be  intrusted to 
private capital, or  such  as require haste  or  confidential 
treatment, or, as in the case of  cable lines or colonial en- 
terprises, such as necessitate the tying up of  large amounts 
of  capital for a considerable period. 
Greater  concentration  of  banking capital facilitates a 
more elastic extension of  credit by eliminating to a large 
extent  reckless granting of  credit, on the one hand, and 
"  panic  sales " (Angstverkaufe)  , on  the other.  Through 
their  better  knowledge  of  the  general  economic  and 
financial  situation  the  great  banks  are  often  able  to 
prognosticate  the  approach  of  industrial,  commercial, 
and  bourse  crises.  While  powerless  to ward  off  such 
crises, they  may,  by  timely  warnings  and  preventive 
measures, lessen the effects and duration of  the calamity. 
Concentration  of  banking  carries  with  it  also  the National  Monetary  Commission 
extension of  check, giro, and  clearing operations-i.  I., 
those factors which lessen the need of  cash for payments, 
and thus broaden the basis for credit transactions. 
In turn, concentration results in a number of  important 
advantages  to  the  private  economic  interests  of  the 
banks.  This is true alike of  that form of  concentration 
which is attained through control of  other enterprises or 
the creation of  communities of  interest (through the acqui- 
sition of  stock, the establishment of  subsidiary companies, 
and  trust  companies,  through  agreement  or  the inter- 
change of  stock), as of  the other form attained by means 
of  decentralization of  operations through the establishment 
of  commandites, branches, agencies, and deposit offices. 
All  these forms of  concentration  of  capital and power 
secure to the  central  institution  a more  complete view 
of  the general industrial situation and of  the varying needs 
and conditions in the different branches of  industry, and 
a detailed  knowledge of  the financial standing of  a large 
number  of  clients, their  trustworthiness  in  general, and 
with regard to credit  in  particular.  This information is 
based  on  the objective expert advices of  reporting agen- 
cies which  are thoroughly familiar with  local  conditions 
and, on the other hand, intimately related  to the central 
institution and acting in its interests.  From such a com- 
prehensive and  accurate survey of  the general situation 
and the detailed information, the central institution derives 
in an ever-increasing manner the following advantages: 
(a) It is able to find a wider  and safer market for the 
sale of  securities which it proposes to float.  It can, there- 
fore, acquire such securities on  a  larger scale and with 
greater confidence, knowing beforehand that such securi- 
ties will  go  into good hands  as permanent  investments, 
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and not be thrown back at once upon  the market, to be 
taken up again by the bank. 
(b)  Its  current  banking  business  is  extended.  This 
extension usually means increased dividends.  This leads 
to the  enhancing  of  its own  credit  both  at home  and 
abroad,  particularly  of  its  acceptance  credit.  It  also 
means greater power  of  intervention in critical times and 
larger freedom of  action in the money market. 
(c)  Its deposit business  is  increased in  proportion  as 
those of  its clients, who belong to the class of  small capi- 
talists and tradesmen, are becoming accustomed to leave 
on deposit with the bank even small amounts of  available 
funds to be  applied to productive  uses.  In this way  a 
stimulus is afforded to such clients to save and accumulate 
reserves-which  is highly desirable from the point of  view 
of  business-and  to turn  over  to the  bank  the receiv- 
ing and making of  payments on their account (geordnete 
Kassenfuhrung).  The effect  of  this  development  is  an 
improvement of  conditions attending settlements by  the 
more  extensive  and  intensive  use  of  checks.  Credit 
transactions  are facilitated,  the  circulation  of  cash  is 
diminished, the bank's freedom of  action is increased, and 
its dividends become more stable. 
(d)  The  bank  is  enabled  to  furnish  its  clients  with 
reliable information and to help them in every way in their 
business  undertakings,  especially  with  regard  to  bills, 
foreign exchange, and payments. 
As against these advantages, the movement of  concentra- 
tion in Germany  has thus far not brought with it a reduc- 
tion of  the cost of  conducting business or of  the expenses 
of  administration,  such  as  was  often  the  case  when 
foreign trusts and analogous combinations were formed. National  Monetary  Commission  German Great Banks 
One  reason  for this  lies  in the fact  that, unlike  the 
situation produced  where trusts were  formed,  the inde- 
pendence of  the original establishments was maintained, 
except in case of  mergers.  As a result, there could hardly 
be  any saving in the cost of  operation or  administration. 
On the contrary, we  were  able to show (on p. 467  et 
seq.) that as a general rule both the absolute amounts of 
expenses of  operation and the percentage of  expenses  to  gross 
profits have steadily risen among the banks that have been 
in the forefront  in the movement toward c~ncentration.~ 
Jorgens has pointed out the increase in taxes, due to  the  per- 
manent ownership of  stock in one corporation by another.' 
Attention has  also been called to the various dangers 
arising from concentration in banking.  With reference to 
this subject the following points may be made: Thus far 
there has been  no  manifestation  of  a  monopolistic ten- 
dency, as regards the treatment of  the public in the so-called 
current business, and  this  in spite of  what would  seem 
to be the natural tendency in view of  the extent to which 
concentration has gone.  On the contrary, in their competi- 
tion the banks have undertaken the greatest services and 
responsibilities for the lowest commissions ever known in 
German banking,  commissions so slight  as to fall below 
the point of  fair remuneration.  On the other hand, there 
are unmistakable  signs of  such  tendencies  in  the com- 
petitive struggle against private bankers; also within the 
domain of  underwriting and of  tenders for the taking over 
of  public loans or of  securities of  public or private under- 
takings.  As we saw before (p. 407 et seq.) ,  outside compe- 
tition in this field may occasionally underbid  the tenders 
of  large banks or groups of  banks, but must fail in the long 
run unless it is in a position to offer the same security for 
making payment, for taking over the securities, or for carry- 
ing out the undertaking.  Many of  the syndicates in this 
field  have  been  in  the nature of  price conventions  and 
have often assumed a monopolistic character. 
It is,  furthermore,  undeniable  that  concentration  in 
German banking has been accompanied by marked injury 
to the sound and vigorous elements among the class of  the 
smaller private bankers.  I am convinced that even to- 
day, as I shall show further on, this class performs eco- 
nomically useful and even necessary functions, and that 
the decline of  the private banker  class represents  one of 
the dark sides of  the progress of  concentration.  As  we 
saw  (p.  618  et  seq.), the  decline  of  this  class  was 
hastened  and  intensified  by faulty  stock  exchange  and 
stamp-tax legislation; essentially, however, it was due to 
the movement of  concentration. 
It may, indeed, be said that the decline of private bank- 
ing,which showed itself in very acute form before the passing 
of  the supplementary bourse act, is only one phase of  the 
modern  struggle for existence, which had its origin in the 
capitalist  system, and will  come to an end only with the 
triumph of  large-scale enterprise and concentration.  It is 
part of  the same conflict  in  which,  it seems, the small 
farmer and the small miller are succumbing before the large 
landowner and large miller, the craftsmen and the home in- 
dustries before the factory, the retail store before the large 
dealer and particularly before the department store.  How- 
ever, in  the other branches of  industrial  life it has been 
policy to protect the middle class in every possible way the 
and to prevent  its decline.  Where  this was  manifestly National  Monetary  Commission 
unavoidable, the effort has been to retard it and to miti- 
gate its effects, so as to allow those injured gradually to 
change their  economic position and to prepare  them to 
face the new problems presented by the altered situation. 
In the attitude taken toward  the middle class and  small 
banker an opposite policy was apparently followed both in 
the various provisions of  the bank-deposit law and in the 
stock exchange and the  imperial  stamp-tax legislation. 
(See p.  618  et seq.)  As  a result  of  these measures the 
rapidity  of  the  concentration  movement  was  greatly 
enhanced and the situation resulting from this tendency 
was made much harder for the private banker.  What is 
even worse, the vitality of  this class was regrettably low- 
ered.  There  seems,  however,  to  be  no  good  reason 
why  the decline of  private  banking  should  have  been 
permitted to assume the proportions that it really did. 
There are to-day, as much  as ever, certain necessary 
and legitimate economic functions for the smaller banker, 
and there is still a broad field of  profitable activity open 
to him.5  The  situation  here  is  similar  to that among 
the  handicrafts,  where  the  reasons  for  the  decay  are 
similar."  The  latter  can  maintain  themselves  where 
the bond  between  producer  and  consumer  is  not  dis- 
solved  and  where  local or  individual  adaptation is  still 
nece~sary.~  In  the  same  way  the  small  banker  can 
hope to compete successfully wherever he may operate, if 
he will adopt from the outset  as  his  motto  in  business 
specialization  and  adaptation  to  local  conditions  and 
needs.  He has here an advantage over the decentralized 
banks in the fact that his expenses of  operation are rela- 
tively  smaller.  Such  specialization has  already  set  in 
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in several fields, although it is  not of  a kind  altogether 
desirable, in case, for instance, the smaller bankers devote 
themselves particularly to the purchase and sale of  mining 
stocks or unlisted securities. 
The primary and normal function of  the small banker 
will  always continue  to be  that of  adviser to the large 
public in their financial affairs in general, and more par- 
ticularly in  the matter of  investments.  This, of  course, 
presupposes that he will  continue to give the necessary 
time and study to this function.  In his capacity of  gen- 
eral adviser he may be able to carry on dealings in securi- 
ties for customers' account, where the latter give special 
security, in accordance with the provisions of  the stock- 
exchange law.  On  the other hand, in  view  of  the low 
commissions  and  the  taxes  imposed  on  the  contango 
business, it would be better policy  for the small bankers 
to engage less  in  security  business  on  own  account, to 
which  they  seem  to hzve been  giving special attention 
during recent years. 
Knowing intimately the personal standing of  his clients, 
the smaller banker will always be professionally best fitted 
to  foster  personal  credit,  and  more  particularly  blank 
credit-a  field  of  banking  that  calls  for  specialization, 
based on knowledge of  individual conditions. 
Where there are no  deposit  offices  or  general banks, 
the smaller banker  is in  a position to carry on success- 
fully  also  a  general  banking  business  with  the smaller 
tradesmen,  extending  to  them  the  facilities  of  check 
accounts, current accounts, and bill discounting. 
On  the bourse his  legitimate functions are trading in 
unlisted  securities  (Kulisse)  , the arbitrage  business, and NatiolzaZ  Monetary  Commission 
profiting by  the fluctuation of  daily  quotations on  the 
different  exchanges whenever  bid and ask prices do not 
accord. 
He is  in  a  position  best  to understand  the needs  of 
small manufacturers and to know thoroughly the intrinsic 
value of  solid securities, both stocks and bonds, issued by 
them, and to find a wide market for them.  Under this 
head belong  also  debentures of  smaller industrial estab- 
lishments, which, while of  undoubted solidity, are issued 
in amounts too small to be listed on German exchanges 
(in  case the amount  is  less  than  ~,ooo,ooo  or  500,000 
marks, respectively) 
On the other hand the recent practice, due to the faults 
of  the stock exchange legislation, of  the smaller banker 
assuming  the  functions  of  industrial  entrepreneur  by 
means of permanent acquisitions on a large scale of  stock 
or of  other participations, seems to us of  rather doubtful 
wisdom. 
Finally there is no reason why the development toward 
more powerful  enterprises in the shape  of  joint-stock  or 
limited  liability  companies, large  beginnings  of  which 
may be seen even at present by cooperation with the great 
banks, and even independently of  them, should not prove 
successful on an equally  large  scale  in the case of  other 
provincial banking concerns either singly or in combina- 
tion with others of  the same class.  A few recent examples 
of  this development are the following: 
Thus with the assistance of  the Hannoversche Bank and 
its subsidiaries, the Osnabrucker and Hildesheimer banks, 
the private banking firm of  Ludwig Peters Nachfolger was 
transformed  in  1905 into the Braunschweiger Privatbank 
The German Great Banks 
Aktiengesellschaft (with a total capital of  6,000,000 marks). 
In the same way, with the cooperation of  the Disconto- 
Gesellschaft  and  the  Berliner  Handels-Gesellschaft, the 
banking firm of  Perls & Co.  in Breslau was transformed 
into the Schlesische Handelsbank  Aktiengesellschaft, Bres- 
lau, which in 1909 opened in turn a branch in  Beuthen 
and one in Striegau.  In 1906 the banking house Johann 
Ohligschlaeger of  Aix-la-Chapelle, of  the Rheinisch-West- 
falische Disconto-Gesellschaft group, was converted into a 
limited liability  association, with  a  capital of  5,500,ooo 
marks.  In 1908 the banking house of  Doertenbach & Co., 
Stuttgart, was  changed to a limited  liability association 
with a capital of  4,000,000 marks.  In 1908 the Hessischer 
Bankverein  Aktiengesellschaft  in  Kassel  was  organized 
through the merger of  the banking firm of  Leopold Plaut 
& Co., of Kassel, and J. C.  Plaut & Co. in Eschwege. 
In 1907  the Berlin banking  firm Car1 Neuburger was 
transformed into a stock company en commandite, and by 
the end of  1908 the latter had established eight branches 
in  different  localities  besides  five  deposit  offices.  In 
addition it had absorbed two banking firms (C. Fahndrich 
& Co.  in  Fiirstenwalde  and  the  Westfalische Bank  M. 
Hirschfeld in Iserlohn).  Early in 1909 it added a branch 
in Deutsch-Krone. 
The banking house of  L. & E. Wertheimber, of  Frankfort- 
on the Main, adopted an original procedure.  It founded 
a  separate  enterprise  under  the name  of  Bank-  und 
Wechselstuben-Gesellschafl m.  b.  H., to operate exchange 
offices in  Frankfort.  The entire capital stock of  the con- 
cern, 2,000,000  marks, was retained by the banking house of 
L. & E.  Wertheimber, which continued operations as before. National  Monetary  Commission 
Finally  there is  no  doubt  that what  has  been  done 
successfully in  other  countries  is  also  possible  in  Ger- 
many  (9, viz: To unite smaller bankers  into syndicates 
or groups which will act not only without any antagonism 
toward the great  banks,  but  rather  enter  into  definite 
agreements and thus act in concert with them. 
The future  activity  of  private  bankers  in  receiving 
deposits is  indeed threatened  by the voluntary publica- 
tion of  periodic financial  statements  by  the joint-stock 
banks since 1909.  In order to save this branch of  business 
for the private banker, we might well resort to the joint 
liability idea of  the Roman  societas argentariorum, i. e., 
bankers'  associations with unlimited liability,  adapting, 
of course, the principle to present day conditions." 
So much for the effect of  concentration on the smaller 
banker. 
We have repeatedly called  attention to certain disad- 
vantages  of  concentration for the central banks.  There 
is on the one hand danger that their ability to maintain 
their assets in liquid form may be impaired particularly at 
critical times by excessive demands for credit and funds, on 
the part of  subsidiary companies,  trust companies, branches, 
commandites, agencies, and institutions joined  with them 
in a community of  interest.  It was also pointed out that 
it is becoming increasingly more difficult for the central 
banks to control the proper use of  their credit and funds. 
As we saw, with the progress of  concentration the condition 
of  the banks from the point of  view of  the liquidity of  their 
assets has steadily grown worse to an extent that can no 
aThere are some indications that since the enactment of  the supple- 
mentary bourse  law  (May 8, 1~08)  an improvement in the condition  of 
private banking has set in, which finds expression  also in a considerable 
increase in the number of  newly founded private banking firms. 
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longer be lightly passed over.  Unless an improvement is 
brought  about by  natural  causes  or  by  criticism either 
from within or by the general public, a situation might be 
created in which the banks' freedom of  action would  be 
impaired in critical periods, particularly in the  event of 
war, and the institutions placed in a perilous condition at  a 
most critical moment.  Public attention has been drawn 
to this situation particularly  since  1908, when  the great 
banks  of  their own  accord began  the publication  of  bi- 
monthly  financial statements which  indicate but a slow 
improvement  in  this  regard.  Furthermore,  it must  be 
admitted  that  with  the growth and decentralization  of 
the  operations  of  the  great  banks  and  their  groups  it 
becomes increasingly  difficult to gain an adequate com- 
prehension of  the financial  reports  and balance  sheets 
issued, as these no longer represent a clear and full picture 
of  the condition of  the banks. 
The effects of  concentration on the bank employees may 
be summed up as follows: It goes without saying that in 
the course of the concentration movement both the abso- 
lute number  of employees in the large banks  as well as 
their proportion to those in the smaller establishments has 
increased greatly-a  tendency which is, however, common 
to other branches of  business.  According to the census of 
1882, there were 28  banks employing 50 or more persons, 
with a total number of 2,697 employed by them.  Thir- 
teen years later the census of  1895 showed 66  banks em- 
ploying each 50 or more persons, with a total force of  7,802. 
In  the  thirteen  years  the number  of  employees  in  the 
large banks had  increased 189.3 per cent.  On  the other 
hand  the  number  employed  in  banking  establishments National  Monetary  Commission 
with  less  than  5  employees  had  increased  only  59.9 
per  cent, and in  middle-sized institutions, with 6 to 50 
employees, only 34.5 per cent.1° 
The data of  the 1907 census are not yet available on this 
point, but it is probable that the number employed in the 
large banks in 1907 represented one-third of  all gainfully 
employed in "financial and credit" institutions, while in 
1895 this number still constituted but a  little over one- 
fifth  (2  I .60 per cent), and in  1882 only a little over one- 
tenth (I  I .8 per cent) of  the persons so employed. 
Prom  these  figures  we  may  conclude  that with  the 
progress of  concentration there has been a great increase in 
the number of  persons who have but slight  prospects of 
ever being able to start an independent banking business 
of  their own.  With the increasing domination of  banks 
with huge capital on the one hand and the diminishing 
power  and sphere of  activity of  the private banker, the 
opportunities of  building  up  a  private  banking business 
have now become considerably smaller. 
In many respects the standing of the bank employee, as 
such, has not improved with the growth of  concentration. 
This is true particularly of  his position within the bank. 
The number  of  employees in the large banks is steadily 
growing.  Thus, for  instance,  at the  close  of  1908 the 
Deutsche  Bank  had  a  force of  4,860 as compared with 
4,439 at the end of  1907.  As the number of  bank clerks 
increases and the bank's  duties become  more  manifold, 
there is naturally introduced a greater specialization in the 
work of each employee.  As a result there is no chance for 
a rounded development or a general training in the pro- 
fession.  This involves a twofold danger.  The situation 
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may result  in a gradual loss of  interest in the work, and 
may also rob the employee of  the broader view of  things 
which in turn makes it harder  for him to enter another 
department  or  profession.  It is  only a relatively  small 
number of  banks which have introduced a periodic change 
of  work for their employees,  a practice highly desirable not 
only in  the interest  of  the  employees, but  also  of  the 
banks themselves. 
Furthermore,  whenever  an  employee is  discharged  it 
is  harder  for him  to find employment in  another bank, 
particularly  in  one  of  the  ever-increasing  number  be- 
longing  to  the  same  group.  This  is  in  the  nature  of 
things,  and  not  due  to any  mutual  agreement  among 
the banks.  This  does not  apply, however, to the free- 
dom  of  bank  officials  of  voluntarily  changing  employ- 
ment  from one bank to another.  After the removal of 
temporary  doubts and objections this freedom has been 
generally conceded, though  even  at present  it is subject 
to certain  limitations  in  the  interests  of  both  parties. 
It was  feared  that the numerous  bank  mergers  and 
absorptions  of  private banks would  make  it possible  to 
dispense with the services of  many  employees and lead 
to  their  discharge.  This  fear  has  fortunately  proved 
unfounded,  there having been  no  reduction  of  the force 
worth mentioning.  This I can say on reliable authority, 
having  made  inquiry  also of  the leaders of  the associa 
tions  of  bank  employees.  On  the contrary, in  all such 
cases the common rule has been to take over undiminished 
the entire available force.  Where mergers took place or 
where branches were established in place of  absorbed pri- 
vate banks, there was usually an extension of  the business National  Monetary  Commission 
which made it necessary to increase rather than to reduce 
the existing personnel. 
As  the power  and capital of  the banks  have  grown, 
the cases  have  become  increasingly rare  where  a  com- 
plete  prostration  of  business  or  a  crisis  has  resulted 
in the discharge of  en~ployees. Moreover, in the course 
of  the concentration movement more and more attention 
is  paid  by  the banks  to  the social obligations  toward 
their  employees.  The  measures taken  in  this  field  are 
due  to the common  labors  of  banks,  bankers,  and  the 
Central Federation of  German Banks and Bankers  (Cen- 
tralverband des  Deutschen  Bank-und Bankier-gewerbes). 
The  federation  began  an  extensive  and  laborious 
investigation  of  the  question  of  pensions  and  death 
benefits  l1  for bank  employees  as  early  as  1903, i.  e., 
before  the  Imperial  Government  undertook  a  similar 
inquiry  with  regard  to  all  salaried  persons  in  private 
employ.  Through the  cooperation of  many  persons in 
banking  circles  and  among  the  bank  employees  them- 
selves there was organized in  Berlin, on  July  I I, 1909, 
the  Beamtenversicherungsverein  des  deutschen Bank- und 
Banlziergewerbes  (a.  G.)  (Insurance  Association  of  the 
employees of  German  Banks  and  Bankers).  The  asso- 
ciation  assures  to all  employees, members  of  the asso- 
ciation,  a  pension  in  case  they  become  incapacitated 
after ten years.' service, and provides benefits for widows 
and pensions for  orphans in  case of  death.  This  asso- 
ciation  is  the first  of  its kind  in  Germany,  and on  its 
board  of  honorary  directors  there are  both the heads 
of  banks and bank employees.  The author of  this book 
is chairman of  the supervisory board.  In the case of  the 
German great banks such insurance had been instituted 
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even  before,  in  the  form  of  independent  funds,  funds 
controlled by the bank, or special insurance.  The same 
is  true also of  many  other credit banks  and likewise of 
a number  of  the larger private banking houses. 
On  the  subject of  salaries  authentic  data have  been 
collected  for  the  first  time in  a paper  of  the business 
manager of  the Centralverband Wittner, so far as it was 
possible  to secure this  information  through  the inquiry 
instituted by the Centralverband.  For a proper  appre- 
ciation  of  the following figures it is well to bear in mind 
that they  refer  only to the regular  salaries and  do  not 
include the customary incidental income of  the employees, 
such as Christmas', or New Year's  bonuses, which usually 
amount to several times the monthly salary. 
In  the  following  table  there  are  given  the  average 
salaries of  bank employees, exclusive of  minor employees, 
according to the investigation  of  the Central Federation 
of  German  Banks  and  Bankers,  of  March,  1906.  For 
the sake of  comparison, there are shown  also the corre- 
sponding average yearly  incomes 'of  all salaried employ- 
ees  in  private employment. 
Age. 
Average sal- 
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The salaries here shown are higher throughout  (except 
for the age group  2-24),  and in part very much higher 
than the average salaries as given in the report  of  the 
Department  of  the  Interior  of  March  14,  1907,~~  for 
salaries in all private establishments.  Their present level 
was reached gradually during the progress of  concentra- 
tion.  On  the  average  they  are  also  higher  than  the 
salaries  paid  to the clerical help  in the smaller private 
banks. 
Whether  the increase in salaries  has  only  kept  pace 
with the increased cost of  living and expenditures of  the 
employees of  the banks, or whether it has gone beyond 
this  point  and means a real improvement  in their con- 
ditions, this question can not be answered even with an 
approximate  degree of  assurance. 
So  far  as  my  experience  and  knowledge  go,  there 
has  never  been  among  the  German  credit  banks  any 
exploitation of  unpaid  help  through the use of  appren- 
tices, as the Berlin great banks take in apprentices only 
in exceptional  cases. 
As  in  all  large  establishments  advancement  of  em- 
ployees to independent positions within the bank has on 
the whole been slow.  In this respect, however, concen- 
tration has brought about a marked improvement.  The 
establishment  of  numerous  branches,  commandites,  de- 
posit offices, agencies, and subsidiary banks at home and 
abroad  has  created  opportunities  for  the promotion  of 
efficient employees more numerous than before. 
The Central Federation of  German Banks and Bankers 
has ever been in sympathy with the efforts to bring about 
certain improvements  in  the conditions  of  the working 
staff, as, for example, the extension of  Sunday rest, early 
closing on Saturday, and better regulation  of  vacations. 
The reforms proposed, while not yet commonly adopted, 
are, however, nearer realization, as the result of  progressive 
concentration and the introduction of  greater uniformity 
in the internal management of  banks. 
The part of  the heads and leading personalities in the 
banks has now become  much  more  important, since the 
former under  certain  circumstances  are  called  upon  to 
determine uniform  business policies  for  entire groups of 
banks.  It  is primarily they who must decide whether the 
banks entrusted to their management shall pursue other 
and higher  aims  than merely  those  of  large  dividends. 
With the growth of  the large establishments on the one 
hand and the disappearance  of  so  many  important  pri- 
vate banking houses, it will  be  increasingly difficult to 
fill these  positions with  men  who  possess  the necessary 
breadth of  view, the powerful initiative, and the organiz- 
ing ability to which Germany's great enterprises in trade, 
industry  and banking are  so  greatly indebted.  Failure 
to find and recognize the work of  such men would involve 
serious consequences not only for the concentration move- 
ment, but for our entire economic development.13 
It remains now  to consider the effect of  concentration 
on the developnient  of  the stock exchange.  There is  a 
large number of  buying  and selling  orders coming to the 
great banks which they can offset against each other, thus 
taking  over  the function  of  the exchange.  Only  such 
orders  as can  not  be  offset  are taken to the stock  ex- 
change.  This applies equally to the business in securities, National  Monetary  Commission 
i.  e.,  the capital market  and to the discount  business, 
i.  e., the money market. 
The result has been that the bourse, in addition to the 
disorganizing effects of  the stock exchange legislation, has 
suffered also the loss of  ever increasing amounts of  busi- 
ness.  This  impaired  its  most  vital  function,  that  of 
proper price determination, and led to most serious con- 
sequences,  especially  during  critical  times,  as  may  be 
proved  by very lamentable examples." 
There is danger that the bourse may gradually cease to 
serve as the most sensitive instrument for measuring the 
movements of  trade or to act as "the almost automatic 
regulator  of  the  economic  currents  converging  toward 
it."15  It is also becoming  evident that more and more 
it is losing its capacity by means of  its quotations to reflect 
or influence public opinion as regards the credit and man- 
agement of  the large majority of  States, communes, stock 
companies, and other corporations, all of  which functions 
were regarded as indispensable for the business community 
.as a whole and the trade in securities in particular. 
The system of  price determinations and quotations pre- 
vailing at the bourses, which in former years represented 
the fullest and truest possible reflex of  existing supply and 
demand as well as other "economic factors, which nowhere 
else were subject to such comprehensive perception  and 
accurate  measurement,"  is  bound  to  lose  much  of  its 
former accuracy, steadiness, and reliability, all oi which is 
highly  regrettable  from the point  of  view  oi public in- 
terests. 
There is furthermore ground for apprehension that this 
movement which also involves the elimination of  middle- 
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men  (brokers,  etc.)  may  develop a  state of  constantly 
growing differences between bank and bourse.  These dif- 
ferences may express themselves in more than a certain 
tension  between banking  and bourse  interests, which is 
frequently noticeable  even  at present.  They may  also 
come  to  affect  the most  characteristic  function  of  the 
bourse, the determination of  prices.  As  a matter of  fact, 
in  the opinion of  some recent  writers, there is  a  direct 
antithesis between bank and bour~e.'~  I regard this view 
as erroneous, but not more so than that of  other writers, 
who seem to regard the two as practically identical.17 
Certain socialists contend that the inevitable result  of 
the concentration movement now manifest in all branches 
of  trade and industry will be to cumulate in an increasing 
volume on one side all the capital and income and on the 
other all the misery and poverty.  Such has not been the 
outcome, nor is it  likely to be.  On the contrary, the social- 
istic  theory  of  the progressive  impoverishment  of  the 
masses  has been  completely refuted  by  the progress of 
concentration in industry and banking.  The purchasing 
power  and the standard of  living of  the laboring classes 
have improved, the income of  the middle and of  the lower 
classes has risen relatively  more than that of  the upper 
classes, and to an increasing extent members of  the lower 
classes have joined the ranks of  the upper cla~ses.~~ 
We have now a valuable work on the "  Development of 
wages in industry since the establishment of  the German 
Empire."  Under this title R. Kuczynski, the director of 
the statistical bureau of  the city of  Schoneberg (Berlin, 
George Reiner, zgog), presents an extremely valuable col- 
lection of  comprehensive and reliable data covering wages National  Monetary  Commission 
paid during this period in Germany in mining (coal, lig- 
nite, salt, and ore), in the building trades (masons,  carpen- 
ters,  painters,  fitters), in  the  stone  and  woodworking 
trades  (joiners,  cabinet  makers,  pattern  makers,  and 
makers of  window blinds), in the metal trades, the book 
trade, and finally in transportation  (vehicular, railroad, 
and sea transportation). 
It is impracticable here to reproduce even the leading 
features of  a work which is bound to retain a permanent 
place in the literature of  the subject.  Suffice it to say, 
that the movement of  all wages  paid  during the second 
period  shows  a  strong  upward  tendency,  more  or  less 
marked according to the branch of  industry, the state of 
general prosperity, the location of  the enterprise, the dif- 
ference between city and country, the kind of  product, and 
the hours of  work.  In the case of  corporate undertakings 
the movement of  wages  manifestly is also influenced by 
the variations  in dividends.  A tabular statement show- 
ing the influence of  the last named factor in each particu- 
lar instance would be of  special interest.  I therefore re- 
frain from citing typical instances from the mass of  mate- 
rial presented, since it might always be objected that they 
had been chosen arbitrarily. 
Even more important would be complementary tables 
on the movement of  prices of  necessaries of  life during the 
same period. For one thing this would  serve to test the 
theory, which I believe to be correct, that "  every increase 
in the prices of  the necessaries of  life gives rise to an effort 
on  the part of  the workers  to  secure higher wages."  l9 
To  be  sure  these  efforts  do  not  always  overcome  the 
just  or unjust  opposition offered, and  hence  it may  be 
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difficult to prove  the theory satisfactorily by statistical 
evidence.20 
Such  complementary  tables  would  also  enable  us  to 
answer  the further question whether and to what  extent 
the gain to the workmen through higher wages has been 
offset by the simultaneous or preceding rise in the cost of 
living.  This much is certain, that the increase of  wages 
in general and in most  trades has been greater than the 
increase since 1879 in the prices of  necessaries caused by 
the  import  duties  on  foodstuffs,  such  as  cereals, flour, 
animals, meat, bacon, and lard. 
In the absence of  such parallel investigations, the con- 
clusions drawn from the wage statistics must necessarily 
be incomplete and open to attack.  They have to be sup- 
plemented  by  reliable  investigations  of  the  growth  of 
prosperity  and  of  the  changes  in  the condition  of  the 
working  classes.  On  this point  valuable  information  is 
available in the shape of  the Materialien zur Beurteilung der 
WohlstandsentwickZung  Deutschlands  irn letzten Menschen- 
alter (materials for estimating the growth of  prosperity in 
Germany during the past  generation), constituting Part 
I11 of  the appendices to the draft of  the imperial financial 
reforms act of  1908. 
Evidence  in  the  same  direction  is  furnished  by 
Troelts~h.~1  Taking  the  contributions  due  from  those 
who come under the old-age and disability insurance pro- 
visions,  he  points  out  that  there  has  been  a  relative 
decrease  in  the contributions  collected  from  the lowest 
wage classes.  This is especially noteworthy in view of  the 
fact that any wage increases within the lowest wage groups 
do not at all affect the rate of  contribution, while wage National  Monetary  Commission 
increases in the higher wage  groups either  do not result 
in  correspondingly  larger  contributions  or  do  so  only 
after some delay.  It is  noteworthy, moreover, that the 
lowest wage group has grown by the accession of  a large 
number  of  low-paid  home  workers  who  during  that 
period  first  became  liable  to  insurance  contributions. 
Another fact of  some importance is cited  by Troelts~h,~~ 
viz, that  25 per cent of  all workmen have deposits in the 
Wurttemberg district savings banks, the average deposits 
for each depositor belonging  to that class  amounting to 
525.1 marks in 1892 and 571.7 marks in 1896. 
Another prediction made by socialists is that the final 
outcome of  concentration will be the socialization of  the 
means  of  production,  for  which  they  are  striving  and 
which is to be consummated in the "state of  the future." 
This prediction has not been realized in Germany, nor is 
it likely to be  realized, if  only for  the one reason that 
individual independence still coistitutes a cherished ideal 
in  the minds  of  most  Germans.  It was  this  sentiment 
chiefly  which  prevented  German  cartels  from  assuming 
the  form  of  trusts  proper,  despite  the  great  technical 
advantages which go with this type of  organization. 
Finally, the movement of  concentration  has  thus far 
not resulted  in  a  comprehensive system  of  state-owned 
industries, a policy  regarded by  many  as necessary and 
highly desirable ;  nor is this likely to happen unless wholly 
unforeseen developments take place.  Nationalization of 
industry is practicable only in case of  industries in which 
operation is more or less automatic.  Unless demanded by 
imperative reasons in some special branch of  industry in 
the interests of  national self-preservation, or of  the safety, 
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rapidity,  and  extension  of  traffic, such  nationalization 
represents but a backward step from the economic point 
of  view. 
Government operation  does  not  leave adequate scope 
for personal initiative, which is indispensable for general 
economic progress, nor for the needful spirit of enterprise 
on  the part of  the managers.  The taking  over  by  the 
Government of  private  enterprises  beyond  the  bounds 
mentioned above is in keeping with the tenets of  collectiv- 
ist industrial organization advocated by social democracy. 
It would tend to weaken the motive of  private gain, the 
most powerful stimulus of  all economic progress.  More- 
over, it would  make impossible the free development of 
the enterprising, efficient, and far-sighted personalities to 
whose  energetic  and  untrammeled  initiative  Germany 
owes so much. 
The tendency toward state socialism, represented par- 
ticularly by Adolph Wagner, which advocates  state mo- 
nopolies and the tightening of  the screws of  taxation to the 
point of  expropriation, in my opinion is likely to do more 
harm to Germany than could ever be done by the purely 
individualistic tendency, little as I am disposed to favor 
the latter. 
In Germany, particularly, where the mere possibility of 
danger or  of  excessesz3  is  sufficient to create  a demand 
for state interference, one thing above all should be borne 
in mind.  What holds good for the cartels is also true of 
all movements toward concentration-all  of  them  are, if 
not the products of distress, at any rate products of  neces- 
sity.  It is  the general opinion in  industrial circles that 
they are the most  effective weapons in the struggle for National  Monetary  Commission 
existence, especially in competition with foreign countries. 
The coincidence of  similar movements in nearly all civil- 
ized countries on the same level of  economic development 
of  itself  makes it probable that this view  is  correct and 
that legislative interference, which is urged at times with- 
out any definite purpose in  view, merely  to impede the 
movement  toward  concentration, represents a  one-sided 
economic  disarmament,  a  policy  highly  profitable-to 
other countries. 
In Germany we have special cause for holding our weap- 
ons ready. 
We know that our agriculture is far from able to supply 
our rapidly growing population with the necessary  food. 
This remains true even after  allowance is  made for  the 
improvement in its position through the recent commer- 
cial treaties and for a considerable increase both of  the pro- 
ductivity of  the land and of  the area under cultivation. 
We know, further, that we depend at present and shall de- 
pend in the future on importation for a large part of  our 
raw material, both in the shape of  tropical products  and 
of  iron  ore,  lumber,  fodder,  and   fertilizer^.^^  Finally, 
we  know that in many branches of  industry our exports 
have declined, though only temporarily, let us hope, and 
that the general field for export is seriously threatened, one 
example being our sugar exports, in which agriculture is 
directly interested.  Some foreign  countries which  here- 
tofore were among our best customers are developing indus- 
tries of their own, which make them more and more inde- 
pendent of our manufactures.  Again, we have to reckon 
with the possible  introduction  of  high  import  duties  or 
preferential duties  in  favor  of  the mother  country,  or, 
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finally, with  more  intense and dangerous competition on 
the part of  other countries, such as the United  States in 
the South American markets.  Meanwhile the growth of 
our investments of  capital abroad, with the income from 
which we have to pay an important part of  our unfavor- 
able trade balance, has not kept pace with that of  the ex- 
cess of  our imports over exports.  In view of  these facts, 
and of  the greater extent and strength of  concentration 
abroad, I do not believe that we  in Germany are as yet 
justified in putting a check on the further progress of  con- 
centration, except so  far as relates to measures  aiming 
merely at  greater publicityz6  in the case of  cartels, or such 
as are dictated by considerations of  social policy  under 
conditions mentioned above. 
The view expressed is confirmed by another considera- 
tion.  Up to 1907 the movement of concentration in Ger- 
man industry and banking was continuously upward.  We 
must, however, reckon also with unfavorable conditions in 
German  trade  and  industry.  Reasonable  dividends on 
the greatly increased capital of  the banks depend on gen- 
eral prosperity in trade and industry, and it is inevitable 
that the banks will suffer from adverse conditions in the 
branches of  industries with which they are allied.  Unfa- 
vorable trade conditions must result in bringing concen- 
tration to a standstill.  This happened, indeed, in  1907 
and 1908 in the case of  the great banks for this and other 
reasons.  The movement may even be reversed, as hap- 
pened more than once in the history of  banking, a recent 
example being the dissolution of  the community of  interest 
between  the Dresdner Bank  and  the A.  SchaaEhausen1- 
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Exceptional legislation of  the kind mentioned can best 
be avoided if  the leaders of  our great enterprises will keep 
more and more in close touch with the active social con- 
science of  our people. 
At a general meeting  of  the Verein fiir  Sozialpolitik 
Brentano reported that when in December, 1903, one of 
the  largest  English  mine  owners  proposed  to  consoli- 
date all  English coal mines into  a single trust he accom- 
panied this plan  with  the proposal  that representatives 
of  the labor organizations should be called in and given 
a place not merely in the discussion of  wages  and condi- 
tions of  labor, but even as regular members of  the board 
of  directors.  This idea was  certainly in  accord with the 
true conception that such a policy would not only confer 
rights  but also impose duties on the workmen, and that 
we cannot  justly hold anyone responsible for his conduct 
in economic matters so long as we  have not  given  him 
an opportunity to develop a sense of  personal  responsi- 
bility. 
.  This proposal was expressive alike of  business shrewd- 
ness and socio-political insight, and represents an attitude 
from which we  are still far removed in Gemany.  Ger- 
man employers still largely cling to the belief  that they 
can indefinitely postpone the recognition of  the right of 
workmen to combine and to bargain  with them through 
representatives, whereas a more liberal policy is called for 
in view of  the combinations that have taken place among 
the  employers.  It  is  my  conviction  that  even  mere 
passive resistance to these demands tends both to sharpen 
the antagonism and to increase the number and vehemence 
of  the demands. 
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Our economic development in many respects will depend 
on the degree of  socio-political insight  possessed by the 
leaders of  our great enterprises, the extent to which they 
appreciate the social duties and obligations that devolve 
upon  them, and the economic self-restraint which  they 
will  impose upon  themselves.  A  state within  the state 
can not and will not be tolerated. 
The future of  German banking will depend essentially 
on the character of  the men at the head  of  the leading 
enterprises.  All will be well  if  these leaders possess the 
necessary caution, knowing  that it is  not  safe to over- 
strain the bow or overheat the boilers. 
I feel confident that German banking by its own efforts 
will prove strong enough to keep out of  leading positions 
men  who  have  what  WaentigZ8 calls  "robust  con- 
sciences,"  and who  cast overboard, as useless ballast, all 
ethical and social considerations.  Should, however, the 
contrary come to pass, in spite of  our hopes and expecta- 
tions,  public  opinion  watching,  as  it does,  our  largest 
enterprises  with the greatest  attention, will  surely react 
more quickly and effectively than it ever did in any other 
period of our economic development. 
One of the most hopeful features characteristic of  our 
economic development has been a growth of  public senti- 
ment  and  sensitiveness  against  encroachments  of  any 
kind, a growth which in extent and rapidity has equaled, 
nay, exceeded, the movement of  concentration. NOTES. NOTES. 
Part I. 
I. "Capitalistic economics,"  in the popular sense of  the expression, sig- 
nifies not only production tending toward the formation of  capital goods, 
but also production "carried  on under the rule and direction of  the owner 
of  the capital, or the capitalist" (a.  von Bohm-Bawerk, "Kapital,"  in the 
Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 2d ed., vol. 5, p. 25).  Ruhland, 
it is true, in his "  Systemder Politischen 6konomie" (Berlin, 1908),  Vol. 111, 
p. 302, ventures to say that "the word capitalism denotes to-day a social sys- 
temin which the liberty to practice usury is more or less completely legalized." 
Capitalists are to him  "usurers in the widest sense of  the word,"  and by 
usury he, like Franz Schaub, understands  "every  contractual  appropria- 
tion  of  an evident surplus  value."  The  symptoms  of  such  capitalism, 
according  to Ruhland, are "that money interests predominate,  and that 
trade and robbery,  gain,  usury,  and extortion  merge  into each  other" 
(ibid., p. 116, No. 7aa). 
2.  Car1 Menger: Contribution to the theory of  capital.  (Jahrbucher fiir 
Nationalokonomie  und Statistik, zd series, Vol. XVII, pp. 1-49,) 
3. I have used the expression "to turn to good account"  in place of  "to 
distribute"  on  becoming  acquainted  with  Rob.  Liefmann's  suggestion 
("Beteiligungs-  und  Finanzierungsgesellschaften;"  Jena,  Gustav Fischer, 
1909, p. 476) that it is better to say "to place at disposal"  than "to dis- 
tribute."  I am sure Liefmann will  not object to the expression "to turn 
to good  account,"  which  I  am  now using, especially since "to place at 
disposal"  only represents one way of  turning to good account. 
4. See especially  Rich. Elirenberg: Der  Handel.  Seine wirtschaftliche 
Bedeutung, seine nationalen Pflichten und sein Verhaltnis zum Staate, Jena, 
G. Fischer,  1887. 
5. See Ad. Wagner, Beitridge zur Lehre von den Banken, Leipzig, Leop. 
Voss, 1857, p. 70. 
6. See Heinr. Rauchberg:  Der Clearing- U. Giro-Verkehr in Oesterreich- 
Ungarn  U. im  Auslande  (Vienna,  Alfred  Holder,  1897), especially:  Die 
Bedeutung der  geldlosen Ausgleichungen  fur  die  Abwicklung  des volks- 
wirtschaftlichen  Zahlungsprozesses  U.  die  Reform  des  osterreichischen 
Zahlungsverkehrs, p. 180 seq. 
7. See Heinrich Rauchberg, loc. cit., p. 204. 
8. This is  expressly  attested  for  Saxony by Rud.  Banck  (Geschichte 
der Sachsischen  Banken,  p.  5).  It was,  however,  in nowise peculiar  of 
that country. National  Monetary  Commission 
9.  The names and years of  foundation of  the German note-issuing banks 
existing up to 1859 were as follows:  1765, the Preussisclie Bank; 1824, the 
Ritterschaftlichc Privatbank of  Pomerania,  at Stettin; 1835,  the Baye- 
rische  Hypotheken-  und  Wechselbank  at Munich;  1839,  the  Leipziger 
Bank;  1847, the Anhalt-Dessauische  Landesbank;  1850, the Bank  of  the 
Berliner Kassenverein; 18  j3, the Weimarische Bank; 1854, the Frankfurter 
Bank  at Frankfort-on-the-Main;  1855, the Bank  fur Siiddeutschland,  at 
Darmstadt ; the  Thiiringiscl~e Bank,  at Sondershausen; the  Kolnische 
Privatbank,  at Cologne  and the Landgraflich  Hessische  Konzessionierte 
Landesbank  at Homburg v. d. Hohe;  1856,  the Mitteldeutsche  Kredit- 
bank,  at Meiningen; the  Bremer  Bank,  the  Hannoversche  Bank,  the 
Gothaer  Privatbank,  the Magdeburger  Privatbank,  the Liibecker  Privat- 
bank;  1859, the Niedersachsische Bank, at  Bueckeburg, and the Commerz- 
bank, at  Liibeck. 
10. See Alfr. Lansburgh in "Die Bank,"  November,  1908, pp. 1079  and 
1083, and in a special work bearing the (much too comprehensive)  title of 
Das deutsche Bankwesen,  Charlottenburg,  1909, pp. 48, 49, and 52.  He 
draws attention to the fact that Krupp acquired the name of  a "cannon 
king"  without having requlred the help of  an industrial and credit bank. 
The  fact  is that the development  of  the  Krupp works  proceeded  with 
extreme slowness in the early days, when there was no banking assistance. 
See Otto Jeidels "  Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie," 
Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, p. 2. 
I I. Rud. Banck, loc. cit., pp. 5-6.  See Herm. Schumacher:  Die Ursa- 
chen  und  \Virkungen  der  Konzentration  im deutschen  Bankwesen,  in 
Schmollers Jahrb., xxx, No.  3, p. 5.  For the particular reasons why the 
establishment of  the Credit Mobilier in France was at that time welcomed 
and promoted far and wide and even  by the Government, see text, p. 50. 
12.  Thus for Saxony by Rud. Banck, loc. cit., p. 6. 
13.  For instance, in the petition  for the concession of  the Frankfurter 
Vereinsbank in 1864 (Geschichte der Handelskainmer zu  Frankfurt a. M., 
1707-1908,  p. 669); see sec. I of  the statutes of  the Bank fiir Handel und  ..  . 
Industrie (~armst~dter  Bank) in Darmstadt, 1853. 
14. Das  heutige  Aktienwesen  im  Zusammenhang  mit  der  neueren 
Entwicklung  der  Volkswirtscl~aft (Deutsche  Vierteljahrsschrift, Heft  3, 
1856, J. G. Cotta, pp. 296-297). 
15. In this matter there is permanent cooperation on the part of  the 
supervisory boards;  a fact which has, by the way, been questioned by War- 
schauer  (Zur  Aufsichtsratsfrage in Conrad's  Jahrbucher, 111  series,  Vol. 
XXVII,  pp.  794-795.)  The  "great  banks,"  the  very  ones  to  which 
Warschauer  refers  to  show  the complete impotence  of  the  supervisory 
board as regards the drawing up of  inventories, make it a practice to sub- 
mit at each meeting  (held nearly every month) a general inventory, which 
is  not  only  examined,  but  if  necessary  discussed  in  detail  during  the 
meeting. 
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16. See below Part 111, chap. 111, sec. 2,  sub. IA: The deposit business, 
p. 191. 
17.  To propound a theory of  crises does not lie within the scope of  this 
work.  On this subject the following works should be consulted:  Michael 
von Tugan-Baranowsky, Studien zur Theorie und Geschichte der Handels- 
krisen in England (Jena, 1901, Gustav Fischer), and Ludwig Pohle, Bevol- 
kerungsbewegung,Kapitalbildungund  periodische Wirtschaftskrisen (Goet- 
tingen,  1902, Vandenhoeck  & Ruprecht), as well as the criticism of  both 
theories  by Arthur Spiethoff  (Schnioller's  Jahrbiicher  fiir  Gesetzgebung, 
etc., Vol. XXVII, No. 2,  p. 331 et seq.). 
For a very detailed list of  works published  up to 1899 on the subject of 
crises, see Theodore E. Burton, Financial Crises and Periods of  Industrial 
and Commercial Depression (New York, 1902, D. Appleton & Co.), pp. 347- 
377.  Unfortunately  that list includes  a  number  of  perfectly worthless 
works. 
18. See the very instructive book by J. W. Gilbart (a former director of 
the London and Lestminster Bank) : "The History,  Principles,  and Prac- 
tice of Banking"  (ed. 1901, London, George Bell & Sons); concerning the 
crisis of  1825, ibid., I, pp. 310-311;  the crisis of  1836, ibid., I, p. 311 seq.; 
the crisis of  1857, ibid., 11, p. 361, seq., and the crisis of  1866, ibid., 11, p. 
342 seq. 
In 1836 over 70 new companies of  every possible description were founded 
in three months, in Liverpool and Manchester  alone.  The facility with 
which credit was obtained, and the encouragement thus given to specula- 
tion, led to increases of  from 25  to 100 per cent in the prices of  all the chief 
articles of  consumption, and of  the  raw  materials of  industry.  In July, 
1836, the Bank of  England raised its rate of  discount to 4%  per cent and 
in September to 5 per cent.  Simultaneously it refused to discount a large 
number  of  American  bills  on  first-rate houses, a proceeding  that caused 
some excitement.  Prices fell, and a number of  firms, mostly second-class 
houses, failed.  The banks withheld their resources, and thus increased the 
crisis.  The joint  stock banks had increased enormously,  had raised  their 
capitals considerably, and promoted speculation.  This was referred  to in 
very harsli terms in a "Report  of  the Select Comniittee  of  the House of 
Commons," which, in conjunction with the prevalent depression, awakened 
the suspicion of the general public.  In November,  1836, the Agricultural 
and  Commercial  Bank  of  Ireland  suspended  payments,  which  caused 
restrictive measures to be taken against the joznt  stock banks, which were 
accustomed  to rediscount their bills in London.  In December,  1836, the 
Northern  and  Central  Bank  of  Manchester,  with  a  paid-up  capital  of 
£8oo,ooo,  had  to apply  to the  Bank  of  England  for assistance.  One 
London private bank,  three large branches of  American firms, and many 
respectable trading firms followed suit. 
In 1857 (ibid., 11, p. 361), 30 houses failed in England with liabilities of 
about £9,08o,ooo.  First of  all the Borough Bank at Liverpool  (October, 
1857)~  with deposits amounting to EI,~OO,OOO,  whereof  £8oo,ooo were at National  Monetary  Commission 
call;  then on November  9,  1857, the Western  Bank  of  Scotland, a very 
important Scotch deposit bank with  161 branches in Scotland, which had 
paid a dividend of  9 per cent in 1856.  It  had claims of  £1,603,000 on 4 
trading firms that had become insolvent, whereas its entire nominal capital 
amounted to £1,5oo,ooo only, and an item of  £260,000  had figured in its 
published  balance  sheet under  "good  assets,"  which the managers them- 
selves, according to notes found afterwards, had described as  bad.  The bills 
of  one of  the 4 insolvent firms had been accepted by 124 different persons; 
inquiries had been made by the bank only concerning 37 of  these persons, 
and of  these latter 2 I had been found either unsatisfactory or positively bad. 
In 1864, that is to say, shortly before the credit and speculation crisis 
of  1866 (ibid , 11, pp. 342-357),  263 companies with a nominal  capital of 
£78,135,000  had  been  formed in  England,  including  27  banks  and  15 
"discount companies."  The rate of bank discount, which up to the middle 
of  1865 stood at 3 per cent, went up on October 2,  1865, to 5 per cent and 
on October 7,  1865, to 7 per  cent, the Bank of  France at the same time 
raising its discount rate from 4 per cent to 5 per cent.  The Joint  Stock 
Discount Company failed in the beginning of 1866;  in April, 1866, Barned's 
Bank at Liverpool, with liabilities amounting to £3,5oo,ooo, a failure that 
caused a panic.  The Bank of  England raised its discount rate on May 8, 
1866, to 8 per cent, and on the 9th to 9 per cent.  On May  10,  1866, the 
great discount house of  Messrs. Overend, Gurney & Co. failed with liabilities 
amounting to £IO,OOO,OOO;  the bank rate was raised to 10 per cent.  Then, 
in rapid  succession, came the failures  of  the Bank  of  London,  the Con- 
solidated  Bank,  the  Agrar  and  Masterman's  Bank-all  deposit  banks; 
further, the  English  Joint-Stock  Bank,  the  Imperial  Mercantile  Credit 
Company, the European Bank, etc.  Within a period of  ten days the Bank 
of England had granted advances on bills and discounted bills to the extent 
of ~12,225,000;  permission was granted to it to issue notes in excess of  the 
legal limit.  The doors of  the most respectable banking firms were besieged, 
and the reports  circulating did not stop at the most respectable  names, 
and augmented tlie evil.  Credit had been granted without discrimination, 
and the banks had either  favored or themselves carried on speculation in 
every direction.  "Men are in haste to become rich.  This is no new thing; 
it has been so at  all times and in all countries.  But the fact is more patent 
now than ever.  Men  live as they journey-at  railroad pace"  (ibid., 11, 
p.  356).  See  also  Max  Wirth,  Geschichte  der  Handelskrisen,  ad  ed., 
Frankfort-on-the-Main,  1874.  For the crisis of  1857, see Otto Michaelis, 
Volkswirtschaftliche  Fragen, vol.  I  (Berlin, F. A.  Herbig,  1873)~  pp  237- 
372;  and Die  Handelkrisis van 1857  (this last article was written between 
March, 1858, and May, 1859). 
The similarity with corresponding German crises is evident.  Recollec- 
tions of  such crises, however, seem to disappear more rapidly than the in- 
juries  they inflict.  This remarkable but firmly established fact, however, 
should not apply  to the directors of  banks,  who  should  and must  gain 
experience from every crisis. 
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19. This was especially noticeable in the German crisis of  1900, and in 
the German and American crises of  1873.  Regarding the latter, Theodore 
E.  Burton  (loc.  cit.,  p.  287)  remarks:  "There  was  an  enornious  ab- 
sorption of  circulating capital in fixed capital.  Railways as well as docks, 
buildings, factories, had been constructed on an unprecedented scale.  All 
the equipment for future production was increasing at a more rapid pace 
than ever before.  In these expenditures we have the effect of  capital in- 
vested  for objects not immediately remunerative." 
20.  Der  deutsche  Geldmarkt,  1895-1902,  in the Schriften des Vereins 
fur  Sozialpolitik, Vol. CX (Die Storungen im deutschen TVirtschaftsleben 
wiihrend der Jahre 1900, ff.,  Vol. VI; Geldmarkt, Kreditbanken) pp. 3-80. 
2 I. See especially the fundamental  essay, Die Krisis auf dem Arbeitsmarkt 
(Vol. CIX of  the Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, and Vol. V of  the 
exceedingly valuable inquiry by this society regarding  Die Storungen  in 
deutschen  TVirtschaftsleben wahrend  der Jahre  1900 ff.)  with  contribu- 
tions  by  J. Jastrow,  A.  Heinecke, R. Calwer, K. Singer,  I,. Cohn, Lands- 
berg, and W. Rloch.  See  also diagram  on  page  140 of  the above-cited 
(note 17) work by Theodore Burton (according to George H. Wood in tlie 
Journal of  the Royal Statistical Society, 1899) for the employment statistics 
in the United Kingdom for 1860-1900,  as well as the Annual  Extracts of 
Labor Statistics, official documents conipiled by the Labor  Department of 
the Board of  Trade. 
22.  See Walter  Bagehot,  Lombard  Street, ed.  1896, p.  199: "What  is 
wanted, and what is necessary to stop a panic is to diffuse  the opinion that, 
though money may be dear, still money is to be had." 
23.  See Ernst Kritzler, Preussische Hypotheken-Aktien-Bank,  Deutsche 
Grundschuld-Bank,  Pommersche  Hypotheken-Aktien-Bank,  Krisis  und 
Sanierung.  Schriften  des  Vereins  fiir Sozialpolitik,  Vol.  CXI;  Krisen- 
enquete,  Vol.  11;  Storungen  in1  deutschen  Wirtschaftsleben,  Vol. VII, 
1903, pp.  1-82. 
24.  See Kreuzzeitung of June 30,  1901, No. 301 (1st Supplement): "It 
can not be  denied  that the Haute banque  through its speedy and ener- 
getic protection of  the legitimate comnlercial credit, especially in Saxony, 
greatly  lessened  the consequences of  the Leipzig  catastrophe.  For this 
action it should be accorded all thanks and recognition." 
25.  See  Moritz  Striill  Uber  das  deutsclie  Geldwesen  im  Kriegsfalle 
(Schmoller's Jahrbuch, Vol. XXIII, 1899, pp.  173-195  and pp. 197-226). 
also  Die finanzielle Mobilmachung der deutschen  Wehrkraft,  by Col. Dr. 
Ritter v. Renauld (Leipzig,  1901, Duncker & Humblot), and the article 
Finanzielle  Mobilmachung by the same author in the Bank-Archiv, fourth 
year,  No.  3,  of  December,  1904, together  with  the  objections  in  the 
Deutscher  Cjkonon~ist  of  January 14, 1903 (twenty-third year, No.  1151); 
Karl Helfferich, Das  Geld im  russisch-japanischen  Kriege (Ernst Siegfried 
Mittler & Sohn, Berlin,  1906) and Die  finanzielle Seite des russisch-japa- 
nischen Krieges (Marine-Rundschau, Oct. 1904); Max Schinckel, Nationale 
Pflichten  der Banken und Kapitalisten im Kriegsfalle (Bank-Archiv,  fifth National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
year, No.  4, p.  41  et seq., Nov.  15, 1905); General v.  Blume, Militarpo- 
litische Aufsatze (Berlin, 1906, Ernst Siegfr. Mittler & Sohn), Chapter I, 4: 
Mobilmachung. Soziale und wirtschaftliche  Folgen,  pp. 14-30;  Max War- 
burg, Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft U.  Borsengesetz, paper read  at the 3d 
General  Congress  of  German  Bankers  at Hamburg,  Sept. 7,  1907); and 
Riesser,  Finanzielle  Kriegsbereitschaft  und  Kriegsfiihrung,  Jena,  Gust. 
Fischer,  1909. 
26.  See Riesser, ibidem, p. 54. 
27.  See, among others, lllax Schinckel: Nationale Pflichten der Banken 
und Kapitalisten in1 Kriegsfall  (Bankarchiv, Vol. V, No. 4, Nov. 15, ~gog), 
pp. 42-43;  Riesser,  loc.  cit., pp.  25-26,  and the discussion  in  Part 111, 
chapter 111, Gd, of  this book. 
28.  See  Moritz  Stroll,  ~ber  das  deutsche  Geldwesen  im  Kriegsfall. 
(Schmoller's  Jahrbuch  fiir  Gesetzgebung,  etc.,  XXIII, p.  176); Riesser, 
loc. cit., pp. 2-4  and p. 41. 
29.  Riesser, Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft und Kriegsfiihrung,  1909,  pp. 
55-75. 
30.  Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 45-55. 
31.  Immediately after the declaration of  war, this war treasure is to be 
delivered  to the Reichsbank, which, according  to section  17 of  tlie bank 
law of  March  14, 1876, may issue the threefold  amount in bank notes- 
namely, 36o,ooo,ooo marks. 
As an increase of  this war treasure in gold is scarcely feasible at  present, 
I have broached  the question  (loc. cit., p.  45,  note I) whether a further 
war reserve fund of  12o,ooo,ooo  marks might riot be accumulated in silver. 
32.  Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 41-42. 
33. Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 49-50. 
34.  In contrast  with Japan, which endeavored  at the very outset "to 
raise  as large  a  possible  share of  the necessary  money  for the war  by 
means of  increased taxation"  (Helfferich, Das Geld im russisch-japanischen 
Kriege, Berlin, Siegfr. Mittler  8r Sohn, 1906, p.  143), Russia  limited her- 
self  to loans,  to drawing on  the considerable  resources  available in her 
treasury, and to diminishing her expenditure, resorting to increased taxa- 
tion only in order to cover the interest on the war loans.  See also Riesser, 
loc. cit., pp. 96-101. 
35.  See Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 5-11,  especially p. 10. 
36.  In this  matter  the  correct  determination  of  the type and  issue 
price  of  the loan is of  the greatest  importance.  (See  Riesser,  loc.  cit., 
pp. 98-99,  pp.  77-92.)  In Germany, unfortunately, even in normal and 
prosperous  times,  the success of  a  loan  subscription has frequently been 
jeopardized, to the detriment of  government credit, by the failure "to make 
momentary sacrifices in order to secure permanent advantages," as Russia 
has frequently done to her own advantage during times of  peace and war 
(Helfferich, loc.  cit.,  p.  89).  The failure  of  the  5 per  cent  war  loan  of 
~oo,ooo,ooo  marks in July,  1870, was due as much to the time of  issue as 
to the injudicious  selection of  the type and issue price  of  the loan (the 
latter against  the emphatic advice of  the representatives  of  the banking 
world  consulted); further, it was ill advised not  to make the banks  sub- 
scription  ofiices, although they only represented  at that time a  relatively 
small financial power.  (See Riesser, loc. cit.,  102-103.) 
37.  See Riesser, loc. cit., p. 28. 
38.  Important conclusions in all these respects may be drawn from the 
financial policy pursued by England during the Boer war  (October,  1899, 
to May,  19o2), and by Russia and Japan during the Russo-Japanese war 
(February,  1904, to the end of  August,  1905)  (See Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 
75-79,  and p.  79, 2,  to p. 93.)  I refer here especially to the "system  skil- 
fully adopted by the Russian financial administration of  procuring at  home 
the money required for war expenses at  home and at the scene of  war, and 
of procuring  by foreign loans the money necessary for payments abroad, 
thus neither  depriving the internal commerce of  Russia  of  its necessary 
currency by sending money abroad, nor menacing the foreign money mar- 
ket on whose good feeling she depended, by drawing on it for large amounts 
of gold.  (Helfferich, loc. cit., p. 219.) 
39. The  note  banks,  mortgage  banks  (including  the "mixed"  mort- 
gage banks),  the building, brokers',  and  insurance  banks, also  establish- 
ments exclusively devoted to the promotion of  industrial undertakings are 
not included in this discussion. 
As regards the remaining "banks"  quite a variety of  designations have 
been  applied  to  them.  The  most  customary term  is  probably  "credit 
bank,"  a name which I shall, as a rule, adhere to in the following pages. 
Other names have been used, however, such as:  "industrial"  banks (a name 
largely  used  during  tlie  last  century) ; "investment"  banks  (Plenge) ; 
"  security"  banks (Sch~noller  and Sattler) ; "banks of  emission "  (Loeb) ; 
"  enterprise"  banks  (Schaffle) ; "  speculation"  banks  (Weber) ; "credit 
mobilier"  banks (Max Wirth).  Knies  (in "Geld  und Kredit,"  2nd part, 
1879, p. 223)  enumerates still more specialised designations: "It has be- 
come customary to classify the banks themselves  as 'loan'  banks,  'giro' 
banks, 'bill' or 'discount' banks, 'deposit', 'account current', and 'cheque' 
banks",  etc.  To my  mind, however, none of  these designations can lay 
claim  to a complete characterisation  of  the activity of  German banks as 
historically developed.  The one or the other designation applies to a bank 
only in as far as the activity implied  by the title (speculation, investment, 
emission, or  security transactions) predominates in the  total range of  its 
business.  Even this, however, does not generally apply to the whole devel- 
opment of  each  individual  bank,  for not only has each bank developed 
quite differently, but within one and the same bank the character and ten- 
dency of  its activity during the different phases of  its development, consti- 
tuted sometinles a radical departure from that pursued by the former man- 
agement according to the business policy pursued  by the new management. 
If we  proceed  from  the distinction between  simple deposit banks and 
the German banks which by reason of  their historical development are of  a 
different  nature, that is to say, if we desire to emphasise that the latter are National  Monetary  Commission 
not simply deposit banks (as is A  Weber's evident intention in his com- 
parlson between "deposit"  and "  speculation"  banks), it would seem more 
appropriate to do as has been done in the case of  the mortgage banks, for 
which, since the mortgage bank law of  July 13, 1899, a distinction is drawn 
between  mortgage  banks  proper,  and  those  carrying  on  miscellaneous 
transactions, which latter, in virtue of  article 46, section I, are exempt from 
the restrictive regulations of  article 5 
From this standpoint, therefore, the existing German credit banks might 
be designated also as  banks transacting n~iscellaneous  business (" combined " 
or "  mlxed "  banks)  More  important, however,  than  the  mere  formal 
question of  definition, is the conclusion resulting from the above, that the 
general opinions and deductions expressed in the following pages regarding 
German banks, particularly German great banks, are invariably given wlth 
the tacit understanding that the general description, when applied in detail, 
i  e ,  with regard to each individual bank, may be subject to extensive modi- 
fications 
40  This has been the case hitherto only with the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
See Die  Disconto  Gesellschaft,  1851-1901,  Denkschrift  7um  50  jahrigen 
Jubilaum, Berlin, 1901 
Part  II. 
I  See (in addition to other works cited)  Wertler Somhart, Diedeutsche 
Volkswirtschaft  irn  neunzehnten  Jahrhundert,  7th  ed  (Berlin,  Georg 
Bondi),  1909, and Ludwig  Pohle,  Die  Entwicklung des deutschen  Wirt- 
schaftslebens im letzten Jahrhundert, 2nd ed  (Leipzig, B  G  Teubner), 
1908 
2  Gustav Schmoller, Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtscl~aftslehre, 
Rd  I1 (1st to 6th edition, Leipzig, 1904, Duncker & Hutnblot), pp  182 and 
183  Schn~oller  thinks, however, that this estimate of  Prussia's capital is 
too low 
3  In Frankfort-on-the-Main for home-manufactured goods, notions, and 
hardware, according to an interesting book by Hugo Kanter. Die Entwick- 
lung  des  Handels  mit  gebrauchsfertigen  IVaren  von  der  Mitte  des  18. 
Jahrhundelts bis  1866 zu Frankfurt a  M  (Tubingen  and I,eipzig,  1902, 
J  C  B  Mohr), p  125 
4  Werner  Sombart,  Der  moderne  Kapitalismus,  I, pp  429, 424-425. 
585,815 loonls were used in the home-weaving industry, and only 217,388 
in factories 
5. Von Reden, Erwerbs-  U  Verkehrsstatistik  (1853)~  p  281,  and Som- 
bart, Der mod  Kapitalismus, I, pp  424-425 
6  In the weaving trade 754,735 workmen were employed in home indus- 
try, 325,277 in factories  (W Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, I, pp. 
424-425 
7.  W  Oechelhauser,  Vergleichende  Statistik der  Eisenindustrie  aller 
Lander  U  Erorterung ihrer okonomischen  Lage im  Zollverein,  1852, pp. 
124 and 128 
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8  W  Sornbart, Der mod  Kapitalismus, v01  I, p  462 
9  E  Engel, Das Zeltalter des Dampfes, 2 ed ,  1881, p  130 
10  Karl  Lamprecht,  Zur  jungsten  deutschen  Vergangenheit,  (Vol  I, 
1st  half  of  his  Deutsche  Geschichte,  Freiburg i  B,  Herm.  Heyfelder, 
1903)9 P  I53 
I I  Von Reden, loc  cit , p  281. 
12  W  Oechelhauser, loc  cit 
13  W~th  regard  to the following remarks see Max Sering, Geschichte der 
preuss - deutschen  Eisenzolle von 1818 his  zur  Gegenwart, in Schmoller's 
Staats  U  Sozialw~ssenschaftl  Forschungen,  v01  111  (1882),  pp  53-62 
On pp  94-95 he polnts out the interesting fact that the financial crisis of 
1847 interrupted the transition to coke fuel 
14  According  to  Lurmann  in  Die  Fortschritte  im  Hochofenbetrieb 
seit  50  Jahren,  Dusseldorf,  1902,  the  output  of  blasting  furnaces  has 
increased sevenfold since 1852 (in capacity expressed in tons)  According 
to Peter Mischler, Das deutsche Eisenhuttengewerbe, v01  I (1852), p  I 50, 
the average English blasting furnace produced in the middle  of  the nine- 
teenth  century  70,000  quintals  annually,  whereas  German  blasting  fur- 
naces only averaged 7,000 quintals annually, as compared with 618,000 in 
1899 
15  W  Sombart, Der mod  Kapitalismus, 11, pp  13-14 
16  "In the district of  Siegen, therefore, the iron ore production has in 50 
years  increased  twenty-five-fold  in  quantity,  thirty-one-fold  in value " 
(See Mollat, Zur Wurdigung der Siegerlander Industrie, Siegen, September, 
1908 ) 
17  Von Reden  Vergleichende Kulturstatistik,  1848, p  412, seq. 
18  W  Sombart, Der mod  Kapitalismus, v01  11, pp  176-7 
19  See Ludwig Geiger, Berlin, 1688-1840  (Berlin, Gebr  Paetel, 1903)~ 
Vol  I  (1903), p  463, Note* 
zo  See  Beitrage  zur  Geschichte  des  Berliner  Handels-  und  Gewerbe- 
fleisses aus der altesten  Zeit  bis  auf  unsere  Tage  A memorial  in  com- 
memoration  of  the fiftieth  anniversary  of  the corporation  of  the  Berlin 
Merchants on March  2,  1870, p  83  In December,  1908, the number of 
persons contributing to sickness insurance funds in Berlin was 738,858 
21  W  Sombart  Der mod  Kapitalismus, 11, pp  176-177 
22  W  Sombart, 11, p  214  Concerning the population  of  to-day  see 
PP  90 and 91 
23  Matches were  introduced  only  in 1834, and sewing machines were 
first used in Germany at the beginning of  the sixties 
24  Max Wirth,  Geschichte  der  Handelskrisen, (2nd ed ), 1874, p  292. 
25  See Sornbart.  D  mod  Kap  I1  pp  284-7,  and  Otto  Bahr  sine 
deutsche Stadt (Kassel) vor  60 Jahren,  Leipzig, Fr  Wilh  Grunow,  1884, 
p. 64 and following 
26  See  K  Knies.  Der  Telegraph  als  Verkehrsmittel,  1857,  p  161, 
et seq. National  Monetary  Commission 
27.  Geschichte der Frankfurter Zeitung 1856-1906,  p  17. 
28.  See  Th.  Bauer:  Die  Aktienunternehmungen  in  Baden  (Karls- 
ruhe, 1903, Macklotsche Buchhandlung), pp. 14 and 15, for the conditions 
prevailing  in Baden, where  there was  a law concerning  stock companies 
already at the beginning  of  the nineteenth century.  It  appears that the 
number of  joint-stock  conipanies in Baden before the middle of  the nine- 
teenth century was very limited.  They were the following: The spinning 
and weaving  mills, at Ettlingen, founded  in 1835; the Badische Gesell- 
schaft  f. Zuckerfabrikation  in IVaghausel founded  in  1836; the  Mecha- 
nische Weberei, " at Thiengen,  founded  in 1843; the Badische Gasaktien- 
gesellschaft,  founded  in  1845,  and  the  Karlsruher  Gasgesellschaft, 
founded in  1848.  Beginning with 1853 came the following: Aktiengesell- 
schaft  fur  Uhrenfabrikation,  at  Lenzkirch,  founded  in  1853;  Verein 
chemischer  Fabriken,  at Mannheim,  founded  in 1854; the French  Com- 
pagnie  de Manufactures de Glaces, etc., founded in 1854, for the manufac- 
ture  of  plate-glass;  the  Badische  Zinkgesellschaft,  at  Mannheim, 
founded in 1855; the wire and screw factory, of  Falkau, founded in 1856; 
the  Badische  Gesellschaft  fur Tabakproduktion  und  Handel,  at Karls- 
ruhe, founded  in 1857; and some other companies of  minor  importance. 
Bauer only mentionsone large concernconverted into a joint-stock company, 
namely the Maschinenbaugesellschaft Karlsruhe, founded in 1848 and con- 
verted in 1852. 
The formation of  companies became more active after the introduction 
of  the industrial law of  1862, which was based  on freedom of  trade and 
freedom  to move about from  place  to place.  The well-known  Badische 
Anilin-und  Sodafabrik, at Mannheim-ludwigshafen, was  founded  about 
this period (1865). 
29.  Engel, Die erwerbstatigen juristischen  Personen,  etc.  Berlin,  pub- 
lished by the Royal Statistical Bureau, 1876, pp.  10-11. 
30.  See Geschichte der Frankfurter Zeitung, 1856-1906, p.  IS. 
31.  Karl Helfferich, Geschichte der Deutschen Geldreform (Leipzig, 1898, 
T'.lncker & Humblot), p. 6 seq., and also his Beitrage zur Geschichte  der 
Deutschen Geldreform, p.  78 seq. 
32.  Hug0 Kanter, loc. cit., pp. I 12-1  13. 
33.  Hugo Kanter, loc. cit., p. 41. 
34.  Rud.  Kaulla,  Die  Organisation  des  Bankwesens  im  Konigreich 
Wiirttemberg, 1908, p. 6. 
35.  W. Sombart, Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,  2d ed., pp. 190-191. 
36.  "Geschichte d. Handelskammer zu Frankfurt a.  M.,"  (1767-1908). 
Jos.  Baer & Co.,  Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1908, p.  659. 
37.  W. Sombart, "Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,"  2.  Aufl., p. 196. 
38.  On  October  I, 1851, even  the  Prussian  Bank  gave  notice  to de- 
positors  to withdraw  their  deposits,  because,  according  to  W.  Sombart 
(Deutsche Volksw., nd  ed., p. 85), "it did not know what to do with the 
money."  At the commencement of  the second period (1870) the deposits 
The German Great Banks 
at the Prussian  Bank  amounted  to  only  15,770,000 thalers=47,310,000 
marks. 
39.  See Lexis, "Banken"  (in Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 
1903, 3d ed., Vol. 11, p. 400). 
40.  Karl Lamprecht, loc. cit., p.  183. 
41.  Walter  Troeltsch, ~ber  die  neuesten  Veranderungen  im  deutschen 
Wirtschnftsleben.  Stuttgart, W.  Kohlhammer, 1899, pp. 32 and 45. 
42.  New  investigations, and the remarks made by Ludwig  Pohle,  loc. 
cit., p.  23, suggested this modified statement as compared uith the one in 
the second edition. 
43.  Vide Karl Lamprecht loc. cit., p. 43. 
44.  W. Sombart, Der mod. Kapitalismus, 11, pp.  148-151. 
45.  Ludwig Pohle, loc. cit., p.  27. 
46.  "In  the  coal  and  iron  deposits  of  Germany  lies  *  *  *  the 
explanation  why  the  German  economic  world  turned  so  decisively  to 
industrial activity during the latter half  of  last century, as well as of  the 
intensity of Germany's capitalistic development."  (W. Sombart, Deutsche 
Volkswirtschaft,  2d ed., p.  103). 
47.  See Hans Gideon  Heymann,  Die  gemischten  Werke im  deutschen 
Grosseisengewerbe.  Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Konzentration der Indus- 
trie,  Stuttgart & Berlin,  1904, J. G.  Cotta Nachf.  (Munchener Volksw. 
Studien,  edited  by  Brentano  and Lotz,  65.  Stuck),  p.  4: "It was  the 
employment of  mineral coal  for  smelting and as a source of  power  that 
paved the way for capitalism and large industry."  (See also p. 62.) 
48.  See Max Wirth, Geschichte der Handelskrisen, 2d  ed., p.  292. 
49.  Engel,  Die  erwerbstatigen  juristischen  Personen,  insbesondere  die 
Aktiengesellschaften  im  Preussischen  Staate.  (Berlin,  Verlag  des  kgl. 
statist. Bureaus, 1876), pp.  10-1  I. 
50.  It  can not be proved that the Credit Mobilier participated financially 
in the founding of  the Darmstadter Bank. 
51.  See Geschaftsbericht der Darmstadter Bank for 1853, page 9.  For- 
tunately the idea was never carried into practice. 
52,  Anonymous  article:  "Die  modernen  Kreditbanken,"  published  in 
1856 in the Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, No.  3 (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 
J. G.  Cotta), page 255 seq. 
53.  Conrad: Grundriss zunl Studium der politischen  Oekonomie.  (4th 
ed., Jena, Gust. Fischer, rgoz), part I, section 72  (p. 229 seq.): "Die Credit- 
Mobilier-oder Emissions- und Industriebanken." 
54.  In the main, the theme seems to have been furnished by the Union 
generale (Bontoux). 
55.  While following a hearse one should neither philosophise nor try to 
make laws.  Had Ihering taken this to heart he certainly would not have 
marred  hie  zreat work "Der  Zweck  im  Recht"  by the following gener- 
alisation written immediately after the crisis of  1873: "The devastations 
which they (the joint-stock  companies) caused among private property are National  Monetary  Commission 
worse than if  fire and famine, failure of  crops, earthquake, war, hostile occu- 
pation had combined to ruin the national prosperity."  (Vol.  I, p. 223.) 
It is both surprising and regrettable that Ruhland quotes my words in 
his  "System  der polit.  Oekonomie"  (Vol.  111,  p.  8)  in quotation marks 
in  the  following  manner:  "Riesser's  desire"  *  *  *  "not  to  phi- 
losophise, nor  to try to make  laws  when  following a  hearse,  and not  to 
select  the effect  of  a  stock  exchange  panic as the starting point  of  a  reforma- 
tory action(!)" etc.  My  words  are simply a  warning  not  to criticise, to 
draw philosophical conclusions, or to take legal action immediately after a 
crisis; that is to say, while one is "following  the hearse."  The italicized 
passage is not only not to be found in the paragraph quoted by Ruhland 
(footnote 3 on p.  38 of  the secondGerman-edition  of  this book), but it 
does not even remotely represent what was written there-a  fact which will 
be clear to every careful reader of  my book.  Keeping the above-mentioned 
facts in view, we  can correctly estimate the scientific basis of  Ruhland's 
deduction found in the following sentence:  "The political economist whose 
duty as a '  physician' is to cure the diseased '  body-economic' would be guilty 
of  the most criminal neglect if  (in accordance with Professor Riesser's wishes) 
he would conceal or overlook its worst and most threatening symptoms!" 
He evidently forgets that it is one of  the first elements of  scientific polemics 
not to construct  an argument on absolutely false citations and then pro- 
ceed to combat it. 
56.  M.  Aycard,  "Histoire  du  Credit  Mobilier,"  1852-1867,  Bmxelles, 
1867. 
57.  Joh.  Plenge,  Grundung und  Geschichte  des Credit Mobilier.  Zwei 
Kapitel  aus Anlagebanken,  eine  Einleitung  in  die  Theorie  des  Anlage- 
bankgeschiiftes (Tubingen, H. Laupp, 1903).  This treatise, intended to be 
the precursor of  a larger unpublished work treating the latter theme (theory 
of  the investment  bank business) in del-d~,  oilers far more than the title 
would lead one to infer, and is characterised by an abundance of  interesting 
material and keen observation. 
58.  The increase took place when it was too late (1866); the capital was 
then doubled, being raised  to 120,000,000  francs.  The reserves amounted 
only to 4,000,000 francs. 
59.  As  early as March 9,  1856, the Government felt obliged to prohibit 
any further issue of  securities on the Paris Bourse.  According to Plenge 
(loc. cit., p.  91), no less than 45-  ----v  '4mited  liability companies with a 
combined  capital of  ~,ooo,ooo,ooo  francs  (not  ~oo,ooo,ooo)  were founded 
' 
in France  from  July  I, 1854, to July  I, 18j5.  Among these companies 
there were  227  joint-stock  companies  en  commandite, with  a  capital  of 
968,ooo,ooo francs. 
The fusion policy in the field of  industry, announced in the 1854 report 
of  the Credit Mobilier in correct anticipation of  the concentrative tendencies 
inseperable from  large-scale industry, was  only  carried out to a  limited 
extent by the company.  On  the other hand, several important railways 
were consolidated by its assistance.  (See Plenge, loc. cit., p. 104.) 
The German Great Banks 
60.  See Plenge's list of  bourse quotations, loc. cit., p.  I I I. 
61.  As  early as  1859  the Credit  Mobilier  had  about 77,om,ooo francs 
of  securities of  all  descriptions  in  its  possession, while  its capital  was 
60,000,om francs, and its reserves  2,000,000 francs.  In 1862 the total of 
these holdings (among which "rentes"  occupied  but a modest place) had 
grown to 148,000,000 francs. 
The advances to subsidiary companies amounted to 29,500,ooo francs in 
1858, and to nearly 73,000,om francs in 1866. 
62.  Aycard,  who  has  a  keen  instinct  in  such  matters,  believes  that 
11,ooo,ooo francs  represented  the profits  solely  from  speculation  during 
1856.  This sum  certainly  did not include the profit  on  issues,  such  as 
Plenge mentions (loc. cit., p.  150). 
63.  3,910  kilometres had been  authorized  up to  1851 and 14,227 kilo- 
metres up to 1857.  (Plenge, loc. cit., p. 91 ) 
64.  See Plenge's list, p.  59 seq., and p. 62.  For instance: In 1852-1854 
French  Southern  Railway;  1854, Austrian  State Railway, Paris-Mulhau- 
sen,  DGle-Salins;  1857, Hungarian  Franz-Joseph  Railway,  Swiss Central 
Railway, and West Swiss Railway, Dauphine Railways, Russian Railway, 
Cordova-Sevilla, Spanish Northern Railway, etc. 
65.  Ad.  U'agner,  Bankbruche  U.  Bankkontrollen,  in  the  Deutsche 
Monatsschrift fur das gesamte Leben der Gegenwart (ed. Jul.,  Lohmeyer), 
1st year,  No.  I.  (October,  I~OI),  pp.  74-85,  and No.  2.  (November, 
1901), pp. 248-258,  especially p. 255.  For the contrary view, see, amongst 
other material,  the Deutscher Oekonomist of  October 19, 1901, and Feb- 
ruary  I, 1902; also Richard Rosendorff, Bankbruche und Bankkontrollen, 
in Hirth's Annalen des Deutschen Reiches, 1902, No. 3, pp. 182-197. 
66.  See Plenge, loc. cit., p.  14.  As  a matter of  fact the French Govern- 
ment frequently adopted a rigorous attitude towards the Credit Mobilier. 
It  prevented  the issue (announced  first for the middle of  September, and 
subsequently for October 5, 1855) of  240,ooo bonds at 500 francs, nine days 
before subscription;  on March 9,  1856, it prohibited the issue of  any fur- 
ther securities on the Paris Bourse; in its charter the Credit Mobilier was 
even forbidden to subscribe to foreign public loans without the consent of 
the Government. 
67.  Loc. cit., pp.  71-98,  sec.  10: Der Pariser Credit Mobilier von 1852- 
1867.  In criticizing  this description  and criticism  it seems to me  that 
Plenge (VII, and 17) is rather too severe. 
68.  Loc. cit., pp. 249-267. 
69.  Max  Wirth  in  his  Geschichte  der  Handels-Krisen  (published  in 
1857) shows by his strong prejudice against the German Credit Mobilier 
Banks (which is conspicuous in some chapters on almost every page) that 
the book was written whilst the author was completely under the influence 
of  the serious crisis of  '57  and the speculative excesses preceding it. 
70.  Section 10 as well as sections 8, I I, 12,  16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 30, 32, 
36,  and  40  were  formulated  somewhat  differently by  resolution  of  the 
general meeting of  May 31,  1860. National  Monetary  Commission 
71.  This is expressly referred to in the following passage of  the program- 
like  business  report of  the Darmstadter Bank  for  1853 (reprinted above, 
p. 48) : "and to lend its cooperation in order to lead enterprise and capital 
into  the  proper  channels,  corresponding  with  the  requirements  of  the 
moment."  It  is obvious that the wording of  this clause is too restrictive 
and, taken literally, is economically incorrect. 
72.  See especially article 5 of  the statutes of  the Credit Mobilier. 
73.  In section  2  of  the statutes  of  the Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft, 
dated July 2,  1856, which in this respect were far more con~prehensive,  the 
object of  the company was stated to be "the carrying on of  banking, com- 
mercial,  and industrial business  of  every  description."  Its activity,  in 
particular,  is  to  extend  to  "industrial  and  agricultural  undertakings, 
mining, foundries, canal, road, and railway building, as well as to the for- 
mation,  combination, and consolidation  of  joint-stock  companies, and to 
the issue of  shares and bonds of  such companies." 
74.  In 1860 the entire wording  of  section  10 was partly  changed  and 
partly supplemented.  In my  text, following a well-founded criticism  by 
Warschauer (in Conrad's Jahrbiicher,  gd series, vol. xxxi, p.  705), I have 
made considerable  abbreviations. 
75.  It must be remembered  that up to the introduction  of  the "Allg. 
Deutsch. Handelsgesetzbuch"  (1862), that is to say, during the first decade 
of  the activity of the Darmstadter  Bank, the management was not in the 
hands of  the directorate, which was merely an executive organ, but solely 
in the hands of the "bank  administration,"  consisting of  18 members. 
76.  Max Wirth, "Geschichte der Handelskrisen,"  2d ed., pp. 244 and 295. 
77.  Max Wirth, loc. cit., p.  296. 
78.  A few years later, in 1866, as already noted, similar conditions pre- 
vailed in England, which, after having passed through the crises of  1825, 
1836, 1839, and 1847, underwent another serious crisis in 1866. 
79.  Business report for 1853 (program), pp. 7 and 10. 
80.  It  is therefore incorrect to state that the bank was "compelled"  to 
establish branches and limited liability companies "merely in order to invest 
its capital profitably"  (Max IVirth, loc. cit., p.  272).  The "half  bankrupt 
calico factory  at Heidenheim,"  with  the transfornlation  of  which into a 
joint-stock  company  Max  Wirth  reproaches  the  bank,  remarking  that 
"nothing  has been heard of  its profits as yet," is the present ilourishing and 
highly  respected  Wiirttemberg  Calico  Joint  Stock Company  (Aktienge- 
sellschaft Wurttembergische  Kattunmanufaktur)  at Heidenheim  (Wiirt- 
temberg). 
81.  See Felix Hecht, Bankwesen und Bankpolitik in den suddeutschen 
Staaten, etc.,  pp.  166-167. 
82.  Others  were  planned  in  St.  Petersburg,  London,  Constantinople, 
Smyma, and Prague. 
83.  Most  of  the other  banks  participated  herein,  or  they  acted  inde- 
pendently, although the latter case occurred only to a small extent during 
;his  period.  For details see p. 71 et seq. 
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84.  On one occasion, it is true (1859), the Darmstddter Bank was induced 
to make long-term  advances amounting to 4,500,000 florins to industrial 
concerns  and  railways,  sustaining  great  losses  thereby.  In this  case, 
however, it obtained  securities the value  of  which  fell  to an extent  not 
anticipated, and it was  unable  to  obtain supplementary  security.  (See 
Model,  Die  grossen  Berliner  Effektenbanken-ed.  Ernst  Loeb--Gust. 
Fischer, Jena, 1896, pp. 6e61.) 
85.  The real  increase  amounted  merely  to 46,000 florins, so  that the 
capital from  1856 on was  25,046,000 florins=42,936,ooo  marks; the cer- 
tificates (Berechtigungsscheine) which had been issued beyond that amount 
had to be gradually withdrawn.  The issue of  these certificates was accom- 
panied by rather unpleasant occurrences.  (See Model, loc. cit., p. 58.) 
86.  It  reduced its "lombard and covered credits"  from  1,400,000 florins 
in  1859 to 90,mo florins in 1864; its loans and mortgages from 4,710,000 
florins in 1859 to 400,000 florins in  1864, and its "illiquid  claims"  from 
910,ooo florins in 1859 to I 14,000 florins in 1864. 
87.  See  the interesting  report:  Die  Disconto-Gesellschaft,  1851-1901, 
Denkschrift zum funfzigjahrigen Jubilaum"  (Berlin,  1901, J. Guttentag), 
p.  15  (quoted hereafter as "  Jubilaumsbericht"). 
88.  The  dividends  which  the  Darmstadter  Bank  and  the  Disconto- 
Gesellschaft distributed during 1856-1900  have been compiled in a table by 
Ad.  Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, Duncker & Hum- 
blot, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 209-210,  those of the Disconto-Gesellschaft also in 
its Jubilee Report, p.  261. 
89.  During the first fifty years of  its existence (1853-1903)  7&  per cent. 
90.  For the period from April  I, 1856, to December 31,  1900,  9.51 per 
cent; from April I, 1856, to 1904, 9.42 per cent. 
91.  Model, loc.  cit., p.  68,  gives a table of  the current business  of  the 
Darmstadter Bank during 1859-1864  and emphasizes that the management 
attached the greatest value to "fostering and extending the current account 
business,  and to carrying  out long engagements."  This table, however, 
appears to me to prove the latter tendency rather than the former, although 
the former also existed.  The current business  of  the Darmstadter  Bank 
yielded, in 1856, 8 per cent of  the total profit of  15 per cent. 
92.  Of  the other banks Model  only  mentions  the Berliner Handelsge- 
sellschaft.  I profit by the opportunity to express my best thanks to these 
banks for supplying me with their business reports for the earlier period, 
of  which  reports in most cases only few copies are in existence,  and these 
in some instances only in manuscript form. 
93.  The item  "debits"  (Debitoren), which  decreased  in 1867 and still 
further in 1868 and 1869, rose to 30,526,471 marks in 1870 and to 62,771,967 
marks in 1871. 
94.  The  deposits,  which  rose  to  7,466,212  marks in  1867  (as  against 
2,716,187 in 1866) fell in 1868 to 4,384,850 marks and in 1869 as low as 
the amount given above (2,274,228 marks).  They increased again in 1870 
to 3,676,343 marks, rose in 1871 suddenly to 14,779,269  marks, and in 1873 National  Monetary  Commission 
as high as 64,788,366 marks without, however, being able to maintain that 
level during the following years. 
95.  At its very first meeting  (30 October,  1848) the supervisory council, 
at  the suggestion of  the board of  directors of  the bank, had fixed 4poo,ooo 
thalers as the limit for individual credit, 2,000,000 thalers for deposits to 
be accepted, ~,ooo,ooo  thalers for its own securities (eigene Effekten), and 
~,ooo,ooo  thalers for  its own bills (Geldanweisungen) (see Ernst Koenig's 
Erinnerungsschrift zum  50-jahrigen  Bestehen  des A.  Schaaffhausen'schen 
Bankvereins vom Oktober 1898, p. 26). 
96.  On this point the board of  directors remarks in its business report for 
1852, page  I : "  We heartily welcome every new and large establishment  . . 
in this town and country, being convinced that in the course of  years the 
prosperity of  the Bankverein will become inseparable from the growth and 
and rise of  the Rhenish industry in all its branches."  (See business report 
1853, P. 3 ) 
97. "For  the exploitation  of  the rich  coal  mines of  the  Essen  field."  -. 
(Business report for 1852, p. 3.) 
98. From  1864 onward only the total sums are given, the number  of 
accounts being omitted. 
99.  No  details can be found for the earlier years.  In 1852 the average 
debit on current account was 6,804 thalers and the average credit account, 
5,255 thalers. 
~m.  The business report of  that year (the one preceding the crisis of  I 857) 
mentions that at  the end of  September "the Prussian Bank for several days 
refused to discount anything." 
101. As  far as balancing the accounts is concerned,  section  57  of  the 
statutes deserves special attention.  It  provided that "the inventory to be 
conipiled annually shall represent the capital of  the society according to 
its true value; the capital, if  anything, should  be  underestimated  rather 
than overestimated." 
102.  This is shown in the business report of  1860, page 2. 
103.  One noteworthy fact disclosed by the business reports of  the bank 
is that during the whole of  the first period a  10 per cent share in the net 
profits was paid  to its founders.  Another  circumstance worth recording 
is that at  the ordinary general meeting held in 1860 a shareholder expresser1 
the desire that (p. 3 of  the minutes)  "in the future the dividends of  the 
bank should be determined by the board of  management, and not by the 
general meeting." 
104.  For  the other reductions and increases,  see  the Jubilee  Business 
Report of  the Mitteldeutsche Credit-Bank for 1905 (1856-1906),  page 2. 
105. Syndicates of  private bankers existed earlier. 
106.  A syndicate under the leadership of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft was 
formed among the Berlin bankers and banking firms during the same year 
(1859) in order to take over a part of  the jo,ooo,ooo-thaler  loan necessary 
for the mobilization of  the Prussian arniy; this was the first step toward 
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the formation of  the so-called "Prussian Syndicate."  (See Jubilee Report 
of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, p. 29.)  (See above, p. 62.) 
107  Nevertheless the business report of  the Darmstadter Bank as early 
as 1862 (pp. I 1-12),  and the reports following, contained a list of  the classes 
of  securities and their amounts, the amounts of  former years being added 
for comparison.  The list comprised  (I) American bonds,  (2) government 
securities  and lottery  tickets,  (3)  preference  bonds,  (4)  railway  bonds, 
(5)  note-issuing  banks'  stock,  (6)  credit  and discount banks'  shares,  (7) 
stock in shipping companies, (8) municipal and mortgage bonds. 
108.  See, for example, the business report of  the Darmstadter Bank for 
1855,  paxe  6:  "We  can  not,  however,  promise  rapid  successes  in  this 
direction  (industry)  *  *  *  and can not satisfy oversanguine views." 
Business  report  for  1857,  page  2: "The  excessive  expectations  which 
swindlers have based  on these new developments (the 'Industrial Banks') 
will certainly not be fulfilled." 
~q.  Felix  Hecht, Bankwesen  und  Bankpolitik  in  den  siiddeutschen 
Staaten, 1819-1875  (Jena, Gustav Fischer,  1880), page 172 
110.  Particularly  through  the revolution  of  1848, the war  with  Den- 
mark in 1849, the Russian-Turkish war of  1853, the Crimean war of  1854, 
the Austrian  war  against  Italy of  1859, the American  war  of  secession, 
1861-1 865, the French-Mexican war  of  I 861-1 867,  the  Austrian-~rissian 
campaign against  Denmark,  1864, and the Prussian war  against Austria 
and her allies in 1866. 
I 11. Especially through the crises of  1856, 1857, and 1866. 
Part III. 
I. Law relating to the coining of  imperial gold coins, December 4, I 87 I ; 
coinage law of  July 9,  1873, with  additions of  July 9,  1873, January 6, 
1876,  and June  I,  1900; law  relating  to the issue  of  imperial  treasury 
notes of  April 30, 1874; supplementary law of  June 5, 1906 (section relating 
to  10-mark and 5-mark notes); and  decree  concerning  the  introduction 
of  the imperial gold standard of  September 22,  1875. 
2.  1,aw relating to the constitution of  law courts of  January 27,  1877, 
and May  17, 1898; civil procedure law of  January 30,  1877, and May  17, 
1898; criminal  procedure  law  of  February  I,  1877; bankruptcy  law of 
February 10, 1877, and May 17, 1898, law concerning matters of  voluntary 
jurisdiction  (freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit) of  May I 7,  I 898. 
3.  Military  service law of  November 9,  1867, with supplementary  laws 
of February 11, 1888, February 8, 1890, and April 15, 1905; military law of 
May 2,  1874, amended by the laws of  May 6,  1880, March I I, 1887, January 
27,  1890, May  26,  1893, March 25,  1899, and partly through the code of 
civil law;  the control law of  February I 5, 1875, law concerning voluntary 
jurisdiction  (freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit) in the army and navy of  May 28, 
1901, and decree of  February 20, 1890, military penal code of  June 20, 1872; 
military criminal procedure law of  December I, 1898. National  Monetary  Commission 
4.  Bank  law  of  March  14,  1875,  with  amendments  of  December  18, 
1889, June 7, 1899, and June I, 1909; statutes of  the Reichsbank, May 21, 
1875, with  decree  of  September  3,  1900; law  concerning  the issuing  oi 
bank notes of  December 21,  1874, law of  February 20, 1906, regardingthe 
issue of bank notes in denominations of  20  and 50 marks. 
5.  Section  125 et seq. of  the constitution of  law courts act, and act as 
to seat of  the supreme court (Reichsgericht) dating I ~th  April, 1877. 
6.  The words which were here added in the second edition, "combined 
with the victorious advance of  large-scale manufacture in almost all branches 
of  industry,"  had to be struck out after the publication of  the statistical 
material in  the essay of  A.  Saucke: "Hat neuerdings  der Grossbetrieb  auf 
Kosten  des  Kleinbetriebs  in  der  deutschen  Industrie  zugenommen?" 
(Has large-scale industry recently increased in Germany at the expense of 
small-scale industry ?)  (Conrad's Jabrbucher, I11 series, vol. 3  I, pp. 222- 
223);  for  although in certain  branches  large-scale  production  doubtless 
increased  greatly  at the cost  of  small-scale  production  even during the 
second period, yet these statistics prove that in German industry (subject 
to accident insurance) as a whole, an increase of  large-scale production at 
the expense of  small-scale production has not taken place,  "at least not 
during the fifteen years from 1888-1903,"  that is to say, during a consider- 
able part of  the second period.  In agriculture, it is true, the number and 
area of the great  landed  properties have greatly increased,  especially in 
East  Prussia;  the  small  and  middle  sized  farms,  however,  show  the 
greatest increase. 
7.  See Ludwig Pohle, loc. cit., pp.  140-141,  and the table printed there. 
8. See  Ernst  von  Halle,  Die  Deutsche  Volkswirtschaft  an  der Jahr- 
hundertwende  (Berlin,  Ernst  Siegfr.  Mittler  &  Sohn,  ~goz),  p.  73. 
According to the statistical annual for the German Empire (tm-enty-ninth 
year, 1908), p. 26, Tab. 13 d., and p. 25, note I, the oversea emigration of 
Germans via German and foreign ports in 1907 amounted to 31,696 persons, 
whereas  the immigration via German  ports into Germany  amounted  to 
217,812 persons. 
g.  See table in Ludwig Pohle, loc. cit., p.  146, under 11. 
10.  See Materialien zur Reurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutsch- 
lands in1 letzten Menschenalter (supplementary Volume 111 of  the German 
Finance Reform Bills of  1908), p. 50. 
11.  See W. Sombart, Der   nod erne Kapitalismus.  11, p. 214. 
12.  In the Palatinate  (Bavarian), according to Emil Herz, loc. cit., p. 
44,  the developnlent proceeded on the same lines.  Thus the number  of 
inhabitants of  Kaiserslautern was 48,306 in 1900, as compared to 8,250 in 
1842; that of  Pirmasens was 30,194 in 1900, as compared to 6,410 in 1842. 
13. See  report  of  Die  Aeltesten  der  Kaufmannschaft  in  the Berliner 
Jahrbuch fur Handel und Industrie for 1904, I, p. 26. 
14. -4d. Wagner, Zur Methodik der Statistik des Volkseinkomnlens und 
Volksvermogens  (in  the  Zeitschrift  des  Kgl.  Preuss.  Statist.  Bureaus, 
forty-fourth year, 1904, p. 41-122),  and in his expert report to the Imperial 
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Treasury, published on the occasion of  the German Finance Reform  Bills 
of November,  1908 (No.  1043), in the "Materialien  zur  Beurteilung der 
Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands irn letzten Menschenalter,"  under 11, 
pp. 122-132. 
15.  A calculation of  this kind made solely on the basis of  population is, 
open to objection, however, because different conditions prevail in different 
parts of  Germany. 
16.  In the Grenzboten, No.  28, of  July 9, 1908, pp. 55-57. 
17.  In the "Woche"  of  August  23,  1906, No.  34 (also in the Konserv- 
ative Monatsschrift of  October, 1908). 
18.  In  the  "Tagliche  Rundschau"  of  1908,  No.  541  Individual 
incomes are computed in this case on the basis of  insurance statistics. 
19. "Zur  Reichsfinanzreform,"  Berlin  (October),  1908.  Here,  too, 
insurance statistics are made the starting point  for  the estimate of  the 
value of  various kinds of  property;  similarly in the essay, "  350 Milliarden 
deutsches Volksvermogen"  (Berlin, Otto Elsner, 1909) 
20.  Differences of  many billions of  marks are also found in examining 
the several  items.  Thus, the value of  capital invested in foreign enter- 
prises and in foreign securities during 1904-1905 is estimated at  a minimum 
of  24,000,000,000  to 25,000,000,000 marks in the memorial of  the aJmiralty 
of  December,  1905,  "Die  Entwicklung  der deutschen  Seeinteressen  im 
letzten Jahrzehnt," and by Ballod likewise at  25,000,000,000  marks, whereas 
Steinmann-Bucher  estimates  the  amount  at ~o,ooo,ooo,ooo  marks.  It 
must  also be borne in mind  here  that in  1892-93 the  Prussian  Finance 
Minister  von  Miquel  estimated  the  amount  of  Prussian  capital  alone 
invested  in  foreign  securities  at 15,ooo,ooo,mo  nlarks  (Abgeordenten- 
Haus. I 7 Legisl. Session, 5th sess., appendix to the stenographic reports No. 6, 
pp. 535-536), an amount that was excessive.  The "Deutscher Oekonomist" 
of  June 27,  1908  places the amount of  foreign securities in German hands 
at ~o,ooo,ooo,ooo  to 15,ooo,ooo,ooo marks, Sombart (Deutsche Volkswirt- 
schaft,  ad  ed.,  p.  416)  at 12,500,000,000 to 13,000,000,000 marks.  The 
value of  German capital in foreign enterprises is estimated in the admir- 
nlty  memorial  mentioned  above at 7,7oo,000,000  to 9,200,000,000 marks 
(1905)~  and the value of  German capital invested in foreign securities at 
a minimum of  16,ooo,00o,ooo  marks. 
21.  Thus it is evident, in particular,  that in the income-tax laws of  the 
various  German  Federal  States possessing a  general  and  direct  income 
tax quite different principles exist for declaration, assessment, and control 
of incomes, as well as for the exemption of  small incomes from taxation, 
and that in regard to the computation of  the value of  property not subject 
to income  tax,  other  great  divergences  may  arise.  It need  hardly  be 
emphasised that in this case as well, a simple calculation of  the German 
figures on the basis of  the Prussian results, and according to the propor- 
tion of  population, is open to objection.  Steinmann-Bucher, in his latest 
work  (350 Milliarden deutsches Volksvermogen, Berlin,  ~gog),  places the 
German national income at not less than 35,000,000,000 marks (p. 107) National  Monetary  Commission 
22.  Grundriss, 6th ed., vol. 11, p.  184 (at the end). 
23.  This  includes  an  amount  of  15o,ooo,ooo marks  for  annual  new 
deposits in  cooperative banks  ("Genossenschaftsbanken"),  which,  being 
mostly made by owners of  capital under 6,000 marks, are generally exempt 
from  the tax on capital.  This gives for Prussia  1,850,000,000 marks, or 
(computed at three-fifths for  the wliole Empire)  3,o80,000,000 marks for 
Germany.  This amount is further increased  by the annual new  deposits 
in the savings banks  (which as a rule  are also exempt from  the tax on 
capital)  of  6~0,000,ooo  marks  (conservatively estimated), which, without 
counting property  not assessed for  the tax on capital, gives the amount 
quoted above, of  3,700,000,000 marks  The author proves this calculation 
by pointing out that there is an annual issue of  stock exchange securities to 
the value of  3,15o,ooo,ooo to 3,200,000,000 marks. 
24.  This applies especially to the estimate of  the French national wealth 
made  by  Mulhall  (1895)  at 198,000,000,000, by  de  Foville  (1902)  at 
161,600,000.000, by  Yves  Guyot  at ~~o,~oo,ooo,ooo  marks,  by  Leroy- 
Beaulieu  (1906)  at 205,000,000,000 to  210,000,000,000  marks,  and  by 
Edmond Thery ("1,es  Progres 6conomiques de la France,"  6th ed., Paris, 
1908, p. 322  seq.)  for  the year  1906 at 201,000,000,000 francs, equaling 
161  ,ooo,ooo,ooo marks. 
The  French  national  income  was  estimated  by  Leroy-Beaulieu  at 
20,000,000,000 marks. 
The same is true of  the national wealth  of  Great Britain and Ireland, 
estimated by Sir Robt. Giffen (1885) at about 204,500,000,000 marks, by 
Mulhall (1895) at  about 235,000,000,000  marks, and by L. G. Chiozza Money 
(in  1908 for  1902-3)  at about 228,000,000,000 marks.  In all probability 
the same is true of  the official estiniate (evidently very conservative) made 
in 1904 of  the "true value" of  the national wealth of  the United States of 
America  (with about Sg,ooo,ooo inhabitants), which is given by the Cen- 
sus Office of  the Department of  Commerce and Labor as $107,ooo,mo,ooo, 
or 43o,~o,om,ooo  marks, for 1904. 
Under  such circumstances,  owing to the complete difference of  bases, 
principles,  and statistical methods, any comparison  of  these foreign esti- 
niates  with  German  estimates of  national  wealth  and income  would  bc 
still more  objectionable, although such comparisons  (with  the necessary 
reservations) are occasionally desirable and useful in many directions. 
25.  According  to the above-mentioned  Appendix 111  to  the Gerrnan 
finance reform bills of  1908: Materialien  zur Beurteilung der Wohlstands- 
entwicklung Deutschlands  in1  letzteu Menschenalter,  pp.  4-15;  but with 
the reservations mentioned above, and on pp. 2 to 4 of  the "  Materialien." 
26.  See especially Appendix IV, of  the Reichstagsdrucksachen, No.  1887: 
Materialien  zur  Beurteiluug  der  Zusammenhiinge  zwischen  dem  offent- 
lichen Schuldenwesen U.  dem Kapitalmarkt, pp. 247-249. 
27.  Jahrbuch fur Handel und Industrie, 1907, vol. I, p. 213. 
28.  See page 248  of  the "Materialien,"  cited  in  Note  26:  "The exact 
amount  of  the very  considerable  capital  that  has migrated  abroad for 
investment in securities can not be estimated even approxi~nately." 
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29.  Deutscher  Oekonomist  of  June  27,  1908  (twenty-sixth year),  page 
395, where objections are also raised  against the employment of  the table 
described in the text. 
30,  Appendix to the Reichstagsdrucksachen No.  1087 of 1908, pp.  247 
and 248 
31.  See  appendix to  the Bank Inquiry,  1908-9:  Zur Frage der Emis- 
sionsstatistik, Berlin, 1909, pp. 6-7. 
32.  See inter alia: Ernst v. Halle:  Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft an der 
Jahrhundertwende,  Berlin,  1902,  pp.  56-57,  and  Mor.  Stroll,  loc.  cit., 
P  '94. 
33.  In the Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preussischen Statistischen Biireaus, forty- 
fourth  year,  1904,  page  92.  In that  passage  Ad.  UTagner avoids  the 
expression which he repeatedly  uses in his essay:  "Die Reichsfinanznot," 
Berlin,  1908 (for instance, pp.  13-14  and 41), where he speaks of  the ele- 
ments  or  classes  "enriching  themselves"  (instead  of  "the  elements,  or 
classes who have become richer"),  words which convey  the idea that the 
very fact of  growing richer  is a reproach, an utterance which, while cor- 
responding  to a strong  popular  impression,  is  not on that account  any 
more correct.  It  is also stated (p. 23), "that the middle as well as the upper 
classes ought not only to be compelled to pay the same amount of  taxes 
in proportion  to their  capacity, especially as measured  by  their  income, 
as the lower  classes, but  that they  should  pay  proportionately  more." 
This  statement  should  be  compared  with  the proof  given  (for  Prussia 
only, and not for the whole Empire) by the Prussian Minister of  Finance 
Freiherr  von Rheinbaben  in the Prussian  Lower  I-Iouse  on January  20, 
I 909  (" Reichsanzeiger,"  January  2 I, ~gog),  which has been  amply con- 
firmed by the official verification  of  the results of  the assessment  for the 
Prussian income tax of  1908 (1st suppl. of  the "Rei~hsanzei~er"  of  Feb- 
ruary  11,  1909,  No  36).  According  to  this  statement  there  were,  in 
1908, 17,957,848 persons completely exempt from taxation  (their iucon~es 
not exceeding 900 marks), or 42.22 per cent of  the population, which in 1908 
numbered 38,026,556 souls.  Of the balance  of the population, 16,176,674, 
or 42.54  per  cent of  the Prussian population, were assessed  in the lowest 
group of income taxpayers (with incomes over 900 and less than 3,000 marks) : 
this class paid a total of 83,752,973 marks, or 34.26 per cent of  the whole 
assessed  amount  of  income  tax.  Thus  there  remained  only  2,000,000 
(1,916,901), equal to 5.5 per cent of  the population, who paid not less than 
66 per cent of  the entire income tax.  Out of these 2,000,000, the persons 
having an income of  over 9,500 marks constituted only 0.87 per cent of  the 
population, while paying 43 per cent of  the entire income tax.  To this the 
municipal taxation must be added, so that, as far as Prussia is concerned 
(and similar conditions probably prevailed  in other Federal States), there 
is no ground for Wagner's statement that it may be doubted, whether taxa- 
tion according to capacity is realized in the legislation of  the Empire, Fed- 
eral States, and municipalities.  Trade,  commerce,  and industry, which National  Monetary  Commission 
pay  by far the greatest  part  of  the taxes, are also  burdened  with  the 
tremendous burden put on them by "social"  legislation. 
34.  "Die  Reicllsfinanznot  U.  die  Pflichten  des  Deutschen  Volks  wie 
seiner politischen  Parteien.  Bin htahnwort  eines alten Mannes"  (Berlin, 
Puttkammer & Muhlbrecht,  1908), p.  14. 
35  See  inter  alia  the  minutes  of  the meetings  of  the Bank  Inquiry 
Commission, concerning points 111-V  of  the list of  questions;  1909, p. 86. 
36.  Thus in Prussia,  according  to the Reichsanzeiger  of  February  11, 
1909, from  1907 to 1908 alone the income-tax-paying population increased 
in the proportion of  4,445 to 4,758. 
37.  According to the calculations of  R. E. May  (in Schmoller's  Jahrb. 
f. Gesetzgebung  U.  Verwaltung,  1899, pp.  271-314)  the follomring condi- 
tions prevailed  in the German Empire at the end of  the nineties:  About 
one-half of  the total national income, or 12,750,000,000  marks, belonged to 
that part of  the earning population (18% millions) possessing incomes below 
900 marks, a little more than one-fourth of  the total national income, or 
6,~oo,ooo,ooo  marks,  belonged  to  that  part  of  the  earning  population 
(3.f  millions)  possessing  incomes  from  900  to  3,000  marks; and  not 
quite  a  quarter  of  the total  national  income,  or  5,750,000,ooo  marks, 
belonged to that part of  the earning population  (one-third  million)  pos- 
sessing incomes exceeding 3,000 marks. 
38. Grundriss, 11, pp. 460-461. 
39. Volume 111  of  the Appendix to the German finance reform bills of 
1908: Materialien  zur  Beurteilung  der  Wohlstandsentwicklung  Deutsch- 
lands im  letzten Menschenalter  (No.  1043 of  the Parliamentary publica- 
tions of  1908), pp.  14-15,  according  to the Reichsanzeiger  of  February 
11,  1909,  the  assessed  taxable  income  of  this  group  amounted  to 
5,450,975,235 marks. 
40.  Ibid. 
41.  Walter Troeltsch, ~ber  die neuesten  Veranderungen  im  deutschen 
Wirtschaftsleben,  p.  144.  At  the same  time  it remains  true that,  as 
already mentioned  (footnote 33) in Prussia  in  1908 there were still about 
18,ooo,ooo sods, or 47.22 per  cent of  the population of  about 38,ooo,ooo, 
exempt from  taxation, and  that of  the balance,  16,ooo,ooo, or 42.54  per 
cent, were assessed in the lowest income tax group (with incomes exceeding 
900 marks and below 3,000 marks). 
42.  With the (rather unimportant)  reservations made on p.  17 of  the 
Materialien  zur  Beurteilung  der  Wohlstandsentwicklung  Deutschlands 
im letzten Menschenalter, already cited several times. 
43.  Allowance has to be made, of  course, for the fact that one person 
may have several savings bank books. 
44.  For  the  period  between  1891-1897  see  Walter  Troeltsch,  Ueber 
die  neuesten  Veranderungen  im  Deutschen  Wirtschaftsleben,  p.  197; 
for  1904 and  1906, Statistisches Jahrbuch  f.  d.  Preuss.  Staat fur  1908 
(Berlin,  ~gog),  p. 144; for 1907 the "  Materialien"  quoted in note 42. 
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45.  In 1908 there were 169 credit banks with a capital of at  least ~,ooo,ooo 
marks each. 
46.  See p. 2 I of  the "  Materialien,"  quoted in note 42. 
47.  That is, from 1880 till the end of  1905. 
48.  Statist. Jahrbuch.  f.  d. Deutsche Reich (twenty-ninth year,  1908), 
pp.  46-47,  and H.  v.  Scheel,  Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft am Schlusse 
des 19.  Jahrhunderts  (Berlin,  1900, Puttkammer & Muhlbrecht), p.  91. 
49.  Materialien  zur  Beurteilung  der  Wohlstandsentwicklung  Deutsch- 
lands, pp. 46-47.  According to Von Halle (loc. cit., pp. 48-49)  the total 
amount  of  power  developed  by engines in all  the works in  Germany in 
1895 was only about 3,500,ooo horsepower. 
50.  For 1843 see above, p. 33, for 1895 and 1907 see the Statist. Korre- 
spondenz of  February 3,  1909  (Year XXXV), p. 2. 
5  I. For the census of  occupations of  1895 see Paul Voigt,  Deutschland 
U.  der  Weltmarkt,  Preussische  Jahrbucher,  vol.  91  (January  and April, 
1898), p. 271. 
52.  Geh.  0ber.-Reg.-Rat  Dr.  Traugott  Miiller,  Industriestaat  oder 
Agrarstaat?  Ein  Beitrag  zur wirtschaftlichen  Wertschatzung  der deut- 
schen  Landwirtschaft  (in  Mentzel  and von  Lengerke's  Landwirtschaft- 
licher  Hulfs- und Schreibkalender, 55th year,  1902,  Part 11, pp.  55-85). 
53. See Statistisches Jahrbuch f. d. Deutsche Reich  (29th year),  1908, 
p. 27 '  5,558,317 agricultural establishments in 1895 (last census published), 
as  compared to 5,276,344 in 1882. 
54.  Ibid., 43,243,742 hectares (I ha =  about 2%  acres) in 1895 as com- 
pared to 40,178,681 in 1882. 
55. Ibid.,  p.  39,  tab.  IV: Live stock in the Federal States according 
to the census of  1907.  The figures show that the number of  sheep de- 
creased from 24,999,406 at the beginning of  1873, to 9,692,501 at the end 
of  1900, and 7,681,072 at the end of  1907, whereas the number of  horses 
increased from 3,352,231 at the beginning of  1873 to 4,195,361 at  the end 
of  1900, and to 4,337,263 at  theend of  1907; cattle increased from 15,776,702 
to 18,939,692 at the end of  1900, and 20,589,856 at the end of  1907; pigs 
from 7,124,088 to 16,807,014 at the end of  1900,  and to 2~,o80,008  at  the 
end of  1907, or more than threefold. 
56.  While the average prices  of  wheat rose  about 60 per  ent,  of  rye 
about 69 per cent, and of  barley about 90 per cent in the old provinces of 
Prussiain the periods 1831-1840 to 1871-1880, they fell again (see'I'roeltsch, 
loc. cit., pp. 32 and 36) despite high corn duties, which were introduced in 
1879, raised in 1887, but reduced again by the commercial treaties of  1892 
and 1894.  Compared  to the prices of  1876-1880  the prices of  wheat in 
Prussia fell during 1881-1885  10 per cent, 1886-1890  20 per cent, 1896 36 
per cent;  the prices of  rye,  1881-1885  4 per  cent, 1886-1890  15 per cent, 
1896 29  per  cent;  the prices of  barley,  1881-1885  7 per  cent,  1886-1890 
I7 per cent, 1896 2 I per cent 
57.  According  to Troeltsch  (loc.  cit.,  p.  44),  in the agricultural  com- 
munes of Prussia there was an increase of  registered mortgages amounting National  Monetary  Commission 
to 190,000,000 marks  per  annum,  or  a  total  increase  of  2,100,000,000 
marks, between  1896 and 1907.  The indebtedness of  the farmers of  126 
Wiirttemberg rural communities increased  40 per cent between  1874 and 
1894.  In this connection Troeltsch  establishes the fact, frequently  cor- 
roborated  elsewhere,  that  80-90  per  cent  of  the mortgage  debts were 
due to the fact that persons acquiring an estate (by purchase or inherit- 
ance) were compelled,  either by insufficiency of  capital  or  by excessive 
demands of  CO-heirs to incur  excessive  obligations.  This evil was aug- 
mented  by overestimation  of  land values,  due to an unhealthy develop- 
ment in the prices of  land. 
58.  Much can and must yet be done to increase agricultural  production; 
on the one hand, by the agricultural exploitation of  the heaths that still 
exist  in considerable  size, especially in the northwest  of  Germany; and 
on  the other  hand,  by the drainage  and cultivation  of  the moors  that 
cover some  500  German square  miles,  400  of  which  could  be  reclaimed 
for  purposes  of  agricultural  cultivation,  This  work,  however,  can  not 
he carried out without a considerable extension of  the present  railways 
and canals.  Unfortunately,  however,  the building  of  the latter is  often 
opposed  by  agriculturists  themselves.  (See Max  Schinkel in the steno- 
graphic reports  of  the Bank  Inquiry Commission, points  111-V  of  the 
question sheet, p. 77.) 
59. This,  of  course,  ought not to be carried too far, as it may lead to 
endless sophistries in favour of  agriculture, such as are presented by some 
authors (see  Traugott Miiller,  loc. cit., p. GI), who include even railway, 
postal, and telegraph enterprises under agricultural undertakings, the em- 
ployees consequently being classified under the heading of  "  those engaged 
in agriculture as a secondary occupation." 
60.  In direct contrast to trade, industry, etc., in which the number of 
independent persons decreased  I 2.6 per  I ,000 during the same p:riod,  and 
the number of  persons in a dependent position increased 30.5 per 1,000. 
61.  See Ludwig Pohle, loc. cit., p. 22;  also his Deutschland am Scheide- 
wege (Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1902), p. 43 seq. 
62.  The statement  frequently  made,  that agriculture,  and agriculture 
only,  creates  new  values,  is incorrect.  "Values"  that  are  completely 
new can not be produced by agriculture either, since at any rate such seed 
as is not produced  by national agriculture forms the basis  of  that activity 
to the same degree that raw materials form the basis of  industrial activity. 
Thus in agricultural as well as in industrial activity (different as they may 
be in detail),  the process is always one of  transformation  or  refinement, 
which in both  cases merely  increases the value  of  preexisting  material. 
If,  therefore, agriculture  and industry are included  in  the "productive 
occupations,"  trade should  be included therein  by the same  right, since 
its value-increasing  activity  consists  in the transfer  of  goods  from  dis- 
tricts where the supply is great to districts where  the demand  is great, 
independent  of  whether  the goods meanwhile  undergo  additional manu- 
facture  or  not.  (See,  among  other  authors: Richard  Ehrenberg,  Der 
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Handel,  seine wirtschaftliche  Bedeutung,  seine  nationalen  Pflichten  und 
sein Verhaltnis zum Staate, Jena,  Gustav Fischer,  1887.) 
63.  Ludw.  Pohle, loc. cit., p.  23.  Max Sering, Handels-  und Machtpo- 
litik,  Stuttgart, 1900  (J. G.  Cotta Nachflg.,  vol.  11,  p.  5),  does  not go 
nearly so far, when he points out that "as early as the beginning  of  the 
fifties, Germany imported more rye, and since the middle of  the seventies 
more wheat, than she supplied to foreign countries."  In 1860 the excess 
of  rye imports amounted to some 259,000 tons. 
64.  Werner Sombart, Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,  and ed., p.  411. 
65.  Huber is right when he says (loc. cit., p.  IO~),  regarding the German 
textile  industry,  that  the whole  export  trade  depends  on  the oversea 
supply of  wool and cotton. 
66.  See  Werner  Sombart,  Die  Deutsche  Volkswirtschaft,  2nd  ed., 
p. 447:  "The piece de resistance of  the German exports consists to-day of 
high-class manufactured  goods, containing great labor value (Arbeitswert) 
and little land value  (Bodenwert).  Germany,  consequently, pays in an 
~  -. 
increasing measure for foreign soil with home labour." 
67. Statist. Jahrb. f. d.  Deutsche Reich of  1909, Appendix, page 153.  The 
special trade exports comprise, since March I, 1906, the exports from the 
customs  area  (Wirtschaftsgebiet), including  domestic produce  (exported 
under the supervision of  the customs authorities and subject to excise or 
stamp duties), such as beer,  spirits,  salt, sparkling wines,  playing-cards 
tobacco,  and sugar; as well  as the exports from the customs area, after 
further manufacture for home account.  The customs area in the sense of 
these new  statistics comprises  the German  Empire  (without Heligoland 
and some communes in Baden), the Grand Duchy of  Luxemburg, and the 
Austrian conlmunes of  Jungholz and Mittelberg. 
The  imports for  home  consumption  comprise,  on  the one hand,  the 
imports into  the free  commerce  of  this  customs  area,  directly  or  with 
cockets, including imports from free districts, bonded warehouscs, etc., as 
well  as  the  imports  of  goods  for  shipbuilding, etc.,  and  the  supplies 
~  - 
of  foreign  goods for  German  ships outward bound; on the other  hand, 
merchandise  imported  into  the customs  area  for  the  purpose  of  being 
further manufactured for home account (ibid., p. 124). 
68. If  it were  possible to compare the figures given  by Rau with the 
present-day official import and export statistics (which in the absence of 
agreement  of  geographic  areas,  of  bases  and  methods  of  calculation  is 
impossible) it would appear that German export trade, as well as German 
import trade, had increased between  1842 and 1907 thirteenfold, while the 
population of  Germany has not even doubled during the same period. 
69. See Appendix,  Volume  111,  to the Imperial  finance  reform  bill  of 
1908: Materialien  zur  Beurteilung  der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutsch- 
lands im letzten Menschenalter (p. 52). 
70. Only in the case of  food and cattle was there a decrease in exports, 
namely,  by  20.2 per  cent,  while  the imports  increased  131 7  per  cent 
(ibid.). National  Monetary  Commission 
71  For details, see page 43 of  the Appendix, Volume 111, to the Impe- 
rial finance reform bill of  1908 
72  Ibid ,  pages 37-38  and 53 
73.  A permanent adverse balance of  payment is altogether impossible-- 
that is to say, it would mean bankruptcy. 
74  In that case, and in that case only, will Ludwig Pohle's fears prove 
unfounded  (loc  clt ,  p  26), that "the increase in the absorptive capacity 
of  the home market denotes a constant growth of  Germany's  dependence 
on foreign countries, instead of  an increase in her economic independence 
75  Engel, in Zeitschrift des Statist  Bureaus, Berlin, 1875, v01  4, p  356 
76  W  Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, 11, p  16 
77  Engel, loc  cit ,  p  457 et seq 
78  Deutscher Oekonomist,  1885, ~1st  Feb , p  72 
79.  Van der Borght's  essay:  "Aktiengesellschaften"  in the Handwor- 
terbuch der Staatswissenschaften  (Jena,  1899, Gust  Fischer), Vol  I, pp 
192-193 
80.  With reference to the distribution by the different branches, see par- 
ticularly  Ed  Wagon,  "  Die  finanzielle  Entwicklung  deutscher  Aktien- 
gesellschaften von  1870-1900''  (Jena,  1903, Gust  Fischer), especially pp 
41 et seq , 56 et seq , 62  et seq , 73 et seq , 107 set seq. 
81  As  late as 1883 there were only  104 machine building  companies, 
with 193,240,000 marks capital 
82  From  1870-1874,  fifty-nine brewery  companies,  with  a  capital  of 
72,000,000 marks, were founded (Ed  Wagon, loc  cit , p  107) 
83  Deutscher Oekonomist,  1901, 26th January, p  45 
84  See v  Halle, loc  cit ,  p. 94 
85. See Deutscher Oekonomist for 7th Jan , 1905, 6th Jan , 1906, and 
18th Jan , 1908 
86  According to information collected by the Imperial Statistical Office 
the figures were 217 companies, with a capital of  260,700,ooo marks 
87  ~hese  figures are based  on material collected by the Imperial Sta- 
tistical  Office 
88  Ed  Wagon, loc  cit , pp  166-167  (The rate of  dividend, however, 
is reduced in case the stock was bought above par ) 
89  For the interpretation  of  "net income,"  see Ed  Wagon,  loc  cit , 
p  12, Dividend  income, minus the losses given in the balance  sheets, or 
those arising from liquidations and failures 
90  From 1872-1900,  exclusive of  machine factories and railway-supply 
factories 
91  See I,  Glier, Zur neuesten Entwickelung der amerikanischen Eisen- 
industrie, in Schmoller's  Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, etc, 27th year, No. 
3, P  229-230 
92  Statist  Jahrb  f  d  deutsche Reich,  29th  year,  1908  Appendix, 
p  30*,  table  19  In 1908  the German output of  pig iron amounted to 
only 11,805,ooo tons (ibid , 30th year,  1909, Appendix,  p  a8*,  tab  20) 
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93  L  Glier,  Zur  gegenwartigen  Lage der amerikanischen  Eisenindus- 
trie, in Conrad's  Jahrbucher, gd series, v01  31,  p  591 (Feb, 1908). 
94  Henry Voelcker,  Eisen  U  Stahl,  in the  magazine  "Die  Weltwirt- 
schaft,"  ed  by v  Halle, Year 111, 1908, Part 11, p  78  According to the 
Imperial statistics the consumption amounted in 1904 to 166 I kilograms, 
and in 1906 to 197 8 kilograms  per capita  These statistics, in calculat- 
ing the consumption, subtract the exports of  pig iron, but not the exports 
of  iron manufactures, and thus arrive  at a larger  consumption figure per 
capita 
95  See Ludmig Pohle, Die Entwickelung des deutschen Wirtschaftslebens 
im letzten Jahrhundert,  Appendix p  145; Statist  Jahrb  f. d  Deutsche 
Reich,  29th year,  1908,  Appendix,  p  29*,  tab  18 (for  the period  1887- 
1907), for value see  E  Jungst,  "Bergbau,"  in the magazine  "Die  Welt- 
wirtschaft,"  ed  v  Halle, Year  111,  1908, Part 11, p  61  The German 
coal  production  in  1908  amounted  to  148,537,000 tons  (Statist  Jahrb. 
f  d  Deutsche Reich,  30th year,  1909; Appendix, p  27*,  tab  19) 
96  E  Jungst, loc  cit , p  60,  and Statist. Jahrb. f  d  Deutsche Reich, 
30th year, 1909, p  97 
97  Rud  Eberstadt, Der Deutsche Kapitalmarkt, Leipzig, 1901, p  64 
98  Thus in 1894 the Gesellschaft  fur elektr  Unternehmungen  Berlin 
(affiliated  with  the  Union-Elektr -Ges,  Loewe-Group),  1895,  die  Akt - 
Ges  fur  elektr  Anlagen  U  Bahnen,  Dresden  (Kummer), Kontinentale 
Gesellschaft  fur elektr  Unternehmungen  (Schuckert),  Bank  fur elektr 
Unternehmungen,  Zurich  (Allgem  Elektr -Ges); 1896, Deutsche  Ges  f 
elektr  Unternehmungen, Frankfurt a  M  (Lahmeyer) , Schweizerische Ges 
fur  elektr  Industrie  (Siemens  &  Halske);  1897,  Elektrische  Licht-und 
Kraftanlagen  A -G  (Siemens & Halske),  Aktiengesellschaft  fur Elektrizi- 
tatsanlagen  (Helios) ; I 898, Elektra, Dresden  (Schuckert) 
99  On  this and the preceding  subjects, see Friedr  Fasolt, Die sieben 
grossten  deutschen  Elektrizitdtsgesellschaften,  ihre  Entwicklung  und 
Unternehmertatigkeit  Dresden,  1904, also  Jos  Loewe,  Die  elektrotech- 
nische Industrie in. Storungen  im  deutschen  Wirtschaftsleben, Vol  111, 
pp  77-155  (publications of  the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, Vol  CVII), 1903, 
Ed  Wagon, loc  cit , p  73 et seq ; Max  Jorgens,  Finanzielle  Trustgesell- 
schaften  (Stuttgart,  1902,  J. G  Cotta Nachf ), p.  116 et seq ; H  Hasse, 
Die A  E  G. (Heidelberg, Winter, 1903) 
100  1896,  "Siemens"  Elektrische  Betriebe  G  m.  b  H  (Siemens  & 
Halske);  1897,  Elektrizitatslieferungsgesellschaft  (Allgem  Elektrizitats- 
gesellschaft);  1898,  Bayerische  Elektrlzitatswerke  A -G  (Helios), Sud- 
deutsche  Elektrizitatswerke  (Kummer) , A -G  Suddeutsche  elektrische 
Lokalbahnen  (Kummer) ; 1900, Elektrizitats-Werke-Betriebs-Aktiengesell- 
schaft  (Kummer)  All  these  companies  (1896-1900)  were  organized in 
boom  time,  when  the  general  public  took  considerable  interest  in  the 
shares of  such establishments. 
IOI  These figures (taken from E  Budde, Elektrotechnik,  in the serial 
Die Weltwirtschaft, ed  v  Halle, year 111, Part 11, 1908, p  88)  The details National  Monetary  Commission 
here given from the Monatliche Nachrichten iiber den auswartigen Handel 
Deutschlands would seem to require considerable revision according to the 
Statist. Jahrbuch f. d  Deutsche Reich, 29th year, 1908, pp. 157-158  (thus, 
for  instance,  the value  of  the incandescent lamps exported  during  1907 
amounted to 10,478,000 marks and not to 8,382,000 marks, etc.). 
102. See Ed. Wagon, loc. cit , p. 62;  Geh. Ober-Reg.-Rat  Gust. Muller, 
Die chemische Industrie, Leipzig, 1909, B  G. Teubner.  As  far as the fol- 
lowing statements have been taken from the reports on the administration 
of  the chenlical trade association we  must not forget that this association, 
which was established on the basis of  the accident insurance act of  the 6th 
of  July, 1884, requiring the employer to insure his workmen against acci- 
dents happening to them while in his employ, includes many minor trades 
which are not, strictly speaking, chemical.  These are the illuniinant, fat, 
soap, and oil trades; also the salt works, so far as they do not belong to 
miners'  associations (Knappschaftsverbande) established  under  the  laws 
of  the several States.  In addition to these are the roof  felt and roofing- 
paper factories, manufacturers of  rubber and gutta-percha goods, the pre- 
serving works, with the excepcion of  those chiefly occupied in preserving 
wood; finally, the artificial  mineral-water trade.  (See Gustav Muller, loc. 
cit., p. 27.) 
103. Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich, 29th year, 1908, p. 47. 
104. See Richard Brauer, Chemische Industrie, in the annual Die n'elt- 
wirtschaft, ed. v. Halle, Year 111, 1908, Part 11, p. 91. 
105. The totals given by Richard Brauer, loc. cit., p. 91,  are incorrect 
as they  are stated in metric  tons  of  1,000 kilograms  instead  of  metric 
quintals of  ~oo  kilogran~s. Moreover, his import and export figures seem 
to include articles which are either used not exclusively or not at all in the 
Gernlan chemical industry. 
106. Ibid., p. 91. 
107 See Rich. Brauer, loc. cit., p. 92. 
108. Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich, 29th year, 1908, p. 47. 
109.  Ludwig  Pohle,  Die Entwicklung  des deutschen  Wirtschaftslebens 
im letzten Jahrhundert, p.  70 seq., especially pp. 72-73. 
I 10. Loc. cit., p. 77. 
111. Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich, 29th year,  1908, pp. 46 and 47. 
I 12.  This includes State railways,  railways  administered on account of 
the State, and purely private railways. 
113. Statist. Jahrb. fur das Deutsche Reich, 29th year, 1908, p.  113. 
I 14. Statist. Jahrb. fur das Deutsche Reich,  1906, p. 66.  At the end of 
1903  this  network  comprised  52,814.2  kilometres  (ibid.,  1905,  p.  62); 
g49,290,0cm travellers  and 390,741,000  tons of  goods  were  conveyed  on 
the standard gauge main and branch lines during 1903 (ibid.,  1905, p.  64, 
tab. zd). 
115. Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich, 30th year, 1909, p. 115, tab. zd. 
116.  W. Sombart, Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,  and ed., p.  267. 
I 17. Statist. Jahrb.  f. d. Deutsche Reich, 30th year, p.  I 18. 
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118. Ibid., p.  117, tab. 3. 
119. Ibid., p.  112, tab. I~. 
120.  Ibid., p.  112, tab. I~,  and p. 111, tab. I&. 
121. Ibid., p. 111. 
122. According to the memorial presented to the Reichstag on the occa- 
sion  of  the naval  bill  of  1899, entitled  "Die  Steigerung  der  deutschen 
Seeinteressen von  1896 bis 1898," which contains the above estimate, the 
total value of  the German merchant marine had increased  from  1896 to 
the end of  1899 by 66% per cent.  The sum required to replace the German 
merchant marine in case of  its loss might therefore be estimated in 1899 at 
least at 750,000,000 marks (p. 147).  A further increase of  14 per cent of 
steamships took place during the next year, sailing vessels decreasing  by 
3 per cent.  The value of  the German mercantile fleet at the end of  1900 
might therefore be estimated at  64o,ooo,o00  to 650,000,om marks.  Accord- 
ing  to  the  memorial  of  the  Imperial  Admiralty quoted  above,  dated 
December,  1905, the value of  the German merchant marine at the end of 
1905 amounted to 81o,ooo,ooo marks, as stated in the text, while the cost 
of  replacing  it would  considerably  exceed  ~,ooo,ooo,ooo  marks.  Accord- 
ing to the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, ed. 1904 to 1905, 
I and 11, the iollowing number of  German joint-stock  shipping companies 
existed at the end of  1903: One hundred  and five joint-stock  companies 
with  a  share  capital  of  415,019,ooo  marks,  and  outstanding  bonds  of 
127,824,000 marks.  The amount of  share and loan capital of  the joint- 
stock  companies  in  Haniburg  and  Bremen  alone  amounted,  according 
to  the  memorial  of  the  admiralty  (December,  1905)  quoted  above,  to 
443,000,ooo marks, against a73,ooo,ooo marks at  the end of  1899. 
123. Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich, 1908, p.  108. 
124. See Emil  Fitger, Ein Jahrzehnt in Schiffsbau, Reederei  und  See- 
schiffahrt, Berlin, Leonh. Simion Nachfolger, p. 22. 
125. See  the  memorial  of  the  admiralty,  December,  1905,  already 
quoted,  p.  94;  Ernst  von  Halle,  Die  Entwicklung  und  Bedeutung der 
deutschen  Reederei  (Handels-  und  Machtpolitik,  Vol.  11,  pp.  129-174, 
Stuttgart, J. G. Cotta's  Nachf., 1900); and Reederei  U.  Schiffahrt, in the 
annual Die Weltwirtschaft, ed.  von  Halle, year 111, 1908, part I, Internat. 
Uebersichten,  p. 83 seq. 
126. See Emil Fitger, loc. cit., pp. 49, 55, and 56-61. 
127. Statist. Jahrb.  fiir  d.  Deutsche  Reich,  30th  year,  1909,  p.  140, 
tab. 13. 
128. See Emil Fitger, .oc.  cit. pp. 61, 64-68. 
129.  See  B.  Huldermann,  Subventionen  der  auslandischen  Handels- 
flotten (Berlin, 1900, Ernst Siegfr. Mittler & Sohn), p. 39. 
130.  It  raiseditscapitalin 18j3, 1865, 1867, 1868, 1870, 1871, 1872, 1874, 
1875 (in 1877 the capital was reduced), 1887, 1888, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900, 
and 1905. 
131.  Regarding the development of  other large German shipping com- 
panies see \lT.  Sombart, Die deutsclle Volkswirtschaft,  2nd ed.,  Appendix Natioaal  Monetary  Commission 
26, p. 544.  Among the other German shipping companies are the following: 
Deutsche  Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft  Kosmos;  Deutsche Levante-Linie; 
Deutsch-Ostafrika-Linie; Hamburg-Siidamerikanische Dampfergesellschaft; 
Deutsch-Australische  Dampfergesellschaft;  Woermann  Linie;  Hamburg- 
Bremer  Afrika-Linie;  Dampfschiffsgesellschaft  Argo;  Dampfschiffsgesell- 
schaft Hansa; Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft  Neptun;  Dampfschiffsreederei 
Union. 
132. The following is  taken  from  Karl Thiess,  Organisation und  Ver- 
bandsbildung in der Handelsschiffahrt  (Berlin,  1903, Ernst Siegf. Mittler 
& Sohn). 
133. The following details are taken in the main from Emil Fitger, loc. 
cit., p.  26. 
134. W.  Sombart,  Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft,  2nd ed., p.  284,  and 
Appendix  25  (Organisation of  inland navigation in the main centres); p. 
543. 
135. Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich, 30th year, 1909, p. 129. 
136. Of  the total length, 2,437.77 kilometres  were navigable by vessels 
of  1.75  meter  draft; 3.082.12  kilometres by vessels of  1.50 meter  draft, 
7,064.07 kilometres by vessels of  I meter draft; 599.40 kilometers by vessels 
of 0.75  meter draft; 1,182.83 kilometers by vessels of  less than 0.75 mete? 
draft.  See Statist. Jahrb.  f. d. Deutsche Reich,  1904, p.  74.  See ibid., 
1905, p.  71,  for  corrections as  to vessels.  These corrections  have been 
introduced in the text.  Statist. Jahrb.  f. d. Deutsche Reich,  1906, p.  75 
gives the same figures, while in the volume for 1908, p. 100, the total length 
of  the navigable waters is given for the 31st of December, 1902, as 13,793.4 
kilometers. 
137. v. Halle, loc. cit., p.  78.  On pages  128-12~ of  the same work are  .  . 
found details on the status of  the imperial navy in 1900. 
138. See the Jubilee memorial published by the directorate of  the Reiclis 
bank: "Die  Reichsbank  1876-1900,"  Gustav Fischer,  Jena  (cited  below 
as the jubilee memorial of  the Reichsbank), as well as the statistical tables 
submitted to the Bank Inquiry Commission of  1908, and the Statist. Jahrb: 
f.  d.  Deutsche Reich,  29th  year,  1908,  pp.  229-234,  and Internationale 
Uebersichten, pp. 70-75";  Karl von Lutnm, Die Stellung der Notenbanken 
in der heutigen Volkswirtschaft  (Berlin, 1909, J. Guttentag) ; Louis Katzen- 
stein, Die dreissigjahrige Geschaftstatigkeit der Reichsbank, Berlin, Leon- 
hard  Simion  Nachf.,  1906.  Regarding  the  questions  submitted  to  the 
Bank Inquiry Commission of  1908, see principally:  Die Verhandlungen der 
Bank-Enquete-Kommission, items I-V  of  the question sheet, Berlin,  1909. 
For the rest, Friedr. Koch, Der Londoner Goldverkehr; (Stuttgart & Berlin, 
1905); E. Schmalenbach, Der Reichsbank-Ausweis  (Zeitschr. fur handels- 
wissenschaftliche Forschung, ed. Schmalenbach, year I, 1906,  No.  3, pp. 
77-92; Heiligenstadt, Der deutsche Geldmarkt (in Schmoller's Jahrb., vol. 
31, pp. 71 seq.); Arthur Feiler, Die Problerne der Bankenquete (Jena, Gustav 
Fischer,  1go8),  Ferdinand  Bendixen,  Das  Wesen  des  Geldes  (Leipzig, 
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Duncker  & Humblot,  1900); Magnus Biermer,  Die deutsche  Geldverfas- 
sung  (Giessen,  1908); Hermann  Schumacher,  Die  deutsche  Geldverfas- 
sung  U.  ihre Reform  (in  Schmoller's  Jahrb.,  Vol.  XXXII, p.  I  seq; R. 
Koch,  Der Kredit bei der Reichsbank  (Zeitschrift f. Handelswissenschaft 
und Praxis, year I, No. 4, July, 1908, pp. I 15-1 18) ; Heymann, Reichsbank 
und  Geldverkehr  (Berlin,  1908); A.  Arnold,  Die  Bedeutung  der  Giro- 
Guthaben fiir die Bankpolitik (in Bank-Archiv, year VI, No. 5, p. 155 seq.); 
Edgar Jaff6, Die Ursachen der letzten Geldteuerung und die Bankenquete 
(Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung, 4th year, No.  13, p. 582 seq, and No.  14, p. 
626 seq.). 
139. The bank notes, according to article 3 of  the bank law, were issued 
up  to  1906 in series of  1,000 marks and  100 marks,  whereas under the 
Imperial law of February 20, 1906, series of 50 and 20  marks were allowed, 
the amount of  which, however, according to the declaration made in the 
Reichstag, remains at  present limited to 300,000,000 marks. 
140. According to the text of the Supplementary Bank Law of  the 1st 
July,  1909.  (Formerly  it read:  "in  exchange  for  German  legal  tender 
money. ") 
141. The 19,416  private giro accounts carried on March 31, 1908, included 
6,366  accounts belonging  to commerce,  transport,  and insurance;  7,763 
accounts  belonging to industries and  trades;  369 accounts  belonging 
agriculture  and allied  trades; 936  accounts  of  joint-stock  banks;  2,3I 
accounts  of  bankers and financial businesses of  all descriptions. 
142. The total turnover in 1908 amounted to 269,946,259,800 marks. 
143. Exclusive of the other clearing houses existing in 113 towns,  the 
total turnover of  which amounted in 1907 to 249,258,0oo,ooo marks. 
144. That is  the  turnover  in  receipts  arid  expenditures  in  the giro, 
transfer, deposit, bill, and collateral loan business,  in  discounted  and col- 
lected securities, and in other business of  every description transacted with 
authorities and private persons. 
145. As far as Germany is concerned it is incorrect to speak of  unsecured 
bank notes,  for  bank notes without any security whatever  do not exist 
there.  (Article 17 of  the bank law). 
146. Cash  in the sense of  article 9 of  the bank  law  consists  of  metal 
(Metallvorrat, see note 147)~  treasury notes of  the Empire, and bank notes 
of  the four note-issuing banks. 
147. "Metal  in hand"  consists,  according  to articles 9 and  17 of  the 
bank law, of  current German money, gold  in bars or in foreign coins, the 
pound fine (German) being calculated at 1,392 marks. 
148. Concerning these reasons, see my remarks before the Bank Inquiry 
Commission of  1908, on points I-V  of  the question sheet (Berlin,  ~gog), 
P. 259. 
149. As a rule a continued outflow of  gold into foreign countries can only 
take place when  the balance of  payments is unfavorable to Germany and 
the quotations on foreign bills threaten to surpass the upper gold point or 
have surpassed it, so that the export of gold bccomes remunerative.  (Se National  Monetary  Commission 
my  statements  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Bank  Inquiry  Commission, 
Berlin, 1909, p  71 ) 
150. See my statements in the Proceedings of  the Bank Inquiry Com- 
mission, p  70 
151. Highest  amount  (December 31,  1go7), 364,297,700 marks; lowest 
amount (January 23,  1907), 54,090,000 marks  The figures for December 
31,  1907, include a lombard loan of  67,630,203 marks to the Preussische 
Zentral-Genossenschaftskasse 
152  The quota has been exceeded in  1881-1885  five times by a  total 
of  92,795,000 marks, 1886-1890  ten times by a total of  585,771,000 marks; 
1891-1895  four times by a total of  253,598,000 marks; 1896-1900  seventy- 
ene times by a total of  8,184,274,000 marks;  1901-1905  thirty-two times 
by a  total  of  4,229,393,000 marks,  1906 seventeen  times by  a  total  of 
3,547,485,000 marks; and 1907 twenty-five times by a total of  5,376,670,000 
marks  During 1907 the note circulation of  the Reichsbank exceeded its 
quota by more than 58,000,000 marks on an annual average, on December 
31,  1907  (a  very  abnormal  year),  the excess above  the quota of  notes 
exempt from taxation attained the record amount of  625,974,363 marks. 
153  The literature of  cartels is so extensive that it is almost impossible 
to survey it  In an appendix to the second edition (German) of  this book 
a list of the most important cartel literature from 1883-1905 was given. 
154  Men~el  (Report at the general meeting  of  the Verein fur Sozial- 
politik,  1894, p  31 seq , and "Die Kartelle und die Rechtsordnung,"  p. 
12 seq ) shows that associations for the limiting of  competition, and for the 
monopolizing of  certain branches of  trade, industry,  and transportation 
existed as far back as medi~val  and ancient times  He refers to the two 
constitutions, 473 A  D  and 483 A  D ,  in the times of  the Roman Empire 
(Cod  lib  4. Tit 59) under the title "On monopolies, and illicit agreements 
of  traders,  also  on  prohibited  and  unlicensed  agreements of  tradesmen, 
employers,  and bath-keepers "  The constitution of  Emperor  Zeno, 483 
A.  D,  deals with monopolies not only in food (especially corn) but also in 
articles of  common use and labor 
In the legislation of  the ancient German Empire, the Imperial decrees of 
15 I 2, 1524, 1530, and 1532, and the imperial police regulations of  1548 and 
1577, provide  severe penalties for "Monopolia  und schadlichen Fdrkauf," 
(monopolies and harmful  sale).  "However,  they do not appear to have 
met with any notable degree of  success " (Report, p. 34; sepaate edition, 
P  '4) 
The Gewerbeordnung  does not contain any clause for cartels similar to 
article 152 regdrding labor contracts. 
155. As early as 1862 the cartel of  Rhenish tin-plate factories, as well as 
the Cologne tin-plate combine, were in existence.  To them was added, in 
1863,  the  German rail cotnbine  The beginning of  the German salt works 
cartel dates from  1868, the potash  syndicate  from  1870 (Bucher in the 
Publications of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, LXI, pp  141-142). 
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156  Consequently  (as opposed  to Son~bart,  Deutsche  Volkswirtschaft, 
2nd ed ,  p  344), the fact that many cartels were formed only after crises, 
and to some extent at the beginning  of  more prosperous  times is only  a 
seeming deviation from this rule  Brentano (Proceedings of  the Verein fur 
Sozialpolitik, LXI, p  176) calls the cartels "a product of  necessity "  He 
says:  "The necessity of cartels is rooted to-day in the constant growth of 
fixed,  untransferrable capital  in distinction  to  the  predominant  liquid 
capital of former times "  He does not fail to point out, however, that this, 
of  course, refers only to the cartels of producers and not to the cartels of 
traders 
157  See  among others Stieda, Schriften  des Vereins  fur Sozialpolitik, 
LXI, p  5, Kleinwachter, Die Kartelle  (1883), p.  126, and in the Hand- 
worterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 2nd  ed, Jena,  1900, v01  V,  p  39; 
Jos  Grunzel, dber Kartelle (1902, pp  8 and 12). 
158  See especially P  F  Aschrott,  Die amerikanischen  Trusts als Wei- 
terbildung  der  Unternehmerverbande,  in  Braun's  Archiv  fur  soziale 
Geset~gebung  und Statistik (1889), v01  11, p  383-418,  and Jeremiah  W. 
Jenks, Die Trusts in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (Conrad's Jahrb 
f  Nat -Oek  und Stat ,  3rd. series, v01  I, p  I seq ,  1891) 
159  Tariff measures, however, in so far as they are intended to check 
an abusive business policy on the part of  the cartels-that  is, by reducing 
or moderating import duties on cartel products, or by introducing export 
duties on cartel products-are  always a two-edged sword, since they react 
in other directions, and a doubtful as well as questionable weapon, because 
they strengthen foreign competition  Some of  these objections (although 
not all) apply to the combating  of  an incorrect cartel policy by means of 
railway tariffs, i e , through facilitating the importation of  competing prod- 
ucts through lower freight rates, and rendering the exportation of  c~rtel-made 
articles more difficult through higher freight tariffs  Other restrictive means 
in the economic field would  be the promoting of  con~petitive  concerns, the 
accluisition of  such undertakings  by the State, or  the endeavor to obtain 
as tlecisive an influence as possible on the price policy of  cartels through 
state participation in cartel undertakings  (This experiment was to have 
been made in the well-known "  Hibernia"  case )  A further means would be 
the promotion of  cartels of  consumers  A "smaller remedy"  for relieving 
the finishing industry (" weiterverarbeitende Industrie") somewhat from the 
pressure  of  raw  material  cartels  by  means  of  duty-free  importation  of 
articles destined for re-exportation  after they have undergone a finishing 
process exempt from customs duty (" zollfreier Veredlungskerkehr")  is of 
service only to export industries, and then only to an inconsiderable extent 
160. See von Halle, loc. cit., p. 47. 
161. Some of these complaints can only be remedied by combinations of 
consumers, which in the face of  the cartels of  producers are becoming more 
and more an urgent economic necessity, as well as by the better organization 
of  the distributing and comn~ission  agencies. National  Monetary  Commission 
162.  Reichstag Publications, 11th legislative period, 11  session, 1905-6, 
No. 4. 
163.  Ibid.,  11th legislative period, 11 session, 1905-6,  No. 351. 
164.  Ibid., 12th legislative period, I session, 1907, No.  255. 
165. Ibid., I zth legislative period, I session, 1907-1909,  No.  1019. 
166.  It is exceedingly interesting to note that these two charges have 
also been brought against the United States Steel Corporation founded in 
1901.  Glier demonstrates convincingly in his treatise "Zur gegenwartigen 
Lage  der  amerikanischen  Eisenindustrie,"  written  in  February,  1908 
(Conrad's  Jahrb.,  I11 series, vol.  35,  p.  587  seq.),  that  the  corporation 
displayed  great moderation  in the fixing of  prices of  manufactured  prod- 
ucts during the first boom (1901 to 1902-3)) although the pricesfor foundry 
raw iron which the corporation neither produced, bought, nor sold, rose by 
about 34 per cent  (pp. 599-601);  it held, however, tenaciously to its high 
prices  (a proceeding  approved of  by Glier) during the period  of  reaction 
(1903-L+), for a reduction in price would not have caused a greater demand. 
167. Although the United States Steel Corporation during the last crisis 
refrained  in the main from selling to foreign countries and endeavored  to 
bring about a recovery solely through enormous limitations of  output, the 
chief  reason for such procedure was that foreign markets at  the time were 
not capable  of  absorbing goods  even  at the lowest  prices.  Subsequent 
events have proved,  however,  that this policy was not able to restore a 
healthy tone to the American market, so that in the event of  another crisis 
a different policy may be pursued by the Americans. 
168. See the remarks of  Director  hfannstaedt  in the "Verbal  delibera- 
tions"  ("kontradiktorische  Verhandlungen")  concerning  German  cartels, 
Part 6,  "Verhandlungen uber den Halbzeugverband am 2.  und  3. Decem- 
ber  1903,"  p. 465.  I consider these remarks to be as correct as they are 
important. 
169. That the so-called "  mixed"  (" gemischt")  works suffered less than 
the "pure"  ("reine")  works, and the reasons therefor, are well known. 
170. The Rl~e~~ish-tXrestphalian  and the Siegerland  Pig  Iron  syndicates 
ceased to exist, for the time being  at  any rate, on January I, 1909, certain 
difficulties preventing their prolongation;  on the other hand, a plate-glass 
sale combine was formed among a number of  Siegerland works.  As regards 
the Upper Silesian Pig Iron Syndicate, see note I 7  I.  The manufacturersof 
pig iron in Rhineland and Westphalia are therefore in the same position 
they were before thenineties, namely in a state of  freecompetition.  Neither 
has a prolongation  of  the Lorrain-Luxemburg Pig Iron Syndicate hitherto 
proved feasible. 
171. For what follows see Volcker,  L'Etat  actuel  de l'industrie  sidC- 
rurgique allemande et son organisation (Revue Economique Internationale, 
vol.  111,  No.  4,  December  15-20,  1904,  p.  727  seq.),  and J.  Kollmann, 
Der Stahlwerksverband (in the "Nation"  22d  year, Nos. 18-22, February 
4-25,  1905).  Meantime  hearings  ("kontradiktorische  Verhandlungen") 
have taken place in the Imperial Office of  the Interior regarding the Stahl- 
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werksverband-Akt.-Ges.  at Dusseldorf, and  the  Oberschlesischer Stahl- 
werksverband  (Limited)  in  Berlin.  Most  of  the Upper  Silesian  Works, 
quitting the last-mentioned union in April, 1907, entered the Dusseldorfer 
Stahlwerksverband,  and  subsequently  founded,  on  June  27,  1907,  the 
Oberschlesische Stahlwerks-Gesellschaft  (Limited) in Berlin for  the  com- 
mon sale of the products B which had been released  (freigegeben) by the 
Dusseldorfer Stahlwerksverband. 
172. Further, the shortening of  the time of  payment for domestic buyers 
to fifteen  days after delivery (foreign buyers have to pay immediately after 
presentation of  bills of  lading), and the limitation of  discount  for domestic 
buyers (no discount is allowed to  foreign customers) will exercise  a favor- 
able  influence  if  really carried out, not  only on  the  Stahlwerksverband 
itself  but far beyond its domain.  On the other hand, a great and serious 
defect in the organization of  the Stahlwerksverband consists in its placing 
on the market (at present) only 3 groups of  its products, whereas the bal- 
ance  (products B), principally  coarse and fine sheet iron, wire,  bar iron, 
and  pipes,  are  sold  by  the works  themselves  at their  own  prices; the 
products, however, are alloted among the different works according to a fixed 
quota.  Products B cause keen competition among the various works, with 
the exception of rolled wire, for which there is a special syndicate, whereas 
for the drawn wire manufactured from the rolled wire, a price convention 
has been established  since the beginning of  January,  1909. 
173. "Die Unzulanglichkeit der heutigen Schutzzollgesetzgebung fur die 
Eisenindustrie." 
174.  In the rail cartel, the English share was fixed at 53.50 per cent, the 
German share at 28.83 per  cent, and the Belgian at 17.67 per  cent.  The 
accession of  the French works (later  on) caused the total to be raised to 104.8 
per cent for the first year, to 105.8 per cent for the second year, and to 106.4 
per cent for the third year, in which the French participated  to the extent 
of  4.8, 5.8, and 6.4 per cent respectively during the three years.  Germany's 
share, after the accessionof the American works, amounted to 21  per cent. 
In the girder cartel (from which the English kept aloof) 73.45 per cent was 
allotted to the Germans, 15.05 per cent to the Belgians, and 11.50 per cent 
to the French;  the latter, however, were  to receive  a  larger  quota were 
the French exports to exceed those of  1903. 
175. See  L.  Glier: Zur  neuesten  Entwicklung  der  amerikanischen 
Eisenindustrie,  in  Schmoller's  Jahrbuch  f.  Gesetzgebung  U.  Verwaltung, 
28th year, No.  I, p.  150 seq.;  earlier articles see ibid.,  27th  year, No.  3, 
p. 229 seq., and No. 4, p. 43 seq. 
176. Sombart  (Deutsche  Volkswirtschaft,  2nd  ed.,  p.  203)  also  says: 
"Doubtless a good share of  the growth of  German economic activity may 
be ascribed  to this interest  taken  by  banks  and  bankers  in  productive 
economic activity, hampering as it may have been for the development of 
the banking business proper (?).  Banks have been directly the promoters 
of the spirit of  enterprise in  Germany; they have  been  pacemakers  for 
industry and trade." National  Monetary  Commission  -F 
177.  The statement made by Paul Wallich  (loc. cit., pp.  6,  25)  that in 
the beginning of  1870 the Discontogesellschaft had the largest capital and 
the Darmstadter Bank the next largest is thus seen to be erroneous. 
178. The capital of  the Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank originally  (in  1856) 
amounted to 8,000,000 thalers, of  which 3,000,000 remained in the hands 
of  the institution, while  in  1859  1,000,000 thalers'  worth of  the bank's 
own stock was redeemed.  In 1869, that is to say, near  the end of  the 
first period,  the paid-up  capital  of  4,000,000 thalers was  increased  by 
r,ooo,ooo to a total of  5,000,om thalers, equal to ~g,ooo,ooo  marks. 
179. This was the last Konzession granted to a domestic bank, since the 
concession system was abolished soon after. 
180. Compare Max Wirth, Handbuch des Bankwesens, gd ed.  Cologne, 
1883, p. 377.  It  may be noted in this connection, that this book, though 
frequently quoted as an authority,  is  in many points superficial and unrelia- 
able.  In particular,  the author's  judgments  and conclusions are largely 
biased by his strong prejudice against the credit banks and should there- 
fore be accepted with  caution.  For  that matter, the author's  own text 
under the heading "German private banks"  comprises,  all told, about j 
pages  (pp. 376-379  and 398-399) ; the rest is statistical material. 
181. Compare, for example, Georg Schanz, article "Banken"  in Elster's 
Worterbuch der Volkswirtschaft, Vol. I, p. 310. 
182. Compare Waldemar hlhller, Die Organisation des Kredit-und Zah- 
lungsverkehrs in Deutschland, in Bankarchiv, Vol. V111 (~gog),  Nos. 7,  8 
and 9. 
18j. Ibid. 
184. In English  banking  literature the term  "banker"  is applied  to a 
person  who obtains outsiders'  funds for the purpose of  circulating them 
for profit; in case a person loans his own capital, he is regarded as a capi- 
talist or a merchant, but not a banker. 
185. On this point see among others Ad. Wagner in Schonberg's  Hand- 
buch, I, p. 437; Adolph Neumann-Hofer,  Depositengeschafte  und Deposi- 
tenbanken  (Leipzig, C.  F. Winter,  1894), p.  39  et seq.; M.  Schraut, Die 
Organisation des Kredits (Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1883), p. 32. 
186. Since May 31,  1879, deposits at  the Reichsbank, in conformity with 
the well-grounded practice of  most other central banks of  issue, no longer 
bear interest.  As  a  result deposits  repayable after notice  have become 
quite insignificant.  At  the end of  1900 they amounted to only  319,881 
marks, as shown in Table 43, p.  337, of  the jubilee memoir of  the Reichs- 
bank  (1876-1900).  On the contrary, the other deposits (on  giro account, 
exclusive of  giro balances of  the imperial and state treasuries) at the end 
of  1908 amounted to 285,303,000 marks. 
187. Compare Waldemar Miiller, loc. cit.  (Bankarchiv, 8th year. No.  8, 
p.  116.) 
188. It  is true that, according  to a statement by an expert before  the 
bank inquiry commission, a certain percentage of  the funds deposited at 
the savings banks (reported to be as much as  one-third of  the total) likewise 
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bear the same character of temporary deposits.  But, if this be so, it means 
that these very depositors, who are said to belong to the middle and higher 
classes, by  taking these funds to the savings institutions and not to the 
banks, deliberately  intend  to give to these funds the character of  saving 
deposits and not of  bank deposits. 
189. Compare Waldemar Muller.  (Bankarchiv, 8th year, No. 8, p.  117.) 
190. Compare Deutscher okonomist, July 28, 1900, p. 466, and Decem- 
ber 2, 1905 (23d year, No.  1197, article  Das  Depositengeschaft  der deut- 
schen  Banken);  also  Robert  Fran7,  "Die  deutschen  Banken  im  Jahre 
1907"  (reprint from the Deutscher Oekonomist, Berlin,  1908), p.  14; and 
T.Valdemar  Muller,  in  Proceedings  of  the  Third  General  Convention  of 
German Bankers at Hamburg, Sept. 5 and 6, 1907, p.  107. 
191.  Proceedings of  the Third General Convention of  German Bankers, 
pp. 107, 115; Deutscher &onomist,  July 28, 1900, and Dec. 2, 1905; Rob. 
Franz, Die deutschen  I:anken  in  Jahre,  1906, p. I I; also Caesar  Straus, 
Unser  Depositengeldersystem  und seine Gefahren,  Frankfurt,  1892, P.  5, 
who states that "up to the present time it was in the main large industry 
and the wholesale trades which were the depositors of  the  erm man bankers,'' 
i. e. the same classes that take part in the giro business of  the Reichsbank. 
192. They also include the so-called hoards  (see Ad.  Wagner,  loc.  cjt., 
p. 61, et seq.), that is to say, quantities of  precious metals which have not 
yet found employment, and the amounts held  ready  for  the purpose of 
liquidating international' payments, or for the arbitrage business. 
193. The report of  the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein for the fiscal 
year  1907  gives  the total amount  of  deposits  as 72,335,365  marks and 
adds that "of  these deposits invariably by far the larger  part consists of 
interest-bearing funds turned over  to us for long terms, varying  for  the 
most part from six months to one year." 
194. Otto Warschauer  in Conrad's  Jahrbiicher,  gd  series, Vol.  XXVII, 
p.  480  (1904).  See however  the correct  reasoning  by  the same author 
on p.  35  of  his book:  Physiologie der deutschen Banken, which appeared 
only one year before. 
195. The total amount to the credit of  clients in the check departments 
of  the German post office was 70,955,349.88 marks on Dec. I, 1909. 
196. This  explains,  among  other  things,  Lansburgh's  discovery  (Das 
deutsche  Bankwesen,  p.  8)  that in  the case  of  the smallest joint-stock 
banks,  with a capital up to  100,ooo marks per bank, the amount of  out- 
siders'  moneys,  i.  e.,  deposits  and  credit accounts,  exceeds  their  own 
capital about thirty-one times, while in the case of  the large banks, with 
a capital of  over  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks each  (except the large Berlin  banks) 
the ratio is only 2  to I.  Hence he infers that it is not the larger capital, 
but publicity, that attracts deposits to the joint-stock  banks,  inasmuch 
as an  increase  of  capital  is  accompanied  by  a  percentual  decrease  of 
outsiders'  moneys. 
197.  According to the "Materials bearing on  the development of  pros- 
perity  in Germany during the last generation"  (Appendix I11 to report National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
on the imperial  finance reform bill of  1908, No.  1043 of  Reichstag docu- 
ments) pp. 18 and 19. 
198. Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir das Deutsche Reich,  1903, p.  187. 
199.  Ad.  Weber,  Depositenbanken  und  Spekulationsbanken.  Leipzig, 
Duncker und Humblot, 1902, p. 82. 
200.  Edgar JaflC,  Das englische Bankwesen, 1905, p.  135. 
201.  Verhandlungen des I11 Allgemeinen Deutschen Bankiertages, p. 96. 
202.  On not less than I I,I  17,700 accounts. 
203.  For 190.5 data see Paul Marcuse's Beobachtungen uber das Noten- 
bankwesen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Berlin,  1907, p.  123. 
204.  Frequent references are made by German  writers to these e~act- 
ments  (especially  regarding  the cash  reserve)  in  advocacy  of  laws  and 
regulations  to  govern  the German  bank deposit  business.  These refer- 
ences are entirely unwarranted,  for  the American regulations mentioned 
in the text (p. 204) were intended  to regulate not the deposit business of 
the  National  banks,  but  solely  their  note  operations.  (See  Neunlann- 
Hofer, loc. cit., p. 35.) 
205.  I have no means of  verifying the data of  Le Figaro of  May 20,  1906, 
according  to which at the end of  1905 the 25  largest credit banks held 
~,ooo,ooo,ooo  francs of  deposits (the meaning of  the term is not quite clear), 
an increase  of  more  than  3,500,000,ooo  francs  over  the  corresponding 
amount in  1885, when  1,159,005,mo francs were reported.  In Austria, 
on the other hand, no systematic fostering of  the deposit business appears 
yet  to  have  commenced.  According  to  an address  by  Karl  Morawitz, 
president  of  the  Anglo-Austrian  Bank,  before  the  Austrian  Economic 
Society  (Bank Archiv, Year VI, no. 5, p.  64)  the deposits in all Austrian 
credit  banks amounted  in 1895 to only 250,000,000 kronen  ($50,75o,mo), 
while the deposits in the savings banks totalled about 5,000,000,ooo kronen 
($1,01s,ooo,ooo). 
206.  Joh.  Fr. Schar.,  Die  Bank  im  Dienste  des  Kaufmanns  (Leipzig, 
1909, G. A.  Gloeckner), pp. 122-126. 
207.  Deposits in  the Darmstadter Bank  since  1894 comprise all daily- 
due liabilities. 
208.  Data  taken  from  Deutscher  Oekononiist,  which  up  to  1908  in- 
cluded among the Berlin banks the following institutions: Deutsche Bank, 
Disconto-Gesellschaft,  Darmstadter  Bank,  Dresdner  Bank,  A.  Schaaff- 
hausen'scher  Bankverein,  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft,  Commerz-und 
Disconto-Bank.  Nationalbank fur Deutschland besides five institutions of 
totally different character viz:  Bank des Berliner Kassenvereins,  Berliner 
Maklerverein,  Amerika  Bank  (now  liquidated),  Deutsche  Ueberseeische 
Bank  and  Deutsche  Treuhandgesellschaft  (German  Trust  Company). 
Since 1908 the five banks last named no longer figure among the "Berlin 
banks"  in the compilations of  the Deutscher  Oekonomist. 
209.  Data  taken  from  Robert Franz, Die deutschen  Banken im  Jahre, 
1906, p.  11, und im Jahre,  1907, p.  14. 
210.  Compare, among others, Ad.  Wagner,  Beitrage  zur Lehre von den 
Banken  (Leipzig,  1857, Leopold  Voss), p.  70:  "The banks by means  of 
credit on the basis of  deposits may raise the purchasing power of  a country." 
211. Compare  Rud.  Eberstadt,  Der  deutsche  Kapitalniarkt  (Leipzig, 
1901, Duncker  8r  Humblot), p.  117 et seq. 
212. Compare Felix  Hecht,  Die Mannheimer  Banken  1870-1900  (Leip- 
zig,  1902, Duncker  & Humblot), pp.  39, 40. 
213. See Felix  Hecht, loc.  cit., p. 40. 
2 14. Ad.  Weber, Die Rheinisch-Westfalischen  Provinzialbanken und die 
Krisis, loc.  cit., p.  342. 
215. K. v. Lumm, Die Entwicklung des Bankwesens in  Elsass-Lothrin- 
gen, 1901, p.  165. 
216.  Joh. Fr. Schiir, Die Bank im Dienste des Kaufmanns, p.  136. 
217.  Edgar JaffC,  Das englische Bankwesen, p.  143. 
218.  Alfred  Lansburgh,  Die Verwaltung des Volksvermdgens durch  die 
Banken.  Reprint from "Die Bank"  (Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1908)~  p.  13 
et seq. 
219.  The money circulation through the German post office, which is still 
carried on to a large extent by means of  cash-shipments,  amounted in 1907 
to  ~g,~oo,ooo,ooo  marks,  i.  e.  to  about  37,000,om  marks  daily.  The 
money required  by the mortgage business, which until recently was also 
on  a  cash  basis  likewise  reaches  enormous  amounts.  Thus in  Prussia 
alone the yearly amount  of  mortgages recorded averages about 4.5 billion 
marks, while the amount of  mortgages  cancelled each year is about 2.3 
billion marks. 
220.  Recently  many savings banks have  made  efforts to extend  their 
activity along commercial banking lines by introducing the check system 
(in accordance with article 2,  sec.  I of  tile check act).  In particular  the 
tenth assembly of  the Union of  Baden Savings Banks, which met at Miill- 
heim, Baden, on November  ro,  1908, adopted  resolutions,  recommending 
the use  of  checks in the case of  saving deposits,  and proposing even  the 
establishment of  regular current accounts including the granting of  credit. 
See the order of  the Prussian minister of  finance, dated April 20,  1909. 
221. See  especially  Siegfried  Buff,  Der  gegenwartige  Stand  und  die 
Zukunft des Scheckverkehrs in Deutschland (Munich, 1907, E. Reinhardt). 
222.  In addition,  14,497 checks were redeemed which were not booked 
on check account, making a total of  61,816. 
223.  Gamp,  Der  landwirtschaftliche  Kredit  und  seine  Befriedigung 
(The needs of  agricultural credit and how to meet them).  Berlin, 1883. 
224.  Verhandlungen  des  Kgl.  (Preuss.)  Landes-Okonomie-Kollegiums, 
1906, p. 17. 
225.  The  most  important  institutions  for  agricultural  credit  are  the 
following: The Imperial Federation  of  Agricultural  Cooperative  Societies 
of Germany (Reichsverband  der deutschen landwirtschaftlichen Genossen- 
schaften in Deutschland) and its cooperative agricultural  bank at Darm- 
stadt,  with  about  11,896 cooperative  credit  societies,  savings  and  loan National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
banks,  belonging  in  1906  to  the federation  and its sub-federations; the 
General federation of  cooperative rural societies for Germany (Generalver- 
band  landlicher  Genossenschaften  fur  Deutschland  [E. V.])  at Neuwied 
with 4,I  59 cooperative credit societies, savings and loan banks belonging 
in  1906 to the federation and its sub-federations; the Bavarian state Fed- 
eration  of  agricultural  loan  associations  and  other  agricultural  coopera- 
tive  societies  (Bayrischer  Landesverband  landwirtschaftlicher  Darlehns- 
kassenvereine  und  sonstiger  landwirtschaftlicher Genossenschaften)  with 
to a total of  364,297,700  marks.  Of  this total, 1,972,200  marks were loaned 
to agriculture and allied rural industries (on 249 collateral certificates). 
229.  Thus among  others Lansburgh in an article in "Die  Bank"  pub- 
lished  separately under  the  title  "Die  Verwaltung  des  Volksvermogens 
durch die  Banken"  (The administration of  the national  wealth  by  the 
banks), p.  26, which I shall have occasion to notice later. 
230.  Materialien  zur  Beurteilung  der  Zusammenhange  zwischen  dem 
offentlichen Schuldenwesen und dem Kapitalmarkt (material to elucidate 
unlimited liability at Munich, with 2,2  59 cooperative societies, savings and 
loan banks in  1906, the Federation of  agricultural cooperative societies of 
the Grand  Duchy  of  Baden  at Karlsruhe  (Verband  landwirtschaftlicher 
Kreditgenossenschaften  im Grossherzogtum Baden), vith 384 cooperative 
societies, savings and loan banks in 1907; the Federation of  Wurttemberg 
cooperative  societies  (Verband  wurttenlbergischer  Kreditgenossen- 
schaften) at  Ulm, with 90 cooperative societies in 1907, the Federation of 
cooperative societies of  the Provinces  of  Posen  and  \Vest  Prussia  (Ver- 
band  der  Erwerbs-  und  Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften  in  den  Provinzen 
Posen und Westpreussen) at Posen, with 22 j cooperative societies in 1907; 
and in  part of  course also  the (Schulze-Delitzsch) General  federation of 
German  cooperative  societies  (Ltd.)  founded  on  self  help  (Allgemeiner 
Verband  der  auf  Selbsthilfe  beruhenden  deutschen  Erwerbs-  und  IVirt- 
schaftensgenossenschaften),  with  917  cooperative  societies  in  1907,  the 
members of  which constitute about one-third of  the total membership  in 
all  (about 16,000) cooperative credit societies.  For details on the above 
see "  Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung  Deutschlands 
im  letzten  Menschenalter"  (Data bearing  on  the progress  of  prosperity 
in Germany during the last generation), vol. I11 of  the Appendices to the 
Imperial Finance Reform Bill,  of  1908, pp.  21-27. 
226.  See Lansburgh, loc. cit., pp. 31-32. 
227.  \Valdemar  Muller,  Die  Organisation  des  Kredit-und-Zahlungs- 
verkehrs  in  Deutschland  (The  organization  of  the system of  credit  and 
payment in Germany) in Bank-Archiv,  Vol. VIII, 1909, No.  7, p. 99. 
228.  Waldemar  hfuller, ibid.  As  regards the Reichsbank, according to 
the returns made to the bank inquiry commission, there were in the entire 
German Empire 70,480 firms and individuals entitled  to credit in its bill 
business.  Of  these  (a) merchants  and trading companies  constituted 41 
per  cent,  or  in  all  29,020  firms  and  individuals  for  the entire German 
empire; (b) manufacturers and industrial companies constituted 31 per cent 
or 21,887 firms and individuals in the Empire, (c) land owners and estab- 
lishments  engaged  in  agriculture and  the  manufacture  of  agricultural 
products 14 per  cent, 9,589 firms and individuals in the Empire; (d) co- 
operative societies of  all  kinds I per  cent or 883 firms and individuals in 
the Empire;  (e) capitalists (Rentner), artisans, and similar  tradesmen  13 
per cent, or 9,101 firms and individuals in the Empire.  According to the 
same official returns, the loans on collateral security made by the bank and 
outstanding on Dec. 31,  1907  (on  5,666 collateral  certificates)  amounted 
the connection between  the public  debt system and the capital market). 
Appendices to Imperial finance reform  bill  of  1908, Part IV, No. 1087 of 
Reichstag Documents, p. 249 
231  "According to competent estimates," foreign countries had absorbed 
by the middle of  1908 no more than 400,000,000 marks of  imperial bonds 
and only between  80,000,ooo and 105,ooo,ooo marks of  Prussian consols. 
(Ibid, P  247, 11 
232  See  Felix  Hecht,  Die  Mannheimer  Ranken,  1870-1900,  Leipzig, 
Duncker & Humblot,  1902,  p. 23:  "Each credit bank  . . . wants to be 
studied by itself ." 
233  Thus Felix Hecht, Lehren der Krisis (Lessons of  the Crisis) (Sept. IS, 
1go3), loc.  cit , p  140.  The same author asserts however  in his  paper 
before  the  general  meeting  of  the Mitteleuropaischer  Wirtschaftsverein, 
Sept  15, 1908 (Publications of  the Verein, No. 6, p  75)  that the German 
tendency to engage in extensive oversea commerical and industrial enter- 
prises  has  "undoubtedly"  taken  much  German  capital  from  domestic 
industrial enterprises and from legitimate domestic credit." 
234  Adolph Weber justly says:  "No country has had so rich or so bitter 
an  experience  in  the  results  of  unsound  credit-granting  as  England" 
(Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, p. 109 ) 
235.  Alfred Lansburgh, Die Verwaltung des Volksvermogens durch die 
Banken  (reprint  from  "Die  Bank,"  Berlin-Charlottenburg,  1908)  The 
merit of  this book is that it has facilitated the study and appreciation of  the 
smaller banks, with a capital of  less than ~,ooo,ooo  marks down to ~oo,ooo 
marks, and even of  the smallest banks with a capital of  less than ~oo,ooo 
marks,  by supplying careful statistics (Tables IV and V and explanatory 
notes, which in the main are to the point).  It should be said, however, 
that in this field Der Deutsche Oekonomist  (mentioned by the author on 
p  24) had  already done valuable preliminary work, though limited  to the 
capital  stock  and  the  deposits  (fremde  Gelder)  exclusive  of  reserves. 
Adolph Weber, in Die Rheinisch-Westfalischen  Provinzialbanken und  die 
Krisis (the Rhenish-Westphalian  Provincial Banks and the Crisis), 1903, 
p  362-371,  which Lansburgh does not mention, was, so far as I know, the 
first to study the activities of  the small banks of  this district in detail and 
with valuable results.  By supplying the omissions of the Okonomist and 
by analyzing the small banks of  all Germany, on the basis of  their balance 
sheets and their activity, Lansburgh has performed a valuable service, par- 
ticularly  from the social standpoint.  We must not forget however,  that National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
the deposits  (fremde Gelder) in all these small banks amount to no more 
than 4 per cent of  the deposits of  all credit banks. 
In his later work,  containing about the same material,  the title "The 
German Banking System"  is inappropriate and misleading, for the entire 
text covers  only  63 pages, of  which  12  are devoted  to the small  banks 
(pp. 22-23).  Since the  author admits this  in  his  preface,  he ought to 
have adopted a more appropriate title.  In passing I wish to note that I 
do not share the author's opinion  (p. 7)  that there are in Germany 6,000 
private bankers.  According to my estimate the (purely)  private bankers 
nuniber about 4,000. 
236.  Especially  on  page  55  of  the  reprint  from  the  periodical  "Die 
Bank"  (Berlin-Charlottenburg), mentioned in note 235. 
237.  The first  point  is  not  regarded  by  Lansburgh  as a  very  serious 
reproach, as is evident from his remarks on p. 8: "The old controversy as 
to whether Germany is to be an agricultural or an industrial state, has long 
ago been  answered  by  the general  development of  things.  No  political 
upheaval  can reverse  this development.  That would  be  a  misfortune." 
His wish is solely that the process should go on without shock by way of 
evolution and not of  revolution,  and that the available funds of  the nation 
should not be thrust into industry by sheer force.  In this he is entirely 
right. 
238.  Die Bank, No. 6, June 1908, p. 543. 
239. Riesser,  Scheckverkehr und  Scheckgesetz  (Check  Circulation  and 
Check  Legislation),  No. 4  of  the  "Veroffentlichungen des  Mitteleuropa- 
ischen Wirtschaftsvereins in Deutschland," Berlin, Putkammer und  Muhl- 
brecht,  1907. 
240.  The causes which compel the German credit banks to extend cur- 
rent account credit preferably  to trade and industry, and only to a slight 
extent to craftsmen, small traders and agriculturists, have been mentioned 
briefly before (p. 223 and following). 
241.  The number of  such persons would thus be counter-balanced in a 
remarkable way by the number of  persons who according to the complaints 
heard in savings banks circles, have been won away from them by the credit 
banks,  one third  of  whose total  deposits are claimed  to be  made  up of 
"  saving deposits." 
242.  "Die Bank,"  June,  1908, p. 544. 
243.  See  Herman  Mauer,  Das  landschaftliche  Kreditwesen  Preussens 
(The Prussian System of  Cooperative  Land Credit),  (Strassburg, Karl J. 
Trubner, 1907); Felix Hecht, Die Landschaften und landschaftsihnlichen 
Kreditinstitute in Deutschland  (the Agircultural  Credit  federations,  and 
similar organizations in Germany), Vol. I, Statistics (Leipzig, Duncker & 
Humblot, 1908). 
244.  Die  Organisation  des  langfristigen  gewerblichen  Kredits  (in  the 
Publications of  the Mitteleuropaischer \Virtschaftsverein, No. 6,  pp. 59-86  ) 
245.  Die Mannheimer Banken, 1870-1900,  Leipzig, Duncker und  Hum- 
blot,  1902.  Lehren der Krisis.  Paper read at the gencral meeting of  the 
Verein fiir Sozialpolitik,  1,s September 1903 (Vol. CXIII of  the publications 
of  the Verein fiir Sozialpolitik), and monograph on "Die Organisation dcs 
gewerblichen langfristigen Rredits (The Organization of  long-time industrial 
credit), 1908. 
246.  A larger  degree  of  publicity,  as for  instance  the more  frequent 
publication of  summary balance  sheets  (Rohbilanzen), while  practicable 
per  se,  is not likely  to  throw  much  more  light  on  the condition of  the 
institution 
247.  Berlin, Puttkammer & Miihlbrecht,  1909, p. 34-36' 
248.  In "  Die Lehren der Krisis,"  p. 141, and in the monograph on "  Die 
Mannheimer Banken," p. 45 
249.  Ad.  Weber,  Die  rheinisch-westfalisclien  Provinzialbanken, in the 
Publications  of  the Verein  fur  Sozialpolitik, Vol.  CX,  p. 344.  In this 
monograph-long  before Lansburgh,-the  activity of  the small banks in 
the Rhine country and Westphalia has been  treated  in great detail and 
duly appreciated, pp. 362-371. 
250.  SO  far as we can foresee, this policy of  the mortgage banks (except 
in a few instances where loans are made on warehouses) is not likely to be 
changed, even if  it be true that the mortgage bank act (art. 12) does not 
stand in the way of  loans on factories, as Ernst Sontag tried to prove (Die 
Griindung einer Industrie-Hypothekenbank-[The  Establishment of  a mort- 
gage bank for Industry]. Kattowitz, Gebr. BGhm,  1909).  The mortgage 
banks  are not likely  to regard  factories as easily  marketable risks  nor 
must they underestimate the risk  that the buildings may remain idle and 
yield no return. 
251.  Waldernar Miiller (Bank-Archiv No.  7, Jan. I, 1909, p. 98). 
252.  See  Otto Jeidels,  Das Verhaltnis  der deutschen  Grossbanken zur 
Industrie (The relation of the great German banks to industry) Leipzig, 
Duncker  und  Humblot  1905,  p  34.  In just  such  cases  however,  the 
central institution proposed  by Hecht would  not be authorized  to inter- 
vene  (Veroffentlichungen  des  Mitteleuropaischen  \Virtschaftsvereins, 
Berlin, 1908, vol. 6, No. 5, p. 79). 
253.  \Ve  may readily suppose, for instance, that the repayment in annuity 
form of  long-time industrial loans granted by the credit banks may be rnade 
a normal part  of  the contract in the same way as is proposed in conncc- 
tion with the central bank. 
254.  The  question  of  the profitableness  of  the enterprise  (Veroffent- 
lichungen, p. 85) which Hecht prefers to leave untouched would of  course 
be largely affected by the greater or smaller amount of  capital stock; but on 
this point, too, Hecht has nothing to say. 
255.  This is also the opinion of  Karl Diehl, Der Bau einer neuen Organi- 
sation des langfristigen industriellen Kredits (Plan for a new organization 
of  long-time industrial credit),  in the  Bank-Archiv  of  March  15,  1909, 
Vol. VIII, No.  12, p.  190.  The article contains a number  of  other perti- 
nent criticisms  of  the proposed central institution.  See also Frankfurter 
Zeitung (Abendblatt) of  Sept. 25, 1908, and the criticisms of  Bank Director National  Monetary  Commission 
Freiherr von Pechmann, in the Veroffentlichungen des Mitteleuropaischen 
Wirtschaftsvereins, KO. 6, pp. 86-95;  also A. M.  Ernst Sontag, op. cit 
2 j 6.  Eugen  Lopuszanski,  Einige  Streiflichter  auf  das  osterreichische 
Bankwesen (Some  side-lights  on  the  Austrian  bank  system)  in  Volks- 
wirtschaftliche Wochenschrift of  Al. Dorn, Vol. L, No.  1305, Dec. 31, 1908, 
P.  437. 
2.57.  See Veroffentlichungen  des Mitteleuropaischen \Virtschaftsvereins,  .  . 
No.  6, p. 75. 
258.  It is to be noted, however,  that in the  transactions  of  the  Mit- 
teleuropaische  Wirtschaftskonferenz  in  Berlin,  May  17  and  18,  1909, 
Hecht  himself  to  all  appearances  assumed  the  necessity  of  legislative 
regulation of  the matter, which he evidently had not contemplated before. 
259.  Security in the shape of  a guarantee or a life insurance policy pledged 
is of  little practical  consequence in connection  with the bonds discussed 
above, so that we may safely ignore such cases here.  Loewy (Ranitsch) 
is  of  a  different  opinion  (Bank-Archiv,  Vol.  VIII, p.  241,  et secl.);  on 
principle he is in favor of  the idea of  a central institution. 
260.  The law (art. I) becomes applicable the moment it is found that 
the object of  the activity of  the enterprise is actually directed to this end. 
It  makes no difference  whether this object of  the undertaking is specifically 
indicated in the charter or by-laws or not; otherwise it would be very easy 
to make article I of  the mortgage bank act inoperative, by simply omitting 
to mention in the charter or by-laws this object of  tl~e  undertaking. 
261.  Ernst Sontag, op. cit. 
262  Veroffentlichungen des Mitteleuropaiscl~en  Wirtschaftsvereins, No. 
6, p.  66. 
263.  See Felix  Hecht,  Denkschrift  iiber  die Organisation  des gewerb- 
lichen langfristigen Kredits, p.  10. 
264.  See Siegfried Buff, Das Kontokorrentgeschaft im deutschen Bank- 
gewerbe  (current-account  transactions in German banking).  J. G.  Cot- 
tasche Buchhandlung Nachf., Stuttgart & Berlin 1904 (issued as No. 60 of 
the Volkswirtschaftliche  Studien, edited by Brentano & Lotz). 
265.  See  Joh.  Friedr.  Schaer,  Die  Bank  im  Dienste  des  Kaufmanns 
(the bank and its service  to  the  merchant),  Leipzig,  G.  A.  Gloeckner, 
=9og*  P.  19. 
266.  In its very first annual report (1853) the Darmstadter Bank stated 
that in accordance with the instructions of  the government of  the Grand 
Duchy of Hesse, the authorities of  the customs department granted credit 
on customs duties to all merchants on their bills provided  with the guar- 
antee (Aval) of  the bank. 
267.  We do not agree with Joh.  Fr. Schaer's view (loc. cit., pp. 23-24) 
that under the provisions of  the law governing bank deposits,  "the bank 
having the care of  securities, is entitled to represent the shares at ' - gen- 
eral meeting, unless the depositor has signified his wish to the contrary" 
(see Riesser, Kommentar  zum Bankdepotgesetz, 2d ed., Berlin, 1906, Otto 
Liebmann, p. 42, sec. 3, d, P).  On the contrary the bank must not assume 
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to represent the shares unless specifically authorized by the depositor, for 
such representation involves a "disposition"  of  the shares, limited though 
it be,  to which  the  bank  taking  care  of  the securities is not entitled. 
The authoriration need  not however  be made out in this case in the form 
prescribed in article 2 of  the bank deposit law. 
268.  Bank-Archiv, Jan.  15, 1909, Vol. VIII, No.  8, pp.  114-15 
269.  Substantially  the  same  description  is  given  by  Joh.  E'riedrich 
Schaer, loc. cit., p. 46, B, a. 
270.  For  the Deutsche  Bank  see  circular  (No.  4)  reprinted  by  Joh. 
Friedr. Schaer, loc. cit., p. 130. 
271. The terms for current  accounts of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft,  the 
Dresdner  Bank,  and  the  Berliner  HandeIsgesellschaft,  in  the  form  in 
which they were in force immediately before 1904, are reprinted in Siegfr. 
Buff, loc. cit., pp. 110-125. 
272.  See Waldemar  Miiller,  Bankarchiv, Vol. VIII,  No  8, p.  115, and 
Joh. Fr. Schaer, p. 74, NO. 1. 
273.  Bank-Archiv,  Vol. VIII, No.  8 (Jan.  15, ~gog),  p.  1x5. 
274.  See Ad.  Weber, Die rheinisch-westfglischen  Provinzialbanken und 
die Krisis, loc. cit., p. 342. 
275.  See Felix  Hecht,  Die  Katastrophe  der Leipziger  Bank  (The col- 
lapse of  the Leipziger Bank) in "Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben 
wahrend der Jahre 1900 8."  (Disturbances in German economic life dur- 
ing  1900 and the following years), Vol.  VI,  Geldmarkt-Kreditbanken,  p. 
384). 
276.  In balancing a current account  the  interest is figured thus: The 
interest-bearing  amounts  (the  result  of  multiplying  the capital  by  the 
number of  days and dividing by loo) are first determined,  (in Berlin the 
month is considered as thirty days) and entered on the credit or debit side 
according as the customer is to be credited with interest or to be debited 
therewith.  The current account is usually kept by double entry and bal- 
anced daily as far as practicable. 
277.  See Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 33. 
278.  See Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p.  169-171,  for an account of  the distri- 
bution  by  localities  and  industries  of  the industrial  corporations  with 
which the large  banks  are connected, either through  the appointment of 
representatives on the supervisory boards of  the corporations or by serv- 
ing as their fiscal offices for the payment of  interest and dividends or the 
redemption  of  bonds  when  mature.  In spite of  his  declaration  to the 
contrary, Jeidels overestimates the importance of such fiscal agencies. 
279.  Robert  Franz,  Die  deutschen  Banken  im  Jahre  1908,  (German 
banks in rgo8), p.  22. 
280.  Even  such an arrangement  could  but seldom  be  made  with  the 
German  retailer.  Contrary  to the custom  prevailing  in  France, he will, 
as a rule, not allow himself to be drawn upon nor does he give bills.  Never- 
theless  he demands long terms  of  credit  and settlement  without  being National  Monetary  Commission 
willing to obligate himself, as in the case of  bill credit, to make payment at 
the end of  the period. 
281.  In England,  too, bills of  this kind  drawn on foreign countries are 
not discounted by the banks.  (See Edgar Jaffk, Das englische Bankwesen 
[the English  banking system] p.  142.)  They are at once sold to foreign 
bill brokers.  For other particulars see Jaffk, pp. 123 and 124. 
282.  According to the Jubilee Report  of  the Reichsbank  (p.  78),  this 
practice explains why the average value of  the bills reaching the Reichsbank 
rose from a minimum of  1,421 marks in 1878 to a maximum of  1,936 marks 
in 1900.  The amounts drawn on banks and bankers are nearly always for 
very large sums.  However in proportion as the large banks are making 
their way into the provinces by means of  their branches, discounting there 
also the bills of  small borrowers, the average amount of  the bills discounted 
declines. 
283.  Edgar JaffP, loc. cit., p. 124. 
284.  Walther  Lotz,  Die  Technik  des  Emissionsgeschafts,  Leip7ig. 
Duncker & Humblot, 1890, p. 58. 
285.  Heiligenstadt, in the Proceedings of  the Bank Inquiry Commission 
of  1908 on points 1-4 of  the cluestion sheet (Berlin, 1909, Imperial Printing 
Office), p. 25. 
286.  Under  the  old stock  exchange law,  in case of  speculation on  a 
cash  basis  the following method  was often  resorted  to among provincial 
banks and private bankers.  The customer engaged in speculation would 
make part payment on  the securities bought for him  and left  on  deposit 
with  bis  bank or  banker.  The balance of  the purchase  price, which was 
to be paid at  once, would be obtained by having the bank or banking estab- 
lishment draw on another banking institution, or else, in order to cover up 
the true character of  the bill as a finance bill, the person on whose account 
the securities were bought  would  draw on a  provincial  bank or private 
banker, that is on his own banker, who would thereupon discount his own 
acceptance.  See W.  Prion, Das  deutsche  \\7echseldiskontgescl~aft. (Bill 
discounting in Germany), Leipyig, Duncker & Humblot, 1907, p. 42. 
287.  See among others Der Deutsche Oekonomist of  Aug. 4, 1900, p. 476, 
July 29,  1905, p.  414, and Rob. Franr, Die deutschen Banken im  Jahre, 
1907, P.  15  & 16.  For the Berlin banks,  during 1894-1899  the amount 
fluctuated between  one-half  and two-fifths.  (See  Ernst Loeb,  loc.  cit., 
p. 267.) 
288.  Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken, etc., p.  I 17. 
289.  Schmoller, Grundriss, 11, p. 493. 
290.  The separation of  the acceptances from the avals was not practi- 
cable because of  difficulties in the technique of  accounting, the two items 
appearinq combined in the balance sheets of  many banks. 
291.  See W. Prion, loc. cit., p. 53. 
292.  Special literature:  W. Prion, Das deutsche Wechseldiskontgescliaft. 
Mit  besonderer  Beriicksiclitigung des Berliner Geldnlarktes (The German 
bill  discounting  business.  With  special  reference  to the Berlin  money 
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market).  (Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot,  1907.)  No.  127  of  Staats- 
und  Sozialwissenschaftliche  Porschungen,  edited by  von Schmoller  and 
Sering.  An excellent work. 
293.  This fact, repeatedly established at the hearings of  experts before 
the bank inquiry conlmission, is also aflirmed by W. Prion (loc. cit., p. 32). 
294.  See W. Prion, loc. cit., p. 61, where he mentions that Hamburq has 
a quotation for the private discount of  prime bills and a special quotation 
for commercial bills, the margin between  them amounting to one-fourth 
to one-eiqhth of  I per cent; and the same is true of  London, where there is 
a difference of  one-half of  I  per cent between  the quotation of  bank bills 
and of  trade bills. 
29j. This device, hardly perceptible to outsiders, of  raising the rate of 
private discount in individual cases, even though the amount be trifling, 
may thus be used by the Bourse as a warning signal.  111 the caseof  an 
excessive straining of  credit on the part of  some bank,  it may perform 
witbin banking circles the same functions and exert the same influence as 
the ruder and ostentatious means of  a general raise of  the official rate of 
bank discount, in case of  a general overstraining of  credit. 
296.  See MT. Prion, loc. cit., p. 33. 
297.  Waldemar  Miiller, loc. cit. (Bank-Archiv., Vol.  8), No.  8, p.  117. 
298.  Loc. cit., p. 51. 
299.  W.  Prion, loc. cit., p. 53. 
300.  The number of  note banks was as follows:  1883-1886,  18; 1887, 17; 
1888,  16;  1889,  14;  1890,  13;  1891-1893,  9; 1894-1900,  S;  1901,  7; 
1902-1904,  6; 1905-1908,  5  (Reichsbank,  Bayerische  Notenbank,  Sach- 
sische Bank, Wiirttembergische Notenbank, and Badische Bank). 
301. The number of  mortgaqe banks varied between  24  in 1883, 39  in 
1900-1902,  and 40 in 1903-1908. 
302.  See Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre,  1907, p. 12, and 
Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre,  1908, p.  14  That enumera- 
tion, however, includes only credit  banks having a capital each of  at  least 
~,ooo,ooo  marks, while in the case of  mortgage banks no such restriction 
is made. 
303.  The amounts of  bills held  by the six great banks of  Berlin vary 
somewhat  from those given by  W.  Prion,  loc. cit.,  p.  208  (514, 559,  671, 
697, 742, 740, 914, 1017 million marks). 
304.  In regard to the figures given above, it is to be noted that in conse- 
quence of  the circulation of  bills between central banks and branch banks, 
certain items have doubtless been counted several times. 
305.  Edgar Jaff6, Das englische Rankwesen, p.  124 and pp.  141-144. 
306.  Edgar Jaffk, loc. cit., p. 125. 
307.  Edgar Jaff6, loc. cit., p. 145. 
308.  The acceptance commission at the foreign banks is one-half  per 
cent. 
309.  Edgar Jaffk, loc. cit., pp. 148-151. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
310.  It is to be noted that the official discount in London represents a 
minimum  rate of  discount,  whereas  the official  rate of  discount  of  the 
German Reichsbank has rather the meaning  of  a  maximum  rate of  dis- 
count,  so  that the two  are not  strictly comparable.  Furthermore,  the 
Bank of  England,  unlike  the German Reichsbank,  reserves  the absolute 
right to decline to discount even  "legitimate"  bills when not convenient, 
so that, especially in times of  overstrained credit, and when  the Bank is 
planning  a raise  of  discount, it does not discount all the billspresented. 
Finally, the Rank of  England, unlike  the German Reichsbank, discounts 
only  the bills  of  regular  customers.  Nevertheless  the variations  in  the 
rates of  discount in Germany and England run entirely parallel.  How- 
ever, the rate of  discount in England has invariably been higher than in 
Germany during the last fifty-six years, the proportion during that time 
being as 100:122.  (On  an average the  difference is  0.63 per  cent.)  See 
the exceedingly instructive work by Joh.  Fr. Schaer, Zalilungsbilanz und 
Discont (Berlin, 1908, S. Simon),  pp.  IIO and  111.  On pp.  IOI  and 102, 
on the basis of  statements by Karl Waidmeyer,  general secretary of  the 
Austro-Hungarian Bank, are given the average rates of  official discount in 
Englsnd, France, Germany and Austria-Hungary from  1852 to 1907, that 
is to say, for fifty-six years, the years of  crisis being noted, while on p.  107 
are given the averages of  the oficial discount of  the last five decades for 
the same countries.  The differences in the figures of  the rates of  discount 
in  Germany  as compared  with  those  of  England,  France and  Austria- 
Hungary, are due, in the foremost place, to the difference of  the economic 
situation and of  the balance of  payment, as well as to the differences in the 
organization of  the money markets and banks. 
311.  See \V.  Prion, loc. cit., pp. 74, 75. 
312. Loc. cit., p. 7s. 
313.  See my  statements before  the bank  inquiry  commission  (Trans- 
actions of  the full comn~ission,  under Numbers I-V  of  the question sheet, 
Berlin, Ernst Siegf. Mittler & Sohn, xgoq), pp. 70, 71. 
314.  Loc. cit., p. 55. 
315. See W. Prion, loc. cit., pp. 77-95. 
316.  My  own views,  coinciding with  the above,  were set forth in  the 
proceedings of  the bank inquiry  commission, under Numbers I-V  of  the 
question sheet (Berlin, ~gog),  p.  259.  By a misprint, the word nicht (not) 
was  omitted  in the phrase "  je  nach  den  Verhaltnissen  des  Geld-  oder 
Warenmarktes  iiberhaupt  nicht  zu  einer  Realisierung  fuhrt"  ("is  not 
realized  on,  in accordance  with  the conditions prevailing  in  the money 
market or the commodity market"). 
317. See W.  Prion, loc. cit.  p. 93. 
318.  Loc. cit., p. 78. 
319. Friedr.  Leitner, Das Bankgeschaft  und seine Technik,  Frankfurt- 
am-Main, 1903, J. D. Sauerlander, publisher, pp. 259-260. 
320.  Lombard loans to banks and others  (bankers and other financial 
concerns)  are greatly  influenced by  the demands of  commerce, industry 
and other lines of  activity, which demands are largely concentrated in the 
banks,  and are particularly  heavy  at the close of  the year  and at other 
customary  dates of  settlement  (schwere  Terming).  As  an illustration  of 
this influence it may be mentioned that on December 31,  1907, the total 
amount of  lombard loans of  the Reichsbank (in 5,666 pledge receipts) was 
364,297,700 marks,  distributed as follows: To joint-stock  banks  (on 497 
pledge receipts)  163,1oo,3oo  marks, to &her  money and credit institutions 
(on 916 pledge receipts)  125,399,000 marks.  It  is also interesting to note 
the proportion of  lombard loans granted to joint-stock  banks and those to 
private banks, etc., at the two dates of  comparison  (March 31,  1908, and 
December 3  I, 1907). 
Before the meeting of  the bank inquiry commission and to some extent 
during its proceedings, there was some talk of  compelling the Reichsbank 
to establish a certain limit which must not be exceeded in the discounting 
of  bills and the granting of  lombard loans on dates of  settlement (schwere 
Terming), especially at the close of  each quarter, the aim being to improve 
the condition of  the bank  In the course of  the proceedings this demand 
was  dropped.  In fact, the close of  the quarter is  precisely the time at 
which  the most  legitimate  demands  of  commercc  arise,  which  must  be 
met almost entirely by the granting of  short-term credit, a task which the 
Reichsbank can not shirk, since the very purpose of  its existence is "to 
facilitate payments,"  while another, though not equally essential part of 
its functions is "to promote the utilization  of  available funds"  (art.  12, 
sec. I of  the bank act). 
On  this point  Waldemar  Muller  justly  remarks: "To grant credit  and 
issue notes in times of  business  calm,  no  central bank of  issue with  the 
privileges  of  the Reichsbank  is  needed; even  so  defective  a  note  bank 
system as that of  the United  States suffices for  that purpose.  It is in 
times of  heavy demand and in times of  crisis that the bank has to prove 
itself  equal to the task  assigned  to it by  the bank  act"  (Bank-Archiv, 
Vol. 8, No. 9, Feb. I, 1909, p.  130). 
32 I. Felix Hecht, Die hlannhei~ner  Banken, p. 40. 
322.  A.  Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationshanken, p  97. 
323.  Waldemar  Miiller,  Die  Organisation  des  Kredit-  und  Zahlungs- 
verkehrs  in  Deutschland  (Bank-Archiv, 15 January,  1909, Vol.  8, No. 8, 
p.  116). 
324.  The  portion  of  the rules  and regulations  of  the Deutsche  Bank 
coming under  this head  is reproduced  in Joh.  Fr.  Schaer, Die  Bank  in1 
Dienste des Kaufmanns, pp.  128 and 129. 
325.  This is the reverse, quite compatible with  the principles of  juris- 
prudence,  of  the provision  of  art. 405,  sec.  2  of  the Commercial  Code, 
which, it is to be noted, is merely declaratory in its nature.  It declares 
that, when  the broker  announces the execution of  an order without ex- 
pressly  stating that he himself  is liable for it, this is equivalent  to  the 
statement that he has closed the transaction with a third party on account 
of his client. National  Monetary  Commission 
326.  This is self-evident from art. 403 of  the Commercial Code. 
327.  Until the new Bourse Law  went into effect, it was customary  to 
add the following: "Transactions relating to securities with fixed date of 
delivery are subject to special provisions." 
328.  This is an extension of  arts. 397  and 369 of  the Commercial Code. 
329.  That is to say, not merely "on account of  all demands on current 
account in the brokerage business"  (art  397, Commercial Code). 
330.  This addition corresponds to art. 8 of  the bank deposit law of  July 
5, 1896, which requires that the broker  (local banker)  who  transmits for 
safe-keeping securities, the property of  a customer, to a central banker, or 
transmits to such banker an order, received from a customer, to purchase 
securities, shall declare to the central banker that the securities belong to a 
third  party or that the purchase is to be made on account of  a third party. 
The consequence of  this is that the central banker  can exercise the right 
of  pledge and retention only in virtue of  claims that have arisen in connec- 
tion with these securities (in particular as regards any remnant of  the pur- 
chase price), but not in virtue of  all claims which the central banker has 
against the provincial banker in connection with any other business  The 
latter was the case before the enactment of  the Bank Deposit Law, when the 
provincial  banker  deemed himself  authorized to leave the central banker 
in ignorance of  the fact that the transmitted papers belonged to a third 
party or that the ordered purchase was to be made on account of  a third 
party.  If  thereupon the provincial  banker became bankrupt, the central 
banker enforced his right of  pledge or retention in virtue of  all his claims 
on  the provincial  banker,  with  the  consequence  that the client  of  the 
provincial  banker  as a  rule  found  that his  right  of  exemption  became 
illusory. 
331. This addition, referring to art. 2 of  the imperial stamp law of  June 3, 
1906, is intended to exclude the joint liability of  the bank for the stamp- 
ing of  the securities in accordance with  the  law.  In virtue of  this pro- 
vision, while the pledging of  foreign securities comes under the definition 
of a "business"  (between living persons) liable to stamp dues, the same is 
not true of  the deposit of  such securities made without any right of  pledge. 
That is the reason why the conditions provide that in the case of  unstamped 
foreign securities the right of  pledge and retention, which otherwise would 
be created, is excluded. 
332  Arts.  1221 and 1235 of  the Banking Code read as follows  Art.  1221 : 
If the pledge has a bourse or  market price, the holder of  it may sell it at 
free sale at the current price through a broker legally authorized to make 
such sales, or  through  a person  authorized  to make public  auction sales. 
Art.  1235: The sale of  the pledge is to be made by way of  public auction. 
If the pledge has a bourse or market value, the provision of  art  I 22  I applies. 
333.  Art.  1246 of  the Banking Code says  If,  according to equity, the 
interests of  the parties concerned would  be better served by a method of 
sale of  the pledges different from that provided in arts. 1235 to 1240, either 
of these parties may demand that the sale shall take place according to this 
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other method.  If  an agreement is not reached.  the decision shall be made 
by the court. 
334.  Concerning the meaning of  the word "  ausdriicklich" (expressly), see 
Riesser, Das Bankdepotgesetz,  2d  edition  (Berlin, Otto liebmann, 1906), 
p. 49, note I, and pp. 26 and 27.  Bruno Buchwald, on p. 172 of  his exceed- 
ingly  valuable  book  "Die  Technik  des  Bankbetriebs"  (5th  ed.,  Berlin, 
Julius Springer, 1909, p.  172)~  reproduces a printed  blank  containing the 
words:  "and I confer on you the rights provided  in section I, article  2  of 
the deposit law of  July 5,  1869."  It is to be noted  that this blank is not 
conformable to the law.  The law requires an express authorization, that is 
to say, the authorization  itself  must make it clear that the giver thereof 
was well aware of  its contents and meaning. 
335.  Hoxever,  to guard  against  an incorrect practice,  such as seems to 
obtain in many places, it must be pointed  out once more that, even where 
such authorization has been given to the banker, he is required to safeguard 
the custorner's securities in accordance with the provisions of  art. 2  of  the 
bank deposit law so long as he has not made use of  the authorization (see 
Riesser, loc. cit , p. 33 under b). 
336.  See Bruno Buchwald, loc. cit., pp. 131, 149. 
337.  See Bruno Buchwald, loc. cit., pp. 149, 352. 
338.  See Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908, pp. 24-25. 
339.  See Ad.  Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken,  p.  102 
340.  See Rob.  Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und  Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
(Jena,  1909, Gust. Fischer), who justly insists that this financing business 
is to be sharply distinguished  from the issue business (p. 84 et seq.).  The 
former consists  in  procuring  the funds, belonging  to the bank  or  to the 
public, required for the operations of  transformation or original founding, 
and-I  may add-in  assuming the functions of  intermediary in these oper- 
ations. 
341.  The ratio of  transformations to original foundings (which are com- 
bined in the table of  companies founded, see p. I ~g),  was stated by van der 
Borght for the period  18gj-1907  at about jo per cent (Jahrbiicher fiir Na- 
tional-Oekonomie und  Statistik, 3d  series,  Vol.  XV). 
342.  See p. I 15 and following of  the present work for an account of  the 
increase in the capital of  stock companies founded in the four-and-a-half-year 
period 1870-1874, as compared with the capital of  stock companies founded 
in the period 18  51-1870. 
343.  Heinrich Sattler, Die Effektenbanken (Leipzig, 189o), p.  2 I : "The 
operations of  transformation  may be briefly designated  as industrial job- 
bery (industrielle Ausschlachtungsgeschafte)  .  " 
344.  Engel, in Zeitschrift des Statistischen Bureaus (Berlin,  1875), Heft 
49  P- 356. 
345 See Ad.  Wagner's preface to Heinrich Sattler's scientifically rather 
unimportant work, Die Effektenbanken  (Leipzig, C.  F. Winter'scche Ver- 
lagshandlung,  1890).  In that preface, Wagner displays with startling dis- 
tinctness his attitude toward the credit banks, which afterward prompted his National  Monetary  Commission 
various extreme proposals.  "The fat dividends," he says in the preface, p. 
VIII, "may in some cases have been earned by these banks honestly, but on 
the whole they owe their high  figure principally  to the exploitation of  the 
heedlessness, inexperience and greed of that portion of  the population which 
engages in  gambling at the bourse."  (Compare with  this statement  the 
sources of bank dividends,  as stated in the present work!)  Again:  "Social 
legislation concerns . . . all those economic relations where there is danger of 
exploitation, and where profits, incomes, fortunes, often of  gigantic dinien- 
sions, are developed without corresponding 'labor,'  at the expense of  the 
persons exploited, though the latter may in many cases share in the blame." 
346.  Walther Lotz, Die Technik des deutschen Emissionsgeschafts (Leip- 
zig, Duncker & Humblot, 1890).  A fundamental work. 
347.  Art. 41, sec. I of  the Rourse law reads as follows: "The stock of  an 
enterprise transformed into a stock company or into a stock company en 
commandite shall not be admitted to trade at  the Bourse before the expira- 
tion of  one year from the date of  the entry of  the name of  the company in 
the trade register  and before  the publication of  the first annual balance 
sheet, with statement of  profit and loss.  In special cases this period may 
be abridged or dispensed with by the government of  the State (art. I)." 
348.  According to the table of  Der Deutsche Oekonomist, reproduced on 
p. 268 of  Ernst Loeb's work, Die Berliner Grossbanken in den Jahren 1895 
his 1902  etc., the premium on newly issued stock in the years  1896-1900, 
inclusive, was as follows: Bank stock, 35.3, 53.5, 36.7, 30.6, and 26.5 per 
cent, industrial stock, 36.1, 66.7, 67.7, 66.9, and 55.2 per cent. 
349.  A "bonus"  (Bonifikation) is the remuneration paid to a bank before 
or at the time of  issue by the party issuing securities solely for services in 
promoting the sale of  the securities, that is to say, a function which has 
absolutely nothing to do with the quality of  the bank as broker for its clients. 
This "  bonus" therefore represents a special remuneration for a special kind 
of  banking activity, consisting in this that the banker undertakes, to the best 
of  his ability and on the ground of  his special knowledge of  customers, to see 
that the securities issued are placed in good hands, that is to say, perma- 
nently.  This function should not be, and in fact can not be, performed by 
any one but a banker.  Hence it is absurd to say that he is bound to pay 
this bonus to his clients, that is to say, the buyers of  the securities, and still 
less, that he acts "fraudulently"  (dolos) in failing to state the fact that he 
received a bonus and to share it with others, as was decided by the Imperial 
Court (I Civil Senate) in a judgment  rendered Dec. 10, 1904. 
350.  How ill-advised it is to draw rash conclusions in regard to the man- 
ner  of  issue from  a temporary  decline in  quotations, is illustrated  by the 
table printed by Ad.  Weber (loc. cit., p.  r55), in which  the list of  "Stock 
companies of  inferior quality"  includes the Jura-Simplon  railway, which 
has since then been nationalized. 
351.  See Walther Lotz, loc. cit., p. 71. 
352. The two tables are reprinted on pp. 278 and 279 of  the proceedings 
of  the bank inquiry commission of  1908 (Proceedings of  the full commis- 
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sion, Numbers I-V  of  the question sheet, Berlin,  Ernst Siegfr. Mittler  & 
Sohn, ~goq),  as appendix to pp. 65 et seq. 
353.  The Frankfurter Zeitung enumerates the bonds thus: "German and 
foreign  mortgage  bank  bonds  (estimated)"  and  "Other  bonds;"  the 
Deutscher Oekonomist, on the contrary, discrin~inates  between  mortgage, 
railway  and industrial bonds,  both in the case of  the German and of  the 
foreign  bonds.  The Frankfurter  Zeitung  gives railway  stock  and tratn- 
way stock in a single item, while the Deutscher Oekonomist separates them. 
The table of  the Frankfurter Zeitung lacks the item  "Insurance stock," 
which receives special notice in the Deutscher  Oekonomist at least in the 
case of German securities.  The table of  the Frankfurter Zeitung contains 
separate statements regarding foreign securities only in the case of  govern- 
ment loans, while the table of  the Deutscher Oekonomist gives these sepa- 
rate statements throughout.  Finally, there are  great differences  in  the 
amounts.  Thus for example the nominal amount of  the foreign govern- 
ment loan issues during 1905 given  in the table of  the Frankfurter Zeitung 
differs from that given  in  the  Deutscher  Oekonomist  by  not less  than 
142,ooo,ooo marks  (Frankfurter  Zeitung,  nominal  amount  724,ooo,ooo, 
Deutscher Oekonomist 866,ooo,ooo marks) in a single group of  securities. 
In 1907 the market value of  all issues, according to the Frankfurter Zeitung, 
was in round figures 1,842,ooo,ooo  marks, while according to the Deutscher 
Oekonomist  it  was  2,135,000,000 marks,  again  a  difference  of  nearly 
300,000,000 marks. 
354. Based largely on Otto Jeidels, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Gross- 
banken zur Industrie, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot,  1905. 
355.  Regarding positions in the supervisory councils as a "consequence 
of  concentration in the banking and particularly  in the issuing business," 
see  Franz  Eulenburg,  Die  Aufsichtsrate in den deutschen  Aktiengesell- 
schaften (Conrad's  Jahrbiicher,  series  3,  Vol.  XXXII, Lieferung  I, pp. 
109 et seq.). 
356. Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. III. 
357 Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 44. 
358. Ibid, p. 51. 
359. For example, in the case of  the fusion of  the Huldschinsky Smelt- 
ing Works with the Upper Silesian Railway Supply Co.,  1904. 
360.  Loc. cit., p. 127. 
361. Loc. cit., p. 55. 
362.  Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 139. 
363 Loc. cit., p.  169, Tables I and 11. 
364 Loc. cit., pp  170, I 7  I,  Tables I11 and IV. 
365 See Riesser, Zur Aufsichtsratsfrage (Berlin, Otto Liebmann,  1903, 
reprint from the Jubilee publication of  the Juristische Gesellschaft zu Berlin 
in honor of  Richard  Koch), pp. 296 et seq. 
366. Rud. Eberstadt, Der deutsche Kapitalmarkt (Leipzig, Duncker & 
Humblot, 1901). Natiortal  Monetary  Commissiort 
367. See Ad.  Weber,  loc. cit., p.  171.  Ruhland, indeed, continues  to 
deem it appropriate,  without  any regard to the objections raised, to say 
(Vol. I11  of  the "System  der  Politischen  Oekonomie",  Berlin  1908,  p. 
146): "According  to an investigation by Eberstadt,  the market value of 
German industrial securities was enhanced by speculation during the period 
from January I, 1895, to April I, 1900, by 75 to IOO per cent above their 
issue price " 
368.  Ernst Loeb, (loc., cit. p. 271) assumes that one-half to three-fourths 
of  the credits booked  under loans  (Debitoren)  were granted  in behalf  of 
commerce and industry, a statement which it would be difficult to verify. 
369. In refutation of  Eberstadt see  also Franz Eulenburg,  Die gegen- 
wartige  Wirtschaftskrise,  Symptome und  Ursachen,  in Conrad's  Jahrb., 
I11  series, Vol. XXIV, p. 381; Heinernann in Conrad's Jahrb. (1902), I11 
series, Vol. XX, p. 128; and Ernst Loeb, in the Schriften des Vereins fur 
Sozialpolitik, Vol. CX (Die Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben,  1903, 
vol. VI), p. 270. 
370.  See for instance the report of  the Darrnstadter  Bank for  1853. 
371.  Page 29. 
372. Jubilee report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, p. 29. 
373. Concerning other mistakes  made in connection  with  the issue  of 
that first war loan, see Riesser, Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft und Kriegs- 
fuhrung (Jena,  Gustav  Fischer,  1909)  p.  102  et seq.  Nevertheless  the 
blame for this poor result has until very recently been laid not on the finan- 
cial administration, which established those conditions against the express 
warning of the representatives of  the banking business, but on the whole 
body of  German banks and bankers. 
374.  Loc. cit., Bank-Archiv,  Vol. 8, No.  8 (of  Jan. 15,  ~gog),  p. 118. 
375. The compensation is effected for the most part by exports. 
376. I  greatly prefer  the term "balance of  clairus"  (Forderungsbilanz), 
proposed  by  Sartorius Freiherr  von  Waltershausen  in lieu  of  the  term 
"balance  of  payments"  (Zahlungsbilanz),  on pp. 73 et seq.  of  his book 
"  Das volkswirtschaftliche  System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande,"  which 
will be discussed on a subsequent page. 
377. Jubilee report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, p.  127. 
378 Bourse inquiry commission, list of  proposals rejected  or withdrawn, 
p. 21. 
379. Sartorius  Freiherr  von  Waltershausen;  Das  volkswirtschaftlic11e 
System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande.  Berlin,  1907, Georg Reimer. 
380.  Bank-Archiv  of  Sept. I, 1908, Vol.  7,  No. 23, p. 35'7. 
381. The issues in question were in the main  Argentine,  Greek, Portu- 
guese, Chilean, and Servian Government  loans, a Buenos-Aires municipal 
loan, Brazilian, Dutch-South-African, and Mexican railway loans, in the issue 
of  which, in one case or another,  all the great banks without exception, 
together with a number of  other banks and banking firms, took part to a 
greater or less extent.  Certain of  these securities declined rapidly almost 
as soon as issued, which led to sharp criticisms of  the issuing firms.  See the 
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table of  the Deutscher  Oekonomist, reproduced  by Ad. Weber, loc. cit., p. 
132.  This table, however, should be used with caution. 
382.  Even Siemens'  calculations (see Deutscher Oekonomist,  Sept.  14, 
1901, p. 529), correct as they are, can not be regarded as pertinent from the 
point  of  view  here  represented.  A more important circumstance is the 
fact pointed  out by Rob. Liefmann  (Conrad's  Jahrbucher,  series 3,  Vol. 
XXVII, p. 172), as well  as in the present work,  that a large part of  the 
issues of  foreign loans is often sold not in German but in foreign markets. 
383. Ad. Weber, loc. cit., p. 134, note 3. 
384. The History, Principles and Practice of  Banking, London,  1901, I, 
p. 64 (see ibid., p. 181). 
385.  Only one j per cent Prussian loan of  £5,ooo,mo,  included  in  the 
table, dated back as far as 1818. 
386.  Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, p. 132.  In 
contrast with these numerical data, taken from the Deutscher Oekonomist, 
there isa  statement, also found in the Deutscher Oekonomist (July 22, 1899, 
p.  527), which puts the figure as low as 1,973,ooo,ooo, a  good  deal  less 
than the 2,417,000,ooo mentioned in the text. 
387.  Ad. Weber, loc. cit., pp. 128-129.  The figure given for 190~  does not 
quite agree with the corresponding figure  given by Ernst  Loeb, Die Ber- 
liner Grossbanken in den Jahren 1895 bis 1902, p.  121, which gives also the 
real estate participations  (Terrainbeteiligungen).  These are stated as fol- 
lows, from 1897 to 1901: 3, 3, 8, 8, 11. 
388.  Ernst Loeb, loc. cit., p.  IGI. 
389.  For the time being the Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft  does not pub- 
lish any summary balances. 
390.  See for example the data from the balance sheets of  the Darmstidter 
Bank for the end of  1899 and 1900, reproduced  by Ad.  Weber, loc. cit., p. 
163. 
391.  See Ernst Loeb, loc. cit., p.  171, and for the preceding table, p.  161. 
392.  No figures are available for the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft,  since 
this bank does not yet publish any summary reports. 
393.  See Jubilee report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft,  pp. 29, 33, and fol- 
lowing. 
394.  See Jubilee report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, pp. 84 and 85. 
395.  For particulars regarding the creation and development of  the firm 
Ludwig Loewe & Co., and of the Loewe group, see Otto Jeidels, p. 243 and 
following. 
396.  See Richard Rosendorff, Die  deutschen  Banken  irn  uberseeischen 
Verkehr  (in  Schmoller's  Jahrb.,  1904, Vol.  XXVIII, No.  4, pp.  93-134). 
Same %uthor,  1.e  d6veloppement des Banques Allemandes  A L'Etranger 
(Revue Economique Internationale, T. I. Sept.  and Oct.,  1906).  Same 
author, Die Deutschen ~bersee-  an ken und ihre Geschafte  (in Rlatter fur 
vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre, Vol. 111, 1908, 
Nos. 7,8)  J. Hellnuer, Die Zahlungsvermittlung der englischen Banken im 
~berseehandel.  Vienna,  1904.  Emil  Herz,  Deutschlands  auslgndische National  Monetary  Commission 
Banken (Annalen des Deutschen Rei~hs,  Vol. 39, 1906, No. I, p. 48 and fol- 
lowing).  R. Hauser, Die deutschen Ubersee-Banken (Jena, 1906).  Anton 
Paul Briining, Die Entaicklung des auslandischen, specie11 des uberseeischen 
deutschen Bankwesens (Berl~n,  1907, Puttkammer & Muhlbrecht).  Andre 
E. Sayous, Les Banques Allemandes et le Commerce d'outremer,  in Bul- 
letin Mensuel de la Federation des Industriels et  des Commer~ants  Fran~ais, 
5th year, No. 52 (January, 1908, Part I).  Same author, ibid., No. 70, July, 
1909, p. 404 and following): Pourquoi et comment il faut former en France 
des Banques d'exportation.  L'exemple  des banques allemandes d'outre- 
mer.  Georges Diouritch, L'expansion  des Ba:ques  Allemandes Q L'Etran- 
ger, Ses Rapports  avec  le Developpement  Economique  de  lJAllemange 
(Paris, 1909, Arthur Rousseau). 
397.  An appreciation has been attempted in my obituary on the occasion 
of  the untimely death of  Dr. George v. Siemens, the gifted and lamented 
president of  the Deutscbe Bank (Bank-Archiv., 1st year, No. 2, Nov., 1901). 
398.  For a discussion of  the manner in which banks had to intervene and 
did intervene on behalf both of  importers and exporters, see, among others, 
Richard  Rosendorff,  Die  deutschen  Banken  im  uberseeischen  Verkehr 
(Schmoller's Jahrbuch fur Geset7gebung, etc., Vol.  XXVIII, No.  14, pp. 
93-134)~  also p. 426 and following of  this volume. 
399.  See Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1871, p. 3. 
400.  See Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1871, p. 4. 
401.  The follou-ing citations are taken from Model, loc. cit., pp. 107, 109, 
and 117.  The above remarks are not intended as a reproach to the news- 
paper in question;  but the sentiments prevailing  at that time in banking 
and bourse quarters, and which are merely found reflected in that paper, 
are of  more than purely historical interest. 
402.  Emil Herz, loc. cit., No. I, p. 48 et seq. 
403.  The German oversea  banks engaged  in  this line  of  business  (the 
so-called  "Inkassogeschaft,"  i.  e.  the collection  of  bills,  bills  of  lading, 
etc.)  have  special  so-called  "Inkasso  tariffs"  See,  for  instance,  the 
Inkasso  tariff  of  the Deutsche Orient bank  reproduced  by Rich.  Rosen- 
dorff,  Die  deutschen  Ueberseebanken  und  ihre  Geschafte,  reprint,  pt. 
24-46. 
404.  See  Waldemar  Miiller,  Die  Organisation  des  Kredit-  und  Zah- 
lungsverkehrs in Deutschland, Bank-Archiv, vol. 8, p.  I 15 et seq. 
405.  In case  of  the  so-called  "option  shipments,"  by  the  terms  of 
which the article may be offered for sale at different  places during trans- 
portation, "option bills of  lading" are given. 
406.  Waldemar Muller, loc. cit., p  116. 
407.  Thus,  for  instance,  the banks,  for  the purpose  of  securing  their 
advances, cause both the sender and consignee to sign declarations, accord- 
ing to which the goods and their proceeds remain hypothecated  with the 
bank,  not only  so long as the documents are in  the hands of  the bank, 
but also subsequently, so that the consignee obligates himself  to hold  at 
the disposal of  the bank the documents or the goods thetnselves  (if  deliv- 
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ered  to him),  to keep  separate accounts  regarding  the goods and their 
proceeds, not to merge the proceeds with other receipts and assets. and to 
deliver  these  proceeds  to the bank  at the earliest  possible  opportunity, 
(letter  of  hypothecation).  The  person  who  receives  the  goods,  when 
informed  of  these  stipulations through  the bank  by the grantee of  the 
advance must make a corresponding declaration  (letter of  lien), and it is 
only  after  such a declaration  and  the giving  of  the acceptance  that he 
receives the documents 
408.  Waldemar Muller, Bank-Archiv, vol. 8, No. 8 (Jan  15, ~gog),  p.  115. 
409.  For  particulars  regarding  the  charter  of  the  Deutsche  Ueber- 
seeische  Bank,  commercial  and  railroad  conditions  in  Argentina,  the 
achievements of  the various  branches of  the bank, the turnover and the 
results attained by  these  branches  see  Ant. Paul Bruning, p. 45-80,  and 
Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., pp. 497-549. 
410.  We  frequently  come across the erroneous view,  adopted to some 
extent in the literature of  the subject, (see for instance Georges Diouritch, 
loc. cit., p. sol), that, under the Argentine laws of  that time, the increase of 
capital of  the old bank (the Deutsche Ueberseebank), which was intended 
in 1891 because of  the large growth of  the business of  the bank, could be 
affected only after its liquidation and the organi~ation  of  a new bank, which 
was  take over  the assets and liabilities of  its predecessor  As  a  matter 
of  fact, the old bank,  too, was a German corporation, so that an incresse 
of  capital would have had to be effected in accordance with German and 
not with Argentine laws.  The true cause, evidently, was that for various 
reasons it was desired to endow the bank with a large capital.  According 
to German law this could only be done by fully paying up the capital of 
the old bank,  which the managers were not willing to do,  preferring  to 
found a new institution with a larger capital, of  which for the time being 
only a part had to be paid up 
41 1.  Ad  (b) and (c) see Anton Paul Bruning, pp.  14, 15. 
412.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1892, p. 4. 
413.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1890, p. 4. 
414.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1872, p. 4 
415.  Report for 1883, p.  11. 
416. Report for 1883, pp. 3,  I I. 
417.  For particulars  see Rich.  Rosendorff, Treuhandgesellschaften und 
ihre Funktionen, in  Conrad's  Jahrbucher,  1906, No.  5,  pp.  608  et secl., 
also  Walter  Nachod,  Treuhander und  Treuhandgesellschaften  (Tubingen 
1908, H. Laub'sche Buchhandlung) pp. 88 et seq. 
418.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1892, p. 4. 
419.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1901, p. 5. 
420.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1903, p. 7. 
421.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1908, p. 8. 
422.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1873, p.  10. 
423.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1883, p  I I. 
424.  Report of  the Deutsche Bank for 1895, p. 4. National  Monetary  Commission 
425.  Report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft for 1887, p. 5.  For particulars 
regarding balance sheets of  the Brasilianische Bank fur Deutschland for the 
years 1889 to 1905 see Rich. Rosendorff, Le dkveloppement  etc. p. 42 and -43, 
also Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., pp. 55-598. 
426.  Report for 1889, p.  9. 
427.  Report for 1890, p. 8, and 1900, p. 13. 
428 For particulars regard~ng  the balance sheets of  the Bank fur Chile 
und Deutschland for the years 1896-1904 see Rich. Rosendorff, Le develop- 
pement etc. (Oct., 1906) pp. 44, 45 and Georges Diouritch, pp. 599-621. 
429.  Rosendorff's statement,  loc. cit., p. 33, that the bank was founded in 
1892, is a misprint. 
430.  For particulars regarding the activity of  the bank, see, among others 
Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., p. 684-690. 
431.  Report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft for 1900, p.  10, and 1905, pp 
13-15. 
432.  Report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft for 1888, p. 8. 
433.  Report of  the Dresdner Bank for 1905, p. 6. 
434.  Report of  the Dresdner Bank for 1905, p. 6. 
435.  Report for 1905, p. 6.  The Dresdner Bank on that occasion noted 
that it would during the coming years regard it as  one of  its principal tasks 
"to enlarge and properly develop the foreign business relations, especially 
in oversea lands with which Germany has active trade connections." 
436.  Report of  the Darmstadter Bank for 1885, p. 16. 
437.  Report of  the Darmstadter Bank for 1871, p. 2. 
438 Report for 1873, p. 16. 
439.  See Anton Paul Bruning, pp. 32, 33. 
440.  Report of  the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft for 1887, p. 8. 
441.  Report for 1889, p.  11. 
442.  Report for 1903, p.  10. 
443.  For particulars see, among others, Georges Diouritch, p. 624. 
444. The absolute amounts in the balance sheets of  the Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank from 1891 to 1904 are given by Rich. Rosendorff, Le Dtveloppernent 
des Banques Allemandes a I'Etranger,  pp. 38, 39.  For further particulars 
see Georges Diouritch, pp. 669-690. 
445.  For particulars see Georges Diouritch, pp. 669-677. 
446.  For particulars see Georges Diouritch, pp. 738-753. 
447.  See  Rich.  Rosendorff,  Neuordnung des Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen 
hlunzwesens,  in Finanz-Archiv  of  Schanz, Vol.  XXII, No.  I, and Schmol- 
ler's Jahrbuch, Vol. XXX, No.  2, p. 170. 
448.  See art. 8 of  the charter (Appendix I to the Deutscher Reichs-und 
Kdniglich Preussischer Staatsanzeiger, Mar. 3, 1905, No. 54).  Furthermore 
the bank is obliged, according to article 13 of  the charter, to publish a state- 
ment of  its assets and liabilities on the last of every month, at  its own cost, 
in  a  periodial  designated  by  the governor  of  the Gern~an  East African 
protectorate. 
449.  For particulars see Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., pp. 754-760. 
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450.  Nevertl~eless,  according to art. 42 of  its charter, published in Appen- 
dix I  of  the Deutscher Reichs- und Koniglich Preussischer Staatsznzeiger, 
February I, 1905, No.  28, it is obliged to publish a statement of  its assets 
and liabilities on the last of  every month, at  its own cost, in the Reichsan- 
zeiger, according to a schedule prescribed in art. 42, sec. 2. 
451.  Memorial  of  the imperial  Admiralty on "Die  Entwicklung  der 
deutschen See-Interessen im letzten Jahrzehnt,"  Dec.  1905, p.  175.  In 
regard  to France, see Rich. Rosendorff, Die franzosischen Kolonialbanken 
(Bank-Archiv,  1904, Vol. 3, No.  10, pp.  172-174).  In  regard to the several 
British colonial and foreign banks, as well as the several French and Dutch 
colonial banks, with their branches, capital and dividends, see Rich. Rosen- 
dorff, Le Developpement etc., pp. 49-51,  and Diouritch, loc. cit., appendix 
to p. 283. 
452.  See Deutscher Oekonomist,  No.  1127, 436; No.  1179, p. 415; and 
Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908, p.  18. 
453.  See Robert Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre,  1906 (p.  14). 
itn Jahre 1907 (p. 21), and irn Jahre 1908 (p. 26). 
454.  E. Wagon,  Die  finanzielle  Entwicklung  deutscher  Aktiengesell- 
schaften von 1870-1900  (Jena, 1903, Gustav Fischer), p. 46. 
455.  See Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen  Reichs,  Ergan- 
zungsheft zu  1909, 11: Die Geschaftsergebnisse der deutschen Aktiengesell- 
schaften im Jahre, 1907, 1908, pp. 15, 16.  Concerning the methods of  cal- 
culation, see E. Moll, Die Rentabilitat der Aktiengesellschaften (Jena, 1908, 
Gustav Fischer). 
456.  Including, in addition to the 6 great banks, the following: National- 
bank  fur  Deutschland,  Commerz-  und  Disconto-Bank,  Mitteldeutsche 
Kreditbank,  Bar:!;  des  Berliner  Kassenvereins,  Berliner  Maklerverein, 
Amerika-Bank,  Deutsch-Ueberseeische  Bank,  and  Deutsche  Treuhand- 
Gesellschaft.  Beginning with  1909, the Deutscher Oekonomist no longer 
enumerates the five last-mentioned institutions among the "Berlin Banks" 
(Deutscher Oekonomist,  Aug. 28,  1909, vol. XXVII,  No.  1391, p. 529), a 
commendable change, since these institutions are managed on a totally dil- 
ferent basis. 
457.  Rud. Steinbach, Die Verwaltungskosten der Berliner Grossbanken 
(Schmoller's Jahrbuch, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 85). 
458.  In conformity with the new and correct practice of  the Deutscher 
Oekonomist, only the nine credit banks properly so called are here included. 
459.  Of  April 3, 1904, reprinted by Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 129. 
460.  In 1908 the gross profits from interest, bills and commissions have 
been combined. 
461.  On  this  point  see  Rud.  Steinbach,  Die  Verwaltungskosten  der 
Berliner Grossbanken  (Schmoller's  Jahrbuch, Vol.  29,  No.  2,  pp. 71-110, 
and No.  3,  pp.  141-179):  Ad.  Weber,  loc.  cit.,  p.  213,  Heinemann,  Die 
Berliner  Grossbanken an der  Wende  des  Jahrhunderts  (Conrad's Jahr- 
bucher, series 111, Vol.  XX, p. 86 et seq.); Frankfurter Zeitung,  No.  91, 
April  I, 1903, and No. 93, April  3,  1903 ("Betriebskosten  der Banken"); National  Monetary  Commission 
Deutscher Oekonomist,  Aug.  2,  1902; Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken 
in1  Jahre 1907, p.  18, and im  Jahre  1908, p.  25.  If  all the banks were 
included, the proportion of  operating expenses to gross profits would be still 
more unfavorable, since the above figures of  the Deutscher Oekonomist do 
not include  the  directors'  fees (Tantiemen),  which  though  constituting 
part of  the cost of  operation  are enumerated separately. 
462.  In 1907 and 1908, reserves and amounts written off  are combined. 
463.  Ed. Wagon, loc. cit., p. 146. 
464.  These words are found in my opening address as chairman of  the 
First General Congress of  German Bankers, in Frankfort-on-the-Main (See 
transactions of  the Congress of  Sept.  19 and 20,  1902, published  by the 
Centralverband  des Deutschen  Bank- und  Bankiergewerbes, Berlin, 1902, 
P  2). 
465.  Compare Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p.  105. 
466.  It is to be noted that the surplus is here calculated not as per Decem- 
ber  31 of  the year given but as per Jan.  2  of  the year following. 
467.  Jubilaumsbericht der Disconto-Gesellschaft, p. 172. 
468.  Compare Ernst Loeb, Supplement to hlodel, loc. cit., p.  152. 
469.  See Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., pp. I 14-1 I 7. 
470.  See Model, loc. cit., p. 58. 
471.  Jubilaumsdenkschrift der Disconto-Gesellschaft, pp.  204-205. 
472.  "The bank is authorized to conduct all kinds of  banking business, 
and therefore to conduct business of  such nature that it can withdraw its 
money from that business at any time it may be needful." 
473. For some unaccountable reason,  Model, in his work  "Die grossen 
Berliner Effektenbanken"  (1896) failed  to mention the A.  Schaaffhausen1- 
scher Bankverein, although it ranked even then among the great Effekten- 
banken, and, having established its Berlin branch in 1891, might properly 
be numbered among the Berlin great banks. 
474.  Compare Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p.  113. 
475.  See Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., pp. I 12, 123. 
476.  Ibid., p. 210. 
477.  See Otto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 137. 
478.  For the following discussion See Model, loc. cit., p. 91 et seq. 
479.  Report of  the Berliner Handelgesellschaft  for  1878, p. 2. 
480.  See A. Sartorius Freiherr von \Valtershausen,  Das volkwirtschaft- 
liche System der Kapitalanlagen im Auslande, Berlin, Georg Reimer, 1907. 
481. During the first period the Darmstadter Bank, as we learned above 
(p. 49), included in its program  the creation of  agencies both at home and 
abroad, whose purpose was to be to foster exportation and the innumerable 
relations between  German industry and the money market.  But for this 
the time was not yet ripe (partly because of  the scarcity of  German capital 
at that period),  and thus the Darmstadter Bank had soon to abandon its 
ambitious plans (see p. 60 above and note 82 on p. 798) just as the Deutsche 
Bank had for a while to give up its East Asiatic agencies opened soon after 
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482.  Otto Jeidels  must  have  overlooked  the close  connection  between 
this phase of banking and the so-called "export industrialism"  or, at  least, 
he did  not attach sufficient importance  to it, when in his excellent  book 
on the "Relation between the great banks of  Germany to industry"  (p. z~o), 
he  deplores  the "lack  on  the part of  the banks,  of  a general  industrial 
policy serving the economic interests of  the nation as a whole,"  and con- 
tends (p. 197) that with the further evolution of  capitalism the banks are 
driven "to exert their  activity abroad," by the growing necessity  to find 
opportunities for profitable investment in foreign countries for unemployed 
German capital.  This argument, while possessing a certain weight, is not 
decisive. 
483.  The exports by  sea constitute a large share of  the total exports. 
amounting in the same year, according  to the special  report  of  the Ad- 
miralty  (introduction p.  v), to 64 per cent of  the total exports. 
484.  According to the report of  the  imperial Admiralty  of  Dec.  1905  . 
on  the  "Development of  the German marine interests in the last decade" 
(introduction, p. v),  of  the total  imports  in  1904 almost  73.9  per  cent 
arrived by sea. 
485.  See Paul Voigt, loc. cit., p.  273. 
486.  In the middle of  the last century, as stated above (p. 44), industry 
was called  upon  to provide  sustenance and employment for the rapidly 
increasing  population which  could  no  longer be  supported  by agriculture 
alone. 
487.  The expression  "feeding  countries"  (Nahrungsstaaten)  is too nar- 
row,  because  we  are dependent  upon  foreign  countries  for  other  things 
besides food-stuffs. 
488.  Thus von Halle's description (loc. cit., p. 70), "Earnings of  German 
capitalists from foreign securities and loans, bought and sold in Germanyn 
is too narrow. 
489.  Paul  Dehn,  Weltwirtschaftliche  Neubildungen  (Berlin,  Allgem. 
Verein fiir deutsche Literatur, ,1904, p. 41). 
490.  See Journal  officiel de la  Republique  Fran~aise,  XXIVe  annee, 
Sept.  25,  1902, and the oft-mentioned Denkschrift des Reichsmarineamts 
of  December 1905, pp. 188-222. 
491. Loc. cit., p. 247. 
492.  Das  Geld im  russisch-japanischen  Kriege  (Berlin,  Ernst  Siegfr. 
Mittler & Sohn, 1906), p. 217. 
493.  See the very instructive report of Leon Say to the French National 
Assembly, made on Aug. 5, 1874, translated in the publication of  the Cen- 
tralverband des Deutschen  Bank- und Bankiergewerbes. "The payment of 
the  French  war  indemnity  of  187-71  in  Strassburg,  Alsace"  (Berlin, 
J. Guttentag, 1906, p. 83). 
494.  See report  of the Reichsmarineamt of Dec.  1905, introduction,  p. 
XI. 
495.  For particulars  regarding the foreign business  of  German  private 
insurance companies, see the report just mentioned, pp.  179-187.  its foundation. National  Monetary  Commission 
496.  Report of  the Reichsmarineamt of  December  1905, p.  I 71, note  I. 
497.  2d  ed.,  pt. 11, No.  3, sec.  13: Daten zur  Handelsbilanz  (Vienna, 
1904)~  p.  780, note 2. 
498.  The total amount of  Austro-Hungarian gold  claims against  foreign 
countries was estimated  by  the Neue  Freie  Presse  of  Mar.  29,  1903, at 
400,000,000 crowns. 
499.  The estimates of  income from these freight receipts differ greatly. 
According to estimates of  von Halle  (loc. cit.,  p.  201),  based  upon Wor- 
mann's calculations,  it amounted in 1897 to 200,000,000 marks annually, 
and  would  therefore  amount  at present  to  about  ~oo,ooo,ooo  marks. 
Rud. Arnold (Die Handelsbilanz Deutschlands, Berlin, 1905, Franz Siemen- 
roth, p.  185) estimates it at a much lower figure.  W.  Lotz (Einiges iiber 
den Ausgleich von Sol1 und Haben in Weltverkehr, Bank-Archiv,  Vol.  I, 
No.  6, p. 93) on the other hand also estimates the German freight receipts 
from oversea shipping at 200,000,000 to 300,000,000 marks.  The freight 
receipts of  the British merchant marine from its oversea trade alone are 
estimated at 1,800,000,000  marks annually.  (Grunzel, System der Handels- 
politik,  1901, p. 584.) 
500.  Ad.  Soetbeer, Bemerkungen  uber die Handelsbilanz Deutschlands 
(in Hirth's Annalen, Vol. 75, p. 731 et sec].).  This is probably the work in 
which the expression Zahlungsbzhnz (balance of  payments) was first used 
(No. 8, p.  735) in contradistinction to Handelsbzlanz  (balance of  trade). 
501.  Compare with the above the report by Ignatz Gruber, (Vienna) on 
statistics  of  the  international  balance  of  payments,  presented  to  the 
International  Statistical  Institute  (10th  session,  London,  July  31  to 
Aug.  1.5,  1905). 
502.  See  Riesser,  Finanzielle  Kriegsbereitschaft  und  Kriegsfuhrung, 
p. 2 et seq. 
503.  Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft  im  19  Jahrhundert,  2d  ed.,  p.  184. 
The amount of Russian State securities (including railway securities guar- 
anteed by the state) disposed of  in France is estimated at ~o,ooo,ooo,w  to 
13,000,000,000 francs. 
504.  The table compiled by Rud. Arnold on pages  169-171  of  his book 
"Die  Handelsbilanz  Deutschlands  von  1889-1900"  (Berlin,  Franz  Sie- 
menroth,  1905)  is  entirely  incomplete,  as  he  himself  admits.  Large 
additions may be made to it from the data contained in the book of  Axe1 
Preyer  "  ~berseeische  Aktiengesellxhaften  und  Grossbetriebe"  (Leipzig, 
Th.  Grieben's  Verlag,  I~OS),  which,  however,  does  not relate  solely  to 
German undertakings and excludes small enterprises. 
505.  2d  ed., part 2,  No. 3,  sec.  13: "Data on the balance  of  payment," 
(Tables 224-458).  Vienna, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdnickerei, 1904. 
506.  This chapter is a  summary of  the views which I advocated  as a 
member  of  the bank bill commission of  1908  and at the examination  of 
experts. 
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506a. See Otto Warschauer,  "  Das Depositenbankwesen  in Deutschland, 
mit besonderer  Beriicksich  tigung  der  Spareinlagen"  (Conrads  "  Jahrb. " 
Third  series, Vol.  XXVII, p.  433-487). 
507.  Caesar Straus, "  Unser Depositengeldersystem  und seine Gefahren," 
(Frankfort-on-the-Main, Car1 Jiigel, 1892). 
508.  Loc. cit., p. 17. 
509.  Loc. cit., p. 26. 
510. Loc. cit., pp. 38-39. 
5  I I. Otto Warschauer,  "  Das Depositenbankwesen  in  Deutschland,"  in 
Conrads' Jahrbiicher,"  third series, Vol.  2 7 (~goq),  p. 473 et seq., 477, 481. 
512.  Loc. cit., pp. 480-481. 
513.  Loc. cit., p. 482. 
514.  Otto Warschauer,  pp.  483-484. 
515. With unlimited liability.  According to Warschauer, credit corpora- 
tions with  limited  liability  should  be  forbidden  to accept  deposits  (loc. 
cit., p. 484). 
516.  Sce resolution  of  Count von Arnim in the Bourse act cotnn~ission 
of  Mar.  10,  1896,  the text of  which has been  reproduced  by  Ad.  Weber 
loc. cit , p.  259-60  and  by others.  According to that resolution,  regula- 
tions are to be issued by which banks and business people engaged solely 
in  the deposit business  are to be prohibited  from  engaging in  contango, 
speculative,  founding and  issuing  business  (except  trust-fund  issues)  as 
well as from participating in such business and in any issues not expressly 
permitted.  They  are  moreover  to  be  compelled  to  publish  monthly 
summary statements,  the form  of  which-set  forth  in the resolution- 
is to be legally prescribed. 
517 See, among others, Otto Warschauer,  loc. cit.,  p. 486  (Bili No.  3). 
51  8.  C. Heiligenstadt, "  Der Deutsche Geldmarkt," in Sch~noller's  Jahrb. 
Vol. 31, NO. 4, P. 98. 
519.  Loc. cit., p. 98, X. 
520.  LOC.  cit., p. 99. 
52 I. Reprinted in "Handel und Gewerbe," Mar. 24, 1906,12th  year, No. 24, 
p. 4  70,  and elsewhere. 
522.  Edgar  Jaffk, in  Transactions  of  the  Third  General  Congress  of 
German Bankers (Allgemeiner Deutscher  Bankiertag), p. 99. 
523.  In such cases the bank usually  assists only the stock brokers,  not 
the joint  stock banks themselves. 
524.  Ed. Jaff6, "Das Englische Bankwesen,"  p.  204,  note I. 
525.  Ed. Jaff6, in Transactions of  the Third General Congress of  German 
Bankers (Allgemeiner Deutscher  Bankiertag), p.  99. 
526.  Caesar Straus, loc. cit., p. 31. 
527.  Loc. cit., p. 99. 
528.  According to J. W. Gilbart, "The History,  Principles  and Practice 
of  Banking,"  ed.  1901,  London,  I, p.  310,'311, et seq.; 11, p. 342, 361, et 
seq. National  Monetary  Commission 
529.  See second  (German)  edition of  this book,  pp. 12-14  (foot-note). 
Thus for instance during the crisis of  18j7 the first banks to fail were the 
Borough  Bank  of  Liverpool  with  liabilities  of  £1,200,000,  the  Western 
Bank of  Scotland, which only a year before had paid a 9 per cent dividend 
and which had  IOI  branch  offices.  The last-named  bank had advanced 
£1,603,000 to four firms which became insolvent, although its total capital 
only amounted to £1,500,000;  furthermore, an item of  £260,000 figured in 
its published balance sheets as good assets, which the managers themselves 
(according to notes discovered) had marked as irrecoverable.  The Derwent 
Iron Co. alone owed the bank no less than £750,000 and had deposited as 
"security"  (in addition  to a land  mortgage)  £250,000  of  its own deben- 
tures, which were  nothing  more  than  notes of  the directors forming the 
company.  None of  these facts, of  course, could be ascertained from the 
published  statements.  In 1858 occurred, among others, the failure of  the 
Northumberland and Durham District Bank of  Newcastle with £1,256,000 
deposits just  after  it declared  a  7 per  cent  dividend  at the semiannual 
meeting of  its shareholders;  the directors pleading that, since so many of 
the shareholders lived on their dividends, they had not the heart "to face 
the shareholders without paying  a dividend!" 
In  1864 no  less  than  27  joint  stock  banks failed,  and  another  large 
number  followed  in  1866, including  the Joint  Stock  Discount  Co.,  the 
Barneds  Bank of  Liverpool with liabilities  amounting  to £3,5oo,ooo, the 
Bank  of  London,  the  Consolidated  Bank,  the  Agrar  and  Mattermans 
Bank, the English Joint Stock Bank, the Imperial Mercantile Credit Co., 
the European Bank, etc., etc. 
In the crisis of  1878 the City of  Glasgow Bank was the first of  the deposit 
banks to fail;  it had lent £4,ooo,ooo to 4 firms, and had published  false 
balance sheets in 1877. 
A series of  other banks followed.  Compare 0. Glauert,  "Depositenbil- 
dung in England U.  in Deutschland"  (Conrad's Jahrb. 3rd series, Vol. VII, 
p. 808):  "From  1814 to 1816,240 agricultural banks suspended payment, 
and 70 within the first six weeks of  1826."  See also Edgar Jaff6, loc. cit., 
PP 196-197. 
According  to Karl  Mamroth,  "  Die  schottischen  Banken,"  (Conrad's 
Jahrb., 3rd  series, Vol. XXIV, No.  I, p. 43,  note  139)  11 banks of  issue 
failed in Scotland between  1804 and 1842. 
530.  Edgar Jaff6, "Das englische Bankwesen," pp. 204-205,  and p.  202. 
531.  Loc. cit., pp. 204, 205. 
532.  In England this "doctoring"  of  the balance sheets is called "window 
dressing."  Edgar  Jaff6, loc.  cit., p.  205. 
533.  Edgar  Jaff6  in  Transactions  of  the  Third  General  Congress  of 
German Bankers (Allgemeiner Deutscher  Bankiertag), p. 96.  Ad. Weber, 
loc.  cit., p.  231.  The reserve  funds alone  of  all  the  82  English  deposit 
banks amounted to about £31,000,000=68  per cent of  the paid-up capital, 
but only about 4%  per cent of  their liabilities. 
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534. The published  balance  sheets of  the  13,912 cooperative  societies 
connected with the Prussian Central Cooperative Society (Preussische  Centrd 
Genossenschaftskasse) showed that at the end of  1905 their  own resources 
amounted to 54,625,382 marks,  the deposits  to  758,514,000 marks.  The 
proportion  consequently was  93:7, i. e., the deposits were  about thirteen 
times as much as their own means.  For 1,002 cooperative societies with 
limited liability the proportion of  deposits to own resources at that period, 
was 885. 
535. Ed. Wagon,  "Die finanzielle Entwicklung  der deutschen  Aktien- 
gesellschaften,"  (Jena, Gustav Fischer,  1903), p.  146; see p. 470. 
536. See Edgar Jaff6, p. 198. 
537. See Ad. Wagner,  "Beitrage zur  Lehre von den Banken,"  Leipzig, 
-  - 
1857, pp. 166-170,  and p. 61. 
538. On  the other  hand,  however,  it must  be remembered  that if  in 
time of  crisis  a  demand  is made  on  a  bank  for  immediate payment  of 
money which  according  to existing agreement is only due within  a short 
time, it can not afford  to  refuse  except  in  case of  necessity,  and  even 
then  for the most  part not without  risk.  A different  opinion,  at least 
apparently, is expressed  in Der  Deutsche Oekonomist  of  Nov.  11,  1905; 
23d year, No.  1194, p. 566). 
539. Lansburgh,  loc. cit.,  pp. 36-38,  refers  to other  sources  of  error, 
namely,  that both  the capital and cash  accounts, and the other balance 
sheet items are considerably  influenced by the reciprocal relations of  the 
banks, so that frequently the same amounts are necessarily counted twice, 
even  three  times.  Consequently,  the immediately  available  assets  are 
frequently lower than they appear in the balance sheet, for instance, when 
according  to the example given  (p. 36)  a  provincial  bank  passes  on its 
ready  cash  to a central bank.  In this case the amount passed  on figures 
in the balance sheet of  the provincial  bank as a bank  credit, and in the 
balance sheet of  the central  bank as cash, and in case  the central bank, 
as is often done, books its giro account at the Reichsbank as cash, the sum 
in question will figure for the third time as the central bank's cash balance 
at the Reichsbank.  This inconvenience  may in part be done away with 
by placing in  the balance  sheet of  the Central  Bank  the amount passed 
on to it by the provincial bank not  only among the cash holdings, that 
is to say among the assets, but also among the debit items, that is tosay, 
among the liabilities. 
540.  As long ago as Sept. 5,  1907, in my report at the Third General 
Congress of  German  Bankers  at Hamburg  (Transactions p.  22;  and re- 
print published by Leonh. Simion Nachfolger, Berlin,  1907, p. p),  I espe- 
cially emphasised  the fact that a permanent falling off  in the liquidity of 
bank balances would constitute "one  of  the most serious drawbacks"  of 
the concentration in the banking business. 
541. The degree of  liquidity of  individual credit  banks may of  course 
be more or less favorable than the average for all banks, even decidedly so. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
542. In regard  to the liquidity  of  the Austrian joint  stock banks,  Dr. 
Eugen Lopuszanski, secretary to the Ministry, Vienna, in a treatise entitled: 
'Einige  Streiflichter  auf  das  Oesterreichische  Bankwesen,"  in  the 
bolkwirtschaftliche ~'ochenschrift,  von H. Dorn, vol. L. No. 1305, Dec. 31, 
1908, p. 442, writes as follows: "  The liquidity, in as far as it is exhibited by 
the ratio of  the so-called liquid  assets (cash, discounts, loans on  collateral, 
and  contango)  to  the  total  of  creditors,  deposits  and  acceptances, 
amounted at the end of  1883 to about 65 per cent, and at the end of  1907 
to about 45 per cent." 
This comparison  shows a considerable  decrease in the liquidity  of  the 
Austrian  joint  stock banks.  But even  the present  percentage  of  45  per 
cent is comparatively favorable. 
543  I wish  to emphasize once more that, in reference to the liquidity 
of  the  assets, the greatest  difference may exist  among  different banks, 
without being noticeable in any balance sheet or summary statement. 
544. Conrads  Jahrb.  I11  series. Vol.  34,  No.  5,  Nov.  1907,  p. 588; 
cf. loc. cit., Vol. XX, pp. 86-97. 
545. See his article  in Conrads Jahrb. I11  series,  Vol.  XX, p.  90,  in 
which he calculates that on Dec  31,  1899, in  I I  Berlin Banks  the imme- 
diately available assets  constituted  only  57  per  cent of  the  liabilities. 
However, he includes neither the loans on collateral, which for those banks 
amounted  to about  463,000,~  marks  on  the date mentioned, nor  the 
securities which  in  1898 amounted  for  the  same banks  to  71q,5oo,ooo 
marks,  but solely cash, specie, bank credits,  bills and contango.  This is 
not consistent,  for  the same  objections  that may be  made against the 
mmediate availability of  the loans on collateral (which by  the way at that 
time included also  the Bourse  contango) can  be  made  against the con- 
tango, (which was regarded by Heinemann as immediately realisable), nay 
even  against the  bills,  which  likewise  cannot  always  be  realised  at a 
moment's notice. 
546. See Robert Franz, "Die Deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908," p. 549. 
547. Some banks, it is true, hold no doubt large amounts of  bills due to 
industrial long-time investments. 
548. See Rob  Franz, Die  Deutschexl  Banken  im  Jahre  1908 (Reprint  .  . 
from the Deutscher Oekonomist, Berlin, 1908), p. 549. 
549. Loc. cit., p  468-470. 
550. Transactions, p. 118. 
551. The compilation  given  in  the  "Tag"  of  Apr.  17,  1908,  entitled 
"  Die  hauptsachlichsten  Bank-  und  Bankierinsolvenzen  1906-1907,"  is 
utterly  unreliable.  Even  the  title is misleading,  inasmuch  as the table 
deals only with a single credit bank, the Marienburger Privatbank, a joint 
stock company with limited liability, with losses to depositors amounting 
to  6,600,000  marks,  as already  noted  in the above-mentioned table  by 
Dr.  Salomonsohn.  The firm  of  Messrs. Haller, Sohle & Co., despite  its 
title  "Hamburger  Bank,"  was  no  Bank, but merely  a  private  banking 
establishment.  On  the other  hand, while  the list purports to be essen- 
tially  a  statement of  losses of  deposits, it quite unwarrantably includes 
brokers'  firms, as well  as a whole series of  banking  establishments which 
either had no deposits, or whose depositors sustained no losses.  One firm 
had  simply gone into liquidation  because  it was  taken  over by a  bank 
(without even a shadow of  danger to depositors);  another firm, alleged to 
have lost 672,000 marks, could not be traced even with the assistance of 
the chambers of  comxnerce. 
552.  See  Deutscher  Oekonomist,  Jan.  18,  1908,  26th  year,  No.  1308. 
553. At the beginning of  the Bank Inquiry of  1908, the Imperial chan- 
cellor expressly  stated through  Herr  Wermuth,  the Under  Secretary of 
State, that no division between pure deposit banks and banks  transacting 
miscellaneous business.was contemplated. 
554. See Edgar Jaff6, "Das Englische Bankwesen,"  pp. 170-178. 
555. Caesar Straus, loc. cit., pp. 38-39;  Otto  Warschauer, loc. cit., p. 474. 
556. This effectually  disposes of  the assertion by the former bank official 
Lansburgh (loc. cit., p.  55) to the effect that the German  bank  managers 
are opposed  to deposit banks solely on the ground that they are not likely 
to yield to them (the managers) sufficient profit.  This direct attack on the 
probity of  all German bank managers does not become any more excusable 
by the fact that Lansburgh (ibid.) starts  with the idea "that a deposit bank 
is far more profitable than a bankdealing in securities,"  an idea which, in 
view of  the present absolutely and relatively small German national wealth, 
is utterly erroneous.  This is not and never was the attitude of  the mana- 
gers of  German credit banks.  They are ready to establish deposit banks 
immediately they become convinced of  the propriety of  such a step, or as 
soon as legal enactments or  the measures  taken by State institutions or 
deposit banks shall force them to do so. 
557.  See 0. Glauert,  loc.  cit.,  p.  815;  Reichsbank  President  Koch  in 
Bank-Archiv, 4th year, No. 5, March, 1905.  The statement that the tasks 
of the Reichsbank have of  late been rendered more difficult by the "con- 
centration of  the credit banks influencing the open market"  would apply 
in a still greater degree to the proposed Reichsdepositenbank, and to any 
private,  or non-Federal  state banks, except  that the effect of  the latter 
would be not  merely to hamper but even to  thwart  the discount policy 
of  the Reichsbank. 
558. See Edgar JaffC  "Das Englische  Bankwesen,"  pp.  170-178.  See 
also an essay entitled  "La haute Banque allemande,"  in  "La chronique 
industrielle,  maritime  et coloniale,"  Jan. 6,  1905, p.  3:  "Thanks to the 
support and aid lent to it by high finance, German industry has in a short 
time  undergone  a  gigantic  development.  There can  be  no doubt  that 
without  this alliance,  without  this union  of  its industrial and financial 
forces, the Empire would not have achieved  the wonders which we  have 
witnessed." 
See also Ad.  U'eber,  loc. cit.,  p.  257,  citing various opinions including 
those of  Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and of  an English expert, who speaks of 
German banks as follows: "They are virtually the pioneers of  the home National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
and foreign trade of  the German Empire"  (see Frederick  J. Fuller  and 
H. D.  Rowan,  "Foreign  competition  in its relation  to banking"  in  the 
Journal of  the Institute of  Bankers,  Vol.  XXI,  Part  11, p. 55).  Even 
AndrC E.  Sayous,  who as a rule has little to say in favor of  the manage- 
ment of  the German banks, and who in his  book, Les  Banques de DCpBt, 
les Banqnes de CrCdit  et les SociCtCs financihres (Paris, 1901, L. Larose), 
pp. 292, 293, goes so far as to assert that a serious panic,  even one of  no 
great  severity,  "would  force  nearly  all  the German  banks  to  suspend 
payment,"  nevertheless concludes  the gd  chapter of  that book with the 
words:  "Be this as it may, while the French banks have accentuated the 
economic stagnation of  our country, the German banks have had a con- 
siderable share in the brilliant  industrial  and commercial  expansion  of 
Germany." 
559  I pointed  out there, among other  things,  that, so  far as human 
foresight goes, there  was no reason to expect  that the Reichsdepositen- 
bank  would  receive  deposits  to  the  extent  of  at least  ~,ooo,ooo,ooo 
marks,  the  amount  on  which  Warschauer  bases  his  calculation  of  the 
chances of  profit-unless  the funds collected by the postal cheque offices 
were assigned to it.  Even assuming  this, the business expenses must be 
deducted from the gross profits, which at first could  hardly exceed  I  per 
cent.  As the expenses of  the German credit banks absorb 31 per cent of 
their  gross profits (see Rob. Franz, "Die Deutschen  Banken in 1907,''  p. 
78), and in the case of  Berlin banks even 33 per cent, the net profits would 
scarcely amount to more than one-fourth to one-half of  I per cent on the 
interest-bearing deposits, and the dividends would amount to abont 5 to 
6  per  cent,  according  to  the amount of  the  share capital.  Even  this 
would only be reached gradually.  Further, I pointed out that the analogy 
with the English  deposit banks, whose dividends had led  Warschauer to 
make his estimate, did not hold.  In the first place, in England the paid- 
up share capital, on which  dividends are to be paid  is, in contrast to the 
reserves, absolutely and relatively trifling in amonnt (in 1904 for 87 deposit 
banks an average of  15,ooo,ooo marks per bank), while the turnover and 
deposits  are  extremely  large,  6,250,000,ooo  marks (see p.  202).  More- 
over, deposits accepted ip London with or without the condition of  two 
weeks'  notice bear interest only at 1% per cent below bank discount, and 
this applies to only such deposits that have been  at the bank's disposal 
for at  least one month, the minimum amount of  deposit at  any time being 
£10.  I have  misgivings  concerning  the use to be made of  "first-class" 
industrial securities and bank shares for loans on collateral up to 30 per 
cent of their  market value, a  device admitted by Warschauer manifestly 
to increase the lucrativeness of  the proposed institution.  At his demand 
I will explain that these misgivings are based  on the fact that dividend- 
paying  securities are subject to great  fluctuations  in  quotation  and,  in 
critical times,  can either  not be  sold  at all or  only at a  great sacrifice, 
while on those very occasions the margin is with difficulty kept up and 
the repayment  of  advances can  not be readily  expected.  Further, the 
practice which  Warschauer is disposed to admit would  lead  to the very 
evil  for which the English  deposit  banks are blamed, namely, the use  of 
deposits for  Bourse  speculation.  Finally,  as regards the "acquisition  of 
first  mortgages"  by deposit  banks pure  and simple,  which  Warschauer 
even  deems  "advisable"  (geboten),  I  do  not  regard  it as a  desirable 
investment, at least  to a considerable  extent, since these banks have to 
be ready at  any time to repay call deposits or short-term deposits, and it 
may be difficult to realize even on first mortgages. 
-  - 
560. Nor can the advocates of  this idea appeal to the fact that according 
to  Roman  law  the creditors  of  noninterest-bearing  deposits  possessed 
a prior  right in the case of  bankrup~cy  of  a banker  (argentarius),  which 
Papinian  expressly  states was  introduced  for the benefit  of  the whole 
community (Utilitate publica  receptum-see  1.  17, secs. 2,  3, 8 D,  16, 3), 
for  modern  business  methods allow of no  comparison  with those of  the 
argentarius. 
561. Among the arguments raised against it, see Deutscher Oekonomist, 
22d  year,  No.  1127, p. 432  (July,  1904), "Suggestions  have  been  made 
relating  to  the  proportion  between  deposits  and  share  capital.  This, 
however, is Fgre word-play without any value; for on the one hand the 
reserves are property of the bank, just as apt to be called upon to cover 
liabilities as the share capital,  and on the other hand the assets are se- 
curity for all liabilities,  and not merely for the deposits.  To establish a 
definite proportion between  share capital and deposits would have a pur- 
pose only in case there were no other liabilities than the deposits.  That 
is the condition  of  the Savings Banks, which  of  course is totally differ- 
ent from that of  ordinary banks." 
562  See Deutscher Oekonomist, July 13, 1904 (22d year, No. I 127)~  p. 432 
563. This remark,  though  often repeated,  is a  gross  exaggeration,  to 
say the least, intended, or at least apt, to scare the timid.  The national 
wealth  certainly does  not  consist  merely  of  deposits,  bills  and current 
account balances,  which  for  all  those banks that had at least  ~,ooo,ooo 
marks capital each amounted at the end of  1908 to about 7,250,000,000 
marks.  Of  these banks only the largest are managed  by 10 to  12 man- 
agers, just  as State and private industrial and agricultural concerns.  On 
the  contrary  the national wealth,  estimated  at present  to  be  between 
216,ooo,ooo,ooo to  ~6o,ooo,ooo,ooo  marks,  consists of  a  great  number  of 
enormous items, such as the savings deposited in savings banks and coop- 
erative societies to the amonnt of  abont 14,000,000,000 marks, of  the vast 
amounts, totaling  about 40,000,000,000 marks, invested in mortgages and 
mortgage bonds, etc. 
Nevertheless, I do not underrate the great power and responsibility of 
the heads of  our great banks, as this book will show. 
564.  In Schmoller's  Jahrbuch,  v01  31,  No.  4,  "  Der  Deutsche  Geld- 
markt,"  pp. 72-95. 
565.  Heiligenstadt very properly omits dcbits on current account from 
the list of  immediately available  assets.  In giving his reasons for  this National  Monetary  Commission 
omission, he makes, however, the surprising statement (p. 82) that "With a 
view  to aiding the enlargement of  commercial and industrial  enterprises 
and enabling them to complete their works, the banks grant credit to these 
enterprises, in the form of  current account credit, quite regularly, and to an 
increasing degree as the money market becomes  less favorable (!).  This 
is done in the hope and with the purpose of  restoring the liquidity of  such 
loans  by the issue  of  shares  and debentures,  when  the  money  market 
becomes more favorable."  It is  hard  to imagine  how  the banks could 
have pursued such a business policy.  What really occurred  occasionally 
was that certain credits which were, originally working credits were, through 
the debtor's inability to pay, gradually transformed into investment credit 
(Anlage-Kredit)  very  much  against  the  will  of  the  creditors;  or,  that 
credit which  was really  intended  to be used  for investment  was applied 
for  as working  credit  (Betriebskredit),  or finally, that during good times 
(or  such as were  considered  good)  the long-term  credit, that is to say, 
investment  credit,  necessary  for  finishing  works  already  begun,  or  for 
extending existing works,  so as to make them profitable  even in critical 
times, was granted in the hope and expectation that the debtor would soon 
he able to get clear of  it in the form of  debentures, or shares.  Lansburgh 
probably goes too far when he says that the credit granted to industrial 
companies is "distinguished"  from all other credit in that it can be cast 
off  at almost  any period  desired  ('l Die  Verwaltung  des Volkverrnogens 
durch die Banken,"  [separate reprint] pp. 9-10). 
During many years of  practical experience in banking I  have not met 
with  a  case where  a  bank  or bank director in his sound  senses granted 
credit regularly during bad times and even "to an increasing degree as the 
market becomes more unfavorable,"  with the idea of  restoring its liquidity 
by issuing shares and debentures at  a more favorable season, and I do not 
believe that such banks or bank directors could remain in business very long. 
It may not be amiss to point out that credit banks have, on the other 
hand,  been  frequently  reproached  with  the  opposite  policy  of  having 
constrained  manufacturers  to adopt the generally unsuitable and far too 
expensive  short-term  personal  credit with  quick  and frequent  renewals, 
although in the case of  improvements, rebuilding, and the erection of  new 
works,  long term credit, irredeemable  for  many  years, or at least  credit 
repayable in instalments, is more suitable. 
566.  See:  Commission  report, p.  26  "*  *  *  that it would  be  out- 
right  unbusinesslike,  especially  in  the  case  of  industrial  companies,  to 
oblige them to withdraw money for the reserve funds from their business 
and invest it independently, whereas they may perhaps be  compelled  to 
burrow the necessary capital at  a higher rate of  interest.  *  *  *" 
567.  See "Deutscher  Oekonomist,"  Dec. 28,  1901, (Vol. XIX, No. 993). 
568.  George Bernhard in "Plutus," 4pr. 24, 1909, p. 306. 
569.  Reprinted anlong others by Ad. Weber, loc. cit., pp. 259, 260. 
570. See Felix Hecht, "Die Katastrophe der Leipziger Bank,"  (Storungen 
im  Deutschen Wirtschaftsleben wahrend der Jahre  1900 ff, published  by 
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the Verein  fur Socialpolitik, Vol.  6,  Geldmarkt,  Kreditbanken,  p.  373, et 
seq.):  "At  the end of  1900 the Leipziger Bank, according to its balance 
sheet, held bills amounting to 37,798,570.67 marks.  But this balance sheet 
does not show that about  12,000,000 marks of  these bills were  pledged 
to the "lottery loan fund"  (p. 384). 
571.  As an additional argument against the demand for a statement of 
the  "total  of  moneys  employed  for contango  transactions and loans on 
collateral,"  the following may be urged:  Nothing is gained, least of  all the 
object aimed at, by showing the extent to which  the bank  has favored 
speculation,  as the contango and loans on collateral may comprise quite 
different  engagements  and  advances on  goods.  Neither  can  the  kind, 
number and above all the quality of  the securities deposited at the bank 
as guarantees  be  ascertained  from  the  statement  demanded,  although 
these  are  the most  essential  points;  and  matters mould  not  be greatly 
altered if  the "total amount1'-nothing  else is possible-of  the guarantees 
were also published. 
572.  Doctor Salomonsohn in Transactions  of  the 111 General Congress 
of  German Bankers, p. I I 6. 
573.  In regard to this see the very appropriate remark by Eugen Lopus- 
zanski in his treatise "Einige Streiflichter  auf  das Oesterreichische Eank- 
wesen  (In the "Volksw.  Wochenschrift"  of  Alex.  Dorn,  Vienna, Dec. 31, 
1908, Vol. LX, No. 1305, p. 433):  "While banking, outwardly, forms only 
a limited part of  the national economy, yet by reason of  its  organic arrange- 
ment and  purpose  it is best fitted,  through  its condition at any given 
moment,  to exhibit  the interaction  of  the forces and the results of  the 
movement of  the national economy, in a cross section, as it were, of  the 
economic organism." 
574.  See the essay:  "  Spargelder"  in  the "  Neue  Politische  Correspon- 
denz"  of  May 21, 1909. 
575. Such a  case is mentioned  by the "Neue Politische Correspondenz" 
of  May 2 I, 1909. 
576.  See "  Aelteste  der  Berliner Kaufmannschaft" in the Berl. Borsen- 
Zeitung, No. 264, June 9, 1909;  Alfred Loewenberg in the "Tag," No. 198, 
Aug. 25, 1909, and especially Koch in the "Zeitschrift  fur Handelswissen- 
schaft und Handelspra~is,"  Vol. 11, p. 38 et sec1 ,  who  justly  points out, 
that the proposal to increase the personnel seems rather strange at a time 
when everbody is studying how to reduce the number of  employees. 
577.  In his book "  Beitrage zur Lehre von den Banken,"  Leipzig,  1857 
P  159. 
578.  Ad.  Wagner,  "Bankbruche  U. Bankkontrollen,"  in the Deutsche 
Monatsschrift  fur  das gesamte  Leben  der Gegenwart  (ibid.  Lohmeyer) 
Year I, No.  I  (Oct., I~OI),  pp. 74-85,  and No. 2  (Nov., ~gor),  pp. 248-258, 
especially p. 2 55.  See on the other hand the Deutscher Oekonomist of  Oct. 
19, 1901, and Nov.  I, 1902, and R. Rosendorff,  "Bankbruche  U. Bank- 





Paul Marcuse, loc. cit., p. 136. 
The fact, noted by Obst, that, according to the report of  the Comp- 
of the Currency of  Sept. 23,  1908, the majority of  the presidents of 
tional hanks have declared themselves satisfied with the supervision 
hitherto exercised by the "national bank examiners,"  does not necessarily 
mean  that this method  has served  its purpose; it may mean  something 
totally different. 
Part I V. 
I. See Hernlann Schumacher, Die Ursachen  und  Wirkungen der Kon- 
zentration in deutschen Bankwesen  (Causes and Effects of  Concentration 
in German Banking) in Schmoller's Jahrbuch, Jan.  27,  1906, Vol.  XXX, 
No.  3, pp. 884, et seq.  Paul Wallich, Konzentration in deutschen Bank- 
wesen  (Concentration in German Ranking), Stuttgart and Berlin, Cotta, 
190.5.  Julius Steinberg, Die  Konzentration  in Bankgewerbe  (Concentra- 
tion  in  Banking),  Berlin,  Franz  Siemenroth,  1906.  Adolf  IYeber,  Die 
Konzentration in deutschen Bankwesen  (Concentration in German Bank- 
ing), Krit. Blntter, f. d. ges. Sozialwissenschaften, Vol. 11, No.  7,  pp. 299- 
303.  Edgard Depitre, Le mouvement de concentration dans les Ballques 
Allemandes (The concentration movement  among German Banks), Paris, 
Arthur  Rousseau  1905.  Otto  UTarschauer, Die  Konzentration  in1  deut- 
schen  Bankwesen  (Concentration  in  German  bank in^),  Conrad's  Jahr- 
biicher, sd series, Vol. XXXII, pp. 145-162.  Andre Si)yous, 1,a  concentra- 
tion de trafic  de banque en Allemape, Journal des Econonlistes Jan. 15, 
1899. 
2.  W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalisn~us,  Vol. I, p. 407. 
3. For  a  description  of  the  movement  of  concentration  in  banking 
abroad see the very excellent accounts in the Vossische Zeitung of  Jan. 26, 
27,28, and 31, 1905.  (They cover Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, 
Belgium, and the United  States.)  Use has been made of  these articles in 
various parts of  the follo~ving  discussion. 
4.  On  this  point  the best  references  are  the  different  sections  (lec- 
tures) of  the classic work of  Karl Bucher,  Die Entstehung der Volkswirt- 
schaft (The Evolution of  Economie Society), Tubingen, Laupp'sche  Buch- 
handlung,  1901, and particularly  the follo~vit~g  sections:  IV,  Die gewerh- 
lichen Betriebssysten~e  in ihrer  geschichtlichen Entwicklung, (The Indus- 
trial  Systems  in  their  Historical  Evolution),  pp.  175  et seq.;  V,  Der 
Niedergang  des  Handwerks  (Decline of  the Handicraft  System), pp. 21  5 
ct seq.;  VII, Arheitsvereinigung und Arbeitsgemeinschaft  (The Combina- 
tion  and  Concentration  of  Labor);  IX,  .4rbeitsgliederung  und  soziale 
Klassenhildung, p. 283 et seq. ; (The Division of  Labor and the Development 
of  Social Classes) pp. 367 et seq. 
5. In order to avoid duplication we must refer to the abundant materid 
given on this point in what is now Part 111, Chap. 111, secs. I and r (See above 
pp. 191 to  407).  See also the valuable work of  Otto Jeidels, Das Verhnltnis 
der deutschen  Grossbanken  zur  Industrie,  mit  besonderer  Beriicksichti- 
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gung der Eisenindustrie"  (The Relation  of  the German Great Banks to 
Industry, with special reference to the iron industry), Leipzig, Duncker & 
Humblot, 1905. 
6.  But this does not necessarily mean the doubling of  profits. 
7.  See Hertnann Schunlacher, op. cit., pp. 5-6.  The requirements of  sound 
principle is that custoniers receiving large amounts of  credit from a bank 
should  be  obliged  to confine their  entire banking  business  to  the bank 
advancing its credit, in order that the bank may be in a position to keep 
posted  on  the business of  the borrower.  This  requirement  can  not be 
readily enforced owing to competition, but so far as it is practicable, it is 
in a large nleasure lived up to by the banks.  Unfortunately  as the Ter- 
linden case has proved, the observance of  this ohligatio~i  by the customer 
can not be readily controlled.  So long as there is no central credit agency, 
such a  clause in the contract  must remain  a lex imperfecta.  Owing  to 
practical difficulties, such an agency has not yet been established, although 
a few attempts have been made. 
8. This too is a function of  the bank floating securities, or of  the banks 
interested  in selling the stocks or  bonds in connection  with  an issue of 
securities.  For this activity exclusively, as distinguished from the hanker's 
work  as hroker,  he  receives  a  "honus."  The  bonus  represents  thus  a 
special compensation  for a special service performed by the banker.  The 
service consists  in  the obligation assumed  by the hanker to make every 
effort, and to utiiile his special knouledge of  his clientele with a view to 
placing the securities issued in good hands, that is to say, where they will be 
held permanently.  This is a duty that should be done hy no one else but 
the banker and can not be done by any one else.  It  is therefore unreason- 
able to require him to divide the bonus with his principal, the purchaser of 
the  securities.  Neither  can  it  be  said,  as the  court  (Reichsgericht,  I 
Zivilsenat)  has held in a decision of  Dec.  10, 1904, that he is acting with 
fraudulent  intent, in case  he  fails  to inform  the purchaser of  the  bonus 
received by him, or in turn fails to let the purchaser share the benefit of 
this bonus. 
9.  See R. Fleischhammer, Zentralisation im Rankwesen in  Deutschland, 
Schmoller's  Jahrbuch  f. Gesetzgebung,  Verwaltung  und  \Tolkswirtscl~aft, 
vol. 25, No.  2, pp. 241 et seq. 
10. See No.  12 of  the Bestimrnungen  fur  den Giroverkehr  der Reichs- 
bank.  (Rules relating to Giro  Business of  the Reichshank )  According 
to No.  10 of  these rules money  deposited  for giro transactions  does not 
bear interest. 
11. Helfferich, Der deutsche Geldrnarkt 1895-1902, p. 44. 
12. It seems that similar occurrences have taken place also in England, 
(See Edgar Jaff.5, Das Englische Bankwesen, p.   go), also in Austria.  In 
1899 the Axiglobnnk established a branch in Aussig, and in the same year 
a branch was established by the IiTiener  Bankverein.  In 1901 the Nieder- 
oesterreichische  Escon~ptegesellschaft  acquired  the branch  of  the Bohmi- 
sche Escomptebank in Trautenau, and in the same year  a branch  of  the National  Monetary  Commission 
Anglobank was opened in that town.  There are many other such exarn- 
ples which may be found in the Prager Tageblatt for Oct. 12, 19oj, No. 281, 
in the article entitled "Die Konkurrenz im Oesterreichischen Rankwesen." 
13.  The Rhenisch-nTestphalian  Pig Iron Syndicate came to an end on 
Jan. I, 1909, as has been  noted  above (see note 170, p. 818) and likewise 
The Lorraine-1,uxembourg  and the Siegerland  pig  iron  syndicates.  For 
details consult the above discussion. 
14. Among them are the general directors of  the following mining and iron 
companies:  Harpener Bergbau-Aktiengesellschaft,  Oberscl~lesische  Eisen- 
dustrie-Aktiengesellschaft,  Bergwerkgesellschaft  Hibernia,  Konsolidatiun, 
Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft  zu  Schalke, Prager Eisenindustrie in Wien, 
Hohenlohe U'erke. 
1.5.  Among them are the general director of  the Gelsenkirchener Berg- 
werks-Aktiengesellschaft,  and  as representatives  of  shipping  circles  the 
general directors of  the Hamburg-American  Line, and of  the North German 
Lloyd. 
16. ilmong them are a former director of  the firm of  Friedrich Krupp, 
and a general director of  each of  the following rnining and smelting corn- 
panies:  Laura  Hutte,  Bistnarkhutte,  Schlesische  Aktiengesellschaft  fur 
Bergbau und  Zinkhuttenbetrieb in Lipine,  and the Kattowitzer  Aktien- 
gesellschaft fur Bergbau und fiisenhuttenbetrieb. 
17.  See Frankfurter Zeitung of  May 26,  1884, No.  147. 
18. The new  tax provision  was  particularly  oppressive  for  the buyer 
since the tax was paid in everv case on multiples of  1,000 marks. 
19. See Centralverbands-Denkschrift of  December, 1903, pp. 32-34  and 
the Verhandlungen  des I1  Allgem. Deutschen  Bankiertages  (Proceedings 
of  the Second General Convention of  German Bankers) at Berlin, May 16 
and 17, 1904, p. 58  (Mommsen), pp. 73-74  (Arons), pp. 83-84  (Franck), 
and the Frankfurter Zeitung of  May 31, 1901. 
20. See Centralverbands-Denkschrift, pp. 42  et seq. and the Proceedings 
of the First General Convention of  German Bankers at Frankfort-on-the- 
Main, Sept. 19 and 20, 1902, pp. 58-59  (von Pflautn), and Dr. Alfred Meyer, 
Die deutschen Borsensteuern  1881-1900  (German Stock Exchange Taxes), 
Stuttgart and Berlin, J. G. Cotta'sche  Buchhandlung Nachf.  1902, pp. 55 
et seq. 
21.  See  Riesser,  Das  Bankdepotgesetz  vorn  5,  Juli  1896.  Aus  der 
Praxis und fiir die Praxis, insbes. des Handelsstandes, erliiutert  (The Bank 
Deposit Law of  July, 1896,  based on its practical application, and explained 
for practical use, for special use of  the commercial classes).  Berlin, Otto 
I,iebmann,  2d ed. 1906, pp. 67 et seq. 
22.  For a  discussion of  the economic injury resulting  from  the stock 
exchange law, see anlong others, Riesser, Die Notwendigkeit  einer Revision 
des Borsengesetzesvom 22 Juni 18961Jan. 1, 1897 (The Kecd for a Revision 
of  the Stock Exchange Law of  June  22, 1896, effective January 1, 1897), 
Berlin,  1902,  Leonhard Simion  Nachf.;  and  Stand und  Aussichten  der 
Borsengesetzreform (Position and Prospects of  the Stock Exchange Reform 
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Legislation, Berlin, 1907, Leonhard Simion Nachf.) and works mentioned in 
note indicated by one asterisk (*) in the aforementioned  Centralverhands- 
Denkschrift, p.  17.  Reference  may  be made to the following economic 
literature of  more general character: 
Franz Eulenburg,  Die  gegenwartige  Wirtschaftskrisis,  Syrnptome und 
Ursacl~en,  Cunrad's Jahrhucher, gd series, Vol. XXIV, p. 382; I-Ielfferich, Der 
deutsche Geldmarkt  1895-1902,  op.  cit.,  p.  27;  Ad.  Weher,  nepositen- 
banken und Spekulationsbauken, p.  7;  Rnd. Eberstadt, Die gegenwartige 
Krisis, ihre Ursachen und die Aufgaben der Gesetzgebung, Berlin, 1902, K. 
Hoffmann, p. 33;  v.  Halle,  Amerika,  seine  Redeutung  fiir  die  Weltwirt- 
schaft und  seine wirtschaftlichen  Beziehungen  zu  Deutschland, insbeson- 
dere zu Hamburg (America, Its Significance in the Economic Life of  the 
World, Its Economic Relations to Germany and Particularly to Hamburg), 
published by the Hamburger Borsenhalle, 1905, particularly p. 3  I : "  Under 
the ill-advised stock exchange laws of  the last ten years, there has been no 
proportionate progress even in participation in the financial operations of 
the various States."  See also Otto \krarschauer, Die  Reform des Borsen- 
gesetzes  in  Deutschland  in  Conrad's  Jahrb.  C.  Nationalokonomie  und 
Statistik, gd series, Vol. XXX, No. 4, Oct. 1905, pp. 433-469. 
23.  These limitations became applicable to both "legitimate"  as well as 
"illegitimate "  dealings in futures. 
24.  Helfferich, op. cit., p. 27. 
25.  See among others the annual report of the Deutsche Bank for 1895 
and that of  the Dresdner Bank for 1896. 
26.  See the article in the Frankfurter Zeitung of  Nov. 15, 1904, No.  318 
entitled  Borsengesetz und Bankenanschwellung  (Stock Exchange Legisla- 
tion and the Growth of the Banks).  This article shows in two tables the 
growth that has taken place in the case of  10 Great Berlin banks and 20 
provincial banks contrasting their situation in 1896 and again in 1903 with 
their position in 1884. 
27.  As  early as the beginning  of  the seventies the "provincial"  banks 
established were based  almost  entirely on private banks which had heen 
transformed  or  absorbed,  as for  instance  the  Provinzial-Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft,  the  Provinzial-Gewerbehank  in  Berlin,  the Suddeutsche  Provin- 
zialbank  in  Stuttgart,  the  Prov.  Wechslerbank  in  Breslau,  the  Prov. 
Maklerbank in Berlin and the Allgemeine Deutsche Filialen-Kreditanstalt 
in Leipzig.  The idea of  these provincial or union central banks was ahead 
of its time, and for that reason failed in most instances. 
As regards England, see Edgar Jaffe, Das Englische Bankwesen, p.  192 ; 
1844-1875;  Gradual  Consolidation  of Joint  Stock  Banks in  London and 
the  Provinces as a  result  of  the absorption  and  supplanting 01  private 
banking firms;  1878-1890,  consolidation  of  the provincial  banks and the 
formation of  large institutions; some of  the latter gaining  a  foothold  in 
London; 189-1896,  almost total supplanting of  private banking firms in 
London  as well.  The great  provincial  banks have  become consolidated 
in London.  J. \V.  Gilbart, op. cit. (ibid.,  I~OI),  p. 423 mentions the fact National  Monetary  Commission 
that as early as 1836 no fewer than 138 private banking establishments had 
merged with deposit banks.  The number of  private bankers in England 
and Wales declined from 448 in 1837 to 261 in 1858, to 226 in 1878, to 144 
in 1891 and to IOO in 1896. 
With reference to Austria, the Neues Wener Tageblatt said as far back 
as September  13,  1903, that the private banker  "has  disappeared  even 
more rapidly than in Germany, we have well nigh reached  the final stage 
in that process." 
According to the Berliner Tageblatt  (of  May  27,  1904, No.  265), not a 
single private banker remained in Crefeld out of  20 that had once been in 
business  there.  For the disadvantages  resulting from  the decline of  the 
profession of  the private banker see Frankfurter Zeitung of  Jan. I I, 1905, 
"  Aktienbanken und Privatbankiers" and the Centralverbands-Denkschriit 
of  1903, pp. 39  et seq. 
In the United States, private bankers until quite lately were still numer- 
ous (numbering in 1902, 4,188), in spite of  the exceptional growth in number 
of  joint-stock  banks, which increased from 9,338 in 1892 to 13,684 at the 
close of  1903 (Vossische Zeitung, Jan. 31, ~gog),  and in spite of  the fact 
that here too bank consolidations have played a great part.  (In 1901, 27 
national banks were absorbed by other national banks, in 1902, 46). 
The special report of  the U. S. Monetary  Commission gives under date 
of  Apr. 28,  1909, the total number of  private banks as 1,497, as compared 
with 6,888 national banks and 11,292 state banks on the same date.  This 
number  is  exclusive  of  642  mutual  savings  banks,  1,061 stock  savings 
banks, and 1,079 loan and trust companies.  The total number of  corporate 
and private banks, including those which had failed to report to the Com- 
mission, is estimated at about 25,000. 
28.  See below  for  a  discussion  of  the question,  whether  the resultant 
severe depression  and the lack of  vitality occasioned by  it, was justified 
to the extent observed.  (Part VI, p.  751). 
29.  As  an example we may cite the increase in small landholdings (less 
than two hectares) shown by the census of  1895.  These form 58 per cent 
of  all  agricultural  holclings.  In  1895  they  amounted  to  3,236,367, as 
against 3,061,831 in 1882.  (Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich fiir 1904, 
P- 24.) 
30.  In consequence of  mergers, the number of  London banks (exclusive 
of  colonial and so called foreign banks) decreased from I 15 in 1885 to 77 
in 1901.  (See Schmoller, Grundriss 11, p. 232.) 
31. Op. cit., pp.  198-247.  See, however, his study, Die Wirkungen  des 
Borsengesetzes  auf  das  Bank-und  Borsengeschaft  (Effect  of  the  Stock 
Exchange Law  on  the Business  of  the Banks and Stock  Exchanges)  in 
Conrad's Jahrb. 1897, gd series, Vol. XI11 pp. 72j et seq. 
32. Centralverbands-Denkschrift  for  December,  1903, p.  37, and Table 
XV, p. 68. 
33. These were the terms used by Eschenbach at the general convention 
of  the Verein  fur  Sozialpolltik  in  1904 (Verhandlungen, p. 286)  in con- 
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troverting those who held that there had been a "relative decline,"  as well 
as an absolute diminution in the number of  private bankers.  Eschenbach 
himself  seems to admit that there had been a relative decrease, but does 
not attribute it  to the stock-exchange law.  In my opinion  there is not 
much  difference between  these  two  views; according  to the above data 
both views would seem sufficiently founded. 
34.  Op. cit., p.  248. 
35  Op. cit., p.  263. 
36.  Paul U'allich  (op. cit., p.  13) calls attention to another circumstance 
which  tended  to drive  private firms  out of  the banking  business  to an 
increasing  extent-the  establishment  of  branches  of  the Reichsbank  in 
the Provinces.  This caused severe competition to the private bankers along 
the most legitimate lines, even in such places where joint  stock banks had 
not yet made their influence felt.  This competition of  the Reichsbank, it 
is claimed, was particularly severe  in the eastern part of  the Kingdom of 
Prussia, for the reason that the Reichsbank rates for discount and Lombard 
loans,  uniform  for  the entire  Empire,  were  much  lower  than the rates 
charged  before the advent of  the Reichsbank, and thus caused  an enor- 
mous lowering of  interest rates in the respective  sections of  the country. 
37.  Op. cit.,  p.  248.  The Centralverband  was unable  to obtain abso- 
lutely  accurate figures on  this  point,  as the Denkschrift  reports.  More 
important, however, is the testimony of  the author, who is a private banker 
in Berlin.  A large proportion of the private firms still in existence have 
continued their business, in order not to deprive of  a livelihood employees 
who  had  served  them  for  many  years.  The business  of  many  of  these 
firms, however,  no  longer  represents any considerable  amounts.  Tulius 
Steinberg  (op. cit., p. g)  did not assert, as the Deutscher ~ekonomist  of 
December 23,  1905, wrongly assumed, that "generally speaking the number 
of  private bankers  had not  declined, but on the contrary had increased 
somewhat "  This assertion he made only for some German large cities; 
on the other hand, for the stock exchange centers of  Berlin and Frankfort- 
on-the-Main he showed a decrease. 
38. See Julius Steinberg, op. cit., p. 9.  The figures reprinted here, taken 
from the giro-accounts  of the Reichsbank and continued to 1904, do not 
give a clear picture, for the reason that no distinction is made between the 
provincial banks which had remained independent and the private banking 
firms. 
39.  I call attention  here again  to the fact that the decline of  private 
banking like the concentration in banking, was, in my opinion, only hastened 
by the stock-exchange law and not caused by it.  Even without the stock- 
exchange law, the movement toward concentration so clearly seen in en- 
tirely different fields, and in foreign countries as well as in Germany, would 
have set in, though perhaps not with such intensity and rapidity.  We have 
here only one phase in a great and universal process of economic evolution. 
Concerning England, Edgar Jaffi: tells us (Inaugural-Dissert, p. 33) that of 
the old private banking firms that belonged to the clearing house  (40 in National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
1810) only 13 retained their membership in 1873 and 3 in 1900.  However, 
English conditions can not be used for comparison, for the reason that, as 
JaffC reports, (Das Englische Bankwesen, p. 93) in the closing decades of  the 
nineteenth century, no new members were admitted to the clearing house, 
not even banks. 
40.  According  to Ad. Weber, Die rheinisch-westfalischen Provinzbanken 
und die Krisis  (Schriften  des Vereins f. Sozialpolitik CX, and  Storungen 
im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben etc. Vol. VI, pp. 326, 327).  The inference 
made there  that the capital  stock of  these banks increased  during this 
period relatively  more rapidly than that of  the large Berlin banks cannot 
be accepted as correct without further evidence.  In the first place com- 
parison is made with only 6 of  the 10 great Berlin banks then in existence. 
As  a  matter of  fact these banks increased their capital stock during these 
seven years "only" from 428,000,ooo million marks to 705,000,000 marks or 
"only"  about 64 per cent whereas the increase for the other banks is 226 
per cent.  In the second place,  all these large banks had previously made 
large additions to their capital beginning with 1885. 
41.  For other calculations see the article in the Frankfurter Zeitung for 
50.  As regards the calculation of  the full share capital,  and of  the surplus, 
see note p. 58 below. 
51.  See Supplement VII, p. 994 et seq.  The Deutsch-Bulgarische Bank 
in Sofia is not included, because it is a foreign bank, nor the Revisions- und 
Vermogensverwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft,  because it is not a bank proper. 
52.  See Supplen~ent  VII, p. 999 et seq. 
53.  See Supplement VII, p. 1005 et seq.  The Ostbank fur Handel  und 
Gewerbe in 1905 absorbed the Ostdeutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft vormals 
J. Simon Wittwe & Sohne in Konigsberg, formerly  one of  the "concern" 
banks of  the A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein, and thus belongs now to 
the Schaaffhausen  group.  It formerly maintained  community of  interest 
relations with the Bank fur Handel und Industrie (Darmstadter Bank), as 
set forth in Supplement VII, p. 984 under  2, and hence can not be here 
enumerated again. 
54.  See Supplement VII, p. 982  et seq. 
55. The Bromberger Rank fur Handel und Gewerbe, formerly mentioned 
here as having a  community of  interest with the Ostbank, has meantime 
been absorbed by the latter. 
May 6 and 7,  1903, Nos.  125 and  126, Konzentration  im  Bankgeschaft, 
and for Nov. 15, 1904, No. 318, Borsengesetz  und Bankanschwellung.  If 
the period  for  1890-1901  is  taken, a  different picture  is  obtained.  See 
W. Christians, Die  Entwicklung  der  deutschen  Aktienbanken von  1890- 
1901 in Bank-Archiv., vol. z, No. 4 Jan. 1903, pp. 53 et seq., and particu- 
larly p. 56.  (Appeared also as reprint). 
42.  The Oberbergische  Bank  with  the cooperation of  the  Rheinisch- 
R'estfalische  Disconto-Gesellschaft  was consolidated  November  I I, 1907, 
with  the Gummersbacher Volsbank into a new corporation, the Oberber- 
gische  Kreditanstalt  in  Oh1  (capital  2,000,000  marks,  with  branches  in 
~alver  and Gurnrnersbach). 
43.  See Paul  Wallich,  op.  cit.,  pp.  16-24.  The chief  example is  the 
Provinzial-Discontogesellschaft,  organized by the Disconto-Gesselschaft in 
1871 with a nominal capital of  30,00o,000 marks but liquidated as early as 
1878. 
44.  Die Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen, pp. 34-38. 
45.  Quoted from Paul Wallich, op. cit., p. 131. 
46.  Die Dusseldorfer Stahlwerksverband was concluded  until June 30, 
1912.  As  to the Oberschlesischer Stahlwerksverband  see note  171, pp. 
818-819. 
47.  In alphabetic order.  The share capital and reserves, unless other- 
wise stated, are given as reported on Dec. 31, 1908. 
48.  Next to it, even now, among the Berlin banks, in point of  centrali- 
zation, is the Nationalbank fiir Deutschland, which  has no  branches nor 
communities  of  interest,  but  17  deposit  offices  and  one  commandite 
(The Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank has no communities of  interest, but has 
5 branches, 3 commandites, 22 deposit offices and 2 agencies). 
49.  See Appendix VII, p. 982. 
56.  See, however, note 7, p 1013. 
57.  It  might also be proper to include the Wurttembergische Vereinsbank 
(share capital 30,000,000 marks), since there is  a  community of  interest 
between  it  and  the  IVurttembergische  Bankanstalt.  (See  Supplement 
VII). 
58.  I have here purposely left unnoticed the fact that the linking together 
of banks is in many cases effected by means of an exchange of  shares, rendered 
possible  through  an increase of  the capital of  the annexing bank.  Thus 
where the share capital both of  the annexing and the annexed bank is taken 
at full value,  there is often,  though not always, an excessive,  but by no 
means necessarily a double, reckoning of  share capital, as a mere matter of 
aritlimetic. 
There may also be cases in which the same capital is counted twice or even 
three times, to wit, when  the annexation is effected not through exchange 
but through acquisition of  stock (without increase of  capital).  It may be 
that all or part of  the capital of  the provincial bank which is annexed by a 
central bank by the latter method is counted once more among the "per- 
manent participations"  of  the central bank.  On the other hand, among 
the "permanent participations"  of  the provincial bank there may be found 
once more the share capital, or part of  it, of  other banks, which the pro- 
vincial bank in its turn has annexed by means of  acquisition of  shares, if  it 
has allowed these banks to continue as separate stock companies. 
This attitude, which I deliberately took in the first edition, I have decided 
to maintain after renewed reflection, especially since every other method of 
calculation would lead to errors at least equal and generally much larger in 
amount,  which  can only be avoided by omitting the summing up of  the 
items into a total. 
In case of  an exchange of  stock, it is generally impracticable, owing to 
lack  of  data in  the reports,  to  ascertain  how  many  shareholders  of  the National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
annexed bank have availed themselves of  the offer to exchange their stock 
for stock of the annexing Lank.  This is strikingly proved by the laborious 
and  detailed  calculation which  Ernst  Loeb,  in  his  oft-cited  work  "Die 
Berliner Grossbanken in den Jahren 1895-1902 " had to make (pp. 101-IO~), 
in order  to ascertain, with only partial success, how many shareholders of 
the  Bergisch-hlarkische  Bank  and  the  Schlesischer  Bankverein  availed 
themselves of  the offer of  exchange made in 1897 by the Deutsche Bank. 
Still less is it possible, in most cases, to ascertain how many of  the shares 
received in exchange remained  permanently in possession of  the annexing 
bank, and how many were sold.  Thus any estimates that may be made in 
this matter are almost entirely baseless. 
Similarly,  in the case of  mere acquisition  of  shares, the balance sheets 
furnish no definite data for exact figures, since the "permanent participa- 
tion~''  are mostly stated merely in the aggregate. 
Thus, aside from a few exceptions, it  is impossible by this method to ascer- 
tain the exact sum which would have to be deducted from the share capital 
of  the annexed  banks, in order  to  obtain an accurate result.  The same 
objection, however, applies to the method proposed by some, which consists 
in ascertaining the book values of  exchanged shares froin the balance sheets 
or reports of  the annexing banks, the reason being that these book values in 
most cases can not be ascertained from the sources in question, and it would 
of  course be  unscientific  to adopt this method  where  it is possible, and 
another method  in other instances. 
Moreover  annexations  have  occurred  within  one and  the same group 
either through exchange of  shares or through other methods of  acquisition 
of  shares, that is to say, without any increase of  capital on the part of  the 
annexing bank.  This leads to differences within the various groups, which, 
if  taken into account in the calculation, would result in a totally false pic- 
ture of  the relative power of  the several groups 
Finally-and  this is perhaps the most important point-the  aim is not 
to ascertain the cafiztal of  the several groups but their capital fiower, and this 
can hardly be represented in any other way than by a statement of  the share 
capital and reserves, unless we are prepared, with Otto Jeidels, (loc  cit., pp. 
91-93)  to take  a  further  step and  include in  the calculation  the entire 
earning capital, that is to say, current account credits and deposits. 
If  the object is simply to represent the capital power, which in fact is the 
only point of  interest, the statement of  the full share capital and reserves is 
justified by the consideration  that, from  the outsider's point of  view, the 
sphere of  influence of  a bank, its credit and business power, are embodied 
in  this share capital and reserves.  Indeed, as rightly pointed  out by W. 
Christians (in the Deutscher  Oekonomist, Dec. 2, 1905, 23d year, No. I 197, 
p.  597), the fact that, for example, the entire capital of  the Norddeutsche 
Bank is held by  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, which in turn has passed over 
to the shareholders of  the Norddeutsche Bank 50,000,000  marks of  its total 
capital of  170,000,000  marks, does not justify  the statement that the total 
capital  of  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  now  amounts  only  to  120,000,000 
marks, and the united  capital of  the two banks only to 170,000,000, not 
220,000,000 marks.  This would be so if  we admitted the principle that the 
shares of  the annexing bank turned over for the purpose of  exchange should 
not be counted together nith the shares of  the annexed bank. 
Even after the operation of  exchange, the capital power  of  the two banks 
is equal to the sum of the share capital and reserves of  both, as has been 
admitted by the Deutscher Oekonomist, not only in the above-cited article of 
Dec  2,  1905, on the capital power of the bank groups (loc. cit., p. 597) but 
even earlier (in No  I 178, July 22, 1905) as well as by Julius Steinberger (op 
cit. p. 7) and Otto Jeidels (op. cit ,  pp  91-92) 
However,  the whole question becomes rather immaterial when we  con- 
sider  the sums involved.  The aggregate capital and reserves  of  the five 
groups  of  banks,  as  set  forth  above, is in  round  numbers  2,000,000,000 
marks.  The significance of  this total will not be greatly changed by adding 
or deducting a few  million marks.  For shares recurring  as securities or 
permanent participations in the balance sheets of  other institutions, Wallich 
(op. cit., pp.  138-139,  Table XIV) deducts 64,000,000 in  the case of  the 
Deutsche Bank group,  75,000,000  in the case of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
group,  ~g,ooo,om  in the case of  the Dresdner  Bank group, and 22,000,000 
in the case of  the Darnistadter Bank group, making a total of  176,000,000. 
As a matter of  fact, these figures represent in part arbitrary assumptions, as 
do those of  Lansburgh (op. cit ,  p. 35) who assumes a like total of  500,000,000 
marks for all the banks. 
59.  In this point I differ from Otto Jeidels,  op. cit., p. 91-3. 
60.  One of  the  factors promoting  the concentration  of  capital,  as we 
have seen, is the formation of  syndicates or groups.  However, this factor 
does  not  belong  here,  since  its  professed  aim  is  not  concentration  but 
quite different  objects, to wit,  the distribution of  risk  on  the one hand 
and the facilitating  of  the issuing function on the other 
61.  In the Kritische Blatter fur die gesamten sozialen Wissenschafteil, 
Vol.  11, NO. 7,  p.  300. 
62.  See tables given by Jeidels, op. cit , pp. 172-173. 
63.  According to the table given by Jeidels  (p. 603 et seq.), the follow- 
ing banks were represented during 1905 in the supervisory boards of  compa- 
nies belonging to the chemical and textile  industries: 
Deutsche Bank  . .  . . .  .  . . . . . 
Darmstndter Bank  . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . .  . . 
Dlsconto-Gesellschaft  .  . . .  . .  . . . . 
A  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  ............. 
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64.  Depositenbankwesen  und  Scheckverkehr  in  England,  p.  259. 
65.  In addition to the economic factors,  there are psychologic factors 
that play a part in this movement, the significance and strength of  which, 
particularly  in the field of  concentration, we  have repeatedly pointed out 
in the text.  Such factors are "the craving for individual freedom"  (W. 
Sombart, Der  moderne  Kapitalismus 11,  p.  237),  ampler  room  for  indi- 
vidual exertion, wider  aims, etc., and, later on, the attraction of  a human 
conglomeration, of  a vast traffic, of  the facilities for learning the latest in 
economic  and  political  matters,  etc. 
66.  Apart  from  those  banks  which  were  satisfied  with  being  repre- 
sented in Berlin by the inadequate method of  silent partnership connections 
(commandztes) with Berlin banking houses (see Paul Wallich, op. cit., p. 56, 
Table VIII.) 
67.  The  Breslauer  Discontobank  of  Breslau  had  likewise  founded  a 
branch in Berlin in 1896, which was however taken over in 1902  by  the 
Bank  fiir  Handel  und  Industrie. 
68. This is  the same process  that may be observed  in  France in  the 
case of  the Paris branch  of  the Credit Lyonnais. 
69.  This  is  the  view  of  Rudolf  Eberstadt,  Depositenbanken  und 
Scheckverkehr in England,  pp.  251  and 259,  note  2. 
70.  For France see Andre Sayous, Die Konzentration des Bankverkehrs 
in Frankreich in the Bank-Archiv, vol. 111, No.  8, of  May 3, 1904, Table I, 
p. 129. 
71.  Edgar Jaffe,  Das englische Bankwesen,  p.  30. 
72.  Edgar  Jaffe,  loc.  cit.,  p.  192. 
73.  Thus the capital of  the Joint Stock Banks in Great Britain during 
the  years  1900-1905,  rose  from  £76,000,0oo  to  £79,50o,ooo,  in  round 
figures, while their  number fell from 83 to 62. 
74.  See above, p. 60j. 
75.  See p. Go7  and following of  the text and notes thereto. 
76.  The several capital increases of  the Darmstadter Bank during the 
second epoch were as follows: Up to 1880 to 60,000,ooo marks, up to 1889 
to 8o,mo,o00 marks,  up  to  1898 to  ~og,om,ooo  marks,  up  to  1902  to 
132,000,000 marks,  up to 1904 to  1j4,ooo,ooo marks.  (The last-named 
figure  has  been  maintained  to date.) 
77.  The  several  capital  increases  of  the  Berliner  Handelsgesellschaft 
during the second epoch were as follows: Up to 1880 to 30,000,000 marks (in 
1882 reduced to 20,000,000 marks), up to 1886 to 30,000,000 marks, up to 
1887 to 40,000,000 marks, up to  1889 to 5o,m,mo marks, up to 1891 to 
65,000,ooo marks, up to 1896 to 8o,wo,ooo marks, up to 1899 to 90,000,000 
marks, up to 1903 to ~oo,ooo,mo  marks, up to 1908 to ~~o,ooo,ooo  marks. 
(The last-named  figure  has been  maintained  to date.) 
78.  The several  capital  increases  of  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft  during 
the second epoch were as follows: Up to 1880 to Go,m,ooo marks,  up to 
1889 to 75,000,000 marks,  up to  1898 to II~,WO,~  marks,  up to  1899 
to  130,000,000 marks,  up  to  1902  to  15o,ooo,ooo marks,  up to  1904  to 
170,000,000 marks.  (The last-named figure has been maintained to date.) 
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79.  The several  capital increases  of  the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bank- 
verein during the second epoch were as follows: Up to 1880 to 36,000,000 
marks, up to 1891 to 48,000,ooo marks, up to 1895 to 60,000,ooo marks, 
up to 1897 to 75,000,mo  marks, up to 1899 to ~oo,ooo,ooo  marks, up to 
1904 to  ~go,ooo,ooo  marks, up to 1908 to 145,000,000 marks.  (The last- 
named  figure  has  been  maintained  to  date.) 
80.  The  several  capital  increases  of  the  Mitteldeutsche  Kreditbank 
during the second epoch were as follows: Up to 1880 to 30,000,000 marks, 
up to 1897 to 36,000,000 marks,  up to 1899 to 45,000,000 marks,  up to 
1905  to  54,mo,ooo  marks. 
Assuming an original capital of  ~,OOO,OCKI  thalers (=~g,ooo,ooo  marks) 
instead of  8,000,mo thalers (since 3,000,000 thalers  remained in the port- 
folio of  the bank), a  nearly  fourfold  increase within  the period  may be 
figured out. 
81.  In Austria  the earning capital  (share capital plus surplus, accept- 
ances, deposits and credits on current account (Krediloren) of  all Austrian 
joint-stock and provincial  banks  (Landesbanken) at the end of  1902 was 
in round  figures  ~,~oo,ooo,ooo  crowns, of  which,  it is  true,  the Austro- 
Hungarian Bank was  credited with about 2,432,000,ooo crowns, and the 
Kreditanstalt with 494,000,ooo crowns.  Out of  60 banks, 6 possessed in the 
aggregate more than 60 per cent of  the total capital.  At the end of  1908, 
the following Austrian banks, which  since 1905 have also greatly increased 
the number of  their branches, showed the following share capitals: 
l 
I. K.  K.  Priv.  Kreditanstalt  fur 
Handcl und Gewerbe. 
2.  K.  K. Priv. 6sterreichische Boden- 
kreditanstalt. 
3. K. K.  Privilegierte osterreichische 
Landerbank. 
4. Wiener Bankverein . . . . . .  . . . . . 
5.  Anglo-6sterreichische Bank. .  . . 
6.  Niederosterreichische  E scorn  t e - 
gesellschaft. 
7.  Unionbank. . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . 











Q ~oo,ooo,ooo  florins. 





roo,ooo.ooo francs  . . .  . . 
6.400,ooo crowns  . .  . 
12,000,000 crowns. .  . 
10,461,000 crowns..  .  . . 
2,000,000 crowns. . 
a Beginning with  1864 only  60,000,ooo florins. 
The  great  Hungarian banks,  too,  have  recently  increased  their  share 
capitals very considerably  (in part also the number of their branches), in 
particular  the  following:  I,  Ungarische  Allgemeine  Kreditbank,  capital 
Increased to 60,000,ooo crowns; 2  Osterreichisch-Ungarische  Commercial- 
bank, capital increased to 42,000,000 crowns; 3, Ungarische Escomte- und 
Wechslerbank,  capital  increased  to  40,000,000 crowns. National  Monetary  Commission 
In France, the following increases of  share capital took  place between 
1870 and the end of  1908: Credit  Lyonnais (with 43 agencies in  Paris, 9 
in the suburbs of  Paris,  174 in French  provincial  towns  and in Algeria), 
from 20,000,000 to 250,000,000 francs; Comptoir national dlEscompte de 
Paris (with  35  bureaux de quartiers in Paris,  14 agencies in the suburbs 
and 150 agencies in the provinces), from 50,000,mo to 15o,m,m  francs; 
Credit industriel  et commercial  (with  30  succursales  in  Paris,  3 in the 
suburbs and I  agency in London), from  15,ooo,ooo to ~oo,m,ooo  francs; 
Societ6  gen6rale  pour  favoriser  etc.  (with  88  succursales,  agencies  and 
bureaus  in  Paris  and  suburbs,  637  agencies in  the provinces,  and  one 
agency each in London and Saint Sebastian, Spain), from  60,000,000 to 
300,000,000  francs. 
82. The several  increases  of  the Deutsche  Bank  were:  Period  ending 
1880  to  45,000,000,  1881 to  60,000,000,  1888  to  75,000,000,  1895  to 
~oo,ooo,ooo,  1897 to 150,000,000, 1902 to 160,ooo,o~,  1904 to 18o,ooo,ooo, 
1905  to 200,000,000 marks; amount unchanged  since then. 
83  The several increases of  the Dresdner Bank were:  Period ending 1880 
to I~,OOO,OOO,  1881 to 24,000,000, 1883 to 36,000,000, 1887 to 48,000,000, 
1889  to  60,000,000,  1892  to  70,000,000,  1895  to  85,ooo,ooo,  1897  to 
x~o,ooo,ooo,  1899 to 130,000,000, 1904 to 160,000,000, 1907 to 18o,ooo,ooo 
marks, 1910 to 200,000,000 marks. 
84. The  several  increases  of  the Commerz- und  Disconto-Bank  were: 
Period ending 1883 to 40,000,000, 1897 to 5o,ooo,ooo, I904 to 85,000,000 
marks; amount unchanged since then. 
85. The several  increases  of  the Nationalbank  fur  Deutschland  were: 
Period ending 1883 up to 24,000,000, 1899 (after reduction to 21,ooo,ooo and 
to 18,000,000) to 27,000,000, 1890 to 36,000,000, 1895 to 45,000,000, 1898 
to 6o,ooo,o~,  1905 to 8o,ooo,~o  marks; amount unchanged  since then. 
86. See also p. 629 and following, for list of  banks and private banking 
firms absorbed  by  provincial  banks  which  remained  independent.  For 
example, the Rheinisch-TT'cstfalische  Disconto-Gescllschaft  in Aachen  (Aix- 
1aChapelle) alone absorbed  a total of  7 banks and 2 private banking con- 
cerns (4 banks and  I  private  banking concern being absorbed in a single 
year,  1905); see. p. 633 et seq. 
87.  In 1909 the Disconto-Gesellschaft set up a branch in Mainz, to take the 
place of  the banking firm of  Barnberger &CO  in Mainz, which it had absorbed. 
88. In 1909 the Deutsche Bank, without absorbing any banking estab- 
lishment, set up a branch in Constantinople, in order to foster and develop 
the manifold relations to Turkey. 
89.  Paul Wallich, (loc  cit., p  59 et. seq.) says that fusion was "  the char- 
acteristic form of  concentration"  in German banking in the period  1880- 
1895.  I am unable to share that view, even as regards the period named. 
Concerning a bank nhich ceased  to exist not long after its establishment, 
it soon became  a  common  saying at the Bourse, that the shares were 
bought and sold "per disappearance." 
90  Such is the case of  the Berliner Bank, which had been unable fully to 
attain its purpose,  namely  to attract the credit business  of  the class of 
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91  Such is, for example, the case of  the Hessische Notenbank under the 
firm name of Bank fur Suddeutschland, which, by reason of the new bank- 
ing law, was no longer able to attain its aims as fully as had been intended 
and was in fact requisite.  Paul Wallich (loc cit., p. 78) reports the absorp- 
tion of  six other former note banks by credit banks.  Here must also be 
mentioned the absorption, in 1905, of  the Braunschweigische Kreditanstalt 
(share capital, 6,750,000  marks)  by  the Braunschweigische  Bank  (share 
capital,  10,500,ooo marks),  the latter absorbing in 1906 also the banking 
firms of  Hermann Schoof in Helmstedt and Hugo Rennau in Schoningen. 
92. See article: "Zwangsfusionen"  in the Berliner Tageblatt  (Handels- 
zeitung) Jan. 15, 1906. 
93. Thus in the case of  the absorption of the Anglo-Deutsche Bank by 
the Dresdner Bank in 1892. 
94. Rudolf  Eberstadt, Depositenbankwesen  und Scheckverkehr in Eng- 
land, op. cit., p.  249.  Edgar Jaff6  (loc. cit, pp. 190-191)  thinks on the 
contrary that "the movement  has been slackening since the beginning  of 
the new century." 
95.  Edgar Jaffe, loc. cit., p. 191. 
96.  Karl Mamroth,  Die schottischen Banken, p  10, note 38. 
97.  Vossische Zeitung,  Jan. 3  I, 190  j  ; see Charles J.  Bullock, Concentra- 
tion of  Banking Interests, in Atlantic Monthly, Aug  1903 
98.  See C. Stegemann,  Die  Entwicklung  des franzosischen  Grossbank- 
betriebes (Munster in Westfalen, Theissing,  1908), pp. 22-23,  26, 39 
99. See p. 869, note 57. 
100. This refers solely to the share capital, not to reserves nor to deposits 
of  all kinds. 
101. The  Rheinisch-Westfalische  Disconto-Gesellschaft  (share  capital 
80,00o,om  marks,  17 branches, see p  633), which was enumerated in this 
connection in earlier editions, and which is particularly active in the mining 
region of  the Rhineland and Westphalia, I no longer include in the group of  -. 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft for reasons stated on p. 673. 
102. The Westdeutsche Bank  vormals Jonas Cahn in Bonn, having  in 
1904  been  absorbed  by  the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein,  can  of 
course not be separately mentioned.  For the same reason the Niederrhein- 
ische Kreditanstalt vormals Peter & Co. in Krefeld (fused in 1904) has to be 
omitted. 
103  Georg  Tischert,  Filialsystem  und  Zentralisation  im  Bankwesen 
(Bank-Archiv May 1903, No. 8, pp  119-120). 
104  Paul Wallich, Die  Konzentration  im  deutschen  Bankwesen,  1905, 
pp. 17-24  and Table 11, p  19. 
105. Jubilaumsbericht  der Disconto-Gesellschaft  (Jubilee report  of  the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft), p.  208.  The  practice of  setting  up independent 
provincial banks at the locality of  the parent bank was probably prompted 
by considerations similar to those which as early as 1864 had led the Darm- 
stadter Bank to transform its branch in Mainz into a commandite, "in order 
to limit the number of  institutions that might directly commit the bank." 
small traders. 
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106. See above (Part 3, chap. 2, par. 4, under 11). 
107. In the first period  (1848-1870)  and at  the beginning of  the second 
period  the  Darmstadter  Bank  took  the lead  in establishing  subsidiary 
companies (Tochtergesellschaften). 
108. See Supplement VII. 
109. In the case of  the domestic subsidiary companies (Tochtergesell- 
schaften), which, as appears from the above remarks,  have of  late been 
established  in somewhat  larger  number,  several institutions have  occa- 
sionally  established them by  joint  action, in order to lessen some of  the 
disadvantages here described. 
110. The formation  of  trust companies  was  also greatly  promoted  by 
paragraph 39 (now 41) of  the stock exchange act. 
I I I. For details the reader is referred to Max Jorgens, Finanzielle Trust- 
gesellschaften (Stuttgart and Berlin, J. G. Cotta Nachfolger, 1902); Robert 
Liefmann,  Beteiligungs-  und  Finanzierungsgesellschaften,  (Jena,  Gustav 
Fischer, 1909) p. 369 et seq. 
112.  Even in these cases, however, the "closer  connection"  means for 
the most part that the bank whose shares are acquired becomes more or 
less subject to the will and guidance of  the bank acquiring them.  Such 
connections might  be more properly called  "communities  of  protection" 
(Schutzgemeinschaften)  than "  communities  of  interest"  (Interessenge- 
meinschaften) . 
A very peculiar  kind  of  community  of  interest is represented  by  the 
connection established in 1905 between the Imperial Bank of  Agricultural 
Credit Societies (Landwirtschaftliche Reichsget~ossenschaftsbank)  in Darm- 
stadt  and  the  Prussian  Central  Bank  of  Credit  Societies  (Preussische 
Zentralgenossenschaftskasse).  The former, which was by far the weaker, 
was permitted to acquire shares of  the latter to the amount of  ~,ooo,ooo 
marks, in exchange for which it surrendered to the latter the business with 
the Prussian Credit Societies (union deposit offices), this surrender being 
deemed an equivalent for the acquisition of  the shares. 
113. See Frankfurter Zeitung No.  216 (Aug. 6, ~gog),  where the view is 
expressed that the estimate of  2,000,000 marks as the amount of  shares of 
the  Rheinisch-Westfalische  Disconto-Gesellschaft  held  by  the  Disconto- 
Gesellschaft is rather high. 
For details concerning the Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft 
see above, p. 633. 
I 14. A similar condition exists in the case of  the Schlesische Handelsbank 
Aktiengesellschaft in Breslau  (formerly Perls & Co.), whose share capital 
at its foundation or rather transformation in 1905 was acquired in part by 
the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft  and in part by the Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
I 15. See Otto Jeidels, p. 261. 
116. In the first  edition  of  the present  work  I  had  pointed  out that 
differences regarding  the business  management  and the common  policy 
would be apt to arise.  The Berliner Jahrbuch fur Handel und Industrie 
(1908,  Vol.  I, p.  261)  states, I do not know on what grounds,  that such 
The German Great Banks 
differences did manifest themselves in the classic instance of  the Dresdner 
Bank-Schaaffhausen alliance, one case occurring as early as 1904 in regard 
to tlfe  Hibernia nationalization  plan,  another  in  1908  in regard  to the 
occurrences connected with the International Exploration Company Erke- 
lenz,  whose  shares were  owned  for  the most  part  by  the A.  Schaaff- 
hausen'scher Bankverein.  It is to be noted that industrial communities of 
interests, too, have sometimes been terminated, mostly through the fusion 
of  the contracting  parties.  Such was  the case with  the community of 
interest entered into in  1904  for five years between  the Bismarckhiitte 
and the Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft in Gleiwitz;  the 
oft-mentioned community of  interest  entered  into in 1904 for thirty-one 
years between the Schalker Gruben- & Hiitten-Verein, the Gelsenkirchener 
Bergwerks-Aktien-Gesellschaft  and  the  Eisenhiittenwerk  Rote  Erde 
Aktiengesellschaft  Aachen, which were fused  in 1907;  the comnlunity of 
interest entered into in 1905 for thirty-five  years between the firm Arthur 
Koppel and the Aktiengesellschaft fur Feld- und Kleinbahnbedarf vormals 
Orenstein & Koppel in Berlin.  In this case, too, the aliance terminated in 
fusion, the former firm being merged in the latter, and the combined enter- 
prise  assuming  the  firm  name  of  Orenstein  &  Koppel,  Arthur  Koppel 
Aktiengesellschaft. 
117.  This view  has been  substantiated  since  the first  edition  of  this 
book  in  1go5, while in industry numerous communities of  interest have 
meantime been entered  into, such as the great communities of  interest in 
the chemical  industry  described  on pp. 721  et seq.  See Henry Volcker, 
Vereinigungsformen  und  Interessenbeteiligungen in der deutschen  Gross- 
industrie, in Schmoller's Jahrb. fur Gesetzebung,  Band XXXIII, Heft 4, 
p.  I I et seq. 
118.  Report of  the Bergisch-Markische Bank for 1897, p. 3. 
119 Paul Wallich(1oc. cit.,  p. 102)rightly  refersalso tothe dlfficultiesfro~n 
the standpoint of  taxation, citing a passage from Jorgens, Finanzielle Trust- 
gesellschaften, p. 75 : "  Double taxation, which is likely to occur in the case 
of a stock company, inasmuch as the tax is laid on the income or  profits 
first of  the company and second of  the shareholde;,  is apt to become triple 
taxation when one stock company owns the other."  Again Wallich justly  .  . 
remarks  (loc. cit.,  p.  110) that "in banking, the permanent  participation 
represents,  in  principle,  the  same  degree  of  improvement  on  the stock 
company as the stock company does on individual enterprise."  However, 
I am unable to agree with  the argument he advances in support of  the 
last-mentioned thesis, because, to my mind, the modern stock company is 
characterized  by  the fact  that  (contrary  to the  opinion  expressed  by 
Wallich, loc.  cit.,  p.  111) the stockholder  (aside from exceptional cases), 
while  possessing an "interest  in the undertaking,"  does  not possess an 
"undertaker's interest,"  especially since it is not the individual stockholder 
but  the aggregate  of  the stockholders that has to be  regarded  as the 
undertaker.  Now  this  aggregate,  though  perhaps  not  possessing  the 
capacity  to undertake,  which  even  the physical  undertaker  may  lack, National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
certainly has the will  to undertake,  as appears from the very fact that it 
does not dissolve the enterprise but carries it on, or rather causes it to be 
carried on.  Hence the assertion recently made (for example by Ad. Gott- 
schewsky in his interesting and stimulating work  "Ueber  die Aktienform 
der Unternehmung," in Schmoller's Jahrb. 31 Jahrg.  I Heft, p. 199 et seq ), 
that in the case of  a stock company there is no undertaker at all, must be 
regarded as erroneous. 
120.  Toward the end of  1904 the number of  commandites had decreased 
by two (see 1st ed., p. 21 I). 
121.  See Jubilee Report of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, pp. 204-205. 
122. See Report of  Darmstadter Bank, 1871,  pp. 12-13. 
123. See Model, pp. 75-76. 
124. See Loeb, cited by Model, p. 168. 
125. However, on looking into the details, we  find that the conditions 
are entirely different.  Among the great banks, the Dresdner Bank has the 
largest number of  branches (14). 
126. To  this must  be  added 4  branches  of  the  Westfalisch-Lippische 
Vereinsbank,  a subsidiary company of  the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bank- 
verein,  mentioned in Supplement VII, and 3 branches of  the Bayerische 
Disconto-  und  Wechselbank,  also  2  branches of  the Revisions-  und  Ver- 
mogens-Aktien-Gesellschaft, as well  as 8 branches of  the Bank fiir Thiir- 
ingen  vormals  B.  M.  Strupp, Aktien-Gesellschaft,  making  a  total  of  17 
branches.  This does not change  the general  statement  nor  the average 
number of  branches per allied bank (Konzernbank). 
127.  In the United States the obstacles are mainly of  a legal nature. 
In Austria,  too,  with the exception  of  the Oesterreichisch-Ungarische 
Bank, which  is a note  bank, the great  banks have hitherto had a rela- 
tively  small number  of  branches.  The Oesterreicllische Kreditanstalt  at 
the end of  1904 had only 7 branches, the Wiener Bankverein 4, the Oester- 
reichische Landerbank 2.  The three last named, however, had a number of 
exchange  offices (Wechselstuben).  In 1905 the branches began  to mul- 
tiply.  According to the Prager Tageblatt, December 2 7, 1905, there were in 
Bohemia alone, at the end of  1905, not less than 31 branches and agencies 
of Bohemian banks and 27  branches and agencies of  Vienna banks, besides 
54 branches and sub-offices (Nebenstellen) of  the note bank (Oesterreichisch- 
Ungarische  Bank).  In 1905-6  the Wiener  Bankverein  alone established 
branches in Marienbad, Karlsbad and Pilsen, which were to be followed by 
others in Bozen and Meeran and in  Constantinople, and this movement 
continued in subsequent years. 
128. Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken (1902), p. 62  et seq. 
129. Rudolf  Eberstadt,  Depositenbankwesen  und  Scheckverkehr  in 
England, p. 248. 
130. In the case of  England,  however,  it is advisable to use  the  term 
banking  offices  (Bankstellen)  rather  than  the term  branches,  since  the 
London "branches"  at any rate in many cases resemble our deposit offices 
rather than our branches. 
131. Edgar  Jaffk,  Das  englische  Bankwesen,  p.  189.  See  preceding 
note. 
132. For the period up to 1903 see Andre A.  Sayous, Die Konzentration 
des  Bankverkehrs  in  Frankreich,  Bank-Archiv, 3 Jahrgang,  No.  8,  May 
1904, pp. 129-132,  especially Table I: Number of  agencies and branches of 
French  credit  institutions in Paris and viclnity  (p. 129), and Table 11: 
Number of  agencies and branches of  the French credlt institutions in the 
province (p. 130); also Vossische Zeitung of  Jan. 28, 1905. 
133. See Karl Mamroth, Die schottischen  Banken, loc. cit., p. 20  et secl. 
134. See, however, note 130 on p  872. 
135. The words "in large part"  were added in deference to an objection 
raised  by  C.  Hegemann in his  paper  Die Entwicklung  des  franzosischen 
Grossbankbetriebes (Munster in Westfalen,  1908, Theissing),  p.  27.  The 
objection must be regarded as well-grounded.  However, he himself states 
(p. 94) that the French branches of the credlt institutions are merely instru- 
ments to carry out the orders of  the central bank. 
136. This is probably  the reason  why  Andre  A.  Sayous,  in  the paper 
mentioned in the above note 132, combines agencies and branches. 
137.  Our Reichsbank, too, had at the end of  1908 487  banking offices 
(Stellen)  (in  1903  379).  See  Vemaltungsbericht  der  Rezschsbank  fur das 
Jahr 1909, page 16.  In Scotland the number of  branches rose very decid- 
edly in 1854, because the stamp tax on bank notes was reduced from j pence 
to I penny (Karl Mamroth, loc. cit., pp. 19-20). 
138. Quoted from Somers, The Scotch banks and system of  issue, Edin- 
burgh 1873.  (See Karl Mamroth, loc. cit., p. 27). 
139. Die Berliner Grossbanken in den Jahren 1895-1902 etc., p. 114. 
140.  For details see Edgar Jaff6, Das englische Bankwesen, pp. 184-85. 
141.  Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, p. 41. 
142. The income tax depends on the legislation  of  the various  states. 
The legislation  of  Prussia,  for  example,  provides  that stock  companies 
having their main office in Prussia and branches in another German state 
are taxed in Prussia on that part of thelr total income which is derived from 
the business operations of  the establishments located in Prussia. 
Similarly, stock companies  having their  main office outside of  Prussia 
but possessing branches in Prussia are subject to the Prussian income tax 
on that part of  their  total income which is derived  from establishments 
located in Prussia. 
143. Loc. cit., p.  I 12. 
144. On  this  account,  agencies,  as  contrasted  with  branches,  would 
doubtless play a very prominent part in Germany also, but for the peculiar 
reasons mentioned in the text.  From a business  point  of  view it would 
be  good  policy to begin with the easier form, the agency, and develop  it 
gradually, as business  increases,  into the more  substantial and important 
juridical  form, the branch.  With this view  some banks, for example the 
Pfalzische Bank, have established branches which they called "agencies" National  Monetary  Commission 
or "deposit offices" or "deposit and exchange offices "  (Wecltselstuben), but 
which had to be recorded as branches. 
145. Of  the remaining  "agencies,"  the majority  are agencies  only in 
name, being entered in the trade register as branches.  See preceding note. 
146. Most of  the sums in question are in fact deposits, because in Meck- 
lenburg,  Oldenburg,  Schleswig-Holstein  and Alsace-Lorraine,  more  than 
elsewhere in  Germany,  especially so  far as the rural population  is  con- 
cerned,  it is customary  to keep  available funds in the banks as deposits 
instead of  investing them.  These sums are sometimes quite large and are 
often kept in the bank for a long time. 
147. See for example Ad. Wagner, Beitrage zur Lehre von den Banken, 
Leipzig,  Leopold  Voss,  1857, p.  164 et seq.,  and above,  pages  189  and 
following, also notes thereto. 
148. Grundriss zum Studium der politischen  Oekonomie 4th ed., Jena, 
1902, Gustav Fischer, p. 149. 
149. Concerning an earlier period see Ad. Wagner, loc. cit., pp. 7-71  and 
others. 
150. Edgar Jaff6, Das englische Bankwesen, p. 189. 
15 I. Hans Gideon Heymann, loc. cit., p.  132. 
Part V. 
I. For details see W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, I,  pp.  553-569; 
Hans Gideon  Heymann,  Die  gemischten  Gewerke  im  deutschen  Gross- 
Eisengewerbe (Stuttgart and Berlin,  1904, J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung 
Nachf.), pp. 211 et  seq. and 280et seq. 
2.  Kontradiktorische  Verhandlungen  iiber  deutsche  Kartelle,  Heft  5, 
Supplement I, pp. 102 et seq. 
3.  Hans Gideon Heymann, loc. cit., p. 211. 
4.  From an earlier period the following example may be cited: 
The A. Borsig machine works, which as early as 1847 had built a puddling 
and rolling mill as an adjunct to the machine works, thereupon leased coal 
and ore mines and in the sixties erected in Upper Silesia other puddling and 
rolling mills, "thus developing from a "machine factory" into a great mixed 
steel plant, through the systematic annexation of  establishments supplying 
the raw material and half-finished manufactures. "  (Hans Gideon Heymann, 
loc. cit., pp.  186-187).  A multitude of  other examples from recent times 
are found in the volume of  Henry Voelcker cited on p. 871, note 117. 
5.  For details concerning  these highly interesting developments, which 
however are beyond the scope of  the present book, the reader is referred to 
the following works : 
Robert Liefmann, Die kontradiktorischen Verhandlungen iiber deutsche 
Kartelle (Conrad's Jahrbiicher, 3 Folge,  Band  XXV, p. 638 et seq.), 1903. 
Idem, Die Verhandlungen iiber die Roheisensyndikate und den Halbzeug- 
verband  in der deutschen  KartellenquCte (Conrad's  Jahrbiicher, 3 Folge, 
Band XXVII, p. 525 et  seq.), 1904. 
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Idem, Kartelle und Trusts (Stuttgart, Ernst Heinrich Moritz),  1905; see 
especially p. 99 et seq. :  Die Weiterbildung der Kartelle. 
Idem, Krisen und Kartelle (Schmoller's Jahrb. Jahrg.  1902, p. 661 et seq. 
and Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, Bd. CXIII, p. 261 et seq. 
Idem, Die Weiterbildung der Unternehmungsformen unter dem Einfluss 
der  Kartelle (Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung,  I  Jahrgang,  Nr.  2,  3 and 4, 
January and February 1905). 
von Landmann, Die amtlichen Erhebungen iiber das deutsche Kartell- 
wesen (Annalen des Deutschen Reichs, 1904, Ns.  I, 2 and 4). 
Hans Gideon Heymann, loc. cit. 
See  also  Kontradiktorische  Verhandlungen  iiber  deutsche  Kartelle, 
Heft 1-8,  Berlin  1903 and 1904 (Franz Siemenroth), especially the reports 
of  Regierungsrat  Voelcker  on the Rhenish-Westphalian  Coal  Syndicate, 
H. I (session of  26-27  Feb. 1902) pp. 25-47  and p. 275 et seq. note (List of 
syndicate coal mines acquired by other coal mines  or smelting works), and 
Heft 5 : Report on the cartel movement in the German iron industry (also 
published  separately),  and Supplement  I: Betriebsvereinigungen  in der 
deutschen Eisenindustrie, page 102 et seq. 
6. See Robert Liefmann, Die kontradiktorischen Verhandlungen etc., p. 
544. 
7.  Ibidem, pp. 642-645. 
8.  It is well known, of  course, that some individual electrical firms, for 
example the A. E. G. (Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft) have for many 
years-kept large balances in their banks. 
9.  Completely absorbed by the Elektrizitats-Aktien-Gesellschaft vormals 
W. Lahmeyer & Co., the absorption taking effect on September I, 1902.  In 
May 1905 the manufacturing section of  the Aktiengesellschaft vormals W. 
Lahmeyer & Co. was united with  the firm Felten & Guilleauine Carlswerk 
Aktien-Gesellschaft in Miihlheim am Rhein, which for that purpose increased 
its share capital from 36,000,ooo to 55,000,ooo marks.  The united  com- 
panies  bear  the name  "Felten  & Guilleaume-Lahmeyer  Werke  Aktien- 
Gesellschaft. " 
10.  In  1898 the Schaaffhausen'sclier  Bankverein  left  the Schuckert 
group and joined  the Loewe group  (Union-Elektrizitatsgesellscl~aft). 
11.  Particular mention may be  made here of  the remarkable  progress 
recently achieved  in the production of  dyes, perfumes,  artificial  silk, the 
extraction of  nitrogen  from the air, the manufacture of  new explosives, of 
materials needed in aerial navigation, the discovery of  prophylactic, anaes- 
thetic and soporific remedies, and last but not least the transmutation  of 
metals, and even of  elements, or substances formerly regarded as elements. 
12.  The discussion here follows in the main L. hlueffelmann, Les ententes 
dans l'industrie  chimique  Allemande  (Revue economique  internationale, 
Vol. I11  No.  4 December  15  to 20,  1904,  pp.  882-890);  a few errors are 
here corrected. 
13. Besides those enumerated  in the text mention should  be made of 
the Farbwerk Muhlheim formerly A. Leonhardt & Co. in Miihlheim;  Kalle & National  Monetary  Commission 
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Co.  in Biebrich (now part of  the combined Hochster Farbwerke-Cassella) ; 
K. Oehler  in  Offenbach  on-the-Main  (now  absorbed  by  the  Chemische 
Fabrik Gviesheim-Elektron). 
14. See Otto Jeidels,  op. cit. pp.  123-125,  where illustrations  are also 
given.  See also p.  I 25. 
15. Op. cit., p.  122. 
16. Hans Gideon Heymann, op. cit., p. 43. 
17.  Ibid., p. 4, 62. 
18.  Ibid., p. 72. 
19.  Ibid., pp. 85-94. 
20.  Ibid., pp.  107-8 
21.  Ibid., p. 119. 
22.  Ibid., p. 199. 
23.  Ibid., p. 204 
24.  See Ludwig Eschwege, Revolutionierende Tendenzen  im  deutschen 
Eisengewerbe (Revolutionizing Tendencies  in  the German  Iron Industry) 
in die Bank, Apr., 1909, pp. 313-318  and "Ladon" in the Zukunft, Apr. 3, 
1909, p. 26. 
25.  Thyssen  keeps aloof  from the great banks that have hitherto been 
dominant in the Lorraine-Luxemburg district, neither has he developed closer 
relations  to the Darmstadter  Bank, which founded  the above  mentioned 
works  or  to  the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  which  reorganized, 
financed  and improved  the technical  outfit of  the Lorraine furnace com- 
pany Aumetz-Friede (This company was merged in 1903 with the Fentscher 
Huttenaktienverein and the Gewerkschaft  Crone.) 
Stinnes too at first had only a few minor bank connections in this dis- 
trict, chiefly through his directorship in the Mittelrheinische Bank  and his 
relations  to Spaeter & Co.  This  may  have  been  the  reason  why  he 
gladly availed himself of  the opportunity in 1901 to secure a strong position 
in this district by entering the directorate of  the Deutsch-Luxemburgische 
Bergwerks- und Hutten-Aktiengesellschaft. 
Part V1 
I. For certain reservations to be made here see above, p. 527 et seq. and 
particularly pp. 535 and 536. 
2.  For the future there is a possibility of  combinations, which would at 
least lead to a saving of  taxes. 
3.  Conditions  in  England  are  evidently  similar.  For  these  see  John 
Cockburn Macdonald, The Economic Effects, National and International, 
of  the Concentration of  Capital in Few Controlling Hands.  (The Institute 
of  Bankers, Oct., 1900, Vol. XXI, pt. VII, pp. 371-3.) 
4.  Finanzielle Trustgesellschaften, p. 75. 
5.  With  reference to his activity as a curb broker  (coulisse) and in the 
arbitrage iield see above pp. 620-621 
6.  Thus Karl Bucher  says (Die Entstehung der Volkswirtchaft, gd  ed., 
1901, p.  229): Concentrated demand cannot be met by scattered  produc- 
tion.  Progress  of  concentration  in  demand  must  be  accompanied  by 
progress  of  concentration in industrial production,  the latter causing  the 
disappearance of  the craftsman. 
7.  Karl Bucher, op. cit., p. 235. 
8.  Otto Jeidels  is mistaken  in his  opinion with  reference  to these and 
the majority of  listed  bonds,  that "industrial  bonds yield  only  a  small 
return."  (Op. cit., p. 55).  The opposite is usually the case. 
g.  This has happened in  England,  too, .but only in a few cases.  (See 
Barclay etc.) 
In France there has been  formed from among the private bankers  the 
"Syndicat  des Banquiers de la province  fran~aise," and the Banque de 
l'Union  Parisienne  (Mallet frPres, VPrnes et Cie., de Neuflize et Cie, etc). 
The former publishes  an organ of  its own,  "La France kconomique et 
financihre."  In Germany similar combinations have been proposed, among 
others by Julius Kohen  (Aschersleben), in the Plutus for July I, 1904, "A 
Bankers'  Association for Cooperative  Buying,"  and by Ludwig Eschwege 
in Die Hilfe of  July 3,  1904, No.  27. 
10.  See W. Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft,  2d  ed., p.  191. 
I I. According to the excellent and exhaustive report (published  also as 
reprint) made by the manager of  the Centralverband des Deutschen Bank- 
und  Bankiergewerbes,  Wittner, Counsellor-at-law in  Berlin,  to the Third 
General Convention  of  Gernian  Bankers at Hamburg in September  1907, 
a schedule was prepared for the purpose of  gathering statistics of  salaries 
paid  to German bank employees,  also regarding the living  conditions of 
these  employees  and  their  families, and  38,000  copies of  this  schedule 
were sent to about 4,000 banking institutions and firms.  The data of  these 
schedule were worked up by the Central Verband.  Of  the total number 
sent out, 24,146 or  about 65 per  cent were returned  filled  out by  1,247 
establishments having 24,146 employees, distributed as follo~~s-264 joint 
stock banks with 16,391 employees, 708 private banks with 5,938 employees 
and 275 cooperative banking institutions with 1,817 employees. 
12. Memorial on the investigation into the econorilic condition of  salaried 
employees in private establishments instituted  during Oct.,  1903, by the 
organi~ations  of  salaried  employees  and  transmitted  to  the  Reichstag 
March  14,  1907. 
13.  According to an article on Banking and Exchanges hy Henry Croshy 
Emery, professor of  political economy at  Yale Ur~iversity  there uas recently 
established in  the United  States the Internatior~al  Banking Corporation 
with  a  capital of  $7,000,000,  with  the intcntion of  having  a  bank  with 
American managers and employees, and American customers.  It  was, how- 
ever, impossible to find  Americans trained for the positions,  and "  today 
all the branch  managers are Englishmen,"  (in Ernst v.  Halle,  Amerika, 
seine Bedeutung fur die Weltwirtschaft  und  seine wirtschaftliche~l  Bezie- 
hungen  zu  Deutschland, insbes.  ZLI  Hamburg,  Verlag der Hatnb.  Borsen- National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
halle 1905, p. 344)  In these matters it is not always true that where there 
is a m-ill, there is a way. 
14. As an illustration of  most recent occurrence I refer to the day of  the 
outbreak of  the Russo-Japanese  war. 
rj. This and the following quotations are from Riesser "Die Notwendi- 
gkeit einer Revision  des Biirsengesetzes," Berlin,  1901, Leonhard Simion, 
PP. 42, 43. 
16.  See Ernst Loeb in the Nationalzeitung of  Apr. 18, 1904, No. 244. 
17.  Thus for example Eschenbach in the Proceedings of  the Verein fur 
Sozialpolitik of  September 16, 1903, Schriften, CXIIT. 
18.  See above p. 97 et seq.  The proportion of  the population assessed 
for the income tax was in 1904 37. I per cent of  the total population; in 1903, 
35.9 per cent, and in 1896 only 29.3 per cent. 
19. Thus Ludwig Pohle, Deutschland am Scheidewege (Germany at the 
Parting of  the Roads)  Leip~ig,  B.  Cr.  Teubner,  1902,  p.  199, Cf.  also his 
polemic  (ibid., pp.  197-198)  against  Dietzel's  theory  that wages and the 
prices of  grain have a tendency to vary in opposite directions, a view which 
I am neither able to share. 
20. In his very interesting rectoral address of  Jan.  26,  1910, on "The 
Development of  the Iron Industry in Germany,"  (p. 10) Muthesius cites the 
oflicial reports of  the Krupp consumers'  institution.  According to these 
reports "there has been no increase worth mentioning during the last twenty 
our  colonies.  It may  also  prove  possible  to  reduce  considerably  our 
imports of  agricultural products. 
25. Thus the cartels may be required to submit their by-laws and certain 
kinds of resolutions  (as for example those  relating to export premiums) 
also to answer inquiries and to publish  certain information.  Schlnoller's 
proposal, that they be required to submit all of  their more important reso- 
lutions,  would  prove  impracticable  owing  to  the  indefiniteness  of  his 
formula, if for no other reason.  See paragraph 7 of  the report made to the 
general meeting ot the Verein fiir Sozialpolitik in Mannheirn, Sept. 27, 1905, 
reprinted in Schmollcr's Jahrbuch  fur Gesetzgebung etc. vol. 29, No.  4, pp. 
326 et seq., and particularly p. 362). 
26.  On  this  point  cfr.  the very  instructive section  in  Paul  Wallich, 
Liquidation of Banks ('l Entgrundungen), op. cit., pp. 34-48. 
27. Schriften des Vereins fiir Sozialpolitik, LXI, pp. 183-184. 
28.  EIeinrich  Waentig,  Industriekartelle  und  Trusts und  das  Problem 
ihrer rechtlichen Regelung (Industrial Cartels and Trusts-The  Probletll of 
their  legal  regulation)  Schmoller's  Jahrb.  f  Gesetzgebung  etc.,  vol.  25 
1901, No. 4, p. 19. 
years in the prices of  the leading commodities entering into the  cost of  living." 
However this very gratifying statement must  be  used  with  caution,  for 
conditions there are undou!tedly  out of  the ordinary. 
2 I. Walter Troeltsch  "  Uber die neuesten  Versnderungen im  deutschen 
Wirtschaftsleben"  (On some recent changes in German Economic  Life) 
Stuttgart, 1899, p. 145. 
22.  Ibid., p.  147-148. 
23.  The well-known Hibernia  case has been considered  as one of  such 
excesses, for the reason that the decline of the government offer was brought 
about by a coalition of  banks, which bought up the stock.  This is however 
a one-sided and incorrect interpretation.  We must not forget that among 
those who favored the government's offer there were two great banks, viz. 
the Dresdner Bank, and the A. Schaafihausen'scher  Bankverein.  Further- 
more,  even in the absence of  the concentration movement a  coalition  of 
banks might be formed for a specific purpose.  Moreover, any one  of  the 
allied great banks was sufficientlj powerful by itself to buy up enough shares 
to bring about the refusal of  the government's offer. 
24.  Max Sering says,  "The  question  of  supplanting  our imports by 
domestic production, must be answered absolutely in the negative.  If  this 
is so, we  must export on a scale, that will enable us to pay for those articles 
("Handels- und Machtpolitik, Vol.  11,  pp.  38-39  Stuttgart, J.  G. Cotta's 
Nachfolger, 1900).  Sering goes somewhat too far, at  least as regards tropi- 
cal products, for these we may hope to draw in increasing quantities from APPENDICES. APPENDIX  I. 
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Kapitalisten, 32. Aufl., Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg. 
2. Literature on stock-exchange legislatiort und reform. 
1895. Gustav Cohn, Beitrage zur deutschen Borsenreform,  Leipzig. 
1896-97.  F. J. Pfleger  und I,.  Gschwindt, Borsenrefor~ri  in Deutschland, 
Stuttgart. 
1898.  Wiedenfeld,  Die  Borse in ihrer  wirtschaftlichen  Funktion  und  in 
ihrer rechtlichen  Entwicklung vor  und unter dern  Borsengesetz, 
Berlin. 
1900.  Riesser, Die handelsrecl~tlicl~en  Lieferungsgeschafte, eine Kritik der 
Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts,  Berlin. National  Molzetary  Commission 
1902.  Verhandlungen des I. Allgemeinen Deutscllen Bankiertags zu Frank- 
furt a. M.  Frankfurt a. M. 
-  Riesser,  Die  Notwendigkeit  einer  Revision  des  Borsengesetzes, 
Berlin. 
1902. N.  hfuller, Differenztheorie und Biirsengeschiifte, Berlin. 
1903.  Denkschrift  betr. die  Wirkungen  dcs Borsengesetzes vom  22. Juni 
1896 und  der durch  das Reichsstempelgesetz vorn  14. Juni  1900 
eingcfuhrten Borsensteuererhohung.  Herausgegehen  vom  Zen- 
tralverband des Deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, Berlin. 
G. Wermert, BBrse, Borsengesetz und Borsengescliaft, Leipzig. 
1904.  Verhandlungen  des 11. Allgemeinen Deutschen Banlriertags  zu  Ber- 
lin, Berlin. 
1904.  Neukamp,  Differenzgeschaft  und  Borsentermingeschat  in  der 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung.  Herausgegeben vom Zentral- 
verband des Deutschen  Bank- und Bankiergewerbes,  Berlin. 
1907. Verhandlungen  des  111.  Allgemeinen  Deutschen  Bankiertages  zu 
Hamburg, Berlin  (Referate von Riesser  U.  Warburg). 
-  Riesser, Stand und Aussichten der Borsengesetzrefornl, Berlin. 
3.  Commentaries and annotated text editons of  the Stock-Exchange  Act. 
1908. Apt, Trumpler, Weissbart,  5. Aufl., Berlin. 
1908. Hemptenmacher,  2. Aufl., Berlin. 
1909 Rehm,  Trumpler,  Dove,  Neukamp,  Schmidt-Ernsthausen,  Breit, 
herausgegeben  vom  Zentralverband  des  Deutschen  Bank-  und 
Bankiergewerbes, mit Vorwort  von Riesser,  Berlin. 
1890.  W. Lotz, Die Technik des deutschen Emissionsgeschafts.  Anleihen 
Konversionen  und Grundungen, Leipzig. 
1902. Max Jorgens,  Finanziclle Trustgesellschaften, Stuttgart und Berlin 
1905. E. Leist, Die Sanierung von Akticngesellschaften, Berlin. 
1907. G.  S.  Freund,  Die  Rechtsverhiiltnisse  der  offentlichen  Anleihen, 
Berlin. 
1908. E. Wolff  und F. Birkenhiehl, Die Praxis der Finanzierung bei Errich- 
tung, Erweiterung, Verbesserung, Fusionierung und Sanierung von 
Aktiengesellschaften,  Berlin. 
Die Bank, Berlin (ed. Lansburgh). 
Bankarchiv, Zeitschrift fur Bank- und  Borsenwesen, Berlin  (ed. Riesser). 
Bankbeamtenzeitung, Berlin. 
The Bankers',  Insurance Managers' and Agents' Magnzine, London. 
The Bankers'  Magazine, New York. 
Bankers' Magazine and Statistical Register, New York. 
Berichte fiber Handel and Industrie  Berlin. 
The German Great Banks 
Berliner Gorsencourier. 
Berliner Borsenzeitung. 
Berliner Jahrbuch fur Handel und Industrie. 
Berliner Tageblatt. 
BlHtter fur Genossenschaftswesen,  Berlin. 
Busch's Archiv fur Theorie und Praxis des allgemeinen deutschen Handels- 
rechts. 
Deutsche  Monatsschrift fur  Handel,  Schiffahrt und Verkehrswesen  (Ro- 
stock). 
Der Deutsche okonomist, Berlin. 
Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung, Berlin. 
Deutsches Handclsarchiv, Berlin. 
Deutsches Handelsblatt, Berlin. 
L'Economiste  europken, Paris. 
L'Economiste francais, Paris. 





Handel und Gewerbe, Berlin. 
Hannoverscher Kurier. 
Internationaler Volkswirt, Berlin. 
Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Rechtspflege (Holtzendorff), 
Leipzig. 
Jahrbiicher fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft (Schmoller), 
Leipzig. 
Jahrbucher fjir Nationalokonomie  und Statistik (Conrad), Jena. 
Journal des Economistes,  Paris. 




Monatsschrift  fur Aktienrecht  und  Bankwesen,  Berlin, 
Monatsschrift fur Handelsrecht und Bankwesen, Berlin. 
Moniteur des IntkrCts matkriels, Bruxelles. 
Neue Freie Presse. Wien. 
Pester Lloyd. 
Plutus, Berlin. 
Preussisches Handelsarchiv, Berlin. 
Reuter's Finanz-Chronik, London. 
Die Sparkasse, Berlin. 
Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Berlin. 
Vierteljahrsschrift fur  Staats- und Volkswirtschaft (Frankenstein), Leipzig. 
Vierteljahrsschrift  fur Volkswirtschaft,  Politik  und  Kulturgeschichte, 
Berlin. National  Monetary  Commissiolz 
- 
Volkswlrtschaftllche Wocl~enschr~ft  (Dorn), Wien 
Vosslsche Zeitung 
\\/ochenschr~ft  fur Aktlenrecht und Bankwesen, Berlin 
Zeitschrlft des Konigl  Slatistischen Bureaus, Berlln 
Zeltschrlft fur das gesamte Aktlennesen  Leipzig 
Zeitschrlft fur das gesamte Handelsrecht, begrundet von Goldschmldt, Stutt- 
gart 
Zeitschrlft fur dle gesamte Staatswlssenschaft, Tubingen 
Zeitschrlft fur die deutsche Volksw~rtschaft  (Schuck), Berlln 
Zeltschrlft  fur Kapltal und Rente  Berlin 
Zeitschrlft fur Llteratur und  Geschichte der Staatsl~lssenschaften,  Leipzlg 
Zeitschr~ft  fur Handelswlssenschaft  und Handelqpraxls,  Le~pzig 
APPENDIX 11. 
Credzt banks founded  durzng the years 1848  1856 
[To page 45  l 
Year of 
c~pltal  at 
end of  1857 
Locatlon  Deslgnatlon 















Total 14 banks 
APPENDIX 111. 
German credzt banks zn  1872 a 




Berllner Handels Gesellschaft 
Schleslscher Bankvereln 
Coburg Gothaer credlt Gesellschaft 
Bank fur Handel und Industne 
Credltanstalt fur Industrle und Handel 
E~slebener  Dlsconto Gesellschaft 
Norddeutsche Bank 
Verelnsbank 
A Sch~affhausen  scher Bankvereln 
Allgemelne Deutsche Cred~tanqtalt 
Comptolr d Escompte de hlulhouse 
OldenburglscheSpar und Lelh Ranh 
Strassburger Bank (Stahllng) 
Pald up 

















































Includes  however  note 
Marks 
39  131 ooo 
11  220 ooo 
7 500  ooo 
I  700  ooo 
42  936  ooo 
I  800 ooo 
600  ooo 
30  ooo  ooo 
6 ooo  ooo 
15  561  ooo 
22  292  000 
800  ooo 
I  zoo  ooo 
2  400  ooo 
183  140 000 
banken  and Produktenbanken  wh~ch  are  omltted  from  the  above 11st  The latter 
lncludes  on the other hand  the so called Maklerbanken (brokers  banks)  Thls made 
necessary a number of  changes tn the table of  the Deutscher Oekonomzst 
The dates prlnted ln heavy tjpe indlcate that the respectwe banks were founded 
dung  the fiftles of  the runeteenth century 
893 
Aachener Bank fur Handel U  Industrle 
Aachener  Dlscontogesellschaft  (Rheln~ 
sche) 
B  ankvereln Aschaffenburg 
Augsburger  Bank 
Barmer  Bankverem  Hlnsberg  rlscher 
& CO 
Allgem  Bau  U  Handelsbank 
Allgem  Deutsche Handelsgesellschaft 
Berllner Bank 
Borsenbank fur Maklergeschafte 
Berllner Bankvereln 
Borsen Handels Vereln 
Centralbank fur Industrle U  Handel 

















2  400 
2  400 
I  500 
2  400 
12  000 
I  200 
3 000 
8  400 
I  800 
18 ooo 
3  600 
22 500 
3  ooo 
Berllner Commerz  u  Wechselbank  1871 
Deutsche Bank  1  1870 
Deutsche Handelsbank  1869 
Deutsche Unlonbank  1871 
Dlsconto Gesellschaft  1801 
Deutsche  Genossenschaftsbank  Sorgel  1865 
Parrlslus & CO 
Gewerbebank  H  Schuster & CO  1863 
Generalbank fur Mahlergeschafte  1872 
Hamburg Berllner Bank  1872 
Berllner Handelsgesell5chaft  1  1856 
Internat~onale  Handelsgesellschaft  1871 
Berllner Lombardbank  1871 
Berllner Maklerbank  1871 
Maklervere~nsbank  1871 
Preusslsche Credltanstalt  1872 
Provlnzlal Dlsconto Gesellschaft  1871 
Provluzlal Gewerbebank  1872 
erelnsbank  Qulstorp & CO  1870 
Wechselstuben  A  G  1872 
Berllner  echslerbank  1871 
Oskonomzrt  of  January  27  1906  (Vol  XXIV No 
banks  mortgage  banhs  the  so called  Baubanken 
4 500 
45  000 
900 
36  ooo 
60  ooo 
7 500 
18 ooo 
3  ooo 
g  ooo 
31  500 
5  250 
I  so0 
2  400 
2  400 






1205)  whlch 
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German credzt banks zn 1872-Continued 
I  I 










































at  end of 
6 ooo 
9  000 
3  000 
13  500 
30  ooo 
I  800 
2  400 

















Coburg Gothaer Credit Gesellschaft 
Bank fur Rhelnland U  Westfalen 
Rheinische Effektenbank 
Rhelnlsch Westfallsche Genossenschafts 
bank 
A  Schaaffhausen'scher Bankvereln 
Kolner Wechsler  U  Comm  Bank 
Nlederlausltzer Bank 
Bankvereln von Gebr  Peter & CO 
Danzlger Bankvereln 
Bank fur Handel U  Industrle 






Sachslsche Dlscont(Lomb ) Bank 
Elsleber Dlsconto Gesellschaft 
Berglsch Marklsche Bank 
Elberfelder Disconto- u Wechslerbank 
Elberfelder Handels Gesellschaft 
Emder (Genossenschafts) Bank 
Thurlnger Bankveran 
Essener Cremtanstalt 
48  000 
3  000 
3 000 




9  600 
3 000 
6 ooo 
5  250 









































I  500 
900 
8 100 
6  ooo 
I  200 
167 
4  500 
9.000 
German credzt banks zn 187rXontinued 

















































Deutsche Effekten  U  Wechselbank 
Deutsche Handels Gesellschaft 
Deutsche Vereinsbank 








,  Hallesche Creditanstalt 
Waaren Credltanstalt 
Anglo Deutsche Bank 
Bankvereln In Hamburg 










Allgemerne Deutsche Credltanstalt 
Communalbank des Konlgrelchs Sachsen 
P Schonhelmerscher Bankvereln 
Lelpzlger Dlsconto Gesellschaft 
Lelpzlger Verelnsbank 
Leipzlger Wechslerbank 
Lelpzlger U echsler  U  Deposltenhank 
Lubecker B anh 
Vorschuss- U  Sparvereln 
Magd~burger  Bankverein 












3  000 
I2 000 
g  000 
30  ooo 
23 800 
7  200 
240 
750 
6  ooo 
g  000 
21 000 
18  ooo 
7  2 
3  000 
2  400 
4  800 
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German credit banks in 1872-Continued. 
Location. 






................  Banque de Mulhouse 
...  Comptoir d'Escompte  de Mulhouse. 
............  Bayerische Haudelsbank 
.............  Bayerische Vereinsbank 
















































A total of 139 banks with a combined capital of  1,1zz,113,ooo  marks, of  which.  how- 
ever, a considerable portion disappeared a short time after. 
.........................  Vereinsbank 
Oldenburger Spar- U.  Leihbank ......... 
Bank fur Landwirtschaft U. Industrie. ... 
OstdeutscheBank .................... 
Provinzial Wechsler- U.  Discontobank ... 
OberschlesischerCreditverein .......... 
Rostocker Vereinsbank ................ 
Rostocker Gewerbebank ............... 
.................  Stettiner Vereinsbank 
Stettiner Jlaklerbank ................. 
Strassburger Bank (Stabling) ........... 
Bank fur Elsass und Lothringen ........ 
....................  Stuttgarter Bank. 
Suddeutsche Provinzialbank. .......... 
Wurttemberger Commissionsbank  ...... 
Wurttemberger Vereinsbank ........... 
Wernigeroder Comm.-Gesellschaft A.-G .. 
.......................  Vereinsbank.. 
..................  Oherlausitzer Bank. 
......................  ZwickauerBank 
APPENDIX  IV. 




















Representation of  the great banks on the supervisory boards of  stock com+anies. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of  industry. 
l 
MINING.  SMBLTING, AND SALT  WORKS. 
I 
STONES  AND  EARTHS. 
Two (vice-chairman). ...... 
One.. ................... 
One. .................... 






Deutsch-Luxemburgische  Bergwerks-  U.  Hutten-Gesell- 
schaft in Bochum. 
Heldburg, A.-G.  fiir Bergbau, bergbauliche  und andere 
industrielle Erzeugnisse, Hildesheim. 
Harpener Bergbau A.-G.. Dortmund. 
Holzverkohlungs-Industrie. Konstanz. 
Internationale Kohlenbergwerks-A.-G., Cologne. 
"Phouix."  A:G.  fur Bergbau und Hutteubetrieb, Horde. 
Rheinische  A.-G.  fur Brauukohlenberghau  U.  Brikett- 
fahrikation. Cologne. 
A. Riebeck'sche Montauwerke, A.-G., Halle. 
Saar- U.  Mosel-Bergwerks-Gesellschaft, Karlingeu. 
I 
MBTAL  WORKING. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
......  One (vice-chairman). 
One (chairman) ........... 
One. .................... 
A.-G. fur Glasindustrie vorm. Friedr. Siemens, Dresden.  . 
Annawerke, Chamotte- U.  Tonwaren, Oeslau. 
Glashiitte Schreiber A.-G..  Furstenberg a. 0. 
Stralauer Glashiitte A.-G.. Berlin. 
I 
MACHINE  AND INSTRUMBNT  MAKING. 
One.. ................... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
..........  One (chairman)  .I Adlerwerke vorm. Heinrich Kleyel A.-G.. Frankfort-on-the 
Main. 
One.. ................... A.-G.  Mix  &  Genest, Telefon-  und  relegraphen-Werke. 
Berlin. 
One.. ...................  A.-G.,  Maschinenbau-Anstalt  vorm.  Venuleth  &  Eden- 
berger, Darmstadt. 
One. ....................  Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft,  Berlin. 
One. .................... Deutsche  Niles. Werkzeugmaschinen-Fabrik, Oberschon- 
weide. 
One.. ................... ~eutsch-~berseeische  Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft,  Berlin. 
One. ....................  Deutsch - Sudamerikanische  'relegraphen .  GesellschafG 
Cologne. 
Two (vice-chairman). ..... Elektriziatswerke Homburg v. d. H. 
Berliner  Metallwarenfabrik  H.  A.  Jurst  &  Co.  A.-G. 
Berlin. 
Deutsche  Gold-  U.  Silber-Scheideanstalt,  Frankfort-on- 
the-Main. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Representatian  of the great  banks on the supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
BANK  FUR HAXDEL UND INDUSTRIE-Continued. 
One .................. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board. 
One. ................. 
...  One (vice-chairman). 
One .................. 
One .................. 
One (chairman). ....... 
Class of industry. 
I%ACAINE  AND  INSTRUUENT  MAKING--CO~~~~U~~. 
One .................. 
One... ................. 
.....  One (vice-chairman). 
One (chairman). ......... 
"Fenstra,"  Fabrik fur Eisenkonstruktionen und Briicken- 
bau, Diisseldorf. 
A.-G. Kortings Elektrizitatswerke, Berlin. 
Lech-Elektrizitatswerke, Augsburg. 
Ludw. Loewe & Co.. Berlin. 
Maschinenbau-Gesellschaft,  Heilbronn. 
"Pbijnix,"  A.-G.  fur Stuhl-.  Herd-  U. Ofenindustrie  in 
Oberhausen. 
Veithwerke, A.-G.,  Sandbach. Automobil- und Fahrrad- 
fabrik. 
CHEMICALS. 
Bayerische Stickstoffwerke in hlunich. 
Chemische Werke, vorm.  H. und E. Albcrt, Biebrich. 
Chemische  Fabrik  Griesheim,  Elektron,  Frankfort- 
on-the-Main. 
( 
ILLUMINANTS, SOAPS,  FATS, OILS, VARNISHES. 
I 
TEXTILES  AND LGATHER. 
One. .................... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 





One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One. .................... 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
One (chairman). ........... 
One (vice-chairman). .... 
One ................... 
I. P. Bemberg. Oebde (Buntfarberei). 
Gruschwitz. Textilwerke, Nensalz. 
Eduard Lingel. Schuhfabrik A.-G.. Erfurt. 
Vereinigte  Kunstseidefabriken,  Frankfort-on-the-Maiu. 
Wurttembergische Kattunmanufaktur, Heidenheim. 
One. ............. 
Albrecbt & Meister, A.-G., Berlin. 
A.-G. fur Buntpapierfabrikation, Aschaffenburg. 
WOOD  AND CARVING  INDUSTRY 
Holzindustrie Herm. Schutt, Czersk. 
FOODS  AND DRINKS. 
Representation  of  the  great  banks m the  ssufiervisory boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
One (chairman). .......... 
One. .................... 
One (chairman). .......... 
One. .................... 
One. .................... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One. .................... 
BANK FUR  HANDEL UND  INDUSTRIE-Continued. 
Aktien-Zuckerfabrik, Gr.-Gerau. 
Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Wetterau, Friedberg 
Altmunster Brauerei, Mainz. 
Continentale Wassenverks-Gesellschaft. Berlin. 
Deutsche Bierbrauerei. Berlin. 
Gehr. Stollwerck, A.-G., Cologne-on-the-Rhine. 
Konsewenfabrik Joh. Braun, Worms. 
Seats on the supervisory 







One (chairman). .......... 
Three (chairman). ......... 
One.. .................... 







Two (vice-chairman). ...... 
One.. .................... 
One (chairman) ........... 
One.. .................... 
Two (chairman). .......... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One (chairman). .......... 
One.. .................... 
One.. .................... 
One (chairman) ........... 
One.. .................... "  Allianz,"  Versicherungs-Gesellscbaft,  Berlin. 
One (chairman). ..........  Deutscbe Lebensversicherungsbank. Berlin. 
One.. ....................  /  "  Industrie." Versicherungs-A.-G., Berlin. 
COMXERCIAL  ENTERPRISES. 
Bank des Berliner Kassenvereins, Berlin. 
Bank fur  Brauindustrie, Berlin. 
Berliner Hypothekenbank. 
Berg- U.  Metallbank in Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
Boden-A.-G. am Amtsgericht Pankow. 
Boden-A:G.  Berlin-Nord. 
Borsigwalder Terrain-Ges. Berlin. 
Breslauer Disconto-Bank in Breslau. 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in Berlin. 
Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
Gesellschaft fur elektrische Unternehmungen. Berlin. 
Immobilien-Verkehrsbank. Berlin. 
Kolnische Hausrenten-A.-G. 
Neue Boden-A.-G., Berlin. 
Ostbank fur Handel U.  Gewerbe, Posen. 
Preussische Pfandbriefbank, Berlin. 
Reiniger, Gebbert & Schall A.-G., Erlangen. 
Suddeutsche Bodcnkreditbank, hlunich. 
Suddeutsche Itnmobilien-Gesellschaft.  Mainz. 
Terrain-A.-G. Berlin-Mariendorf, Berlin. 
Terrain-Gesellscbaft. Berlin U.  Vororte, A.-G. 
Vereinsbank, Wismar. 
Westliche Boden-A.-G., Berlin. 
Wittennuer Boden-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
l 
TRANSPORTATION. 
...........  One (chairman) 
..........  Two (chairman). 
....................  One.. 
....................  One.. 
....................  One.. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
......  One (vice-chairman). 
..........  One (chairman). 
One.. ...........  ,  ........ 
Dessauer Strassenbahn-Gesellschaft. 
Frankfurter Lokalbahn-Akt.-Ges. 
Grosse Berlinrr Strassenbahn. 
Kameruncr Eisenbabn-Gesellscbaft, Berlin. 
Lnftschiffahrt A.-G.. Frankfort on  the Main. 
"Midgard."  Deutsche Seeverkehrs-A.-G,, Nordenham. 
Santa Catharina-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
Suddeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Darmstadt. 
Westdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Cologne. National  Monetary  Commission 
1 
FOREIGN  COMPANIES. 
Representation  of the great  banks on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued  . 
BANK FUR HANDEL UND  INDUSTRIE-Continued. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board. 
BERLINER HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT. 
Class of industry 
....................  One.. 
....................  One.. 
....................  One.. 
One.. .................... 
One.. .................... 
....................  One.. 
l  MINING,  SMELTING, AND  SALT  WORKS. 
Amsterdamsche Bank. 
Banca Marmorosch Blanck Sr  Co., Bucharest. 
Consolidated Mines Selection Company, London. 
Gesellschaft fur elektrische Beleuchtung vom Jahre 1886, 
St. Petersburg. 
Societe Generale Belge  d'Entreprises  Electriques, Brus- 
sels. 
K. priv. Wechselstuben-A.-G., "Mercur,"  Vienna. 
l 
STONES  AND  EARTHS. 
......................  One 
....................  One.. 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
One.. .................... 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
One (director). ............ 
....................  One.. 
..........  One (chairman). 
....................  One.. 
One.. .................... 
..........  One (chairman). 
One (vice-chairman) ..... . 
One.. .................... 
....................  One.. 
....................  One.. 
....................  One.. 
One.. .................... 
...........  Qne (chairman) 
....................  One..  Portland-Cementwerke. Hamburg. 
Bergwerks-Gesellschaft, "Hibernia,"  Herne. 
"Bismarckhutte"  in Bismarckhutte. 
Eisenhutte Silesia, Paruschowitz in Oberschl. 
Frankfurt, Finckenheer,  Braunkohlen. A.-G. Charlotten- 
burg. 
Gewerkschaft, "Viktoria"  Lunen. Dortmund. 
Gewerkschaft Gunthershall, Gollingen. 
Harpener Berghau-Gesellschaft. Dortmund. 
Hohenlohe-Werke in Hohenlohehutte, Upper Silesia. 
Kaliwerke Sarstedt. 
Kaliwerke Priedrichshall in Schude. 
Kraft, Bergbau, A.-G., Leipzig. 
Oberschlesische Kokswerke, Berlin. 
Planiawerke,  A.-G.  fiir  Kohlenfabrikation in  Plania  b. 
Ratibor. 
A.  Riebecksche Montanwerke in Halle a. S. 
Rombacher Huttenwerke, Rombach. 
Schantung Bergbau-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
Schlesische Kohlen- U. Kokswerke in Gottesberg i. SchL 
Vereinigte Lausitzer Glaswerke, A.-G. Weisswasser. 
l 
METAL  WORKING. 
The German Great Banks 
One (vice-chairman) .....,. 
....................  One.. 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
....................  One.. 
Represeutatwn of  the great  banks on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
Aluminiumindustrie Neuhausen. 
Eisen- und Stahlwerk, Bethlen-Falva. 
Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie in Gleiwitz. 




One  ...................... 
BERLINER HANDELSGESELLSCHAET-Continued. 
...........  One (chairman) 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
One  ...................... 
One. ..................... 
.......  One (vice-chairman) 
One ...................... 
One (chairman). .......... 
One (chairman). .......... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One ...................... 
Seats on the supervisory 
board. 
.....................  One 
Two (vice-chairman). ..... 
Two (vice-chairman).  ...... 
Two (vice-chairman). ...... 
Class of  industry. 
One ..................... 
One. .................... 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
Two (vice-chairman).  ...... 
One. .................... 
One. .................... 
One (chairman). .......... 





METAL  WORKING--CO~~~~~~~. 
Rheinische Stahlwerke, hleiderich. 
Russische Eisenindustrie. Gleiwitz. 
Vereinigte Dcutsche Nickelwerke, Schwerte. 
Westfalische Drahtindustrie, Hamm in Westphalia. 
MACHINE  CONSTRUCTION  AND  INSTRUMENT  MAKING. 
Akkumulatorenfabrik, Berlin- 
Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft,  Berlin. 
Benrather llascbinenfahrik, Berlin. 
Berlin-Anhaltische hlaschinenbau, Berlin. 
Berliner Elektrizitatsnerke,  Berlin. 
Deutsche Nileswerke, Oherschoneweide. 
Elektrotechnische U'erke,  Berlin. 
Kraftubertragungs-Wrrke, Rheinfelden. 
Julius Pintsch, Berlin, Elektrizitatswerk. 
Stettiner Maschinenbau. "Vulcan."  Stettin. 
CHEMICALS. 
Bayerische Stickstoffwerke, Miinchen. 
Chemische Fabrik, Lindenhof, C. Weyl. A.-G., Mannheim. 
Dellarocca, Chemische Fabrik, A.-G., Berlin. 
Rutgerswerke, Charlottenburg. 
ILLUMINANTS, SOAPS, PATS,  OILS, VARNISHBS. 
Deutsche Continental-Gasgesellschaft, Dessau 
FOODS  AND DRINKS. 
Leipziger Bierbrauerei, Reudnitz. 
W. A.  Scholten, Starke- und Syrupfabrik.  A.-G..  Bran- 
denburg. 
Zuckerraffinerie Tangermunde. 
BUILDING  TRADES. 
Wilhelm Bruch, Kanalbau-A.-G., Berlin. 
COMMERCIAL  ENTERPRISES. 
A.-G. fiir Erwerb- U. Verwertungsindustrie.  Neuhof. 
Bahnhof Jungfernheide, Boden-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
Bank iur deutscl~e  Eisenhahnwsrte, Berlin. 
Bank fur elektrische Untrmehmungen, Zurich. 
Berliner Maklerverein, Berlin. 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. Berlin. 
Deutscher Eisenhandel. A.-G., Berlin. 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank, Berlin. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Representatton  of  the great  banks  on  the  supervzsory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panzes-Contlnued 
BERLINER HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT-Continued  -- 
l 
Seats on the snpervlsory 
hoard 
Class of  Industry 
l 














Two  (dlrector  and  char 
man) 
One (vlce chalrman) 



















Dlamanten Pacht Ges  Berlln 
Handclsgesellschaft fur Grundbesltz  Berhn 
Industrlegelande Schoneberg. A -G , Berlln 
Llquldatlonsvereln fur Zeltgeschafte, Berlln 
Ostbank fur Handel U  Gewerbe, Posen 
Paplerfabrlk Koeshn, A  G , Koeslln 
Preuss~sche  Hypotheken Aktlenhank, Berlln 
Rnchshank. Berlln 
4  G  fur Verkehrswesen  Berlln 
Braunschwelg Schonlnger Elsenbahn  Braunschwelg 
Brohlthal Elsenbahn Gesellschaft. Cologne 
Caplto & Kleln. A  G,  Benrath 
Deutsche  Kolonlal Elsenbahn  U  Betrlebs Gesellschaft. 
Berlln 
Kamerun E~senbahn  Gesellschaft, Berlln 
I 
Lelpzlger elektrlsche Strassenbahn, Lelpzlg 
Ostdeutsche Elsenbahn Gesellschaft, Kon~gsberg 
Westdeutsche Elsenbahn Gesellschaft, Cologne 
TRAYSPORTATION  ENTERPRISES 
l  FOREIGN  COMPANIES 
A  G  Hadeland  Dergwerk zu Grua (Norway) 
A -G  ' Elektrlzltat "  Warsan 
Banca Marmorosch  Blank & Co. Bucharest 
Banque Andreewltch & CO,  A -G,  Belgrade 
Banque Internatlonale de Bruxelles 
Bohmlsche  Montanges  vorm  fursthch Furstenberglsche 
hlontanwerke, Vlenna 
Gesellschaft  der 'vietallfabnken, vorm  D  I-Iantke. War- 
saw 
A  Gorz & CO  London 
Kraftwerk Laufenburg In Laufenhurg  Switzerland 
Labouchere  Oyens & CO  Bank, Amsterdam 
Norge Erz Dergbau. Ges  LU Hakedal (Uorway) 
Oesterrelch  Alplne Montan Gesellschaft  blenna 
Prager Elsenlndustr~e,  Vlenna 
Schantung Elsenbahn Gesellschaft. Ts~ngtau,  Chlna 
Schwelzerlsche Metallbank In Basle 
Suddeutsche  Donau Dampfschlffahrts Gesellschaft.  VI- 
Representatton  of  the great  banks  on the supermsory  boards  of  stock  cm- 
panzes-Continued 
COMMERZ  UND  DISCONTO BANK 
Seats on  the supervisory 
board  Class of  Industry  i 
l  MINING,  SMELTING,  AND SALT  WORKS 
One 
One 




















Mecklenburglsche  Kall Salzwerke  Jessenltz 
STONES  AND  EARTHS 
Portland-Cementfabrlk "Germanla,"  A  G  In Lehrte 
"Teutoma,'  M~sburger  Portland Cementfabrlk, Hanover 
METAL  WORKING 
Stanz-  U  Emallllenverke vorm  Car1 Thlel & Sohne, A -G. 
In Lubeck 
Berltner Gusstahl  U  Elsenglesserel, A  G ,  Berlln 
MACIIING  AND  INSTRUMENT  MAKING 
A  G  Gorhtzer Masch~nenbauanstalt  U  Elsenglessere: 
Contlnentale  Ge-ellschaft  fur elektrlsche  Lnternehmun- 
gen, Nuremberg 
Dusseldorfer Maschlnenbau A  G  vorm j  Lohenhausen 
Elektn~~tats  A  G  rorm  Schuckert & CO ,  Nuremberg 
Lelpz~ger  Werhzeugmaschlnenfabr~k  vorm  W  v  Plttler 
Masch~nenbauanstalt  U  Elsenglessere~  vorm l  h  Flother. 
Gassen 




Chemlsche  Fabnken Harburg Stassfurt,  vorm  Thorl & 
Heldtmann  A  G  Harburg 
I  TEXTILES 
Norddeutsche  Jutesplnnerel  U  Weberel,  Hamburg Har- 
burg 
FOODS  AND  DRINKS 
Barmbecker Br~uerel  A -G. Hamburg Barmbeck 
Brauere~  ' Germanla, ' A  G,  Berlln 
Norddeutsche Zuckerraflinene, Frellstedt 
BUILDING  TRADES 
A  G  Berllner Neustadt In Llqu~d  In Berlln 
COMMERCIAL  ENT ERPRISES 
Credlt  U  Sparbank In Lelpzlg 
Grundstncks A  G  m Berlln 
Llchtenberger Terraln A -G 
Revlslons  U  Vermogensverwaltung. A  G , Berlm. National  Monetary  Commission 
Representation  of  the  great  banks on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies--Continued. 
One ................. 
COMMERZ-  UND  DISCONTO-BANK-Continued. 
.....  One (vice-chairman). 
One .................... 
Seats on the supervisory 
board. 
COMMERCIAL  BNTISRPRISES-CO~~~~U~~. 
Terrain-Gesellschaft  am  Teltowkana!  Rudow-Johannis- 
thal. 
Terrain-Gesellschaft Munchen. Priedenheim. 
Waren-Commissionsbank in Hamburg. 
Class of  industry. 
INSURANCE  ENTERPRISES. 
I  TRANSPORTATION  ENTERPRISES. 
....................  One. 
One.. ................... 
"  1ndustrie"-Versicherungs-A.-G.,  Berlin. 
"Nordstem."  Unfall-  U.  Altersversicherungs-A.-G..  El- 
berfeld. 
l 
HOSTELRY  AND TAVERN  ENTERPRISES. 
I 
....................  One. 
One (chairman). .......... 
....................  One. 
....................  One.  Ka~serkeller,  A.-G..  Berlin.  l 
Bergische Kleinbahn-A:G.  in Elberfeld. 
Reinickendorf -Liebenwalde-Schikebecker  Eisenbahn- 
A.-G. 
Vereinigte Elbschiffahrts-Gesellschaften. A.-G. in Dresden. 
l  POREIGN  COMPANIES. 
....................  One.  Santa Catharina-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
DEU'I'SCHE  BBNK. 
l 
MINING,  SMELTING.  AND SALT  WORKS. 
I 
STONES  AND  EARTHS. 
One (chairman) ........... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
....................  One. 
One. ..................  . 
....................  One. 
One (vice-chairman). ..... 
One. .................... 
...................  One. 
One.. ................... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One. .................... 
....................  One. 
One. .................... 
One (vice-chairman). .....  .I  Steingutfabrik SBmewitz. Meissen. 
Bleichert'sche Braunkohlenwerke. Neukirchen. 
Bocliumer Verein  fur Bergbau U.  Gussstahlfabrikation. 
Conlinentale Wasserwerks-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
Deutsche Mineraliil-Industrie, A.-G.. Berlin. 
Essener Bergwerksverein "Konig Wilhelm." 
Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke. 
Gelsenkirchener Dergwerks-A.-G. 
Gewerkschaft Wilhelmsschacht, Gnaudorf-Borna. 
HarpenerBergbau-A.-G., Dortmund. 
Konigsborn,  A.-G., fur Bergbau,  Salinen-  U.  Solbadbe- 
trieb. 
'Phonix," A.-G. fur Bergbau und Hiittenbetrieb, I-Iiirde. 
Rornbacher Hiittenwerke. 
Otavi, Minen- U.  Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
German Great Banks 
Representation  of  th  great  banks on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
DEUTSCHE BANK-Continued. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of industry. 
l  METAL  WORKING. 
(  MACHINE  CONSTRUCTION  AND INSTRUMENT  MAKING. 
....................  One. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One (chairman) ........... 
Aluminium-Industrie.  A.-G., Neuhausen. 
Hirsch, Kupfer- und Messingwerke, Halberstadt. 
Reichelt, Xfetallschrauben-A.-G.,  Furstenwalde. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One (chairman) ........... 
....................  One. 
One. .................... 
....................  One. 
One. .................... 
One. .................... 
Two  (I chairman. I  direc- 
tor). 
Two (chairman) .......... 
One. .................... 
One. .................... 
....................  One. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One. ....................  J. D. Riedel. Berlin. Chemische Fabrik. 
Akkumulatorenfabrik Berlin-Hagen. 
Bayerische Elektrizititswerke, Munchen. 
Benrather Maschinenfabrik, Berlin. 




Deutsche  Ueberseeische  Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft,  Ber- 
lin. 
Elektrische Licht- U.  Kraftanlagen, Berlin. 
Fabrik fur photographische Apparate, Dresden. 
J. Frerichs & Co., Osterholz.  Maschinenfabrik U. Schiffs- 
werft. 
Car1 Hamel, Schonau. Maschinenfabrik. 
Kraftubertragungswerke, Rheinfelden. 




One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One.. .................. 
One. .................... 
....................  One. 
....................  Two. 
One.. .................... 
One (chairman). .......... 
1 
ILLUMINANTS, SOAPS, RATS,  OILS,  AND VARNISHES. 
Mannesmannrohren-Werke. 
Markische Maschinenbau-Anstalt. Wetter. 
Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Niirnberg. 
Oberschlesische Eisenbahnbedarfs-A.-G., Friedenshiitte. 
Orenstein & Koppel, Berlin, A.-G. fur Feld- urld  Klein- 
bahnbedarf. 
Jul.  Pintsch A.-G.,  Berlin.  Maschinenfabrik  U.  Beleuch- 
tungs-Gesellschaf t. 
Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizititswerk, Essen. 
F. Kuppersbusch & Sohne, A.-G. 
Siemens & Halske, Berlin. 
Ernst Schiess.Werkzeugmaschincnfabrik.  Diisseldorf. 
Voigt & Haeffner. A.-G.. Prankfort on the Main. 
One. .................... 
..........  Two (chairman) 
...........  One (chairman) 
One. .................... 
Dentsche Continental-Gas-Gesellschait, Dessau. 
Deutsche Petroleum-A.-G.. Berlin. 
Europaische Petroleum-Union, Bremen. 
F. Thorls, Vereinigte Harburger Olfabriken. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Representatzon of  the  great  banks on the supervzsory boards  of  stock  corn 
panzes-Continued 




Class of Industry  Seats on the supervlsory 






One (v~ce  chairman) 
One 
Allgauer Baumwollsp~nnerel  u  Weberel 
Baumwollsplnnerel  Germanla  Epe 
Bremcr U  ollkamtnerel 
Bremer  Tauwerkfabrik  A  G  vorm  C  H  Mlchelsen. 
Grohn 
Schleslsche Tcxtllwaren  Methner & Frahne  Landeshut 







One (delegate and member 








Mecklenburglsche  Sparbank  Schwerln 
Neu Bellevue  A  G  fur  Grundstucksvenvertung  Berlln 
Neu Westend  A  G  fur Grundstucksverwertung Berlln 
Norddeutschc Kred~tanstalt  Konrgsberg 
Preusslsche Bodenkred~t  Aktlenbank  Berlrn 
Prlvatbank  Gotha 
Relchshank  Berlln 
Hannoversche Bank 
Mecklenburglsche  Hypothcken  und  Wechselbank 
Schwerln 
One 
One (vlce chairman) 
I 
PAPER 
One  I Paul Suss Luxuspaplerfabr~k  Dresden 
I 
RUBBER 
One (chalrman)  /  Verelnlgte Berlln Frankfurter Gumm~naren  Rhelnlsche Kredltbank  Mannheim 
Sachs~sche  Bank  Dresden 
Schlesischer Bankvereln  Breslau 
Suddeutsche Rank  Mannhelm 
Schoneberg West  A  G  fur  Grundstucksverwertung 
Berlln 
Terraln Gesellschaft  am Teltowkanal  Rudow Johannls 
thal A  G 
Wllmersdorfer Terrain Gesellschaft  Rhelngau  Berlln 
l 




Aktlen Muhlenwerke Stockau Re~chertshofen  Mauchlng 
Zuclerfabrlk Frobeln 




BUILDING  TRADES 
One  One (chalrman) 
One 
Gesellschaft fur den Bau von Untergrundbahnen  Berlln 
Internat~onale  Baugesellschaft  Frankfort on the Maln  I 
INSURANCE  ENTERPRISES 
I 
ART  INDUSTRY  One  Allgemeine  Verslcherungs Gesellschaft  fur  See  Fluss  /  U  Landtransport  Dresden  Kunstdruck  U  Verlagsanstalt  Wetzel & Naumann  Lelp 
21s 
IIoritz Prescher Nachf  A  G  Leutzsch  Kunstdruckerel 
One (chalrman) 
One (vlce chalrman) 
One (vlce chairman) 
One 
Allianz  Verslcherungs A  G  Berlln 
' Atlas  Deutsche  Lebensvers~cherungs  GeseUschaft 
Ludw~gshafen 
Kontnientale Vers~cherungs  Gesellschaft  Mannhetm 
Mannheimer Verslcherungs Gesellschaft 
Sachs~sche  Ruckvers~cherungs  Gesellschaft In Dresden 
Transatlant~sche  Gutemerslcherungs Gesellschaft In Ber 
hn 
' Unlon  Allgemelne Verslcherungs Gesellschaft  Berlln 




One (vice chairman) 




Bodengesellschaft am Hochbahnhof  Schonhauser  Allee 
Bcrlln 
Borsenhandelsvereln  Berlln 
Deutsche  Treuhand Gesellschaft  Berlln  (Rev~sions 
Gesellschaft) 
Deutsche IIandels  U  Plantagen Gesellschaft  Hamburg 
Deutsche Kolonlal Gesellschaft fur Sudwestafrlka 
Deutsche I-Iypothekenbank  Melnlngen 
Deutsche Ueberseelsche Bank  Berhn 







TRANSPORTATION  ENTERPRISES 
One 
One (v~ce  chauman) 
A  G  Weser  Sch~ffswerft  Bremen 
Deutsch Austral~sche  Dampfsch~ffs  Gesellschaft  Ham 
burg 
Gesellschaft fur rlektnsche Hoch  und Untergrundbah 
nen  Berlln 
Elektnsche Strassenbahn  Barmen Elberfeld 
Norddeutscher Lloyd  Bremen 




SIX  (drrector) 
One 
One (vlce chalrman) 
One 
One (vlce chauman) 
One 
One 
One National  Monetary  Commission 
Representation  of the great  banks  on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued  . 
DEUTSCHE  BANK-Continued. 
p.  .-  --  - 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of industry. 
I 
POREIGN  COMPANIES. 
Two (chairman). .......... 
Two (chairman). .......... 
......  Two (vice-chairman). 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
One ..................... 
Two (chairman) ........... 
One ..................... 
One (chairman). .......... 
One. .................... 
......  Two (vice-chairman). 
.....  Three (vice-chairman). 
Two (chairman) ........... 
Anatolische  Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft,  Constantinople. 
Bagdad Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. 
Bank fur elektrische Unternehmungen, Zurich. 
Bank fur orientalische Eisenbahnen. Zurich. 
Betriebsgesellschaft  der  orientalischen  Eisenbahnen. 
Vienna. 
Compafiia Barcelonesa de Electricidad. 
Eisenbalm-Gcsellschaft Mersina-Adana. 
A. Goerz & Co., Ltd., London. 
Gesellschaft fur elcktrische Beleuchtung.  St.  Petersbwg. 
National Bank of  South Africa, London. 
Societe du Chemin de Fer Ottoman Salonique-Monastir. 
Societe du Port de Iiaidar-Pascha. Constantinople. 
Steaua Romana, A.-G. fur Petroleumindustrie, Bucharest. 
DIRECTION DER DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT. 
l 
MINING.  SMELTING. AND  SALT  WORKS. 
I 
STONES  AND  EARTHS 
One (chairman). .......... 
....................  One. 
....................  One. 
One. .................... 
....................  One. 
Two (chairman) ........... 
...................  Three. 
...................  Three. 
....................  One. 
....................  Two. 
....................  Two. 
One (chairman). .......... 
....................  Two. 
....................  One.  A.-G. fiir Betonbau Diss & Co.. Dusseldorf. 
....................  One.  Porzellanfabrik Kahla. 
Bochumer Bergwerks-A.-G .  Bochum. 
Continentale Tiefbohrgesellschaft, Halle. 




Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-A.-G.,  Gelsenkirchen. 
Gewerkschaft Braunkohlengrube, Borna. 
Gew~rkschaft  Christoph Friedrich. 
Hustenen Gewerkschaft. 
Otavi Minen- und Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
"Phonix,"  A.-G. fiir Bergbau U. Huttenbetrieb, Laar. 
"Union,"  A.-G.  fur Berghau,  Eisen-  U. Stahlindustrie. 
Dortmund. 
Zinkhuttcn- und Bergwerks-A.-G. vorm. Dr. A. Lowitsch 
k Co., Kattowitz. 
l 
METAL  WORKING. 
....................  One..  Neuwalzwerk, A.-G..  Bosperde. 
....................  One..  Rheinische Stahlwerke, Meiderich. 
The Germa'n Great Banks 
Representation  of  the great  banks  on the sufieruisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
DIRECTION  DER DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT-Continued. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of  industry. 
/  *ACHING  CONSTRUCTION  AND INSTRYMENI  MAKING. 
I 
CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY. 
One.. .................... 
....................  One.. 
......  One (vice-chairman). 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
Three. ................... 
One.. .................... 
....................  One.. 
....................  One.. 
Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
Bergmann, Elektrizitatswerke, Berlin. 
Berliner Maschinenbau-A.-G..  Berlin. 
Deutsche Ueberseeische Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft. Berlin. 
Maschinenfabrik  U.  Muhlbau-Anstalt H. Luther, Braun- 
schweig. 
Rheinisch-WestfSlische Elektrizitatswerke, Essen. 
Sachsische Maschinenfabrik. Chemnitz. 
Turbinia, Deutsche Parsons Marine A.-G. 
/ 
ILLUMINANTS,  SOAPS.  PATS,  OILS,  VARNISHBS. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
....................  One.. 
..........  One (chairman). 
....................  Two. 
....................  Two. 
One (chairman) ........... Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
Three. ................... Allgemeine Petroleumindustrie, Berlin. 
Anglo - Continent.  vorm.  Ollendorffsche  Guano-Werke, 
Hamburg. 





FOODS  AND DRINKS. 
One.. ....................  v. Tucher'sche Brauerei, Nuremberg. 
I 
COMMERCIAL  ENTERPRISES. 
Two. .................... 
One.. .................... 






Fow  (I vice-chairman.  I 
Allgemeine Deutsche Krcditanstalt, Leipzig. 
Bank des Berliner Kassenvereins, Berlin. 
Bank fur Thiiringen vorm. B. M. Strupp, Meiningen. 
Bank fur Chile und Deutschland, Hamburg. 
Barmer Bankverein, Hinsberg. Fischer & Co., Barmen. 
Bayerische Disconto- und Wechselhank. Nuremberg. 
Bayerische Revisions- und Vermogens-A. G., Munich. 
Berliner Maklerverein. 
Brasilianische Bank fiir Deutschland, Hamburg. 
chairman). 
Two (vice-chairman). ...... 
One.. .................... 






Busse 8; Co.,  Berlin, Bankgeschst. 
Deutschc Afrika-Bank, Hamburg. 
Deutsche Asiatische Bank. Shanghai U.  Berlin. 
Deutscher Eisenhandel, A:G. 
Deutsche Grundkreditbank. Gotha. 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank. Meiningen. 
Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Bank, Berlin. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Representation  of  the great  banks  on the supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
DIRECTION  DER DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT-Continued. 
Representation  of  the  great  banks  on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
DIRECTION DER DISCONTO-GF,SEI.LSCHAFT-CO~~~~~~~. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of industry. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of  industry. 
One.. ................... 
One (chairman). ......... 
One. .................... 








Two (vice-chairman). ..... 













One (chairman). ......... 
Two .................... 




Two.  ................... 




Norddeutsche Bank, Hamburg. 
Oberlausitzer Bank, Zittau. 
Preussische Zentral-Bodenkredit-A.-G., Berlin. 
Preussische Hypotheken-Aktienbank, Berlin. 
Reichsbauk, Berlin. 
Revision, Treuhand-A.-G.. Berlin. 
Heinrich Aug. Schulte, A.-G., Dortmund. 
Stahl & Federer, A.-G., Stuttgart. 
Suddeutsche Disconto-Gesellschaft,  Maunheim. 
Terrain-Gesellschaft Berlin-Sudwesten. 
PLANTATION  COMPANIES. 
Deutsche  Kolonisationsgesellschaft fur Sudwestafrika. 
ENTERTAINMENT  ENTERPRISES. 
Berliner Eispalast-Gesellschaft. Berlin. 
INSURANCE  ENTERPRISES. 
"Nordstern,"  Lebensversicherung in Berlin. 
"  Nordstern,"  Unfall- und Altersversicherung in Berlin. 
TRANSPORTATION  ENTERPRISES. 
Brothaler Eisenbahngesellschaft, IIcnnef. 
I>eutsch-Chinesische  Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. 
Deutsche  Ostafrika-Liuie.  Hamburg,  Dampfschiffahrts- 
Gesellschaft. 
Grosse Leipziger Strassenbahn. 
FOREIGN  COMPANIES. 
Banca Commerciale Italiana, Milan. 
Banque de Credit, Sofia. 
Banca Generala Romana. 
Banque GCn6rale Roumaine, Bucharest. 
Compagnie GPnerale des Tramways de Behire. Brussels. 
Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo. 
Compagnie industrielle des Petroles, Paris. 
Compagnie internationale d'orient. Brussels. 
Concordia. Rumanische Petroleumindustrie. Bucharest. 
.........  One (chairman). 
One .................... 





Two (I chairman, I director 
One .................... 
One ..................... 
.....................  Two 
One ..................... 
FOREIGN  COMPANIES-CO~~~~U~~, 
"Credit  Petrolifer,"  Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Ent- 
wicklung dcr rumanischen Petroleumindustrie. 
Deutsche Niederlassungs-Gesellschaft, Tientsin. 
Elektrische Strassenbahn. Valparaiso. 





Socii.tb Financiere  de Transport et d'Eutreprises  Indus- 
trielles, Brussels. 
Societe Gbnerale Belge d'Eutreprises electriques. 
"Vega."  Rumanische Petroleum-Raffinerie. 
Warschau-Wieuer Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. 
DRESDNER BANK. 
1  MINING,  SMELTING. AND  SALT  WORKS 
I 
STONES  AND  EARTHS. 
One. .................... 
One.. ................... 
Two (vice-chairman) ...... 
One. .................... 
One. ...........  -.  ....... 
One. .................... 
One. .................... 
Three (chairman). ........ 
One. .................... 
One. .................... 
One. ...................  .I Porzellanfabrik Ph. Rosenthal & Co., A.-G. in Selb. 
One. .................... Sachsisch-Bohmische Portland-Zementfab-S-  1  den. 
"Bismarckhutte"  in Bismarckhutte. 
Deutscll-Luxemburger  Bergwerks-  und  Hutten-Gesell- 
schaft in Bochum. 
Deutsch-Ocstcrreichische  Bergwerks-Gesellschaft,  Dres- 
den. 
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-A.-G.  in Gelsenkirchen. 
Internationale  Kohlcubergwerks-Gesellscbaft.  Cologne. 
Mulheimer Bergwcrksvereiu in Mulheim a. R. 
"  Phonix."  A.-G. fur Berghau u. Huttenbetrieb. Horde. 
Saar- U. Moscl-Bergwerks-Gesellschaft  zu Karlingen. 
Schlesische Zinkhiitten-A:G.  in Lipine. 
Vereinigte  Konigs-  U.  Laurahiitte, A.-G.  f.  Bergbau U. 
Hiitteubetrieb, Berlin. 
I  METAL  WORKING. 
One. .................... 
.....  One (vice-chairman). 
One. .................... 
Gebr. Bohler & Co., A.-G.. Berlin. 
A.-G. Lauchhammer in Lauchhammer, Eisenwerk 
Sachsische Gussstahlfabrik in Dohlen bei Dresden. National  Monetary  Commission 
Representation  of  the  great  banks  on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
DRESDNER  BANK-Continued. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of  industry. 
I 
MACHINE  CONSTRUCTION  AND  INSTRUMENT  MAKING. 
1 
CHEMICALS. 
....................  One. 
....................  One. 
....................  One. 





One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One (chairman) ...........  /  Gehl & Co., A.-G. in Dresden. 
Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft zu Berlin. 
Ascherslebner Maschinenbau-A.-G.  in Aschersleben. 
Balcke, Tellering & Co., A.-G. in Benrath. 
Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken in Berlin. 
Dcutsch-~berseeische  Elektrizitiits-Gesellschaft in Berlin. 
Feltcn & Guilleaume-Lahmeyerwerke, A.-G., Mulheim. 
Kraftubertragungswerke in Rheinfelden. 
Kohl, M,, A.-G. in Chemnitz. 
Ludw. Loewe & Co., A.-G., Berlin. 
l 
TEXTILES. 
One (chairman) ........... Maschinenbau-A.-G.  Evlarkt-Redwitz vorm. H. Rockstroh.  l 
I  PAPER. 
One. .................... 
One (chairman) ........... 
....................  One. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
....................  One. 
One. .................... A.-G.  Kartonnagenindustrie in Loschwitz bei Dresden. 
Norddeutsche Seekabelwerke in Koln-Nordenham. 
Orenstein & Koppel, A.-G. fur Kleinbahnen etc. 
Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizilats-A.-G. in Essen. 
Wanderer, Fahrradwerke  vorm.  Winkelhofer & Janicke 
in Schonau. 
Erdmannsdorfer  A.-G.  fur  Flachsgarn-Maschinenspin- 
nerei u. Weberei. 
Vereinigte Strohstoffabrikcn. Dresden. 
I  FOODS  AND DRINKS. 
l 
COMMERCIAL  ENTERPRISES. 
One. ..................... 
One. .................... 
Aktien-Bierbrauerei zu Reisewitz bei Dresden-Lobtau. 
Sachsische Malzfabrik in Dresden-Plauen. 




One (chairman) ........... 
One (chairman) ........... 
One. .................... 
Two  (vice-chairman  and 
chairman). 
Two (chairman) ........... 
Two (chairman). .......... 
Two (director) ............ 
One. .................... 
Representation  of  the  great  banks  on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
DRESDNER  BANK--Continued. 
-- 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of  industry. 
Allgemeine Boden-A.-G. zu Berlin. 
Banque de Mulhouse in Mulhausen i. Els. 
Baubank fur die Residenzstadt Dresden. 
Berlinische Boden-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
Berlinische Boden-Credit-A.-G. Berlin. 
Berliner Maklerverein, Berlin. 
Bodengosellschaft  Kurfiirstendamm, Berlin. 
Centralbank fur Eisenbahnwerte, Berlin. 
Deutsche Orientbank. A.-G., Berlin. 
Deutsche Siidanlerikanische Bank. Berlin. 
Eisenbahnbank, Frankfort on-the-Main. 
One. .................... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One. .................... 
Two (vice-chairman) ...... 
One (chairman) ........... 





Two  (vice-chairman  and 
chairman). 
Eisenbahn-Rentenbank, Frankfort on-the-Main. 
Gesellschaft fur elektrische Unternehmungen, Berlin. 
Markische Bank, Bochum. 
hlecklcnburgische Bank, Schwerin i. M. 
Norddcutsche Lagerhaus-A.-G., Berlin. 
Preussische Pfandbriefbank, Berlin. 
Rheinische Bank in Essen. 
Rheinisch-Westfalische Boden-Credit-Rank, Cologne. 
Sachsische Boden-Creditanstalt in Dresden. 
A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein, Cologne. 
Schtnargendorfer Boden-A.-G. 
Two. .................... 
Two (vice-chairman).  ...... 
One. .................... 




..........  One (chairman)  .I Berlin-Charlottenburger  Strassenbahn, Berlin. 
Two (chairman). .......... Continentale  Eisenbahn-Bau- und Betriebs-Gesellschaft. 
Berlin. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft. Cologne. 
One (chairman). .......... Deutsch .  Niederlandische  Telegiaphen -  Gesellschaft. 
Cologne. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... Dux-Bodenbacher Eisenbahn, Vienna. 
One. .................... Gross Berliner Strassenbahn, Berlin. 
Onc (chnirrnan) ........... Lausitzer Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Sommerfeld. 
One (chairman). .......... Osteuropaische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 
One (chairman). ..........  Sachsisch - Bohmische  Dampfschiffahrts .  Gesellschaft. 
Dresden. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... Strasseneisenbahn-Gesellschaft in Hamburg. 
One. ....................  Westliche Berliner Vorortbahn, Berlin. 
Schwarzburg, Hypothekenbank in Sondershausen. 
Schwarzburg, Landesbank in Sondershausen. 
Terrain-Gesellschaft Berlin-Sudwesten. 
Terrain-Gesellschaft arn Centralviehof, A.-G. 
Terrain-Gese!lschaft  Dresden-Sud. 
Terrain-Gesellschaft Park Witzleben, Berlin. 
Wurttemberg. Landesbank, Stuttgart. 




"Allianz,"  Versichemngs-A.-G.,  Berlin. 
"  Deutscher Anker."  Pensions- und Lebensversicherungs- 
A.-G., Berlin. 
Magdeburger I'eue~ersichernngs-Gesellschaft. 
TRANSPORTATION  ENTERPRISES. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Representatton  of  the  great  banks  on  the  supervzsory  boards  oj stock  com- 
panzes-Cont~nued 
Representatton of  the  great  banks  on the  supervzsory  boards  of  stock  com 
DRESDNER  BANK-Continued 
I 
NA I'ION 41 DANK  FUR DEUTSCHLAND-Continued 
Seats on the supervisory 
board  Cl~ss  of  Industry 
I  HOSTELRY  AND TAVERN  ENTERPRISES 
Seats on the snperv~sory 
board 
l 
METAL  WORKING 
Class of  industry 




Deutsche Eisenbahn Speisewagen Gesellschaft  Berlln 
A  G  vorm  Speyr & CO  Basle 
Bank fur Onentallsche Elsenbahnen In Zunch 
Betnebs Gesellschaft  fur  Onentallsche  Elsenbahnen 
\  lenna 
Belglsche Eisenbahnbank  Brussels 
Deutsch Asiatlsche Bank  Shanghal 
Gen  Mlnlng  and  f  lnance Comp  Ltd  Johannesburg 
London 
Gewerksch~ft Brucher Kohlenwerke  in Teplltz 





Elsengiesserel A  G  vorm  Keyllng & Thomas In Berlln 
K  Kastner  A  G  In Lelpzlg 
Schweliner Elsenwerk hluller & CO  A  G  Schwelm 
I 



















A  G  H  F  Eckert In Serlln Fnedrlchsberg 
Allgemelne Elektnzltats Gesellschaft In  Berlin 
Berllner Elektrtzltatswerke 
Brandenburglsche Carbld  u  Elektnzitatswerhe  Berlm. 
Bresl~uer  A  G  fur  Fisenbahnwagenbau In Breslau 
Deutsch  Nlederlandlsche  Telegraphen  Gesellschaft  CO 
logne 
Deutsche  Nlles  Werkzeugmaschlnenf~bnk  Rerlln 
Deutsche Ueberseelsche Clektr~zltats  Gesellschaft  Berlln 
Deutsche Waffen  u  hlunltlonsfabriken  Berlin 
F  Dlppe  Maschinenfabrik  A  G  In Schladen a  Harz 
J  Frer~chs  & CO  A  G  In Osterholz 
ICraftubertragungswerke Rhelnfelden 
Ludw  Loewe & CO  A  G  Berlin 
Oherschlcs~sche  Elsenbahnbedarfs  A  G  Fr~edenshutte, 
Upper Sllesla 
G  Sauerbrey  Maschinenfabrlk  A  G  Stassfurt 
Schleslsche Elektrtzitats Gesellschaft  Breslau 
Telefonfabrik A  G  vorm  Jul  Berllner zu Hannover 






NATIONALBANK  FUR DEUTSCHLAND 








Alkal~werke  Ronnenberg  IIanover 
Bergbau Gesellschaft  l  eutonla  Hanover 
Blsmarckhutte  In Blsmarckhutte 
Deutsch Luxemb Bergwerks  u  Hutten A  G inBochum 
Kamenin Bergwerks A  G  Berlrn 
Lothringer Huttenvere~n  Aumetz Fnede 
Oberschlesische  Eisenlndustrie  A  G  f  Bergbau  u 
Huttenbetrleb in Glelwxtz 
Oberschleslsche Zmkhutten  A  G  In Kattowltz 
Phonix  A  G  fur Bergbau  u  Huttenbetneb  Duls- 
burg 
Rheinische A  G  fur Rraunkohlen  u  Brlkettlndustne In 
Harrem und Koln 
Schantung Bergbau Gesellschaft In Berlin 
Styrumer Elsenindustrle A  G  In Llqu  Oberh~usen 
Zechau Knbltzsche  Kohlenwerke  Gluckauf  A  G. 
Zechau l  S 
STONES  AND  EARTHS 





Chem~sche  Fabrlk Honningen vorm  Walther Fulda & CO 
Chen~lsche  Werke vorm  Dr  Hemrich Byk  Berlln 
/ 
ILLUMINANTS  SOAPS  FATS  OILS  AND VARNISHES  One 
0  nc 
One 
One 
Celle Wletze. A  G  fur Erdolgenlnnung  rn  Hannover 
Deutsche Mlneralollndustrle  A  G  Berlln 
Deutsche Petroleum A  G  Berlln 
One 
One 
One  I  LEATHER 
One  Lelpzlger  Gnmmlwarenfabrrk  vorm  Jul  Mm,  Herne &  1  c0  One  A  G  fur Asphaltlerung  U  Dachbedeckung  vorm  J  I  FOODS  AND DRINKS  Jesench  Charlottenburg 
'  Adler  deutsche Portland Cementfabnk  A  G  Berlin 








Schomburg  H  & Sohne  A  G  Berlln 
Aktlen Brauerel Fr~edrichshaln  Berlln 
Berllner Bockbrauerel  Berlln 
Blerbrauerel  A  G  vorm  Gebr  Hugger In Posen 
Blerbrauerel A  Sch~ffqer.  A  G  m K~el  One (vlce chairman) National  Monetary  Commission 
- 
Representatzon  of  the  great  banks  on the  supervzsory  boards  of  stock  corn- 
panzesxontlnued 
NATIOYAI BANK  FCR DEUTSCHLAND-Continued 
Seats on the supervlsory 
board 
















Two (vlce chalrman) 















l  FOODS  AND DRINKS-c~lltln~ed 
Breslauer Aktlen Malzfabnk  Breslau 
Deutsche B~erbrauerel  A  G  In Berlln 
Rosltzer Zuckerrzffinene  Rosltz (S  A ) 
l 
BUILDING  TRADES 
Tlefbau  U  Kalte~ndustrle A  G  vorm  Gebhardt  & 
Koenlg  Nordhausen 
Umon ' Baugesellschaft auf Aktlen In Berlln 
l 
ART  INDUSTRY 
A  G  I1 Gladenbeck & Sohn Blldglesserel  Berlln 
R  l&'  Dlnnendal  A  G  Kunstwerkerhutte be1 Steele 
Kunstanstalt B  Gross  A  G  In Le~pzlg 
H  Schott  A  G  ln Rheydt 
I 
COMMERCIAL  ENTERPRISES 
A  G  fa  Montanlndustr~e  Berlln 
Bank fur Braulndustrle  Berlln 
Berl~ner  hIaklcrvereln  Berlln 
Boden A  G  Berhn Nord  Berlln 
Boden Gesellschaft  an  der  Krelsbahn  Berlm Nordost, 
Berlln 
Deutsch Aslatlsche Bank  Berlln 
Deutsche Orlentbank  A  G  Berltn 
Deutsch Sudamerlkanlsche Bank  Berlln 
Deutsche rreuhznd Gesellschaft  Berhn 
Gesellschaft fur elektrlsche Unternehmungen  Berlln 
IIandelsst~tte Bellealllance ' A  G  Berlln 
Industr~egelande  Schoneberg  Berlln 
Ncue Boden A  G  Berlln 
Norddeutsche Credltanstalt  Konrgsberg  1  Pr 
Norddeutsche I~umob~llen  A  G  Berlln 
Preusslsche pfandbrlefbank  Berlln 
Rhelnlsch Westfdlsche Boden Credltbank  Cologne 
Stansdorfcr rerraln A  G  am Teltowkanal Berl~n 
leltower Boden A G  zu Berlln 
Terraln A  G  hlunchen Nord Ost  Munlch 
Terrain Gesellschaft  am  neuen  Botanlschen  Garten 
Berlln 
l  INSURANCE  ENTERPRISES 
Deutscher  Anker  Penslons  U  Lebensverslcherung 
Bedln 
The German Great Banks 
One 
Representatzon  of  the  great  banks  on the  supervzsory  boards  of  stock  corn 
panaes-Continued 




















TRANSPORTATION  BNThRPRISFS 
Deutsch Sudamenkanlsche  relegrsphen Gesellschaft  Co- 
logne 
S  Elchelb~um  Transport A  G  Breslau 
Grosse Berllner Strassenb lhn 
Kamerun Eisenb?hn Gcsellschaft 7u Berlln 
'  Mldgard "  Deutsche Seeverkehrs A  G  In Bremen 
Nledellzusltzer Elsenb~hn  Geselischzft  Berlln 
Osteuropalsche l  clegraphen Gcsellschaft  Cologne 
Santa Kathanna Llsetlbahn Gesellschaft  Berlln 
Schantung Elsenbahn Gescllschaft  Tslngtau 
PLANTATION  COMPANIES 
Guatemala Plantagen Gesellschaft  Hamburg 
Osma Rochela Plantagen Gescllschaft  Hamburg 
FOREIGN  COMPANIES 
Bank fur elektrlsche Unternehmungen In Zurlch 
Credlto Itahano  Genoa 
Compagnle  Mktallurglque  Franco Belge  de Martagnea, 
Brussels 
Orlentbank  A  G.  Athens 
Rumanrsche 4  G  fur Industne "  Konlgrclch Rumanlen " 
Czmplna 
Ungarlsche Lokalelsenbahnen A  G  In Budapest 
A  SCHAAI'I'HAUSEU  SCIICR  BANKVCREIN 
l 










SIX  (chalrman) 
Two (chaumau) 
BergwerLsGesellschaft  Aller  hordstern  m  b  H, 
Gr  Hausllngen 
Bergwerks Gesellschaft  Gluckaufsegen'  m Horde 
Betgwerks Gesellschaft ' Trler'  m  b  H  In Hamm 
Deutsch Luxemburg  Bergwerks  U  Hutten A  G  in 
Bochum 
Eschwe~lcr  Bergwerksvere~n  ~n Eschweilcr Pumpe 
Gelsenh~rchener  Bergwerks A  G 
Gewerkschaft  der  Zeche  Blankenburg  In  Hammerthal 
a  d  Ruhr 
Gewerkschaft  Zukunft  Cologne 
Harpener Rergbau A  G  In Dortmund 
Internatlonale Bohrgesellschaft Erkelenz 
Internahonale Kohlenbergwerks A  G  St Avold National  Monetary  Commission 
Representation  of  the  great  banks  on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued. 
A.  SCHAAFFHAUSEN'SCHER  BANKVEREIN-Continued. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of industry. 
I 
STONES  AND  EARTHS. 







One (vice-chairman). ...... A.-G.  fiir Rhein.-Westfal.  Cementindustrie in Beckum. 
One. ....................  Weseler Portland-Cement- U.  Tonwerke in Wesel. 
Lothringer Huttenverein Aumetz-Friede in Kneuttingen 
i. L. 
"PhKnix,"  A.-G. fur  Bergbau U. Huttenbetrieb. Duisburg- 
Ruhrort. 
Rheinische  TVassenverks-Gesellschaft,  Cologne. 
Rombacher Huttenwerke, Cologne. 
Sieg-Rhein. Hutten-A.-G. zu Friedrich Wilhelmshiitte. 
Vereinigte  Stahlwerke v. d. Zypen & Wissen  Eisenhutte. 
Cologne-Deutz. 
Zechau-Kriebitzsche  Kohlenwerke  "Gluckauf,"  A.-G.. 
1  METAL  WORKING. 
1  Zechau (S.-A.). 
1  MACHINE  CONSTRUCTION  AND  INSTRUMENT  MAKING. 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
One (chairman). .......... 
One. .................... 
Eschweiler-Koln.  Eisenwerke, A.-G.  in Eschweiler. 
Fa~oneisen-Walzwerk  L.  Mannstaedt & Cie.. Kalk, near 
Cologne. 
Schwelmer  Eisenwerk  Muller  Qr  Co.,  Schwelm  (West- 
phalia). 
Stahlwerk "Krieger,"  A.-G.  in Dusseldorf. 




One. ..................  :  . 
Two (chairman). .......... 
One  (chairman). .......... 
One. .................... 
One. .................... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 






Representation  of  the  great  banks  on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  cont- 
panies-Continued. 
A. SCHAAFFHAUSEN'SCHER  BANKVERWIN-Continued. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  i  Class of  industry. 
Allgemeine  Elektrizitatsgesellschaft in Berlin. 
Anker-Werke, A.-G.,vorm. Hengstenberg & Co.. Bielefeld. 
Bergmanns Elektrizitatsncrke, A.-G., Berlin. 
Deutsche Waffen-  und hlunitionsfabriken, Berlin. 
de Fries & Co.. A.-G., Dusseldorf. 
Gasmotorenfabrik ' Deutz." 
Gesellschaft fur elektrische Unternehmungen. 
Kottbuser Maschinenbauanstalt U.  Eisengiesserei, A.-G. 
Maschinenbauanstalt Humboldt, Kalk, near Cologne. 
A.-G.  Maschinenfabrik "Deutschland"  in Dortmund. 
Waggonfabrik A.-G.. vorm. 1'.  Herbrandt & Co., Cologne- 
Ehrenfeld. 
Waggonfabrik, A.-G.,  Uerdingen. 
X-alther  &  Co.,  Commandit-Gesellschaft  auf  Aktien, 
Delbruck, near Cologne. 
Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik  Gildemeister  &  Co., A.-G., 
Bielefeld. 
Weyersberg.  Kirschbaum & Co.,  A.-G.  fiu Waffen  U. 




ILLUMINANTS, SOAPS. FATS, OILS, AKD VARNISHES 
.......  One (vice-chairman) 
One. .................... 
Two (chairman) ........... Deutsche Mineralol-Industrie. A.-G., Cologne. 
A.-G.  fur  chemische Industrie in Gelsenkirchen-Schalke. 
Chemische Fabrik Honningen, vorm. XValther Feld & Co., 
A.-G. 
l  TEXTILES. 
One. .................... Rosltzer Zuckerraffinerie  in Rositz.  I 
One (vice-chairman) ....... 
One.. .................... 
Two (chairman). .......... 
One (chairman). .......... 
Two (chairman). .......... 
Dulkener I3aumwollspinnerei, A.-G. in Dulken. 
Krefelder Teppichfabrik, A.-G., Krefeld. 
Rhein. Kunstseidefabrik. A.-G.. Cologne. 
Schollersche  und  Eitorfer  Kammgarnspinnerei.  A.-G. 
Breslau. 
FOODS  AND  DRINKS. 
One ..................... 
One (chairman). .......... 
i 
BUILDING  TRADES. 
A.-G.  fur Rruckenbau, Tiefbohrung  U.  Eisenkonstruk- 
tioncn in Neuwied. 
Rhein. Baugesellschaft. Cologne. 
Tiefbau  U.  Kalteindustrie,  vorm.  Gebhardt  &  Konig, 
Nordhausen. 
ART  INDUSTRY. 
.........  One (chairman).  .I W. Hagelberg, A.-G., Berlin  (Art prints). 
l 
COMMERCIAL  ENTERPRISES. 
......  One (vice-chairman). 
One (chairman). .......... 
......  One (vice-chairman). 
One. .................... 
Three. ................... 
Two (vice-chairman). ...... 
....................  Two. 
One. .................... 
One (chairman) ........... 
Two. .................... 




Two (vice-chairman). ...... 
One. .................... 
One (vice-chairman). ...... 
A.-G. fur  Rhein.-Westfil.  Industrie. Cologne. 
Alexanderwerk,  A. v. d. Nahmer. A.-G.  in Remscheid. 
Allgemeine Boden-A.-G. in Berlin. 
Bank fur  deutsche Eisenbahnwerte in Berlin. 
Deutsche Orientbank, A.-G.. Berlin. 
Deutsch-Siidamerikanische Bank, A.-G., Berlin. 
Dresdner Bank in Dresden. 
Dussrldorfer Baubank in Dusseldorf. 
Kolner Verlagsanstalt U. Druckerei. A.-G., Cologne. 
Mittelrhein.  Bank. Koblenz. 
Neue Boden-A.-G.. Berlin. 
Oldenburg. Landesbank. 
Ostbank fur Handel U.  Gewerbe, Posen. 
Preussische Pfandbriefbank, Berlin. 
Rheinische Bank. Essen on-the-Ruhr. 
Rhein.-Westf.  Boden-Creditbank, Cologne. 
Schwarzb~~g.  Hypothekenbank in Sondershausen. National  Monetary  Commission 
Representation  of  the  great  banks  on the  supervisory  boards  of  stock  com- 
panies-Continued  . 
A.  SCHAAFFHAUSEN'SCHER  BANKVEREIN-Continued. 
Seats on the supervisory 
board.  Class of industry. 
...................  One. 
One .................... 




....................  One 
One. ................... 
One (chairman). ......... 
One (vice-chairman). ..... 
One .................... 
One .................... 
One (chairman). ......... 
One (chairn~an)  .......... 
One (vice-chairman). ..... 
One (vice-chairman) ...... 
One (vice-chairman). ..... 
One (chairman). ......... 
One (chairman). ......... 
One (chairman). ......... 
One .................... 
....................  One 
......  One (vice-chairman) 
....................  One 
One .................... 
....................  One 
COMMERCIAL  ENTERPRISES-Continued. 
Schwarzburg.  Landesbank, Soudershausen. 
Treuhand-Vereinigung, A.-G.. Berlin. 
Westfalisch-Lippische Vereinsbank in Bielefeld. 
INSURANCE  ENTGRPRISES 
"  Rhenania."  Versicherungs-A.-G.  in Cologne. 
A.-G. fur Verkehrswesen  in Berlin. 
Badische Lokaleisenbahnen-A.-G. in Karlsruhe. 
Berlin-Charlottenburger Strassenbahn, Berlin. 
Braunschweig. Landeseisenbahn-Gesellschaft. 
Braunschweig - Schoninger  Bisenbahn - Gesellschaft  in 
Braunschweig. 
Brohltal-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft,  Cologne. 
Grosse Berliner Strassenbahn, Berlin. 
Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft  zu Berlin. 
Moselbahn-A.-G. in Trier. 
Modrath-Liblar-Briihler  Eisenbahn-A.-G., Cologne. 
Rinteln-Stadthagener Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft in Rinteln. 
Schlesische Dampfer-Compagnie in Breslau. 
Schlesische Kleinbahn A.-G. in Kattowitz. 
Vereinigte Westdeutsche Klcinbahn-A.-G..  Cologne. 
Westdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Cologne. 
Wiirttembergische Nebenbahncn-A.-G., Stuttgart. 
POREIGN  COMPANIES. 
Banque Internationale de Bruxelles in Brussels. 
Foraky Soc. au Belge  de I'Entreprise de Forage et de 
Foncage, Brussels. 
RumLnische A.-G. fur Industrie. Konigreich Rumiinien. 
Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft  in Tsingtau. 
Societi Italiana Langen & Wolf, Milan. 
SociCte  Francaise de Forage et de Recherches  Minieres 
(Brevet Raky). Paris. 
The German Great Banks 
APPENDIX  V. 
TOTAL  VALUE OF  SECURITIES ISSUED AT  THE BERLIN STOCK 
EXCHANGE  BY  THE  GREAT  BANKS  DURING  THE YEARS 
1882-1908. 
BANE  F~R  'EANDEL UND INDUSTRIE. 
Total value of  securities  issued at  the Berlin stock  exchange  during the years 
1882-1908. 
Year.a 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 



















































110.  ooo. ooo 
13,400,  ooo 
9,310,  ooo 
Issued 
jointly  with  1  Issued 
l 































80,250,  ooo 
184. ooo, ooo 
118,000.  ooo 





































194,902,  700 
IIO,OOO,OOO 
IIO,OOO,OOO 
IO~,IOO,  ooo 
74, 75o.000 










j-65.60o.000 National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Ranks 
Value of  securities  issued  and  listed at  th  Berlin stock  exchange during the 
years 1882-1908. 
Value  of  securities  issued  and  liskd  at  the  Berlin stock  exchange  during the 
years 1882-1908-Continued. 
GERMAN  PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
Issued 
Year.a  exclusively 
by the bank.  banks.  /  "L 
6,000,000 
............. 





1882  ............... 
1884  ............... 
1886 
1887  ............... 
1888 




1893..  ............. 
1894..  ............. 
1895  ............... 
1896..  ............. 
...............  1897 
1898 
1899..  ............. 
~goo..  ............. 
1901..  ............. 
17,ooo.ooo 





190,000.  ooo 

















sr,~oo,  ooo 
2,300,000 
1,500,  000 








1  14.500,  000 
Year.a 























.............  1906.. 
1907 
1908  ............... 
Issued 
exclusively 









lO,OOO,  000 
.............. 
2.800,  000 
20,000,000 
6,  ooo,  ooo 
Z~,~OO,OOO 
57,500,  ooo 
~.000,000 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made 











FOREIGN MORTGAGE  BONDS. 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banding firms. 
Issued 































GERMAN  RAILWAY  SHARES. 
............................ 
48.480,  ooo 
........................................... 
1,8~~,~~~ 





1896  ............................. 
1897.. 
1898  ............... 
l 
j 
..........................  ./. 
13,150,000 
1900  ...............  ............................................ National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value  of  securztzes  zssued  and  lzsted  at  the  Berlzn  stock  exchange  durzng  the 
years 1882-1908--Continued 
Value of  securztzes  zssued  and lz~tcd  at  the  Bcrlzn  stocb exchange  durznq the 
years  1882-1~08--Contlnued 
FOREIGN  RAILWAY BONDS-Contmued 
GERMAN  RAILWAY SHARES-Continued 
Issued 
Issued 
Issued  Issued  iointly with 
exrluslve~y  ~~~~~~y  %lth  jointly  TV  th  other banks 






by tht  bank 
Marks 
1902 
GERMAN  STREET RAILWAY BONDS 
Afarks 
42  000  000 
$1 arks 
11 450  ooo 
Marks 
-  --i 
Marks 
I  I 
FOREIGY RAILWAY SHARES 
Issued 





J~~~~'~  with 
OtEngat 
Marbs 
2  000  000 
17  boo  ooo 
Issued 
jo~ntly  wlth 
other banks b 
Afarks 
5  600  ooo  l  49  (0°  Oo0  l 
Marks 
87  ooo  ooo 
I  687  500 
BANK SHARES 
l  I  l  1 
6 ooo  ooo 
20 000  000 
3  000  000 
16  zoo  coo 
28  ooo  ooo 
GERMAN  RAILWAY BONDS 
16  ooo  ooo 
8  ooo  ooo 
8  ooo  ooo 
17  ooo  000 
24  000  000 
2  500  000 
3  000 000 
5  500  ooo 
4  000  000 
5  000  000 
4  500  000 
12 500  000 
16 ooo  ooo 
33  250  000 
20 000  000 
8 ooo  ooo  FOREIGN RAIL\+ AY BONDS 
- 
INDUSTRIAL SHARES  6  500  ooo 
20  000  000 
19 ooo  ooo 
I2 000  000 
3  600  coo 
4 000  000 
7,000  ooo 
/  16 ooo  ooo  16 ooo  ooo  876  489  740 
111 288  750 
31  175  020 
52  800  ooo 
16 ooo  ooo 
I00 000  000 
I  000 000 
I  358  400 
3  592  800 
5  006  ooo 
2  944 000 
2  436 ooo 
3  000  000  1 
13  000  000 
4  800  ooo  / 
a Only those years are given during wh~ch  issues were made 
b Including private banklng firms 
a Only those years are glvrn during which i5sucs were made 
b  Including pr~vate  banking firms National  Monetary  Commission 






5. zoo, 000 
............. 












I,  ~00,000 
















by the bank. 
INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 





































































and  great 
banks.6 
1883 ............... 










.............  1894.. 
1895.. ............. 













I  _.  .  -- 
a Only  those years are given during which issues were made. 
































a only those years are given during which issues were made. 


















~g,  600, ooo 
10,500,  000 
4,000,000 
171,508,800 
10,  225,000 






























6. 591,435, 232 
438, 920, ooo 
Issued 
exclusively 




14, 225. ooo 
............. 









4,800,  ooo 
2g.350.000 
.  69, 700,500 
85,000,ooo 





112,150,  ooo 
69.1oo.000 
73. 296, ooo  ,  69,910, ooo 
Issued 
jointly 
OtEnrt National  Commission 
Value of  securities issued and listed  at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the 
years 1882-1908. 
GERMAN  PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
- -  1  Marks  1  Marks.  1  Marks  1  Marks. 
1883 ...............  2,000,ooo  .......................................... 
Year.a 
..............  I903 ............................  3,000,000 
I904 ...........................................  27,000,000 
I905 ...............  8,ooo.ooo  ............................ 
1906 ......................................................... 
1907 ............................  9, 796,000  IZ,OOO,OOO 
1908. ...........................  3,000,  ooo  60,000,  ooo 
e,ffzi',",ly 
by the  bank. 
FOREIGN  PUBLIC SECURITIES. 

















1884.. ............  .l.. ...........  .l..  ............ 
l  1886.. ............  .;.  ............  ..  ............. 
GERMAN  MORTGAGE  BOSDS 
Issued 





450, 000, 000 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private Lanking firms. 







...............  1896 
1898 ............................. 
1902 ............................. 










































1896.. ....  :.  ....... 
1898 
1899 ............................. 
............................  1901 
.............................  1903 
.............................  1904 
.............................  I905 
I907 







by the bank. 
GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. 





~0,000,  000 
........................................... 
............................................ 
..............  1883. 
1886 ............... 




.............................  1906 
3.150.000  1..  ...........  .l.. .......................... 
..........................................  2,316,000 
.......................................  3,000,000 
2,000,ooo  j..  ............  3.65o.000  .............. 
i  .......................................  3,500,000 
...........................  1,  400,000  /.  6,500,000 
2,100,000  ............................  II.0~0,000 
.........................  8,500,ooo  8.600,ooo 
1.350,ooo  ..............  600,ooo  .............. 
Issued 
jointly  with 
OtEnrt 









...........  7,425,  000  1..  .I.. 
..........................................  g.375.000 
..........................................  13.975.000 
...........................................  10,6oo,800 
...........................................  6,750,ooo 
...........................................  11.250.000 
22,500,000 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
































............................ National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value  of  securities issued and listed at the  Berlin Stock  Exchange during the 
years 188~-1g&?-Continued. 
Value  of securities issued  and  listed  at the  Berlin Stock  Exchange during the 
years  1882-rgo8-Continued. 
GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES-Continued  FOREIGN  RAILWAY BONDS. 
Year9 
FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 
...............  1904 
1906 
.............................  1908 
GERMAN  RAILWAY BONDS. 
Isstied 
exclusively 
by the bank. 
aOnly those years are given during which issues were made. 









































21,  ooo, ooo 
149,040, ooo 
6,753,600 
3,000,000  ............................ 
4,000,000  ............................ 
9,500,  ooo  ..............  3,000,000 
IO,OOO,OOO  40,00o,000  .............. 
............................  25,500,000 




a  Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking firms. 
Marks. 
16, ooo. ooo 
.............. 




















67,286,  500 
16,000.  ooo National  Monetary  Commission 





Issued  Issued  jointly ulth 
excluslvelv  101ntly with  jointly wlth  other banks  year  a 
by the bank  1  OtEgat  1  other banks b  and meat 
banks b 
The German  Great  Banks 
Value of  securztzes  zssued  and  lzsted  at  the  Rerlzn Stock  Exchange durzng the 




5  000  000 
Year a 
Marks 
8  000  000 
12 500  000 
16 ooo ooo 
10 000  000 
20 000 000 
8  000  000 
Marks 
4  000 000 
5  000  000 
24  000  000 
Marks 










16 ooo  ooo 
6  ooo  ooo 
6  ooo  ooo 
4  500  ooo 
35  400  000 
4  800  o~~ 
10  500  ooo 
21  500  ooo 
I0 000  000 
10  923  750 
18 000  000 
7 000  000 
4  000 000 
Marks 
I  500  ooo 
I  ZOO  000 
3  199  so0 
6  600  ooo 
I  ooo  ooo 
3  750  000 
21  500  000 
2  000  000 
5  000  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
19  ooo  ooo 
19 ooo  ooo 
3  600  ooo 
4  ooo  ooo 
3  000  000 













4  500  ooo 
6  ooo  ooo 
6  ooo ooo 
10  600  ooo 
4  000  000 
17  900  ooo 
37  752  000 
675  000 
3  750  000 
Marks 
a Only those years are given durlng whlch ~ssues  were made 
b Includrng prlvate banklng firms 
4  800 000 
6  294  ooo 
8  ooo  ooo 
15  zoo  000 
18 200 000 
1 000  000 
10 ooo  ooo 
11 000  000 
I  750  ooo 
17  800 000 
9  ooo ooo 














3  000  000 
1  14 250  000 
12 500  ooo 
6  000  000 
49  000 000 
5  000 000 
10 000  000 
34 300  ooo 
12  150  000  1 
12 350  000 
250  ooo 
7  500  ooo 
3  ooo ooo 
5  ooo  ooo 
1 000 000 
13  850 ooo 
10  250  000 
4  ooo ooo 
10  ooo 800 
9  398 ooo 
6  000  000 
11 600  ooo 
5  ooo  ooo 
I  000 000 
20  000  000 
24  000  000 
29  000  000 
55  000  000 
37  I00 000 
17  300  000 
8  000  000 
7  500  ooo 
20  347  500 
4  000  000 
161 320  000 
40,798 ooo 
91  850 000 
25  700  000 
5  000 000 
29  050 000 
35  000  000 
56  500  000 
152  zoo  000 
55  870 ooo 
46  100 000 
DEUTBCEE  'BANK. 
Total value of  securztzes zssued  at the Berlzn Stock Exchange  durzng the years 
1882-1908 
Issued  Issued 
Issued  I  Issued  1  ..-  .-.A  .. 
Marks 
I4 400  000 
323  405  080 
23  875  700 
124  375  000 
69  460  ooo 
78  354 600 
Marks 
I  500  ooo 
2  600  ooo 
Marks 
15  ooo  ooo 
6  g80  ooo  1  17  400  ooo 
220 612  800  1 
I  678 966  538 
210 000  000  16 000  000 
I00  000  000  5  000  000 
a Only those years arc given durlng whlch issues were made 
D Includcng pnvate banklug firms 
Marks 
35  782  560 National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great BanKs 
































by tile bank 
38  500  ooo 
Value of  securztzes zssued  and lzsted  at the Berlzn  Stock  Exchange durzng the 
years 1882-1908 
GERMAN PUBLIC SECURIrIES 
.p-p-  I  I 
Marks 
71  ooo  ooo 
135  116  800 
34  320  000 
136  IOO  ooo 
67  IOO  ooo 
54  140  ooo 
180  243  600 
I  433  080  ooo 
67  655  ooo 
I71 379  480 
329  430  ooo 
455  747  ooo 
81  378  800 
144  530  ooo 
603  334 040 
710  269  800 
635  947  900 
737  543  800 
227  963  600 
206  395  ooo 
Marks 
1  500  ooo 
Issued 
jointly w~th 
other banks b 
Marks 
7 000  000 
Issued 
jo~ntly  ulth 
other bmks 
and great 
bmks  b 
Marks 
547  132  048 
34 910  400 
10  600  ooo 
8  500  ooo 
35  450  ooo 
10  ooo  ooo 
11 700  ooo 
68  406  500 
77  500  000 
74  591  200 
241  700  ooo 
118  300 ooo 
59  500  000 
80  887  ooo 
235  687  ooo 
259  IOO  ooo 
370  270  ooo 
220 064 900 
o  Only thosc years are gwcn durlng which lssues were made 
b Includ~ng  prlvate banking firms 
235  000  000 
508  ooo  ooo 
342  500  000 
25  000  000 
Marks 
59  446  397 
3  000  000 
18 500  ooo 
27  600  ooo 
6  500  ooo 
21  998 400 
10 000  000 
41  228  000 
119  320 ooo 
65  772  ooo 
110 650  800 
691 038  408 
I09  092  ooo 
250  125  ooo 
97  265  000 
72  900  000 
Value  of  securztzes zssued and lzsted  at  the  Herlzn  Stock  Exchange  durzng  the 
years  188~-1908--Cont1nued 
Marks 
321  080  000 
401  306  944 
572  400  000 
366  750  000 
64  750  ooo 
158  ooo  ooo 
33  ooo  ooo 
178 550  ooo 
65  800 ooo 
116  198  400 
606  430  000 
133  350 000 
183  ooo  000 
388 050  000 
3  209  204  490 
130  IOO  ooo 
829 go0  000 
234  950  ooo 
6  603  2~5  232 
6  308 030  000 
GERMAU PUBLIC SECURITICS-Continued 
47  8  OoO  950  OoO  ooo  / 
6  500  ooo  4  ooo  ooo 
208  zoo  ooo  7  500  ooo 
Year  a 
Marks 
21 500  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
48  200  ooo  5  ooo  ooo 
13 3IO  000  I72  500  000 
12 300  000  42  000  000  l  l 
Issued 
jo~ntly  wlth 
other banks b 
llIurLs 
3  ooo  ooo 
11 873  900  3  500  ooo 
16  500  ooo  20  937  ooo 
28  000  000  58  937  ooo  1  l 
Issued 






by the bank 
42  400  000  75  500  000 
59  464  ooo  125  ooo  ooo 
52  575  000  123  654  900  l  l 
Iqsued 
J~~~~~~  ultil 
OtEnrt 
3  228  000 
88 570  ooo 
I  272  000 
20  000  000 
2  165  ooo 
29  000  000 
Marks 
10  000  000 
57  800  ooo 
24  000  000 
59  000  000 
19  ooo  ooo 
74  000  000 
69  865  oco 
60  ooo  ooo 
60  ooo  ooo 
a Only those years are nlpen durlng wh~ch  lssues were made 
b Including pnvatc  banh~ng  firms 
I  I  l 





















14  400  ooo 
14  0,s  600 
16  ooo  ooo 
16 ooo  ooo 
14 400  000 
19  zoo  ooo 
21  600  ooo  294  132  048 
,  34  610  400 
26  000  000 
I  626  966  538 
51  546  397 
45  734  320 
148  906  944 
20  400  000 
11 250  000 
116  767  080  46  406  500 
66  30  00  1 
651  219  408 
216  960  000  1 
75  850 ooo  1  173 400  000 
142  800 000 
51  ooo  ooo 
463  080  ooo 
242  250  000 
3  121 539  490 
678 300  ooo 
6  481  565  232 National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
Value of  securztzes zssued and lzsted at the  Derlzn  Stock Exchange durzng the 
years  1882-1908-Continued 
Valw  of  securdzes ossued and lzsted at the  Berlzn  Stock Exchunge durzng the 
years  188~-1g08--Continued 
GERMAN MORTGAGE  BONDS  GERMAN  RAILWAY SHARES-Continued 
Issued  1  Issued  1  issued  1  Issued  1  jomtly wlth 
Year  exclusively  J~'~~'~  lolntly wlth  other banks 
by the bank  O~E~,'"~  other banks b  and great 
banks b 
Marks  Atarks 
Year a 
Marks  Marks 
3  500  ooo 
5 000  000 
600  ooo 
2  000  000 
26  300  000 
Issued 
exclus~vely 
by the bank 
Marks 
5 000  000 
I  500  ooo 
3  453  600 
Marks 
Issued 
10Lntly  %lth 
OtEnrt 
Marks  1  Marks 
Issued 
jointly nlth 
other banks b 
5 000  000 
45  000  000 
30  ooo  ooo 
46  ooo  ooo 
76  ooo  000 
25  000  000 






I  700  ooo  40  ooo  ooo 
4  210  000 
GERMAN  RAILWAY i3OTDS 
70  000  000  1  I0 000  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
2  775  700 
500  ooo 
I  000  000 
35  ooo  ooo 
10  ooo  ooo 
45  000  000 
2g  000  000 
IOO  ooo  ooo 
50  000  000 
60  ooo  ooo 
40  ooo  ooo 
I0  000  000 
30  ooo  ooo 
60  ooo  ooo 
I00  000  000 
80  ooo  ooo 
15  ooo  ooo 
2  300  ooo 
I2 500  000 
10  000  000 
23  650  000 
rOREIGN MORTGAGE  BONDS  5  700  ooo 
2  000  000 
52  000  000 
16  ooo  ooo 
17  000  ooo  17  000  000 
IIO  500  ooo 
8  IOO  ooo 
11  250  000 
FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES 
10  800  ooo 
52  500  000 
331  162  ooo 
5  600  ooo 
48  960  ooo  GERMAY RAILWAY SHARES 
80  ooo  ooo 
1889  2  200  000 
1891  1  I  200  000  1  1  1 
1895  3  000  000 
a Only those years are glven durlnn uhlch Issues were made 
b Including gnvate  banking firms 
a Only those years are glven durlng which issues were made 
b Includmg pnvate banklnp firms National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value  of  securztzes  zssued  and  lzsted at the Berlzn Stock Exchange  durzng  the 
years 1882-1908-Continued 
Value  of  securztzes zssued and lzsted at  the Berlan  Stock  Exchange  durzng  the 
years 1882-1908--Continued 
BANK SEIAREb-Continued  FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARhS-Continued 
l  l  I  I 
Year a  Year a 
Marks 
5  000  000 
93  249  200 
50  000  000 
24  201  600 
17  880  ooo 
Marks 
136  743  600 
481  042  800 
73  500  000 
Marks 
2  000  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
g  000  000 
Issued 
exclus~vely 
by the bank 
Issued 
exrlus~rely 
by the bank 
Marks 
Issued 
~olntly  with 




Marks  Marks 
3  000  000 
42  250  000 
25  500  000 
8 000  000 
Issued 







FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS 
Marks 
24  ooo  ooo 
12 500  000 
16  000  000 
Issued 
jolntly wlth 
olher banks b 
Marks 
84 ooo  ooo 
13  860  ooo 
27 300  000 
46  zoo  ooo 
g2  100  000 
26  120 ooo 
132 000  000 
64  ooo  ooo 
32  640  000 
132  640  000 
I  176  730  800 
Issued 




190  ooo  ooo 
I00  000  000 
169  ooo  ooo 
B 4NK DEBENTURES 
INDUSTRIAL SHARES 
2  600  ooo 
1 g80  000 
I1 I00  000 
GFRMAN  STREET RAILWAY SHARES 
GER1IAY  S'lREET RAILWAY BONDS 
16 ooo  ooo 
1894  1  l  l 
16 ooo  ooo 
3  316  800 
3  000  000 
I 600  ooo 
2  000  000  BANK SHARES 
12 150 000 
4  600  ooo 
8  705  ooo 
7  810  800 
34  600  ooo 
20  ooo  400 
3  ooo  ooo  l  :  ::F::: 
1  36  500  ooo 
68  ooo  ooo 
300  ooo 
5  500  000 
a Only those years are glven dur~ng  which Issues were made 
bIneludlng prlvate banktng firms 
a Only those years ?re glr en durlng wh~ch  ~ssucs  were made 
b Including prtvate banklng firms National  Monetary  Commission  The Germart Great Banks 
Value  of  securztzes zssued and lzsted at the  Berlzn Stock  Exchange durzng  the 
years 1882-1908-Continued.  Total value of securztzes  zssued  at  the Berlzn Stock  Exchange durzng the years 
1882-1908  INDUSTRIAL SHARES-Contmued 
Issued 










by  the bank 
Issued 
exclus~vely 






other banks ', 
Year a 
Issued 
lo~ntly  w~th 
other banks b 
Year a 
Issued 





7  385  000 
38 068,800 
A4arks 
6  700  ooo 
18  zoo,ooo 
Marks 
5.000 000 
750  ooo 
4  ~00,000 
I. 000 000 





5  000,000 
Marks 





Marks  Marks 
851 7822  560 
10 000,000 
2  450,000 
59  250  000 
36  800 ooo 
44  000  000 




1,315, 73% 680 






68  IOO.OOO 
162,300.000 
42,670,000 
66, 780  ooo 
IhDLSTIZIAL BONDS 
IS  000  000 
6  600  ooo 
I  000  000 
I  000  000 
1 200  000 
I  500  000 
3  000  000 
I,  000,000 
8  000, ooo 
6  ooo  ooo 
2  500  000 
6,500 ooo 
20 000  000 
24  000  000 
29  000  000 
55  000  000 
I7  I00  000 
12 800 000 
8,000 ooo 
7,500  000 
15  ZOO  000 
41  500  000 
168,250 000 
aOnly those years are glven dur~ng  ah~ch  Issues were made 
b Includ~ng  grlvate banklng firms 
a Only those yc?rs arc glven dunng  wh~ch  Issues were made 
b Includ~ng  prlv?te banking firms 
IZ  528  ooo 
35  125  000 
4,000 ooo 
38  650  000 
II 500  ooo 
11 ooo  ooo 
40  200  000 
16  ooo  ooo 
I  ooo  ooo 
28  500  ooo 
13  ooo  ooo 
57  800 ooo 
46  470  ooo 
27  500  000 
8  650,800 
g  600, ooo 
8  740  ooo 
20  ooo,ooo National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value of securztzes  zssued  and  lzsted at the Berlzn Stock  Exchange durrfty the 
Iears 1S8~-1g08--Continued 
FOREIGN PUB1  IC bECURITIES-Continued 
Value of  securztzes  zssued  and lzsted  at the Herlzfi Stock Exchange durzng the 
years 1882-1908 










by the bank  Year 
Issued 
~olntly  with 
other banks b 
Year a  Issued 
exclus~vely 
by  the  bank 
and great 
banks  b 
Marks 




Marks  Marks 
142  800 ooo 
Iswed 
~ointly  w~th 
other banks  b 
1  MYI~Y 
40  000  000 
'2 883 035  200 
108 ooo ooo 
I  757  700  ooo 
286  go0  ooo 
448  zoo  ooo 
357  200 000 




and  grcat 
banks  b 
Marks 
6  050  ooo 
15 000  000 
000  /  235  000  000 
ooo  1  458  ooo  ooo 
Marks 
I  500  ooo 
102 000  000 
212 500  000 
1 317  349  500 
3  ~25  364  490 
90  426  570 
500  000  000 
,  6  481  565  232  i  127  500  ooo 
561  600  ooo 
149  850 ooo 
Marks 
7  500  ooo 
I2 000  000 
Marks 
32  000 
ooo  6  230 
I15 395 
000  40  000 
6  ooo ooo 
12 000  000 
000  7  500  ooo 
000 
8  ooo  GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS 
169 ooo 
42  000 
9  500 
11 937 
23  937 
56  ooo 
127  296 
106  ooo 
I0 000  000 
138 ooo  ooo 
64  960  IOO 
408  317  ooo 
474  000  000 
26  000  000 
00  io  000 
000  190  000  000 
4  092  500 
54  000  000 
15  488  ooo 
1  000  000  4  118  ooo 
60  ooo  ooo 
20 000  000  36  zoo  ooo 
30 000  000 
zz  400  ooo 
FOREIGN  PUBLIC SECURITIES 
118  560  ooo 
4  050  000 
12  800 ooo  / 
54  000  000  1  7  128 000 
18 oog  250 
l  I  I  I 
a Only those years are gl\ -n durlng whlch lssues were made 
b Includlng pnvate banklng firms 
238  500  ooo 
161 064  455 
081  561  680 
425  887  664 
206  400  000 
36  187  500 
a Only those years are glven dunng which Issues were made 
b Includlng prlvate banking firms 
34 418  825 
76  500  ooo National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value  oj  securztzes  assued  and  lzsted  at the Berlzn  Stock Exchange durzng the 
years 1882-1908-Continued 
Value  of  securzizcs zssued  and lzsted  at the  Berlzn  Stock  Exchange durang the 
years 1882-1908-Continued 
GERMAN RAILW  4Y BONDS-Conttnued  FOREIGY  hIORTGAGE  BOVDS 
Iswed 
exclustvely 
by the bank 
Marks 
7 800  300 
22 500  000 
Year a 
Issued 
















11  250  ooo 
11 377  090 
Issued 
jorntly wtth 
other banks b 
Marks 
25  000  000 
42  000  000 







26  775  000 
3  400  000 
850  ooo 
244  231  632 
Marks 
1906  4 500  000 
1907 
FOREIGN  RAILWAY SHARES 
51 000  000 
51 ooo  ooo 
Marks 
37  I20 000 
4  800  ooo 
36  ooo  ooo 
Marks 
7 000  000 
g  500  ooo 
5  000  000 
6  913  890 
8  ooo  ooo 
5 600  ooo 
GERMAU  RAIL\% 1Y SHARES 
I  500  ooo 
1 500  000 
2  400  000 
I  938  ooo 
27  ooo  ooo 
214  992  000 
I  800  ooo 
1 250  000 
5 000  000 
5  000  000 
g  200  000 
105 ooo  ooo 
FOREIGN  RAILWAY BONDS 
6  ooo  ooo 
I  560  ooo  6  500  ooo 
16 ooo  ooo  20  000  000 
39  437  200 
75  380  800 
48  645  ooo 
67  286  500 
GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS 
848  369  360 
111  288  750 
21 374  000 
52  800  ooo 
16 ooo  ooo 
160 000  000 
207  402  000 
46  515  500 
25  957  000 
160  445  260 
15  200  000 
22 450  000 
I  200 000 
6  ooo  ooo 
16 000  000 
I90 000  000 
92  ooo  ooo 
aonly  those years are glven durlng whtch tssues were made 
b Includ~ng  prlvate bank~ng  firms 
a Only those years are gtven durlng wh~ch  Issues were made 
b Includ~ng  pm ate bank~ng  firms National  Monetary  Commission  The German  Great Banks 
Value of  secarities  issued  and  listed  at the Berlin Stock Exchange  during the 
years  1882-1908-Continued. 








by the  bank. 
INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 
GERMAN STREET RAILWAY BONDS. 


















23,250.  ooo 
zo,ooo, 000 
Value of  securities  issued  and  listed  at  the Berlin Stock Exchange during the 
















































30.834,  ooo 



















































.............  1896.. 
.............  1897.. 
.............  1898.. 
...............  1899 























by the bank. 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 













...............  1882 
...............  1883 
...............  1884 
1886.. ............. 
1887 ............... 
...............  1888 
...............  1889 
...............  1892 
1893 ............... 
1894 
.............  1895.. 
1896 ............... 
.............................  1897 
.............................  1898 
.............................  1899 




aOnly those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking firms. 
Marks. 
3,750,000 
6,000,  ooo 
.............. 
36, zoo. ooo 
.............. 




















































.l. .............  12,000,000 National  Monetary  Commission 
Value oj securities issued and listed at  the  Berlin  Stock  Exchange  during  the 
years 1882-1908-Continued. 
Issued  1  Issued  1  Issued  Issued  1  jointly  with 
Year.a  exclusively  jointly  with  jointly with  other banks 
by  the bank.  Otp:nrt  other banks.b  and great 
banks. b 
DRBSDNBR  BANE. 
.............................  1904 
.............................  1905 
.............  1906.. 
.............  1907.. 
.............  1908.. 
Total value of  securities issued at  the Berlin Stock  Exchange during  the  years 
1882-1908. 
Marks. 
I.  800, 000 
4.000.000 
21. ooo, ooo 
Year.a 





g. 700, ooo 
18,000,000 







.............  1889.. 
.............  1890.. 
1891.. 
.............  1892.. 
1893.. 
.............  1894.. 
.............  1895.. 
.............  1896.. 
.............  1897.. 
.............  1898.. 
..............  1899. 
.............  1900.. 
.............  1901.. 
.............  1902.. 
Total value of  securities issued at the Berlin  Stock  Exchange  during  the  years 
1882-1908-Continued. 
I  Issued  Issued 
exclusively  jointly  with 
by  the  hank.  Otgnrt  l 
Marks. 
.............. 
10, ooo, ooo 
.............. 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b  Including private bankim firms. 

































Issued  jointly with 
jointly with  other banks 






















































































1906.. .............  25, zoo, ooo 
1907.. .............  47,550,000 
1908.. .............  209, 734,400 
Value of  securities issued and  listed  at  the Berlin Stock Exchange during  the 
years  188~-1908. 
GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
-- 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 




























and  great 
banks.b 
Issued 















































~0,000,  000 
~5,000,ooo 
I I 2. ooo, ooo 
.............. 














zg, 000, ooo 
.............. 









65,000,ooo National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value of securities issued and listed  at  the  Berlin  Stock  Exchange during  the 
years 1882-1908-Continued. 
FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
Year9 













.............................  1907 
1908 ............... 
I  I  I 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking firms. 
Issued 
exclusively 
by  the bank. 















FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. 
Issued 

































































a Only those years are given during which issues were made 




GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. 



















FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. 
l  I 
12.g20,ooo 
2,740,060 














GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 







I  ......................................... 






















16,320,  ooo 
12. ooo, ooo 
64,000.000 
40,000,000 National  Monetary  Commission  The Gerrna,n Great Banks 
Value of securities  issued and  listed at the  Berlin Stock Exchange  during the 
years 1882-1908-Continued. 
Value  of securities issued  and listed at  the Berlin Stock  Exchange during the 
years 1882-1908-Continued. 
FOREIGN  RAILWAY BONDS-Continued.  BANK SHARES-Continued. 
I  Marks.  Marks  /  Marks.  /  Marks. 
1894 .........................................................  32,640,000 
.........................................................  1895  32,640,000 
Year.a 
GERMAN  STREET-RAILWAY SHARES. 
BANK SHARES. 
1  Issued 
ex:?z&dely  jointly with 








by the bank. 
Issued 





































































41. 250, 000 













79,315,  200 
3 7,000,000 
23,000,000 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking firms. 
............................ 






a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking firms National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value  of securities  issued  and  listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the 
years 1882-1908-Continued. 








.............................  1892 
.............................  1893 
.............................  1895 
1896 ............... 
1897 ............... 
.............................  1898 
IgOO... 
.............  1901.. 




.............................  1906 
.............................  I907 
.............................  1908 
Total value of  securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during  the  years 
1882-1908. 
Issued 




by the  bank. 


















19,980,  ooo 
36, 189,  ooo 
106,000,  ooo 
40,870,000 
127,558,600 




































































o  Only those years are given during which issues were made. 






































105,  ~00,000 
216,870,000 
Value  oj securities issued and listed at the  Berlin Stock Exchange during the 
years  1882-1908. 
GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
Issued 












.............  1895.. 
1896 ............................. 
1897 ............... 
.............................  1898 












j,  000,000 
Issued 
exclusively 
by  the  bank. 
.............. 













FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
Issued 
jointly  with 
OtEnct 
.............  ...........................  1905..  .l  77.62~.170  .l  678.300.000  I 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 










2, 500,  ooo 
8,100,000 
...........................  /  2,000, 000 
...........................  1  41,220,000 




and  great 
banks.b 
30,000,  000 
30,000,000 
30,000, ooo 
...............  17,~0o,ooo 













~0,000,000 National  Monetary  Commission 
Value  of  securztzes zssued and  lzsted at the  Berlzn Stock  Exchange durzng the 
years 1882-1p8--Cont1nued 
GERMAN MORTGAGE  BONDS 
Issued  1  issued  1  Issued  1  Issued  1  lolntly with 
Year a  ex lllslvely  jointly  with  jointlv wlth  other banks 
by the  bank  OtEnrt  other banks b  and great 
banks b 












Value  of  securztzes  zssued and  lzsted at  the Berlzn Stock Exchange durzng the 
years 1882-1908-Continued 
FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS 
Year a 
Marks 
20 000  000 
80 ooo ooo 
20 000  000 
60  ooo ooo 
30 ooo ooo 
20  000  000 
GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES 
Marks  Marks 
Issued 
exrl~is~vely 
by the bank 
Marks 
20 000  000 
110 000  000 
165  ooo ooo 
45  000  000 
60  ooo  ooo 
Issucd 
~"'"~ly  *lth 
Otknrt 
5  000 000 
5  000  000 
g  200 000 
14 297  000 
4  024  000 







I  Issued 
Marks 
BANK  SFIARES 
5  ooo ooo 
Issued  ~o~ntiy  with 
jointly wlth  other banks 
other banks b  and great 
Marks 
15  ooo  ooo 
50  000  000 
12 000  000 
4  000  000 
I2 000  000 
4  000  000 
30  ooo  ooo 
5  500  000 
34 800  ooo 
600  ooo 
25  000  000 
8  750  ooo 
35  200 000 
FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES 
1  banks b 
f  500 000 
6  ooo ooo 
g  000  000 
6  500  ooo 
22  100  000 
Marks  Marks 
100 000 000 
60  ooo  ooo 





6  ooo  ooo 
25  500  000 
15 300  000 
8  ooo  ooo 
GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS 
24  000  000 
12 500  000 
16 ooo  ooo 
16  250  000 






1 500  000 
16 980  ooo 
3  689  ooo 
8  500  ooo 
33 620  ooo 
74  058  600 
29  589  000 
35  150 000 
15  700  000 
4  200  000 
1 500 000 
3  600 ooo 
12  784  ooo 
4  800 ooo 
25  300  000 
4  684  600 
600 ooo 
10 000  000 
13 000 000 
g  500  000 
I1 go0  000 
4  500  ooo 
3  000  000 
4  800 ooo 
a Only those years are grven dunng wh~ch  lssues were made 
b Including pr~vate  banking firms 
16 044  000 
8  280  ooo 
18 600  ooo 
15  200  000 
8  ooo  ooo 
I1 400  000 
25  400  000 
5  872  600 
104 415  zoo 
51  ooo  ooo 
22 700  000 
- 
20  I00  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
g  000  000 
43  250  250 
25  000  000 
21 000  000 
22 400  000 
89 500  ooo 
20  500  000 
34 550  000 
- 
a Only those years are glven dunng  whlch issues were made 
b Including private banklug firms National  Monetary  Commission 
P- 
Value of  securltzes zssued  and  lzsted  at  the  Berlzn  Stock Exchange durtng the 
years  1882-1908-Cont~nued 
IUDUSTRIAL  BONDS 
l  l  l 
Issued 
Issued  Issued  Issued  iolntly wlth 
exc~llslve~y  lolntly -lth  jointly with  other banks 
by the bmk  great  other banks 6  and areat  I  banks  1  banks b 








APPENDIX  VI. 
TOTAL VALUE OF  SECURITIES ISSUED AT ALL GERMAN STOCK 
EXCHANGES BY THE GREAT  BANKS DURING THE YEARS 
1897-1908 
Marks 
4 500 ooo 
3 000 000 
6 ooo ooo 
3 250 000 
40 500 000 











Total  value  of  securztzes  zssued  at  all  German  stock  exchanges  durzng  the 
years 1897-1908 
Marks 
3 500 ooo 
5 000 000 
14 500 000 
Year 
a  only those years are glven during which Issues were made 
b Including private banking firms 
I2  000 000 
16  ooo ooo 
3 000 000 
6 ooo ooo 
30 500 000 
10 000 000 
25 000 000 
3 000 000 
26 000 000 
I2 000 000 
3 ooo coo 
6 ooo ooo 
Marks 
I0  000 000 
Marks 
421  644 ooo 
269 840 ooo 
85 500 000 
31  600  ooo 
73  I00  000 
187  815 700 
421 374 700 
54 509 000 
go 050 000 
203 250 000 
14 550 000 
48 810  ooo 
Marks 
6 ooo ooo 
3 500 ooo 
Issued 
exclus~vely 
by the bank 
Marks 
5 700 000 
68  156 500 
36 500 ooo 
8 200 000 
34 500 000 
43 000 000 
30 000 000 
44 000 000 
81 450.000 
184 ooo ooo 
190 000 000 
I42 700 000 
57 300 000  1 
17 700 000 I 
59 IZO ooo 
l 
24 397 500 
15 000 000 




Value of  newly zssued  secuvztzes  lzsted  at  all  German stock exchanges durzng 
the years 1897-1908 
Marks 
25  703 000 
6 939 500 
83 139 500 
5 079 ooo 
12  500 ooo 
11 go6 800 
38 500 ooo 
21  400 000 
82 497 200 
9 750 ooo 
3 300 000 
GERMAN  PUBLIC  SECURITIES 
Issued 
iomtly wlth 
other banks b 
Marks 
74 750 000 
451.400 000 
118.700 ooo 
247 400 ooo 
386 691 250 
I 261 099 500 
3 434 609 074 
586 040 570 
I  183 611  000 
420 158 200 
7 008,815  232 







Issued  I   id..  I  Issued 
exclusively  J"'L'L'Y  ~o~ntly  wlth 
by the bank  otznrt  other banks b 
Issued 





287 500 ooo 
14 703 000 
a6 500 ooo 
a 300 ooo 
4 500 000 
1 050 000 
13 000 000 
Marks 
7 500 000 
3 000 000 
14 500 ooo 
6 ooo ooo 
Marks 
24 703 000 
4 939 500 
3 639 500 
I  079 000 
8 500 ooo 
10  656 800 
Marks 
20 000 000 
6 ooo ooo 
27 700 000 
57 500 000 
28 000 000 
17 000 000 
26 g60 100 
Only those years are mven durlrlg which Issues were made 
b Includmg pnvate banlung Erms National  Monetary  Commission 
Value of  nswly issued securities  listed at all  German stock  exchanges during 
the years  1897-1908-Continued. 
GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIESContinued. 
I  I 
Year.5 
The German Great  Banks 
1go4.. 
.............  1905.. 
.............  1906.. 
.............  1907.. 
.............  1908.. 
value of  newly issued  securities  listed  at  all  German stock  exchanges during 
the years 1897-1908-Continued. 
Issued 
exclusively 
by the bank. 
GERMAN RAILWAY  SHARES. 










jointly with  Otf:nrt 
FOREIGN  PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
Marks. 
16,000,ooo 




























GERMAN RAILWAY  BONDS. 
I  1  I  I 
Issued 





35,000,  ooo 
.............. 






FOREIGN  RAILWAY  BONDS. 
A4arks. 
405.317.000 
387,000.  000 
44,000,000 
438,500,ooo 














..............  1903. 
1904 
1905 
.............  1906.. 
1907 
1908 
GERMAN  MORTGAGE BONDS. 













a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 









FOREIGN  MORTGAGE BONDS. 
.........................................................  1897  51,000,000 
.........................................................  1904  11  11  34,000,000 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 














1897  ............... 
...............  1898 
1900  ............... 
rgoz.....  .......... 
1903  ............... 
1904  ............... 
............................  1905 
...............  ,906 
1907 









30,000.000 National  Monetary  Commission  The German  Great  Banks 
Value of  newly issued  securities  listed  at  all  German stock exchangesduring 
the years  1897-1908-Continued. 
BANK SHARES--Continued. 
Year.a 
BERLINER  HANDELS-GESELLBCHAFT. 
1904. 
.............  1go5.. 
.............  1906.. 
1907 ............... 
1908 ............... 




by the bank. 
Marks. 
22,000,ooo 


















Otpln~at  e,ff:yi',",ly 



















































































Value of  newly issued  securities  listed  at  all German stock  exchanges  during 









9, 750, 000 
sg,ooo,  ooo 
5. 200,000 
I.  ooo,ooo 
5,OOO,OOO 
3,000,000 
I,  450,000 




.............  1898.. 
.............  1899.. 
1900.. 
1901 ............... 
.............  I~OZ.. 
.............  1903.. 
.............  1904.. 
.............  1g05.. 
.............  1906.. 
.............  1907.. 
.............  1908.. 
INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 
GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
Issued 


























a  Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b  Including private banking firms. 




I. 250, 000 
.............. 

























.............  1898.. 
....................  1899 
...............  1900 
.............  1901.. 
.............  1902.. 






a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b  Including private banking firms. 
ex:~;;i',",ly 











1903 .............................  3.000,000  ............. 
1904. ..........................................  2~.000,000 





















and  great 
banks. b National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
Value of  newly issued  securities  listed  at  all German stock exchanges during 
the years 1897-1908-Continued. 
Value of  nmly issued  securities  listed  at  all  German stock exchangw during 
the years 1897-1908-Continued. 
FOREIGN  PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 
Issued 
Issued  jointly with 
iointlv with  other banks  Year.a 
dther banks.)  I  and mat 
banks.b 
ex:g~&",ly 
by the bank. 
1  Marks.  1  Marks.  1  Marks.  1 
.............................  1898  46,406,500  .............. 












































GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 
FOREIGN  RAILWAY BONDS. 
ex:f:~~",ly 











I  I  I 
FOREIGN  MORTGAGE  BONDS. 
1902  6,750.000  .............. 
..............  1904  II.250,OOO 



















GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking firms.  I  I  I  ! 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking Ems. National  Monetary  Commission 
Value oj  newly  assued  securztzes  lasted  at  all German stock exchanges durang 
the years 1897-1908-Continued 
INDUSTRIAL SHARES 
Year a 













DEUTSCHE  BANE. 
Issued 
exclus~vely 
by  the  bank 





7,500  000 
3  000  000 
5,000  ooo 
1,000 000 
13,850 ooo 
10  250  000 
4  000  ooo 
Issued  Issued 
Issued  Issued  jo~ntly  wlth 
exclus~vcly  101ntly  lo~ntly  w~th  other banks  year  a 







103 955  000 
258  279  480 
347.330  000 
476,497,000 
98 347  550 
217  030,ooo 
656  134.040 
736  org. 800 
688  797.900 
762  043,800 
262.763  600 
241.945.000 
Marks 
6  294  000 
8  ooo ooo 
15  200  000 
18 200 000 
I  000  000 
10  000, ooo 
11 ooo,o00 
I  750,000 
17  800 000 
g, ooo,ooo 
21  200  000 
Afarls 
11 700  ooo 
68  406  500 
77  500  000 
74  591  200 
261  700  ooo 
140  500  ooo 
60  750  ooo 
82  887  000 
235,687,000 
267, o37.000 
370, 270  000 
221,264.000 
Issued 
jo~ntly  wlth 
other banks 
.  . 
20 000  000 
24  000  000 







4.000  ooo 
161.3~0,ooo 
Marks 
27  950 000 





131  566  300 
843 338,408 
129  842,000 
291,125,000 








IO,OOO,  000 
9,398 ooo 
6,000 000 
11 600  ooo 
14 ooo ooo 
1,000,ooo 
a Only those years are given during wluch Issues were made. 
b Includlng prlvate banking 6rms. 
28  730  000 
10, 700, ooo 
3,000 000 










3,221  204  490 
527  417,000 
I  346,550,000 
1 555  674  856 




40  798  000 
gr  850 ooo 
25  700,000 
5  000 000 






26  600,ooo 




6  ooo  ooo 
4  500.000 
35.400  000 
4,800  ooo 














l  I  I  l 
a Only those years are glven  durlng whlch  Issues were made 




4  500  000 
6  500  000 
4  ooo  ooo 
Value of  newly zssued  securztzes lzsted  at all German stock  exchanges durzng 
the  years  1897-1908. 
GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
Issued  1  Issued  Issued  1  Issued  1  jointly w~th 
Year a  exclusively  101ntly  jo~ntly  wlth  other banks 
by  the  bank  OtEngat  other banks b  and great 
banks b 
Marks 
37  950  000 
8  ooo  ooo 
208  zoo  000 
48  zoo  ooo 
13  310  ooo 
I3  800 ooo 
11,873  zoo 
17  600  ooo 
28  000  ooo 
42  400  000 
Marks 
4  000  000 
7  500,000 
5  000  000 
I72  ~00.000 
45  000  000 
3  500  ooo 
20 937,000 
58  937  000 
83  437  000 
125  000  000 
123  654,900 
Marks 
2,45OS000 
3  000  000 
3  228,000 
94  570,000 
5,272 000 
I  000  000 
3  800 ooo 
3  952  000 
32  000  000 
10  165  ooo 
245  000  000 
Marks 
24  000  000 
388 ooo  ooo 
81 865  ooo 
448  317  000 
450  000,000 
1,321,720  600 
481,500  000 
I  016  325,000 
I  I  I  l 
a Only those years are glven dunug whlch issues were made 
b Includmp prlvate banklng firms. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value of  newly issued  securities  listed at all German stock  exchanges during 
the years 1897-1908-Continued. 
FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
I  l  I 
Issued  )  Issued  Issued  I  Issued  1  jointly with 
Year.a  exclusively  jointly  with  jointly with  other banks 
by the bank.  Ot~~nk~t  other banks.b  and great 
banks.6 
Value of  newly issued securities  listed  at  all Gernzan stock  exchanges  during 
the years  1897-1po84ontinued. 
GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES 





xgo  4 
...............  1905 
...............  1906 
1907. 














...............  1898 
1899 
1900. 
...............  1901 
GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 
l  I 
FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 
l  I  I  I 
Issued 
exclusively 
by the bank. 










































1  I  l  I 
BANK SHARES. 
1897.. .............  52,000,ooo  6,000,ooo  25,500,ooo  .............. 
1898.. .............  24,201,600  g.ooo,ooo  8.000,ooo  ..............  l  1899 ...............  ~0,880,000 .......................................... 
Issued 















110.  ooo, ooo 
go  ooo  ooo 
50,000 000 
60,  ooo.ooo 








a Only those years  are given during which issues were made. 








70  ooo.ooo 
.............. 
35. ooo.ooo 
IO.OOO  000 
45,000,ooo 
29,000  000 
IOO,O~O.OOO 
15,000.000 
IO.OOO.  ooo 
30.000.000 
..............  1898 
...............  1899 
...............  1900 
.............  ,901.. 
.............  1902.. 
.............  1903.. 
..............  1904. 
.............  1905.. 
.............  1906.. 
.............  1907.. 
..............  1~~8. 





5.000  ooo 
55.000.000 
30.000.000 





80 000. ooo 




































a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking hs. 
13.931  200 
...............  1898 
...............  1899 
.............................  1900 
..............  1901. 
...............  1903 
..............  1904. 


















16. 204. 256 
ro,ooo,ooo National  Monetary  Commissiolz  The German Great Banks 
Value of  newly zssued  securztzes  Ezsted  at  all German stock exchanges durzng 
the years 1897-1908-Continued 
DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT 
Total value of  securztzes zssued at all German stock exchanged  durzng the years 
1897-1908  BANK SHARES-Contmued 
Issued 
exclus~vely 
by the bank 
I 
Year  a 
Marks 







and  great 
banks b 
Marks 




other banks b 
Issued 
exclus~vely 












other banks b  I  Marks  Marks  1  Marks  Marks 
711  692  ooo  30 350 000  331  900  000  365  960 000 
67  680  900  27  251  600  632  690  784  417  813  280 
185  724  ooo  41  100  ooo  357  200  ooo  67  500  ooo 
10  252  000 
I9 400  000 
44  750  800 
109 500  800 
72  816  ooo 
24  999  600 
43  220 000 
I22 610  000  23  031  200  204  200  000  240  450  000 
49  464  600  179 ooo  ooo  89  400  ooo  561  492  ooo 
172  ooo ooo  72  000  000  561  600  ooo  I  505  349  500  1/11 
I2  500  000 
16  ooo ooo 
6  250  000 
20  000 000 
INDL  STRIAL SHARES 
l  l  I  I 
l0 505  000 
7  810  800 
39  000  000 
18 135 000 
44  518  800 
zz  600  ooo 
10 100 000 
Value of  newly zssued  securztzes lzsted  at  all German  stock  exchanges durzng 
the  years  1897-1908  6  700  ooo 
18  200  000 
19  zoo  ooo 
11 250  ooo 
5  000  000 
750  000 
5  500  ooo 
I  000  000 
GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES 
Year a 
30  969  ooo 
I2 750  000 
22 225  000 
17 ooo  ooo 
18  go0  ooo 
29  669  000 
20 273  500 
25  235  ooo 
13 000 000 
75  g50  ooo 
26  600  ooo 
69  350  ooo 
162  300 000 
62  670  000 
67  030  ooo 
Issued 
exclus~vely 
by  the  bank 
2  450  000 
59  250  000 
36  800 ooo 
44  000  000 
35  900  ooo 
Marks 
18  552  500 
Marks 
2  750  000 
4  000 000 





40  000  000 
Marks 
Issued 
jo~ntly  ulth 
other banks b 
INDUSTRIAL BONDS 
Issued 
jo~ntly  wtth 
other banks 
and  great 
banks b 
6  ooo  ooo 
I2 000  000 
7  500  000 
I0 000  000 
138  ooo  ooo 
64  960  100 
408  317  ooo 
474  000  000 
26  000  000 
434  000  000 
I  133 325  000 
3  500  000 
8  ooo  ooo 
5  500  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
6  500  ooo 
I  I00  000 
43  000  000 
16 ooo ooo 
IS  178  800 
10 350  ooo 
8  740  ooo 
20 750  000 
8  ooo  ooo 
67  ooo  ooo 
20 000  000 
24  000 000 
29  000  000 
55  000  000 
20  700  000 
IZ  800 ooo 
9  400  000 
7  500  000 
I5  200  000 
44  700  ooo 
168 250  ooo 
6  275  800 
1 000  000 
4  092  500 
94  000 000 
15  488 ooo 
2  000  000 
169  ooo ooo 
42  000  000 
g  500  ooo 
11 937  000 
23  937  000 
63  937  000 
127  296  ooo 
106 ooo  ooo 
36  ooo  ooo 
12  528  000 
36  925  ooo 
6  500  ooo 
38 650  ooo 
15  500  ooo 
1I  ~OO  oo~ 
40  200  000 
I  000  000 
30 500  ooo 
I3 000  000 
57  800 ooo 
46  470  000 
27  500  000  a Only those years are glven durlng wh~ch  Issues were made 
b Including pnvate barhug 6rms 
a Only those years are glven during whlch Issues were made 
Including private banking firms National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
Value of  newly issued  securities  listed  at  all German stock exchanges during 
the years 1897-1908-Continued. 
Value of  newly issued  secureties  listed  at  all German stock exchanges during 
the years 1897-1go84ontinued. 
FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 
Xmued  1  Issued  issued  1  Issued  1  jointly with 
Year.a  exclusively  jointly  with  jointly with  other banks 
by the bank.  Otenct  other banks.b  and great 
banks.b 


































I  I  I  I 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
b Including private banking firms. 













l  lssuedl  l 
Issued 
exf~~~~,",ly  jointly with  joi:z,"':ith  jointly 
other banks 



































































a  Only those years are given during which issues were made. 







1897  6,000,ooo  ..............  18,ooo.ooo 
1898 ...............  ..............  8,000,ooo 











1,687,500 National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great  Banks 
Value of  newly issued  secureties  listed  at  all German stock exchanges during 
the years 1897-1908-Continued. 
BAN  K  SHARES-Continued. 
DREBDNER  BANE. 














by the bank. 
Issued 




















































































a Only those years arc  given during which issues were made. 









.............................  1897 
1898 ............................. 









































3201415,  200 



























69, ZOO,  ooo 
44, 700.000 
142,900,  ooo 
172,000,000 







Value of  newly issued  securities  listed at  all German stock exchanges during 









12,000,  000 
.............. 






























13,  000,000 
15,000. ooo 
14,000,000 
29. 142, 100 
6,000,000 
5.652.400 










5,  000,000 
118.000, ooo 






118, 154. g00 
............. 
6,200,000 












I,  277,720,600 
460,000,000 
955.000,OOO 
1  -  - --p--. 
a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 
bIncluding private banking hs National  Monetary  Commission 
Value of  newly  zssued  securzlzes  lzsted  at all Grrman stock exchanges durzng 
the years  1897-1908-Continued 
FOREIGN  PUBLIC SECURITIES 
Issued  Issued  Issued 
excll,slvely  lorntly  ~orntly  wtih 






60  ooo ooo 









I  l  l 
FOREIGN  MORTGAGE BONDS 
l  I  l 
GERMAN  MORTGAGE BONDS 
I  I 
Marks 
7 875 ooo 
I99 834 400 
30 ooo ooo 
35 ooo ooo 
The German Great Banks 
Marks 
77 520 ooo 
142 800 000 
rzo ooo 000 
220 000 000 
15 ooo ooo 
55  ooo 000 
go 000 000 
I905  /  67 500 000  1  I 
GERMAN  RAILWAY  SHARES 
I 
Value of newly zssued  securztzes  lzsted  at  the  German stock  exchanges durzng 
the pears  1897-1908--Contlnued 
1906  1 
l 
GERMAU RAILWAY BOWDS-Cont~nued 
Marks 
51  ooo ooo 
463 080 ooo 
13 691 250 
242 250 000 
698 700 000 
95 ooo ooo 
40 000 000 
Marks 
. 
6 481 565 232 
64 260 000 
15  000 000 
95 360 zoo 
60 750 ooo 
Year a 









by the bank 





I  500 000 
I901  8  839 000 
a  only those years are gtven durlng which Issues were made. 
b Includrng prrvate bankrng firms 
25  000 000 




FOREIGN RAILWAY  SHARES 
banks b 
Marks 






l  000 000 
7 000 000 
2  000 000 
25 000 000 
Marks 
11 g00 000 
13  504 256 
FOREIGN  RAILWAY  BONDS 
48 ooo ooo 
25  500 000 
15  300 000 
1906 
80  000 000 
I 687 500 









I  350 000 
26 ooo ooo 
26 795 ooo 
GERMAN  STREET RAILWAY  BONDS 
6 ooo ooo 




I  250 000 
I  200 000 
14 297 000 
500 ooo 
Only those years are grven durlng whlch Issues were made 
b Includ~ng  pnvate bankrng  firms  1 
2  500 000 
3 000 000 
5  500 ooc National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value of  newly zssued  securttzes  lasted  at all German stock exchanges durzng 
the years 1897-1908-Contmued 
BANK SHARES 
I  l  I 
A.  SCHAAFFHAUSEN'SCHER  BANEVEREIN. 
Total value of  securztzes zssutd at all German stock exchanges durzng the )ears 
1897-1908 
Year a 
Issued  1  Issued  1  Issued  Issued  1 
Year a  exclu.~vely  10'ntly  jo~ntly  n~th  10111tly  other banks  w~th 












127  558  600 
135  589  000 
85  450  000 
45  700  ooo 
4  800 000 
46  ooo  ooo 
11 600  ooo 
39  284  ooo 
20 550  000 
60  500  ooo 
184  684  600 
5  I00  000 
Issued 
exclus~vely 
by the  bank 
Marks 
I1 000  000 
43  544  000 
27  780  000 
18  600  ooo 
33  700  ooo 
I1 000  000 
43  400  000 
231  I79 000 
290  297  770 
185  815  zoo 
I54  920  000 
238  320  ooo 
Marks 
78  ooo  ooo 
9  600  ooo 
29  600 ooo 
41  000  000 
300  ooo 
10  500  ooo 
22 600  ooo 
Issued 
J~'~~~~  '\lth 
Otkngat 
INDUSTRIAL SHARES 
I  -  -1  P- 
a Only those yelr? are glven during wh~ch  issues were made 
b Includlng pr~vzte  bank~ng  firms 
Marks 
7  713  000 
6  500  ooo 
22  TOO 000 
25  500  ooo 
AI  zrlr 
17  870 000 
27  250  ooo 
I  350  ooo 
14  500  000 
21 000  000 
26  ooo  ooo 
30  000  000 
417  617  ooo 
31  250  ooo 
31  ooo  000 
33  470  000 
30 000  000 
Value of  newly zssued  securztzes  lzsted at  German stock exchanges durzng the 
years  1897-1908 
Issued 
jo~ntly  s~th 
other banks b 
Marks 
20 000  000 
23  ooo  ooo 
29  700  ooo 
130 450  000 
I01 500  000 
76  ooo  ooo 
37  000  000 
68  797  ooo 
749  600  ooo 
140  359  ooo 
I05  500  000 
216  870 000 
21  200 000 
29  000  000 
53  700  ooo 
28  000  000 
23  500  ooo 
18 600  ooo 
49  800 000 
91 750  750 
41  250  000 
31  800 ooo 
pp 







25  000  000 
2  060  ooo 
I  260  ooo 
2  200 ooo 
5  000  000 
3  000  000 




8  ooo  ooo 
24  000  000 
12 so0  000 
16  000  ooo 
6  250  ooo 
20 000  000 
2  oor  600 
40  I00  000 
9  200 000 
19  zoo  ooo 
I  250  ooo 
I0 950  000 
61  950 ooo 
79  315  200 
37  000  000 
23  ooo ooo 
















3  500  000 
I  750  000 
8  851  600 
7  850 000 
25  I34  400 
600  ooo 
I  500  ooo 
7 460  ooo 
20  193 000 
28  195  000 
9  550  000 
5  720  000 
3  go0  ooo 
Marks 
40  000  000 
35  000  000 
45  500  000 
36  ooo  ooo 
12 000  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
22 947  500 
27  500  000 
171 320  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
39  779  000 
I0 000  000 
2  000  000 
41  220 000 
96 500  ooo 
n Only those years are glven durlng wh~ch  ~ssues  were made 
b Includlng prlvate banklng firms 
900  000 
2  500  000 
2  500  ooo 
10  000  000 















17  500  ooo 
10  000  000 
15  000  000 
26  000  000 
30  000  000 
408  317  ooo 
30  ooo  ooo 
30  000  000 
30 000 000 
30 000  000 
2  500  000 
3  250  000 
18 ooo  ooo 
I2 000  000 
65  ooo ooo 
I  I  I  I 
a  Only those years are g~v)n  durlng whlch Issues were made 
b Includ~ng  prlvate banklng firms 
4  ooo  ooo  1  Io 000  ooo 
16  ooo ooo 
8  951 000 
9  700  ooo 
1 600  ooo 
I  501  400 
3  000  000 
3  ooo  000 
20 000  000 
10  ooo  ooo 
82  500  000 
33  970  000 
45  500  000 National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Value of  newly zssued  securztzes lzsted  at  German stock exchanges durzng the 
years 1897-1908-Continued 
BAUK SHARES 
Value of  newly zssued  securztzes  lzsted  at  all German stock  exchanges durzng 
the years  1897-1908-Continued 
FOREIGU  PUBLIC SCCURITIES 








by the bank 
Issued 
1°1ntly  Otenrt 
Year a  Year  a 
(  Marks  Marks  1  Marks  I  Marks 
I905  77  625  170  678  300  ooo 
GERMAU  MORTGAGE:  BONDS 
Marks 
30  000  000 
5  500  000 
34  800  ooo 
600  ooo 
25  000  000 
8  750  ooo 
35  200 000 
180 000  000 
Issued 
exclustvely 
by the bank 
Marks 
6  ooo  ooo 
g  000  000 
6  500  ooo 
22  I00  000 
Marks 
6  000  ooo 
Issued 
J~~~~~~  Otzncat 
Marks 
8  ooo  ooo 
24  000  000 
12 500  000 
16 ooo  ooo 
16 250  ooo 
20 000  000 
20  000  000 
60  ooo  ooo 
30  000  000 
20  000  000  1 
PO  000  000 
l  ::; ::: ::: 
45  000  000 
60  ooo  ooo 
Issued 
jointly w~th 
other banks b 
INDUSTRIAL SHARES 
Issued 




74  058  600 
29  589  000 
40  650  ooo 
15  700  ooo 
4  ZOO  000 
3  000  000 
3  600  ooo 
12  784  ooo 
4  800  000 
25  300  000 
4 684  600 
3  I00 000 
370  000 
9  750  000 
1 350  000 
4  500  ooo 
I  620  ooo 
I  000  000 
3  470  000 
16  044  000 
8  280  000 
18 600  ooo 
15  zoo  000 
8  ooo  ooo 
11 400  000 
25  400  000 
5  872  600 
104  415  200 
51  ooo  ooo 
22 700  000 
g  000  000 
43  250  ooo 
25  000  000 
21 000  000 
22 400  ooo 
89  500  ooo 
20 500  000 
34  550  000 
GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES 
IYDUbTliIAL  BONDS 







60  ooo  ooo 
r  687  500 
FOREIGN  RAILWAY SHARES 
l  l  I  l 
5  ooo  ooo 
25  000  000 
3  000  000 
26  ooo  ooo 
5  ooo  ooo 
5  000  000 
g  ZOO  000 
I4 297  000 
4  024  ooo 
11 000  000 
I  l  l  I 
GERMAN  RAILWAY BONDS  16 ooo  ooo 







6  ooo  ooo 
30  500  000 
I0 000  000 
57  300  000 
I7  700  000 
59  I20 000 
I2 000  000 
3  000  000 
6  ooo  ooo 
24  397  500 
15  000  000 
106 320  000 
a Only those years are glven during which Issues were effected 
b Including pnvate bankmg firms 
I0 000  000 
3  680  ooo 
I  250  000 
I  l  l  l 
a  Only those years are glven dur~ng  wh~ch  Issues were made 
b Includ~ng  prlvate banklng firms 
10.000  000 
13.000  ooo 
g, 500  000 
I1 go0  000 
4  500  ooo The German Great Banks 
APPENDIX  VII. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION  OF  THE GERMAN 
GREAT BANKS1 
[Founded in 1853.  Capital. 154,ooo.ooo marks.  Surplus. 30,250,000 marks.] 
[To page 641.1 
Branches  (7).--Frankfort  on-the-Main since  1864  (agency as early  as 
1854);  Berlin  since 1871;  Hannover since  1900; Strassburg since 1901; 
Halle and Stettin (with deposit office Bollwerk) since 1906;  Leipzig (with 
deposit office Leutzsch) since 1908. 
Commandites  (4).-Rumelin  & Co. in Heilbronn,  Wingenroth,  Scherr 
& Co. in Mannheim;  Schmitz, Heidelberger  & Co. in hlainz,  Fuld & Co., 
Pforzheim. 
Deposit  offices (31).-Since  1900, viz, 16 in Berlin;  2 in Charlottenburg; 
I  each  in Halensee,  Gross-Lichterfelde  W.,  Zehlendorf,  Kottbus,  Forst 
(Lausitz),  Frankfort -on  - the  - Oder,  Greifswald, Guben,  Lahr  (Baden), 
Offenbach-on-the-Main,  Prenzlau,  Spremberg  (Mark),  Stargard  (Pomer- 
ania). 
Establishments  (h'iederlassungeiz)  (5).-In  Freiburg  - in -the  - Breisgau, 
Giessen, Landau (Pfalz), Neustadt (Haardt), Quedlinburg. 
Agencies (7)"-In  Alsfeld, Butzbach, Herborn, Pasewalk, Sangerhausen, 
~enftenber~;  and Sorau. 
The Darmstadter Bank has founded or participated in the founding of 
the following subsidiary institutions (Toch  tergesellschaf  ten)." 
1871  The  Amsterdamsche  Bank  in  Amsterdam  (share  capital 
6,ooo,o0o florins.) 
The Bank  fur  Handel  und  Industrie  is  represented  on  the 
supervisory board by three members of  its own managing board. 
1881.  The Wurttembergische Bankanstalt, formerly Pflaum & Co., 
in Stuttgart (share capital ~o,ooo,ooo  marks).  Since 1881 it has 
had  a  contractual  community  of  interest  with  the  Wiirttem- 
bergische Vereinsbank in Stuttgart, founded in 1869 (share capital 
30,000,000 marks;  branches in Heilbronn, Reutlingen, and Ulm; 
commandites in Ellwangen, Esslingen, and Gerabronn).  The two 
banks share up to 1930 profits and losses pro rata of  their share 
capital, i.  e., in the proportion of  I to 3.* 
The  Bank  flir  Handel  und  Industrie  is  represented  on  the 
supervisory  board of  the Wurttembergische Bankanstalt by two 
members of  its own managing board. 
1889. The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in Shanghai, with 12 branches in 
Berlin,  Hamburg, Tientsin,  Tsingtau,  Hankow,  Hongkong, Cal- 
cutta, Tsinanfu, Peking, Yokohania, Kobe (Japan), and Singapore, 
share capital, 7,500,000 Shanghai taels, fully paid up (jointly with 
other firms). 
This bank has the privilege of  note issue by its establishments 
situated within the check districts of  Kiauchau and in China. 
The  Bank  fur Handel  und  Industrie  is  represented  on  the 
supervisory board. 
1894.  The  Banca  Comnzcrciale  Ztaliana  in  Milan  (share  capital 
rog,m,ooo lire) jointly  with other German,  Austrian, and Swiss 
firms. 
Number of  branches 33 (in Italy). 
The  Bank  fur  Handel  und  Industrie  is  represented  on  the 
supervisory board. 
1898. The  Banque  Internationale  de  Bruxclles  in  Brussels  (share 
capital 25,000,000 francs, fully paid up) jointly with other German 
and foreign firms. 
The  Bank  fiir Handel  und  Industrie  is  represented  on  the 
supervisory board. 
1900. The Bankers'  Trading Syndicate in London (capital £~oo,ooo). 
1904-5  The Banca Alarmorosch  Bhnk & Co.,  Socictate anonima in 
Bucharest,  formerly  a  comnlandite  of  the  bank  (share capital 
~o,ooo,ooo  lei) jointly  with the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. 
1906.  The  Amerika-Bank  Aktien-Gesellschaft  (capital  25,000,000 
marks in five series, of  which 5,000,ooo are fully paid  up and the 
remaining  zo,ooo,ooo marks to the extent of  25  per cent).b 
The Darmstater Bank has absorbed the following banks and banking 
firms: 
1900. The banking firm Gust. Maier & Co. in Frankfort on-the-Main. 
1901. The banking firm H. Oppenheimer in Hannover. 
1901. The banking firm Otto Davisson in Hannover. 
IQOI.  The banking firm Bernhard Lillienthal in Giistrow. 
1902. The  Bank  fur Suddeutschland  in Darmstadt (share capital 
15,672,300  marks). 
1902. The Berlin ofice of  the Breslauer Discontobank. 
1904-5.  The banking firm Robert Warschauer &Co. in Berlin. 
1905. The banking firm Philipp Nicolaus Schmidt in Frankfort-on- 
the-Main. 
1906.  The banking firm Hermann Arnold & Co., banking comman- 
dite, in IIalle-on-the-Saale. 
1907. The banking firm Ed. Loeb & Co. in Neustadt a. d. H. and 
Landau. 
1907. The banking firm Max Klette in Pren7lau. 
Through stock ownership  the Darmstadter  Bank maintains communi- 
ties of  interest with the following institutions: 
I. Since 1902 with the Breslauer Discontobank  in Breslau  (share capital 
25,000,ooo marks) which has 10 branches in Glatz, Gleiwitz, Gorlitz, Kat- 
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towitz, Lauban, Myslowitz (Upper Silesia), Oppeln, Ratibor, Zabrze (Upper 
Silesia), and Ziegenhals.  This bank also has: 
Three deposit offices in Breslau. 
One agency in Habelschwerdt. 
It absorbed the following firms and banks: 
1888. Perls & Co. in Gleiwitz. 
1900. Landsberger & Co. in Kattowitz. 
1905. L. Silberberg in Myslowitz. 
1905. L. Reymann in Oppeln. 
1905. The Zabrzer Discontobank Kochmann & Co. in Zabrze. 
1908. The banking firm Karl Schubert Nachf. in Gorlitz. 
Two members of  the managing board of  the Bank fur Handel und Indus- 
trie have seats on the supervisory board of  this bank. 
2.  Since 1902 with the Ostbank fur Handel und Gewerbe in Posen (share 
capital 18,000,000 marks), which has 9 branches, viz, in Allenstein,  Brom- 
berg,  Danzig,  Graudenz,  Konigsberg,  Landsberg  a.  d. W.,  Memel, Stolp 
i. P,, and Tilsit). 
One commandite, viz, R. Damme in Danzig. 
Two agencies, viz, in Culm (Western Prussia) and Schwerin a. W. 
Twenty-two deposit offices, viz, in Braunsberg, Danzig, Gnesen, Hohen- 
salza, Insterburg, Kaukehmen in Eastern Prussia, Konigsberg in Prussia (2), 
Konitz, Krotoschin, Lissa in Prussia, Lyck in Eastern Prussia, Marienburg, 
Marienwerder, Osterode, Posen  (3), Rastenburg, Rawitsch, and Schneide- 
muhl. 
One exchange office (Wechselstube) in Neu-Skalmierschiitz. 
It absorbed the following banking firms and banks: 
1898. The banking firm Heimann Saul in Posen. 
1899. The banking firm C. W. Quilitz in Landsberg a. d. W. 
1905. The  banking  firm  Ostdeutsche  Bank,  formerly  J.  Simon 
Wwe.  &  Sohne  in Konigsberg  (share  capital  ~o,ooo,mo 
marks)  which  in turn had  absorbed  the banking firms J. 
Simon  Wwe.  & Sohne in Konigsberg  in Prussia,  and M. 
Friedlander  in Bromberg, and had  two  branches,  one in 
Tilsit and one in Danzig. 
1906.  The  Bromberger  Bank  fur  Handel  und  Gewerbe  (capital 
2,000,000 marks), founded by the Ostdeutsche Bank  The 
former took over the Bromberg branch of  the Ostdeutsche 
Bank and absorbed the following firms: 
1901. Franz Lietz in Inowrazlaw. 
1908. Hermann Kiister in Stolp i. P. 
3. Since 1903 with  the  Deutsche Nationalbank,  stock company en com- 
mandite (formerly the Nordwestdeutsche Bank, stock  company en comman- 
dite, in Bremen).  Share capital, 33,000,ooo marks.  This bank has- 
Eight branches, viz, in Bremen, Bremerhaven, Dortmund, Lehe, Minden, 
Miilheim-on-the-Ruhr, Oldenburg, and Osnabruck. 
Eleven deposit offices, viz, in  Bremen-Neustadt,  Blumenthal  in  Han- 
nover, Cloppenburg, Delmenhorst, Hohenkirchen, Jever, Liibbecke, Norden- 
ham, Rinteln, Vechta, and Vegesack. 
It  absorbed the following banking houses and banks: 
1901.  Georg C.  Mecke & Co.  in Bremen. 
1905. 'The  Vegesacker Bank Schild & Co. in Vegesack, near Bremen, 
with branch in Blumenthal (Hanover). 
1905.  The Oldenburger Bank  (share capital 2,000,000 marks) with 
6  branches  in  Atens-Nordenham,  Cloppenburg,  Delmen- 
horst, Hohenkirchen, Jever, and Vechta. 
1906.  The  Deutsche  Nationalbank  in  Bremen  (share  capital 
1,5m,ooo  mark^).^ 
1906.  The  Mindener  Bankverein  (share  capital 4,500,000  marks), 
with 2 branches in Liibbecke and Rinteln. 
1906. The Leher Bankverein Bischoff & Co. in Lehe. 
1908.  Gerh. Muhlenbeck in hfulheim-on-the-Ruhr. 
4.  Since  1905 with  the Bayerische Bank fzir Haqzdel und Industrie (for- 
merly Bayerische Bank) in Munich (share capital 8,000,ooo  mark^).^ 
This bank has- 
Four branches, viz, in Bamberg, Fiirth, h'uremberg, and Wurzburg. 
One exchange office (\i7echselstube) in Nuremberg. 
The bank has absorbed the following houses: 
1905.  The banking firm Gutleben & Weidert in Munich. 
1907. The banking firm Erdmann & Frankenau in Nuremberg. 
1908. The banking firm Gerh. Miihlenbeck in Rlulheim-on-the-Ruhr. 
The Darmstadter Bank is represented by three members of  its managing 
board  on the supervisory board  of  the Bayerische Bank fur Handel und 
Industrie. 
Since 1904 the Bank fur Handel z~nd  Industrie has maintained  contrac- 
tual business  connections with  the  Vereinsbank  in  U'ismar,  which  took 
over the former  deposit  office  of  the Bank fur Handel und  Industrie in 
Rostock (share capital 1,500,ooo marks, with 59 agencies in hlecklenburg); 
likewise  since  1902 with  the  E'echselstubcn-Aktiengesellsclzaft  Il.lerkur in 
Vienna  (share capital in 1908, 20,000,000 kronen, with 9 branches), which 
took over the clientele of  the former commandite of  the bank (Dutschka & 
Co.).  The former is represented  on the supervisory board of  the Vienna 
institution by two members of  its managing board. 
[Founded in 1856.1 
Capital en commandite, I ~o,mo,ooo  marks. 
Surplus (in round figures), 34,500,000 marks, equal to 31.63 per cent of 
the share capital. 
Branches.-None. 
Conzmandites.-None. 
Deposit offices.-None. National  Monetary  Commission  The German Great Banks 
Has absorbed- 
1901. The banking firm  Breest & Gelpcke in Berlin, which in 1891 
had  taken over the Internationale Bank (capital 40,000,000 
marks). 
Participated  in the founding of  the following subsidiary 
companies (Tochtergesellschaften) 
1872. The  Schweizerischer  Bankverein  in  Basle  (share  capital 
50,000,ooo francs). 
1889.  The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. 
1894. The Banca Commerciale Italiana in Milan. 
1898. The Banque Internationale de Bruxelles, Brussels. 
1904-5.  The  Banca  Marmorosch  Blank & Co.,  Societate anonima 
in  Bucharest  (jointly  wit11  the  Bank  fur  Handel  und 
Industrie). 
[Founded in 1870.1 
Share capital, 85,000,ooo marks. 
Surplus, 12,8o1,5jj marks. 
Branches.-Three,  viz, in Berlin, Hannover, and Kiel. 
Deposit offices.-Fifty-four,  viz,  10 in Hamburg,  I  each in Wandsbeck 
and Altona-Ottensen, 29 in Berlin,  2  each in Charlottenburg  and Schone- 
berg,  I  each  in ~'ilmersdorf,  Friedenau,  Rixdorf,  Weissensee,  Halensee, 
Neurnunster, Potsdam, Spandau, and Bberswalde. 
Commandztes.-Two,  viz, J. Dreyfuss  & Co.  in Frankfort  on-the-Main, 
S. Kaufmann & Co. in Berlin. 
The Cornmerz-  und Disconto-Bank has absorbed the following institutions: 
1904-5.  The  Berliner  Bank  in  Berlin  (share  capital  42,000,000 
marks). 
This bank had 14 deposit offices, viz, Berlin, g; Char- 
lottenburg,  I, Schoneberg,  I; Spandau,  I, Eberswalde, 
I; Neustrelitz, I Xon~mandites,  I (S. Kaufn~ann  & Co. 
in Berlin). 
It had absorbed- 
1889. The Berliner Handelshank, E.- G. in Berlin. 
1889. The banking firm A.  Russ jun.  in Berlin. 
1907.  The banking firm B. Magnus in Hanover. 
The Commerz- und Disconto-Bank founded as its sub- 
sidiary company (Tochtergesellschaft) : 
1905. Jointly with  the Disconto-Gesellschaft, the 
Revisions-  und  VermogensvemaLtu~zgs- 
Aktiengesellsclzaft,  Berlin  (share  capital 
~,ooo,ooo  marks), with  4  branches  in 
Hamburg, Hof, Leipzig, and Munich. 
Since 1872 it maintains a  community of interestg through share owner- 
ship (19,302 shares, at £10 paid in, £193,020) with the London and Han- 
seatic Bank, Ltd., in London (total capital is made up of  40,000 shares). 
Since  1904 it has maintained  friendly  relations  with  the  Kredit- und 
Sfiarbank  in  Leipzig  (share  capital  10,350,000 marks)  which  had  ab- 
sorbed- 
1888.  The Kredit- und Sparbankverein in Leipzig. 
1897.  The banking  firm  Franz H.  Moschlers Solzne  in Altenburg 
and had a commandite interest in the banking firm Schirmer 
& Schlick (in liquidation)  in Leipzig. 
IV. DEUTSCHE  BANK  IN  BERLIN. 
[Pounded in 1870.1 
Share capital, zoo,ooo,ooo marks. 
Surplus (in round figures),  102,ooo,ooo marks. 
Branches.-Nine,  viz, Brcrncn since 1871  ; Hamburg, since 1872; London, 
since  1873; Frankfort on-the-Main, since  1886, when  the Deutsche  Bank 
took over the assets and liabilities of  the Franhfurter Banhverein;  Munich, 
since  I 889 ;l0 Leipzig  and  Dresden,  since  1900;  Nuremberg,  since  I 905 ; 
and Constantinople, since 1909. 
Commandites.-Two,  viz, Rosenfeld & Co., Vienna, and, since 1905, G. E. 
Heydemann in Bautzen with branches in 1,iibau and Zittau. l1 
Deposit  ofices,  Seventy-seven,  viz,  Berlin,  27;  Charlottenburg,  6; 
Schoneberg,  2;  Rixdorf,  I, Steglitz, I; Wilmersdorf,  2; I  each in Friede- 
nau, Weissensee, Spandau, Wiesbaden,  Deuben,  Meissen,  and Augsburg; 
Hamburg, 14; Leipzig,  7. Dresden, 9; Munich,  I. 
The Deutsche Bank founded or took part in the founding of  the follow- 
ing subsidiary companies (Tochtergesellschaften) .  l2 
1889. The  Ilcutsch-ilsiatische  Bank  (jointly  with  other  domestic 
and foreign concerns).  (See above, p. 983.) 
1890. The Deutsche  TreukandCeseUscltaft in Berlin  (share capital, 
1,500,mo  marks)  (former  firm  name: Deutsch-Amerika- 
nische Treuhand-Gesellschaft). 
1890.  The Deutsche  Uebcrseeische Bank  in  Berlin,  which  took  the 
place of  the Deutsche  Uebersecbank, I'ounded in 1886 (share 
capital  20,000,m  marks.)  (See above, p. 433, sub a.) 
Twenty-two branches,  viz,  in  Santiago de  Chile,  Val- 
paraiso,  Antofagasta,  Concepcion, Iquique, Temuco,  Val- 
divia,  Osorno, and Puerto Montt, in Chile:  Buenos  Aires, 
Bahia Blanca, Cordoba, and Tucuman, in Argentina; Mexico 
City;  Lima,  Callao, Trujillo,  and  Arecluipa,  in  Peru; La 
Paz and Oruro, in Bolivia; Montevideo, in Uruguay; Madrid 
and Barcelona,  in Spain; Guayaquil, in Ecuador. 
1894.  The Banca Commerciale Italiana in Milan  (jointly with other 
domestic and foreign concerns).  (See above, p. 983.) 
Thirty-three branches in Italy. National  Monetary  Commission 
1904-5  The Aktzengesellschaft fur uberseezsche Bauunternehmungen, 
Berlin, wh~ch  operated unt11 1906 under the firm name of 
the Deutsch Ostafrzkanzsche Bank (jo~ntly  a ith nlne other 
German  firms,  includ~ng the  Deutsch Ostafrzkanzsche 
Ha~zdelsgesellschaft)  ,  share  cap~tal, 2,000,000  marks 
(See above, p  438, sub l ) 
1905.  The Zentralamerzka-Bank, Aktzengesellschaft In Berlin (jointly 
wlth the Deutsche  Uberseezsche  Bank, the  banking  house 
Lazard Speyer-Elhssen in Frankfort-on the-Main,  and the 
Sch~uezserzsche Kredztanstalt)  Share  capltal,  ~o,m,ooo 
marks,  of  which  for the time being  25  per  cent  has been 
paid In 
1906  The Mexzkanzsche Bank fur  Handel und Zndustrze (Banco Mexl- 
cano de Comercio 6  Industrta) in Mexlco (jo~ntly  with the 
banking  house  Speyer  & CO in New York),  share capital, 
16,000,000 pesos,  the bank  took  over the buslness  of  the 
Banco Aleman  Transatlantico  in  Mexico,  the  concession 
runs for forty years beg~nn~ng  with March 19, 1897  (See 
above, p  439, sub m ) 
The Deutsche Bank has absorbed the following banks and private bank- 
ing firms l3 
1886  Frankfurter Bankvere~n 
1901  Menz, Blochmann & CO , Dresden 
1905  H  Chr  Schm~dt,  Hamburg 
1906  Buhler & Heymann, hlun~ch  and Augsburg 
Through stock ownerslup, the Deutsche Bmk has communities of  inter- 
est w~th  the follow~ng  banks l4 (for wli~ch  the date of  affiliation  and share 
capital are shown) 
Share capltal 
(marks) 
1897  (I) Bergische Markische Bank, Elberfeld  75, m,  ocO 
(2) Schlesischer Bankvereln, Breslau  30, 000, ooo 
(3) Hannoversche Bank, Hanover  22, 500, 000 
1898  (4)  Oberrhernische  Bank, Llannhelm  ~o,oo~,ooo 
1902  (3) Duisburg-Ruhrorterbank,  Dulsburg  12, m,  000 
1903  (6)  Essener Kreditanstalt, Essen on the Ruhr.  60, ooo, ooo 
1904  (7)  Siegener Bank fur Handel und Gewerbe, Sie- 
gen 1  IL'  4,000, m 
(8) Sachsische Bank, Dresden  30,000,000 
(9)  Essener Bankbere~n,  Essen on the Ruhr  15, 000, ooo 
(10) Oldenburglsche Spar- und Lelhb,lnk, Olden- 
hurg 
(I  I) Prlvatbank zu Gotha 
1905  (12)  Deutsch Ostafrlkanische Bank, Berl~n,  with 
a branch ~n Dar-es-Salam  2  000 000 
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(I) Bergisch Marklsche  Bank, share capital  75,000,000  marks,  has  17 
branches, viz,  Aix la-Chapelle,  Barmen,  Bocholt,  Bonn,  Coblenz, Dussel 
dorf (~n  combination with a deposit office), Duisburg, Hagen, Cologne, Kre- 
feld, Slana-Gladbach, Paderborn, Remscheid, Rheydt, Solingen, St Johann- 
Saarbrucken, Tr~er,  8 deposlt offices, viz, Bad Neuenahr, Bernkastel, Cues, 
Cronenberg,  Dusseldorf-IT  ehrhahn, Goch,  Hilden, Schwelm,  Warburg; 3 
commandites, viz, Huser & CO ,  in Solingen  &lax Gerson  & CO, Ltd , In 
Hamm and Soest, D  Fleck & Scheuer, in Dusseldorf 
It has absorbed the following banks and private bankers 
1895  R  Jacobi,  Cologne  J  H  Bnnk & CO,  Elberfeld, Salomon 
Philipp, Ruhrort 
1898  The  Remscheider  Bank,  Ruhrort  (capital  stock,  z,m,ooo 
marks),  Huser & CO ,  Solingen 
1901  A  & C  Sohmann,  Krefeld, Goldschmidt & CO,  Bonn  In 
the  same  year  the  Bergisch Marklsche  Bank  undertook 
the  liquidation  of  the  firms  Beckerath  &  Heilmann  in 
Krefeld and Rob  Suermondt & CO ~n Aix-la-Chapelle 
1902  Barmer Handelsbank, Barmen 
1904  Paderstein'scher  Bankverein,  Paderborn  und  Warburg 
(share  capital,  5,000,om  marks)  Lalard,  Brach  &  CO 
(Kommanditgesellschaft)  In  St  johann-Saarbrucken, 
Trlerer  Bank, Trier  (share capltal,  2,000,000  marks),  A 
Molenaar  &  CO  (Kommandltgesellschaft  auf  Aktien, 
Krefeld  (share capltal,  1,260,000 markq),  thls bank dele- 
gates two of  its officers to serve on the supervisory board 
of  the  Deutsche  Bank,  and  the Deutsche  Bank  In  turn 
delegates two of  its officers  to serve on the board  of  A 
Molenaar & CO 
(2) The Schlesischer  Bankverein  of  Breslau  (capital  stock,  30,000,000 
marks)  has  13 branches, located  as follows  Beuthen  (in Silesia),  Glatz, 
Gleiwitz,  Glogau,  Gorlltz,  Hlrschberg  (in  Silesia),  Konigshutte,  Leob- 
schutz,  Liegnitz,  Neisse,  Rybnik  (in  Upper  Silesia),  and  Sprottau and 
Waldenburg (~n  Lower Silesia)  Two deposlt offices, both In Breslau, and 
three commandites, Georg Fromberg & CO,  Berlin,  Richard Vogt & CO, 
Frankenstein (Silesia), and Hugo Scherzer (Schweidnitz)  It absorbed in 
1905 the Hirschberg branch of  the banklng house  Abraham  Schlesinger, 
and in 1906 the banking firm Gebruder Herzberg, Breslau 
At the close of  1905  ~t established  friendly  relations  wlth  the Ober- 
schleslscher Credit-Verein of  Ratibor, and the N~ederlausltzer  Kredit- und 
Sparbank at Kottbus  It  has a branch in Guben and an agency in Weiss- 
wasser  0 -L  The  latter  has  absorbed  the banking  house  of  Wilhelm 
Wllke In Guben, and earller the Kattowitzer Bankvereln  The Schlesischer 
Bankvereln 1s represented on the supervisory board of  the Deutsche Bank 
by a member of  its own executive board  The Deutsche Bank delegates National  Monetary  Commission 
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two  of  its executive  officers to the supervisory board of  the Schlesischer 
Bankverein. 
(3)  The ~annoversche  Bank, Hanover (capital stock, 22,5m,000 marks), 
has 5 branches, located as follows: Cellc, Han~eln,  Harburg a. E., Luneburg, 
and Verden; 2 deposit offices-one  at  1,inden ancl the other in Stade.  Com- 
mandites, none.15 
The Hannoversche Bank absorbed in 1906 the banking firm of  A.  Leh- 
mann inverden.  Jointly with tlie Hildesheimer Bank and the Osnabrucker 
Bank it established a subsidiary, the Braunscliweiger Privatbank, A.-C., 
with an authorized  capital stock of  6,000,ooo tnarks, of  w11ich  3,000,m 
is paid in.  This was fornlerly the banking firm of  Ludwig Peters Each- 
folger  of  Brunswick,  commandite  of  the Hildesheirner  Bank,  and was 
transformed in 1905 under its present name. 
Through  stock  ownership  it has communities of  interest with  the (a) 
Osnabriicker Bank and (6) the Hildesheimer Bank. 
(a)  The  Osnabrucker  Bank,  in  Osnabriick  (share  capital  14,500,ooo 
marks), which has also founded the Quakenbrucker Bank, has I I branches, 
located as follows: Aurich, Emden, Bsens, Herford, Leer, Lingen, Meppen, 
Munster, Norden, Salzuflen, Weener.  It has 13 agencies and has absorbed 
the following: 
1905.  The Ostfrz'csische Bank,  in Leer  and Weener;  capital stock, 
3,000,000 marks.  This institution has been  retained as a 
branch bank of  the Osnabrucker Hank under its former name 
and in 1907 absorbed the banking firm of  R. Van Hoorn, of 
Leer in Ostfriesland. 
-  Marcus  D. Ganz, a  banking  firm in Herford  which has been 
continued as a branch of the Osnabriicker  Bank  under  the 
nanie of  the Herforder Bank. 
1906.  Harlingerlandische  Bauk  Eyben,  Rode &  Jansen,  in Esens 
(Ostfriesland). 
1907. The Emder Bank, Emden (with a branch in \lreener); capital 
stock,  I,OOO,Q~O  marks.  Car1  Krecke, in  Salzuflen. 
1908.  The  Volksbank  Arenberg-Meppen  and  the  banking  firm 
Langscllmidt & Sohn, Lingen. 
(b)  The  Hildesheilner  Bank,  in  Hildesheim  (capital  stock,  8,mo,ooo 
marks), has two branches (one in Gottingen and one in Goslar), two deposit 
offices (Harzburg, Iangspringe), and 3 commandites, Joseph Kayser & Co. 
in Einbeck, M.  Falck in Einbeck, and M. Katz in Duderstadt  It  has ab- 
'  sorbed the following: 
1886. M.  Davidsohn, Hildesheim. 
1886. Schiff & Traube, Hildesheim. 
1905.  Benfey & Co., Gottingen. 
The Deutsche  Bank  is  represented  on  the  supervisory  board  of  the 
Hannoversche Bank. 
(4) The Oberrheinische  Bank  (formerly  Koster  &  Co.)  in Mannheim 
which  was  merged  in  1904  with  the Rheinische Kreditbank.  It  had g 
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branches,  located  as  follows: Heidelberg,  Karlsruhe,  Freiburg  i.  B., 
Rastatt, Bruchsal, Tinden-Baden, Strassburg i. E., hfulhausen i. E., Basle. 
It had a deposit ofice in Ludwigshafen; z commandites, in Baden-Baden 
and Rastatt, and had absorbed the following banking firms: 
1883.  Kostcr & Co., Mannheim. 
1896. C. Schwarzmann, Stmssburg. 
1898. Christian hlez, 1:leiburg;  R. Nicolai & Co., Baden-Baden arid 
Rastatt; F. S. Meyer, Baden-Baden. 
1903. Ed. Koelle, Karlsruhe. 
Through ownership of  stock the Oberrheinische Bank and the Deutsche 
Bank had a community of  interest with the Sz~ddeutsche  Dank, in hlannheini. 
(5)  The  Duisburg-Rulirorter  Bank,  in  Duisburgl"capital  stock, 
12,ooo,ooo marks) has 4  branches.  In  Diisseldorf  it had a  branch since 
1897  under  the  name of  the  Niederrheinische  Bank,  Zweiganstalt  der 
Duisburg-Ruhrorter  Bank.  The other  branch was established  by taking 
over the Hornberger Volksbank, with offices in Oberhausen and Ruhrort. 
(6) The  Bssener  Kreditanstalt  in  Essen-on-the-Ruhr  (capital  stock, 
60,000,000 marks) has 16 branches, located as follows: Bocholt,  Bochum, 
Dortmund, Duisburg, Duisburg-Ruhrort, Gelsenkirchen, Iserlohn, Mulheim 
(Ruhr), Munster i.  W., Oberhausen, Recklinghauscn,  and  it'esel.  Eight 
agencies, as follows: Altenessen, Dorsten, Hamborn, Herne i.  \V.,  Homberg, 
Schalke,  Witten,  \Vanne.  Three  command+es, viz,  Ernst  Osthaus  in 
Hagen,  C.  Basse in Liidenscheid, and J. A.  Holling in Buer. 
It  has absorbed the following: 
1895.  Levi Hirschland, Essen. 
I 902.  Kreditbank, Recklinghausen. 
1903. S. Hanf, Witten. 
1905. The Iserlohner Volksbank (capital stock, ~,ooo,ooo  marks). 
1905.  Poppe & Schtnoelder, 1Vesel. 
1906. The  Westfalischer  Bankverein  (capital  stock,  8,ooo,000 
marks), Munster (with a branch in Bocholt). 
1908. Albert Heinrich Rost, Munster. 
1909.  The Duisburg-Ruhrorter  Bank, Duisburg. 
(7)  The Siegener Bank fur Handel und Gewerbe in Siegen i. W. (capital 
stock, 4,000,000 marks).  The Deutsche Bank is represented on its super- 
visory board. 
(8)  The Sachsische  Bank,  Dresden  (capital stock,  30,000,ooo  marks), 
has 8 branches, located as follows: Annaberg, Chemnitz, Leipzig, Meerane, 
Plauen i. V., Reichenbach i. V., Zittau, and Zwickau. 
(9)  The  Essener  Bankverein  of  Essen - on - the -Ruhr  (capital  stock 
15,000,ooo marks), grew out in 1899 of  the banking firm Rebling & Rehn. 
It has 3 branches, viz, Borbeck, Bottrop i. W., and Oberhausen; 2 deposit 
offices (Altenessen and Essen-Ruttenscheid), and I commandite, the bank- 
ing house Ferdinand Klostcrmann in Hattingen. 
The  Deutsche  Bank  is  represented  on  the  supervisory  board  of  the 
Essener Bankverein. National  Monetary  Commission 
(10) The Oldenburgische  Spar- und  Leihbankl'  in Oldenburg  (capital 
stock, 4,000,000 marks) has 6  branches, viz, Brake,  Delmenhorst,  Jever, 
Lohne,  Nordenham,  Varel,  Wilhelmshaven,  and  I  deposit  office  at 
Ovelgonne. 
(I  I) The  Privatbank zu Gotha (capital stock, ~o,ooo,mo  marks) has 3 
branches-erfurt,  Leipzig,  and Weimar.  The  Deutsche  Bank  is repre- 
sented on its supervisory board. 
(12) The  Deutsch-Ostafrikanische  Bank  in  Berlin  has  a  branch  in 
Dar-es-Salam. 
The Deutsche Bank is united with (a) the 1\Iecklenburgisclze Hypotheken- 
und  Wechselbank  and (b)  the Rheinische Kredztbank  in a  community  of 
interest, based  on  agreements  and  exchange  of  representatives  on  the 
supervisory boards. 
(a)  Since 1897 it has been allied with the Mecklenburgische Hypotheken- 
und  Wechselbank  in Schwerin18 (capital stock,  9,000,ooo marks).  This 
institution has a branch in Gustrow and 63  agencies  (62 in Mecklenburg 
and I in Ratzeburg).  Through ownership of  stock it has a community of 
interest  with  the  Mecklenburgische Sfiarbanh  (capital  stock,  3,000,000 
marks), with a branch in Rostock, an office in Schoneberg, and 79 agencies 
in Mecklenburg.  The Deutsche Bank  has, moreover, a direct interest in 
the Mecklenburgische Sparbank.  The latter has an interest in the Meck- 
lenburgische Treuhandgesellschaft m. b. H. in Schwerin. 
The Mecklenburgische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank delegates one of 
its officers to represent it on the supervisory board of  the Deutsche Bank, 
and the latter delegates one of  its executive officers to serve on the board 
of  the Mecklenburgische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank. 
(b)  The community of  interest with the Rheinische Kreditbank in Mann- 
heim  (capital stock, 75,o00,800 marks)  dates from  1904.  This bank has 
13 branches, located as follows: Baden-Baden, Freiburg i. B., Heidelberg, 
Kaiserslautern, Karlsruhe, Konstanz, Lahr i. B., Muhlhausen i. E., Offen- 
burg,  Pforzheim,  Speyer,  Strassburg i.  E.,  and Zweibrucken.  It has 3 
deposit offices (I in Bruchsal and 2 in Mannheim).  Since the absorption of 
the Oberrheinische  Bank it has two agencies-I  in Neunkirchen  (district 
of Trier) and  I  in Rastatt; 2  commandites:  G. F. Groh6-Henrich  & Co. 
in Saarbriicken and B. Burger & Co. in Wolfach. 
It has absorbed the following banks and banking firms: 
187 I. Joseph Sautier, Freiburg i. B. 
1874. Pfalzer  Bankverein,  Mannheim;  Gebriider  Zimmermann, 
Heidelberg. 
1897. G. Miiller & Kons., Karlsruhe and Baden-Baden, Franz Funck  ,  . 
(formerly Gebruder Wolff), Baden-Baden. 
1898. The Kaiserslauterer  Bank, formerly Biicking, Karcher & Co. 
1899.  The Ortenauer Kreditbank, Offenburg. 
1899. Kaufmann, Engelhorn  & Co., bank commandite,  Strassburg 
i.  E.; Ed.  Strohmeyer, Baden-Baden;  the Lahrer  Kredit- 
bank, Karl Bader & Co. 
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1901. The Mannheimer Bank, A.-G. (capital stock, 6,wo,ooomarks). 
1903. Gebriider Kapferer, Freiburg i. B. 
1904. The Kredit- und  Depositenbank, Zweibrucken (capital stock, 
q,ooo,ooo marks). 
1905. The Oberrheinische  Bank (capital  stock, 20,000,000 marks). 
with its branches, deposit office, commandites, and commu- 
nities of interest as given on page 990, KO.  4. 
1906. A.  Sulzberger, Konstanz; Julius  Kahn & Co., Pforzheim (for- 
merly  the commandite  of  the IITiirttembergische  Vereins- 
hank). 
1907.  The Gewerbebank, Speyer. 
Through stock ownership the Rheinische Kreditbank has been united in 
a community of  interest since 1901, with the newly organized Mannheimr 
Bank (capital stock, ~,ooo,ooo  marks) and since 1904 with the Sziddcutsche 
Bank  in Mannheim  (capital stock,  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks),  with  a  branch in 
Worms.  This community of  interest, however, it shares with the Deutsche 
Bank, both banks being  represented on the supervisory board of  the Siid- 
deutsche Bank. 
The Rheinische Kreditbank elects two of  its officers to serve on the super- 
visory board of the Deutsche Bank, and the latter delegates two members 
of  its executive staff to serve on the supervisory board of  the Rheinische 
Kreditbank. 
Finally the Deutsche Bank maintains friendly relations with the follow- 
ing institutions: 
(a) The Anhalt-Dessauische Landesbank, of  Dessau.  This bank  has 6 
branches, located  as follows: Ballenstedt,  Finsterwalde,  Kothen, Torgau, 
Wittenberg,  Zerbst,  and  6  deposit  offices (Coswig,  Dahme,  Jessnitz, 
Kirchhain N.-L.,  Raguhn, and Rosslau in Anhalt).  It has abandoned its 
Berlin branch.  In 1908 it took over the Raguhner Gewerbebank, and the 
deposit office in Jessnitz of  the banking firm Paul Schauseil & Co. of  Halle. 
(b)  The Braunschweiger Privatbank, of  Brunswick.  It  has deposit offices 
in Wolfenbuttel and in Braunschweig (the latter took the place of  the bank- 
ing house Louis Bremer & Co., of  Brunswick, absorbed by the Braun~chwei~er 
Privatbank in 1909). 
(c)  The Braunschweigische Bank und Kreditanstalt, of  Brunswick.  It  has 
3  deposit  offices, viz,  Goslar,  Blankenburg,  and  Oschersleben,  and  8 
commandites. 
It  absorbed in 1908 the Blankenburger Bank and the banking firm C. 
Uhl  & Co. in Brunswick, and in 1909 the firm  F. Heine, of  Oschersleben, 
transforming the latter into a deposit office. 
(d) The Chenznitzer  Bankverein, of  Chemnit7, mith  its branches and  3 
agencies. 
(e) The  Danziger  Privat-Aktienbank  in  Danzig,  with  3  branches,  6 
deposit offices, 7 agencies, and 2 commandites. 
In 1900 it absorbed the banking firm Ernst Poschmann in Danzig. National  Monetary  Commission 
(f) The Nordde?~tsche  Kreditanstalt in  Kdr~igsberg  (Prussia); capital stock, 
15,000,ooo marks.  It  has a branch in Danzig (which has deposit offices in 
Langfuhr,  Oliva,  and  Zoppot),  Posen  (with deposit  ofice),  and Stettin 
(with  deposit  office); deposit offices in Konigsberg, Bri~sen  i. W., Elbing, 
Insterburg, Thorn, Culmsee, Gumbinnen, Kolberg, and Tiegenhof, besides a 
number of  agencies. 
(g) The hlagdeburger Privatbank, hIagdeburg (for details, see p. 630). 
(h)  The Bayerische Handelsbank, Munich (for details, see p. 632). 
(i) The Bayerische  Vereinsbank, Munich (for details, see p.  632). 
(j) The Commerzbank, Liibeck. 
(k) The Lubecker Privatbank, Liibeck. 
(l) The Deutsclze  Vereinsbank, Frankfort-on-the-Main.  This bank  ah- 
sorbed in 1908 the firm Gebriider Schuster, of  the same city. 
(Direktion der Disconto-Gesellschaft, Berlin.) 
[Founded 1851  (present organization since 1856).] 
Share capital, 170,000,000  marks. 
Surplus, 57,592,611 marks, equal to 33.88 per cent of  its share capital. 
Branches.-Four,  located  as follows: London, 1900;  Frankfort-on-the- 
Main,  1901; Bremen,  1903;  and Mainz,  1909. 
Commandites.--One,  Brnesto Tornquist & Co., Buenos Ayres, since 1889. 
Deposit offices (dating from  r895).Sixteen, of  which I I are in Berlin, 3 
in Charlottenhurg,  I in Friedenau, and I in Wiesbaden. 
It has established or participated  in the establishr~~ent  of  the following 
subsidiary companies:lg 
1880. The Deutsche  Handels-  und  Pla?~tagc~zgcscllschaft  der  Sudsec- 
inseln, Hamburg, capital stock, z,75o,ooo marks (a reorgan- 
ized company). 
1883-86.  The  Neu-Guinea-Kompagnie,  capital  stock,  6,000,000 
marks. 
1887. The Brasilianische  Bank fur  Deutschland, Hamburg  (capital 
stock,  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks,  jointly  with  the  Norddeutsche 
Bank).  The institution has 5 branches, located as follows: 
Rio de Janeiro, SBo Paulo, Santos, Porto Allegre, and Bahia. 
1889. The Deutsch-Asiatische Ba,nk, Shanghai.  It  was organized by 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft jointly with German and foreign 
concerns,  and  has  a  paid-up  capital  stock  of  7,500,000 
Shanghai  taels.  It has  12  branches, located  as follows: 
Berlin, Hamburg, Tientsin, Tsingtau, Hankow, Hongkong, 
Calcutta, Tsinanfu, Peking, Yokohama, Kobe (Japan), and 
Singapore. 
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1894. The  Bnnca  Commerciale  Italians,  Milan,  capital  stock, 
105,000,ooo lire (jointly with German and foreign banking 
firms)-33  branches in Italy. 
1895.  The Bank fur  Chile und DeutsctUand,  Hamburg, capital stock 
~o,ooo,ooo  marks, of  which 25  per cent or 2,j00,000 marks 
has been paid in (jointly with the Norddeutsche Bank).  It 
has g branches, located  as follows:  Valparaiso, Santiago, 
Concepcion, Temuco, Antofagasta, Victoria, and Valdivia, 
in Chile, and La Paz and Oruro in Bolivia. 
1897. The  Banca  Generala  Romana,  Bucharest,  capital  stock, 
~o,ooo,ooo  lei.  It has 2 branches, in Braila and Grajova, 
and an agency in Constantza. 
1898. The Ranque Internutionale de Bruxelles, capital stock, 25,000,000 
francs.  (See p. 442,  letter h.) 
1900.  The Compagnie Commerckle Belge, anciennement H. Albert de 
Bary  &  Co.,  Societe  anonyme  B  Anvers,  capital  stock, 
5,000,ooo francs. 
1905.  The Bayerische Disconto- und Wechselbank,  Nuremberg, capital 
stock, 12,000,000  marks (jointly with the Bayerische Hypo- 
theken- und Wechselbank, Munich). 
This bank has 15 branches, located in Augsburg,  Bam- 
berg,  Bayreuth,  Hersbruck,  Hof,  Kempten,  Kitzingen, 
Kulmbach,  Lauf,  Regensburg,  Roth  i.  B.,  Schwabach, 
Schweinfurt, Uffenheim, and Wiirzburg;  4  deposit  offices, 
in  Neumark  (Oberpfalz),  Pfaffenhofen-on-the-Iler,  Roth- 
enburg-on-the-Tauber, and Weissenburg. 
It  has absorbed the following banking firms: 
1905.  G  J.  Gutmann,  Nuremberg;  P.  C.  Bonnet, 
Augsburg;  Friedrich  Giinthert,  Wiirzburg; 
Jonas Nordschilds Nachf., Schweinfurt ; Con- 
rad Arnold, Lauf  and Hersbruck. 
1906.  Klunk  & Gerber,  Hof;  Jos.  S. Schmid, Bam- 
berg; Max  Feichtmeyer, Regensburg;  Fried- 
rich  Grieninger  &  Sohn,  LTfTenheim and 
Rothenhurg;  M.  Oettinger Siihne, Neumarkt 
(Oberpfalz). 
1907. Julius  Leisser,  Wiirzburg;  S.  Schwabacher 
Nachf., Bayreuth and Kulmbach. 
1908. G. W. Loos, Weissenburg; Hans Schmitt, Bam- 
berg;  Siegmund Edenfeld, Wiirzburg; Abrell 
&  Deffner,  Kempten;  Jonas  Nordschild, 
Scllweinfurt-on-the-Main. 
1909.  August  Ahammer  & Co.,  Weissenburg  a.  D.; 
merged with  the bank's  deposit office at the 
same town. National  Monetary  Commission 
~go~.  The Revisions-  und  Vermogensverwaltungs-AktknGesellschaft 
(Audit  and Trust  Company)-name  changed  in  1909  to 
"Revision,"  Treuhand-A  ktiengesellschajt,  Berlin.  Capital 
stock, I ,ooo,ooo  marks, increased to 2,000,000  in 1909.  The 
institution  has  3  branches  (Cologne,  Dresden,  Leipzig,) 
jointly  with  the  Commerz-  und  Disconto -Bank.  The 
former  branch  at Munich  was  in 1907  made  a  separate 
institution with  a capital stock of  400,000 marks under the 
name of  the  Bayerische  Rewiswns-  und  Vermogenszemal- 
tungs-A  ktiengesellschaft. 
1905.  The Bank  fur  Thuringen, formerly  B.  M. Strupp A.G.,  in 
Meiningen;  capital  stock,  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks,  of  which 
7,500,000  marks  is paid  in.  This bank  was  established 
jointly with the former banking house of  B. M. Strupp, the 
Alitteldeutsche  Kreditbank,  and  the  Allgemeine  Deutsche 
Kreditanstalt.  It has  12  branches,  located  as  follows: 
Apolda,  Eisenach,  Frankenhausen 'a.  Kyffhauser,  Gotha, 
Hildburghausen,  Jena,  Neustadt  on the  Orla,  Possneck, 
Ruhla,  Saalfeld, Salzungen, and Sonneberg.  It has  ab- 
sorbed the following firms: 
1905.  B. M. Strupp, Meiningen, with branch offices in 
Gotha,  Hildburghausen,  Salzungen,  Ruhla, 
and Jena. 
1906.  Hermann  Lobe,  Meiningen;  the  Meiningen 
branch of  the Mitteldeutsche  Kreditbank; J. G. 
Bohme  & Sohn, Apolda; Richard  Eberlein, 
Possneck. 
1907. Severus Ziegler, Eisenach;  Nikol. Martin Scheler 
& Sohn, Saalfeld. 
1909  The Bankverein Frankenhausen. 
1906.  The Deutsch-Afrika Bank, capital stock r,ooo,ooo marks.  It 
has branches in  Swakopmund, Windhuk, and Liideritzbucht, 
and an agency in Santa Cruz. 
1906.  The Banque de  Cridit (Kreditna Banka), Sofia, capital stock 
3,000,000 gold leva  (francs), of  which  1,000,~  gold leva 
has been paid in, jointly with S.  Bleichroder and the Nord- 
deutsche Bank. 
. The  Stahl  &  Federer  Aktiengesellschuft,  Stuttgart, capital 
stock  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks.  It  has  3  branches,  located  in 
Heilbronn,  Reutlingen,  and Pfullingen.  It has absorbed 
the following firms: 
1907. I. Gumbel, Markt  in Heilbronn;  Emil Ruoff, 
Reutlingen. 
1908. Johannes Rieger, Pfullingen. 
It has  a  community of  interest with  the Gewerbebank 
in Ulm. 
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The Disconto-Gesellschaft  has absorbed the following firms: 
1904. J. Schultze & Wolde, Bremen. 
1906.  Eugen Schlieper &Co., Berlin;  Gebr. Neustadt, Frankfort-on- 
the-Main. 
1907-8.  Meyer Cohn, Berlin. 
1909.  Bamberger  &  Co.,  Mainz.  This  firm  had  on  November, 
1908, absorbed the firm Gebruder Oppenlieim, of  Mainz. 
Through stock ownership, the Disconto-Gesellschaft  has been united in 
a community of  interest with the following institutions: 
1895. Norddeutsche Bank, Hamburg. 
1901. Allgemeine Deutsche Kreditanstalt, Leipzig. 
1904. Barmer Bankverein, Hinsberg, Fischer & Co., Barmen. 
1904-5.  Siiddeutsche  Disconto-Gesellschaft,  Mannheim; 
Geestemiinder Bank, Geestmiinde. 
I. The Norddeutsche Bank,  Hamburg, capital stock 5o,oco,ooo  marks, cash 
contributions  of  "complementary"  partners (Komplementare)  1,200,000 
marks, ordinary surplus 5,120,000 marks, special reserves 6,235,m  marks. 
It  has I branch in  Altona;  6 deposit (giro) offices, 5 of  which are in Ham- 
burg and I in Harburg;  and I  commandite,  Ephraim Meyer & Sohn in 
Hanover.  It absorbed in 1904 the banking  firm of  W.  S. Warburg, in 
Altona. 
z. The  Allgemeine Deutsche Kreditanstalt, Leipzig; capital stock, 90,000,ooo 
marks; surplus, 37,850~75  I  marks.  It has z I  branches, located as  follows: 
Altenburg,  Annaberg,  Bautzen, Bernburg,  Chemnitz,  Dresden,  Freiberg, 
Gera, Glauchau, Greiz, Grimma, Leopoldshall,  Limbach in Saxony, Mark- 
ranstadt, Meerane, Oschatz,  Pirna, Riesa,  Schkeuditz,  Schmolln, Zittau, 
and, since 1909, Meuselwitz. 
It  has 15 deposit offices (g in Leipzig and suburbs, 6 in Dresden  and sub- 
urbs), but no commandites.  It  has absorbed the following banks and firms: 
1873. Lingke & Co., Altenburg. 
1901. Becker & Co., Leipzig and Greiz.  Before that time the Dis- 
conto-Gesellschaft had had an interest in this firm. 
1902. C. F. Blaufuss, Gera. 
1903.  Giinther & Rudolph, Dresden. 
1905.  Vereinsbank, Grimma (capital stock,  500,cao  marks); Ernst 
Berndt, Annaberg; C. G. Lochmann, Wwe. & Sohn, Oschatz; 
Kunatli & Nieritz, Chemnitz. 
1907.  Ketzscher & Andreae, Pirna; Bernburger  Bankverein Wich- 
mann & Co., Bernburg and Leopoldshall (Stassfurt); Ferdi- 
nand Heyne, Glauchau;  Ludwig & Co., Freiberg (Saxony). 
Through  stock  ownership  the  Allgenieine  Deutsche  Kreditanstalt  is 
united in a community of  interest with the following banks: 
The Voqtlandische  Bwk, Plauen i. V. (capital stock, 5,500,ooo marks), 
with branches in Auerbach  and Falkenstein  i. V.,  Klingenthal i. S., and 
Reichenbach i. V.; Busse & Co., Berlin; Bayerische Disconto- und Wechsel- 
bank in Nuremberg; Bank fur Thiiringen, formerly B. M. Strupp, Meiningen. National  Monetary  Comrnissiort 
Since  1904-5  the Oberlausitzer Bank, in Zittau (capital stock, 2,700,000 
marks, branch at Neugersdorf),  and the Vereinsbank, in Zwickau (capital 
stock, 4,500,000 marks).  'The  shares of  the Allgemeine Deutsche Kredit- 
anstalt, which had to be given in exchange for the shares of  these institu- 
tions, were obtained primarily from  the holdings  of  the Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft.  On the supervisory board of  the Oberlausitzer Kreditanstalt both 
the Allgemeine Kreditat~stalt  and the Disconto-Gesellschaft are reprcsented. 
3. The Barmer  Bankvereift Hinsberg,  Fischer  & Co.,  Barmen (capital 
stock, 59,836,200 marks), has  17  branches, located  as follows: Bielefeld, 
Cologne, Crefeld, Dortmund, Diisseldorf, Hagen, Hamm, Iserlohn, Lennep, 
Liidenscheid,  Maria-Gladbach,  Ohligs,  Osnabriick,  Remscheid,  Rheydt, 
Soest, and Solingen. 
It  has 5 deposit offices, located as  follows: Barmen-Rittershausen, Hohen- 
limburg, Uerdingen, and 2 in Diisseldorf. 
It  has absorbed the following banks and firms, 
1898. The Gladbacher Bankverein Quack & Co., Maria-Gladbach. 
1900.  Leffmann Stern, Hagen. 
1902.  The Diisseldorfer Bankverein (capital stock, 9,000,000 marks). 
1904. The Dortmunder Bankverein, which had a commandite inter- 
est in the banking house Balcke & Co., and had branches in 
Hamm and Soest. 
1905.  A. W. Dreyer, Wwe., Rielefeld;  Wallach & Emanuel, Iserlohn; 
N.  Blumenfeld,  Osnabriick: The Crefelder Gewerbebank, 
Crefeld (capital stock, 2,000,  IOO marks), the Liidensclleider 
Bank,  formerly Liidenscheider  Volksbank  (capital  stock, 
1,250,000 marks). 
1906.  Albcrt Simon & Co., Kotnmanditgesellschaft, Cologne. 
1907.  The 1,enneper Volksbank, Lennep. 
1908. The Ronner Privatbank, Bonn. 
The Disconto-Gesellschaft  delegates one of  its managing  partners  to 
serve on the supervisory board of  the Barmer Rankverein, and the Barmer 
Bankverein in turn delegates one of  its directors to serve on the supervisory 
board of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
4.  The  Suddeutsche  Disconto-Gesellschaft,  Mannheim  (capital  stock, 
31,250,000 marks), has 4  branches,  located  as follows. Freiburg  i.  Br., 
Lahr  i. B.  Landau,  and  Pforzheim;  I  deposit  office,  in  Heidelberg,  6 
agencies,  in  Annweiler,  Rergzabern,  Edcnkoben,  Germersheim, Miillhcim 
i. B., and Neustadt i. Schw.; and  I  commandite,  viz,  E.  Ladenburg in 
Frankfort on-the-Main. 
It has absorbed the following firms: 
1904-5  \V  H. Ladenburg & Svhne, Mannheim. 
1906.  \Veil  &  Benjamin  (Kommanditgesellschaft),  Mannheim, 
Stosser-Fischer, Lahr; J. M.  Bernion, Landau. 
1908.  Jacob Baer, Bruchsal. 
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The  Disconto-Gesellschaft  is  represented  on  the supervisory  board  of 
the Siiddeutsche Disconto-Gesellschaft, and one of the partners of  the firm 
E.  Ladenburg,  has entered  the supervisory board  of  the Disconto-Gesell- 
schaft. 
Finally, since 1907, the Disconto-Gesellschaft is on friendly terms with 
the  Magdeburger  Dankverein,  of  hlagdeburg  (capital  stock,  15,ooo,ooo 
marks) (see above, p. 629).  This becatne manifest in the election of  a director 
of  the Disconto-Gesellschaft  to a place  on  the  supervisory board  of  the 
Magdeburger Bankverein. 
VI.  DRESDNER  BANK,  DRESDEN. 
[Pounded 1872.1 
Capital, 18o,ooo,ooo marks.  (zoo,ooo,ooo marks since 1910.) 
Surplus, 5 1,500,ooo marks. 
The Dresdner Bank has 27  branches,  located as follows: Altona,  Augs- 
burg, Bautzen, Bremen,  Biickeburg, Kassel, Chemnitz, Detmold, Dresden, 
Emden, Freiburg  i.  B.,  Frankfort-on-the-Main,  Fiirth,  Greiz,  Hamburg, 
Hanover,  Heidelberg,  Leer,  London,  Liibeck,  hfannl~eini,~~  Meissen, 
Munich, Nuremberg,  Plauen i. V., TViesbaden, and Zwickau. 
It  has I commandite, viz., the exchange office (Wechselstube) Bosse, Keil 
& Co.,  Berlin, formerly the commandite of  the Deutsche Genossenschafts- 
bank Sorgel, Parrisius & Co. 
Since 1895 its deposit offices have grown to 57 in number-23  in Berlin, 
2 each in Charlottenburg, Schiineberg, Friedenau, anti Gross-Lichterfelde; 
I each in Pankow, Steglitz, Wilmersdurf, Rixdorf, l'ernpelhof,  and Altona; 
4 in Dresden,  I  in Frankfort-on-the-hlain,  11 in  Hamburg,  I  in  1,indcn 
near Hanover,  2  in Nuremberg, and  I in Wiesbaden.  In 1909 there were 
added branches in EscIlwege and Fulda. 
The Dresdner Bank has cooperated in the establishment of  the follolving 
subsidiaries. 
1889. TheDeutsch-Asiatische Bank (with other firms).  (See p  983.) 
1894. The  Banca  Commerciale  Italiana (with  other  firnms).  (See 
P  983.) 
1904.  The Deutsch-Westafrikanische  Bank  (established  jointly  with 
the  Deutsch-lVestafrihrtische  IIandelsgesellschaft.  (See p. 
457, sub 4.) 
The capital stock of  this company  is  i,ooo,ooo marks. 
The bank is a colonial company, having its ofice in Berlin, 
and branches in  Hamburg, Lome, and Duala.  Its purpose 
is to regulate  the currency circulation and facilitate pay- 
ments both within the German colony of  \Vest Africa, and in 
its relations with foreign countries, and to carry on banking 
in accordance with its charter. 
1904. Speyr & Co., A.-G., Basle (capital stock,  ~g,ooo,wo  francs). National  Monetary  Commission 
~gog.~~  The  Treuhand  Vereinigung,  A.-G.,  Berlin  (capital  stock, 
~,m,ooo  marks),  with a branch in Dresden  and an office 
jointly  with  the  A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  in 
Cologne. 
The  Deutsche  Orientbank,  A.-G.,  Berlin,  capital  stock, 
16,000,ooo marks,  established jointly with the National 
bank fiir Deutschland, see pages 446 and 454. 
1906.  The Deutsch-Sudamerikanische  Bank,  A.-G.,  Berlin, capital 
stock,  20,000,000 marks,  established  jointly  with  the A. 
Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein. 
The Dresdner Bank has absorbed the following banks and 
firms: 
1872. Michael Kaskel, Dresden. 
1873. The Sachsischer Bankverein, capital stock, 5,250,000 
marks. 
1877. The Sachsische  Kreditbank, capital stock, 9,ooo,ooo 
marks. 
1891. R. Thode & Co. 
1892. The Anglo-Deutsche  Bank,  Hamburg, capital stock, 
12,goo,wo marks. 
189j. The Bremer Bank, Bremen, capital stock, 20,000,000 
marks. 
1896. S. E. Wertheimber, Nuremberg and Furth. 
1898. Alexander Simon, Hanover; W. J. Gutmann, Nurem 
berg. 
1899. The Niederachsische Bank, Buckeburg, capital stock, 
6,ooo,ooo marks. 
1904. The Deutsclie Genossenscliaftsbank Sorgel, Parrisius 
& Co., Frankfort  on-the-Main  and Berlin, capital 
stock, 30,000,000 marks. 
Through  stock  ownership  this  bank  had  a 
community of  interest with the Wurttembergische 
Lawdesbank of  Stuttgart,  capital stock, 8,000,ooo 
marks,  with  2  branches  (Ulm  and Heilbronn) 
and I  deposit office (Cannstatt). 
The  Wiirttembergische  Landesbank  had 
absorbed thefollowing firms: 
1899. Breunig & Fischer, Stuttgart. 
1900.  Albert Schmidts Nachfolger, Heil- 
bronn, and had a commandite 
interest  in  the  Wechselstube 
Bosse, Keil & Co., in Berlin. 
In taking over and continuing the business of  the Genos- 
senschaftsbank  (Bank  for  Cooperative  Credit  Societies), 
the Dresdner Bank instituted special cooperative credit de- 
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lin  and Frankfort-on-the-Main in order to minister to the 
business of  the German industrial and agricultural coopera- 
tive societies. 
1904.  Von  Erlanger & Sohne, Frankfort-on-the-Main,  ab- 
sorbed by the Dresdner  Bank jointly with the A. 
Schaaffliauscn'scher  Bankverein.  Through stock 
ownership, this firm had a  community of  interest 
with the following banks:= 
(a) The Oldenburgische Landesbank, Oldenburg, 
capital stock,  3,000,000 marks, of  which  40 per 
cent, or  1,200,000 marks, is paid up.  This bank 
has 7 branches and 43 agencies. 
(b)  The ~lfecklenburgische  Bank, Schwerin, capi- 
tal stock, 5,000,ooo marks, of which 40 per cent, or 
2,000,ooo marks, is paid  in.  It has a branch in 
Neubrandenburg and 54 agencies and has in turn 
a community of  interest with the following banks: 
Rostockcr  Gewerbebank, A.-G.,  Rostock, capital 
stock, 980,000 marks, with 26 agencies. 
Neuvorpommersche Spar- und Kreditbank, A.-G., 
Stralsund, capital stock, ~,ooo,ooo  marks, with  26 
agencies. 
The  Dresdner  Bank  and  the A.  Schaaffhau- 
sen'scher  Bankverein are both represented on the 
supervisory board of  the Mecklenburgische Bank. 
(c) The  Lan,dgraPich - Hessische  konzessionie&e 
Landesbank,  Homburg  v.  d.  H., capital  stock, 
~,ooo,ooo  marks,  with  2 branches (Nauheim  and 
Friedberg). 
(d)  The Schwarzburgische Landesbank, Sonders- 
hausen  (capital stock, 2,500,000 marks,  of  which 
~,ooo,ooo  marks are paid  in),  with  6  branches, 
located as follows: 
Arnstadt,  Ilmenau,  Rudolstadt, Saalfeld, Suhl, 
IVrida. 
Tlle Dresdner Bank and the A.  Schaaffhausen' 
scher Bankverein are represented on the supervis- 
ory board  of  this bank. 
1906. Ed. Kauffmann & Fehr, Freiburgi. B.24;  Ernst Heyde- 
mann, Meissen; C. H. Reinliardt, Bautzen. 
1907. Paul von Steffen, Augsburg. 
1908. M. Kapeller, Munich; Eduard Bauermeister, Zwickau; 
Kahl & Oelschlagel, Dresden, whose business was then 
in process of  liquidation: Mauer & Plaut, Kassel. 
partments with cooperative society advisory councils in Ber- National  Monetary  Commission 
1909. David M.  Kahn, Eschwege;  F. U'allacl-i, Fulda. 
Through  stock  ownership"  the Dresdner  Bank  has  a 
community of  interest with  the  follouing banks since the 
dates given: 
1903.  (I) The  A4arkiscb  Bank,  Bochum,  capital  stock 
9,m,ooo  marks. 
(2)  The Rheinische  Bank, Essen  (formerly Mulheim- 
on-the-Ruhr), capital stock 2 r ,m,ooo  marks.26 
1904.  (3) The Oberschlesische Bank, Beuthen, capital stock, 
2,500,om marks. 
(4) The  It~iirttembergische  Landesbank, Stuttgart,  capi- 
tal stock, 8,000,m marks. 
(5)  The Oldenburgisclze Landesbank, Oldenburg, capi- 
tal stock, 3,000,000 marks, of  which I ,200,000 
marks are paid in. 
(6)  The  Mecklenburgische  Bank, Schwerin, capital 
stock,  5,000,000  marks,  of  which  2,000,000 
marks are paid in. 
(7)  The  Landgraflich IIessische konzessionierte Landes- 
bank  in Homburg  v.  d.  H.,  capital  stock, 
l,ooo,om marks. 
(8)  The Schwarzburgische  Lande~bank,~~  Sondershau- 
sen, capital stock,  2,500,000 marks,  of  which 
~,ooo,ooo  marks are paid in. 
(I) The Markische Bank, Bochum,  has 9 branches,  located as follo~vs: 
Arnsberg,  Beckum,  Castrop,  Dortmund,  Gelsenkircl-ien,  Langendreer, 
Munster i. W.,  Recklinghausen,  and Witten.  It has  2 agencies, in Buer 
and Oelde, and I exchange office at Wanne.  It absorbed in- 
1898. The banking firm Albert Lauffs, Bochum. 
1899. The Herner Bank, Herne, capital stock, ~,m,ooo  marks. 
(2)  The Rheinische Bank, Essen (formerly in Mulheim-on-the-Ruhr), has 
4 branches at  Mulheim, Duisburg, Meiderich, and Dinslaken, and I exchange 
office at Hochfeld.  It  has absorbed the following firms: 
1897. Gust. Hanau, Mulheim-on-the-Ruhr. 
1905. Herm. Thate, Meiderich. 
1906.  Dietrich Schroter, Dinslaken. 
1907. Fr. H. Moeschlers Sohne, Meerane (i. S.). 
The  Dresdner  Bank  is represented  on  the  supervisory  board  of  the 
Rheinische Bank. 
(3) The Oberschlesische Bank, Beuthen, has 2 deposit offices (exchange 
offices), I in Konigshutte and I in Tarnowitz. 
(4)  The Wurttembergische  Landesbank, Stuttgart,  has 2  branches (Ulm 
and Heilbronn) and  I  deposit office (in Kannstadt), had a communityof 
interest with the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank until 1904, and since then 
with the banks formerly affiliated with the banking house von Erlanger & 
Shne  (see p. roor), i. e., with the following: 
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(5) The  Oldenburgische  Landesbank,  Oldenburg,  with  8  branches  and 
43 agencies. 
(6)  The Mecklenburgische  Bank, Schwerin, which has a branch in Neu- 
brandenburg and 50  agencies, and has a community of  interest with the 
(a)  Rostocker Gewerbebank, A.-G., Rostock, capital stock, 2,000,000 marks, 
with 50  agencies,  and  the  (b) Neuvorpommersche  Spar- und Krcditbank, 
Stralsund, capital stock, ~,ooo,ooo  marks, with 26  agencies. 
(7)  Landgraflzch ffessische Konzessionicrte  Landesbank,  Homburg v.  d. 
H., with two branches (Nauheim and Friedberg in Hesse). 
(8)  Schwarzburgische  Landesbank, Sondershausen, with 6 branches. 
Between  1903 and the end of  1908 the Dresdner Bank was united by 
agreement with the A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein in a community of 
interest.  The A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein, of  Cologne, has a capital 
stock of  1q5,mo,ooo marks. 
The contract was in substance as follows: The community of  interest was 
to run from January I, 1904, for thirty years.  The two companies were not 
merged,  but the business of  both was conducted  jointly,  the net profits 
were pooled, and then divided in proportion to the capital stock of  each, 
including surplus funds as shown by the balance sheets.  Only such sums 
as had heen  permanently put into the surplus were  to be counted-i.  e., 
amounts definitely  set aside as surplus, and not funds set aside to cover 
particular risks. 
The annual profits  were pooled  under the following conditions:  Each 
company was to keep its own profit-and-loss account, regardless of  its com- 
munity of  interest.  From  the gross profits each  bank was to deduct first 
all the general expenses and the amounts required to be written off  or set 
aside for surplus funds by statute or by the by-laws, and then the amounts 
of  compensation shown by the books as  due to the general managerial staff, 
the managers of  the branches, to other officials and members of  the super- 
visory board, the bonuses to employees, and a suitable amount for deprecia- 
tion on bank buildings.  The remaining net profits were to go into a com- 
mon fund, to be divided on the basis indicated  above.  After  the share 
of  the profits due to each bank had been determined, each institution was 
to prepare independently its own final  balance sheet and profit-and-loss 
account, in accordance with statute and its by-laws. 
Whatever amount one bank  niight have to pay to the other was to be 
entered  as profit or loss in the profit-and-loss account of  either bank, de- 
creasing by so much the amount of  net profits of  the bank making payment, 
and increasing by so much the net profits of  the bank receiving payment. 
The computation of  the actual allowances (Tantiemen) to the members 
of  the managerial staff and of  the supervisory board were thus to be based 
not on the amounts shown by the provisional profit-and-loss statement, but 
on the final determination of  net profits. 
The pooling applied only to the annual profits, but not to losses.  In this 
case  the accounts  of  either  company  showed  a  net loss for  the year, 
loss, unless  made  up by the share in the profits of  the other company, National  Monetary  Commission 
was to be  covered from its surplus or in some other manner, in order that 
the net profits  of  the following year  might not be reduced  by any losses 
carried over from the preceding  year's account.  In order to insure unity 
of management and the pursuance of  a cominon policy, the following pro- 
visions were made and carried into effect: 
(I) Either bank was to be represented by two of  its executive  officers, 
and three menibers of  its supervisory board on the supervisory board of  the 
other bank. 
(2)  For the  preliminary  consideration of  important  transactions  the 
supervisory board of  either bank was to elect from  its midst  a  standing 
committee, composed of  an equal number  of  members,  who  were  to be 
joined by two persons, normally executive officers, of  the other company. 
(3)  These two committees combined were to form a council of  delegates 
(Delegationsrat).  Aside from passing upon questions involving differences 
of  opinion, this council was to approve the provisional balance sheet  and 
profit-and-loss statement drawn up by each bank with the view of  arriving 
at  the joint profits, to pass upon the division of  the common fund, and par- 
ticularly to determine what sums were to be written off  or set aside for sur- 
plus funds before computing profits. 
The increase of  capital by either company was made dependent on the 
approval of  the council in the sense that any increase of  capital stock made 
by either bank without such approval was to be disregarded in apportioning 
the annual profits, and furthermore that such an increase  was to give to 
the other bank the right to withdraw from the agreement. 
It  was further agreed that whenever experience showed that a modifica- 
tion of  the terms of  the agreement became  necessary in any respect, any 
change was to be approved  by at least two-thirds of  all the members  of 
either supervisory board, in the same way, as  when the  original agreement 
was made. 
The community of  interest, as a matter of  fact, came to an end on Jan- 
uary I, 1909, although the annual report spoke only of  a "modification." 
"Provision was however made " for the continuation of  the existing inti- 
mate relations and the mutual representation on both boards under a new 
agreement. 
For data  regarding the  Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank, see noteZ8on  page 1016. 
[Founded in 1881.1 
Share capital, 80,000,ooo marks. 
Surplus, 13,220 om  niarks. 
Branches.-None. 
Commandites  (-.).-Erttel,  Freyberg  & Co.  in Leipzig  and,  since  1905, 
Born & Busse in Berlin. 
Deposit  ofices  (I-/).-Fourteen  in Berlin  and I each in Charlottenburg, 
Potsdam, and Steglitz. 
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Jointly  with  several  other  concerns  the  bank  founded  the following 
subsidiary companies (Tochtergesellschaften):29 
1889. The Deutsch-Asiatische  Bank.  (See p. 983.) 
1895. The Credito Italiano in Rome (share capital, 75,om,ooo lire), 
with 17 branches. 
Jointly with the Banque Nationale de Grbce, it  founded: 
1904. The  Banque  d'Orient  in  Athens  Ishare  capital,  ro,ooo,om 
francs);  branches in Saloniki and Smyrna. 
1905.  Jointly  with  the  Dresdner  Bank  and  the  A.  Schaaff- 
hausen'scher Bankverein, it founded the  Deutsche Orientbank 
Aktiengesellschaft  in  Berlin,  which  took  over  the former 
branches  of  the  Banqw &Orient  in  Hamburg  and  Con- 
~tantinople.~~  Deposit  offices,  3, including Stamboul and 
Pera.  Additional  branches  have  been  opened  in  Cairo, 
Alexandria,  Rrussa,  Kalamata,  Constantinople,  Saloniki, 
Smyrna, Tangier, and Casahlanca (share capital, 16,000,ooo 
niarks). 
Has a community of  interest since 1905 with the Deutsche Polastinabawk 
in Berlin (share capital, 5,ooo,ooo marks), founded in 1899, with 5 branches 
in Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Beirut, and Hamburg;  founded in turn as its 
subsidiary  (Tochtergesellschaft) the Levante-Kontor, G. m. b. H., with office 
in Constantinople. 
The Nationalbank fiir Deutschland absorbed the following banking firms: 
1898. Jacob Landau in Berlin. 
1904. S. Lange in Berlin. 
1907.  Corn & Busse in Berlin, which since 1905 was conducted as a 
conlmandite of  the bank in conjunction with of  her partners.31 
VIII. A. SCHAAPFHAUSEN'SCHER  BANKVEREIN,  IN COLOGNE-ON-THE-RHINE 
[Founded in 1848.1 
Share capital, 145,000,000  marks. 
Surplus, 34,157,125 marks. 
Branches  (~o).~~--Berlin  (since  1891), Bonn, Cleve, Crefeld, Duisburg, 
Dusseldorf, Neuss, Rheydt, Ruhrort, and Viersen. 
Commandite-Philipp  Elimeyer in Dresden, since 1898. 
Deposit ofices (15).--Cologne  (3),  Godesberg, Charlottenburg, Schoneberg, 
Potsdam,  Dulken,  Emmerich,  Grevenbroich,  Kempen,  Krefeld,  Moers, 
Odenkirchen, Wesel. 
Founded or took part in the founding of  the following subsidiary com- 
panies  (Tochtergesellschaf  ten)  .33 
1889. The Deutsch-Asiatische  Bank jointly with other domestic and 
foreign concerns.  (See p. 983.) 
1898. The  Banque  Internationale  de  Bruxelles  jointly  with  other 
concerns.  (See p. 442,  letter h.) National  Monetary  Commission 
1900.  The  Westfiilisch-Lippische Ilereinsbank,  A.-G.,  in  Bielefeld 
(share capital, 7,000,000  marks).  The latter has 4 branches, 
viz, in Detmold, Herford, Lemgo, Minden;  2 deposit offices, 
Oeynhausen and Rinteln on the Weser. 
It absorbed the following banking firms: 
1900. Katzenstein & Sohne, Bielefeld. 
1900. Gebruder Siekmann in Herford. 
-.  Salomon & Oppenheimer in Detmold and Lemgo. 
1904. Jointly with the Dresdner Bank, the Stock Company Speyr & 
Co. in Basle (share capital, ~g,ooo,ooo  francs). 
1905. Jointly  with  the Dresdner  Bank,  the Treuhand-Vereinigung, 
Akticngesellschaft, in Berlin (share captal, 1,000,000 marks). 
. Jointly  with the Dresdner  Bank  and the Nationalbank  fur 
Deutschland, the Deutsche  Orientbank, Akticngesellschaft,  in 
Berlin  (share capital, 16,000,000 marks), with branches in 
Constantinople and Hamburg, taken over from the Banque 
dlOrient, and additional branches  in Alexandria,  Brussa, 
Cairo, Kalamata, Saloniki, and Smyrna. 
1906.  Jointly  with  the  Dresdner  Bank, the  Deutsch-Siidamerika- 
nische  Bank, Aktiengesellschaft,  in  Berlin  (share  capital, 
2o,ooo,o00 marks).  (See p. 446.) 
The A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein absorbed the following banking 
firms and institutions: 
1903. The banking firm  A.  & L. Camphausen  in  Cologne-on-the- 
Rhine. 
1904. The  Westdeutsche  Bank,  formerly  Jonas  Calin,  in  Bonn 
(share  capital,  8,000,000  marks).  Originated  from  the 
transformation  in 1896 of  the bankingYirn1 Jonas Calm in 
Bonn,  and took over in  1898 the banking firm Solmitz & 
Cohen in Cologne-on-the-Rhine. 
1904.  The Niederrheinische  Kredit-Anstalt,  fornierly  Peters & Co., 
in Crefeld  (share  capital, 21,000,000 marks)  with  twelve 
branches, in Duisburg, Rheydt, Ruhrort, Neuss, Emmerich, 
Mors,  Grevenbroich, Odenkirchen,  Viersen,  Wesel, Cleve, 
and Kempen-on-the-Rhine. 
1904. Jointly  with  the  Dresdner  Bank, the  banking  house  von 
Erlanger & Siihne in Frankfort-on-the-Main.  (See p. 1001.) 
1908.  The banking firm Blumberg & Golln~ick  in Berlin. 
The A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein maintains colnmunity of  interest 
relations"  with the following institutions: 
I. Through ownership of  shares: 
(I) Since 1901 with the Pfalzische Bank in Ludwigshafen (share capital, 
5o,o00,000  marks).  Branches, 16, viz, in Alzey, Bamberg, Bensheim a. d. B., 
Darkheim  a.  d.  D.,  Frankenthal, Frankfort-on-the-Main,  Kaiserslautern, 
1,andau (Palatinate), Mannheim, Munich, Neustadt a. d. H.,  Nuremberg, 
Pirmasens, Speyer, Worms, and Zweibrucken.  Agencies, 4, viz, in Donau- 
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eschingen, Gemersheini, Grunstadt, and  Osthofen  (Rhenish  Hesse).  Ex- 
change  and deposit offices, I I, viz, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 4; Munich, 3 ; 
Lambrecht,  I ; Lampertheim,  I ; Landstuhl,  I.  Absorbed  the followinn 
banks and banking firms: 
1886. The Volksbank in Ludwigshafen. 
1894. The banking  firm Joh.  Franck in Worms on-the-Rhine;  the 
banking firm Louis Dacquk in Neustadt a. d. H. 
1895.  The Deutsche  Unionbank in Mannheim (founded in 1873 with 
a capital of  6,000,000 marks) and in Frankfort-on-the-Main, 
which in turn had absorbed the banking firm Gebr. Sonne- 
berg in Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
1896. The banking firm J. F. Haid in Speyer. 
1897.  The banking firm Muller & Weyland in Landau; the banking 
firm Earl Weyland in Landau; the banking firm Hermann 
Menner in Landau; the banking firm  Zweibrucker  Bank, 
Lehmann, Muller & Co., in Zweibrucken. 
1898. The bailking firm  Bloch & Co., in Munich and Nuremberg; 
the banking firm  Seb. Pichler's  sel. Erben in Munich:  the 
banking firm Reichard & Glaser in Frankenthal. 
1899. The  Vorschussverein  in  Bamberg; the  Vorschussverein  in 
Alzey . 
1900.  The banking firm Markus Levy in Worms-on-the-Rhine. 
The Volksbank in Bensheim. 
1908. The banking firni Barnch Bonn in Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
The Volhsbank in Germersheirn. 
(2)  Since 1903 with the Mittelrheinische Bank in Coblenz (share capital, 
20,000,000  marks).  Branches, 3, viz, in Duisburg,  hleiderich,  and Metz. 
The Mittelrheinische Bank maintains community of  interest relations with 
the following institutions: 
The Mull~imer  Bank in Mulheim-on-the-Ruhr,  founded  in 1889 with a 
share capital of  9,ooo,ooo marks (number of  branches, 3, viz., in Hamborn, 
Oberhausen, and Sterkrade); the Dorstener  Bank in Dorsten, and the Mar- 
kischcr Bar~kverein  in Gcvelsberg. 
A director of  the A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein and a former direc- 
tor of  the Bankvcrein, at present a director of  the Rheinische Bank, have 
joined the supervisory board of  the Alittclrl~inische  Rank. 
(3)  Since 1905 with the Ostbank fur  Handel und Gewerbe in Posen, a con- 
stituent of  the Darmstadter Bankgroup (see p. 984, No. 2), with a share capi- 
tal of  18,000,ooo marks, which absorbed in 1905 the Ostdeutsche Bank vo?m. 
J. Simon Ww. 6'  Sohne (share capital, ~o,mo,ooo  marks), with which the 
A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  liad  been  maintaining  community  of 
interest relations. 
11. By agreement: 
The  A. Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  maintained  a  community  of 
interest with the  Dresdner  Bank  from  1903 to January I, 1909.  (The 
tenor of  the earlier agreement is stated above on p.  1003 under the head of National  Monetary  Commission 
the Dresdner Bank )  Since then as a result of  a new underst'lndlng  there 
exist  merely  "intimate buslness  relation<"  whlch  find expression  in the 
fact that "prov~sion  has been made for the mutual representation on the 
supervisory boards of  elther institution " 
APPENDIX  VIII. 
PROGRESS  OF  CONCENTRATION  WITHIN  EACH  OF  THE 
GREAT  BANKS  AND  WITHIN  THE  BANKS  ALLIED  WITH 
THEM  (KONZERNBANKEN) 
Data for the ezght Berlzn great banks 
End of  year- 
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Datajor the etght  Berlzn great banks-Continued 
TABLE  4 --Commerz-  und Dzsconto-Bank 
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TABLE  5 -Deutsche  Ranh 
End of  year- 









Data for  each of  the great banks. 
T~BLE  2 -Darmstadter  Bank. 
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Data for  the ezght  Berlzn great banks-Contmued 
TABLE  8 -Natzonalbank  fur  Deutschland 
TABLE  9 -A  Schaaffhauscnscher Bankverezn  5" 
End of year- 
Iii the subsequent table (10) a comprehensive picture of  the progress of 
concentration is glven for those prov~nclal  banks which are allied mth one 
of  the five Berlin great banks, each of  nhich, as we saw, is at  the head of  a 
bank group 
The 41  banks which are part of  the commun~ty  of  interest systems of  the 
great banks-the  so-called Konzernbnnken, exclusive of  subsidiary banks 
(Tochterbanken)-show the following development 







BANK)  59 
I  Breslauer Dlscontohank 
z Ostbank  fur  Handel  und 
Gewerbe 
3  Nordwestdeutsche Bank 






I  Berg~sch  Markrsche Bank 
z Schleslscher Bankvereln 
3  Hannoversche Bank 
(a)  Osnabrucker Bank 
(b)  Hlldeshelmcr Bank 
4  Du~sburg  Ruhrorter Bank 
5  Essener Kredltanstalt 
6  S~egener  Bank  fur  Handel 
und Gem erbe 
7  Sachslsche Bank 
8  Essencr Bankvereln 
g  Oldenburglsche  Spar  und 
Lelhbank 
ro  Cmder Bank 
11  Prlvatbank zu  Gotha 
12 Mecklenburger Hypotheken 
U  Wechselbank  wlth the 
Mecklenburs~sche  Spar 
bank 
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2  Rhe~n~sche  Bank  4 
3  Oberschles~sche  Bank 
4 Wurttemberglsche ~andesbank  2 
5  Oldenburgrsche Landesbank  8 
6 Mecklenburglsche Bank  I 
(a) Rostocker  Gewerbe- 
bank, Akt~enpesell- 
schaft 
(b) N  e uvorpommer'sche 
Spar- und  Kred~t- 
bank 
7  Landgrafl  Hess~sche  konzess 
Landesbank  a 
8  Schwarzburg~sche  ~andesbank  6 
I  Pfalzische Bank  I  6 
2  M~ttelrhe~n~sche  Rank, wlth the  3 
Mulhelmer I3ank  3 
Total  ....  241 
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NOTES  TO  APPENDICES  V11 AND  V111 
I  In alphabetical  order  The amounts of  share capital and surplus, 
unless otherwise specified, are as per Dec  31, 1908 
2  In the case of  commandites,  i  e  firms in which a bank has a silent- 
partnership interest, account is taken here of  the commandite interests in 
banking firms 
3  No account is taken of  institutions such as the Bank fur Brauindustrie 
(founded  in 1899, share capital 7,000,000 marks) which are financing insti- 
tutions, but not banks proper, for the same reason no mention is made of 
the Suddeutsche Bodenkreditbank in Munich, founded in 187 I by the Bank 
fur Handel und  Industrie, which is represented on its supervisory board, 
and of  the Suddeutsche Immobiliengesellschaft in Mainz, on the supervisory 
board of  which the parent bank is likewise represented 
4  In the beginning of  1906 the two institutions, with the cooperation of 
the administration of  the royal private fortune, transformed the Konigliche 
Wurttembergische Hofbank, hitherto conducted  as a partnership  (offene 
Handelsgesellschaft), into a limited  company with an original  capital  of 
~o,ooo,m  marks  In 1908 the three institutions jointly  transformed the 
banking firm Doertenbachels in Stuttgart into a limited company with an 
original  capital  of  4,000,ooo  marks  In  1908  the  Lyurttembergische 
Vereinsbank  took over+ the banking firm Schlack & Fritsch in Aalen 
5  In addition a premium of  IV  per cent, equal to 2,500,000 marks, has 
been paid in, which constitutes part of  the legally prescribed  surplus 
6  This  bank  originated  from  a  transformation  of  the  banking  firm 
Hincke, Bluthe  &  Meininghaus and  had  branches in Blumenthal  (Han- 
nover), Dortmund, Osnabruck, and Vegesack 
7  According to its balance  sheet as per  Mar  31,  1905, the Bayerische 
Bank  had  a  capital of  9,ooo,ooo marks  and a  surplus  of  76,210  marks 
(13,044 marks of  reserve) when the firm was transformed into the Bayer- 
ische Bank fur Handel und Industrie  The capital was reduced to 8,000,000 
marks by an exchange of  stock at the rate of 9 old shares for 8 new ones 
The  ~,m,ooo  thus sct free,  together  with  the existing  surplus and the 
undivided profits for the period Apr  I to Dec  31, 1905, was used to form 
the new surplus and to cover losses to be written off  With the change 
of  firm the business  year was changed to conform with  the calendar  year 
period  In the general meeting of Nov  20, 1905, the capital was raised by 
rn,m,ooo marks, so that at present it amounts to 20,000,000 marks  Of 
the 12,000,000 marks of  new shares  ~,ooo,ooo  were taken over at the rate 
of  I 10 per cent by the Darmstadter  Bank, 6,m,o00  were  used in taking 
over the good will of  the firm Gutleben & Weidert, while 5,000,000 serve to 
strengthen the operating resources of  the bank 
8.  No  account is taken in this connection of  the enterprise founded in 
1904-5  under the firm  name of  the Deutsche-Kolonial-Eisenbahnbau-und 
Betriebsgesellschaft  Its object is the construction  and operation in the 
German colonies of  railroads, minor railways, and harbor facilities.  Since National  Monetary  Commission 
Apr. I, 1905, this company has been  operating as a lessee the Usambara 
Railroad in German East Africa;  in 1905 it commenced, for account of  the 
Imperial  Government, the construction of  the Luderitzbucht-Kubub Rail- 
way (about 130 km.) in German Southwest Africa.  Neither is any account 
taken  here  of  the Bank  fiir  deutsche  Eisenbahnwerte,  founded in  1906 
(capital  ~o,m,ooo  marks,  of  which  25  per  cent  was  paid  in;  bonds, 
~,WO,OOO  marks). 
9.  No  account is taken here of  the Bank fur Bergbau und Industrie, the 
shares of  which are partly owned by the Commerz-und Disconto-Bank, for 
the reason that the former is a financing company. 
10. The  Munich branch  opened  in  1906 deposit offices in hfunicli and 
Augsburg, while taking over the banking firm BBhler & Heymann in Munich 
and  Augsburg;  the Dresden  branch  opened  in  1907  a  deposit  office  in 
Meissen, and in 1908 one in Radeberg  (Saxony). 
11. The former comrnandite  Guillermo Vogel  8~ Co. in  Madrid has been 
transformed into a branch of  the Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank (see supra. 
P  439). 
12. No  account  is  taken  here  of  institutions,  such  as  the  Bank  fiir 
elektrische Unternehmungen in Zurich, founded  in 1895 with a capital of 
33,000,0o0 francs, and the Bank fiir orientalische  Eisenbahnen in Zurich, 
founded in 1896 with a share capital of  50,000,ooo  francs,  both of  them 
being financing institutions and not banks proper. 
13. In addition  the Deutsche  Bank  undertook  the liquidation  of  the 
Berliner  Bankverein  (1875)  and  of  the  Deutsche  Unionbank  (1876), 
taking over at  the same time their customers.  See Deutscher Oekonomist, 
Tan. 27,  1906;  vol. 24,  No. 1205, p. 35  With reference to the La Plata 
Bank, see above pp. 423 and 433. 
14. With reference to the acquisition of  shares, a notable instance is the 
taking over of  about 3,000,000 marks of  newly issued shares of  the Anhalt- 
Dessauische Landesbank of  Dessau in 1905, the capital stock of  which was 
increased  by this issue  to  12,000,000 marks (see p. 993, sub. a).  In 1906 
the shares of  the Braunschweigische Privatbank and of  the Wurttember- 
gische Vereinsbank  were newly acquired, while the share holdings  in the 
Niederlausitzer Kredit-und  Sparbank were increased. 
15. The firm of David Daniel, of  Celle, which had formerly been a com- 
mandite of  the Hannoversche  Bank, was  made a  branch  of  that bank, 
which relinquished  its commandite interests in the firms of  Menz,  Bloch- 
mann & Co., Dresden; H.  J. Kledwig & Reibstein, Gottingen; and Keibstein 
& Co., Munden. 
16. The  Duisburg-Ruhrorter  Bank  became  a  branch  of  the  Essener 
Kreditanstalt in the middle of  1909 
17. The Deutsche Bank in 1904 (effective Jan. I, 1905) took over a new 
stock issue of  ~,ooo,ooo  marks (nominal) of  the Oldenburgische Spar- und 
Leihbank.  Unlike the old shares, these have not thus far been listed on 
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18. Under  the  direction  of  the  Mecklenburgische  Hypotheken-und 
Wechselbank, there was founded  in 1906 the Mecklenburgische Treuhand- 
gesellschaft m. b. H. (share capital, ~,ooo,ooo  marks), with office  in Schwerin. 
19. Among stock acquisitions for the last few years we mention 300,000 
marks nominal of  new shares of  the Geestemunder Bank, in 1906-an  issue 
by which the capital of  this bank was increased  to  1,300,000 marks, and 
300,000 marks of  shares of  the Bayerische Bodenkreditanstalt of  Wurzburg. 
20.  The Mannheini  branch  in 1906 opened  a  deposit office in Freiburg 
i. B., which took the place of  the firm of  Ed. Kauffmann &Fehr, acquired 
by it. 
21.  We disregard  here institutions, which the Dresdner Bank  helped  to 
organize, such as the Bank fur orientalische Eisenbahnen in Zurich, or the 
Zentralbank  fur Eisenbahnwerte in Berlin, capital stock 6,000,cmo  marks, 
these being  financing institutions, but not banks proper.  For the  same 
reason  we  ignore the General  Mining  and Finance  Corporation Limited, 
of  London, capital ~I,~~o,ooo,  an institution in which the Dresdner Bank 
is heavily interested. 
22.  For an account of  the Deutsche Orientbank founded jointly  by the 
Dresdner Bank, the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein, and the National- 
bank, see p.  1005 under the head of  Nationalbank fur Deutschland. 
23.  The permanent investments in the stock of  the Eisenbahnbank, and 
the  Eisenbahnrentenbank  of  Frankfort-on-the-Main  are  here  ignored, 
as these are financing institutions, but not banks proper. 
24.  See above note 20.  In addition, the  Dresdner Bank in  1906  took 
over  all  the  assets  of  the  Zwickauer  Gewerbebank,  which  went  into 
liquidation. 
25.  I assume  that there exists at least an agreement of  regulating the 
mutual relations of  the Dresdner and the affiliated banks, numbered 5 to 
8, inclusive. 
26.  In 1905  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks additional  stock was issued,  raising  the 
former  capitalization  to  21,000,000  marks.  Of  the  new  issue  the  A. 
Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  took  6,000,000  at par  as a  permanent 
participation.  At the same time on July I, 1905, it handed over the busi- 
ness of  its branch  in Essen  to the Rheinische Bank.  A  former  director 
of  the  A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  took  over  the  management 
of  the Rheinische Bank and,members of  the board of  managers (Vorstands- 
mitglieder)  of  the  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein  took  seats  on  the 
supervisory board of  the Rheinische Bank, as did also the chairman of  the 
supervisory board  of  the hlittelrheinische Bank.  The Rheinische  Bank 
in turn took over in 1906 2,000,000 marks nominal of  stock of  the Bank- 
verein Gelsenkirchen of  Gelsenkirchen  (with a branch in Wattenscheidt), 
in the establishment of  which it had shared. 
27.  The banks,  numbered  5 to 8,  may perhaps  better be  regarded as 
affiliated with the Dresdner  Bank by contract rather than through stock 
ownership.  In the case of  these banks the community of  interest is based  the stock exchange National  Monetary  Commission 
- 
for  the time being  on permanent  stock holdings  of  the Dresdner  Bank, 
and not upon the mutual exchange of  stock. 
28.  The  Mitteldeutsche  Kreditbank,  Frankfort-on-the-Main,  founded 
1856,  capital  stock  (since  1905)  54,000,000  marks;  surplus  (approxi- 
mately),  6,400,000 marks.  It  has 6 branches,  located as follows: Berlin, 
Essen,  Fiirth,  Giessen,  Nuremberg,  VJiesbaden,  and  3  commandites- 
Meyer & Diss, Baden-Baden, the Kommanditgesellschaft Bernard  Wein- 
mann,  Munich, and Weiss Herz  & Co.,  Mayence.  Since  1899 it opened 
22  deposit  offices  (13 in Berlin  and Charlottenburg,  I  in Pankow,  4 in 
Frankfort-on-the-Main, I  in Hochst,  I  each in Marburg, Offenbach, and 
Wetzlar.  It  has 2  agencies (in Budingen and Butzbach).  It  has absorbed 
the following firms: 
1898, B. Berl6, IViesbaden. 
1899, S. Pflaum & Co., Nuremberg & Furth. 
1906, Arthur Andreae & Co., Frankfort-on-the-Main;  Aron  Heichel- 
heim, Giessen;  Moritz Heertz, Wetzlar;  Hermann Wertheim, Marburg. 
1907, North,  Kammeier  & Co.,  Essen  (formerly  a  commandite  of 
the Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank). 
1909, Otto Goebel, Fulda  (acquired  to  serve  as a  deposit  office). 
Gebr. Fiirth & Co.,  Hanau (acquired to serve as a branch). 
In  conjunction  with  the  Disconto-Gesellschaft,  the  Allgemeine 
Deutsche Kreditanstalt, and the former banking firm of  B. M.  Strupp 
of  Meiningen (see p. 996), the Mitteldeutsche Kreditanstalt established 
as a subsidiary the Bank fur Thuringen formerly B. M. Strupp A. G., 
Meiningen (share  capital  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks, of  which  5,000,000 marks 
were paid in.)  The latter has twelve branches (in Eisenach, Franken- 
hausen,  Gotha,  Hildburghausen, Jena, Neustadt  (Orla),  Ruhla, Sal- 
zungen,  Saalfeld,  Sonneberg, Apolda, and Possneck.  It  has absorbed 
the former Meiningen  branch of  the Mitteldeutsche  Kreditbank, the 
banking firms B.  M.  Strupp and Hermann Lobe at Meiningen  (the 
latter since January  I, 1~06),  also the banking firms J. G. Bohme & 
Sohn at Apolda, and Richard Eberlein at Possneck. 
29.  No account is taken here of  the Bank fur elektrische Unternehmungen 
in Zurich, founded in 1895 with the cooperation of  the Nationalbank. 
30.  In the same year  (1905)  the  Wiener Bankverein  opened a branch 
in Constantinople. 
31.  In 1907  the Nationalbank  took  over  the clientele  of  the dissolved 
firm Strauss, Thalmessinger & Co. in Berlin. 
32.  The former  branch  in  Essen  passed  over  since July  I,  1905,  to 
the Rheinische Bank (see p.  1015, note 26). 
33. No account is taken here of  institutions such as  the Bank fiir Deutsche 
Ei~ei~bahnwerte  (share  capital,  ~o,ooo,ooo  marks),  founded  by  the  A. 
Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein in conjunction with other concerns,  the 
former being a financing institution, but not a bank proper. 
34.  See above p.  1015, note 26, regarding the relations of  the A. Schaaff- 
hausen'scher  Bankverein to the Rheinische Bank. 
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35.  No  account is taken here of the German oversea banks, nor of the 
mortgage and brokers'  banks.  Institutions in which several great banks 
participate are counted in the table only once. 
36. Moreover 6 agencies; no branches in foreign countries. 
37. The deposit office in Rostock has been taken over by the Vereins- 
bank in IVismar. 
38.  The  Bucharest  commandite  has  been  transformed (in 1904-5)  into 
a stock company, but does not figure in the table for the reason that it is a 
foreign bank.  A new commandite, Fuld & Co., in Pforzheim, was founded 
in 1905; the commandite in Dresden, on the other hand, was relinquished 
in 1905. 
39.  No  account is taken here of  the permanent participations in foreign 
stock companies:  The IVechselstuben-Aktiengesellschaft  Merkur, in Vienna, 
the Banca Marmorosch Blank &Co., in Bucharest, and the Bankers' Trading 
Syndicate, in London. 
40.  No account is taken here of the permanent participation in the Lon- 
don andHanseatic Bank (19,302 shares, at  £10, paid in, equal to £193,ozo), 
the latter being a foreign company. 
41.  Moreover an agency in London. 
42.  Moreover two commandites in foreign countries of  which no account 
is taken here. 
43.  Account is taken only of participations in the shape of  stock owner- 
ship (see above, p. 988 et seq.).  No  account is taken in this and  the other 
tables of  communities of interest, concluded in turn by each of  the 13 allied 
banks (Konzernbanken).  The former are shown on p. 1011 and for each of 
the bank groups in Table 10,  last column.  Neither is any account taken of 
the participation  in the Zentralamerika-Bank  Aktiengesellschaft,  although 
it has its main office in Berlin. 
44.  Moreover an agency in London. 
45.  One commandite in a foreign country. 
46.  No  account is taken of  the  stock participation  in the  Rheinisch- 
Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft. 
47.  Moreover an agency in London. 
48.  No account is taken of  the stock participation in the Eisenbahnbank 
and Eisenbahnrentenbank  in  Frankfort-on-the-Main, which  are financing 
institutions but  not  banks proper, nor of the stock  participation in the 
foreign stock company, Speyr & Co., in Basle, etc.  Neither do the figures 
include  the stock participations in the Orientbank and in the Deutsch- 
Sudamerikanische Bank, though the latter has its central office at Berlin. 
49.  No  account  is  taken  of  the stock  participation  in the  Deutsche 
Orientbank, although the latter has its main office in Berlin. 
50.  The communities  of  interest entered into by the absorption of  the 
banking house von Erlanger & Sohne (see above p. 1001, sub. a-  d) have 
been enumerated under the head of  the Dresdner  Bank, which took them 
over  jointly  with  the A.  Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein.  No account is 
taken here of  the stock ownership  in the Deutsche Orientbank and the 
Deutsch-Siidamerikanische Bank. Natiofial  Monetary  Commission 
51  The branch  Essen has been dropped (taken over by the Rheinische 
Banh) 
52  'lhe  Darnlstader  Bank group Includes also the domestic subsidiary 
company, Wurttembergische B ~nkanstalt  vornl  Pflaum & CO ,  which has a 
contractual communitv of  interest with the 1% urttemberg~sche  Verelnsbank 
53  In 1905  the Ostbark fur  Handel  und  Ge~lerbe  absorbed  the Ost- 
deutsche Bank vorm  J  Sinlon \i  we  & Sohne in Konigsberg  The latter 
had 2 branches and had absorbed  2 private banking firms 
54  No account IS taken here of  domestic subsidiary companies (Tochter- 
gesellschaften)  doing  buslness  within  the country and  belonging  to the 
Deutsche  Bank group, vi~,  the Deutsche Treuhand  Gesellschaft and the 
Braunschweiger  Prlvatbank  Aktiengesellschaft  in Brunswick  founded in 
1905 by the Hannoversche (Osnabrucker und Hlldesheimer) Bank through 
the transformation of  the banking firm Ludwig Peters Nachf 
55  The Oberrl~einische  Bank (vorm  Kosier 8:  CO ), taken over in 1904 
by  the  Rheinische  Kreditbank,  had  9  branches,  2  commandites,  one 
deposit offlce  had absorbed 6 priv~te  banking iirms, and jointly  with the 
Deutsche Bank had a community of  interest through stock ownership with 
the Suddeutsche Bank in Mannheim 
56  The  Rheinisch Westfallsche  Dlsconto Gesellschaft  (share  capital 
80,000,ooo  marks)  IS no longer included  among the Disconto Gesellschaft 
group  At the end of  December, 1905, it had 14 branches, 2 commandites, 
3 deposit offices, had absorbed  2  private banking firms and 7 banks, and 
has communities of  interest through stock omnership with 5 other banks 
The Disconto Gesellschaft  group has been augmented by  the accession  of 
the following domestlc  subsidiary cornpantes  The Bayerlsche  Dlsconto- 
und IVechselbank  in Nuremberg with  3  branches and 4  deposit  offices, 
whlch has absorbed 5 private banklng firms (see p 995)  the Bank fur Thu- 
ringen vorm  B  M  Strupp, Aktiengesellschaft in Meiningen, whlch has 8 
branches and in turn has absorbed 4 private banking firms as well as the 
Meiningen branch  of  the Mitteldeutsche Kredltbank (see  p  996)  and the 
Revisions  und  Vermogens-Verwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft in Berlin  with 
2 branches  (see ibid ) 
57  The  Dresdner  Bank group comprises  also the domestic subsidiary 
company  Treuhand-Vereinigung, Aktiengesellschaft, in Berlin (see p 1000) 
The Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank  Sorgel, Parrisius & CO,  taken over by 
the Dresdner Bank, had absorbed 2 prlvate banking firms (see above, p 1000) 
58  The Ostdeutsche Banh vorm  J  Sirrion \\'we  & Sohne in konlgsberg 
(which had 2  branches and had absorbed 2  banking firms), taken over in 
1905  by the Ostbank fur Handel und  Gewerbe in Posen  (which belongs 
to the Darmstadter Bank group) no longer belongs to the A Schaaffhausenl- 
scher Bankverein group  The Ostbank fur Handel und Gewerbe belongs now 
simultaneously to the Darmstadter  Bank and to the Bankverein groups 
59  The smaller  number of  communltles  of  interest (16 instead  of  20, 
given as per Dec ,  1904, on p  2 I I of  the first edition of  this work) is accounted 
for by  the elimination of  the 6 comlnunitles of  interest  of  the Rheimsch- 
Westfallsche Disconto-Gesellschaft and the accession of  two new ones 
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